Does more Feminism mean less Nationalism?

The Relationship Between Feminism and Nationalism in Peacetime-Serbia

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Abstract

This research explores the extent of feminism and nationalism in peacetime Serbia and also the correlation between. Theories suggest these two systems of thought to be incompatible with each other, even exclusive. If someone is in fact a supporter of nationalist ideas, it is unlikely for this person to also have feminist sympathies. Insights obtained by reviewing and analyzing existing national data on how much support the Serbian people have for nationalist and feminist ideas gives an understanding of to what point the ideologies are widespread across the country. A field study in Belgrade, composed by surveys and interviews, has also been conducted to examine the validity of the alleged negative correlation between the two systems of thought. The research ultimately reveals, on the national level, higher percentage of respondents being against both feminist and nationalist ideas than in favor of them. On the local Belgrade level, the study highlights the reoccurring incident of participants shown indecisive of their opinions towards either system of thought. Simultaneously, aforementioned theories were proven likely valid since results from the local surveys in Belgrade yet showed an incompatibility of participants being both feminist and nationalist at the same time.

Key words: feminism, gender, nationalism, Serbia, correlation,

Words: 8344
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This includes my loving grandparents, to whom I dedicate this thesis.
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1 Introduction

1.1 Background

Nationalism and feminism are two systems of thought articulated across left and right spectrums that have a high level of political and ideological relevance in today’s world. Currently, extreme right-wing parties are gaining more and more popularity across Europe, while gender equality is becoming more developed, or at least receiving more attention, than it has been in the past. A deeper understanding of how these two political concepts relate to one another is necessary due to their contemporary relevance, which fulfills this study’s requirement of being significant to society (Teorell & Svensson, 2012, p. 18). Is there room for a modern feminist-thinker in a society dominated by a nationalistic atmosphere? Does the latter necessarily preclude feminism, as some theories suggest?

With this thesis I look for an answer to these questions, using the country of Serbia as a case study. The ethnic war-conflicts in the early 90s in the Balkans made this country a fitting choice to study since it is the most recent European example of extreme nationalism and gendered violence in war. Serbia is now in a post-conflict state and still holds a social environment where the population’s views on nationalism and gender roles can be clearly identified. The highly debated Gay Pride-parade in Belgrade stands as an example of this, being cancelled year after year due to lack of support from common citizens and because of violent threats made by the extreme right. My inspiration for this thesis-topic coincided with the cancellation, once again, of the parade in fall 2013 by the Serbian government.

Looking at Serbia from the outside, it is easy to draw a simplistic picture of a primitive country characterized by suppression and inequality across several dimensions. The reality, however, is, as always, more multifaceted than that. On at least the legacy-making level, laws and policy frameworks exist against discrimination seeking to improve women’s rights and achieving gender equality (LegislationOnline, 2009). In 2013, the relatively high percentage of 33% women hold seats in the Serbian parliament (Worldbank, 2013), and there is an equal representation of boys and girls enrolled in Serbian schools and universities (Statistical Office
of the Republic of Serbia, 2011, p. 114). Though the implementation of such legislation and the lack authority that the female parliament-members have, have both been questioned and criticized, it must however be considered as a step in the right direction. There are educated girls and boys with equal legislative opportunities, and as such an equal official ability to impact on their society, which indicates the significance of problematizing what might be considered highly nationalist and anti-feminist opinions amongst the Serbian people.

1.2 Research Objective

This research’s purpose is to study how feminism and nationalism co-exist in a country of allegedly visible traditional gender structures and nationalist sympathies. The first step is to record public opinions on these two systems of thought, by reviewing reports and statistics on the subject that may show certain structures. The second step will be to clarify the correlation between feminist and nationalist sympathies. This will ultimately show if feminist tendencies, that aim to break free from strict gender roles, lead to less nationalist support. The empirical knowledge that this study will result in should be able to validate or dismiss existing theories that describe the relationship between the two systems of thought.

1.3 Research Questions

"Does more feminism mean less nationalism?" is this thesis’s central research question.

With a hope of finding an answer to the above question, the following features will be investigated:

- What is the extent of feminist and nationalist sympathies (support) in Serbia?
- What is the correlation between feminist and nationalist sympathies?
2 Theory

In this section I present my theoretical framework that incorporates definitions and theoretical conflicts used for the research, and highlights them in a Serbian context.

2.1 Definitions and theoretical conflicts

According to feminist theories, the conflict between nationalism and feminism is rooted in how “successful nationalisms depend on mobilizing particular gender identities, and gender takes particular forms in specific national settings.” (Code, 2000, p.359). With clear gendered concepts of what makes someone a man and what makes someone else a woman, “nationhood” can be constructed (Yuval-Davies, 1997, p. 1). This standpoint represents the core of the main problem between these two systems of thought. Nationalisms, like right-wing movements uphold gender roles and oppose feminisms because feminisms questions gender roles, thus dissolving the idea of heteropatriarchal families (Brzuzy & Lind, 2007, p. 498). In trying to comprehend nationalism, one must take into consideration that it is a political space, which allegedly to a large part is reserved for men only; Spyros (1996, p. 75) elaborates on this idea, being one of many who claims that nationalist movements’ views on their nation are based on the fact that they are seeing it as “a male community, in which women are represented as symbols, boundaries or reproducers of the nation”.

These perspectives that focus on feminism and nationalism as two exclusive systems of thought form the main theory that this thesis will test. The logic that these theories develop is clear; to achieve gender-equality, which is the main idea behind the different forms of feminism, will be problematic if the upholding of gender-roles and permanent structures is the norm with nationalism. Holding to the belief that nationalism is gendered to the point where a woman is before all the identity of a nation, rather than an action-taking individual, enhances the woman’s role as a passive stereotype (Peterson & Runyan, 2010, p. 91).
The male-dominant nationalist movement parallels to the equally male-dominated militarism (Kronsell, 2012, chapter 2), which shares the same importance of constructing what a “nation” is and who is, or is not, part of it. This kind of “Othering” procedure is yet again not in harmony with the values of gender equality. The specific national gendered identities forced forward by such Othering are by Kronsell detected as the masculine “neutral soldier” and the feminine “mother” (2012, chapter 1).

In the dictionary, (Dictionary Reference, 2013) a definition of the word feminism is:”the doctrine advocating social, political, and all other rights of women equal to those of men”. A feminist does not necessarily in this sense have to be an activist who is ideologically aware and labels him or herself as a “feminist”, but merely a person who recognizes the importance of gender equality and strives for it. This is furthermore a reason to why this thesis does not attempt to refer to feminism as a strict theoretical ideology, but rather a system of thought which may incorporate many different aspects of the feminist spectrum. In the feminism-survey used for this research, feminism is measured to the largest part in relation to one’s openness to defying gender roles. Thus the continuous definition and focus of feminism in this study will be in accordance to this opinion-based approach, rather than a mapping of a current situation of gendered inequality.

2.2 The Serbian context

For my research, I will focus on the country of Serbia as a case study, which will be further discussed in this thesis’s Method & Material-part. One way in which the nationalist tendencies may exist in 2013’s Serbia is in the prevalence of different identity-shaping factors that were as relevant during wartime as they are today. One of these is the romanticized masculinity of Serbian nationalist movements. During the Milosevic era, the ideal of a masculinist people emerged in which any opponent was regarded as “unmanly” (Spyros, 1996, p.80). This specific kind of restructuring of the national identity is of course problematic for feminist movements. Another vital element of Serbian nationalism is its focus on history, where Kosovo in particular holds a highly symbolic value of what the true core of Serbian identity is (Spyros, 1996, p.81). Racioppi and O’Sullivan See (Gender, nation, identity 2005, p. 26) call this the importance of territory-origins, and add to it the dimension of religion, another helping factor when it comes to identity-shaping of a people. This is of
high importance since defined personal and collective comprise the core of nationalism (2005, p. 22).

Attempts to explore the Balkan wars have focused on nationalism’s impact on women and the occurrence of sexual violence. What I wish to focus on in this thesis is whether, in peacetimes, nationalism still functions as an antipode to feminism because it emphasizes holding on to traditional and unequal gender structures. Cynthia Enloe, a feminist researcher, has formulated theoretical assumptions, which center around the fact that nationalism can in fact never be in favour of women in any way, and that gender relations that have existed during wartimes will simply be practiced in a new fashion in peacetimes (Sylvester, 2013, p. 25). So if Serbia is indeed a highly nationalist country today, this leaves the fight for gender equality in a rather static position. Enloe further puts emphasis on the fact that nationalism, in whichever time, will continue to be male-dominated and will “rarely if ever take women’s experiences as a point of departure, the rallying cry” (Sylvester, 2013, p.42). This is in accordance with Spyros’s aforementioned theory about nationalism being a male community.

On the subject of feminism, reports from the Genderbarometer for Serbia from UN Women in 2012 show how gender inequality is portrayed in different ways in the country. It also shows how attitudes about certain traditional gendered roles are deeply rooted in the population. Nevertheless, a key argument that the authors of the Genderbarometer make is that “The straightening of certain (quasi) traditional and patriarchal values in the public discourse, expressed through acceptance of right-wing ideologies or extreme nationalism, is not simply transferred to the micro level, especially not to the level of actual behaviour.” This would entail that the nationalist political environment that currently characterizes Serbia, is not something that should be visible when looking into the attitudes of individual citizens.

The separation between nationalism in public discourse and nationalism on the micro level is controversial. This is a sub-theory that this thesis will aim to validate or dismiss. Can a separation like that really be made? And how does it affect feminism in the country, holding the belief that more nationalism leads to stricter gender roles? These are related questions that I hope to gain insight into through my material, even though they are not the main focus. My hope is that the findings of my thesis will have an explanatory nature, mapping the situation of these opinions in peacetime Serbia. I also hope that it will serve as a theory-testing case study that puts the concepts of Enloe, Kronsell and Spyros and the other mentioned theorists to the test, where the results can be generalized and attributed to other countries and cases as well.
3 Methods and Material

In order to find an answer to the thesis’s main research-question, whether more feminist sympathies mean being less prone to support nationalisms, my method will be a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis that will use Serbia as a case study.

3.1 Case study

Deciding on having Serbia as a case study for this project is a choice that falls under the categorization of “relevant, important cases” (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, p. 222) since it is a country where tendencies of nationalist behaviour and traditional gender structures are more clearly projected than in, for example, Sweden. My research was conducted in Belgrade, but I am also incorporating national statistics which concern all of Serbia. The Balkan wars in the 1990s are also the most recent European example of what can happen when nationalism is allowed to grow to distressing proportions. In the former Yugoslavian states it came to a peak that resulted in ethnic cleansing, genocide and sexual violence. Today, Serbia’s government is under the rule of the Slobodan Milosevic’s former party, the Socialist Party, known for sharing sympathies with the nationalist movement. The fact that such a party has been democratically elected and supported by a majority of the Serbian people, together with explicitly extreme right-wing parties such as the Radical Party, shows how tendencies of nationalism may still be present today.

3.2 National data

For measuring the part of extent of feminist and nationalist values amongst Serbian citizens, the material came from existing local statistics and reports that measured such sympathies. One source of statistics and data for this thesis is presented in the aforementioned
Genderbarometer from 2012. It is a research project on gender relations in Serbia and has been presented in association with UN Women. The Genderbarometer was written by Dr. Marina Blagojevic Hughson, a professor from Belgrade University with an extensive international background in gender studies. This study’s second major source comes from Serbia’s Equality Commission, which conducted a public opinion research on Serbian citizen’s attitudes on discrimination in late 2012. This research will be referred to in this study simply as “The Discrimination-report”.

Gender Equality on a Local Level (Babovic-Suboticki, 2013) is the result of a European Union-funded project, conducted by the Serbian Development Initiative Group Secons. Secons works together with several local organizations in the Former Yugoslav Republics and also Sweden, in order to collect data and analysis on issues of social development.

Besides being issued by acknowledged researchers and validated by upper-level administrations, these three reports have in common that they have all been made in the last year (2012-2013). By that they offer the most current data that can be found for this study.

The Genderbarometer (2012), The Discrimination-report (2012) and Gender Equality on a Local Level (2013) all contain quantitative data that is relevant for mapping the situation on these issues in Serbia. Their results and my analysis of them will form the base for this thesis’s qualitative method. Though studies have indeed been done on gender structures and on nationalism in Serbia (the latter mainly figuring in the Discrimination-report), the two have never been researched simultaneously, which I believe will bring a needed dimension to the already existing material. The data that can be found in the reports shows that there are certain structures of feminism and nationalism in the Serbian society, but not what the possible correlation is between the two.

3.3 Surveys

With the aim of connecting information on feminism with that of nationalism, one part of my methodological approach was to conduct a Feminism questionnaire-survey as well as a Nationalism questionnaire-survey in Belgrade between the dates of November 14 and November 23, 2013. By using surveys, the method used also takes a shift from qualitative to quantitative (Teorell & Svensson, 2012, p. 264 -265)
The reason for conducting these surveys was to measure the correlation of these two concepts from randomly chosen citizens. The surveys are constructed in such a way that they are respondent surveys, meaning that they aim to collect the thoughts and opinions of the people who answer them. Determining how common certain ideas are with different people aligns with the purpose of my thesis since my focus is to measure the tendencies of nationalist and feminist sympathies, as well as how they correlate with each other. (Esaiasson and others, 2012, p. 229). With the results of these two surveys I will make cross tab analysis, which will ultimately show what the relationship is between nationalist and feminist opinions among a selection of the Serbian people. With the results of such analysis, it will become clearer if perhaps stronger nationalism entails less feminism.

3.3.1 Feminism Survey

Psychology professor Dr Harold Takooshian from Fordham University in New York City formed a suitable Feminism Survey-model in 1983 that he has generously agreed to let me use for my research. Using questions from an already established researcher is a cumulative approach, which lessens the burden of establishing what different definitions and concepts of “feminist behaviour” might be (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, p. 39). Takooshian’s focus in the survey lies on asking questions that investigate if one is prone to agree or disagree with statements that are in favour of upholding gender roles. Scoring high feminist points on this survey equates to having sympathies with the ideology. It is, compared to similar surveys, designed for easy translation, which I also noticed when I started translating it to Serbian. The translation-ease is furthermore a reason to why I was not attempting the “Attitude towards women scale” (AWS) conducted by Janet T. Spence and Robert L. Helmreich, even though it appears to be the most commonly used survey-type when it comes to these measures. Takooshian’s model (Appendix D) consists of 20 agree/disagree-questions and one open one, and the entire survey fits into one sheet of paper. This makes it easy to pair with an additional Nationalism-survey without adding up to an excessive amount, which would refrain respondents from participating in the research. The questions used in the survey are also compatible with what Esaiasson and others (2012, p. 244-245) determine to be “intelligible questions”.

It is relevant to mention that there are five embedded f-scale questions within Dr
Takooshian’s feminism survey (questions, 10, 13, 16 and 20) that rate one’s authoritarianism. Measuring such fascist receptivity in relation to nationalism might illustrate the level of extremeness of nationalist behaviour in case someone for example scored high on both authoritarianism and nationalism. For the analysis of the survey-findings, I have divided the three types of questions (feminism, authoritarian and nationalism) and applied individual scoring to them, so that it will be easy to see if someone who for example scores high on feminism ends up scoring low on nationalism. However, the authoritarian-dimension will unfortunately not be analysed in this research due to lack of space and time. A full explanation on the coding for all data analysis is presented in Appendix A.

3.3.2 Nationalism Survey

The Nationalism survey needed to be of a more Serbia-specific nature than the general Feminism-one, which required that I created it myself. Here ideas for fitting nationalist statements came from Spyros’s (1996, p. 81) and Racioppi & O’Sullivan See’s (2005, p. 26) theories that indicate nationalist focus on religion and historical identity. I also re-used some statements from the Discrimination-report after having asked for permission by Serbia’s Equality Commissioner Nevena Petrusic. Inspiration was also found by researching rhetorical arguments from nationalist movements in Serbia with the party programme from the Serbian Radical Party being one of them. Before conducting this survey for my research in Belgrade, I emailed it to two Serbians and also Dr Takooshian to confirm that both linguistic experts and an experienced question-maker approved of it.

3.3.3 Distribution and Limitation

The surveys were distributed in public by several local contacts and myself, in different areas of Belgrade, making it a convenience sample. By receiving assistance in distributing the surveys, I was surer to achieve intersectionality amongst participants. In total 127 completed surveys were collected during the nine days I was visiting. I am aware of the fact that with the results from the 127 Belgrade citizens I collected data from, a generalization for what the population of Serbia thinks on this matter is limited. Belgrade is the capital of Serbia and attitudes between city-residents and people from more rural settings are of course different, but with the limited time I have to conduct my research I
am nonetheless forced to conform to a geographical boundary. This quantitative part of the study is also dedicated to determine the relation between feminism and nationalism, rather than being an attempt of mapping Serbian citizens’ general views on feminism and nationalism (that is what the incorporation of the aforementioned national statistics is for). Focusing on the capital is also appropriate in the sense that it is the place in Serbia where the chances of remoteness between public discourse and opinions amongst citizens are probably the smallest, which makes it an applicable example of the least likely-method (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, p. 154). With the least likely-method, an answer can emerge to the previously raised question of whether nationalism in public discourse and nationalism on the micro-level truly are two remote notions.

3.4 Survey coverage

The feminism survey contains six questions (q22 – q28) that address some demographic basics as well as intersectional differences, mapping who the participants that answered the questionnaires are. The information that the surveys asks for is sex, age group, level of education, marital status, if one was employed outside the home, if the mother in the house planned to work after having children, and religiousness.

3.4.1 Demographic Limitations

In an ideal scenario, the demographic contents (age, education, sex) would have been equally distributed through stratified sampling (Teorell & Svensson, 2012, p. 85) of the Serbian participants. A fitting alternative to equal representation would also have been to distribute in accordance with the actual representation within the population (Serbia’s or Belgrade’s) as a whole. If there are for example 20% of 50-59 year olds in Serbia, then an equivalent to that percentage would also have been sought out to take part in the surveys. Due to a lack of time however, not all three of these contents could be satisfyingly represented. It would have required extensive background-checks on anyone interested in participating in the research and ultimately result in fewer numbers of participants.
3.4.2 Demographic contents

The main demographic focus whilst handing out surveys was to have at least the sexes represented as equally as possible. This was considered an important part because of this particular research’s focus on gender. Every other day whilst on my field trip, the filled-out surveys were counted in order to make an appreciation of whether or not one of the sexes was being under-represented. The surveys not handed out by myself, but by contacts in Belgrade, were instructed to aim for distributing them as 50/50 regarding sex as possible.

In the end, out of 127 participants, 65 were women (51.6%) and 61 were men (48.4%), with one respondent missing from the system.

When looking at the distribution of age at table 2, a large majority of the participants are between the ages of 20-29 (39.4%), with the second biggest group being 30-39 years old (26%). Together, these two age groups form 65.4% of the respondents of this research. How did this happen?
The immediate explanation is that these were the two age groups that were the easiest to approach around town. Since the method of finding participants was through a convenience sample, the convenient way to approach was by passing the surveys along to whoever was available around town – in a café or bar, in any empty-looking store, outside and inside some university-campus or for example on the bus. The most probable group to frequent or work in these mentioned places are indeed expected to be between the ages of 20 and 39.

These were in general the surveys that were handed out by me personally.

Contacts I have in the city that handed out a number of surveys for me, were selected based on the premises that they could reach out more to some demographic representatives that I could not – mostly older citizens and people working in places that were not approachable from the street, like for example doctors (meaning mostly age 40-49 or 50-59).

The education-factor measured how much education one might have achieved. It shows an equal representation to some extent between those with a high school-diploma (26%), those who have been to “some” college (also meaning being currently in college) (25, 2%) and those who have graduated from college (33, 1%). With higher education playing a larger role today when it comes to making a career than it used to in the past, these number seem reasonable in accordance with the fact that the majority of the participants were young (ages 20-29 and 30-39).

Table 3
On a scale of 0-9, the participants were asked “How religious are you?”, 0 meaning not at all, and 9 meaning very religious. When divided into three smaller categories for the sake of easier measurement, an unexpectedly equal representation appears, with each of the three options holding almost exactly one third of the participants’ religious views. The numbers are 30, 4%, 35, 2% and 34, 4% for category 1, 2 and 3 respectively.

Table 4

The employment-factor in table 5 is interesting to observe since it shows a majority of the respondents (74.6%) being currently employed, either part-time or full-time. This means amongst other things that a part of that big group of 20-29 year olds, many of them students, who filled out the surveys are probably in some way employed. Since this was, as mentioned previously, a study conducted in Belgrade through convenience-samples, much of the material is collected from the busy city centre where people in general come to work or to spend money shopping or eating, meaning that they have some form of income that can allow
this sort of behaviour.

**Table 5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes, part-time</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes, full-time</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Are you now employed outside the home? | 0% | 10% | 20% |

The distribution of “Marital status” and “Does your mother plan to work after having children” will not be analysed, merely briefly mentioned in this study. The results for marital status show approximately half of the respondents being married and half being single (See appendix B). The latter question was difficult to interpret by some of the respondents. By “mother”, it was hard to know if it was one’s own mother in the past, in the present with grown-up children, or if it was ones girlfriend/wife. Since also only 13 respondents, 10, 8% answered “no”, it is clear that it can be regarded as irrelevant to this study.

### 3.5 Interviews

In addition to the usage of questionnaire-surveys, my visit to Belgrade consisted of three semi-structured interviews with representatives from three local feminist organizations. It is an appropriate compliment to the questionnaires since it enables further insight to the different dynamics of nationalism and feminism, which cannot be completely achieved with only agree/disagree answers from predetermined questions (Esaiasson et al., 2012, p. 229). The interviews were transcribed (Appendix E), and then validated by the respondents to ensure accuracy of content. The organizations in question were *Women in Black*, a universal feminist activist group that works against militarization and nationalism, *ACT Women*, an artistic organization that increases visibility of women’s issues and advocates for women’s rights through a combination of art and activism, and *Center for Moms*, an independent group
that amongst other things assists with legal aid for mothers that have been discriminated against at their workplace. These are organizations that work for feminism in different ways and through different perspectives, and their member’s input has given much insight. The results from these interviews will not form the bases for the theory-testing part of my thesis since Esaiasson and others (2012, p. 256) do not recommend using conversational interviews as methods for testing a theory. However, they might serve well when it comes to illustrating and giving depth to certain points that have already been made through the results from surveys and other statistics.
4 Empirical Analysis

In this section the results from existing data and my own surveys are presented and discussed in relation to the research question and theory.

4.1 Feminism in Serbia

Searching for signs of feminist and nationalist attitudes amongst the Serbian people has been measured through quantitative research from the Genderbarometer, the Discrimination Report and Gender Equality on a Local Level. From the Genderbarometer, feminist attitudes can be interpreted from data presented in the section *Attitudes about gender* (2012, p. 258):

| Source: Adapted from the Genderbarometer (2012, p. 258) |

Table 6

- A vast majority of men (83%) believe that domestic violence should be severely penalized.
- 85% of women and 78% men agree or strongly agree that “children give life meaning.”
- 71% of men and 58% of women agree or strongly agree that “every family should know who the boss is”.
- 36% of men and 30% of women agree or strongly agree that “abortion should be banned.”
- 74% of men and 66% women agree or strongly agree that “every woman should be a good homemaker.”
- 66% of men and 55% women agree or strongly agree that “gay marriages should be banned.”
- 70% of men and 75% women agree or strongly agree that “education is key to success in life.”
- 63% of men and 55% women agree that “for a man the most important thing is to earn well.”
- 33% of men and 61% women agree that “women’s lives are harder.”
- 38% of men and 25% women agree that “men are bigger losers in transition.”

Aside from the varied opinions regarding whether “women’s lives are harder”, it is clear that men and women tend to stay on the same side of the 50 % spectrum concerning whether they agree or disagree. The questions most relevant to gender role-opinion are “every family should know who the boss is”, “every woman should be a good homemaker” and “for a man the most important thing is to earn well”. Here the results show that neither a majority of men nor women are prone to disregard the traditional gender roles of women as caretakers and men as dominant breadwinners.
The Genderbarometer’s analysis of these findings is presented in the *General Findings of the Survey* (2012, p. 248). It states that the gender regime of Serbia is currently moving in two separate directions:

1. towards the **strengthening of the family**, while maintaining a certain gender asymmetry, and 2. towards the **strengthening of individualization**, with an emphasis on symmetry and egalitarianism in family and partnership relations. However, both directions retain a strong family orientation combined with a decrease in gender inequalities.

In this quote, the Genderbarometer reports that there is still gender asymmetry, but expresses an optimistic view-point of the current situation, emphasizing that things are changing for the better. This approach comes across several times throughout the report. It is unclear whether such optimism is based on the aforementioned *Attitudes about gender*-part. The gender roles within the family and household are nonetheless clear; Babovic – Suboticki, 2013, p. 42 report what the division of labour is at home between men and women, and the results point towards women doing a large majority of every domestic chore. Such traditional responsibilities in the house are well in line with the national gender roles detected by Kronsell, where women are categorized as simply “mothers” (2012, chapter 1). However, a comparison between the year 2003 and 2007 shows improvement and development in a more positive direction.

**Table 7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of chore</th>
<th>2003 (in %)</th>
<th>2007 (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooking</td>
<td>90, 3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washing Clothes</td>
<td>89, 1</td>
<td>3, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaning</td>
<td>85, 3</td>
<td>3, 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ironing</td>
<td>90, 6</td>
<td>2, 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Childcare</td>
<td>75, 7</td>
<td>2, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Help with school-work</td>
<td>75, 5</td>
<td>9, 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Adapted from *Gender Equality on a Local Level* (2013, p. 42)*
Even though the proportion of men doing domestic chores is critically low in 2007 as well as in 2003, each chore has men taking more part in it in 2007 than it did four years previously. Mysteriously enough, this cannot be said when it comes to dividing the labour by doing it “Together”. Here the figures are more split, with some chores being done together less than before (ex: Childcare), and some more (Ex: Cleaning), but with the overall trend still pointing towards a decrease in working together. In terms of equality, this sharing of responsibilities would have been the most gender equal option: The Genderbarometer emphasizes this type of change that focuses on “connectedness and solidarity” (2012, p. 265 – 266) since the other type of labour-division simply enhances a sense of conflict between the genders.

For Gudovic (Act Women Interview 2013, Appendix E), the feature most vital in the means to achieving any gender equality is having equal economic power. It is a tool with which women can liberate themselves if needed; “Women stay in situations of domestic violence due to the fact that they are conditioned, they say: ‘Where will I go with the kids?’, ‘How will I live?’, I don’t have enough money to pay for court?’. Only a minimal number of women own things in their own name. Not just housing and land, I am talking about cars, about computers.” (Gudovic, Appendix E). What Gudovic refers to, and Babovic-Suboticki demonstrated earlier, is not the same type of “opinion-based” feminism, which is the main approach of this thesis (in accordance with Takooshian’s survey), but rather a description of inequality on a gender level. It is nevertheless relevant to mention in order to illustrate the gendered circumstances for feminists in Serbia. The Genderbarometer’s Property-part (254) shows the following statistics on this issue:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8</th>
<th>Source: Adapted from Genderbarometer (2012, p. 254)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>➢ Women in Serbia are much less likely to own real estate and motor vehicles than men. On the other hand, they are more likely than men to co-own property. There is an obvious transfer of ownership underway, which is gradually putting men and women on an equal footing in this respect. This is reflected in the increasing incidence of co-ownership situations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Among higher educated men, 36% own apartments, and among those with a university degree, this is true in as many as 46% of cases. The corresponding numbers for women are 23% and 30% respectively. On the other hand, the least educated men own individual homes in 41% of the cases, while 24% of the least educated women do.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ Among women with higher education, 30% own motorcars, whereas among women with university degrees, this is true in 20% of the cases. The corresponding numbers for men are 62% and 73% respectively.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>➢ In as much as 46% of all cases, men with the highest education levels have bank savings to their name and loan arrangements in 46% of the cases. At the other extreme are the least educated women, of whom only 6% have savings and 10% have loans.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The numbers above signify an unequal economic balance between men and women regarding property-assets. The Genderbarometer (2012, p, 255) also shows that “One in four women and one in ten men aged 20-50 do not contribute at all to their family budget”. This is a considerable difference, and besides representing that women to a larger extent perhaps do not have the economic capital to contribute, it can also signify that they may not be expected to contribute even if they have the means since such behaviour is not part of their traditional gender role. Women are also largely under-represented in the spectrum of business-ownership. Figures from a study done in 2011, report that 71, 1 % of firms in Serbia are owned by men and only 28, 9 % by women (Babovic – Suboticki, 2013, p. 38). In relationship to the equal representation of sexes at universities (Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 2011) this attests of an unequal working situation when the students graduate.

4.2 Nationalism in Serbia

For signs of nationalism, most of the data in this study has come from the Discrimination-report (2012). The report recorded different value orientations amongst its interviewees based on how they responded to certain statements. Nationalism was one of these value orientations and its statements were: “I’m ready to sacrifice for the interest of my nation” and “We’re in danger of losing our identity due to the mixing of different cultures”. (2012, p. 49). The results of this study showed the following percentages: 27 % of the participants were “Internationalists”, 47% were “Neutral” and 26% were “Nationalists”. The two extremes of “Internationalist” and “Nationalist” show almost identical figures, whereas the mid-option, “Neutral”, is the most common choice.

When reviewing the two examples of nationalist statements, the second one seems most relevant to Spyros’ identification of Serbian nationalism, which holds a primary focus on identity and history (1996, p. 81). Spyros’s other example of idealized masculinity (1996, p. 80) and Racioppi & O'Sullivan See’s (2005, p. 26) perspective of religion as important identity-shapers are not present in these two statements, however. This means that the results are not as representative as they might appear, which demonstrates need for other, more suitable statement-measurers. Fortunately, the value-orientation of “Traditionalism” was also recorded within the Discrimination report and shows attitudes towards the following
statements: “Leading positions in the business world should be in the hands of men”, “The best virtue for a woman is being a good housewife”, “One should firmly hold on to peoples' customs and tradition” and “One should uphold the morale preached by the religious community” (2012, p. 49). These traditionalism-virtues are appropriate with the aforementioned nationalist-identifiers relevant for the Serbian context, and therefore in this study considered as measurers of nationalism as well. The results here added up to the following: 32 % were “Modern”, 44% were “Neutral” and 24 % were “Traditionalists”. The biggest part of the respondents once again identified themselves as being “Neutral”, and it is clear that agreeing with “Traditionalist” statements was the relatively least popular choice.

With the Discrimination-report’s (2012) percentages from being “Nationalist” and “Traditionalist”, 26% and 24 % respectively, a pattern forms which shows that, even though a minority supports nationalist ideas (“Nationalist” and “Traditionalist” combined), it should still be considered as a strong minority; In neither case do the majority of the respondents dismiss nationalist virtues, but rather choose to conform to a neutral position that could ultimately lean towards either direction. The Genderbarometer has also linked traditionalism and nationalism together, which resulted in the following conclusion (2012, p. 260):

The strengthening of certain (quasi)traditional and patriarchal values in the public discourse, expressed through acceptance of right-wing ideologies or extreme nationalism, is not simply transferred to the micro level, especially not to the level of actual behaviour. The micro level usually preserves its own “logic,” while the public discourse, especially in the media, only partially corresponds with this “logic.” The “traditional” is often constructed by erasing the memory of what was previously there.

In the above quote, traditionalism and patriarchy, which form the structure behind extreme nationalism, are partially detached from the sphere of Serbian citizens on the micro level. This phenomenon of difference of nationalist opinion between micro and micro-level has been highlighted earlier in this thesis’s theory-section, and it is arguable whether or not 24-26 % nationalist sympathies amongst Serbian arbitrary citizens can be considered as “not simply transferred to the micro level” (Genderbarometer, 2012, p. 260).

Having ethnicity play a large part in Serbia’s nationalistic history (Racioppi & O’Sullivan See’s 2005, p. 26), especially referring to the Balkan wars in the 1990s, the ways in which ethnic distancing is portrayed today is of high relevance to this study. When asked, “Would you mind if some of the members of the following groups became ‘in the family’?” (2012, p. 29), a large part of the respondents replied that they did indeed mind:
The table above shows reluctance to inter-ethnic marriage in largest part with Albanians and Roma. The low ethnic distancing towards Serbs is explained by the fact that the survey was conducted in Serbia with mainly ethnic Serbian participants. Nonetheless, the Discrimination-report (2012, p. 32), further notes that discrimination based on which ethnic group one belongs to is the least perceived form of discrimination (in relation to for example class, age, sexual orientation etc.) by the citizens. According to Serbian citizens, ethnic distancing is not that common. Subjectivity plays a large part in this testimonial since the interviewees of the study go on by meaning that Serbs are in fact the ethnic group that gets discriminated against the most, which does not make logical sense. The Discrimination-report trusts this to be a result of “self-projection”, meaning that whichever group one identifies with gets a stamp of endangerment that one wants to defend (2012, p. 32). Such self-projection and distancing oneself from other groups displays aforementioned theoretical values of “Othering” that spring from nationalism and militarism.

4.3 Survey Results

By conducting a quantitative research with surveys in Belgrade during nine days in November 2013, patterns emerged that will be presented below, and which can now display certain attitude-trends within feminism and nationalism.
4.3.1 Feminism

124 Belgrade citizens answered all of the feminism questions in the surveys, with 3 respondents missing from the system. The scale of 1 to 5 represents the extent of a respondent’s composed feminist values:

1 = Not at all feminist
2 = Not really feminist
3 = Moderately feminist
4 = Rather feminist
5 = Very feminist

Table 10

The results of the survey in table 10 show the majority of answers to be leaning more towards a trend of feminism than not; 79, 8% of participants score 3 or more on the scale. Amongst these, 3 - “Moderately feminist”, is the most frequent value, covering the attitude of 37, 1% of the respondents. Scoring 1 or 5, the two extremes of the scale, are the least popular options. Yet, being classed as a “Not at all feminist” is the least frequent value, with only 4, 8% of the respondents answering the survey in accord with those principles.

When reviewing the different background-factors of survey-participants, the most patterned structures can be found in the connection between Education and Feminism (Table 11). Here a positive correlation is found that signifies a higher probability of supporting with feminist values if one has a higher education.
### Table 11

**EDUCATION and FEMINISM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EDU.</th>
<th>Feminism Score</th>
<th>∑</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grammar school</td>
<td>0,0%</td>
<td>33,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High sch.</td>
<td>0,0%</td>
<td>25,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>6,3%</td>
<td>9,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coll. grad.</td>
<td>7,5%</td>
<td>15,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grad school</td>
<td>7,1%</td>
<td>0,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,8%</td>
<td>15,3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 4.3.2 Nationalism

The nationalism questions were answered by 123 survey-participants, with 4 missing from the system. The composed nationalist values were then also coded into a scale of 1 to 5:

1 = Not at all nationalist  
2 = Not really nationalist  
3 = Moderately nationalist  
4 = Rather nationalist  
5 = Very nationalist
In contrast to the feminism-results, answers concerning nationalism are more evenly distributed across the scale in table 11. Whilst a majority, 23, 6 %, identifies with being “Not at all nationalist”, 22, 8 % are “Moderately nationalist” and 21, 1 % are “Very nationalist”. These statistics only withhold marginal differences between each other. Such an even distribution across the spectrum of the scale demonstrates a higher rate of participants being willing to answer the survey with clear agree/disagree-answers rather than “no opinion”. The feminism survey, on the other hand, contained more of such cautious “no opinion” answers, which indicates less certainty. This might suggest either that the nationalism survey contained clearer questions that were easier to position an opinion around, or that taking standpoints to different nationalist statements is more practiced than reflecting over gender roles of men and women.

Table 13 illustrates how men and women responded differently to nationalism. By the results, the theoretical concepts of Enloe (Sylvester, 2013, p.42) and Spyros (1996, p. 42), stating nationalism to be a male-dominated system of thought, appear legit. A greater percentage of men scored highest on the nationalism scale (72 %) than women did (28 %), and the same pattern can be found on who scored the lowest: 60 % women and 40 % men. In Appendix B, one can further review additional tables of this kind that measure how the respondents scored on feminism and nationalism in relation to factors such as age, religion and education.
Table 13
SEX and NATIONALISM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationalism Score</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>∑</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>48.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>72.0%</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>51.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A similar pattern is found in the relationship between religiousness and nationalism. Racioppi and O’Sullivan See (2005, p. 26) emphasized the importance of religion in national identity-building, and from these results they appear to be correct. The more religious the participants were, the higher was their score on the nationalism-scale.

Table 14
RELIGIOUSNESS and NATIONALISM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationalism Score</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>∑</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3.3 Correlation Between Feminism and Nationalism

With an aim to investigate how attitudes of feminism and nationalism affect each other, I created two tables that measure correlation between the two ideologies. They illustrate how respondents that fitted into different feminist categories scored on the nationalism scale and vice versa. The two tables essentially measure the same thing, with focus on either
feminism (Table 15) or nationalism (Table 16).

Table 15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N score 1</th>
<th>N score 2</th>
<th>N score 3</th>
<th>N score 4</th>
<th>N score 5</th>
<th>∑</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all F.</td>
<td>16, 7 %</td>
<td>16, 7 %</td>
<td>16, 7 %</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>50 %</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not really F.</td>
<td>11, 1 %</td>
<td>5, 6 %</td>
<td>27, 8 %</td>
<td>11, 1 %</td>
<td>44, 4 %</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately F.</td>
<td>11, 1 %</td>
<td>20 %</td>
<td>20 %</td>
<td>20 %</td>
<td>28, 9 %</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather F.</td>
<td>24, 2 %</td>
<td>30, 3 %</td>
<td>30, 3 %</td>
<td>12, 1 %</td>
<td>3, 3 %</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very F.</td>
<td>68, 4 %</td>
<td>5, 3 %</td>
<td>21, 1 %</td>
<td>5, 3 %</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>F score 1</th>
<th>F score 2</th>
<th>F score 3</th>
<th>F score 4</th>
<th>F score 5</th>
<th>∑</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not at all F.</td>
<td>3, 4 %</td>
<td>6, 9 %</td>
<td>17, 2 %</td>
<td>27, 6 %</td>
<td>44, 8 %</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not really F.</td>
<td>4, 5 %</td>
<td>4, 5 %</td>
<td>40, 9 %</td>
<td>45, 5 %</td>
<td>4, 5 %</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately F.</td>
<td>3, 4 %</td>
<td>17, 2 %</td>
<td>31 %</td>
<td>34, 5 %</td>
<td>13, 8 %</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather F.</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>12, 5 %</td>
<td>56, 3 %</td>
<td>25, 5 %</td>
<td>6, 3 %</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very F.</td>
<td>12 %</td>
<td>32 %</td>
<td>52 %</td>
<td>4 %</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The theories presented in this study’s theory-section have been clear – nationalism and feminism are not expected to go together. This being based on the fact that the upholding of gender roles is crucial when it comes to nationally idealizing a traditional, heteropatriarchal family (Brzuzy & Lind, 2007, p. 498). Since many of the statements on the feminism survey required the respondents to take a stand pro or against such gender roles, nationalists should not be expected to score high points on the feminism scale. The results shown in the tables are, for the most part, in harmony with the theories, especially in Table 13 (feminism). Those who were not at all, or not really, feminist scored the highest on the nationalist scale whilst the strongest feminists scored the lowest. In line with this, none of the “Very Feminists” showed a score of 5 on the nationalism scale. Table 14 (nationalism) also confirms the theories by showing how those who were not at all, or not really nationalists scored high on feminism whilst 0 % of the “Very nationalists” scored a 5 on the feminism scale. The figures in the tables marked with green illustrate results that support the theories, whilst those with red mean that they differ. Having 25 % of the rather nationalists scoring a 4 on the feminism scale is not theoretically expected since 4 may still be considered a relatively high feminist-sympathy.
As discussed before, many of the participants positioned themselves towards the middle (score 3) of the different scales, which somewhat problematizes an analysis of the results. Having a high percentage of strong nationalists, or strong feminists, scoring 3 on the opposite scale does not fully align with the exclusive theories. Such examples are marked with yellow on the tables. Nonetheless, there are several more numbers marked with green rather than red or even yellow, ultimately meaning a trend towards supporting the theories.
With the objective towards finding an answer to whether more feminism means less nationalism, this thesis has researched both the extent of feminism and nationalism in Serbia, and investigated the correlation between the two through a field-study in Belgrade.

Results from national statistics, concerning the extent of how widespread feminist sympathies are, show more than half of men and women actively supporting the existence of gender roles and thus being “anti-feminist”. Observable inequalities furthermore represented both domestically and in the workplace. The surveys conducted in Belgrade displayed a somewhat different picture, with more respondents in favor of feminism than against, and with a majority positioning themselves neutrally (in the middle of the scale). Results from national statistics also depict nationalism as an ideology little favored by the Serbian people with most people being neutral to it, but yet with an important presence since approximately 30 – 58 % of Serbs choose to distance themselves from various ethnic groups. Survey-results from Belgrade align with the national statistics by also having a big minority of the respondents supportive of nationalist values. An important finding of this analysis, that has been a contribution to already existing research, is that the majority of participants, both on national and Belgrade-level, are indecisive of their opinion towards nationalistic and feminist values since so many position themselves at the middle of the scale. Uncertainty, projected by answering “no opinion” on the Belgrade-surveys, was more common with feminism than nationalism, possibly indicating relatively little experience in reflecting over gender roles.

Theories arguing the incompatibility of feminist and nationalist values were in this study proven correct; survey-results showed it unlikely to score high on both the feminism-scale and the nationalist-scale. This answers the central thesis-question of this thesis, concerning whether more feminism means less nationalism, with a likely yes. A higher percentage of men scoring high on the nationalism-scale also aligned with Enloe (Sylvester, 2013, p.42) and Spyros (1996, p. 42) theories about nationalism being a
man-dominated system of thought. Nationalism was also proven more popular amongst participants that were very religious than with those that were not (Racioppi and O’Sullivan See, 2005, p. 26)

My sum up reflections for this thesis recommend a need of further research towards understanding the wide spectrum of these ideology-scales where much measures as “moderate” or “indecisive”, and is thus difficult to interpret in accordance to theories about exclusive correlation between two different systems of thought, as it has been for me. I also recommend further research to make use of my wide selection of collected material that did not get the opportunity to be analyzed in this thesis. A suggestion could be problematizing reflections on nationalism and feminism from the interviews made with the Serbian feminists in relation to the theoretical framework, as well as the survey-results.
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Appendices

Appendix A – Coding for Data Analysis

Feminism
The feminism-questions 1, 7 and 8 were removed from the result-data since they did not make sense culturally for a Serbian. Question 1 had been translated in a way that made it easy to interpret as a negative question, and 7 and 8 were irrelevant since there is not the same sort of cultural difference between Mrs and Miss in the Serbian language.

Answers that measure feminism were first recorded (an answer which indicated high feminism got scored as 2, the “no opinion”-answer was 1, and the answer that was not feminist got scored as 0). The answers were then calculated together for all the questions (2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 1, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18). This formed the scale “feminist points”, which measures from 0 to 24 (scoring the maximum of 24 would equal someone who answered with a maximum of feminist answers, and scoring 0 would be the opposite, someone without any feminist answer). This scale, now called “feminism” was then divided into 5 ratings in accordance with the Likert scale (Simply Psychology, 2008), from 1 to 5, 1 meaning no feminism and 5 meaning full feminism. This range captures different intensity-levels and will facilitate further analysis.

1 = 0 1 2 3 4
2 = 5 6 7 8 9
3 = 10 11 12 13 14
4 = 15 16 17 18 19
5 = 20 21 22 23 24

Nationalism
Since the nationalism survey was composed by me, without much time of pre-testing the questions, I conducted through SPSS an explorative factor analysis and then a confirmatory factor analysis to settle which of the statements were actually measuring nationalism. These turned out to be all except the two last questions, 9 and 10.

Answers that measure nationalism (from statement 1-8) were first recorded (an answer that indicated high nationalism got scored as 2, the “no opinion”-answer was 1, and the answer that was not nationalist scored 0). These were all then calculated, forming a “nationalism points” scale of 0 to 16 (16 meaning scoring full-nationalism points and 0 meaning not having answered with a single nationalist opinion). From this scale, Likerts scale was applied,
rating the answers into five categories: 1 meaning no nationalism and 5 meaning full nationalism. This scale is called “nationalism”.

1 = 0 1 2 3  
2 = 4 5 6  
3 = 7 8 9  
4 = 10 11 12  
5 = 13 14 15 16  

Authoritarianism
Answers that measure authoritarianism (embedded in the feminism-survey) were first recorded (an answer which indicated high authoritarianism got scored as 2, the “no opinion”-answer was 1, and the answer that was not authoritarian got scored as 0). The answers were then scored together for all the questions (10, 13, 16, 19, 20) that then formed the scale “authoritarian points” that measured from 0 to 24 (scoring the maximum of 10 would equal someone who answered with a maximum of authoritarian answers, and scoring 0 would be the opposite, someone without any authoritarian answer). This scale, now called “authoritarianism” was then divided into 5 ratings from 1 to 5, 1 meaning no authoritarianism and 5 meaning full authoritarianism.

1 = 0 1  
2 = 2 3  
3 = 4 5 6  
4 = 7 8  
5 = 9 10  

Religiousness
The religious scale from 0 to 9 was divided into three categories – measuring Not religious, Moderate and Very Religious.

1 = 0 1 2  
2 = 3 4 5 6  
3 = 7 8 9
Appendix B – Additional Tables and Graphs from Surveys

Marital status

- Single
- Married
- Widowed
- Separated

Does the mother in your home plan to work after having children?

- No
- Yes
- 3
- 9
### RELIGIOUSNESS and FEMINISM

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<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
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<tr>
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### EDUCATION and NATIONALISM

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### AGE and NATIONALISM

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<tr>
<td>60&lt;</td>
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### AGE and FEMINISM

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"Are you a 'feminist'?" and FEMINISM *

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<td>1</td>
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<td>Are you a &quot;feminist&quot;?</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>50%</td>
</tr>
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<td>25%</td>
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"Are you a 'feminist'?" and NATIONALISM *

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<th>Σ</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Are you a &quot;feminist&quot;?</td>
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<tr>
<td>No, no opinion</td>
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<td>52,9%</td>
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<td>No, bad opinon</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>11,8%</td>
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<td>95,5%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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</table>

* These two tables represent answers to the feminism survey’s question "Are you a feminist?" Out of the 127 initial respondents, only 74 replied to this question. Their various answers were transformed to four categories: "Yes", "No, but share values", "No, no opinion" and "No, a bad opinion".
Appendix C – Interview Questions

1. Present your organization
2. What does feminism mean to your organization? (How does it show in the work that your organization does?)
3. What is your view on the feminism in Serbia?
4. What are the biggest obstacles in Serbia when it comes to achieving gender equality?
5. What is your view on nationalism in Serbia?

(Sub question: Are there any means through which feminism and nationalism could find common ground?)
Appendix D – Surveys

Feminism Survey (English, Original Copy)

Opinion survey **

People seem to have very divided opinions about the feminist movement. We are researchers who would appreciate your frank opinions on the statements below. For each item, circle whether you Agree (A), Disagree (D), or have No opinion (N). This survey is anonymous. Thank you.

1. D N A Women who do the same work as men should not necessarily get the same salary.
2. D N A A woman should have more responsibility than a man in caring for a child.
3. D N A Women should have more responsibility than men in doing household duties.
4. A N D Unisex clothes are a good idea, so men and women can dress more alike.
5. D N A By nature, women are more emotional than men.
6. D N A By nature, women enjoy sex less than men.
7. D N A When I meet a woman for the first time, I prefer to call her Miss or Mrs., rather than Ms.
8. D N A I would prefer to call myself Miss or Mrs., rather than Ms.
9. D N A A woman should adopt her husband's last name when they marry.
10. A N D Human nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict.
11. A N D Married women with young children should work outside the home if they wish.
12. A N D I'd say it's perfectly all right for a husband to stay at home while the wife supports the family.
13. A N D People can not be trusted.
14. D N A I'd say women's liberationists "rock the boat" too much.
15. D N A Many women who deny their femininity are actually confused people.
16. A N D A few leaders could make this country better than all the laws and talk.
17. D N A The use of obscene language is more unbecoming for a woman than for a man.
18. D N A The needs of a family should come before a woman's career.
19. A N D Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough willpower.
20. A N D In general, women should stay out of politics.

21. Are you a "feminist?" What is your view of the feminist movement? (More space on back)

22. Age: □ under 20 □ 20-29 □ 30-39 □ 40-49 □ 50-59 □ 60+
24. Marital status: □ Single □ Married □ Widowed □ Separated □ Divorced
25. Are you now employed outside the home? □ No □ Yes, part-time □ Yes, full-time.
   If "yes," what occupation: ____________________________________________
26. Does the mother in your home plan to work after having children? □ No □ Yes.
27. You are (circle one): not religious 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 very religious
28. You are: □ male □ female.
Istraživanje javnog mnjenja*
Medju ljudima postoje podeljena mišljenja oko pokreta feminizma. Unapr. hvala na iskrenim odgovorima na pitanja koja slede. Molim Vas da zaokružite jedan od ponudjenih odgovora za svaku sledeću izjavu: Slažete se (S) Ne Slažete se (N) Nемаte Mišljenje (M)

Upitnik je anoniman. Hvala.

1. S N M Ne mora obavezno da znači da žene i muškarci koji rade isti posao dobijaju istu platu.
2. S N M Žena treba da ima više odgovornosti što se tice brige o detetu nego muškarac.
4. S N M "Unisex" odeća je nešto pozitivno, da bi i muškarci i žene mogli slično da se oblače.
5. S N M Žene su po prirodi emotivnije od muškaraca.
6. S N M Ne mora obavezno da znači da žene i muškarci koji rade isti posao dobijaju istu platu.
7. S N M Kada upoznam ženu po prvi put, radije je zovem "Gospođa" nego "Gospodica".
8. S N M Radije bih da me zovu "Godspoda" nego "Gospodica" (da sam žensko).
10. S N M Na osnovu ljudske prirode, uvek će postojati rat i konflikt.
11. S N M Udate žene sa malom decom bi smele da rade van kuće ako tako žele.
13. S N M Ne može se verovati ljudima.
14. S N M Po meni, pokreti o "liberizaciji žena" prave previše buke.
15. S N M Mnoge žene koje poručuju svoju ženstvenost su ustvari samo zbunjene.
17. S N M Psovanje lošije stoji ženi nego muškarcu.
19. S N M Većina ljudi koji ne uspeju u životu jednostavno nemaju dovoljno snage i volje.

21. Da li ste vi “feminista”? Kakvo je vase mišlenje o pokretu feminizma? (Možete pisati i na drugoj strani)

22. Starost: oispod 20 o20-29 o30-39 o40-49 o50-59 o60+
23. Obrazovanje: oOsnovna š. oSrednja. oNezavršen Fakultet oZavršen Fakultet. oDiplomske Studije
24. Bračni status: oSingle oOženjen/Udata oUdovac/ica oRazveden/a
25. Da li ste zaposleni van kuće? oNe oDa, polu-vreme oDa, puno radno vreme
Ako "Da", kojom profesijom:
26. Da li majka u vašoj kući planira da radi posle rađanja dece? oNe oDa
27. Vi ste (zaokružite izbor): ne religiozni 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 veoma religiozni
28. Vi ste: oomuškarac ožena

* This survey has been adapted with permission from Harold Takooshian, PhD, Fordham University, New York NY, USA
Istraživanje javnog mnjenja, Drugi Deo

Ovim upitnikom se mere stavovi o srpskoj nacionalnoj svesti. Molimo Vas da zaokružite jedan od ponudjenih odgovora za svaku izjavu koje po vasem mišljenju najbolje odgovara Vašem slučaju: Slažete se (S) Ne Slažete se (N) Nermate Misljenje (M)

Ovaj upitnik je anoniman. Hvala.

2. S N M Patriotizam je jedan od najvažnijih čovekovih kvaliteta.
5. S N M Normalna osoba priznaje samo tradicionalne veroispovesti (pravoslavlje, katoličanstvo, islam)
7. S N M Zemlje evropske unije i ostale zapadne zemlje su sistemski protiv Srbije.
8. S N M Ne verujem našim državama susedima.
Nationalism Survey (English)

Opinion Survey, Second Part

With this survey opinions concerning national conscience are measured. Please truthfully circle one the standpoints that best represent your opinions:
You agree (S), don’t agree (N) or have no opinion (M)

2. S N M  Being patriotic is one of the more important qualities of a person.
3. S N M  The battle of Kosovo in 1389 has great influence to me what it means to be a proud Serbian.
4. S N M  The Serbian orthodox church should have more influence in Serbia.
5. S N M  A normal person only recognizes traditional religions (orthodox, catholic, islam).
6. S N M  One should be cautious towards other people, even when they appear to be friendly.
7. S N M  The European Union and the rest of the western countries are systematically against Serbia.
8. S N M  I don’t trust my neighboring countries.
9. S N M  I avoid making friends with Croats, Bosnians and (/or) Albanians.
10. S N M  Serbia should be a nation consisting of only Serbs.
Appendix E – Interview Transcriptions (Serbian)

Center for Moms Transcription

Jovana Ruzicic – Centar za Mame

Please present your organization.

1. Centar za mame je nevladina organizacija, osnovana sa idejom da podrzi mame Srbije, da se izbore za svoja prava, Nas rad se zastavlja na nekoliko principa. Prvi je pomoc mamama pri ostvarivanju svog prava garantovana zakonom radu. Mi se bavimo mamama koje su na neki nacin bile diskriminisane radno zbog toga sto su mame, tako da nam se javljaju trudnice koje su dobile odkaze, zene koje su vracaju na manje plate manje pozicije nego sto su imale pre nego sto su otisle na trudnjacko, i zene koje su na bilo koji nacin bile diskriminisane ili nisu sigurne da li su bile diskriminisane pri ostvarivanju svojih radnih prava. Pored toga sto se borimo za radnih prava mama, borimo se i da pokusamo da umrezimo mame, zato sto ima jako malo aktivnosti sto mame okupljuju tako da mi organizujemo mesecna druženja, mesecne radionice na razne teme, gde pored toga sto mame cuju i nauce nesto interesantno, cuju i iskustva drugih mama i u mnogo prilika nam se desi da nam mame kazu "Jao pa ja pre ovih radionica sam mislila da sam najgora majka na svetu a sada vidim da nisam, i da i druge zene ne stignu nekad da operu kosu i da se doteraj i nekako se sada osećam mnogo lakše jer sam mislila da ja puno gresim i da samo ja ne stizem sve.” Tako da to su dve glavne stvari kojima se mi bavimo, ono sto zelimo je zena koja prvo pod broj jedan nije radno diskriminisana i zena koja zaista bira koja ce da bude majka ili ne. Zelimo da mnoge zene danas nemaju izbora. Izbor je kada imate dve stvari koje su jednake, odnosno kada ne znate da jedna stvar ne iskljucuje drugu, i nekako mislim da se mnoge zene plase da postanu mame zbog toga sto moze radno da im se desi. I broj dva, zelimo da zivimo u zemlji gde zene mogu da ispunje i svoje licne potencijalnosti a i svoje profesionalne potencijalne, i gde ih mace i ne ometaju, odnosno ne spreca u tome. Tako da to je ono cime se mi bavimo, kroz razlicite kanale i razlicite aktivnosti.

What does feminism mean to your organization? How does it show in the work that your organization does?

2. Centar za Mame kao organizacija, mi smo zasnovani feministickim vrednostima – to su jednoopravnost i jednakost. Mislim da ipak nacin na koji mi komuniciramo nase vrednosti, trudili smo se mazda da malkice to vise priblizimo obicnoj zeni. Obicnoj zeni koja moza fakultetski obrazovana, obicnoj zeni koja moza nema jasno definisan koncept u njenom glavu sta je feminizam ili sta nije. Mislim da ono sto treba u narednih par godina u Srbiji jeste da se menja svest gradjanstva, mislim da treba da se menja svest zena, mislim da one treba da se osvete da imaju prava i da za ta prava trebaju, i mogu da se izbore. Tako da nekako, moza na trenutke mi i ne
What are your thoughts on feminism in Serbia?


What are the biggest obstacles for achieving gender equality in Serbia?


What are your thoughts on nationalism in Serbia?

ACT Women Transcription

Zoe Gudovic - Act Women

Please present your organization.

1. Act Women je feministicko umetnicki angazovani kolektiv. Mi smo nastale 2003. I tada kad smo nastale smo nastale kao, sa obzirom da smo je formirale nas tri koje smo pripadale lezbejskom pokretu, nekako je bilo vise orientisano kao lezbejska umetnicka grupa, feministicka. Ali vremenom kako smo rasli, sada nas je vise nego 7 devojaka, prosto i nismo sve lezbejski orientisani, nismo sve lezbejske. Nekako smo rekla da jako nam je bitno da nastavimo kao feministicki umetnicki kolektiv. Ono sto Act Women radi svih ovih godina, radi angazovanju umetnost, uglavnom imale smo tada ideju da pravimo dekonstrukciju sistema u kome mi zivimo. Znaci dekonstrukciju patrijarhata, dekonstrukciju kapitalizma i tog neoliberalnog sistema koji nas je u jednom trenutku, a i dan danas, stavlja u odredjene razjedinjene modele i koji od nas ocekuje da budemo pod odredjenom standardu koji se ocekuje od strane zena. Mi smo prosto rekla Ne, i pravile smo predstave protiv konzumerizma, dekonstrukcija tela, cak i dekonstrukcija samog feminizma, kako feministkinje gledaju na odredjene stvari po pitanju prava i tih sloboda. A onda, paralelno sa tim, radile smo i vrlo angazovane predstave na samoj ulici, to su bile predstave koje su bile protiv nasilja nad zena. I to su bile, evo vec 11:a godina kako mi radimo predstave u okviru 16 dana aktivizma protiv nasilja nad zena. Act Women u tom trenutku izlazi na javna mesta i kroz
instrument kakav je teatar se trudi da ponudi negde, i da probudi kod ljudi koji su obični prolaznici. Do sada je stalno bilo reci da je to privatna sfera, da to treba da se desava unutra cetiri zida. I u odnosu na to, mi smo rekli «Ne, i hocemo da pogovorimo vasa cetri zida». Mi smo negde bile, kroz nasu umetnicku praksu, performerke i rekli da «mi moramo da prigovaramo na ovome sto se desava generalno u drustvu». Ali nismo htele da idemo u zatvorene institucije, nego nam je nekako ulica bila izazov za nas. I pogotovo ulice u drugim gradovima, ne samo u Beogradu. Dokle Act Women je dosta radio na decentralizaciji, mi smo prosle vise od 40 mesta u Srbiji, igrajuci na trgovima, na pijacama, ispred policiskih stanicama, pravosudja, cak i u romskim halama. Na najneverovatnijim mestima i pod najgorim uslovima. Cela ideja je bila da, nekako, dekonstrujisemo ulogu zene, da zena nije ta koja stalno mora da, i u tim predstavama obradjivale smo razlicitih stepena nasilja. Od samara, silovanja, to jest sexualnog zlo-ostavlanja, do ubitka zivota, to jest ubistva zene. To je u jednom trenutku bilo i dalje mocno zato sto ti igras na ulici, dosta se zena identifikuje sa telom o kome mi pricamo, da onda nekako se oslaze da prijave nasilje. Lepota je u tome sto mi biramo umetnost koja komunicira sa drugim ljudima, tako da mi radimo ravno sa drugim zenskim organizacijama koja nama pomazu. Pomazu nam od davanja podataka, da budu relevantni, da ti ne izmisljas kakve li su situacije i slucajevi, statistike. Vec da prosto , nekako, ubrzi se rad prakticni kod zena na terenu koje se bave nasiljem nad zenama sa svoje profesionalne strane, i nama umetnicama pomognu da mi transformisemo to kroz tela i kroz glas. Tako da to je jedan segment, a drugi ovaj koji sam ti rekla da se bavimo i kritikom drustvu, u odnosu na onom gde nas on gura, to su bile razliche predstave koje smo radile o trans-terapije, do onog pitanja smrtne kazne u Srbiji. Znas, uglavnom se pojavljujemo na mestima gde je umetnost nekako zaboravljena. Ranije si ti imala i neku vrstu ulicnih rituala, vise ne postoji to, tako da mi smo tu kao ulicna pozoristna grupa, vrlo aktivne.

What does feminism mean to your organization? How does it show in the work that your organization does?

2. Vazan nam je feminizam zato sto otvara, to je nekako polaznica tacka za dijalog. Ti, u ovoj zemlji koja je trpela, koja je prosla kroz tu militarizaciju, i dalje smo mi nekako zrtve tog nasiljickog reza, i tog patriotsko-nacionaliztickog propagiranja – uloge zena, kakva zena treba da bude. Dana imas ceo koncept ono za crkvu, ono kada zena ima menstruaciju i dalje nije pozелjna da ulazi unutra, da bi bilo dobro da i dalje veze maramu. Znaci te neke tradicionalne vernosti su nama bile, nekako, nametnute, i feminizam je nama ponudio mogucnost da izadjemo iz tih okvira nametnutih uloga, i da ih kritikujemo. E sad, niko ne voli da, pogotovo sistom i pogotovo patrijarhat u kome mi zivimo, a to znaci kontrola i moc, niko ne voli da se drugaciji, drugi glas cuje. E sad, mi smo rekli da «mi ne pristajemo na modele, od telesnog do mentalnog», i kad ti progovoris, kada ti ustvari otvoris na transparentan nacin, kroz dijalog, komunikaciras sa drugim ljudima. Ali imas svoj stav, mi smo se povezale sa tim da bude absolutno jasna poruka za prava zena. Samim tim je feminizam preteca, on uopste nije.. Ti kad kazes u Srbiji da si feministkinja, to uopste nije popularno, to je vrlo ruzna, nepozeljna rec. Feministkinje su i dalje perscipirane onako kako su
muskarcii videli feministkinje, a to ti je da dizes glas protiv sistema koji uglavnom vode muskarci i određuju muskarci. Ti se pobunis kao zena, a naravno da si ti onda dlakava, ne volis muskarce, lezbejka, debela, ruzna.. sve ono sto mogu da ti postave kao sistem nepodobnosti da bi te neko vredjao, e oni to prikace. To je godinama, decenijama, kao sema feminist. Medjutim to nije tako, kada ti das tvoj glas protiv neceg kao sto je militarizam, kao sto je xenofobija, kao sto je homofobija, rasizam, kao sto je nasilje, svi oblici diskriminacije, kad se pobunis zasto se toliko novca daje za vojsku i oruzju, a ne za socialna pitanja. Kad se pobunis za pitanja obrazovanja, kada das glas za pitanje prigovora savesti, to jest zasto vojska mora da je obavezna jer su nase drugare gurali u logore. Znaci to su sve pitanja Gde je ekonomsko moc zena? Koji su socialni statusi? Gde je politicka partisipacija? Na svim tim nivoima, naravno tu je svuda moci, mi svuda tada govorimo o kontroli. I zene, kada razbiju taj krug i bore se za socialnu pravdu, one nisu podobne. I naravno da sistem onda bacio kletvu kao najgore osobe koje zaruzavaju taj sistem jesu feministkinje. E, mi smo dovoljno besne, i dovoljno smo ljute, i dovoljno smo naučile da ne cutimo. To je prvenstveno bitno, i zene su raskrstile i ono sto se mi trudio u okviru feministickog pokreta i sa bavljenjem umetnoscu oko toga, jeste da ne pristajemo na strah. A strah je odlika svega gde te sistem gura, gde moze da te kontrolise. I to uglavnom se odrzava na korumpirano društvo i na društvo koje imamo trenutno u Srbiji. Tako da, mozda sam malo skrenula sa onog pocetnog, to jest uloga umetnosti u svemu tome, ali pitali se negde za feminizam, jer ja mislim da se mi stalno bacamo u nekim floskulama «sta je feminizam?», teoretisemo oko toga, ali sustinski je baza da ti rascistis sa tim jednim modelom moci, i niko ne voli.. Ljudi jako vole moc, i zene u nekim trenutcima preuzimaju nekako slike modele koje, opet, muskarci diktiraju. Ja mislim da je nasa odgovornost kao feministkinje da postavimo sistem vrednosti, koji nece opet podpadati pod onom sto smo kritikovale, pa preuzele, vec napraviti stvarno odgovarajuci temelje za socialnu pravdu.

What are your thoughts on feminism in Serbia?

3. Ono sto sam ja ponosna jeste da on opstaje i dalje, on postoji sada vec vise od 25-30 godina. To je negde pokrenulo lavinu da su se glasovi cuje. Znas da stalno potenciram na glasu, ti sustinski jedini kapital koji posedujes u svemu svetu. Cime god materijalno da si se ti obogatila u svom zivotu, ne moze da ti nadonesti situaciju, ti si najvise povredjena i najvise su zene povredjene od existencije toga da su one shvucene kao objekti, da se prema njima moze vrsiti nasilje kako kome odgovara. Zato ja uvek kazem da ja polazim od toga. E sad, 78:e kada su se zene okupile i muskarci, koji su bili iz razlicitih akademskih bransa, uglavnom filozofija, sociologija, knjizevnost i pravo, oni su tu polemisali gde i koja je pozicija zena. Tu su se glasovi culi, to su bili veoma mocni glasovi koji su otvorili prostor posle za sve nas drugih. I onda, taj pokret, od SOS-telefona, do potrebe zena da se zastite od nasilja, i zenskih grupa.. Pocetci su bili prigovoriti o nasilju, i onda su se vremenom uradili i nagradjivale druge potrebe zena, kao sto su prava na izbor politickih, sexualni identiteti, akademsko savrsavanje. Tako da sam ja srecna jer mi to feministcki pokret ponudio, i dan danas ga imam. I dan danas sirim mogucnosti

**What are the biggest obstacles for achieving gender equality in Serbia?**


**What are your thoughts on nationalism in Serbia?**


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Women in Black Transcription

*Milos Urosic – Zene u Crnom*

Please present your organization.

What does feminism mean to your organization? How does it show in the work that your organization does?

2. Zene u crnom su osnovale tri vrste zena. Prvo, to su bile zene koje su bile involvirane u feministicki pokret u bivsoj Jugoslaviji pred-ratni, koji je postojao. Druga grupa zena, to su bile majke i srodnice ciji su muskarci nasilno odvedeni u rat. Treća grupa zena su gradjanke, koje su prosto dosle da kazem ni-izcega, nego prosto su ositele da one mogu u taj prostoj civilnog gradjanstva, da one mogu da se aktiviraju i da budu aktivne protiv rata. I sve vreme, zene u crnom se trude da baste tih ideja feminizma, kao sto je solidarnost. To se pokazuje tako sto su svo vreme rata, znaci pet godina permanentno, na Trgu Republike sat vremena svake stajale u crnini i cutanju protiv rata. One su na neki nacin bile ziva historija, one su intervenisale u kontekst dok su se slocini desavali, one su te zlocine osećale posle 99:e na Kosovu. I, paralelno sa protestima, svakog avgusta, Zene u crnom su organizovale susrete prostora za skupljene zene iz celog sveta i da pricaju o ratu, o otporu ratu, o militarizmu, o antimilitarizmu, o feminizmu, o lezbejstvu, zenskim ljudskim pravima, o dezerterima, o podruci dezerterima i to dalje. A takođe, Zene u crnom od italijanke su uzele, one su to izumele, to jest, žešte feministicka izgradnja mira. Odnosno zenska mirovna politika. To se zove posećivanje tegovnih mesta. Dok rat traje, zene iz agresorske države, to jest Srbije, idu na noge zena u Hrvatsku, u Bosnu, na Kosovo. Sami taj cin jeste cin solidarnosti, koji smo mi nastali posle rata u praksi koji mi pozivamo Posećivanje Mesta Zlocina Pocinjenih u nase Ime. Tamo, gde su se desili zlocini, mi idemo i taj cin za nas ima cetri znacenja. Prvo, samim tim cinom mi priznajemo da su se zlocini desili. Drugo, mi se solidarizemo sa zajednicom zrtava, izrazavamo nasu solidarnost i izrazavamo nase zalenje. U tom cinu, kao da se izjednacavaju dva osecanja. Prvo, to je strah, zato sto zajednica zrtava ne zna sta smo mi radili i onda postoji taj razuman strah. A i mi se

Jel dovoljno?
Zene u crnom u citavom svetu su izkljucivo zenska grupa. Postoje razlozi za to, historijski. Mejdtutim Zene u crnom u Beogradu, nacin na koji su nastale, su oduvek bile otvorene za one «drugacije muskarce», tu pre svega mislim na one koji nisu hteli da idu u rat, ili oni koji su pobegli iz rata, dezerteri. Tu je bio siguran prostor za strane muskarce koji su bili spremni da dele iz te vrednosti feminizma, pacifizma, anti-militarizma i tako dalje. Naravno da mi mislimo da je potrebno da se grupa siri, odnosno da postaju sto vise ljudi koji se salazu sa nasim vrednostima, mada nazalost nije tako u Srbiji.

What are your thoughts on nationalism in Serbia?
3. ...

Najveca zasluga feministickog pokreta ovde jeste pokretanje SOS-telefona za zenu i decu zrtve muskog nasilja. Prvi SOS-telefon u jugo-istocnoj Evropi nastaje u Zagrebu 88:e godine kada je jedna feministkinja iz te nacionalisticko-ekipe dala stan svoje bake na koriscenje, tako da tu to nastaje. Kasnije se otvara SOS-telefon u Ljubljani i kasnije u Beogradu. Zene u Zagrebu se organizuju i otvore centar za zrtve rata...

Na zalost, ovde ljudi perscipiraju feminizam kao losu stvar. Ovde feministkinje ljudi percipiraju kao mrziteljke muskaraca, ruzne zene, brkate, bez sista i tako, izvini na izrazu, i koje se ne briju. I to je najgori stereotip. Ovde su ljudi jezivo mizogini. Mi u ovoj godini, nije se jos zavrsetila, imamo 41 ubijenu zenu, samo zato sto je zena. Tako da ovde su ljudi uglavnom feministkinje, nema puno feminista, ima ih jako malo. UglaVKnom su vezani za aktivisticke grupe, za nevladine organizacije, i nesto malo za akademske krugove. UglaVKnom
What are the biggest obstacles for achieving gender equality in Serbia

4. Ako kazem patrijarhalno drustvo necu reci nista novo, jer mi zivimo u patriarhatu kao univerzalnom sistemu dominacije. Ali to jeste, mogu da kazem prvi uzrok. Iz njega proisticu svi ostali – nacionalizam, militarizam, seksizam, to je prosto sve retrogradne tendensije u drustvu. Stereotipi, medije kreiraju stereotipe, bio je rat i mi smo post-konflikt, zena je samo supruga, ona je majka, ona ne radja decu ona radja Srbe, ona nema istih sansi na poslu jer ona ce da postane trudna i da se uda, ona ne moze ovo, ona ne moze ono, ona ne treba to da radi. Ovde u ovom drustvu crkva ima veliki uticaj, i los, kao u citavoj istocnoj Evropi. Kao, komunizam je gazio crkvu, a crkva se vratila u najgoroj mogucoj varianti.

What are your thoughts on nationalism in Serbia?


Feminizam i nacionalizam ne mogu da nadju zajednicki jezik zato sto nacionalizam

Anti- feministicki u svojoj biti. On mrzi zene, on je svodi na njene tradicionalne uloge, tako da ja mislim da mi ne moze da pomirimo nacionalizam i feminizam i da mi ne smemo to da radimo. Jedan izkljucuje drugi, kontradiktorno je. Moj stav je ako si feministkinja ti mora da budes anti-nacionalistkinja, ti ne smes da budes da budes nacionalistkinja, ti ne prestajes u tom trenutku da budes feministkinja.