Why Egypt, but not Tunisia?
Comparing transitions in Egypt and Tunisia

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to explain why Egypt’s transition from authoritarianism has so-far failed, while Tunisia’s is still moving forward. By using relevant theories within the field of democratization and transitology, this study examines three crucial differences in the two cases, which explain the difference in their respective outcomes. These three underlying differences are in the two cases’ military-influence, political society, and international pressure. This paper shows how the presence or absence of these influential factors have been a big part in determining Egypt and Tunisia’s transitional success. To compliment the study, six in-depth interviews with journalists, activists, analysts, and bloggers have been conducted – giving me a deeper understanding of the two cases and my study itself.

Why was there an authoritarian counter-coup in Egypt, but not in Tunisia?

Keywords: Egypt, Tunisia, Democratization, Transition, Authoritarianism

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1 Introduction

Until this day, democracy has proven, provisionally, to be the least harmful form of government – making it desirable for many people. In countries that lack key democratic institutions, or democracy itself, democratization is a process that is meant to lead said countries on a path towards democracy.

Egypt and Tunisia are interesting cases to compare because of their perceived similarities but crucial underlying differences. Tunisia experienced a popular uprising against the dictator Zine El Abedine Ben-Ali, who ruled the country for more than two decades. This uprising called for greater freedoms of expression and opinion, greater equality, greater political representation and transparency, and an end to police brutality and corruption. This revolt spread to Egypt and many other Arab countries in a wave of revolts, now known as the Arab Spring. In both countries, the popular movement managed to topple dictators who ruled with iron fists, backed up by powerful police and/or military structures. After this initial toppling, a transition from authoritarianism was initiated, with the end goal being, at best, the consolidation of a true democracy (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986:3).

This paper seeks to enquire whether certain factors have eroded Egypt’s path to democratization to the extent that the regime, in fact, has not transitioned to another form of government. At the same time, the study looks at factors in Tunisia, to achieve a greater understanding of the differences between the two cases. The first democratically elected President of Egypt, Mohammed Morsi was toppled one year after he was elected by the Military. This military coup has led to increased political polarization and crackdown on dissent. Meanwhile, in Tunisia, the development has been quite different - the military did not intervene. A civilian national unity government was introduced. Though there have been security and legitimacy questions, and outright protests against the interim government, it never descended into chaos quite like in Egypt. There is the same political split in Tunisia as in Egypt, but Tunisians managed to negotiate a compromised solution, and draft a constitution taking into consideration many different aspects of the country and the people living in it.

The question this paper aims to answer is therefore, why was there an authoritarian ‘counter-coup’ in Egypt, and not in Tunisia?

The comparative methodology will be expanded on and further defined in the forthcoming chapter on methods. Both Egypt and Tunisia are experiencing transitional processes, and because of this, the theoretical field of democratization and transitology are the most appropriate to apply to this study. This will be explained further in the third chapter. Chapter four will deal with the historical background to contextualize current events in the two countries. Finally, the analysis will be presented in chapter five, tying together the theories and fully answering the question. The conclusion will present the final findings and results of the study.
2 Methodology

To narrow my interests down to a single question, it is essential for me to apply an appropriate methodology. The main purpose of this paper is to explain why the democratization process in Tunisia is doing better than Egypt’s. Therefore, I chose to apply a qualitative comparative case study approach. In the following section lies a more in-depth explanation of this methodology.

2.1 Comparative Case Study

Comparing the two cases is the best way to explain and understand the underlying factors and drivers of the difference in democratic development in Tunisia and Egypt (Teorell, 2012:226).

I have chosen to apply John Stuart Mill’s “method of difference” (*ibid*). This approach aims to choose two or more cases that have similar characteristics such as population, religion, geographic location, political system, language, history etc. Tunisia and Egypt share many of these characteristics as they are both Arabic-speaking countries with a majority Arab, Sunni Muslim population. They are both countries located in North Africa, both former European colonies, and both gained independence in the mid-20th century. Both Tunisia and Egypt had secular dictators who ruled their respective countries for decades through autocratic measures with large and extensive security apparatuses. The people of Tunisia and Egypt ousted their respective dictators, Hosni Mubarak and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali through popular uprisings, and elected islamists to their governments. Both countries experienced backlash to these elections and huge protests once again threatened to topple newly elected islamists from power.

Now, to explain my earlier proposition that, despite these similarities, in Tunisia "the democratization process is doing better"; let me point out three crucial differences between the two countries: the role of the military, political society, and the international context.

Another methodological tool applied to support this study is interviews. The six interviews are conducted with people connected to both the Egyptian and Tunisian democratization processes. Among them are journalists, activists, analysts, and political actors (see Appendix 1). By applying an in-depth interview technique, I aim to achieve particular and up-to-date insights, not readily retrievable from analysis of relevant literature (for more information about the interview, and interviewees, see Appendix 1 & 2).
2.2 Material

Primary and secondary sources have been utilized to support this study. The primary sources are in the form of news articles and TV features from relevant agencies who cover these transitional processes. The secondary sources I have used, apart from interviews, are a number of scientific articles and books on democratization. For the historical background chapter, I use *The Arabs* by Eugene Rogan (2009) of the Oriental Studies faculty at Oxford University. To back up key events and dates I have used several scientific and journalistic articles from the past 3 years from Tunisia and Egypt.
3 Theory

This paper’s theoretical framework takes its root in certain, purposefully selected differences in both cases. Though many other factors surely influenced the difference in the outcome (independent variable), such as level of education, and size of population, I have chosen (due to limitations) to focus on the three factors I earlier mentioned, which I deem the most important – the influence of the military, political society, and international pressure. Within the vast study of democratization, this paper focuses on the temporal aspect of democratization – transitology. It studies the transition from authoritarianism, and looks at why some transitions lead to democracy and others do not.

The theory of Transitology, according to Philippe C. Schmitter (2014), focuses on the transitional period when a country is moving away from an authoritarian government. When this ousting, revolution, or simple change is achieved there are four possible outcomes:

1. A reversion to the same or a different form of autocracy.
2. The formation of a hybrid-regime, which does not fully accomplish the criteria of a political democracy, but adopts some key institutions like voting – this is not a stable and lasting form of government, and will most likely revert either back to authoritarianism, or one day become a representative political democracy in its true form.
3. The establishment of an ‘unconsolidated democracy’ which is stronger than the hybrid-regime and seems to fulfill all the minimal procedural criteria for democracy, but without a commonly accepted set of rules to regulate the political game between political forces.
4. The fourth outcome is obviously the most desirable, namely, a fully consolidated democracy. This democracy shall have “consolidated via mutually acceptable rules and broadly valued institutions of civic freedom, political tolerance, and fair competition among its major actors.”

It is clear that in Egypt, the outcome has been the first, namely, the reversion to the same autocratic tradition which was present before Mubarak’s ouster. In Tunisia, however, this is not the case, and according to Alfred Stepan, it has achieved the third outcome and is well on the way to become a fully consolidated democracy (Stepan, 2012).

3.1 Influence of the Military

According to, Bauman, Rittberger and Wagner (2001:40), influence is measured by how actors use their capacities to control their political environment. Throughout the Egyptian transitional process, the Egyptian military has effectively used their influence to preserve, and expand their influence over Egyptian politics.
The military plays a big role in Egypt, as the former head of its institution (General Abdel Fatah El Sisi) is now running for President with wide-spread popularity. During the transitional period, it is essential that the military be dealt with in a smart way. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986:29-35) have many thoughts regarding the military, including how to diffuse a strong and politically active military, how to properly settle a past account involving military violence against its citizens, and the degree to which the former authoritarian regime was militarized.

The military has indeed expanded its influence in Egypt, and by analyzing the transitional process through transitology theory, I aim to prove how, in the case of Tunisia, the lack of that very military presence has deeply influenced that country’s transition. (Stepan, 2012).

3.2 Political Society

Alfred Stepan, one of the most important scholars within the field of democratization, developed the **Twin Tolerations** theory, addressing the issue of religion in politics – specifically in “Arab spring countries” (Stepan, 2012). The twin tolerations is first the toleration of religious citizens of the authority of the state, and in turn the state’s toleration and welcoming of religious peoples into politics (*ibid*).

Stepan refutes a common claim that religion stands as an obstacle towards modernization and democratization. Through extensive studies, involving the case of Tunisia, he comes to the conclusion that ‘hard secularism’ associated with France’s Third Republic is, in fact, an obstacle to democratization in itself. This is an important theoretical approach to be aware of, while analyzing the failings of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt, and the relative success of Ennahda in Tunisia.

Stepan claims that Tunisia has successfully made a transition toward democracy, and now faces the difficult task of democratic consolidation¹ (*ibid*). In both Tunisia and Egypt a vibrant and creative civil society was the backbone of the revolts toppling Mubarak and Ben Ali. However, the difference is that in Tunisia this translated into a relatively successful political society. From the perspective of Twin Tolerations theory, this happened because of the different political parties’ toleration towards each other, and the agreements and guarantees constructed in the aftermath of Ben Ali’s ousting (*ibid*).

Negotiating pacts is another criteria essential to a successful transition towards democracy. In Egypt, pacts that were negotiated were never solidified during the Muslim Brotherhood administration. Contrastingly, in Tunisia, many political pacts were solidified and contributed to the drafting of the newly accepted constitution. A political pact is defined as an agreement, publically explicit or not, between a set of actors who wish to better define the basis of power, and protect their own “vital interests” (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986:37). Often these pacts are seen as

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¹ Not to say that this transition also has not caused turmoil, mass protests, political assassinations, and hurt the economy.
temporary solutions to ease tensions and avoid possible unwanted outcomes – like an authoritarian counter-coup.

3.3 International Pressure

The importance of the international dimension when discussing democratization and transitions from authoritarian systems is often disregarded. Eva Hansson describes\(^2\) in her article, both the impact domestic democratization has on international relations, and the impact international relations has on democratization (Gustavsson et al, 2014).

Hansson describes how many Western nations have supported dictatorial military regimes in developing countries in the past and how this has perpetuated authoritarianism rather than democracy. Hansson also describes democracy-inducing impacts of international relations. For example, geographic proximity, cultural exchange, media, academic exchange, social networks among other factors have proved to further democratic development (ibid).

Global superpowers supporting dictatorships is highly relevant, considering Egypt’s annual receipt of $1.8 billion in military aid from the US.\(^3\) Similarly, David Cameron’s decision to launch an investigation into alleged terrorist plots by the Muslim Brotherhood in the UK. It is also relevant when it comes to Tunisia’s relationship with France, and the fact that many of its migrant workers traveled there rather than to Saudi Arabia (as in Egypt) (Stepan, 2012).

3.4 Overlaps

It is crucial to point out that there are significant overlaps in these different factors. The military’s position internationally affects its domestic influence in Egypt. The international position of Tunisia has affected its political culture. Egypt’s military has influenced the country’s political culture, and so on and so forth. Overlaps in theory can be confusing, however, since each theory is relevant for each factor I do not choose to explicitly separate my theories, rather show how they link to each other. This will be elaborated upon in the analysis section.

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\(^2\) in her chapter of the yet-to-be released textbook on International Relations – *Internationella Relationer*.  
\(^3\) This is essentially the US pumping up the Egyptian military for its strategic importance for maintaining Israeli peace.
4 Historical Background

Both Tunisia’s and Egypt’s modern histories are crucial for understanding current political events and contexts. The time frame for this historical background is not the same for both cases, because a further historical analysis is required in Tunisia, while in Egypt looking back to the time of national independence will suffice for the purposes of this paper. In Egypt I closely examine the military, for it is this institution that has shaped the political society of the country, while in Tunisia, I focus on their most powerful institutions within the Bourguiba and Ben-Ali regimes.

4.1 Egypt

In 1952 a charismatic Egyptian officer mounted a military coup against King Farouq, part of the same dynasty as was established in the early 19th century by Muhammed Ali⁴ (Rogan, 2009:140). This was Gamal Abdel Nasser, who would grow to be one of the most popular leaders in Arab history. Nasser was indeed a military man, and ran the country as such. Many of his policies were socialist, aiming to benefit the masses, but he did not tolerate political dissent or opposition. Thousands were arrested in Stalinist-styled purges where communists, Muslim Brothers, and former regime loyalists were thrown in jail (ibid:288).

Nasser’s land reforms and anti-colonial actions gained him popularity and trust with Egyptians, as well as his defiance in the face of attack from Britain, France, and Israel when he nationalized the Suez Canal (ibid:339). Yet, he suffered a humiliating defeat in the 1967 war against Israel, and died three years later from a heart attack, marking the beginning of the end of Arab Nationalism (ibid:395).

Nasser’s vice-president at the time, Anwar Sadat, was also a military man – part of the “Free Officer” group that ousted King Farouq in 1952 (ibid:408). One of the most crucial events of his presidency was the peace treaty with Israel. The peace treaty Sadat signed with Israel (starting the US’s annual military aid to Egypt at around $1.8 billion) had many consequences for Egypt’s geopolitical role in the Middle East, and the role of its military domestically. The most palpable consequence was his assassination by islamist extremists, who shot him dead during

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⁴ Although the military coup in 1952, abolishing Egypt’ monarchy, and establishing its first Republic may seem to be the most important precedent for military intervention in politics, it is not (Rogan, 2009:141). The Egyptian military intervened in domestic politics as early as 1881, in a time when the army represented the only viable opposition movement against colonial powers, including Ottoman and European empires (Ibid:137). Ahmad Urabi, a charismatic military leader, who was one of the first ethnically Egyptian commanders in the army (the army was traditionally made up of ethnic Turks, to assure allegiance to the Ottoman Empire), together with other officers set forth a list of demands to the Ottoman viceroy at the time, Khedive Tawfiq. According to scholar Eugene Rogan, this action set a “dangerous precedent of military men intervening in politics that would recur through Arab history across the twentieth century” (ibid:140).
a military parade which they had infiltrated, disguised in military fatigues (ibid, p.398).

After Sadat’s assassination, his vice-president, Hosni Mubarak, also a former army officer, assumed the presidency. Mubarak ruled for the next thirty years with the infamous “emergency law”\(^5\) in effect the entire time (The Family, 2012). According to the Al-Jazeera documentary, The Family, Mubarak seemed to embrace liberal reform in his early years, but quickly digressed to a more authoritarian governance, suppressing dissent and expanding his own powers and those of the notorious secret police (ibid).

The relationship between the Mubarak regime and the main islamiast opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood was complicated. However, it can be summed up by saying that the government selectively worked with the Brotherhood\(^6\), allowing them to function as a non-political social organization, and permitting limited political activity (ibid).

However, Mubarak’s neglect of widespread displeasure ultimately led to his downfall. In February, 2011 Mubarak and his NDP (National Democratic Party) government (Al-Jazeera, 2011a). Mubarak handed over his powers to the SCAF (Supreme Council of Armed Forces). The SCAF orchestrated parliamentary and presidential elections in which the Muslim Brotherhood gained a majority in the parliament and won the presidency (ibid).

A year after Mohammed Morsi was elected president, he was ousted by a military coup, following unprecedented protests against his rule (Kirkpatrick, 2013). This led to the military-appointed interim government. Defense minister Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi spearheaded this campaign which cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood organization, jailing up to 20,000 people, and notoriously sentencing more than 500 people to death at a time (Kirkpatrick, 2014). Today, Sisi is running for president in a race no one doubts he will win.

4.2 Tunisia

Tunisia gained its independence from France four years after Nasser’s revolution in Egypt, in 1956 (Rogan, 2009, p.331).\(^7\) (ibid, p.330). In 1954, negotiations were initiated for Tunisia’s independence from France (ibid, p.331). Meanwhile the Tunisian nationalist movement was growing, with charismatic Habib Bourguiba in the forefront. Bourguiba founded the nationalist Neo-Destour party which, much to the ruling Bey’s displeasure, came to dominate the negotiations for independence

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\(^5\) The emergency law was simply a way for Mubarak to justify the constant crackdown on any political dissent. It gave him and his government the power to disregard the constitution and have people arrested without suspicion or a fair trial (The Family, 2012).

\(^6\) The Brotherhood were arguably the most powerful political group in Egypt, and were still up until Morsi’s ousting in 2013 (Naguib, 2014).

\(^7\) Tunisia was a French protectorate, ruled by the France-friendly Husaynid Bey dynasty. The Husaynid Dynasty in Tunisia, like the dynasty started by Muhammed Ali in Egypt, were both remnants of the Ottoman Empire and served as viceroys for them (Ben Mabrouk, 2013).
After two years of negotiations Tunisia adopted a new constitution and elected Habib Bourguiba as the new Tunisian republic’s president (ibid).

Bourguiba was a self-proclaimed ally of the west, calling for peace between the Arabs and Israel. He was also a self-proclaimed pioneer in women’s rights (Pace, 2000). However, shortly after his ascension to power, he altered the constitution, allowing him to be president for life (ibid).

Bourguiba prioritized education, an enduring tradition in Tunisia8, and made birth control readily available, while also legalizing abortion (Ben Mabrouk, 2013). Another enduring legacy of Bourguiba’s was his complete separation of the military from politics, forbidding them from joining the ruling party (Barany, 2011). However, his collectivization campaigns within the agriculture sector, coupled with other factors led to near economic collapse. Throughout the 70’s and 80’s Bourguiba grew increasingly authoritarian – cracking down hard on political Islam (Pace, 2000). He was ousted in a bloodless coup by his newly appointed prime minister, Zine El Abedine Ben-Ali in 1987 – on the grounds that the president was not medically fit to carry out his duties (Ben Mabrouk, 2013).

Ben Ali was not affiliated with the military at the time of ‘The Doctor’s Coup’. Ben Ali, like his predecessor, kept the military separate from the state, until its only function became “a small and modestly funded force focused on border control” (Barany, 2011). He also cracked down on political Islam (Redissi & Schraeder, 2011). Ben Ali re-instated the institution of elections, but won every election with such a landslide that people had no doubt the system was corrupt (Cherif, 2014). He allowed parties to exist, but made it very difficult for them to function. According to Youssef Cherif, a Tunisian political analyst, Ben Ali’s Tunisia was, in fact, more authoritarian and less free than Mubarak’s Egypt. Ben Ali expanded his brutal secret police infrastructure and limited press freedoms (ibid).

This was the framework of deepening country-wide tensions in which the self-immolation by the 26 year old fruit vendor, Mohammed Bouazizi took place, literally igniting the Arab Spring (Redissi & Schraeder, 2011). Bouazizi’s self-immolation mirrored the frustration many in Tunisia felt over poor socio-economic conditions and the brutal treatment from authorities (ibid). Wealthy Tunisians were also affected by poor conditions. Up to 45% of university-graduates were unable to find a job in Tunisia during Ben Ali (ibid).

After Ben-Ali’s ouster, a civilian body assumed leadership of the transitional process. The head of the military, General Rachid Ammar, made it clear from the beginning that the military had no political stake in the future of Tunisia (ibid).

The first free elections were held in October 2011 and the islamist party Ennahda won 41% of the seats in the 217-member constituent assembly. A government was appointed by the assembly, led by Ennahda’s former secretary-general, Hamadi Jebali as the Prime Minister (Stepan, 2012). During this time, a new constitution was written and approved by the people through elections. Although there were political tensions in the late summer of 2013, Jebali, unlike Morsi in Egypt, stepped down and agreed to relieve his powers to an interim government of technocrats to

8 Nearly all interviewees claim Tunisia’s education system to be much better than Egypt’s.
finalize the constitution and prepare the country for upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections (Economist, 2013).
5 Analysis

5.1 Influence of the Military

In a political transition from authoritarianism, O’Donnell and Schmitter emphasize the need for both “hard-liners” and “soft-liners” within the transitional government (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986:15). In Egypt, hard-liners in the form of the notoriously brutal SCAF took over the transitional process early on (Brown, 2013). Though its leadership positions were reshuffled under Morsi, the army remains one of the most important political players throughout Egypt’s so-far failed transition from authoritarianism. The Egyptian army, like the Tunisian one, did not fire upon its citizens when ordered to by the President, and ended up siding with the people on the issue of ousting their respective dictators (Barany, 2011). Why, then, is the army so important when comparing these two cases? And why has the army brought authoritarianism back to Egypt, while in Tunisia it completely stayed out of politics?

5.1.1 Egypt

“The role of the military in Egypt was to preserve itself, and the established institution of power”, (Eskandar, 2014).

Egypt’s military has had such a big and privileged role in Egyptian politics and economy since Nasser’s military coup in 1952, making its biggest incentive preserving itself. The military in Egypt controls large portions of the Egyptian economy. Some say 20%, while others go so far as to say 40% (Tadros, 2012). Unlike in Tunisia, the Egyptian military did not “take sides” in the uprising of 2011 until two and a half weeks into the revolt, analyzing which side would be more beneficial for them to stand with (Barany, 2011). When realizing that Mubarak’s tactics were failing, the military chose to convince the aging Mubarak to hand over the power to the SCAF (ibid). Stability and security being one of the army’s biggest priorities, they decided to give the people what they wanted by securing Mubarak’s departure, and permitting mass protests on Tahrir Square. However, the SCAF soon grew tired with many activists’ demands for transparency, justice against former regime loyalists, a more representative constituent assembly, increased acceptance for freedom of speech and human rights, and brutally cracked down on political activists and protestors in the months following Mubarak’s ouster (Brown, 2013).

According to Brown, two things were necessary for Egypt’s democratic transition to be successful:

1. “A broad agreement among elites on the rules of the transition”

2. “A procedure that allowed people to express their will early without having all matters settled by backroom deals”

Neither of these issues were settled when the military took over the transition in February 2011. The first thing the military did was suspend the constitution and

9 According to all the Egyptians I interviewed, the parliament has no insight in the military’s economy or budget whatsoever.
appoint an ex-judge to form an 8-man committee to suggest constitutional changes (Al-Jazeera, 2011b). The army deceived the people into thinking these were simply constitutional amendments when in actuality the constitutional changes were inserted into a new, military-drafted “constitutional declaration”, that would decide how the state would be run during the transition (Brown, 2013). Why did the military take control of the transitional process so early on, and why did it not leave it up to a civilian body to manage the transition?

**Dealing with the Military**

To best preserve their position, the military decided to play a very crucial role in Egypt’s transitional process. They became a sort of firewall, which any political actor would have to go through before achieving some kind of political victory. Like a firewall, they claim to be protecting the security of transitional aspirations of the Egyptian people. In Egypt, the military controls a large portion of the economy, has the largest electoral base, has no parliamentary oversight, has a wide international backing (both from Russia and the West), and currently dominates the transitional process. The Muslim Brotherhood realized from very early on that they would be forced to work with, rather than against, the military if they hoped to gain any kind of political victory (Naguib, 2014). This is, of course, not documented or proven, but one can assume a great deal of things from tracing the transitional process.

According to an interview from The Guardian with Khalil Al-Anani (expert on Egyptian islamists at Durham University), the Muslim Brotherhood were not keen on partaking in protests against Hosni Mubarak in the early stages of the uprising (Shenker, 2011). However, after seeing the unprecedented number of protesters on the street, they decided to join. Contrary to the majority of secular youth organizations who partook in the protests, the Brotherhood is a secretive organization (much like the military in that sense) with no transparency in their leadership and actions (Roll, 2013).

When the SCAF sent Egyptians to polling stations in March 2011 to vote on a set of constitutional amendments (or, rather, the military’s transitional roadmap), the Brotherhood urged their supporters to vote in favor of the proposed amendments, while secular youth activists urged their supporters to vote against the proposition (Naguib, 2014). Voting yes would mean that parliamentary and presidential elections would come sooner, rather than later, which would benefit the Brotherhood organization, as they had the biggest voter-base in the country at the time (Naguib, 2014). Naguib and Eskandar both believe that the military leadership and the Brotherhood leadership struck a deal about the transitional future of Egypt (Naguib, 2014) (Eskandar, 2014). The military agreed to let elections come sooner, while the Brotherhood vowed to work with the military - preserving their economic and political role domestically, and internationally (ibid).

“Everyone knows here in Egypt, whether it’s true or not, that the SCAF handed power over to the MB through negotiations, because it never announced the results when they had to” (Eskandar, 2014).

The Brotherhood, once in power, had set a dangerous precedent – namely that the military is a necessary partner in order to achieve political victories. After
parliamentary elections in the winter of 2011/2012, the next phase of the military-run transition was to draft a constitution. The constitution would be written by a hundred-man constituent assembly, which the parliament would choose in an indirect vote (Brown, 2013). The parliament decided to elect half of the members of the assembly from the parliament itself (dominated by Islamists) and the other half from various social groups (where Islamists were significantly represented) (ibid). This deepened the political and social divide in the country, with non-Islamist activists boycotting the process or trying to stop it altogether through judicial means (ibid). In terms of Twin Tolerations theory, this is an unwanted effect of a polarized religious society (Stepan, 2012).

However, the constitutional process continued, and the next election – now for the presidency – came in May 2012. Because of the disproportionate strength of the Muslim Brotherhood and SCAF, the vote came down to a run-off between Mohammed Morsi of the Brotherhood and Ahmed Shafiq, a man who was even prime minister during Mubarak’s presidency. In a very close election, Morsi managed to win the presidency, only to realize that the army, through the SCC (Supreme Constitutional Court) had declared that the conditions under which the Islamists-dominated parliament was elected were unconstitutional, and another ruling straight from the military stripped Morsi of most of his presidential powers (Brown, 2013).

Once in power, Morsi did his best to reverse these changes, in a move that ended in total chaos. First, Morsi challenged the SCC ruling attempting to reinstate his much-needed parliament, which failed. However, the next measures he took were more successful. Morsi managed to reverse the military-ruling, regaining the traditional presidential powers in Egypt. Next, he reshuffled the top of the uniformed leadership within the military, dismissing among others Field Marshall Tantawi and replacing him with Sisi, who now runs for president (ibid). As the deadline for the completion of the draft constitution approached, Morsi and his allies grew nervous, and in one of the most destructive moves in Egypt’s modern political history, Morsi granted himself the “powers of a God” (ibid) (Naguib, 2014). Morsi was now free to make constitutional changes without military or judicial oversight. He now had more power than Mubarak ever had, according to the constitution his constituent assembly was writing. This plunged the country into heavy polarization with street protests increasing, and calls for Morsi’s removal increasing (Brown, 2013). A referendum was held in the winter of 2012/2013 for the newly drafted constitution, where many of the opposition boycotted, bringing a mere 30% turnout. However, the constitution passed, making the next phase in Morsi’s plan to call for yet another election for the lower house of parliament which was deemed constitutionally illegal just about six months earlier (ibid).

These elections never came to pass, because the military had now realized that their safest bet was not with Morsi, but against him. The Brotherhood was becoming unpopular amidst claims of Morsi wanting to turn Egypt into an authoritarian theocracy (ibid). Whether this was a valid fear or not, an organization named Tamarrod11 organized a movement calling for Morsi’s resignation. This ended in

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10 In which the Muslim Brotherhood sponsored Freedom and Justice Party gained a majority of the seats, along with many salafies and other Islamists (Brown, 2013).

11 The Tamarrod movement may have started out as an independent activist organization, but many Egyptians believe the military funded their activities and deeply influenced their marketing strategies.
street protests on the 30th of July 2013 in the entire country. Much like when Mubarak was ousted, power was handed back to the military. However, this time it was through a military coup, fully legitimizing the military’s seizure of power, which is very problematic in terms of democratic transitions. Since then the military has drafted and adopted a new constitution for the country, chosen through elections12, and its defense minister has resigned from the military to run for president with only one opponent, the leftist Hamdeen Sabbahi who ran in the elections against Morsi (Essam El-Din, 2014).

The military has reverted Egypt back to authoritarianism worse than during Mubarak, with the Muslim Brotherhood organization not only banned but labeled a ‘terrorist group’, with over 1000 of their members receiving death sentences in only two trials, and over 20,000 jailed (BBC, 2013). Many protesters have been killed since the military coup, including over 1000 people during the dispersing of a sit-in in August 2013 (ibid). The military-appointed interim government has also cracked down hard on secular dissent in the country, arresting many opposition figures (most of whom served jail sentences during Mubarak), claiming they broke

Throughout the transitional process, which Brown neither defines as a true transition or something which brought about any positive change, the military were always present, and always working behind the scenes to preserve itself, so that it became impossible to operate without having to “gear their actions to the military’s” (Brown, 2013:52). Also, and more importantly, Egyptians have learned that dealing with the military is necessary to not become prosecuted, accused of being a spy, and/or being a terrorist.

Fearing Revenge

A crucial point made by O’Donnell and Schmitter’s (1986:28) is that settling a past account with an institution of power like the military can prove to be a difficult task. During the period when the military took over power in the spring of 2011, and the current post-Morsi period, the Egyptian army has committed gruesome human rights violations (Nabuig, 2014). If they were held accountable, many high-ranking officials within the military structure could face international prosecution. Violations include the notorious “virginity tests” (incidentally Sisi’s idea and initiative) made on young women spending the night on Tahrir Square to systematically humiliate them, and the many brutal crackdowns of street protests, including the bloody dispersal of the anti-coup sit-in at the Raba’a Al Adawiya Square in Cairo (Butt, 2012) (Amnesty International, 2013). The military in Egypt has made itself directly responsible for many crimes against humanity, and therefore, fearing to lose its privileges and given role in Egypt’s political future, it will not permit political dissent and any challenge to its rule.

O’Donnell and Schmitter (ibid:30) studied many cases in which transitions from authoritarian (but not necessarily to democratic) states occurred. They observed contextual differences, such as the military’s degree of involvement in these crimes, and to what extent these atrocities were truly horrific They found that in cases where the military had been involved, and the scars of the atrocities were very open and visible in the social psyche, the worst solution was to completely ignore it (ibid).

12 It was a landslide yes vote for the constitution, with 98% voting for it (Kingsley, 2014). This is more than vaguely reminiscent of Mubarak days when he would win election after election with over 90%, often an unusually high consensus in any democratic country about any issue.
To act like the atrocities never happened only helped to strengthen the military’s (or police’s) sense of “impunity and immunity” (ibid). It also serves as a blatant obstacle for the country’s political future, as in practice society would not just be ignoring past crimes, but also ethical values that are required in the country’s modern, functioning judicial system (ibid).

In presidential candidate and former defense minister Sisi’s latest interview with state media, he emphasized Egypt’s commitment to cracking down on the Muslim Brotherhood, which has been labeled a terrorist organization (Eskandar, 2014a). Eskandar claims Sisi called for a larger police force, while brushing “lightly over the topic of accountability over human rights violations” (ibid). If the worst thing Sisi can do is ignore the human rights violations against political opposition, then the worst has certainly come to pass.

To make matters even worse, the crackdown on the Brotherhood and all their members and affiliates for their alleged crimes has given the military increased legitimacy. Lina Wardani, Egyptian journalist, claims that the Egyptian military, in fact, is not scared of retribution. She does not believe there will be any retribution either, from any future regime in Egypt (Wardani, 2014). Whether this is true or not, it gives insight into the political climate in Egypt and what kind of power the military has proven to be.

5.1.2 Tunisia

In extremely stark contrast to Egypt, the Tunisian military played a much more quiet and insignificant role in the Tunisian transitional process, which Stepan (2012) has proclaimed to be a successful one. Like the Egyptian military, the Tunisian refused to fire upon its citizens, but unlike the Egyptian military, did not and was not expected to take over the transitional process and form its own ‘SCAF’ (Barany, 2011). There are many reasons for this, including political society and the international context. In Tunisia, as has been explained in the previous section on the country’s historical background, the founding dictator Habib Bourguiba, and his successor, Zine El Abedine Ben Ali, both kept the military small. They also took heavy measures to separate the military from politics and the economy (ibid). Instead, the military was modestly funded and had no incentive to preserve any status of affluence and political influence as it had none to begin with (ibid). The military sided with the people and secured the installation of the country’s civilian transitional entity, enforcing the ban on former regime loyalists and members of Ben Ali, or any other party under his dictatorship from participating in politics (ibid). Another important factor in the military’s weakness in Tunisia is the lack of an international importance.

To study why the transitional process was so much more successful in Tunisia than in Egypt, it is less significant to examine the Tunisian military as such, because they

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13 the same notorious authority which killed countless political dissidents before, during, and after the uprising of 2011

14 Three Al-Jazeera journalists have been in Egyptian jails for several months pending a trial against them for the crime of interviewing members of the Brotherhood (Al-Jazeera 2014).
did not participate in politics. The military’s lack of action throughout the transitional process certainly is a factor that has helped Tunisia during its transition.

5.2 Political Society

5.2.1 Tunisia’s Transition

Tunisia’s transition started, not with a military-led transitional council, but with an elected constituent assembly, who then elected a transitional government (Stepan, 2012). Much like in early Egyptian elections, the major Islamist movement Ennahda won a majority of the seats in this constituent assembly. This assembly then elected Hamadi Jebali (former secretary-general of Ennahda) as prime minister, and human-rights activist Moncef Marzouki as president. This government was installed in December 2011 and had the task to draft a new constitution, which would lead to new governmental elections after its completion (ibid). However, Tunisia has not experienced a smooth process since then, but much like Egypt, has had several obstacles and political tensions on the way. Much like in Egypt, the secular opposition parties and the Islamists did not see eye to eye, and a political and societal divide was beginning to emerge. Two crucial events served as catalysts for what could have plunged the country into total chaos.

On February 13th, 2013 a well-known Tunisian leftist politician and lawyer was gunned down by a militant Islamist while leaving his home (The Economist, 2014). Anti-Ennahda protests were heard across the country just hours after the assassination. Many accused Ennahda and Salafi movements to have been involved in the assassination. Whether this is true or not, it prompted the Ennahda-led government to reshuffle its prime minister, foreign minister, and justice minister positions, seemingly diffusing the situation. A few months later another top secular opposition figure named Mohammed Brahmi was assassinated in July 2013. This prompted even bigger street protests and outrage from the secular opposition (ibid). A few days after the assassination of Brahmi, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was ousted by a military coup – allegedly legitimized by popular support for their actions. This showed Ennahda and Tunisians how fragile the transitional process was, and after several months of political deadlock and protests, an agreement was finally reached between Ennahda and the secular opposition. The Ennahda-led government stepped down in January 2014, to be replaced by a group of neutral technocrats who would lead the country until the next elections, which Ennahda will be permitted to participate in (ibid). A new constitution was also adopted, around the same time as Egypt’s, which many claim to be the most progressive in the Arab World. So why is Egypt facing a military dictatorship while Tunisia is paving the way for a party-plural democracy? Although the lack of a military institution bent on preserving the status quo is certainly important, it is highly significant to contextualize Tunisian politics in terms of political society.
Twin Tolerations

As mentioned in the previous section on historical background, Ben Ali’s Tunisia was a police state, but not a military state (Barany, 2011). When Ben Ali was ousted and exiled in early 2011, there were no incentives for any political institution or entity to preserve the status quo, everyone wanted change. This paved the way for Tunisia’s diverse and pluralistic political society and culture.

Whereas in Egypt the SCAF took over, in Tunisia a commission called the Ben Achour Commission set up a coalition of representatives from all the newly legalized political parties and civil society groups (Stepan, 2012). According to Stepan, this turned out to be “one of the most effective consensus-building bodies in the history of ‘crafted’ democratic transitions” (ibid). This diverse commission set up the rules of the transition, which it set to a vote in the spring of 2011. An overwhelming majority of the commission voted in favor of the proposed transitional package, and from there the transition was able to emerge. One of the most crucial decisions in this package was to draft and implement a new constitution before electing an official government, because as almost all of the people I interviewed have said about Egypt: “how can we vote for a president or parliament when we do not know what powers he/she/they will have?” (Naguib, 2014) (Eskandar, 2014) (Wardani, 2014). Instead of voting for members of parliament, Tunisians voted for members of a constituent assembly. According to Stepan, the idea of Twin Tolerations were adhered to during this transition because, for the most part, secular and islamist politicians have respectfully negotiated with each other (Stepan, 2012).

It is clear that the constitution-drafting process in Tunisia was much more transparent and inclusive than the Egyptian one. According to a Tunisian activist I interviewed, Aïda Khemiri, civil society groups could follow the drafting of the constitution due to its transparency, and if something would come up that seemed undemocratic, they would organize demonstrations outside of the parliament building (Khemiri, 2014). Tunisian political society has been able to stay on the path of democratization despite political assassinations, turmoil, and mistrust between seculars and islamists. The same political turmoil and polarization existed in Egypt, so why, other than the lack of a military leading the transition, did Tunisia establish a successful political society while Egypt did not?

To answer this question, we must look to Tunisia’s historical political society. Stepan dates Tunisia’s political society back to the days of Ibn Khaldoun (1332-1406), the celebrated political philosopher (Stepan, 2012). Due to relative autonomy from the Ottoman Empire, Tunisia grew to become the most liberal and tolerant nation in the Arab World in the mid 19th-century (ibid). Tunisia drafted the Arab World’s first constitution, which according to historian Albert Hourani, left its mark by forming a new political consciousness in Tunis (ibid). Two main institutions, the Islamic-based Zeitouna Mosque University, and the secular Sadiki College worked together to influence the drafting of this constitution, which abolished slavery before the US and France did (ibid). The strength of these institutions working together (one religious, one secular) has contributed to the more twin-tolerant mindset of many Tunisians until today.

Stepan describes the years in which Habib Bourguiba took over as “the lost decades”, due to his harsh modernization techniques (ibid). Bourguiba was the
opposite of twin-tolerant, in effect banning religion in public life. He immediately closed down the religious Zeitouna University, cut the teaching of religion in public schools to one hour a week, shut down private koranic schools and required teachers to speak French as well as Arabic (ibid). Both Bourguiba and his successor Ben Ali gained great legitimacy by claiming that if they were not in power, an islamiestheocracy would replace them, like what happened in Iran in 1979 (ibid). This, however, has proven not to be true.

In 2003, a “Call from Tunis” was issued by the four major opposition parties to Ben Ali’s rule from their exile in France (Ennahda, CPR, Ettakatol, and PDP) which all took part in the transitional process through the constituent assembly (Stepan, 2012). The result of their negotiations was a document which supported the idea of twin-tolerations and affirmed their will to look to a future past Ben Ali (ibid). It embraced “respect for the people’s identity and its Arab-Muslim values”, guaranteeing “liberty of beliefs to all and the political neutralization of places of worship”. It also ensured that any government after Ben Ali would be “founded on the sovereignty of the people as the sole source of legitimacy” (ibid). In other words, any future government would have to be a civil and secular one, but Ben Ali’s anti-islamist tactics would cease. These political parties kept meeting and negotiating outside of Tunisia throughout the 2000’s, reaching more and more agreements on crucial issues, such as the family code and gender equality (ibid). This cooperative political society, and the lack of a powerful authoritarian institution of power such as the Egyptian military, served as a strong basis for the transition to democracy in Tunisia. They have also appointed a new constitution, claimed by many of the people I interviewed to be one of the most progressive in the Middle East.

5.2.2 Egypt’s (lack of) Political Society

Wardani claims that prior to the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, both countries had creative and impressive civil societies who organized the protests that brought down Ben Ali and Mubarak (Wardani, 2014). However, many remain baffled as to why this was not translated into a political society in Egypt as described in the previous section. As described above, the military in Egypt was influential in breaking down the political society, but the influence of the military is not the only factor contributing to Egypt’s lack of a political society.

The most important factor contributing to this was the lack of building pacts between islamists and secular opposition movements prior to the uprising. Whereas Ennahda in Tunisia were in negotiations with secular parties as early as 2003, the Muslim Brotherhood was a secretive organization at the time who were arguably less moderate than Ennahda (Stepan, 2012). Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was not strictly a non-regime political party like Ennahda, but were more incorporated in the political system during Mubarak (ibid). As described in the historical section, the Brotherhood in Egypt was working with the Mubarak regime, participating in political processes as independents (Naguib, 2014).

Another factor is the unwillingness of the Brotherhood leadership to establish a political consensus with secular forces in Egypt. Stepan claims to have interviewed three top Brotherhood officials who stood by their 2007 claim that “no woman or
Christian could make an acceptable president of Egypt” (Stepan, 2012). Shortly afterword, Stepan interviewed Ghannouchi, asking him what he thought of this statement. His answer: “Democracy means equality of all citizens. Such a platform excludes 60 percent of all the citizens and is unacceptable” (ibid). This clearly shows the difference in the two islamist movements, and the degree to which they are willing to work with secular forces to build a consensus-style democracy.

Although there certainly are secular forces both in Tunisia and Egypt, the fact of the matter is that the islamist movements in both countries were the most popular. This was clearly proven through elections in both countries (ibid). This meant, for secular forces, that cooperation and negotiation with the islamists was absolutely necessary. In Egypt, however, this did not happen at all. There was no “call from Tunis” prior to the uprising, and because of the military’s takeover of the transitional process, secular and islamist parties often turned to the army instead of each other. Whereas in Tunisia, seculars and islamists had been in negotiations since 2003, this did not happen in Egypt until the islamists gained the presidency (ibid).

According to Eskandar the problem was not that Morsi refused to engage in negotiations and deals with seculars, but that he made many promises and guarantees to secular forces without acting upon them (Eskandar, 2014). The most famous of these promises was Morsi’s commitment to appointing a female, Christian vice-president (ibid). This promise, along with many others made to the seculars were completely disregarded by the Morsi administration, angering the seculars who subsequently refused to engage in any kind of dialogue with Morsi (ibid). Morsi completely bulldozed over the secular parties, who, in the end, decided to side with the military rather than see Morsi continue his rule. This is why many secular forces such as the Social Democrats openly supported the military coup and were a part of the protests against Morsi in the summer of 2013 (Amin, 2013).

This displays an important difference between the two countries: Egypt, failing to build political pacts, while Tunisia succeeds.

5.3 International Pressure

Eva Hansson writes that traditional democratization and transitology theories have disregarded the complexities which accompany regime-change (Gustavsson et al, 2014, ch.18). According to Hansson, regime-change is not simply a linear process that starts with political liberalization and ends with democratic consolidation, it is rather a much more complex process.

International pressure (or the lack of it) in the Arab World can explain a lot of the outcomes of the Arab Spring countries after the mass demonstrations were initiated. In Bahrain, a coalition of Gulf-countries assisted the Bahraini government to completely silence the revolutionary movement (Holmes, 2014). In Libya, a
coalition of Western countries assisted the revolutionaries by creating a “no-fly zone”, effectively deeming Qadaffi’s air force useless (Al-Jazeera, 2011c).

The reasons why countries sometimes engage their militaries in foreign conflicts, and sometimes do not, are often geopolitically strategic. For Western powers like the US to demand China democratize would be unthinkable, it might lead to a world war, but to invade Iraq was perceived as less of a threat, plus it might have created a ‘snowball’ effect (and arguably a strategic resource abundant in Iraq).

Clinton claimed early on during the uprising that the US supports “the fundamental right of expression and assembly for all people”, while going on to say that the US’s “assessment is that the Egyptian government is stable and is looking for ways to respond to legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian people” (Reuters, 2011). How much more contradictory can one get? The so-called stable government of Egypt was a corrupt dictatorship which was actively shooting down demonstrators, and had a history of denying the fundamental rights of expression and assembly. Did Clinton not know this? It is very unlikely that she did not, but there are some fundamental differences in Egypt and Tunisia which explains why the US did ‘meddle’ in Egypt’s politics, while leaving Tunisia completely alone.

Egypt is the most populous Arab country, with one of the strongest Arab armies, which also happens to share a border with Israel (CIA, 2014). The US has a tradition of supporting authoritarian regimes around the world, notably in Latin America and the Middle East, in order to ‘contain’ communism or more recently political Islam and terrorism. The US supported the Mubarak regime throughout his 33-year rule for fear of an alternative that would be hostile to Israel. This is also the reason for the US’s annual contribution of $1.8 billion dollars to Egypt’s defense budget (AP, 2014). One of the US's most important policies in the Middle East is to ensure security for their long-term ally, Israel, and in this context support for democratization is conditional on that priority (ibid). Although the US temporarily suspended this aid amidst Sisi’s crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood and secular political dissent, it has vowed to resume it as of May, 2014 (ibid). It is clear that the US does not have a problem with returning to its policy of supporting an authoritarian Egypt, rather than see it democratize because of perceived risks. Wael Eskandar puts it simply: “One must look at America’s rationale…how would it be in America’s best interest to keep Egypt on a democratic route? How does this benefit the US?” (Eskandar, 2014).

Contrastingly, Tunisia is a relatively insignificant country in the international context. It is a small country with a much smaller population than Egypt, and does not share a border with Israel. France was also known for its ties to the Ben-Ali regime, and indeed, the French foreign minister at the time confirmed the shipping of tear gas and other means to battle protesters just days before Ben Ali was ousted (Willsher, 2011). However, because of this embarrassing fact, coupled with her ‘vacation’ in Tunisia during the uprising, her resignation became inevitable (ibid).

Hansson claims that international pressure such as world powers supporting dictatorships can promote authoritarianism and actively work against democratization, but she also claims that international exchanges can very much promote democracy (Gustavsson et al, 2014, ch.18). The fact that many exiled Tunisian political parties and actors (notably Rachid Ghannouchi, founder of Ennahda) were based in France is quite significant (Stepan, 2012). Although one
can argue over whether France’s democracy is as fully-fledged as it claims to be, but it is indeed more democratic than Mubarak’s Egypt or Ben Ali’s Tunisia was. Stepan claims that Ghannouchi and Ennahda’s exposure to the international community caused them to be more moderate and less dogmatic than the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (ibid).

5.4 Overlaps

As noted in the theories section, one cannot overlook the overlaps between the causal factors discussed above. Because of this, and the confusion it may instill, I have chosen to take a short section to comment upon this.

5.4.1 Military Influence – Political Society

Undoubtedly, the fact that Egypt’s transitional process was controlled by the military, and that it was not in Tunisia, is significant. The influence of the military has indeed affected Egypt’s political society, most often in a negative way – by pitting polarized actors and groups against each other only to swoop in and reestablish ‘order’, or simply to “divide and conquer” as Lina Wardani puts it (Wardani, 2014). Similarly, in Tunisia the lack of a military influence is significant in itself because the political society was allowed to fully blossom. However much these causal factors seem to be linked, it is still important to note that regardless of a military influence, Tunisia’s main islamist force was exiled in France (as noted in the above section), while Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood remained in the Egyptian political system. Therefore, it is still important to keep these causal factors separate rather than speak of the military influence as the only one to be significant.

5.4.2 Political Society – International Pressure

As mentioned in the previous section, a big reason for the fact that Tunisia’s political society is more successful than Egypt’s is that it gained much experience from international exposure. However, this is not the only reason. Tunisia’s political history, as well as the willingness of its political groups and actors to cooperate and build consensus is the main reason for its relative success in political society. International pressure such as the US’s military contribution to Egypt can explain certain aspects of Egypt’s political society, but this is also too simplistic of an explanation, which is why these causal factors also have remained separate.

5.4.3 International Pressure – Military Influence

Although the US’s military aid to Egypt has made a lot of Egypt’s military influence stronger, the military would not have been able to thrive unless it could play upon
their popularity and their history as protectors of Egypt. Similarly, the lack of significant international contributions to Tunisia’s military is not the only reason for its refrain from political participation, it is also due to Tunisia’s political history. Therefore, these causal factors have also remained separate.
6 Conclusion

In the middle of a question I was about to pose to Lina Wardani, she interrupted me and said:

“Can I just say something? Yes there are differences, and I recall the same kind of questions since the uprising on the street, in seminars, on the radio, in culture cafés, but I still feel that the cases had very similar positions” (Wardani, 2014).

This is the crux of my study. Tunisia and Egypt were so very similar going into these revolts that to imagine the outcomes being so different today would be very hard to do in January, 2011. However, I believe I have pointed out the most important three causal factors, namely the different degree of military influence, the difference in political society, and the difference in international pressure.

As mentioned in the section above on overlaps, these three causal factors are of course dependent on each other, but without each isolated factor, the difference in outcome would not be the same. Through this study I have shown that Egypt’s military influence caused their transition to go rotten, and double back on itself, while the lack of a significant military influence in Tunisia moved them farther away from authoritarianism. I have shown that political society and the degree to which it can affect high politics matters, and fosters democratization processes. This has given Tunisia the transitional edge it need to successfully move forward. Finally, I have shown that international pressure (or the lack of it) matters. In Egypt, peace and stability were prioritized above human rights and democracy, while in Tunisia international exchanges and the lack of international ‘ meddling’ gave it yet another edge in its democratic transition.

In conclusion, these countries will probably keep transitioning in some form of direction, but what the result of this process starting with the Jan/Feb 2011 uprisings, cannot be foretold now. However, with this paper I have aimed to explain the transitional outcomes so far, through my comparison of Egypt’s failure to Tunisia’s success.
7 References

7.1 Oral Interviews

Cherif, Youssef, Tunisian political analyst and archeologist
Eskandar, Wael, Egyptian journalist covering the Egyptian transitional process
Khemiri, Aïda, Tunisian blogger/activist
Naguib, Mina, Egyptian blogger/activist
Sandels, Alexandra, Swedish former LA Times Middle Eastern Correspondent, recently back from a trip to Tunisia
Wardani, Lina, Egyptian journalist/activist covering the transitional process

7.2 Literature

7.3 Internet Sources

Downloaded: 2014-04-20

Downloaded: 2014-05-15

Downloaded: 2014-05-07

Downloaded: 2014-04-24

Downloaded: 2014-05-06

Downloaded: 2014-04-02

Downloaded: 2014-04-02

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Downloaded: 2014-04-03

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Downloaded: 2014-05-12

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8 Appendices

8.1 Appendix 1

**Oral Interviews**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Place of Interview</th>
<th>Interview Method</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Youssef Cherif</td>
<td>Tunisian analyst, archeologist</td>
<td>April 28(^{th}), 2014</td>
<td>20 minutes</td>
<td>Tunis, Tunisia</td>
<td>Skype Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wael Eskandar</td>
<td>Egyptian journalist</td>
<td>April 15(^{th}), 2014</td>
<td>23 minutes</td>
<td>Cairo, Egypt</td>
<td>Skype Interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aïda Khemiri</td>
<td>Tunisian blogger/activist</td>
<td>April 26(^{th}), 2014</td>
<td>23 minutes</td>
<td>Tunis, Tunisia</td>
<td>Skype Interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mina Naguib</td>
<td>Egyptian blogger/activist</td>
<td>April 18(^{th}), 2014</td>
<td>20 minutes</td>
<td>Stockholm, Sweden</td>
<td>Personal Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandra Sandels</td>
<td>Former <em>L.A. Times</em> Middle East</td>
<td>April 19(^{th}), 2014</td>
<td>23 minutes</td>
<td>Stockholm, Sweden</td>
<td>Personal Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lina Wardani</td>
<td>Egyptian journalist/activist</td>
<td>May 11(^{th}), 2014</td>
<td>18 minutes</td>
<td>Cairo, Egypt</td>
<td>Skype Interview</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 8.2 Appendix 2

### Interview Guide

x: Question discussed with respondent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List of Sample Questions</th>
<th>Youssef Cherif</th>
<th>Wael Eskandar</th>
<th>Aïda Khemiri</th>
<th>Mina Naguib</th>
<th>Alexandra Sandels</th>
<th>Lina Wardani</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In your opinion, is Tunisia ‘doing better’ in terms of democratization than Egypt? Why/Why not?</td>
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<tr>
<td>How does the Ennahda Party and the Muslim Brotherhood differ? How are they Similar?</td>
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<td>How autonomous is Egypt’s military?</td>
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<td>What is the significance of Tunisia’s new constitution?</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>How has the international community reacted/acted toward the revolts in Egypt/Tunisia?</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>Why did dialogue and compromise fail in Egypt?</td>
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<td>How did dialogue and compromise succeed in Tunisia?</td>
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<tr>
<td>What kind of political and civic society existed in Tunisia/Egypt before and after the revolts?</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Does the fact that Ennahda was exiled while the Brotherhood was not have any significance?</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>Question</td>
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<tr>
<td>Was the constitution-drafting in Egypt/Tunisia a transparent proceeding?</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How did the constitution-drafting look like in Tunisia/Egypt?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Is Egypt/Tunisia of geopolitical importance internationally?</td>
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<td>How did/are civil society groups operating during the transitional process?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Will the Tunisian/Egyptian constitution be implemented?</td>
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