The European Union’s Border Management
A study about the coordination in its horizontal and vertical dimension

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Abstract

One of the greatest achievements of the European Union (EU) is the abolition of internal borders and the establishment of the right to free movement. Consequently, the EU has made an effort managing its common external borders by establishing several internal mechanisms, instruments and bodies as well as various forms of cooperation with the associated Schengen countries and external third actors. Considering the various means of the EU’s border policy, the question arises how these different efforts are coordinated. As for the EU’s border management to be effective it has to take place at different levels. Hence, this study’s analysis is guided by an altered version of the four-tier access control model developed in the EU Schengen Catalogue. Thereby, the focus lies on the different efforts undertaken by the EU as well as on the coordination in the horizontal and the vertical dimension of border management. As result, this thesis suggests that the mode of coordination depends on the respective stakeholders involved and the EU’s relationship towards these actors and therefore varies across the different levels of border management.

Key words: border control, coordination, European Union, four-tier access control model, integrated border management

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List of abbreviations

Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ)
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS)
Council of the European Union (Council)
Directorate-General (DG)
European Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM)
European External Action Service (EEAS)
European Commission (Commission)
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
European Parliament (EP)
European Union (EU)
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)
German Federal Ministry of Interior (German FMI)
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM)
Integrated Border Management (IBM)
International Organization for Migration (IOM)
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)
Member States (MS)
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)
Passenger Name Record (PNR)
Schengen Information System (SIS)
Supplementary Information Request at the National Entries (SIRENE)
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP)
Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI)
Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA)
Swiss Directorate for European Affairs (Swiss DEA)
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
United Kingdom (UK)
United Nations (UN)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
United States of America (USA)
Working Group (WG)
1 Introduction

“The external borders of the EU play a key role in defining and protecting the area of freedom, security and justice that we all desire. The control and surveillance of borders contribute to managing flows of persons entering and leaving that area and help protect our citizens from threats to their security.”

One of the greatest achievements of the European Union (EU) is the abolition of internal borders and the establishment of the right to free movement guaranteed to EU citizens by treaty. Nowadays, the Schengen area comprises almost 44,000 km of external sea borders and 9,000 km of land borders, granting nearly half a billion inhabitants the right of internal free movement (Frontex 2014a). However “most threats to the internal security of the EU either originate outside Europe or have a clear nexus to other parts of the world” (Council 2010b: 3). Considering that the problems of irregular migration and crime are not subject to geographical restrictions, external border control is crucial for the EU’s internal security. Thus, with the abolition of internal border checks the EU saw an increasing need to strengthen the management of its ‘external frontiers’, meaning the combined territory of the EU Member States (MS).

An effective border management is considered inevitable for stability, security as well as for economic growth. Hence, a strong management of the external frontiers helps reducing and fighting the cross-border movement of crime, terrorism and irregular migration. At the same time, it facilitates trade and legal movement of people. Therefore, using the words of Marenin (2006: 11) “borders must be both open and closed, be both gates and walls”. These different functions already point towards the multi-functionality and complexity of border management.

Thus, notwithstanding that the responsibility for borders remains primarily with its MS, the EU developed several mechanisms and policies internally, but also in cooperation with the associated Schengen countries. Additionally, the EU signed various agreements with third parties and initiated different projects for securing its external frontiers. In this regard, the European Commission2 (2007: 13) stressed the importance of coordination and cooperation in border control “to reach the common goal of open, but controlled and secure borders”. Considering the various means of the EU’s border management, the question arises how these different efforts are coordinated.

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1 Council 2002b: 3
2 Hereafter: The Commission
Reviewing official documents and secondary literature, it is arguable that in order for the EU’s border management to be effective it has to take place at different levels ranging from the member state level, over common European action to the involvement of the associated Schengen countries and third actors outside the EU. Nonetheless, most of the border management literature deals with separate single elements of the EU’s border policies like asylum and migration issues (e.g. Geddes 2005), Frontex (e.g. Carrera 2007), the Schengen area (e.g. Monar 2006) or the European approach to individual countries (e.g. Kirisci 2007). Another frequently covered topic is the accountability of the EU’s border management. So far only little scholarly work was conducted, however, investigating into the broader picture of European border management and the coordination of its different levels. Berg and Ehin (2006) are two of the few scholars who examine more than one policy area in their study, but still do not scrutinize their interconnection. As hardly any scholar has investigated more thoroughly into the different levels of the EU’s external border policy and the coordination, with this thesis a contribution to this matter is intended. Thus, the following twofold question shall guide the subsequent study:

What are the different efforts undertaken by the EU to manage the European external borders, and how are these efforts of border management coordinated?

Since coordination is generally difficult to be achieved by any policy system (Schout & Jordan 2008: 11), coordinating the EU’s external border regime can be considered even more intricate due to its characterization as a so-called ‘high politics’ field by intruding the states’ sovereignty. In this context, Chisholm (1989: 13) considers coordination as an attempt “to bring about some kind of order”. Over the years, the EU developed an Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy stressing the importance of cooperation and a smooth interplay of national measures, joint EU action and cooperation with the Schengen associated members and third countries. The establishment of the four-tier access control model for border management by the EU Schengen Catalogue can be regarded an attempt to ‘bring some kind of order’ into the European efforts of border control. This model is altered slightly to fit the needs of this paper and used as a framework to scrutinize the various European means to control the common external borders.

Referring to Malone and Crowston (1990: 361) coordination is “the act of managing interdependencies”. In this regard, it is arguable that the way cooperation occurs reflects the particular mode of coordination. Consequently, the following analysis aims at identifying and examining the nature of these interdependencies and how are they managed by the EU, or in other words how they are coordinated. Hence, by determining the stakeholders’ relationship, the particular mode of coordination can be identified.

According to the multilevel governance approach by Hooghe and Marks, which describes policy coordination across multiple levels, interaction among actors occurs in two ways: in a vertical dimension across the different levels of governance and in a horizontal dimension between relevant actors within the same level (Hooghe & Marks 2001: 1-4). Considering the EU’s four-tier access control
model, these two dimensions seem also to be present in border management. Thus, this study investigates the coordination of the multiple stakeholders and mechanisms in the horizontal dimension (the interaction between the EU and the respective actor in the particular level) and in the vertical dimension between the different levels of border management.

In order to cover these two dimensions of coordination in European border management, the initial research question is divided into two sub questions that guide the later analysis:

**Horizontal dimension:** What are the different efforts undertaken by the EU to manage its external borders and how does the cooperation and coordination with the respective actor(s) look like?

**Vertical dimension:** How are the different levels of border management interconnected and coordinated?

The following thesis’ aim is twofold: first, the different efforts undertaken collectively by the EU to manage the external borders within the different levels are examined. Thereby, the focus is not solely on migration and asylum as many scholars previously did, but on the concept of border management as an approach to fight cross-border crime in general. The second more theoretical purpose is to contribute to the existing research by investigating into the coordination of the IBM levels. However, as this thesis focuses on the analysis of the existing structure of the EU’s efforts in protecting its external borders objectively, it does not discuss the moral and ethical criticism of the EU’s measures of border control which is often raised by NGOs and public media. Neither does it assess the effectiveness of the EU’s IBM.

For reasons of overview, this chapter ends with an outline of the study. After this introduction, Chapter 2 leads into the concept of border management by offering definitions of the most important terms. Next to the discussion of IBM, a brief outline of the legislative development of the EU’s border policies is given. Following this, Chapter 3 provides the theoretical background as a basis for the later analysis by determining the concepts of coordination and cooperation, before the methodology chapter (Chapter 4) describes the methodological approach and research design of this study. Chapter 5 entails the actual analysis of the EU’s efforts in border management by subsequently investigating into the different levels of the adjusted four-level-model of border management (horizontal dimension, Chapter 5.1) and their interconnection (vertical dimension, Chapter 5.2). Chapter 5.3 merges and theorizes the findings of both dimensions. Finally, the paper concludes (Chapter 6) by answering the main research question as well as assessing the outcome and limits of the study.
2 Border management

As aforementioned, this thesis aims to examine the EU’s efforts in border management. In this regard, the following questions may arise: ‘What are borders, border control and management?’ and ‘How does the EU approach its border management?’. This chapter thus focuses on providing the necessary background knowledge to examine the EU’s efforts to manage its external frontiers. The particular concepts are defined in a first step, before the European approach of external border management and its development are outlined in a second.

2.1 The concept of borders, border control and border management

Over decades, the perception of what constitutes a border has changed. According to Berg and Ehin (2006: 66) the conceptual category of external borders is extremely diverse and fragmented. Although there is no definition agreed-upon of what constitutes border security by scholars, the importance of controlling the external borders is uncontested, as it constitutes a key priority of states. Geddes (2005) distinguishes between three types of borders: territorial, organizational and conceptual. Territorial borders are understood as the classical land, sea and air ports of entry “at which the sovereign powers of the state to exclude are exercised” (Geddes 2005: 789). The second type of borders, organizational borders, are said to consist of the membership conditions for migrants leading to the access to the welfare state, labour market and the national citizenship. Lastly, conceptual borders comprise notions of community and identity (Geddes 2005: 788-790). The following thesis is based on the first conception of territorial borders. In this regard, the EU refers to external borders as “the Member States’ land borders, including river and lake borders, sea borders and their airports, river ports, sea ports and lake ports, provided that they are not internal borders” (EU 2006: Article 2(2)).

Controlling the frontiers is considered an integral part of high politics that impinges directly on state sovereignty (Geddes 2012: 266). Therefore, an effective border management is indispensable. In general, border management describes the act of managing the respective border control measures and the administration of borders. Hills (2011: 33) points out that the precise meaning of border management varies according to the national context. However, it usually concerns the legislative framework, approaches and procedures to regulate
activities as well as traffic across borders.\(^3\) As this thesis scrutinizes the European efforts of external border management, a definition of border control coined by the EU is used in the subsequent analysis. Consequently, border control is defined as “activities carried out at a border, in response exclusively to an intention to cross a border, and consisting of border checks and border surveillance” (EU 2010a). Thereby, the definition is composed of two integral elements of border management which are the systematic check of all persons crossing the external frontiers and the assurance of effective border surveillance between border crossing points (Council 2002a: 10; Council 2009: 14).

Referring to Anderson (2000: 15) border controls are part of so-called ‘frontier regimes’. These regimes “consist of agreements about borders […]; the practices that have grown up around them; the administration and management of borders controls; related systems of police and customs cooperation; and institutions and arrangements for transfrontier cooperation” (Anderson 2000: 15). The frontier regime of IBM established by the EU is subject to scrutiny in the following thesis. But what does European IBM imply?

### 2.2 Integrated Border Management (IBM)

According to the Council of the European Union\(^4\) (2009: 8) “an overall model for European border management is an important tool for safeguarding internal security of the Member States and, in particular, to prevent and reveal illegal immigration and related crime as well as other cross-border crime”. Thus, effective border management is not only inevitable for those countries at whose frontiers border control is carried out, but for all MS that participate in the area of free movement and have abolished their internal borders (principle of solidarity) (Council 2009: 8). Reviewing the respective literature, different approaches are suggested to tackle the issue of managing the external borders. One approach is the concept of IBM with a particular emphasis on security issues.

Referring to Marenin (2010: 17) IBM has diverse meanings both in literature and in practice. As this thesis investigates the EU’s efforts of border management, the European IBM perception will be used. The EU’s concept of IBM was first mentioned by the Commission in the 2002-2006 planning programme for the Western Balkans, followed by the ‘four-tier access control model’ stated in the Schengen Catalogue in 2002. In order to effectively manage

\(^3\) In more detail, the EU determines management of external borders as “the activities carried out by public authorities of the Member States in order: (a) to carry out checks and surveillance at external borders provided for by articles 5 and 6 of the Schengen Convention; (b) To gather, analyse and exchange any specific intelligence or general information enabling the border guard to analyse the risk that a person, object or asset constitutes for the internal security of the common area of freedom of movement, law and order or the national security of the Member States, and for general compliance with Community legislation; (c) To analyse the development of the threats likely to affect the security of the external borders and to set the priorities for action by border guards accordingly; (d) To anticipate the needs as regards staff and equipment to ensure security at external borders” (Commission 2007a: 10).

\(^4\) Hereafter: The Council
its borders, the EU developed a more general IBM strategy over the years. Therefore, a respective European IBM concept, based on the aforementioned general definition of border management, was adopted by the JHA Council in 2006. The Commission (2007: 13) defined IBM as “the coordination and cooperation among all the relevant authorities and agencies involved in border security and trade facilitation to establish effective, efficient and integrated border management systems, in order to reach the common goal of open, but controlled and secure borders”. Accordingly, as the concepts of coordination and cooperation constitute integral parts of IBM, they are discussed more in detail in Chapter 3.

The EU’s IBM strategy consists of the following aspects: border control (checks and surveillance), investigation of cross border crime in coordination with the respective law enforcement authorities, the four-tier access control model\(^5\), interagency and international cooperation, coordination and coherence of institutions and MS’ activities (Council 2006: 4). Furthermore, the EU defined several objectives to be achieved through the successful application of the IBM strategy such as the facilitation of traffic, trade and border controls, action against cross-border crime, irregular migration and terrorism as well as the cooperation with the countries of origin and transit of crime and irregular migration. Additionally, with the development of an IBM strategy the EU aimed to detect persons who are running serious risks in attempting to enter the EU irregularly and to enable appropriate measures by the border control services (Council 2006: 5-6).

According to Carrera (2007: 4) the “first generation of the EU IBM” was created by two achievements: the adoption of the Schengen Borders Code and the establishment of Frontex. The development of the legislative framework of the EU’s border policies is subject of the following section.

### 2.3 The development of the EU’s border management policy

Before the EU’s efforts to manage its frontiers are scrutinized, it appears necessary to outline the legislative development of the EU’s border policies briefly to provide background knowledge for the later analysis.

One of the first attempts of border control cooperation occurred outside of the framework of European treaties: the Schengen Agreement of 1985. It was signed by Belgium, France, (West) Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands at a symbolic location on the river Mosel where the borders of France, Germany and Luxembourg meet. The Schengen Agreement, complemented by the ‘Schengen Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement’\(^6\), abolished internal border controls between the participating states. Additionally, it established common rules and cooperation in migration, visas and asylum. Nevertheless, it took

\(^5\) Please consult Chapter 4.1 on methodology, since the four-tier access control model will be used as the basis for the methodological framework of this study.

\(^6\) Hereafter: the ‘Schengen Convention’
additional five years before the Schengen Convention finally implemented common uniform principles of border control based on a European legal basis. These principles were laid down in a ‘Common Manual for External Borders’ (Commission 2002: 6; Monar 2006: 175). By 1997 nearly all EU MS had signed the Schengen Agreement. However, whereas the UK and Ireland did not sign the agreement, Denmark only opted out of some parts. The Schengen Protocol as appendix to the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 finally integrated the Schengen acquis into EU legislation (Council 2002a; Geddes 2012: 272; Lavenex 2010: 463).

With the creation of the pillar system by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, border control became an explicit matter of European internal security. Since then, border management has fallen within the competence of JHA (Geddes 2012: 266). The Treaty of Amsterdam, together with the Tampere Programme (1999-2004), coined the idea of the EU as an area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) and declared it a fundamental objective of the EU by enshrining it in Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

In 2001, the Laeken European Council initiated the discussion concerning the development of a EU IBM strategy by stating in its Conclusion that “[b]etter management of the Union’s external border controls will help in the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration networks and the traffic in human beings” (European Council 2001: 12). The next significant step on the path towards a European IBM was taken by the Commission in 2002 by publishing the Communication ‘Towards integrated management of the external borders of the Member States of the European Union’. The document included possible approaches for developing a common policy for managing external borders (Hobbing 2005: 1). Subsequently, the Council adopted a ‘Plan for the management of the external borders of the Member States of the European Union’ in 2002 containing five integral elements of IBM: common cooperation and coordination mechanism, personnel and inter-operational equipment, common integrated risk analysis as well as a common corpus of legislation and burden sharing (Council 2002a). The Seville European Council in 2002 approved the plan pursuing an increase of synergies among the MS (Council 2002b). In 2006, the JHA Council published strategic deliberations of the IBM and by this further defined its scope (Council 2006).

Two years later, the Hague Programme (2004-2009) was drafted. It was a derivative of the Tampere Programme. Among others, the Hague Programme emphasized the ‘external dimension’ of internal security by focusing on cooperation with non-EU MS. The 2009 Stockholm Programme contained a subsequent action plan and renewed the external focus (European Council 2010). The key elements were addressed in the Treaty of Lisbon which made the institutional processes and Community decision-making rules applicable for almost all matters of internal security, including border control (Geddes 2012: 266, 280-281).

In 2008, the Commission published three Communications, also known as the ‘Border Package’, covering the evaluation and future development of Frontex, the European border surveillance system (EUROSUR) and future challenges for EU external border management (Council 2009: 17). By adopting an ‘Internal
Security Strategy’ in 2010, the Council operationalized cooperation between law enforcement, border and judicial authorities, before in February 2013 the Commission published a new ‘smart border package’ of measures to reinforce border checks and surveillance and to improve operational coordination (Commission 2013c). The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 turned the former intergovernmental character of JHA (including border controls) into a supranational one by granting rights to the European Parliament (EP) through the ordinary legislative procedure and by giving the right of initiative to the Commission. The provisions on border control are nowadays laid down in chapter two ‘Policies on Border Checks, Migration and Asylum’, Title V, particularly in Article 77 TFEU.

Based on this legislative framework various measures of IBM were taken on the operational level. These efforts as well as the cooperation and coordination of the multiple means are scrutinized in Chapter 5.
3 Theoretical considerations

Once the concepts related to border management and the European IBM strategy in particular were introduced, it is necessary to discuss the concepts of cooperation and coordination as integral elements of IBM to establish the principal theoretical basis.

3.1 Coordination

Well-functioning and effective coordination is an indispensable condition of the EU’s IBM strategy. But what does coordination actually mean? Various disciplines have already approached the concept of coordination. Reviewing the respective literature, the term is frequently utilized by scholars and politicians but rarely defined. Generally, Chisholm (1989: 13) considers coordination as an attempt “to bring about some kind of order”. In more depth, Malone and Crowston determine coordination as “the act of managing interdependencies between activities performed to achieve a goal” (1990: 361). Therefore, the emphasis lies on “interdependencies” as the actors are aiming at achieving a “common objective” (Malone & Crowston 1990: 362).

This definition can also be applied to the management of the EU’s external borders. As aforementioned, the EU has developed different means and cooperates with several stakeholders pursuing the same objective: border security and control. Thus, there are interdependencies between the activities of the policies, mechanisms and actors which require a well-functioning management, and thus coordination, according to the outlined definition by Malone and Crowston.

But how can coordination be achieved? Generally drawing from the respective literature it is arguable that coordination depends to a large extent on the relations between the actors involved in the policy that needs to be coordinated. Thereby, “any organization is dependent on other organizations for resources” (Rhodes 2006: 433). Accordingly, “actors employ strategies within known rules of the game to regulate the process of exchange” (Rhodes 2006: 433), leading to different modes of coordination.

The most commonly known coordination modes are hierarchy and network. In this regard, a system coordinated by hierarchy features a top-down command structure with clear standards and rules to ensure the regulated action of subordinate bodies (Jordan & Schout 2008: 15). Thus, a hierarchy’s main element is the “overt rule-driven design and direction” (Thompson 2003: 22). Nevertheless, Chisholm (1989: 13) stresses that this mode is not necessarily
indispensable, as coordination “may consist of a number of things of equal rank or of a number of actions or processes properly combined”. In this respect scholars bring in a second mode of coordination as alternative to hierarchies: networks. A popular definition comes from Kickert, Klijn and Koopenjan (in Adam & Kriesi 2007: 132), defining networks as “(more or less) stable patterns of social relations between interdependent actors, which take shape around policy problems and/or policy programme”. Other scholars determine ‘policy networks’ more specifically as “sets of formal institutional and informal linkages between governmental and other actors structured around shared if endlessly negotiated beliefs and interests in public policymaking and implementation” (Rhodes 2006: 426). In this regard, important characteristics of a policy network are that the members are essentially equal, have mutual interests and are dependent on each other (Adam & Kriesi 2007: 129; Jordan & Schout 2008: 16).

In a quintessence, networks and hierarchies can both be considered tools to “manage interdependencies” and thus to ensure coordination. Thereby, the mode of coordination depends on the particular relation between the involved actors to a large extent (Adam & Kriesi 2007: 130; Thompson 2003).

Most scholars agree that generally coordination in the EU appears in network structures (e.g. Jordan & Schout 2008; Jönsson & Strömvik 2005). This however might not be the case for coordinating the different efforts undertaken by the EU in the field of IBM. As previously outlined, border management is considered high politics by touching profound and vital interests of the MS. Therefore, managing and coordinating the security of the EU’s frontiers varies to a certain extent from low politics and the general management of the EU. Furthermore, the European IBM strategy also considers the cooperation and interaction with various actors outside the EU. In this regard, the coordination modes are very likely to differ compared to the general EU internal coordination. Therefore, the question arises which mode is present in coordinating the EU’s IBM.

Drawing on literature, some criteria (cf. Table 1) can be identified that constitute the characters of the coordination modes of hierarchy and networks. These criteria guide the later analysis in terms of determining the particular form of coordination in both the horizontal and vertical dimension of European border management.

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7 There are various forms of policy networks such as epistemic communities, issue networks, iron triangles, policy sub-systems or policy communities (more information please consult Rhodes (2006)).

8 The criteria are derived primarily from the work of Adam & Kriesi (2007); Arino (1997); Chisholm (1989); Jönsson & Strömvik (2005); Lavenex & Wichmann 2009; Rhodes (2006); Schout & Jordan (2008) and Thompson (2003).

9 The criteria illustrate the ideal types of the coordination modes of hierarchy and networks. Rhodes (in Jönsson & Strömvik 2005: 17) already noted “it’s the mix [between the types] that matters”. Hence, in the empirical analysis (Chapter 5), the findings might point to variant forms or combinations of both modes of coordination.
Much research has been conducted concerning the coordination of the EU and within its MS (Schout & Jordan 2008: 4). However, only few scholarly literature deals with the coordination of the various actors and mechanisms of policy enforcement in external border management. In this context the aforementioned multilevel governance approach by Hooghe and Marks can be considered one concept that deals with the handling of policy coordination across multiple layers. In short, multilevel governance describes the interacting authority structures at different territorial levels for decision-making within the EU. The approach takes into account the various actors involved such as supranational, national, regional and local state and non-state actors. In this regard, governance is understood as “coordinating multiple players in a complex setting of mutual dependence” (Kohler-Koch: in Jönsson & Strömvik 2005: 13).

The system of European IBM can be studies from the perspective of multi-level governance, as the EU developed various mechanisms at different levels to manage its external borders. Moreover, this approach appears to be suited for the thesis’ aim as it takes multiple stakeholders at varying levels of policy-making into account. Nonetheless, since IBM also involves stakeholders from outside the EU, the original approach needs to be extended by adding an ‘external level’.

Furthermore, Hooghe and Marks argue that the actors of all political arenas and levels are interconnected. As initially mentioned, according to them, the interaction among these actors occurs in a vertical and in a horizontal dimension (Hooghe & Marks 2001: 1-4). Hence, using the multi-level governance approach allows for an understanding of the issue’s complexity within and between levels. To structure the multi-layered policy area of IBM, the following thesis refers the system of European IBM as a four-level model by investigating into the different

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hierarchy</th>
<th>Network</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top-down structure</td>
<td>Essentially equal actors/relative balance of power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political and/or economic</td>
<td>institutional linkages/Social patterns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leverage</td>
<td>Built on trust and loyalty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear standards and rules</td>
<td>Mutual interests/Symmetric interdependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(monitoring of compliance)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric dependence</td>
<td>Diffuse reciprocity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific reciprocity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 In this thesis, *asymmetric dependency* means that one party is more depended on the benefits of the relation than the other party.
11 *Specific reciprocity* means “situation in which specified partners exchange items of equivalent value in a strictly delimited sequence” (Keohane, in Jönsson & Strömvik 2005: 20).
12 In a network mode of coordination, this thesis refers to *symmetric interdependence* as a situation where all parties are equally deepened on each other.
13 *Diffuse reciprocity* means “the participants do not insist on immediate and exactly equivalent reciprocation of each and every concession, on an appropriate ‘quid’ for every ‘quo’” (Jönsson & Strömvik 2005: 20).
levels\textsuperscript{14} of border management and how they are interconnected and coordinated. Thereby, the study aims to explore which modes of coordination occur both within the different levels (horizontal dimension) and across the levels of border management (vertical dimension).

3.2 Cooperation

The next concept that is important to be defined is closely linked to coordination: \textit{cooperation}. Cooperation is just like coordination a significant concept and integral part of the European IBM strategy. Thus, it can be said that the whole concept of IBM is built upon cooperation among different actors at and between the multiple levels of border management.

In its IBM strategy, the Commission stressed the importance of internal and international cooperation (Commission 2004a: 19-23). But what do we understand by \textit{cooperation}? Like coordination, cooperation is approached by diverse disciplines of research. Especially in the field of international relations, cooperation is a well-known and often utilized concept.

Arino (1997: 215-219) points out, that cooperation includes two particular elements: veracity and commitments. Thus, actors that intend to cooperate shall act truthfully as well as endeavour to make efforts. These basic values are embedded in the self-conception of the EU since cooperation is a fundamental assumption of the EU and enshrined in many parts of the European Treaties. Nonetheless, cooperation within the EU often differs from other kinds of bilateral or multilateral cooperation. Therefore in the case of the European IBM strategy, cooperation has to be distinguished from the general cooperation within the EU, as border policies are a field of high politics and involve a variety of stakeholders, including third actors from outside the EU. Thus, it is arguable that external actors require further incentives to cooperate with the EU in securing European borders. Thus, the commitments made by the actors are very likely to differ and thus may lead to varying levels of cooperation.

Furthermore, according to Adam and Kiresi (2007: 134) there are three levels of cooperation: conflict/competition, bargaining/negotiation and cooperation. In this regard, as the form and the degree of cooperation is to a great part intertwined with the stakeholders’ relation, it affects in turn the coordination mode. Hence, using the words of Jönsson (1986: 42), “the ability of each participating actor to gain his ends is dependent on the behaviour of other participating actors”, in short ‘strategic interdependence’ leading to ‘strategic interaction’. Consequently, for cooperation to occur, incentives and a certain degree of interdependence between the actors is necessary (Axelrod 1981: 307). Thus, the conditions of cooperation in turn determine the mode of coordination. Accordingly, the later analysis pursues to investigate the stakeholders’ cooperation in European IBM and thereby detect how it is coordinated.

\textsuperscript{14} The four filters of IBM are measures of border management outside the EU, in cooperation with the Schengen area, at the external borders and measures inside the territories of the MS. This model and its utilization as framework for this study are explained more in detail in Chapter 4.
4 Methodology

Once the theoretical foundation is set, the research design and methodology of this study is introduced. The above-outlined concepts of coordination and cooperation as well as the multilevel governance approach are employed in a deductive approach. Thus, these broad theoretical concepts are narrowed down for the needs of this study and thereby evolved and refined as basis for further research in the field of European IBM.

In the course of the EU’s IBM development a four-tier access control model was created that is now utilized as a template and reference for this thesis’ analysis. The following section describes the original model in a first step before launching an altered version of the model serving as framework to guide the later analysis.

4.1 The original four-tier access control model

According to the EU (Council 2002a: 9), IBM is “spread over four complementary tiers”. Based on this, a respective model was developed as part of the EU Schengen Catalogue\textsuperscript{15} in 2002, called the ‘four-tier access control model’. It exposed a system covering the complex aspects and different levels of European IBM.

The four tiers of the model are:

- activities in third countries, countries of origin and transit
- bilateral and international cooperation (cooperation with neighbouring countries)
- measures at the external borders
- activities inside the territories. (Council 2002a: 11)

The first tier covers the activities of border management in third countries. It requires the cooperation with liaison offices and staff from the Schengen countries in third countries with a focus on countries of origin and transit of cross-border crime (Article 47 Schengen Convention). They are meant to give advice and

\textsuperscript{15} The EU Schengen Catalogue’s purpose is to clarify and outline the Schengen acquis by indicating recommendations and best practices meant as guidelines for states acceding to the Schengen area, but also for those who fully apply the Schengen acquis already (Council 2002: 7). In course of the developments in the field of border management, the initial Schengen Catalogue of 2002 needed to be revised and updated in 2006 and 2009, also by including the work and cooperation tasks performed by Frontex into the four-tier access control model.
training regarding visa processes to consular officials in third countries determined in Articles 15 and 17 (Council 2002a: 12).

The second tier treats border control in multilateral, bilateral and local international cooperation. Here, the focus is lying especially on the cooperation with neighbouring countries. Concerning this matter, the Catalogue recommends the establishment communication channels and local contact points to exchange information, develop emergency procedures and handle incidents in an objective manner to avoid political disputes (Council 2002a: 13).

Measures at the external borders determine the third tier of the four-tier access control model which covers the “core area of general border strategy” (Council 2002a: 14) meaning border checks and surveillance based on risk analysis. Accordingly, the Catalogue outlines measures to be taken for safeguarding the external borders: the development of coherent legislation and an appropriate infrastructure consisting of both material and human resources. Furthermore, a clear concept of training is required covering operational skills, knowledge of legislation and language training. To ensure internal coordination, information exchange between the authorities and a clear allocation of competences is essential (Council 2002a: 14-15).

The last tier deals with activities inside the territories of the Schengen countries aiming at preventing illegal immigration and cross-border crime internally through measures enforced by the national authorities in accordance with the respective national law. Thereby, police cooperation between the Schengen countries may support national action (Article 39(4), (5) Schengen Convention). Moreover, the fourth tier comprises repatriation pursuant to national law, Article 23 of the Schengen Convention, humanitarian grounds and international law (Council 2002a: 15).

4.2 An altered four-level model of border management

As aforementioned, the four-tier access control model was initially designed for managing the borders of the Schengen area. However, this thesis pursues the objective of investigating the efforts primarily undertaken in the name of the EU to manage the European external borders. Accordingly, the cooperation with the associated Schengen countries is regarded as one separate approach and thus as a level of IBM in itself. Therefore, the original model is altered slightly to suit the needs of this thesis.

Like the original model, the altered one consists of four levels. The measures are regarded intently from the very outside of the EU (cooperation with third actors) to the inside (measures within the EU MS’ territories).

- Measures in cooperation with third actors
- Measures in cooperation with the associated Schengen countries
- Measures of border control by the EU
- Internal measures by the MS.
The first level of the altered model concentrates, like the original model, on measures of border control undertaken outside the EU. However, the main difference is that this study aims not at focusing only on activities in third countries, but also on activities in cooperation with third actors. Thus, while the original four-tier access control model dealt with border management through liaison officers giving advice and training to the third country personnel, this study’s first level investigates the general cooperation with third countries in forms of agreements and programmes. Regarding this, the cooperation with neighbouring countries is seen as an integral part of the first level. Consequently, since the original four-tier access control model approaches multilateral, bilateral and local cooperation with a special emphasis on the neighbouring countries in its second tier, the altered model combines tier one and two of the original model in its first level. Among these third countries the EU cooperates with to ensure the security of its external borders, two types of countries can be identified: third countries without any direct geographical connection to the EU and third countries in the European neighbourhood. Further, this study also discusses the cooperation with international organisations as third actors.

The cooperation within the Schengen area and thus cooperation with the associated Schengen states is scrutinized in the second level of the thesis’ altered model. This level does not exist in this form in the original four-tier access control model of the EU Schengen Catalogue. However, the Swiss Federal Office for Migration developed a national four-filter model (cf. Swiss FOM 2012) whose second filter constitutes of the Schengen cooperation which is applied in this thesis’ analysis as second level. The second filter of the respective Swiss model covers, like the EU’s four-tier access control model, bilateral and multilateral cooperation with other countries. However, the difference between the two models is that the Swiss model focuses on the Schengen area (Swiss FOM 2012: 1) whereas the second tier of the four-tier access control model deals with the EU’s neighbourhood. Therefore, in this thesis, the second level of the altered model follows the Swiss model and discusses the EU’s cooperation with the four associated Schengen countries.

Common European measures of border control at the EU’s external borders constitute the study’s third level. This layer is very similar to the original fourth tier of the four-tier access control model as it covers means of joint EU actions to directly manage the European frontiers.

The fourth level of the altered model is also closely related to the original model by covering measures inside the territories of the EU MS. The sole difference is the fact that in the case of the adjusted model the internal measures of the European MS are taken into account, whereas the original model considers all internal activities of both EU MS and associated Schengen countries. Thus, the emphasis of this fourth level lies on the national measures undertaken independently from common EU action. In this regard, it is necessary to mention that border control is still a prerogative of the MS and that therefore the EU’s IBM is only binding to a certain extent. Accordingly, as the overarching research question refers to the IBM efforts carried out jointly in the name of the EU, the last level concerning the national measures conducted independently by the 28 MS is not significant for answering the research question and is hence excluded.
from the analysis. Nevertheless, one has to consider that the national efforts are partly interconnected (e.g. by bilateral agreements) and thus affect the EU’s action in border management to a certain extent.

Summarizing, this thesis utilizes an altered version of the original four-tier access control model of the EU Schengen Catalogue to guide and structure the analyses. By doing so, this thesis aims at gaining more in-depth knowledge and at generating a new theoretical framework for further research within the field of European border management with a particular focus on coordination.

4.3 The research design

Since the different means undertaken by the EU to secure its external borders and their coordination are subject to critical scrutiny, the question arises which research design is appropriate to obtain the intended gain in knowledge. First of all, merely no literature exists on how the different levels of border management are interconnected and coordinated so that this thesis will be an exploratory study. This kind of study is “characterized by a lack of detailed preliminary research” and “generally distinguished by the absence of preliminary propositions and hypotheses” (Streb 2010: 372). Furthermore, exploratory studies are often used as a basis for consecutive research (Streb 2010: 372).

As Malone and Crowston (1990: 357) point out, “good coordination is nearly invisible”. Therefore, in order to examine the interconnection and coordination of the different levels of European IBM, the instrument of a case study stands to reason. Referring to Gerring and McDermott (2007: 688) a case study is “a form of analysis where one or a few units are studied intensively with an aim to elucidate features of a broader class of (…) units”. Thus, such research design “allows the investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events” (Yin 1994: 3). Thereby, it facilitates the achievement of in-depth knowledge of the issue’s underlying mechanism and the analysis of complex causal relations (Kacowicz 2002: 120). On account of their advantage to address causal complexity, case studies are regarded to be strong where statistical methods are rather weak (George & Bennett 2005: 19). Accordingly, the case study design is especially suited for the purpose of this study as it allows investigating the underlying coordination mode within and between the multiple levels of IBM. Additionally to the fact that it appears to be a useful tool considering the complexity of this policy field, a case study is suited for the heuristic purposes of this study (Kacowicz 2002: 128; George & Bennett 2005: 20). Another advantage is the fact that the design allows a high level of conceptual validity for concepts that are usually difficult to measure with statistical methods and formal models (George & Bennett 2005: 19). This positive feature is utilized when investigating into the theoretical concepts of cooperation and coordination in IBM.

As the thesis’ objective is to gain knowledge about the policies and actors in border management as well as about their coordination, within-case analyses in the three levels are conducted. In a first step, the relationship between the EU and
the respective actors of each level are scrutinized separately to gain a better understanding of the mode of coordination in the particular level (horizontal dimension) (Chapter 5.1). Subsequently, Chapter 5.2 investigates the coordination between the cases and thus the different levels (vertical dimension).

The particular cases for each level are selected by purpose due to the fact that the random selection of cases is no option in small-N case studies (Gerring 2007: 87). Furthermore, the purposive sampling “can nonetheless make an important contribution to the inferential process by enabling researchers to choose the most appropriate cases” (Seawright & Gerring 2008: 295). As a case is determined “an instance of a class of events” (George & Bennett 2005: 5), all cases selected for this study belong to the ‘class’ of coordination in the EU’s border management. Since coordination depends on the relationships between the particular actors, the cases are selected according to the EU’s relation to the stakeholders in the particular level of border management. Based on literature review, it is arguable that the EU’s relationship towards all respective actors involved in the four levels differs, leading presumably to a variation in the mode of coordination.

In this context, typical cases are especially suited for the study as they are considered to be representatives of the phenomena, namely coordination in the EU’s border management. By examining a typical case, the interest lies in the characteristics within that particular case (Seawright & Gerring 2008: 299; Gerring 2007: 90ff). In this thesis, the characteristic of interest is the particular mode of coordination in the levels of European IBM. Based on that, the chosen cases are the following:

Table 2. Case selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Cases</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 1</td>
<td>Measures in cooperation with third actors</td>
<td>Third county without geographical connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Third country in the EU’s neighbourhood:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Russia (Strategic Partner)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Western Balkans, Turkey (Candidate countries)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ENP countries</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>International organisation:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UN, IOM, Interpol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2</td>
<td>Measures within the associated Schengen countries</td>
<td>Associated Schengen countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3</td>
<td>Measures of border control by the EU</td>
<td>Frontex, COSI, WGs, European Institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 4</td>
<td>Internal measures within the MS’ territories</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16 Thereby, ‘EU’s border management’ is understood as where the EU acts collectively as a union, meaning action in border management through the European institutions or competent European agencies and not through single member states.
Besides the advantages derived from a case study, the research design also involves difficulties. Since the cooperation between the various actors is of dynamic nature and frequently occurs through informal channels, coordination is often difficult to seize. Therefore, a case study cannot precisely detect whether other potential third variables - which might have been neglected - have a possible impact on the outcome of the study. Thus, Gerring and McDermott (2007: 688) cite the non-experimental characteristic of a case study as a disadvantage, arguing that “case studies are often observational, rather than experimental”. Additionally, in most instances single case studies do not provide a sufficient foundation for generalizations (Yin 1994).

Considering these problems, the question arises why the research design of a case study could still be applied? The following thesis tries to counter these threats by its methodological and theoretical approach. Thus, the observations are structured to plot the interconnection of the actors and mechanisms’ coordination by employing the above-outlined framework of the four-filter model. This model functions as a tool to scrutinize the different levels and thereby establish an order of analysis. Furthermore, the following thesis does not aim at generalizing the chosen cases, but rather to utilize them to get first insights of coordination and cooperation, as it is generally the aim of an exploratory study (Streb 2010: 372). This shall therefore serve as a basis for subsequent more in-depth research.

In order to conduct the case studies, information and qualitative data are collected from both primary and secondary sources. Due to the fact that merely little research has been conducted concerning the coordination of policies, actors and mechanisms in European IBM, secondary literature is used to receive information about the actors and European policies in the respective levels. Additionally, the study employs official documents. Nonetheless, one has to take into account that “important political processes often lack an accompanying body of documentation” (Tansey 2007: 8). Accordingly, interviews with officials are used to complement and reinforce the knowledge gathered through secondary literature and document research.

Summarizing, although case studies face some threats, such as potentially being unable to abstract all findings on a general level or being biased through possible alternative explanations, this research design appears to be suited. Thus case studies are used to demonstrate the complex and dynamic nature of IBM by filtering the competent actors in the respective levels as well as to examine whether and how the different efforts of European border management are coordinated.

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17 For the purpose of this study semi-structured telephone interviews with the spokesperson of Frontex, with an employee from the Swiss Directorate for European Affairs (DEA), Section for Justice and Home Affairs as well as with an employee from the German Federal Ministry of Interior (FMI) were conducted. In this regard, one possible threat which appears essential to mention is that due to the sensitivity of border security the interviewees might not be that subjective and open with information.
5 Coordination of the European Union’s border management

Once the necessary foundation is set, the following Chapter 5.1 concentrates on the horizontal dimension of European border management by answering the first sub-question: “What are the different efforts undertaken by the EU to manage its external borders and how does the cooperation and coordination with the respective actor(s) look like?”. Thus, the focus is lying on the relationship and cooperation of the various actors with the EU and thereby on the mode of coordination within the respective level.

Subsequently, Chapter 5.2 investigates the relation between the different levels (vertical dimension) in order to answer the second sub-question: “How are the different levels of border management interconnected and coordinated?”.

Chapter 5.3 finally compares and merges the findings of both dimensions.

5.1 The horizontal dimension

5.1.1 Level one: Measures of border management in cooperation with third actors

In times of globalisation, internal security cannot be achieved without an external dimension and international cooperation. This is also applicable to the protection of the EU’s external borders. Article 216(1) TFEU provides the legal basis for the EU to conclude agreements with third countries and international organizations. In this regard, the first level of the altered four-level model concentrates on border management in cooperation with third actors outside the EU and the Schengen area. As aforementioned, this thesis’ altered model does not solely concentrate on measures of the EU in third countries but also on measures of cooperation with third actors in general, including international organizations.

5.1.1.1 Measures in cooperation with third countries

Already since the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 the EU has the possibility to negotiate and conclude agreements with third countries on all AFSJ matters (Monar 2010: 31). The introduction of the EU’s legal personality by the Treaty of Lisbon further “ensure[s] that the Union can negotiate more effectively with key partners” (European Council 2010: 34).

One of the first attempts to collaborate with non-EU partners in IBM was enshrined in the aforementioned Tampere Programme’s external dimension. A
more recent effort can be found in the 2011 renewed Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). It strengthened the commitment towards operational cooperation and dialogue with third countries to combat irregular migration, cross border crime and to ensure border security (Commission 2011).

Notwithstanding that border management primarily falls within JHA, many efforts of border control outside the EU and Schengen area are also implemented by CFSP missions. However, the weakness of the EU’s competence in external policy and the fact that the EU itself does not dispose of operational assets for border control but even more relies on the capabilities of its MS are often regarded as challenges (Monar 2012: 59-60; Weinar 2011: 3).

The original four-tier access control model offers the establishment of liaison offices as well as the responsibility of MS’ embassies and missions in third countries for issuing visa as one approach to ensure control over border crossings into the EU (Council 2009: 13-14). The following sections investigate further European measures of border security in cooperation with third countries. Thereby, the focus lies on the EU-third country relationship to detect the particular mode of coordination.

Among these countries the EU cooperates with, two ‘types’ can be identified: third countries without direct geographical connections to the EU and third countries in the European neighbourhood. At this point it appears necessary to draw this distinction since cooperation and thus coordination in IBM is regarded to differ according to the stakeholders’ relationship.

Third countries without a direct geographical connection to the EU

The first group of countries the EU maintains relations with for the purpose of ensuring its frontiers are states that are no direct European neighbours. Reviewing official documents and secondary literature, the EU is involved in many projects to develop IBM systems in non-neighbouring countries or stabilizes these through development aid. This is done in order to prevent and combat cross-border crime and irregular migration with the indirect purpose to ensure border security. Nevertheless, this thesis aims at investigating the EU’s efforts to directly manage its own external borders.

The US-EU collaboration is considered a typical case for cooperation in border control with a third country that is not situated in the EU’s neighbourhood. Although on both transatlantic sides somehow different approaches of border management are applied, the EU and the USA frequently cooperate in several aspects of border security. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the transatlantic cooperation was further enhanced (Archick 2013). For effective law enforcement the American authorities, Frontex and Europol maintain close relations (Archick 2013: 4). Besides of formal agreements between the agencies, an exchange of information and best practices on border management takes place regularly (Council 2011a: 16).

As organised crime and terrorism frequently involves international travel and thereby enters the EU via its border crossing-points, an effective management of the official points of entry is necessary. Thus, referring back to the initially mentioned EU definition which includes “airports, river ports, sea ports and lake
ports” (EU 2006: Article 2(2)), the Passenger Name Record (PNR) agreement between the EU and the USA is considered one important endeavour to secure the airports as they are international gateways and thus significant points to cross European borders.

The initial agreement facilitating the transmission of passenger data between the EU and USA was concluded in 2004, followed by a renewed agreement in 2007. Nevertheless due to data protection concerns, the EP postponed its vote. Until the final agreement, many discrepancies existed between the respective actors, especially regarding the privacy standards and data protection. On account of fears of privacy rights’ violations, the EP brought the case to the European Court of Justice which in turn annulled the PNR agreement with the reasoning that it lacked a proper legal basis (Archick 2013: 12; Hobbing & Koslowski 2009: 13). Based on an external PNR strategy (Commission 2010), the EU finally concluded the agreement in November 2011. In April 2012, it was approved and adopted by the EP, and entered into force in July 2012 (Archick 2013: 15).

Drawing on literature, the cooperation with the USA in terms of border control can be regarded to be limited in most cases to the exchange of information. Nevertheless regarding the EU-US relationship, both sides are considered more or less equal actors based on a relative balance of power and a mutual interest in controlling the entry/exit of passengers for security reasons. This is underlined by the fact that the agreement was not concluded until the European objections concerning data protection were solved. Despite the presence of specific reciprocity, the cooperation seemed to be based on a symmetric interdependence. This is because both transatlantic partners depend on the other’s information to control the entries via the respective airports. Summarizing, the EU’s efforts in border control in cooperation with the USA are characterized by a network mode of coordination.

Third countries in the direct neighbourhood of the EU

The second group of countries the EU cooperates with consists of the European neighbours. With the latest enlargement of 2004 and 2007, the European external borders moved further eastwards. As Günther Verheugen, Commissioner responsible for the 2004 enlargement, said “enlargement is proving a success in expanding the area of stability and prosperity in Europe. However, this area can only be sustainable if it also extends to our neighbourhood” (Verheugen 2003: 4).

Drawing on previous reading, it is arguable that the EU’s relation to its neighbours differs. Referring to appendix 1, the European neighbourhood can

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18 PNR data are information provided by passengers which are collected and stored by air carriers in their databases. These data are used for almost 60 years now by states worldwide to combat crime and terrorism. The agreement between the USA and the EU on PNR regulates that the data shall be used for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of serious transnational crimes and in particular terrorism (EU 2013a). By concluding this agreement, the entry and exit of persons via the European airports shall be controlled. This “prevention mechanism” was also part of the EU’s Internal Security Strategy (Council 2010a: 12). Similar agreements on PNR were signed jointly with Australia in 2008 and 2012 and with Canada in 2006. The latter is currently renegotiated.
further be subdivided into three types: strategic partner, candidate country and participant of the ENP.

**Strategic Partner**

The Russian Federation is the biggest and most powerful country in the European neighbourhood. After the latest enlargement, the European-Russian border comprises more than 2200 kilometres with five EU MS bordering directly to Russia. Especially due to these reasons the country is seen primarily as a strategic partner (Verheugen 2003: 8). The instrument of a strategic partnership is not properly defined yet as neither the Treaties nor any other EU document specifies its nature. However, one hint can be found in Articles 21 and 22 TEU: “The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations”. Although the existing ten strategic partnerships of the EU differ, they all intend to define the particular relations and thereby function as framework for further cooperation (Cîrlig 2012).

The EU-Russian relationship is primarily based on a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement19 (PCA). Notwithstanding that the EU maintains ten strategic partnerships worldwide and concluded different PCAs with its neighbouring countries, Russia is the only immediate neighbour of the EU that is labelled a ‘strategic partner’. Nevertheless, the EU-Russian relation20 can be characterized by both cooperation and competition. In this context, the weight of this partnership is often said to be diminished by the lack of a coherent EU policy towards Russia (Shapovalova 2011: 33) resulting in a loss of trust and loyalty.

The PCA dates back to 1994 and already then included provisions on a joint fight against cross-border crime. However, according to Golunov (2013: 126), here the first asymmetries became visible as the agreement seemed to imply that the cooperation dealt with crime of Russian origin and that “Russia should adopt the EU’s best practices, rather than vice versa”. Since the St. Petersburg Summit in May 2003, cooperation is divided into ‘four common spaces’. Accordingly, the ‘Common Space on Freedom, Security and Justice’ focuses on cooperation on fighting illegal migration, terrorism and cross-border crime by including provisions for border management (Commission 2007b: 14-16).

Due to its extensive economic and military power and its cultural links, Russia has considerable influence on the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood (Shapovalova 2010: 34). However, Russia is also a ‘country of origin and transit of irregular migration’ as Frontex reports that in the second and third quarter of 2013 Russian nationals constituted the highest share of nationalities whom the entry into the EU at a European external border was refused21 (Frontex 2013a: 48).

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19 PCAs offer neither a prospective membership, nor any other kind of association with the EU.

20 For more detailed information about the character and the history of the Russian border management as well as the EU-Russian relationship in various means of cross-border cooperation, please consult Golunov (2013).

21 Q2: 10578 and Q3: 5930 refusals of entry which amounts 18% (Q3) of all refusals of entry at the European external borders (Frontex 2013a: 48).
On account of these reasons, Russia can be considered inevitable for securing the EU’s external borders. Consequently, Frontex concluded working arrangements with the Russian Border Guards concerning the establishment of operational cooperation (Commission 2007b: 14-16). Furthermore, besides of bilateral cooperation between EU MS and Russia22, the EU and the Russian Federation arranged different mutual accords regarding the security of their common borders.

One important instrument to ensure and enhance effective border management cooperation is included in the ongoing negotiation process concerning an EU-Russian visa regime. At the 2003 summit the negotiations on a future visa-free regime were opened and resulted into a visa facilitation agreement in 2006. Based on this, operational measures and more specific steps23 of the so-called Visa Dialogue were jointly elaborated and adopted in a document called “Common steps towards visa free short-term travel of Russian and EU citizens” in 2011. It contained a significant section about border management with a commitment to enhance cooperation and to optimise the mechanism. Both partners agreed to “deploy appropriate staff, resources, technical equipment and infrastructure at the relevant parts of the state border, as well as effectively implement border control procedures and best practices at their common state border crossing points” (EU-Russia 2011: 4-5). The fact that the agreement was developed and adopted on a joint basis indicates that a network mode of coordination was used.

In 2012, a schedule to monitor the implementation of the common steps was set. In the first progress report in December 2013, the Commission states that progress concerning the cooperation in border management has been made, but still detects shortcomings and room for improvement on both sides24 (Commission 2013a: 6-7). Due to the recent crisis in the Ukraine, the EU suspended new negotiations on visa liberalisations with Russia (Euronews 2014).

Although the Common Steps-Agreement was supposed to be based on reciprocity (i Sagrera & Potemkina 2013: 4), during the negotiations some discrepancies appeared: while the EU tried to convince Moscow to take more effective measures of border security and to enhance the control over its post-Soviet borders, Russia put an emphasis on visa liberalization (Golunov 2013: 126). Furthermore, the EU pointed out technical problems, whereas Russia believed that all technical requirements were met and accused Brussels for political obstacles. In this context it also appeared interesting that the EU speaks about ‘visa dialogue’ whereas Russia calls it ’visa-free dialogue’ (i Sagrera & Potemkina 2013: 4-5). This finding weakens the first indication for a network coordination mode. However, although specific reciprocity is further speaking for

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22 The European countries bordering directly to Russia have for instance signed bilateral border management agreements with the Russian Federation. Further, multilateral cooperation occurs also under the framework of the Northern Dimension (e.g. Berg & Ehin 2006; Golunov 2013: 123-124, 127ff).

23 These steps are divided into in four blocks: 1) Document security, including biometrics, 2) Illegal migration, including readmission, 3) Public order, security and judicial cooperation, 4) External relations (EU-Russia 2011).

24 For instance, the reports recommends a deeper cooperation and more structured information exchange since data is still gathered separately leading to fragmented statistics (Commission 2013a: 6-7)
hierarchical elements, the partnership seems to be based on a relative balance of power which is a criterion for a network mode.

Summarizing, despite some disagreements, discrepancies and a certain lack of trust and mutual understanding, both partners are dependent on each other and possess a relative balance of power. This underlines the aforementioned characterization of their relationship by cooperation and competition. Hence, it appears difficult to clearly access their relation and thus the coordination mode in border control. Notwithstanding the appearance of certain hierarchical elements in some regards, the cooperation in border management seems to be based first and foremost on a network character, although this mode is clearly attenuated.

**Candidate Countries**

A second group of countries in the European neighbourhood are labelled as ‘candidate countries’. According to the Commission “a country is deemed to be a candidate country when […] the EU Council formally recognises the country as a candidate, thus granting the country candidate status. Acceding countries are those candidate countries which have completed accession negotiations and signed an accession treaty with the EU” (Commission 2013d). Since the Tampere European Council in 1999, candidate countries are committed to adopt and implement the acquis (Kirisci 2007: 8). During the accession negotiations, Chapter 24 of ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’ covers the field of border management.

After the latest accession of Croatia on 1 July 2013, there is no other acceding country at the moment. Currently the candidate countries are Iceland, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey. The negotiations with Turkey were opened in October 2005, whereas those with Iceland were opened in July 2010 and those with Montenegro in June 2012. The negotiations with the FYROM and Serbia have not started yet (Commission 2013e). As all Western Balkans countries have been offered the prospect of an EU membership, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are potential candidate countries that “were promised the prospect of joining when they are ready” (Commission 2013e).

In the following, the Western Balkans and Turkey are subjects to scrutiny regarding their cooperation with the EU in border management. Since the Turkish relationship with the EU differs from the EU-Western Balkans relation to certain extent, the two are analysed separately in sequence.

The Western Balkans is strategically important to the EU as the region is geographically surrounded by EU territory. According to the Frontex Risk Analysis, the Western Balkans are considered a transit region for secondary movements of non-European migrants en route from Greece to other EU MS (cf. appendix 2) (Frontex 2013b: 11ff). Therefore, “the Western Balkans countries

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25 The accession negotiations of Iceland were put on hold by the Icelandic government in May 2013 (Commission 2013e).

26 Under the UN mandate pursuing to Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council

27 In the following, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the FYROM, Montenegro, Kosovo and Serbia will be referred to as the Western Balkans.

28 Since Iceland is also a country of the Schengen area and shares no direct border with the EU, it will be examined in the model’s second level.
continue to be of strategic importance and of particular interest to the European Union” (Council 2011a: 12) leading to European efforts in strengthening the Western Balkans border management with the purpose of securing the EU’s external borders. Hereof, Collantes-Celadora and Juncos point towards a dual logic that guides the EU’s IBM strategy in the Western Balkans: “border management as a first step in the process of integrating these countries into the EU and as a way to defend the EU populations from external security threats” (Collantes-Celadora & Juncos 2012: 202).

Since the end of the 1990s the Western Balkans countries were part of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), a long-term policy for helping states to tackle the challenges of reforming to democratic institutions, combating corruption, ethnic violence, poverty and social exclusion as well as promoting trade and economic development. In this context, each country of the Western Balkans region negotiated its ‘own’ agreement. From 2000 to 2006 the EU allocated EUR 4.65 billion to the regional programme “Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation” (CARDS). It contributed also to the strengthening of IBM (Commission 2004a: 5). The Instrument for Pre-Accession is the successor of the CARDS programme (2014-2020) and covers the European assistance for border management nowadays by disposing of EUR 11.7 billion (Commission 2014a). Since the very beginning, border management requirements were included in the SAP and are still regularly monitored by the Commission in its annual reports (Collantes-Celador & Juncos 2012: 204-206). These clear prescribed rules and their monitoring are a first evidence for a hierarchical mode of coordination.

At the EU-Western Balkans Summit in 2003, the official start of the accession talks for the Western Balkans were set. Already in the so-called Thessaloniki Declaration, the countries committed themselves to “concrete measures […] to cope effectively with illegal immigration and improving border security and management, aiming at achieving European standards” as well as “strengthening administrative capacity in border control” (European Council 2003). Furthermore, in 2004 the EU published ‘Guidelines for IBM in the Western Balkans’ which were updated and clarified in January 2007. They are often seen as threshold criteria in terms of border management for the accession of the Western Balkans countries to the EU (Marenin 2010: 70).

In this context, scholarly literature frequently stresses the fact that the EU’s possibilities to make third countries cooperate or adopt European objectives depend on the EU’s political leverage to a large extent (Monar 2012: 65). As the Western Balkans countries have a strong perspective of joining the EU, the membership prospect clearly accounts for a great European influence on the performance of these countries (Collantes-Celador & Juncos 2012). Accordingly, IBM requirements are deeply embedded in a prosperous membership (conditionality). This specific reciprocity is also visible in the allocation of the aforementioned funds. Hence, the top-down structure, asymmetric interdependence and specific reciprocity support the earlier finding of a hierarchy.

29 The tripartite document functions as a framework for border management-related activities and provides guidance for the development of national IBM strategies for the Western Balkans countries (Commission 2007a).
Furthermore, apart from rule of law and police missions, like for instance EULEX which among others supports the Kosovo Border police, both Frontex and Europol engage and cooperate with the respective border agencies of the Western Balkans countries. This cooperation occurs under the framework of the SAP, the Guidelines and based on bilateral agreements (Collantes-Celador & Juncos 2012: 205-208).

Reviewing official documents and secondary literature, a multitude of international actors (organisations and bilateral donors) is involved in enhancing IBM in the Western Balkans. As “these actors are driven by their own interests and priorities, which are sometimes in conflict with EU conceptions of IBM” (Marenin 2010: 118) coordination tends to be difficult. This however is an internal problem to the case of the Western Balkans and is only of marginal importance to the objective of this thesis. Moreover, due to space limitations, only the framework for the EU’s engagement in the Western Balkans in terms of border management was presented. Based on this framework, the EU runs different projects ranging from training over legal support to the funding and provision of IT-systems and operational equipment.

Summarizing, the relationship between the EU and the Western Balkans is primarily characterized by a top-down structure and strong European leverage resulting in specific reciprocity and conditionality. Therefore, it is arguable that there is a hierarchical mode of coordination in border management between the EU and the Western Balkans as candidate countries.

After having investigated the EU’s efforts of external border management in cooperation with the Western Balkans countries, the focus lays now on the candidate country Turkey.

Turkey has been involved in the European integration based on the Ankara Association Agreement since the early 1960s. Already in 1987, the country applied to join the European Economic Community and was declared to be ready to join the EU in 1997. In 2005 the accession negotiations started but until Turkey agrees to apply the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Association Agreement to Cyprus, the EU refuses to open eight negotiation chapters (Commission 2013f).

The country is geographically significant for the EU as it is a transit point between three continents: Asia, Europe, and Africa. The Greek-Turkish border was the main crossover to illegally enter the EU for many decades, before lately the Bulgarian-Turkish border became one of the most used routes for crossing frontiers into the EU (Frontex 2013a: 13). Although the trend is decreasing, the Eastern Mediterranean route via the Turkish borders is still considered a main route of cross-border crime (cf. appendix 2). Furthermore, it is noticeable that Turkey is not only a country of transit but also of irregular migration and crime’s origin since large numbers of people, primarily from regions of Eastern Turkey, are trying to enter the EU illegally (Kirisci 2007: 2). These reasons make the country interesting for the EU’s border policy.  

30 There are different efforts undertaken by the EU to enhance the European-Turkish border security by intensified operational measures of surveillance regarding for instance new technical surveillance systems or the Frontex operation JO Poseidon (Frontex 2013a: 21). Nonetheless, these are measures undertaken by the EU directly at the Turkish border which are covered in the
As aforementioned border management is an integral requirement of the accession negotiations. These conditions also apply for the Turkish endeavours for an EU-membership. Besides the various operational activities to enhance border security, in 2006 the Turkish government adopted a national action plan for a Turkish IBM strategy and endeavoured to harmonize the Turkish law according to the Schengen Convention (Kirisci 2007: 2-10). However, in a report in 2012, the Commission claimed that there is only limited progress in strengthening the Turkish IBM (Sert 2013: 178).

In 2013, the EU concluded a ‘roadmap towards a visa-free regime with Turkey’ similar to the above-outlined visa-dialogue with Russia, also including a section concerning border management. Nevertheless, an important difference between the Russian and the Turkish negotiations is that the Russian ‘roadmap’ was developed on a joint basis with requirements for both sides, whereas the chapter on IBM in the visa dialogue with Ankara states that “Turkey should fulfill the following requirements […]” (EU 2013b: 7). Thus, the document’s wording indicates a top-down structure pointing towards a hierarchy in coordination.

The hierarchical indication is reinforced by the fact that the Turkish efforts to create a border management system according to European standards are also supported by the Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance (Commission 2014a). This suggests a dependency on European funding and would support the argument of a hierarchical relation. Nonetheless, one has to recognize that Turkey itself invests a large amount of money in the modernisation of its border control system (Kirisci 2007: 21-22).

Notwithstanding that the EU’s conditionality achieved success for Turkey in strengthening its border control; Kirisci (2007: 2-3) identified some “reluctance” by the Turkish authorities to cooperate with the EU in all matters of border management. This is considered to derive primarily from the economic, political and administrative costs of a more modern border system. Furthermore, since the last decade, Turkey achieved a lot of progress and can be regarded a regional power as it is not dependent on the EU as other neighbouring countries. Thus, compared to the other candidate countries, Turkey is in a somewhat stronger position to ‘revolt’ against the EU’s conditionality. Thus although there are still many asymmetries, the Turkish-EU relationship can nowadays be considered to be based on a certain balance of power which weakens the initial argument of a hierarchy.

Moreover, the EU-Turkish relationship is increasingly overshadowed by mistrust and dwindling credibility of the EU. Kirisci (2007: 6-8, 27) stresses that many Turkish officials start losing trust into a prospectus membership as the EU is not clear about Turkey’s accession and keeps suspending the talks on eight chapters. Consequently, this affects the ‘effectiveness’ and leverage of the accession agreement’s conditionality to a large extent. As border management is an integral part of this agreement, the Turkish motivation for adopting European standards is decreasing. This development clearly undermines the EU’s position model’s third level. Thus, this first level concentrates on measures of border management in cooperation with the third country, in this case Turkey.
in the top-down structure, weakens conditionality and thus the hierarchical way of cooperation.

Nevertheless, the EU is aware of the importance of a good relationship and secure European-Turkish borders as Turkey is a direct link to the instable regions of the Middle East. Furthermore, despite the costs of an IBM modernisation, Turkish officials also see the benefits for Turkey’s security (Kirisci 2007: 20-22). Hence, the increasing power of Turkey and the geographical location results in an ever more symmetric interdependency.

Summarizing, there are clear elements of hierarchy in the EU-Turkish relationship in border management, especially considering the conditionality of the accession agreement. However, during the last decades, Turkey went through an extensive change and is not that depended on the EU anymore. Furthermore, decreasing trust and dependency further weakens the EU’s leverage. Nevertheless, both the EU and Turkey are interested in effective and secure borders. Taking all aspects together, the EU’s efforts of border management in cooperation with Turkey are characterized by a severely weakened hierarchy.

Drawing an interim conclusion, the EU’s relation in border management towards its candidate countries differs. While there is an almost clear hierarchical form of coordination in the case of the Western Balkans, the picture is more differentiated in the case of Turkey. Although the latter also enjoys candidate status, the EU-Turkish relationship in terms of border security tends to be more on an equal level than the European relation with the Western Balkans leading to a more attenuated form of hierarchical coordination.

**Countries of the ENP**

A last group of countries in the European neighbourhood consists of those participating in the ENP. The ENP was initiated in 2004 with the objectives of enhancing cooperation in political and security matters and to support social-economic development without the prospect of an EU-membership (Commission 2004b). In its ENP strategy paper, the Commission already considered border management as “a priority” (Commission 2004b: 16) by stressing that “the goal should be to facilitate movement of persons, whilst maintaining or improving a high level of security” (Commission 2004b: 17).

Currently, there are 16 countries involved in the ENP. 12 countries are fully participating in the programme whereas Belarus, Libya and Syria remain outside most of the ENP structures and Algeria is negotiating an ENP action plan at the moment. Although the ENP was primarily composed as a bilateral policy, it is complemented by three regional and multilateral cooperation initiatives: the Eastern Partnership, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as well as the Black Sea Synergy (EEAS 2014a). The riots in the course of the Arab Spring and the ongoing civil war in Syria led to an increasing number of migrants trying to illegally pass the EU’s external borders. As the ENP countries are countries of

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31 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, Ukraine
both origin and transit of irregular migration, it became even more important for the EU to cooperate with these countries in terms of border control.

The ENP includes different projects and initiatives to support the beneficiary countries in obtaining the required reforms in border management. Besides financial support, the EU provides a wide range of instruments like equipment, training or technical expertise. Furthermore, one important instrument is the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM). Currently there is one of these missions to Moldova and Ukraine which was launched in 2005 and will presumably last until 2015. The mission involves advice by customs and border police experts from the EU MS under a total annual budget of EUR 12 million (Monar 2012: 62; UNDP 2012). In course of the Arab Spring, another significant mission was established in May 2013: EUBAM Libya. EUBAM Libya is a civilian mission under the CFSP with the mandate to support the country in improving and developing the security of its borders. The mission responds to an invitation by Libya and has an annual budget of around EUR 30 million (EEAS 2014b).

The EU’s projects of its ENP are currently financed by a new European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)\(^\text{32}\). From 2014 to 2020, it shall dispose of EUR 15.4 billion (enpi-info 2014). Thereby, the financial support is based on the principle of ‘more-for-more’, meaning that ENI is “incentive-based and differentiated in forms and amounts” (enpi-info 2014.). Hence, the EU grants extra financial support to those countries of the ENP that show improvements and reforms. The support is then based on an annually ENP Progress Report published by the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission (EEAS 2014a). The top-down structure, conditionality and monitoring of the compliance indicate at a first glance a hierarchical mode of coordination.

This first impression of a hierarchy is however weakened, considering that the EU’s “interdependence in relation with the ENP countries is strongly asymmetric, with the EU having much stronger interests in cooperation with most aspects of JHA than its neighbours” (Lavenex 2010: 85). This goes in line with the argumentation by Monar (2012: 65) who noted that since the ENP countries do not have the incentive of an EU-membership the EU’s leverage is not as powerful as it is concerning its candidate countries.

The support of each participating country is based on bilateral action plans, PCAs or association agreements. According to Baracini (2009: 136) the ENP action plans are very similar to the accession partnerships of the candidate countries since both contain a set of priorities and required reforms that have to be fulfilled to receive benefits from the EU. Nevertheless, one difference is that the ENP agreements are not unilaterally ‘imposed’ by the Council but jointly agreed between the EU and the ENP country. This “allows the EU to promote only those political reforms that the ENP partner is willing to make” (Baracini 2009: 137). Accordingly, while the conditionality to fulfil the requirements to receive

\(^{32}\) ENI is the successor of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. In 2012 alone, the budget for cross-border cooperation “including fight against organised crime and ensuring secure borders” under the ENPI amounted Euro 92.8 million (Monar 2012: 61). Additionally, EUR 1.2439 billion were allocated for capacity building in JHA issues in the EuroMed countries and EUR 728.4 million for the same purpose to the Eastern Partnership (Monar 2012: 61).
financial support indicates a hierarchical structure between the EU and the ENP countries, the latter finding points more towards a network coordination.

Moreover, the EU launched different training projects regarding border security in cooperation with the respective ENP countries. One example is the ‘Eastern Partnership – IBM Flagship Initiative’ that started in the beginning of 2010 and provides training in border control and guidance to the participating countries (EaP IBM 2012). The project reveals important elements of a network mode of coordination such as shared mutual interests and no notable top-down structures. This is primarily due to the fact that the core idea of this project is the exchange of best practices and the support by European experts rather than the allocation of funds.

Summarizing, although the ENP countries lack the incentive of an EU-membership and have a voice in negotiating the agreements, there are still elements of conditionality. Furthermore, these countries see the needs in strengthening their border management for improving the prosperity and security of their own country. Accordingly, the ENP countries rely on the EU’s financial support, expertise and good relations with the EU also regarding trade and further aid. Taking this into account, the cooperation and coordination between the EU and the ENP countries in border management is primarily characterized by an attenuated hierarchy.

5.1.1.2 Measures in cooperation with international organizations

Apart from the afore-outlined cooperation with third countries, the EU works closely together with different international organisations in terms of border management.

The aforementioned Stockholm Programme confirmed the EU’s commitment and importance of European cooperation in and with international organizations. Thereby the UN was named “the most important international organisation for the Union” (European Council 2010: 37). Accordingly, the EU cooperates with different UN offices concerning European border management. The most frequent collaboration occurs with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). As this UN office is responsible for fighting illicit drugs and international crime it shares the EU’s concern for secure borders. One instance is the cooperation in improving border control in the Western Balkans. Besides of collaboration in risk analysis, capacity building, training and information exchange as well as mutual consultation, Frontex and UNODC jointly work on building the capacity of border control personnel based on a working agreement from April 2012 (UNODC 2014).

Apart from the cooperation with the UNODC, the EU also cooperates with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The UNDP is interested in a strong border management as this is considered to be inevitably for national and regional stability and for economic growth. One particular example of cooperation to secure the EU’s external borders directly is the aforementioned EUBAM mission to Moldova and Ukraine. While the mission is fully funded by the EU, the implementation is conducted jointly by the EU and UNDP (UNDP 2012).
Another important international organisation the EU cooperates with in IBM is the IOM. Nowadays, the organization is considered a major source of intelligence, advice, assessment and technical assistance regarding border policies and practice (Andrijasevic & Walters 2010: 979). According to the IOM itself, it “assist[s] governments in meeting their migration's operational challenges” and in “create[ing] policy, legislation, administrative structures, operational systems and the human resource base necessary to respond effectively to diverse migration and border challenges and to institute appropriate migration governance” (IOM n.d.). The organization is a key implementing partner for the EU since the late 1990s and is funded by the EU MS and the Commission to a large extent (IOM 2012; Weinar 2011: 10).

In the course of its support for border management, the IOM draws on the EU’s IBM strategy and often cooperates with Frontex, the EEAS and the Commission (IOM 2012). One significant example of cooperation between the EU and IOM is a project in the Western Balkans and Turkey covering several aspects of IBM. Besides training and the provision of expertise, a forum for the national Heads of Border Services was established with the purpose to exchange information and strategies on the management of border posts. The project is funded by the Commission with EUR 2.5 million (IOM 2011).

A third important partner organization in securing the EU’s external borders is Interpol. The International Criminal Police Organization’s main task is to support the police cooperation of MS worldwide. In 2012 the Commissioner for JHA Cecilia Malmström named Interpol as a “key partner” in securing the EU’s external borders. In this context, Interpol established an Integrated Border Management Task Force to centralize their border management efforts and to “enhance[e] the capacity of border security in member countries” (Interpol 2014). Coordination is, among others, ensured by the secondment of a Special Representative of Interpol to the EU (Interpol 2012). The cooperation in border management between the EU (primarily Frontex and Europol) and Interpol consist primarily of the access to databases and exchange of information and training (Interpol 2013). Thereby, the work of the European agencies and Interpol is complementary (Interview Swiss DEA 02.05.2014).

Concluding, the EU cooperates with different international organizations in securing its external borders. However, the scope and type of cooperation varies. Nevertheless, the relationship between the EU and the international organizations can generally be characterized as a network due to the presence of a common interest in strengthening IBM and a diffuse reciprocity. Additionally, the cooperation is based on the assumption that the EU and the respective international organization are equal partners based on bilateral joint agreements without conditionality.
5.1.1.3 Summary level one

The first level of the thesis’ analysis clearly demonstrated that the mode of coordination depends on the actors’ relationship. Thus, as the EU’s relation towards the stakeholders varies different coordination modes are recognizable in this level of border management as it can be seen in table 3.

Table 3. Summary of the modes of coordination in level one

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Mode of coordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Third country without geographical connection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third country in the EU’s neighbourhood</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia (Strategic partner)</td>
<td>Attenuated network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Balkans (Candidate countries)</td>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey (Candidate country)</td>
<td>Attenuated hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP countries</td>
<td>Attenuated hierarchy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International organisations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNODC, UNDP, IOM and Interpol</td>
<td>Network</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Considering however the multiple types of stakeholders the EU cooperates with, the different policies and measures themselves do not seem to be interlinked within this first level. Nonetheless, they can still be regarded complementary in their purpose to ensure the security of the EU’s external frontiers.

Moreover, it appears difficult to determine where exactly the overall responsibility for coordinating European border management with the third actors lays. Reviewing the first level, the Commission is primarily responsible for implementing and monitoring the agreements concluded by the Council, whereas Frontex\(^33\) concludes working agreements with the third actors and supports European operational efforts with and within the EU’s neighbourhood. Moreover, the EU-Delegations are supposed to support the coordination between Commission and Council initiatives (Collantes-Celadora & Juncos 2012: 207). Nevertheless, referring to Marenin (2010: 116), IBM in cooperation with stakeholders outside the EU involves “three policy domains: community, member states and a common foreign policy” and thereby reflects the “reality that only limited agreement exists on who has authority over what policy”.

5.1.2 Level two: Measures of cooperation within the Schengen area

After having investigated the EU’s efforts of securing its external borders in cooperation with third actors, the following section focuses on the second level of

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\(^{33}\) Frontex role as a European agency for coordinating EU member states’ operational activities is regarded in level three (Chapter 5.1.3).
the altered four-level model of border management. This level contains the cooperation within the Schengen area and thus cooperation with the non-EU Schengen states.

The core of the Schengen area is the abolishment of internal border controls between the participating states which makes a close cooperation to manage the common frontiers inevitable. The cooperation is regulated in the Schengen Catalogue that entails two parts: external border control as well as return and readmission (Council 2009: 6). The Catalogue’s first part is most interesting for this study as it covers a set of rules concerning external border checks, police cooperation and cross-border surveillance (Commission 2013g; Kaczorowska 2008: 32-34).

The Schengen area consists of nearly all EU MS as well as Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. The UK and Ireland are not part of the Schengen agreement, whereas Denmark only opted out of some parts. Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and Rumania are not yet part of the area of free movement (cf. appendix 3). However, these countries are still considered in this chapter as they participate in many aspects of the Schengen cooperation and have a joint interest in an effective external border control. Nonetheless, this second level focuses on the EU’s cooperation and coordination with the four associated countries.

Iceland and Norway are two of the non-EU members of the Schengen cooperation. Their association with the Schengen area dates back to December 1996 and was extended with the implementation of the Schengen acquis based on a Council Decision and a renewed agreement in 1999. In 2001 the abolishment of border checks was introduced (EU 2009; Europaportalen 2013).

Due to its location, Switzerland was already economically deeply integrated into the common market and had concluded various agreements on police and border cooperation (Wichmann 2009). In 2004, Switzerland became an associated country of the Schengen area. This association was confirmed by a Swiss referendum in 2005 and the internal borders were officially abolished in 2008. Liechtenstein’s participation in the Schengen area is regulated in a protocol signed in 2008 which entered into force in 2011 (EU 2009).

All four associated countries were already involved in European border security through bilateral agreements before they became members of the Schengen area. Nowadays, the four countries have an even stronger interest in cooperating with the EU to secure the external borders as these countries are linked to the external frontiers through the area of free movement created by the Schengen agreement. This mutual interest already indicates a symmetric interdependency (cf. Wichmann 2009: 657-658).

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34 This section scrutinizes the EU’s cooperation with the associated Schengen member states under the framework of the Schengen agreement. Apart from the one cooperation that is clearly labelled as ‘Schengen cooperation’, the non-EU Schengen members frequently collaborate with the EU in other means of border management (cf. Chapter 5.1.3 and 5.2).

35 The historical development of the Schengen area was briefly outlined in Chapter 2.3. For a more detailed presentation please consult Karanja (2008).

36 New member states have to fulfil particular pre-conditions and requirements and to undergo a ‘Schengen evaluation’ to join the Schengen area (Commission 2013g).
Regarding the formal cooperation, the establishment of the Mixed Committee\textsuperscript{37} enables all four associated members to participate in the Schengen cooperation. The Committee’s meetings take place in the margins of the Council meetings (Norwegian Mission to the EU n.d.). Nevertheless, due to the facts that no votes are taken in the Mixed Committee (Kaczorowska 2008: 32) and the four associated members do not possess any voting rights the Council, some scholars tend to argue that the influence of the associated countries in the political machinery is rather limited (e.g. Wichmann 2009: 671-673). Notwithstanding, they are still considered influential in the decision-shaping process and in the drafting of new legal instruments due to several factors. First of all, the absence of voting rights in the Council is tempered by the fact that voting is rare and decisions usually are taken by consensus (Wichmann 2009: 671; Interview Swiss DEA 02.05.2014). Moreover, the non-EU Schengen countries are allowed to participate in all relevant Council working groups (WGs) and Commission’s committee meetings (Interview Swiss DEA 02.05.2014). In this context, the Commission is further obliged to consult experts and the governments of the associated Schengen members the same way than it does with EU members (Europaportalen 2013). Therefore, although the four countries do not have voting rights in the Council, they are still able to influence and shape the development of the Schengen acquis.

Practical cooperation, based on the Schengen Convention, takes place in several forms such as joint training, common techniques or arrangements in police cooperation. One example for joint training is the Operation Perkunas, an information-gathering exercise for the purpose of detecting the link between irregular external border crossings and secondary movements within the Schengen area. 23 EU MS as well as Norway and Switzerland participated in the operation carried out from 30 September to 13 October 2013 (Commission 2013b: 3). As the training seemed to occur on a reciprocal level, the indication of an equal relationship between the EU and the associated countries especially in operational terms is stressed. This finding was confirmed in an interview with the Swiss DEA (02.05.2014).

Another more known mean of border protection is the Schengen Information System (SIS), a computerised system for exchanging information about missing or wanted persons or items with a request for action. It functions as a basis for other measures of external border control. Thus, the SIS shall counterbalance the abolishment of internal border checks and is considered the “most important compensatory measure” (Karanja 2008: 56). The MS receive and supply information via national SIS which are connected to the central SIS online\textsuperscript{38} (Kaczorowska 2008: 33). Additionally, all border-crossing points of the Schengen external frontiers are equipped with SIS terminals for checking

\textsuperscript{37} The Mixed Committee consists of the EU-member states, representatives of the Commission and associated Schengen countries (Norwegian Mission to the EU n.d.).

\textsuperscript{38} Within the SIS, data exchange can also be carried out directly from one national SIS to another via the Supplementary Information Request at the National Entries (SIRENE) system. For this purpose, every Schengen state maintains one office responsible for SIRENE which is available at any time. The offices are connected through a telecommunication network called SISNET (Kaczorowska 2008: 33).
concerned persons (Karanja 2008: 381). The initial system was established in 1995. It was updated by a second generation (SIS II) which was introduced by a Commission Communication in 2001 and came into force in April 2013. The costs for the new system accounted around EUR 168 million and were paid partly by the EU and partly by the associated states (Swiss DEA 2013). The burden-sharing and the fact that all states have the same access to the SIS underline the equal standing in cooperation.

At this point an interconnection to the first level is recognizable as Interpol complements the cooperation between the Schengen countries and also draws back on the SIS (Swiss DEA 2013). However, it appears interesting that in the SIRENE system “Schengen alerts take precedence over Interpol alerts” (Council 2011b: 9).

Finally, reviewing the cooperation within the Schengen area and the EU’s relationship to the associated countries, all criteria for a network mode are present. This thesis argues that all participating states have a mutual interest in securing their common frontiers after the abolishment of the internal border checks. Accordingly, their interests are reciprocal and they rely on each other which is leading to a symmetric interdependency. Regarding the actual cooperation in securing the common external borders, there was no indication of a difference in the treatment between EU and associated states. Furthermore, a diffuse reciprocity became visible as there is no immediate and exactly equivalent reciprocation of each concession.

Alone the fact that the associated members are not allowed to vote in the Council and Council WGs over Schengen developments weakens this picture of a network to a certain extent. Nonetheless, there might formally be differences between the EU and associated states, but in practice all Schengen members are alike (cf. Interview Swiss DEA 02.05.2014). This is illustrated by the fact that all countries are equally allowed to discuss and shape new developments of the Schengen acquis. Moreover, no elements of conditionality were present due to the reciprocal interests, a relative balance of power and the fact that these countries currently do not pursue an EU membership. Therefore, it is arguable that cooperation and coordination of the EU with the associated states within the framework of the Schengen acquis is determined by a network mode.

5.1.3 Level three: Measures of border control directly by the EU

The focus of the following chapter shall be the efforts of IBM undertaken by the EU at the European external frontiers directly (level three).

Generally speaking, the EU’s border management is based on the principle of solidarity. Hence, the MS are controlling their borders not only for themselves but also for the other members as they are interlinked through the area of free movements (Council 2009: 8). Nonetheless, principally every MS is responsible for its own frontiers making the EU’s IBM policy only binding to a limited extent (Hobbing & Koslowski 2009: 9; Interview German FMI 16.05.2014). Accordingly, many border security measures are undertaken autonomously by the

39 Except for Iceland, but the Icelandic government has put the talks on hold.
MS\textsuperscript{40}. However, this thesis investigates joint efforts of IBM by the EU. In this regard, many European endeavours are meant to coordinate MS’ action because the EU itself does not dispose of operational assets (Council 2006: 11).

Based on literature review and information from the interviews (Swiss DEA 02.05.2014, German FMI 16.05.2014), coordination of IBM on European level can be divided into strategic and operational coordination. Thereby, the best known agency responsible for the EU’s operational border control is Frontex. As its full name\textsuperscript{41} implies, Frontex’ mandate is to coordinate the cooperation between the MS and to “improve the integrated management of the external borders of the European Union” (EU 2010b)\textsuperscript{42}. Based on risk analysis, Frontex initiates and coordinates joint missions as well as acts as forum for information exchange (Interview Frontex 16.05.2014). The associated Schengen countries as well as third countries of the EU neighbourhood may participate in Frontex coordinated missions based on framework agreements (Interviews Frontex 16.05.2014, Swiss DEA 02.05.2014). Nonetheless, the agency’s primary focus lies on the EU MS.

Due to its legal status as a European body, Frontex is able to act relatively autonomous (Kasparek 2013). The agency is represented by an executive director and governed by a Managing Board that is tasked to control the functions of the agency. This board consists of one representative from each MS\textsuperscript{43} and two Commission representatives. Besides of its presence in the Managing Board, the Commission maintains a political link to Frontex as it “guides the agency on the state of affairs in Council” (Carrera 2007: 13). The facts that all EU MS enjoy the same rights under the framework of Frontex and share mutual interests indicate a network mode of coordination.

Additionally, the EU developed different operational mechanisms to manage its external borders. EUROSUR can be named as one surveillance system using for instance earth observation satellites or unmanned aerial vehicles. Furthermore, it enables “near real-time sharing of border-related data between members of the network” (Frontex 2014b).

Regarding the more formal strategic IBM coordination, the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI) within the Council (Council 2010c: Article 1) attracts attention. It was established by a Council Decision in 2010 and is tasked to “ensure that operational cooperation on internal security is promoted and strengthened within the Union” (Article 71

\textsuperscript{40} These independent or bilateral measures and policies of border management by the member states would be part of fourth level of the four-level model which will not be regarded in this thesis due to the above-outlined reasons.

\textsuperscript{41} European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union

\textsuperscript{42} Apart from training and risk analysis, Frontex has the possibility to launch a joint operation or to deploy Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) consisting of operational assets of member states in case of severe threats at an external border (Council 2009: 15). Furthermore, the agency assists and coordinates different ‘subnetworks’ for border control such as the European Patrols Network, a multi-agency approach functioning as “backbone” for Frontex-coordinated joint operations at sea (Frontex 2014a).

\textsuperscript{43} The UK and Ireland may participate but have no voting rights (Frontex 2014a). Furthermore, the four associated Schengen states are allowed to participate at the board’s meetings but retain only limited voting rights regarding issues that concern operational aspects of Schengen cooperation (Frontex 2014a; Interview Swiss DEA 02.05.2014).
The high-level committee, consisting of competent members of the national ministries and the Commission, is responsible for all matters of internal security. Nonetheless, the Internal Security Strategy (Council 2010a: 13) specifies the mandate “to ensure effective coordination and cooperation between law-enforcement and border-management authorities”. Based on this, it shall advise the Council regarding operational cooperation and evaluate the IBM’s general direction and efficiency (Council 2010c). Nonetheless, the committee is not allowed to conduct operations or prepare legislative acts by itself (Council 2010c: Articles 4, 6). Article 71 TFEU regulates that COSI has to inform the Council and EP about its activities. Generally, the establishment of COSI shall support the coordination and information transfer to the national governments via the Council and establish consistency between the European agencies (Council 2010c).

Moreover, the IBM relevant Council WGs need to be considered. The WGs compose the ‘lowest level’ in the JHA decision-making structure and tasked to prepare new legislation by coordinating the MS’s positions in IBM (Lavenex 2010: 464; Interview Swiss DEA 02.05.2014 and German FMI 16.05.2014).

In this regard the ‘External Border Practitioners’ Common Unit’ (SCIFA+)44, a special WG tasked with strategic coordination, is worth mentioning. Composed of senior officials, it functions as a forum for MS to exchange information in the fields of asylum, immigration and borders (Commission 2014b). The SCIFA+ may invite Frontex to its meetings (Interview Frontex 16.05.2014). Furthermore, the Schengen associated members may also participate in meetings with Schengen related topics (Interview Swiss DEA 02.05.2014). Beside coordinating national undertaking 45 and overseeing EU-wide pilot projects on border control, it establishes strategic guidelines and recommendations before the issues are handed over to COREPER and finally to the Council, including COSI (Council 2006: 11).

These institutional bodies responsible for the strategic coordination in European IBM clearly feature a top-down structure. The coordination between them is embedded in the hierarchical structure but also ensured through the Commission and the respective Council presidency that preside the meetings. By setting strategic priorities, the Council presidency is able to ensure that all bodies work in the same direction (Interview German FMI 16.05.2014).

Beside their legal status, the scope of Frontex and the institutional bodies’ mandate differs. More in detail, Frontex is responsible for the coordination of operational cooperation, whereas COSI, SCIFA and the other WGs are tasked to coordinate cooperation more formally by strategic deliberations and preparations for decision-making in IBM. Furthermore, while Frontex’ work focuses solely on border control, the institutional bodies deal with frontiers as only one aspect of the EU’s internal security. Notwithstanding the differences, the cooperation and

44 The SCIFA+ consists of members of SCIFA and heads of national border control services and is a formation within the Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA) (Interview Swiss DEA 2014; Lavenex 2010: 464).

45 These national measures by member states would be part of level four. As this thesis is looking at common EU action, this last level will be omitted (cf. Chapter 4.2).
relations of the MS in the discussed bodies can be described as equal\textsuperscript{46} and determined by symmetric interdependencies and diffuse reciprocity.

At this point it appears essential to mention the role of the EU institutions in border management. First of all, a “lead function” (Lavenex 2010: 464) is exercised by the European Council based on its strategic programming\textsuperscript{47} (Article 68 TFEU). The next significant actor is the Council, especially in its JHA formation. As the Lisbon Treaty determines the entire scope of JHA as a shared competence, the EP is involved in the legislative process through the ordinary legislative procedure (Article 77(2) TFEU). Furthermore, the Commission enjoys the right of initiative, monitors the implementation and is involved in operational measures (Council 2006: 11; Interview Swiss DEA 02.05.2014). Based on literature, the involvement of the EU institutions supports the finding of a network mode as they offer a stable membership, an equal standing of the MS, symmetric interdependencies and mutual interests. It confirms the above-outlined argumentation of scholars for a network character in the EU (e.g. Jordan & Schout 2008; Jönsson & Strömvik 2005).

Concluding the third level, “[t]he management of the EU’s external borders is based on the principles of solidarity, mutual trust and co-responsibility of the Member States” (Council 2006: 5). This is supported by this chapter’s impression of an equal relationship between the EU and the MS in common European action of border control. The fact that the EU established different means for burden sharing (Marenin 2010: 14) and that all MS have the same rights in the European institutions and bodies as well as cooperate jointly in different means underlines that finding further. Additionally, besides the equality aspect, all other criteria for a network mode are fulfilled as the EU MS’ relationship is based on diffuse reciprocity and a mutual interest in securing their common frontiers.

Regarding the relationship between the bodies entrusted with the coordination in IBM and the European institutions, indications for a hierarchy in their internal coordination, such as clear rules and a top-down structure, became visible. Nevertheless, this finding is weakened as they also share mutual interests and interdependencies.

### 5.2 The vertical dimension

After having scrutinized the horizontal dimension, the following chapter concentrates on the vertical dimension. Therefore, this analysis’ second part builds on the afore-acquired knowledge to answer the second sub-question: “\textit{How are the different levels of border management interconnected and coordinated?}”.

Reviewing the examined levels of border management, various measures of European border control were identified. Thereby, the efforts undertaken by the EU in one level seem to be conducted rather independently from the other levels

\textsuperscript{46} This finding was supported by all interviewees (cf. Interviews Frontex 16.05.2014, German FMI 16.05.2014 and Swiss DEA 02.05.2014)

\textsuperscript{47} For example the Tampere, The Hague and Stockholm programmes (please see Chapter 2.3.).
at first glance. This is supporting the argumentation put forward by scholars of IBM being a fragmented policy area (cf. Berg & Ehin 2006). Nevertheless, the measures and policies of the four levels can be regarded complementary and interlinked through the responsible European actors.

Generally, considering the relationship between the different levels of border management, the strongest links seem to occur between the last three levels. In this regard, level three and four are interconnected through COSI and SCIFA which coordinate projects of the MS. Moreover, European legislation decided upon in level three needs to be implemented in national law and also applied to national actions of border control (level four). Additionally, the MS are using the shared databases of Frontex (level three) but also data retrieved for instance from SIS (level two) for national measures (level four).

Next, level two and three are also closely interlinked as the abolishment of internal borders within the Schengen area created a mutual interest in securing the external borders. This close interconnection and relationship is illustrated by the associated Schengen states’ frequent participation in the second level of European border management. Thereby, the associated Schengen countries may participate in formal and in operational means.

Notwithstanding that level one appears to be to some extent outside of the close relationship between the EU MS, common European action and associated Schengen countries, the cooperation with third actors is still regarded significant for an effective European IBM. Thus, the first level’s most intensive interconnection can be seen with level three. In this regard, compared to the efforts by the EU to establish European standards of IBM in its neighbourhood, cooperation with countries that are not geographically connected to the EU occurs primarily through the exchange of information. Regarding the European neighbourhood, the EU aims at enhancing and strengthening their border management with the consent of the respective states. Furthermore, based on working agreements, the neighbouring countries may also participate in joint EU missions. Occasionally, international organisations take part in such actions as well. Among the involvement of the European institutions with the third actors, especially the appearance of Frontex and the Commission is noticeable. Furthermore, the Schengen associated countries (level two) are also involved in European action (level three) in and with the countries neighbouring the EU (level one). Despite the thesis’s aim of investigating into common European endeavours of IBM, it appears necessary to mention that there is also an interconnection between level one and four through bilateral agreements and measures by EU MS with third actors.

As previously mentioned, the presence of Frontex stands out as it is visible in each level. This was already noted by Carrera (2007: 27) expressing that Frontex is the “main institutional actor in charge of putting the integrated and global paradigm into practice”. Hence, through working agreements with actors in

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48 In this regard, it is important to note that the formal participation is restricted to matters that concern the Schengen area. Further, the associated countries only have limited voting rights in the third level’s institutions and bodies.

49 Only those third countries outside the EU participate in EU joint missions that have signed a respective agreement with Frontex (Interview with Frontex 16.05.2014).
level one, the involvement of the associated Schengen members in Frontex’ Managing Board and in common missions (level two), the coordination of MS’ joint operations (level three) and lastly through the assistance of the EU MS’ actions (level four), Frontex interlinks all four levels.

Apart from the strong involvement of Frontex, the Commission contributes to the picture of interconnection by implementing and monitoring policies in all levels supplemented by its right of initiative. Accordingly, different Commission Directorate-Generals (DGs) are involved. As border management falls primarily within JHA, DG Home Affairs is the most frequently concerned department, especially in levels two and three. Nonetheless this DG can also be recognized as being part of level one as it is further mandated to deal with borders regarding the EU neighbourhood and strategic partners like the USA and Russia (Commission 2013j). Apart from the DG Home Affairs, the DGs External Relations (RELEX) and Enlargement are involved in the first level as well.

Another European institution that appears to be a present in all four levels is the Council. Apart from the above outlined legislative competence (level three, four) this intergovernmental body signs international agreements (level one) on behalf of the EU. The associated Schengen members (level two) may also participate in respective Council WGs (level three).

Due to the abovementioned ordinary legislative procedure, the EP is also involved in the legislative process between the levels. The decisions taken in level three have to be implemented into national law and thus need to be applied to national action in level four. Moreover, the associated countries (level two) are affected by Schengen related acts. The EP’s role in the first level is primarily to approve or reject (international) agreements negotiated by the EU in the consent procedure (Article 289(2) TFEU).

Considering the diversity of actors and policies in European border management, scholars generally stressed the importance of so-called ‘linking-pin organizations’ that “occupy central positions in terms of being reachable from, and able to reach” most of the actors in the system (Jönsson 1986: 42). Thus, linking-pin organizations are often regarded as communication channel and broker, although they might have self-interests (Jönsson 1986: 43).

Considering the overarching presence of Frontex, it is arguable that this agency acts as a linking-pin organization. This is stressed by the fact that Frontex possesses a central position within the European IBM, centres all activities and coordinates the operations. Moreover, it links European border control to third parties, which is another significant characteristic of a linking-pin organization (Jönsson 1986: 43).

Furthermore, Jönsson and Strömvik (2005: 18) observe that the Commission is usually noted as a linking-pin in European politics. This can also be the case in IBM due to the Commission’s central role and its interconnection with all levels, especially with regards to initiating new legislation, monitoring and implementing the EU’s strategies in the neighbouring countries and at MS level. Marenin (2010: 9) even speaks of a “lead responsibility” in IBM. Thus, while Frontex merely links the levels in operational and practical means, the Commission can also be considered a linking-pin organization in terms of legislative and formal
interconnection. Accordingly, the Commission can further be characterized as a “process manager” (Kohler-Koch 1996: 368).

Nonetheless, it appears difficult to distinguish one actor that holds the main responsibility for the whole coordination between the different levels of border management, as it was already concluded in the first level’s summary.

After having scrutinized the relationship between the levels of border management, the impression arises that the most present mode of coordination in the vertical dimension is a network form. This is notably the case among the last three layers, primarily due to the fact that in these levels the involved stakeholders share mutual interests and social patterns. Furthermore, their cooperation is based on trust and on a relative balance of power. Accordingly, the interconnection among the levels two, three and four showed no evidence of conditionality or a top-down structure which appeared to be one of the most crucial indicators for hierarchical coordination. Considering this, the relation between level one and three varied to a great extent. As level one involves diverse types of third actors, the EU’s relationship towards them differed. Consequently, the interconnection between level one and three offered both hierarchical and network modes of coordination as well as hybrid forms. Thereby it was noticeable that the first level’s relation towards level two, which primarily involves practical collaboration, is characterized by a network mode of coordination owing to the fact that the Schengen countries have no leverage on the EU’s neighbourhood.

Concluding, these observations support the earlier findings and argumentation that the actors’ relationship determines the particular mode of coordination. Thereby, the linking-pin role of Frontex and the Commission was stressed.

5.3 Merging the horizontal and vertical dimension of European border management

After having scrutinized both the horizontal and vertical dimension of IBM, the following section briefly summarizes and compares the findings related to the mode of coordination (cf. appendix 4).

Regarding the horizontal dimension, the study demonstrated that the EU’s relation towards the actors involved within the particular levels of IBM differs to a large extent, leading towards varying modes of coordination. Hence, in the first level network and hierarchical as well as variant forms of coordination were present. While a rather clear network mode in the coordination and cooperation became visible regarding the USA and international organisations, the EU-Russian relationship appeared to be a more attenuated strain of a network. Furthermore, strong hierarchical coordination was present in the EU’s relation towards the Western Balkans as candidate countries, whereas in the case of Turkey (candidate country) and the ENP countries, the findings indicated a more weakened hierarchy. Thus, while within level one a variety of coordination modes became visible, the operational cooperation with the associated Schengen
countries (level one) and the coordination of common European action between the MS (level three) were primarily characterized by a network mode.

The second part of this study’s analysis discussed the vertical dimension of the EU’s border management with an emphasis on the level’s interconnection and coordination. Accordingly, it demonstrated that although all four levels are interlinked, the intensity of the interconnection varies. Thereby, interdependencies and relations of the actors are essential for the degree of interconnection. Consequently, it is arguable that the more mutual interests the stakeholders share, the more interconnected are these levels and the more likely is the appearance of a network between the respective levels. This was in particular shown by the close interlinkage of level two and three, whereas level one appeared to be a bit outside of the strong connection between the EU’s common action and the associated Schengen countries. Accordingly, the interconnection between the last three levels is characterized by a network in coordination, whereas the mode of coordination between level one and three differs depending on the respective stakeholder in the first level. Based on the distinction between formal strategic and operational coordination as well as on the findings regarding the other levels’ interconnection with level one, it is arguable that the more practical the cooperation’s nature, the more likely is a network mode of coordination.

Referring back to the initial definition of coordination by Malone and Crowston (1990: 361) as “the act of managing interdependencies”, in all cases and levels interdependencies of the stakeholders became visible. Interdependencies are necessary as both sides need incentives to cooperate. Thereby, it appeared to be of importance whether the interdependency was asymmetric or symmetric. The thesis showed that the more symmetric the dependency, the more likely is a network mode of coordination. In this context, reviewing the particular EU-stakeholder relationships and the EU’s internal coordination, it is noticeable that a hierarchical coordination mode is more likely to appear when conditionality and an asymmetric dependence are present. Hence, the stronger the EU’s political leverage, the more effective is the conditionality and the more probable is the presence of a hierarchy in terms of coordination.50

Furthermore, the presence of trust and equality are significant factors for networks in coordination. Level two and three demonstrated these notions, intensified through diffuse reciprocities, whereas in the cases of hierarchical coordination in level one a top-down structure with specific reciprocity (related to conditionality) was identified.

Nonetheless, in the end the combination and intensity of the factors and criteria mattered resulting sometimes in variant and attenuated forms of coordination.

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50 This was especially underlined in the case of the Western Balkans as candidate countries in comparison to the ENP countries.
6 Conclusion

The abolishment of the EU MS’ internal borders with the purpose of creating an area of free movements inevitably led to the need for effective European border management. Thereby the protection of the henceforth common frontiers became a community interest. Nonetheless, the findings of this study approved Berg and Ehin’s (2006: 55) characterization of the EU’s border policy as a “composite policy”. This fragmentation in turn also affects the coordination of European border management.

The thesis’ first objective was to investigate the different efforts undertaken by the EU to manage the European external borders. Hence, considering the variety of stakeholders and measures, this study aimed at merely giving an overview by covering the most important aspects of the EU’s border management within the three examined levels. These endeavours included different surveillance techniques, common databases, joint missions and agencies as well as agreements of cooperation and funding by the EU. Thereby, the efforts to control the European external borders appeared to be of rather similar nature in level two and three, compared to the measures and policies of the EU towards and in cooperation with the third actors in level one.

Turning to the research question’s second interest, namely the coordination of the EU’s efforts in border management, this thesis’ investigation was divided into a horizontal and a vertical dimension. Summarizing, in both dimensions it is arguable that the EU’s border management is neither a clear network nor hierarchy, but differs according to the four levels. The thesis demonstrated and confirmed that the mode of coordination depends on the respective stakeholders involved and the EU’s relationship towards these actors. As these relations are dynamic, the respective form of coordination varies and can therefore also expose variations within one particular mode. Thereby, the impression arose that operational cooperation in IBM is more often determined by a network mode of cooperation than strategic or formal legislative coordination.

Moreover, notwithstanding that the analysis of the vertical dimension exposed the importance and presence of the European institutions in all levels of border management, the role of the Commission and Frontex as linking-pin organizations was noticeable. However, it appeared difficult to further pinpoint one actor that is responsible for coordinating both formal and operational matters of all levels. Although level three can be regarded the centre of European IBM, the interconnection to the three other levels is nonetheless of great significance since the involvement of the associate countries and third countries is essential for border management to be effective.

In order to assess the study thoroughly, the influence of the EU MS cannot be denied as “within the legislative and political framework, the territorial authority and responsibility for border management remains with the member
states” (Council 2006: 11). Furthermore, although Frontex is able to act relatively autonomous it is still governed by a Managing Board composed of officials from the participating countries. Additionally, the direction and measures of border management in all levels are determined by intergovernmental institutions, namely the European Council and the Council. In this respect, referring back to Hooghe and Marks (2001: 1-4) who argue that multilevel governance means a loss of control for national governments, the impression arises that this is less intensively the case in European border management. Nevertheless, it may be considered that the EP can influence developments of IBM through the ordinary legislative procedure.

Finally, it appears essential to evaluate the limits of this study. First of all, this thesis only took the efforts of IBM undertaken by the EU directly into consideration. However, the EU also conducts policies that are only rather indirectly connected to border security like prevention of crime and irregular migration in other non-contiguous third countries through development aid or peace missions. Considering the multitude of European efforts, this thesis merely gave an overview over measures and policies conducted at the three examined levels to lay the foundation for further studies. Furthermore, as this study concentrated on common European efforts, the fourth level of the model was omitted. Thus, future research should also consider bilateral actions and measures undertaken rather independently by the MS as well as the possible influence of further stakeholders such as civil society, NGOs or private actors.

In conclusion, although the final responsibility for border control remains with the MS, the EU still has a far-reaching influence. This thesis showed that the four levels of border management are closely interconnected through the respective actors. Nevertheless, while researching some shortcomings also became visible such as overlaps of activities, a constantly changing institutional framework or the high politics character of border control that often impedes to reach an agreement. Notwithstanding these issues, there is a noticeable trend of Europeanization and centralisation of IBM coordination which was inconceivable two decades ago. In order to maintain the internal security of the area of free movements, one of the EU’s major achievements, a common and cooperative European IBM policy is inevitable. Thereby, the inclusion of the associated Schengen countries and third actors, in particular the EU’s neighborhood, is essential.
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Appendix

Appendix 1. The immediate Neighbours of the EU

Appendix 2. Illegal Border Crossings at the Western Balkans

(Commission 2013i)

(Frontex 2013b: 19)
Appendix 3. Schengen Area

(Commission 2013g)

Appendix 4. The Modes of Coordination in the EU’s Border Management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Mode of Coordination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No geographical connection</td>
<td>USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Neighbouring countries</td>
<td>Russia (Strategic partner)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Western Balkans (Candidate country)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey (Candidate country)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ENP countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Organisation</td>
<td>UN, IOM and Interpol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Associated Schengen Countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Formal Coordination: Attenuated Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Frontex, COSI, WGs, European Institutions</td>
<td></td>
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