Increased Vertical Coherence of EU’s Foreign Policy through Institutional Changes – Desirable but Unachievable?

A Study on the Effects of Institutional Changes on the Vertical Coherence of EU’s Foreign Policy

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Abstract

The question of why institutional changes would affect the vertical coherence of the European Union’s foreign policy is addressed in this thesis. In answering the research question propositions on why institutional changes would have an effect on state behaviour, thereby policy outcome, are derived from both the normative and the rational choice versions of institutionalism. The proposition: changes in the normative foundation of an institution stem from the normative institutionalism, whereas the proposition: changes in the hierarchical structure on coordination is derived from the rational choice institutionalism. These are in turn compared over time to the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy at the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. In order to determine whether the vertical coherence has changed, data is collected on the session meetings were the EU delivered statements on agenda items without Member States giving national statements at the same meeting and on the same agenda items. The findings of the research are as following: during the time period of 1998-2008 there was an increased vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy, whereas during 2008-2013 the vertical coherence of the European Union’s foreign policy at the First Committee decreased.

Key words: Institutional Change, Vertical Coherence, EU’s Foreign Policy, Normative Institutionalism, Rational Choice Institutionalism.
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1 Introduction

The Constitutional Treaty provides for a number of important institutional changes designed to improve the coherence of the EU’s external action (European Commission, 2006).

Whether or not institutional changes effect the EU as a multilateral actor is debated in the academic literature. On the one hand some scholars, such as Knud Erik Jørgensen and Ramses A Wessel (2011:201-285) argue that the effects of institutional changes in legal competences on the EU’s position and performance in other international institutions are ‘doubtful’ (2011:285). Moreover, Fraser Cameron argues that changes in the institutional structure and procedure introduced with the Amsterdam Treaty are not alone sufficient to “ensure a coherent foreign and security policy” (1998, 59-76). On the other hand, some scholars such as Thomas Risse (2010) stress that the inclusion of the High representative and the external action service in the Lisbon Treaty means that the European Union has “completed the foreign and security portfolio” and “now commands the whole range of institutional capabilities of a cohesive and strong foreign and security policy” (2010:38). Furthermore, Jolyon Howorth underlines that the institutional arrangements introduced with the Lisbon Treaty have effects “in taking the EU foreign policy and security policy forward“ (2010:457). Moreover, Dominic Tolksdorf (2013) argues that the establishment of the High Representative and an external action service with the Lisbon Treaty “changed the conduct of the EU foreign policy significantly” (2013:1).

The discussion on whether or not institutions have an effect on states behavior, and thereby on policy outcomes, can be summarized is in the wording of John Petersen as ‘the debate that never ends’ (1998:7). Nevertheless, the assumption that institutional changes or reforms are necessary tools in order to improve the coherence of EU’s foreign policy seem to be widely emphasized. For instance, Javier Solana underlined that the ‘Reform Treaty will bring more coherence’ of EU external policy and increase its role as a global player (Council, 2007). Nonetheless why should we assume that institutional changes through Treaty reforms affect the coherence of EU’s foreign policy?
1.1 Aim and Research Question

The aim of this thesis is twofold: a theoretical and an empirical aim. The theoretical aim is to derive and test possible propositions from normative institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism on why institutional changes would have an effect on state behavior and thereby policy outcomes. The empirical aim is to compare the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy in an international organization. Following that line, the research question in this thesis is:

*Why would institutional changes affect the vertical coherence of the European Union’s foreign policy, especially in international organizations such as the UN?*

1.2 Terms and Definitions

In the following section the terms institutional change, vertical coherence, EU foreign policy, and international organizations are defined in order to avoid ambiguity when referred to in this study as well as to enable the reader to follow the arguments and conclusions made. The definition of vertical coherence has been given a more detailed discussion as it make up a significant part of the research.

1.2.1 Institutional Change

Scholars address the definition of institutions differently. Whereas some scholars emphasize institutions as both formal and informal rules affecting the behavior of actor (Knight, 1992:xi), others understand institutions as the legislative process (Milner, 1993:18). Nevertheless, the definition of institutional change used in this study is defined by László Urbán who views institutional change as ‘the replacement of one set of rules, expectations, and behaviors with another’ (1997:239).

1.2.2 Vertical Coherence

The scholarly academic literature on EU emphasizes coherence as a precondition for achieving effective foreign policy outcomes (Koehler, 2010; Thomas, 2012), and for acting as well as speaking as one actor (Allen, 1998). Nevertheless, both scholars of political science and legal scholars define coherence in a multitude of ways, although legal scholarship is more or less united in drawing a distinction between the principles of coherence and consistency (Cremona, 2011; Blockmans – Laatsit, 2012). Nonetheless in EU legislation are the terms coherence and
consistency frequently used as interchangeably. Literature on coherence of EU foreign policy argues that this is a result of the translation of the Treaties into the Member States’ different languages. For example the French version refer to the term coherence, which has been turned into the English consistency - sometimes replaced by references to cohesion, whilst the German version refer to kohärenze (Gebhard, 2011:105; Hillion; 2008:12; Missiroli, 2001:182; Nuttall, 2005:93; Thomas, 2012:458; Tietje, 1997:211).

There are conflicting views in the literature on whether the difference between coherence and consistency matter. On the one hand, Simon Nuttall (2005:93) argues that any attempt at distinguishing between them ‘risk ending up in linguistic pedantry’. For that reason, authors use coherence and consistency interchangeably (Olsen, 2008:160; Gaspers, 2011:19) or define coherence as others would define consistency (Portela – Orbie, 2014:64). On the other hand, some scholars consider a distinction between the terms an analytical necessity (Reynaert, 2012:207-208; Dave, 2011:18; Gephard, 2011:106; Portela – Raube 2009:3-4). In the latter, consistency is defined as the ‘absence of contradiction’ and involves compatibility, namely that the different EU policies do not legally contradict each other. Coherence in turn implies increased systemic synergy in the implementation of these policies, i.e. the ability to add value to Member States’ foreign policies by acting together, and thus involves positive links between policy areas (Missiroli, 2001:182-184). Cristopher Hillion (2008) stresses the need to distinguish the notion of coherence from consistency, as the ‘latter is an essential but insufficient condition for achieving the former’ (2008:12). In other words, coherence is considered a ‘desirable plus’ while the notion of consistency is perceived as a ‘minimum requirement’ (Missiroli, 2001:182). Consequently, scholars who advocate a distinction of the terms seem to define consistency as a precondition for coherence and therefore as interlinked. Accordingly, Hillion underlined that coherence is, aside from the absence of legal contradiction, about ‘added value’ and ‘synergies’ (2008:17).

Nonetheless, in line with the abovementioned discussion one might argue that no clear line can be drawn between the terms of consistency and coherence, rather as observed by Missiroli both terms underline the need for compatible policies with the aim of ensuring that EU acts unitary (2001:182). The distinction between the terms should thereby be viewed as a linguistic, instead of an analytical, dilemma. Even though Horst-Günter Krenzler and Henning C. Schneider suggest a definition of consistency in studying EU’s external activities, I would however argue that it is also applicable to coherence: ‘a behavior based on agreement among the Union and its Member States, where comparable and compatible methods are used in pursuit of a single objective and result in an uncontradictory foreign policy’ (1997:134).

Regardless of definition the literature divide the notion of coherence/consistency into different contextual levels of EU external relations. Ben Tonra underlines that coherence, as a part of a policy condominium instead of a common policy, should be sought at several levels: ‘between the instruments and capabilities available within each pillar of the Union, between the pillars themselves, between Member States and Community activities, [and] between the Union and its international partners […]’ (2001:38). These four different conceptual
dimensions of coherence: internal; horizontal; vertical and external are also observed by Cameron Gerhard (2011:107-109). Nevertheless, other scholars simply divide the notion of coherence vertically and horizontally (Missiroli, 2001:5; Olsen, 2008; Dave, 2011: 19-23). For the purpose of this research a distinction between the internal and horizontal dimensions as well as between the external and vertical dimensions of EU’s foreign policy seems irrelevant. Further, as thesis aims at studying the foreign policy coordination as well as cooperation between the Union’s institutions and Member States, rather than the external activities of the Union as a whole, it focuses on the so-called vertical coherence of the EU (Hillion, 2008:17).

In sum, this research define vertical coherence as the consistency between Member States and EU’s action.

1.2.3 European Union’s Foreign Policy

In the literature, authors debate on the appropriate distinction between European foreign policy and EU foreign policy. In line with the abovementioned definition of vertical coherence, namely compatibility of the foreign policy between the Member States and the institutions of the Union, the definition of foreign policy refers to the intergovernmental coordination of national foreign policy within the EU. As observed by Peterson et. Al. “foreign policy refers to policies and actions in those areas that are normally in the remit of national foreign ministers and on which nearly all decisions are taken unanimously” (2010:290). Therefore is EU’s foreign policy used as an umbrella term for the national foreign policy of the Union’s Member States and the Common Foreign and Security Policy, hereinafter also referred to as ‘the CFSP’.

1.2.4 International Organization

There are several different perceptions of the distinction as well as relationship between international institutions, regimes and organizations. In this study, institutional organizations will be defined according to Michel Virally’s definition, as “an association of States, established by agreement among its members and possessing a permanent system of a set of organs, whose task is to pursue objectives of common interests by means of co-operation among its members” (1981:51).¹

¹ For related definition see White (1997)
1.3 Theoretical Point of Departure

The theoretical debate on the role of institutions has long occupied researchers. Scholars have either focused on the question of whether institutions matter or not, or on how institutions matter. In connection with the former question, Robert O. Keohane and Lise Martin (1995) argue in *The Promise of Institutionalist Theory* that institutions constitute an ‘important determinant’ to state behavior, and thereby replying to John Mearsheimer’s article *The False Promise of International Institutions* (1995) within which he argues that institutions do not have any effect on state behavior. The theoretical literature on how institutions matter encompasses several approaches to institutionalism. In *Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms* Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor (1996) identify three main forms of institutionalism: sociological; rational choice; and historical. Furthermore, in *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The New Institutionalism* Peters P. Guy (1999; 2005; 2012) identifies seven types of institutionalism: normative; historical; rational choice; empirical; sociological; interest representation; and international institutions. In addition, Vivien Schmidt (2008; 2010) emphasizes a discursive version of institutionalism that includes the ‘substantive dimension of ideas and discourse’ (2010:3). Regardless of terminology, the basic assumption of institutionalism is that institutions affect the behavior of political actors, or at the international level states, and thereby the policy outcome.

1.3.1 Differences between the Versions of Institutionalism

As outlined above, the literature of institutionalism emphasizes a variety of versions and thereby in following sub-section the differences between them are discussed. The so-called empirical version of institutionalism emphasizes empirical research on the impacts of structures on action and thereby ought to rather be of methodological rather than theoretical concern. Furthermore, interest representative institutionalism\(^2\) emphasizes how actors, others than states and individual actors, interact to form structural arrangements among themselves, and thereby constitute an institution. Moreover, international institutionalism encompasses the link between international relations and political science literature on institutions (Peters, 2012; 87-105, 123-154). However, a lack of clarification by Peters for why these versions should be treated separately from other versions of institutionalism leads us to argue that they do not constitute a theoretical source for the purpose of this research.

Although the normative, sociological and discursive versions of institutionalism are portrayed as separated from each other, they do demonstrate more similarities than differences. As regards similarities, they have the same view on what mechanisms institutions may provide which and how these mechanisms affect state

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\(^2\) By Christopher Ansell (2009) termed ‘network institutionalism’.
behavior. Furthermore, they all assume that ideas are exchanged and conveyed through a process of socialization (March – Olsen 1989:22) – by Schmidt called ‘an interactive process’ (2010:3). Accordingly, one might argue that normative, sociological and discursive institutionalism all derive from the theoretical assumption on the role of institutions by James March and Johan Olsen (1984; 1986; 1989; 1998; 2006), which some scholars have categorized as ‘normative’ institutionalism. ‘Normative’ refers to a concern with norms and values as explanatory variables, and not to normative theory in the sense of promoting particular norms and values (Peters 2012; Tallberg – Jönsson 2008; Thoenig 2003; Thomas 2009). The difference lies in which factors they emphasize as the underlying sources for institutional change. However, the question of which versions of new institutionalism may generate explanatory factors for why institutions change or not, is debated (see for instance Hira – Hira 2000; Peters 2012) and of little importance when addressing the question of how institutional change affect vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy.

The literature on institutionalism argues that the historical version encompasses both a rational choice argument of actors as calculators and a normative cognitive-cultural perspective on the relationship between institutions and actors (Lowndes 2002:96). The historical institutionalism literature emphasizes ‘path-dependency’ in order to explain institutional stability and calls attention to so-called ‘critical junctures’ to explain changes. These junctures, characterized by a situation in which constraints on action are eased for a short period, may then constitute the starting point for path-dependency processes (Capoccia – Kelemen, 2007:341-343; Steinmo et.al, 1992). Accordingly, historical institutionalism is more concerned with the role of ideas to explain institutional ‘reproduction’ rather than using ideas to understand change after the initial formation of an institution (Hay, 2006). The literature on historical institutionalism has therefore been criticized for not specifying or developing an understanding of how institutions, or even institutional changes, may affect the behavior of actors (Peters, 2012:83). While Peter Hall (2010) argues that the historical version of institutionalism offers analytical solutions to explain when and how institutions change, we argue that as a result of its limit to analytical address the question of how institutions affect actors’ behavior historical institutionalism per se is not applied in this research.

The rational choice version of institutionalism consists of scholars from both political science and international relations (Pollack, 2007:33-34). The ‘normative’ and ‘rational choice’ versions of institutionalism have the most varying perceptions on what mechanisms institutions may provide and how these affect state behavior. On the one hand, a rational choice approach associates institutions as formal structures and rules of the ‘political game’ which affect the strategic and calculated state. On the other hand, a normative approach define institutions as informal and formal rules of appropriate behavior. In contrast to the historical approach, both rational choice and normative versions tend to focus on the process and outcome rather than the origins of institutional change (Mabee, 2011:28). Moreover, while a rational choice approach emphasizes state preferences prior to institutions, normative institutionalism view preferences as shaped by institutions. As observed by Vivien Lowndes (2002:106) the ‘normative’ and ‘rational choice’ versions of
institutionalism “are built upon different theoretical assumptions about the impact of institutions on political behavior, and about the interaction between individual actors and institutions.” Consequently, we should assume that one might derive different mechanisms for institutional changes, and for the theoretical aim of this research the rational choice and normative versions of institutionalism will be applied.

1.3.2 Normative vs. Rational Choice Institutionalism: Compatible or Competitive

Normative and rational choice institutionalism are basically understood as two competing theories on the relationship between institutions and action (Knight, 1992: 14). As outlined above, a rational choice version of institutionalism emphasize actors’ preferences as exogenous and institutional factors as endogenous, while a normative version of institutionalism in turn argues that actors’ preferences are shaped by institutions (Aspinwall – Schneider 2000:10). The main dispute between the versions is whether or not the logic of consequence exceed the logic of appropriateness (see for instance Krasner). Nevertheless, to distinguish the exact circumstances in which one motivation predominates is beyond the scope of this research. In line with Goodin and Lingeman who argued that “it is a matter of analyzing behavior within the parameters set by institutional facts and opportunity structures” (1996:10-11), it is reasonable to assume that both norm and rational calculation motivate action, thereby affect state behavior.

In the literature on rational choice institutionalism, scholars recognizes that institutional constraints also can be informal, as such inclusion of norms and values in individual preferences can explain behavior (Eggersson, 1996:19). Nevertheless, these informal constraints are recognized as underlying formal constrains (North, 1990:36-53). Although, some scholars argue that rational choice institutionalism therefore encompasses both logics of action (see for instance Kahler, 1998), we argue that normative and rational choice institutionalism define institutions differently and should therefore be treated separately. As observed by Snidal (2013:88) ‘the elastic of the rationality concept makes it tempting […] to reduce alternative conceptions to a form of goal seeking. Treating “appropriateness” as an element of utility function simply miss the difference between the approaches, which needs to be taken more seriously’.

Moreover, a rational choice version of institutionalism focuses on short-term effects of institutions whereas a normative variant emphasizes the long term effects. Even though the issue of time may be of marginal importance when addressing the question of how one would assume that it is of greater importance when addressing the question of why institutional change affect state behavior. For the purpose of this research, the rational choice and normative version of institutionalism is to be viewed as complementary.
1.4 Research Contribution

This subsection review existing theoretical and empirical literature in order to emphasize the theoretical as well as empirical contribution of this research.

1.4.1 Theoretical Contribution

Scholars of institutionalism emphasizes that institutions change and seek to include institutional change as an important variable to be studied (March – Olsen, 1984; 1989:49; North, 1990; Keohane – Nye, 2012). Nonetheless, scholars of institutionalism have rather focused on the connection between institutions and action in order to explain stability (Mahoney – Thelen, 2010: 6-7). For instance, in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change edited by Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (1993) scholars address ideas within a rationalist framework and underline that institutionalization of ideas affect political behavior and thereby stabilizes institutions. Moreover, one might assume that the scholars of institutionalism, as a reaction towards ‘doubters’, rather have stressed explanations as to why institutions have an effect on state behavior, and thereby focused on explaining continuity and stabilization instead of change (Guy Peters, 2012). For instance, Daniel C. Thomas (2009a; 2009b) has derived the explanatory factor ‘entrapment’ from normative institutionalism in order to explain why Member States of the EU act collectively on matters of foreign policy.

Furthermore, in theorizing on institutional change scholars of institutionalism rather address the question of why institutions change (see for instance Alston et Al. 1996 and Douglass North, 1990). Nonetheless, scholars of institutionalism implicitly encompass assumptions on the effects of institutions. For instance, Nils Brunsson and Johan Olson (1997) emphasize the effects of reorganizations on institutions, thereby the behavior of actors, as either leading to changes or stabilization. This as a consequence of their argument that reforms may both prevent change as well as contribute to stability (1997:199-200). Therefore, this thesis theoretical contribution is to search for possible explanations from the normative and rational choice versions of institutionalism to why we should expect institutional changes to have an effect on state’s action, and thereby policy outcomes.

1.4.2 Empirical Contribution

The existing empirical literature on the effects of institutional changes on the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy in institutional organizations are limited. Rather in studying the institutional changes, particularly after the establishment of the Lisbon Treaty, scholars have mainly focused on its effects on the EU as an efficient multilateral actor in international organizations. For instance, in their book chapter the position of the European Union in (other) international organizations:
confronting legal and political approaches (2011:201-285) Knud Erik Jørgensen and Ramses A. Wessels conduct an analysis on the effects of institutional changes on the correlation between legal institutional competences and the position of the EU in another international institution. Furthermore, in their book chapter The EU as a multilateral security actor after Lisbon: Constitutional and institutional aspects Jan Wouters, Stephanie Bijmakers and Katrien Meuwissen (2013: 72-103) studied the institutional changes with the Lisbon Treaty on the coherence of EU’s common foreign and security policy. This was done in order to assess whether the changes enhanced the EU’s capacity as a ‘multilateral security actor’. Nevertheless, the findings in connection with the coherence of the Union’s foreign policy are based on a legal approach, meaning that the effects were determined by the change of Treaty provisions.

In the same line, Steven Blockmans and Marja-Liisa Laatsit (2012) analyze whether the creation of an external action service has enhanced the inter-institutional coherence of EU’s external actions by underlining the widening of its legal mandate as stipulated in the Treaties provisions. Moreover, in article European foreign policy after Lisbon: strengthening the EU as an international actor (2010) Kateryna Kohler study the effects of institutional changes on the coherence of EU’s foreign policy by analyzing the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. Nevertheless, in order to assess the institutional changes introduced by the Treaties, Madeleine Holsti et. Al. (2010) studied the voting cohesion of the EU at the General Assembly over time. Furthermore, Xi Jin and Madeleine Holsti (2011) analyzed the effects of institutional changes introduced with the Lisbon Treaty on the voting behavior of EU’s Member States at the United Nations General Assembly. In sum, it seems to be an empirical gap in the literature as studies have either focused on the legal changes of the Lisbon Treaty, in order to determine its effects on the coherence of EU’s foreign policy, or on voting cohesion. Therefore, the empirical contribution of this thesis is to ‘fill’ this gap by studying the effects of institutional changes on the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy in international organizations.

1.5 Outline

The following section will start with presenting the normative version of institutionalism, which will be followed by a section on the rational choice version of institutionalism. These theoretical sections will emphasize institutionalism arguments for why institutional changes would affect states behavior. Thereafter is the methodological motivations and choices made in order to answer the research question. In the following section we will emphasize the institutional changes with the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Lisbon Treaty which according to the theoretical approaches are important factors for institutional changes to have an effect on states behavior, and thus the policy outcome. In the sections thereafter a study on the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy at First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly according to the theoretical approaches are conducted. The
findings in the research will be summarized in a concluding section. In the concluding section the research question will be answered and suggestions for further research is made.
2 ‘Normative’ Institutionalism

The following section encompasses the normative institutionalism conceptualization of institutions and how its changes effects state behavior. This section therefore begins with a definition of institutions and how they change. Subsequently the section addresses why institutions according to the normative version of institutionalism changes.

2.1 Institutional Change – A Learning Process

Normative institutionalism conceptualizes institutions as a collection of normative values and rules which are means for determining the political behavior of actors. Routines are also embedded in the conception of institutions, as they are developed in order to implement and enforce rules. March and Olsen emphasizes the ‘logic of appropriateness’ as a means for shaping and constraining the behavior of members of the institution (1984; 1989; 2009). Accordingly, actors are driven by appropriate rules, which in turn are organized into institutions. These actors are by Keohane and Martin (1995) referred to as states, while March and Olsen refer to them as ‘human’ or ‘political’ actors. Rules of appropriateness are seen as carries of lessons from experience and are developing as a result of experience with a specific situation over time (March – Olsen, 2009:1-22). A normative institutional approach is, therefore, rather concerned with institutional development than change per se (Peters, 2008:8; Olsen, 2008:29). In other words, institutions develop and adapts to changes in a process of learning and selection. Nevertheless, the literature on normative institutionalism points to several stimuli for change in addressing the question of which factors of change that may cause developments in the learning process and, thus changes of institutions (Hira – Hira, 2000; Peters, 2012:36).

Guy Peters (2008:8-11) argues that in order to study development within an institutions one need to take two types of change into consideration: internal development of institutionalization; and type of change in values and/ or structures that are assumed to characterize the institutions. The first type of change considers the long term process of institutions to become institutions, the so-called learning process. Even though Peters’ two types of change are addressed by the literature on normative institutionalism, one might argue that it is difficult from a normative institutionalist perspective to draw a line between them. As March and Olsen (1989:40) emphasize “[…] values and preferences of political actors are not exogenous to political institutions but develop within those institutions”. Accordingly, the internal development of institutionalization is rather a part of the
changes of values and structures as well as the types of changes of values and structures are a part of the internal development of institutionalization.

The development of institutions depends on both the current environment and political condition as well as on the institution’s history and internal dynamics. Institutional outcomes are therefore determined by external pressures and internal conditions (March – Olsen, 1998:15). Nevertheless, normative institutionalism view history as inefficient and, as such, portrays the link between political institutions and their environment as less automatic. In other words institutional development may occur under circumstances of inconsistency with their environment or even collapse without any external cause (March – Olsen, 1989:16). At the same time, actors may shortly change their behavior as a consequence of radical environmental changes, stemming from reforms or fast fluctuating circumstances\(^3\), but rules and standard operating procedures change gradually over a long period of time and during fairly stable environments (Brunsson – Olsen, 1997:11). Consequently, we cannot see the process of adaptation as mechanisms for matching appropriate institutions with exogenously created environments (March – Olsen, 1989:46).

### 2.2 The Effects of Administrative Reforms

The literature on the normative version of institutionalism conceptualizes administrative reforms as attempts at changing organizational forms. The assumption is that reforms tries to change organizations by ‘intervening’ in existing structures and processes. Although scholars of normative institutionalism do not address the nature of this intervention, they further argue that reforms attempt to intervene in organizational structures and processes in order to improve an organization’s results (Olsen – Peters, 1996:5; Brunsson – Olsen, 1997:1; March – Olsen, 1989\(^4\)). By consulting the literature of these scholars, we might point the effects of administrative reforms on the behavior of political actors. March and Olsen (1989:86-89, 94-95) recognizes that administrative reforms and major reorganization projects can lead to structural changes of the organization, but argues that they do not directly affect the behavior of members of the institution. In other words, as stated above, administrative reforms can affect the behavior of actors shortly after its establishment as it causes environmental changes but does not change the normative foundation of institutions.

Therefore, changes in administrative structures or procedures can be seen as challenging elements of the core system of meaning, belief, interpretation, status and alliances in politics (March and Olsen, 1989:112). Moreover, as carriers of social values, organizations can function as creators of meaning and identities

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\(^4\) Note that March and Olsen (1989) refer to this conceptualization as ’administrative reorganization’.
through which a political discourse and frequent interactions between actors can become a part of actors’ belief (Olsen – Peters, 1995:8). Accordingly, reorganizations are viewed as expressions of social values and can potentially transform both agendas and goals through repetition of similar ideas and arguments over a long period of time. In *The Reforming Organization* Brunsson and Olsen (1997) specifically address the question of reforms in organizations and emphasize that development of institutions is less a matter of structural reforms, such as legislation, and more one of changes of norms and world views. Therefore, when the environment is institutionalized the primary effect of attempted reforms may be in the creation of meaning. In that regard, development of meaning becomes a more significant aspect of the reform process than the structural changes achieved. Consequently a reform effort may set off, or rather become a part of, a long term process of change in the normative foundation of institutions (Brunsson – Olsen, 1997:11-12).

### 2.3 Changing Normative Foundations

A normative version of institutionalism emphasizes that institutions create an interpretative order through the structure of meaning. Within this interpretative order actors’ values, beliefs and identities are shaped, and thereby their behavior (March – Olsen, 1989:17). Nonetheless, in connection with the argument that organizations encompass social values normative institutionalism underline that the construction of meaning is intertwined with organizational intentions and actions, ‘as meaning is constructed in the context of becoming committed to action’ (Brunsson – Olson, 1997:11-12). Consequently, organizations and reorganizations are tied to the discovery, clarification and elaboration of meaning. The literature on the normative version of institutionalism conceptualize the structure of meaning as a cluster of beliefs and norms which characterizes institutions (March – Olsen, 1989:39-52; 1998). Therefore, we should assume that changes in the normative foundation of an institution affect the behavior of states, as preferences are shaped by institutions, and thereby the policy outcome.

The structure of meaning is part of the process by which a society develops an understanding of what constitutes a ‘good’ society, without necessarily being able to achieving it. As March and Olsen argue “[…] Institutions create their own environments by the way they interpret and act in a confusing world. It is not simply that the world is incompletely or inaccurately perceived, but also that actions taken as a result of beliefs about norms and environment can, in fact, construct the environment” (1989:47). Nevertheless, as individuals and institutions seek to achieve some kind of cognitive consistency, beliefs are linked with preexisting values and cognitions. Understandings of events and their value are therefore connected to previous experiences and social linkages. However, values and beliefs become institutionalized through the development of meaning and thereby, political actors discover and construct their meaning through the process of acting on them (March – Olsen, 1989:46).
March and Olsen and their associates also emphasizes the question of what may affect the creation of meaning by arguing that reorganization and administrative reforms are domains of rhetoric and symbolic action. In connection with the latter, a normative version of institutionalism underlines that redefinition of the tasks, the objectives and the performance of an organization can be brought about by rational discourse and political rhetoric, involving arguments and the development of ideas. Political discourses and continuing rhetoric about the concerned reform is assumed to affect actors’ beliefs, values and world view, thereby affecting nature of existence (March – Olsen, 1989:47-48; Brunsson – Olsen, 1997:11).

Nevertheless, normative institutionalism emphasizes that world view and norms also can be changed in a process involving slogans and symbols which establishes shared conceptions of experience. Symbols, rituals and ceremonies therefore provides actors with an interpretation about the world. Nonetheless, Brunsson and Olsen (1997:4-5) argue that changes does not necessarily leads to expected changes in actors behavior. For instance, if a reform attempts at changing an organizations established institutional identity which ‘violate’ with the existing values and beliefs actors’ behavior may either be stabilized or inconsistent. Furthermore, changes in line with the established values and beliefs of the institution are “carried out as a matter of routine”. These changes may then rather contribute to stabilized state behavior, but if continued small changes are made in the same direction, they may lead to changes in the foundation of the institution and thereby the state behavior (Brunsson – Olsen, 1997:199-200).

Rhetoric and symbols thereby enable gathering and processing information are driven by a lack of clarity about how to talk about the world, whereby symbols and political rhetoric enable actors to develop an understanding of what constitutes a ‘good’ society through a gradual socialization into a culture of shared principles and standards (March – Olsen, 1989:48; Brunsson – Olsen, 1997:11-12). When reform aim at changing administrative culture, concepts of meaning, norms, identities, the resources necessary to mobilize support and commitment for change among civil servants and others directly affected appear to be considerably larger (March and Olsen, 1989:110). Nonetheless, the normative version of institutionalism emphasizes that reforms aiming at changing administrative culture, concepts of meaning, norms, and identities is time consuming and requires commitment for change by actors directly affected by it (March and Olsen, 1989:110).

In sum, the structure of meaning can then be viewed as the normative foundation of institutions within the beliefs, values and identities is shaped. This normative foundation in turn affect the rules of appropriates, and thereby the behavior of actors as its preferences is shaped by the institution. Therefore we should from a normative version of institutional expect that changes, or at least developments, in the normative foundation of an institution affect state behavior, by changing organizational symbols and frequent political rhetoric about them.
3 Rational Choice Institutionalism

The following section begins with a definition of institutions from a rational choice perspective. Followed is a discussion from a rational choice version of institutionalism on the structural constraints imposed by institutions and which are expected to have an effect on actors behavior. These structural constraints are then addressed in the section on ‘changing structure for strategic choices’.

3.1 Institutions Structure Strategic Interactions

The rational choice perspective derives from neo-classic economics and view actors, or at the international level states, as utility-maximizers which rank priorities in accordance with their fixed set of preferences. In determining their action, actors as utility-maximizers are therefore expected to calculate the utility of alternative courses of action and are assumed to maximize their preferences through strategic calculations. Moreover, their calculations are affected by the actor’s expectations about the actions of others (Ward, 2002:66-71). Accordingly, the rational choice version of institutionalism emphasizes that strategic interaction is an important factor the determination of political outcomes (Pollack, 2009:125-127).

Nevertheless, uncertainty for rational actors about the actions of others are likely to lead to a suboptimal outcome. In other words, another outcome could be found that would make at least one of the actors better off without making any of the others worse off. This can also be defined as instances when rational actors interact with others in a context requiring cooperation and coordination in the pursuit of mutual advantage. Hence, without institutional arrangements the actors may establish collectively suboptimal outcomes, as actors seek to maximize their own preferences. Consequently, means of resolving the uncertainty of the action of other actors is important in order for strategic action to reach an equilibrium, which would enable rational actors to assess the outcomes associated with their choice of strategies (Knight, 1992:48-54; Snidal, 2913:87).

Notably, rational choice institutionalism emphasizes that the problem of uncertainty can be reduced through institutions (Knight, 1992:53). Institutions are defined as sets of rules “created by human action and structuring that action” (Keohane, 2002:15), or as emphasized by Douglas North (1981:3) “the rules of the game in a society”. Scholars of a rational choice perspective underline that institutions are constructed by the utility-maximizing states in order to coordinate

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5 Also observed by Andrew Moravcsik and Frank Schimmelfenning (2009:68) who argues that ‘international institutions is […] a collective outcome of interdependent (strategic) rational state choices.’
their action and thereby reach collective beneficial outcomes. Moreover, according to the rational choice version of institutionalism, institutions themselves constitutes equilibria and serve as constrains for actors in a ‘game’ to achieve collective benefited outcomes (Snidal, 2013:88).

The institutions resolve the problem of uncertainty by providing information about the strategies of other actors. In that regard, scholars of rational choice institutionalism emphasize institutions as providing a set of formal constrains, in terms of political and judicial rules. These formal rules provide information about how actors are expected to act and structure the strategic choices of actors in such a way as to produce equilibrium outcomes (Knight, 1992:54). Furthermore, institutions might structure the strategic choices of actors by providing information about the choices and behavior of other actors; by affecting the range of alternative choices; and by providing enforcement mechanism (Shepsle, 1989; Tallberg, 2006:16). Nonetheless, in connection with the enforcement mechanism rational choice institutionalism argues that as the benefits of complying with agreements exceeds the costs, actors constrain themselves in order to constrain the action of others. This can from a rational choice version of institutionalism be explained as a condition under which states engage with institutions in order to reduce the uncertainty about others strategies as well as to affect future expectations of others actors. In doing so, an actor need to commit to a future course of action within the institution and thereby enforcing the formal rules on themselves (North, 1990:54-60; Knight, 1992:64-65). Information and enforcement are therefore assumed to reduce uncertainty about the corresponding behavior of others and to “allow gains from exchange” (Hall – Taylor 1996:12).

### 3.2 Changing Structure for Strategic Choices

As outlined above, rational choice institutionalism emphasizes institutions as a result of state action and thereby is it assumed that institutions change in terms of supply and demand. In other words, institutions will change when it lies in the interest of actors to do so (Alston, 1996:26-28). Furthermore, Keohane (1989:10) underlines that changes in processes, as a result of institutional changes, “can exert profound effects on state behavior” (1989:10). Hence, in line with a rational choice definition of institutions we should expect that changes of institutions, meaning formal rules, affect the structure of a situation in which actors select strategies for the utilization of their preferences. Moreover, in accordance with the rational choice institutionalism argument that actors themselves formalize institutional changes, we should expect actors to act in accordance with these. Therefore, we should in turn discuss what kind of changes in the structure of strategic choices that could affect state behavior and, thereby collective outcomes.

According to a rational choice institutionalism perspective the function of rules is to facilitate exchange of information between actors for collective beneficial outcomes, we should emphasize arrangement aiming at resolving situations requiring collective choices. In that regard, by viewing co-ordination as “the
creation of a common order for a number of separate elements” (Ekengren – Sundelius, 2004:112) through a process involving shared activity we emphasize structures of co-ordination as an important element for changing the structures of strategic choices. In doing so, we start by identifying possible co-ordination structures affecting state behavior.

As observed by, Knight (1992:172) Elinor Orstrom (1990) provides with an inspiring three-level typology of interlinked institutional rules. The ‘lowest’ level of rules are operational formal rules governing the everyday activities, next level constitutes rules governing the process by which policy decisions are made; and lastly, the ‘upper-level’ rules affect the daily activities and results, and determine the specific rules to be used in crafting set of collective-rules that in turn affect the set of operational rules. Furthermore, by encompassing Douglas North’s (1990:47) distinction of hierarchical and decision structures one might argue that instead of dividing institutional rules into three levels of analysis it rather contains two levels. While the two ‘lower’ levels: operational and collective, together constitute the basic decision structure; the ‘upper-level’ include the hierarchical decision structure of the policy. From these two levels one might then derive two dimensions of structures.

In connection with the former level, a state needs to follow decision-making structures and rules depending on the policy area addressed. For instance, policies which require decision-making on a consensus basis and necessitate states to coordinate their preferences with another. In order for states to coordinate their strategies they need to share information about each other’s strategies and preferences attached to different courses of action. Furthermore, approaches of rational choice institutionalism underline that state’s incentives for reducing uncertainty depends on the institutional design to maximize their utilities (Lowndes, 95-96). In that regard, Robert Keohane and Lise Martin (1995:43-44) argue that by securing more information states can come to agree on which of multiple outcomes are preferred and thereby may it be possible to follow policies more nearly the maximize utility of an equilibrium. Accordingly, we should assume that formal structures and rules of institutions created to increase information sharing would lead to increased collective outcomes. Another reason for why increased coordination meetings may affect state behavior is based on the assumption that it would enable compromises, which should lead to reaching an equilibrium of preferences and a collective beneficial outcome. Furthermore, Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffman underline the importance of ‘convergence of preferences’ (1991:23) in studying institutional changes. Following arguments of rational choice approaches on institutions we should assume that more coordination meetings means increased information sharing and increased knowledge and understanding about the fellow participant preferences. This in turn is assumed to affect actors’ available strategic choices.

6 Which could be viewed in line with Ernst B. Haas’s notion of ‘supranationality’: referring to a decision making form within which “participants refrain from unconditionally vetoing proposals and instead seek to attain agreement by means of compromises upgrading common interests” (1964:66).
Nevertheless, we now turn to a short discussion about the above mentioned dimension on the hierarchical decision structure of the policy. The hierarchical decision structure is based on the rational choice assumption that states by engaging in institutional settings delegate mandate to other actors. Accordingly, we should assume that actors delegate coordination matters in order to ensure exchange of information of the concerned actors preferences and strategies should lead to increased collective beneficial outcomes. As observed by Clara Portela and Kolja Raube a hierarchical structure of policy is needed in order for states to coordinate their actions, by stating that otherwise “internal forces would produce a clash and whirlwind of different external policies” (Portela – Raube 2009:4). Furthermore, according to a rational choice institutionalism perspective states may delegate coordination in order to reduce transaction costs of determining common solutions (Scharpf, 1999:165-166; Keohane, 1984).

Therefore, from a rational choice version we should assume that: changes in the hierarchal structure on coordination, by centralizing responsibility for coordination, decreases available strategic choices as well as transaction costs and increases information sharing, thereby the collective beneficial outcomes.
4 Method

The following section, present the research design applied in order to assess different theoretical explanations as to why institutional changes would affect the vertical coherence of the European Union’s foreign policy and how it has developed over time. The section therefore discuss and motivate the methodological choices made in order to answer the research question.

4.1 Explaining the Effects of Institutional Changes on the Vertical Coherence of EU’s Foreign Policy

In the search for explanations of why institutional changes would affect states behavior, and thereby the policy outcome, the basic argument of this research is that by contrasting different theoretical definitions of institutions to the study of vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy over time and viewing different findings as complementary we will be able to find explanations to the why-question. Nonetheless, this does not rule out the fact that by comparing over time some explanation(s) may prove to be more convincing than others. The two different ‘aspects’ on the effects of institutional changes are derived from competing versions of institutionalism and are tested against the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy over a time period. As set out in the section on ‘theoretical point of departure’ the two versions of institutionalism emphasized in this research are the normative and rational choice perspectives. While the latter define institutions in terms of formal structures and rules, the former conceptualizes institutions in terms of informal rules.

Robert O. Keohane and Lise Martin (1995:47) observed the difficulties of finding an optimal situation to test the impact of institutions. Nonetheless, by assessing what kind of events that should have preceded the institutional changes according to the different theoretical aspects, we should be able to find time periods during which institutional changes of coordination on the Union’s foreign policy occurred. These two competing versions of institutionalism are therefore applied in order to outline the institutional changes on the coordination of the European Union’s CFSP after the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Lisbon Treaty. In that regard, the normative and rational choice versions of institutionalism enables an identification of under which Treaties, and thus time periods, the different institutional settings of coordination were intensified. These periods are than contrasted against the propositions derived from the competing theoretical explanations. Therefore by comparing the different institutional changes, according to the proposed theoretical propositions, over a period of time we might assess their
effects on state behavior and thereby policy outcomes (Levy, 2008:5). In other words, in order to explain the effects of institutional changes on the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy, the propositions are applied as both analytical tools to identify institutional changes of the Unions’ CFSP over time and as theoretical tools to assess its effect on state behavior.

Moreover, the term ‘proposition’ is used instead if the commonly known term hypothesis (George – Bennett, 2005). The reason for this is that the research is not designed to develop a new theory regarding the effects of institutional change on state behavior and thereby policy outcomes. As already underlined the rational choice and normative versions of institutionalism are rather to be seen as complementary as their different definitions of institutions also means that they encompass different time periods for when changes should have an effect. Nevertheless, in order to give an account of why institutional change effect the behavior of Member States and thereby the Union’s foreign policy we derive propositions from the normative and rational choice versions of institutionalism which can be empirically tested. As pointed out by Keohane and Martin (1995), namely that “the point of new theory is to generate testable hypotheses and liberal institutionalism only has value insofar as it generates propositions that can be tested against real evidence” (1995:46). Accordingly, the proposed propositions derived from the normative and rational choice versions of institutionalism can be viewed as a contribution to the versions assumptions on the effects of institutional change in that it test it ‘against real evidence’.

This further raises the question of whether the findings in this research can be applied to other cases. The findings of this study should first and foremost be related to the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy in international organizations. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the theoretical findings could not be applied to other cases. On the one hand, one might argue in general terms that the theoretical findings could be applied to domestic, regional as well as international organizations which are changing the institutional settings in order to affect the behavior of its members, and thereby the collective outcome. This argument should than be underlined by the fact that the theoretical assumptions on the effects of institutional change is based on scholars of both political science and international relations. On the other hand, one might argue that in order to determine whether the propositions derived in this thesis are applicable to other cases, further research needs to be conducted (George – Bennets, 2005:123-124).

4.2 Comparing Cross Time

Following the argument in the section above, in order to determine the theoretical explanation on the effects of institutional changes on states behavior and collective foreign policy outcomes we test their respective assumption over a period of time. In order to assess whether the normative or the rational choice version of institutionalism contributes with the most applicable explanation we compare the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy during sessions at the First Committee of
the United Nations General Assembly, hereinafter also referred to as ‘UNGA’. In other words, we focus on the relation between the institutional changes according to the theoretical approaches and the outcome of vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy in the UNGA. The First Committee has dealt with matters of disarmament and international security since the establishment of UNGA in 1945. The foreign and security issues addressed at meetings during different sessions of the First Committee are of general concern to the Member States’ of the EU and of the Union as a whole and thereby constitutes a forum of relevance in comparing the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy over time. The effect of institutional changes on the vertical coherence of the Union’s foreign policy is compared during the time period of 1998-2013. The study thereby encompasses institutional changes with the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Lisbon Treaty.

In doing so, this research begins with studying the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy during the 53rd session, which occurred before the establishment of the Amsterdam Treaty. Subsequently, in line with the argument by a rational choice institutionalism perspective that an effect in state behavior should occur shortly after an institutional change, this thesis therefore addresses the 54th session. According to normative version of institutionalism we should expect long term changes in state behavior and thereby assume some effects on the vertical coherence at the 63rd session in 2008. Furthermore, in order to determine the explanatory power of the different propositions on the effects of institutional changes on state behavior this research encompasses the sessions held at the United General Assembly from 2008-2013. During the 66th session during the time period 2011-2012 at the United Nations General Assembly, the Disarmament and the International Security Committee held in total 25 meetings between the 16 September 2011 and the 4 September 2012 (United Nations, 2013a:x). The EU did not have any statements during the 25 meetings of the First Committee (United Nations, 2012a:45-47). Nevertheless, the Member States held in total national statements on different agenda items at 22 meetings (United Nations, 2012b:48-164). Consequently, the 66th session is not studied per se, rather the 53rd, 54th, 63rd, 65th and the 67th sessions are addressed and thereby this thesis compare over the time period of 1998-2013.

### 4.3 Data Collection

In order to conduct the above emphasized qualitative research design of this thesis and in answering the research question both primary and secondary literature are used. Following subsection encompasses the choice of data collected in this research.

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7 For further information on which meeting member state’s held national statements’ please see Annex 1.
4.3.1 Primary Literature

The data collected on the primary literature constitutes of inter alia theoretical scholars of institutionalism. For instance, in Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1990) Douglass North points out the effects of institutionalism from a rational choice perspective. Moreover, Jack Knight (1992) also underlines definitions of institutions in accordance with a rational choice perspective on institutions. The books and articles by James March and Johan Olsen (1984; 1986; 1989; 1998; 2006), Robert O. Keohane and Lise Martin (1995) are encompassed under the normative version of institutionalism. Nonetheless, these scholars does not explicitly label themselves under normative or rational choice versions of institutionalism. Through their character as ‘primary’ literature, meaning that no one has already draw conclusions from the scholars’ theoretical thoughts, we are able to draw conclusions of the literature. Consequently, the scholar have been encompassed under the versions of institutionalism due to their definition of institutions as well as assumption on how and why institutions effect states behavior, and thus the policy outcome.

Further primary literature collected in this study are official documents of the UN and the EU, as well as press releases. For instance the United Nations document: Index to Proceedings of the General Assembly summarizes the speeches held by states and regions at the annual Committee meetings and agenda items. Therefore the amount of EU statements as well as national statements by Member States of the European Union held during the 53rd, 54th, 63rd, 64th, 65th and 67th session of the First Committee are collected through the Index to Proceedings of the General Assembly. Moreover, data is collected from official documents of the United Nations in order to clarify the subject of the agenda items. In additional official EU documents, such as press releases, speeches, Council Decisions and reports which are of importance in order to link the versions of institutionalism in this study with empirical data shall be collected.

4.3.2 Secondary Literature

The so-called secondary literature applied in this thesis is research conducted by other researcher, meaning that the literature has already been processed and analyzed. Consequently, the secondary literature used are from scholars which have already tried to interpret the main theoretical assumptions of institutionalism. These are inter alia Institutional Theory in Political Science (2012) by Guy Peters; Political Science and the Three New Institutionalism (1996) by Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor; as well as The Rules of Integration: Institutionalist approaches to the study of Europe (2001) by Gerald Schneider and Mark Aspinwall, which provides with an insight on the general distinctions of institutionalism in the literature. Furthermore, secondary literature used in this study is inter alia books and academic on existing studies of Treaty changes. The criticisms with secondary literature is that it may misled the researcher into ‘false’ direction. In that regard, one might argue that this problem can, to some extent, be dealt with by always
questioning the validity and reliability of the literature at hand, and by complement the questionable assumptions with primary literature.

4.3.3 Operationalization

First we need to clarify how to measure vertical coherence of the European Union’s foreign policy. Consequently, we shall reiterate this thesis definition of vertical coherence, namely the consistency between Member States and EU’s action, as well as the definition of EU’s foreign policy as ‘an umbrella term for the national foreign policy of the Member States and the Common Foreign and Security Policy’. In other words, vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy occurs when Member States and the Union acts in accordance with each other on matters of foreign policy. Applied to this research, an indication for vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy would be when the EU delivers a statement on agenda items at meetings of the First Committee and the Member States does not give a national statement at the same meeting and on the same agenda items. Accordingly, if the amount of EU statements, without Member States having national statements at the same meeting and on the same agenda items, increases compared to the previous session the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy has increased. The same logic applies when determining whether or not the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy has decreased. The UN document on: Index to Proceedings of the General Assembly is used in order to determine at which meetings and on which agenda items the EU and the Member States delivered statements.

Furthermore, in order to assess the theoretical explanations as to why institutional change(s) affect states behavior to coordinate their action in international organizations we should identify relevant indicators thereto. According to the normative version of institutionalism symbolic action and the political rhetoric are necessary long term means to change the normative foundation of coherence, and thereby state action. Therefore, should official EU documents such as press releases and speeches by ‘reformers’ on the changed symbolic actions during a long time be seen as an indicator for the goal of a reorganization or reform to affect the states behavior. Nevertheless, an indicator on the development of the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy is the action by Member States, in terms of delivered statements at the UNGA sessions. Moreover, a rational choice perspective of institutional changes underlines changes in the hierarchical structural of responsibilities over coordination according to Treaty provision as an indication for increased collective outcomes and thereby increased vertical coherence of the European Union’s foreign policy.
5 Institutional Changes with the Treaty of Lisbon

The following section outline the pre-existing Treaty provisions on the coordination of EU’s foreign policy in order to understand and determine changes with the Treaty of Lisbon and the Amsterdam Treaty. In connection with the latter, we will emphasize the institutional changes on coordination of EU’s foreign policy by comparing provisions set out in the Maastricht Treaty. Nevertheless, the Nice Treaty stipulates the same provisions for coordination of foreign policy as the Amsterdam Treaty. Therefore, in outlining the changed provisions with the Lisbon Treaty we are comparing with those set out in the Amsterdam Treaty. The section begins with addressing the formal structural changes of importance according to rational choice institutionalism. Thereafter, we discuss the symbolic changes with the Lisbon Treaty which in line with a normative version of institutionalism are necessary to change the normative foundation of institutions.

5.1 Constrain through Centralized Coordination Responsibilities

The Maastricht Treaty created the three pillar structure, which in turn characterized the provisions until the Lisbon Treaty. The CFSP existed within the so-called second pillar. The coordination of EU’s foreign and security policy was managed by Member States rotating presidency in connection with the Secretariat General. Nevertheless, with the Amsterdam Treaty the Secretariat General of the Council where given an increased role of coordination through the creation of the post High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. The structure of coordination was therefore characterized by: the Council of Ministers, hereinafter also referred to as “the Council”, should in accordance to Article 13 (4) EU recommend common positions to the European Council and implement them through the instruments of the CFSP. In other words, the Council had the mandate to ensure “unity, consistency and effectiveness of EU action with the principles and guidelines for CFSP and its common strategies”. The Presidency of the Council was assisted by the Secretariat General of the Council, Javier Solana, who also had the role of the High Representative on matters within the scope of the CFSP. The High Representative should particularly assist the Council in contribution with policy formulation, preparation and implementation of decisions (Craig, 2010:405-407; Chalmers et.al, 2010:660; Maganza, 1999:178).
After the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the European Council and the Council still have the mandate to define a common approach of the Union. Nonetheless, the Lisbon treaty created the post of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy which was given an increased role with responsibility to ensure implementation of the decision adopted by the European Council and the Council (Craig, 2010:406-413; Article 26-27 TEU; Chalmers et. al, 2010:663-664). The High Representative shall be assisted by a European External action Service, hereinafter also referred to as ‘the EEAS’, in order to fulfill its mandate (Article 27 (3) TEU). The organization and functioning of the EEAS was adopted by the Council on July the 26th 2010 and established by Council Decision 2010/427/EU. The function of the EEAS is stipulated in Article 27 (3) of the Treaty of the European Union and shall accordingly ‘work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States’. Nonetheless, Council Decision 2010/42/EU further encompasses the function and scope of the EEAS. Article 1 (2) of the Council Decision set out EEAS as a ‘functionally autonomous body’ and Article 1 (3) further emphasizes the scope of EEAS by stipulating that ‘The EEAS shall be made up of a central administrative administration and of the Union Delegations to third countries and to international organizations’.

The function of the EEAS is set out in Article 2 (1) which stipulates that it shall support the High Representative to conduct CFSP, including the Common Security and Defense Policy, and contribute to the formulation and preparation of proposals in the field of CFSP. Furthermore, the EEAS shall support the High Representative in ensuring consistency and coordination of the Union’s external action. As regards Article 2 (1) Steven Blockmans and Christophe Hillion argue that compared with the Lisbon Treaties the EEAS is given increased “coherence-mandate” with the Council Decision 2010/427/EU. Theses authors argues that by reproduce Article 18 (4) TEU, stipulating tasks in relation to consistency of EU external action, in Article 2 (1) the task of the EEAS is not simply to ensure coordination and consistency of CFSP, but rather of the EU external relations as a whole (2013:25-29).

Nevertheless, the emphasis of this research is on the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy and therefore from a rational choice version of institutionalism we should underline the function of the EEAS to support the High Representative in ensuring the consistency and coordination of CFSP at international organizations.

The transformation to EU delegations constitutes a further structural change on coordination which was introduced with the Lisbon Treaty. The role of Union delegations is stipulated in Article 221 (1) TFEU by which ‘Union delegations in third countries and at international organizations shall represent the Union’. This was further emphasized in an EEAS document on the EU diplomatic representations, in which it was underlined that the delegations had the responsibility of coordinating. The shift from Commission delegations to EU delegations has meant that the diplomats of the Member States holding the rotating Presidency no longer have the responsibilities to coordinate EU positions and local representation of EU statements (EEAS, 2012; 2011:16; Blockmans – Hillion, 2013:56). The delegations will form part of the EEAS.
Furthermore, the purpose of Union delegations is set out in Article 5 (9) of the Council Decision 2010/427/EU, in which it is stated that ‘The Union delegations shall work in close cooperation and share information with the diplomatic services of the Member States’. The task of Union delegations to cooperate and share information with Member States’ diplomatic services has raised questions of whether or not Article 5 (9) require an ‘exchange’ of information. Nevertheless, Member States are already obligated to share information with EU delegations in accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU and the loyalty obligation in Article 24(3) TEU. Furthermore, they are also obliged to share information through the revised and expanded version of Article 32 (3) TEU which stipulates that Member States’ diplomatic missions and the Union delegation at international organizations shall cooperate to formulate a common approach. Moreover according to Article 34 TEU Member States are obliged to coordinate their action in international organizations and shall uphold the EU position (Blockmans – Hillion, 2013:58; Craig, 2010:410).

Therefore from a rational choice version on the effect of institutional changes, the EEAS and EU delegations are encompassed as centralized coordination responsibilities as they through their mandate to prepare and formulate proposals can affect available choices, and thereby Member States’ strategies.

5.2 Change Symbols for Changed Behavior

The normative version of institutionalism underline that changes of normative foundations occurs through symbolic means. Consequently, with the Amsterdam Treaty we should from a normative institutionalism perspective emphasize the establishment of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Secretary General of the Council of the European Union. As regards the Lisbon Treaty we should emphasize the establishment of an external action service in form of the EEAS as well as the Union delegations. The Commission delegations were formally transformed with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009 into EU delegations. In other words, the implementation of Article 221 (1) TFEU meant that former ‘Commission Delegations’ became ‘Union delegations’ (EEAS, 2011:16). The transformation to EU delegations aimed moving away from the international presence through delegations of the Commission, which only constituted one of EU’s institutions. The creating of EU delegations should therefore enable a single diplomatic presence of the Union as a whole and speaking on behalf of a single legal entity at third countries and international organizations (Blockmans – Hillion, 2013:56). Furthermore, according to a normative version of institutionalism the mandate of the High Representative to formulate a proposal on the organization and functioning of the EEAS, as set out in Article 27 (3) TEU, means that the High Representative acts as a ‘reformer’ who affects the normative foundation of institutions through their political rhetoric.
6 EU and MS’ Statements at UNGA

The following section outline the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy at the 53rd, 54th, 63rd, 64th, 65th and the 67th session of the First Committee. This section is divided into three subsections, within which the institutional changes emphasized by the normative and rational choice version of institutionalism are encompassed. Moreover sequent subsections also analyzes the amount of statements held by the EU, without Member States giving national statements at the same meeting and on the same agenda item.

6.1 Vertical Coherence Pre-Lisbon

This sub-section outline the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy pre-Lisbon, by emphasizing the EU as well as the Member States’ statements delivered at the 53rd, 54th and 63rd session of United Nations General Assembly First Committee.

6.1.1 1998-1999: Statements Delivered under the Maastricht Treaty

During the United Nations General Assembly 53rd session at the Disarmament and the International Security Committee, the so-called First Committee, 31 meetings were held between September 9 and November 13, 1998 (United Nations, 2000a:4). The EU delivered statements on behalf of the Member States at the 3rd, 13th, 21st, 24th, 27th and at the 31st meeting (United Nations, 2000b:42-46). Even though, Germany gave national statements at the 21st and 24th meeting on other agenda items than 74G ‘Relationship between disarmament and development measures’ or 71I ‘Convention of the 4th special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament’, on which the EU held statements (United Nations, 1998a, 1998b; 2000b:49). The same goes for the national statements delivered by Germany, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom at the 27th meeting. During the 27th meeting Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom held national statements on agenda item 71P ‘Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons’, and Portugal as well as the United Kingdom gave national statements on agenda item 73B ‘Report on the Conference on Disarmament’, while the statement by EU encompassed agenda item 71E ‘Transparency in armaments’ and 71Q ‘Regional disarmament’ (United Nations, 1998c; 2000b:49-158).

In sum, either Member States’ national statements at the 21st, 24st or the 27th meeting encompassed the same agenda items as was addressed by the EU
statements. Consequently, out of EU delivered statements during six meetings neither one of them where overlapped by Member States’ national statements, meaning that Member States did not express their national position at the same meetings and on the same agenda items as the Union.

6.1.2 1999-2000: Statements Delivered during the Amsterdam Treaty

The 54th session of the United Nations General Assembly, the First Committee had 28 meetings between September 14 and November 11, 1999. Since the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force May 1, 1999 (European Union, 2009), the Member States were during the 54th session obliged to act in accordance with the provisions therein. From a rational choice version of institutionalism assumption that institutional constrains are short-termed, we should assume that Member States adopt to the new structures and rules of coordination shortly after the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, and thereby the establishment of the High Representative, entered into force four months before the 54th session began we should expect Member States acting towards a collective beneficial outcome, meaning an increased vertical coherence.

From a normative institutionalism perspective we should argue that the role of a Secretariat General of the Council and High Representative of the European Union for the CFSP has, at the time being, recently entered into force, and thereby the political rhetoric about the expectations of the reorganization on the coordination of action. For instance on October the 18, 1999 Javier Solana made remarks on its role as Secretariat General and High Representative and the future of the Unions foreign and security policy by stating that: “We do not start in a vacuum. The European Union is already a global player on the world stage”. Nevertheless, Solana further pointed at requirements necessary to become a more influential actor on the global stage by inter alia underlining that “Europe has to be able and willing to define its common interests. Europe has to be determined to pursue them in the international arena” (European Council, 1999). According to a normative perspective on institutional change Member States are therefore not expected to change their behavior, rather to act in accordance with previous 53rd session.

During the 54th session the EU held statements at the 3rd, 19th, 22nd, 25th, 26th and the 27th meeting (United Nations, 2011b:33-36). Sweden held a national statement at the 19th meeting on agenda item 80 ‘Convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects’, whereas the EU gave a statement on agenda items 76 ‘General and complete disarmament’ and 85 ‘Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty’ (United Nations, 1999; 2011b: 99). Nevertheless, at the 25th meeting Belgium, France and Portugal held national statements on the same agenda item as the EU, namely item 76f ‘Small arms’. Moreover, either the national statements by Belgium or the United Kingdom at the 26th meeting addressed agenda item 76b ‘Transparency in armaments’, on which the European Union delivered a statement. Nonetheless, France gave a statement
on agenda item 76b at the 26th meeting and thereby stated their national position at the same meeting and on the same item as the EU delivered a statement on behalf of its Member States (United Nations, 1999; 2011b:9, 33-39, 84).

From a rational choice perspective on institutional change we should have assumed that the created post of a High Representative was able to affect the Member States’ strategies and preference. However instead of increased collective position, the Member States had in comparison with the 53rd session more frequently statements at the same meetings and on the same agenda items as the EU. Nonetheless, from a normative institutionalism perspective we should expect the symbolic action by establishing a High Representative, aiming at ensuring consistency of the European Union’s foreign policy, effected the normative foundation of coherence through a long termed process of learning. In other words, through frequent interaction between Member States and political rhetoric on the expectations with the creation of a High Representative could the normative foundation of coherence change, and thereby state behavior.

In sum, the EU held during the 54th session statements at six meetings, from which Member States had statements on the same agenda items at the 25th as well as the 26th meeting. Therefore, we might argue that vertical coherence of the EU’s foreign policy was the case at four out of six meetings during the 54th session at the First Committee.

6.1.3 2008-2009: Statements Delivered under the Nice Treaty

The Lisbon Treaty had not entered into force during the 63rd session and thereby was neither the EEAS nor the EU delegations formalized. The structures and rules of coordination actions were rather set out in the Treaty of Nice which in turn was the same as stipulated in the Amsterdam Treaty. Nevertheless, the expectation of the Treaty of Lisbon is exemplified with the by the European Council in 2008, by stating that:

Our capacity to address the challenges has evolved over the past five years, and must continue to do so. We must strengthen our own coherence, through better institutional co-ordination and more strategic decision-making. The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty provide a framework to achieve this (European Council, 2008).

The United Nations General Assembly sixty-third session at the First Committee, held in total 22 meetings, from which the last meeting was on October 31, 2008 (United Nations, 2010a:4). The EU held statements at the 2nd, 8th, 11th, 12th, 16th, 20th and 21st meeting. During the 2nd, 8th, 16th and the 21st meeting the EU gave statements on agenda items without additional national statements by Member States of the Union. Even though Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands held statements on the 20th meeting none of them addressed the agenda items 88 ‘Prevention of an arms race in outer space’ or 94 ‘Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region’, which were encompassed in the
statement by the EU (United Nations, 2008a; 2010b:11, 36-37, 59, 79). Moreover, neither the national statements by Hungary nor Italy during the 11th meeting encompassed the agenda items 89b ‘Missiles’ nor 89 ‘General and complete disarmament’ on which the EU delivered a statement regarding the position of the Union (United Nations, 2008b; 2010b:49, 69). Nevertheless, during the 12th meeting Denmark as well as the EU held statements on agenda item 89c ‘Problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus’ (United Nations, 2008c; 2010b:31, 37).

In sum, the EU held during the 67th session statements at seven meetings, and out of these they delivered statements, without Member states expressing their positions in national statements on the same agenda items, in total at six meetings.

6.2 2009-2010: What to Expect When You’re Expecting the Unexpected

During the 64th session at the United Nations General Assembly, the First Committee held 24 meetings on disarmament and international security. These meetings were held between October 1 and November 2, 2009. The last meeting was held June 11, 2010 (United Nations, 2011a:4). Since the Lisbon Treaty and the EU delegations were formally launched at the first December 2009, we should, according to normative institutionalism, during this time period expect increased political rhetoric on the establishment of the EEAS and EU delegations. For instance in a press release November 2009 the General Secretariat of the Council emphasized the symbolic shift of delegations, by underlining that:

The Commission’s delegations will become Union delegations under the authority of the High representative and will be a part of the EEAS structure. […] EU delegations will work in close cooperation with diplomatic services of the Member States” (General Secretariat, 2009:3).  

As of the first December 2009 Commission delegations became EU delegations, or as the Delegation of the EU to Ukraine informed: “The Delegation of the European Commission will become as of today the Delegation of the European Union” (Delegation, 2009). In that regard, a normative version of institutionalism would view the High Representative Catharine Ashton, with the authority to form a European action service, as a ‘reformer’ advocating for the expectations as well as meaning of a European external action service. For instance, in a speech on March the 23rd, 2010 Catharine Ashton stated that:

[…] the creation of the EEAS is a huge change for Europe. A once-in a generation opportunity to build something that finally brings together all the instruments of our engagement […] in support for a single political strategy. […] So we must have a system that promotes comprehensive strategies and
joined-up action – not where, as today, we try to work comprehensive despite our system” (European Commission, 2010a).

In connection with the speech by Catharine Ashton, a normative institutionalism would argue that EEAS is used as symbolic means to shape the normative formative foundations of coherence and thereby the Member States preferences to co-ordinate their foreign politics and collective action. Furthermore, from a normative version of institutionalism we should assume that reformers also use political rhetoric in order to shape the world view of the EU’s Member States. This can be exemplified by Catharine Ashton’s speech on March the 25th, 2010:

Europe needs the EEAS. Because we must adapt to a world of growing complexity and fundamental power shifts. We can only punch our weight if we bring together all our instruments – economic and political, development and security, crisis management and long term engagement – in support of a single political strategy. The Lisbon Treaty offers precisely the opportunity to build a modern policy for the modern world – moving beyond traditional “diplomacy” (European Commission, 2010b).

The symbolic as well as rhetoric means used by reformers in order to affect state behavior, can be further exemplified by a press release of the 3010th Council of European Union meeting on April the 26th, 2010 in stating that:

The creation of the EEAS is one of the most significant changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. It aims to enable greater coherence and efficiency in the EU’s external action and increase its political and economic influence in the world (Council of the European Union, 2010:8).

From the press release by the Council of the European Union we might assume that the Member States at a marginal have accepted the political discourse on the changed symbols. Nonetheless, from a normative version of institutionalism we should assume that rather the action of states determines whether or not the normative foundation of coherence has changed as an effect of the symbolic actions and political rhetoric. Furthermore, in a speech on February the 8th, 2011 to the United Nations Security Council, Catherine Ashton emphasized the establishment of the EEAS by stating that:

The Lisbon Treaty is now in force. This is a historic step which matters to Europeans and non-Europeans alike. The Lisbon Treaty offers the opportunity to strengthen the EU's international impact and strategic vision, through streamlined decision-making and greater policy coherence and consistency. The European External Action Service will lead to more integrated policy-making and delivery, by bringing together all the instruments of our global engagement […] This should also make the EU a better partner for the UN (European Union, 2010).
6.2.1 EU Statements at the Sixty-fourth Session

At the 64th session the EU held statements at the 9th, 12th, 13th, 18th, 19th, 22nd and 23rd First Committee meeting (United Nations, 2011b:41-44). In line with a normative perspective on institutional changes we should further emphasize the long-term learning process for normative foundations of institutions to change. Applied to this session, we should assume that as the EU delegations were formalized during this session the Member States have not had the time to increase their interaction or to share experiences. Therefore, we should according to normative institutionalism expect Member States to behave in a similarly to the 63rd session. From a rational choice version of institutionalism we should in turn expect Member States to adopt to the new structures of EU delegations relatively shortly after their formalization. The formalization of Union delegations with the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 meant that Member States as well as the delegations should increase their information sharing. An increased exchange of information should according to a rational choice perspective affect their strategic calculations and thereby the collective outcome. Accordingly, we should expect an increased vertical coherence at the 23rd meeting.

During the 64th session the EU held statements, without Member States delivering national statements at the same meetings and on the same agenda items as the Union, at the 9th and 13th meeting. At the 12th meeting the European Union held a statement on agenda items: 96q ‘Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction’; 96k ‘Implementation of the convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and in their destruction’; and 103 ‘Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons and their destruction’ (United Nations, 2009b). Nonetheless, during the 12th meeting Hungary stated their national position in connection with agenda item 103, whereas a statement was delivered by Poland on agenda item 96k. Hungary and Poland thereby addressed the same agenda items at the same meeting as the EU gave a statement.

Moreover, during the 18th meeting Austria held a statement on agenda item 98 ‘Report on the convention of disarmament’, while at the 19th meeting Spain held a statement on agenda item 88 ‘African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty’. Following that line, Ireland, Portugal, the United Kingdom and Germany gave national statements at the 22th meeting on agenda item 96z ‘Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms’ (United Nations, 2009c, 2009d, 2009e). Consequently, agenda items 96k, 98, 88 and 96z were addressed in statements by both the EU and the Member States (United Nations, 2011b: 46-50). Furthermore, at the 23rd meeting, during which we should according to rational choice institutionalism expect an increased vertical coherence, the EU as well as Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom held statements on agenda item 93 ‘General and complete disarmament’ (United Nations, 2009a). In sum, during the 64th session EU held statements on behalf of the Member States, excluding
national statements by Member States at the same meetings and on same items, during three meetings.

6.3 2010-2011: Let’s Talk the Talk and Walk the Walk

During the 65th session at the United Nations General Assembly, the First Committee had 23 meetings between October the 1st and October the 29th 2010, and one meeting at June the 22nd 2011 (United Nations, 2013a:x). The EEAS was adopted by the Council of Ministers on July the 26th, 2010 and 27 new Heads of Delegation and 1 Deputy Head of EU Delegation was decided on September the 15th 2010 by the High Representative (European Commission, 2010c). From a normative version of institutionalism we should still anticipate that Member States are in the so-called ‘learning process’, meaning that the political rhetoric on the expectations of EEAS and EU delegations are still of importance for changes in the normative foundation of coherence and thereby state action. In connection with the importance of reformers political rhetoric, Catharine Ashton underlined in a speech on July the 7th 2010 to the European Parliament the importance of a European external action service for Europe by stating that:

We cannot afford to act in a disparate manner in a world that is seeing fundamental power shifts and where problems are increasingly complex and inter-linked. We need to defend Europe's interests and project Europe's values in a more coherent and effective way. And we should be ambitious in how we do it (European Commission, 2010d).

Furthermore, in the same speech Catharine Ashton emphasized the meaning of an EEAS for the European Union’s foreign policy:

Europe needs the External Action Service to build a stronger foreign policy. We need an integrated platform to project European values and interests around the world. It is time to give ourselves the means to realize our ambitions. It is time to get the right people in place to start doing the necessary work (European Commission, 2010d).

Moreover, according to a normative version of institutionalism, the speeches by Catherine Ashton shapes the actors perceptions about the world as complex and almost unmanageable without an European external action service, which in turn shall work for the interests and values of Europe. The political rhetoric by Catharine Ashton on the necessity of an external action service in order for Europe to address matters of international security, is further stressed in a speech to the European Parliament on October the 20th 2010:
The lives of the citizens of Europe are touched by the foreign policy every day. [...] What we are doing in terms of counter-terrorism and security issues also helps keep people safe. So it matters hugely that Europe is a foreign policy actor and is able to operate in the world. I want the people of Europe to understand and recognize that and to support us in the work we are doing (European Commission, 2010e).

Form a normative version of institutionalism, one could argue that in the statement delivered on October the 20th 2010 the ‘reformer’ tried to affect the actors world view by encompassing the security threats which citizens of Europe are facing, such as terrorism. Furthermore, in a speech on January the 19th at the official opening of the EU Delegation to the Council of Europe Catharine Ashton encompasses the expectations of increased coordination and consistency, in stating that:

The creation of the EEAS is also a major change and a step forward in creating a more coherent and consistent EU foreign policy; opening of EU Delegation to Council of Europe is an important step to strengthen coordination and partnership. We should continue to back one-another up, to improve shared values. As Europe is changing, our cooperation is changing (European Commission, 2011a).

Nonetheless, in a speech 8 February 2011 to the United Nations Security Council Catherine Ashton emphasized the expected effect with the establishment of the EEAS, by stating that:

When I spoke to the Security Council last year, I updated you on the progress regarding the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and the promises this held for strengthening the EU’s contribution to addressing international concerns. [...] In our view the Lisbon Treaty and the External Action Service are not just good for Europe. They also make us a better partner for the UN. We are grateful for your help in recognizing this (European Commission, 2011b).

This statement encompasses the reformer’s expectation that reorganizations are necessary means in order to change state behavior as well as the assumption that EEAS is of importance for the performance of Member States at the international arena.

Nevertheless, from a rational choice version of institutionalism we should expect Member States to adopt their actions in accordance with the new structures and rules with the establishment of EEAS and EU delegations. According to rational choice institutionalism the structures of an administrative body with responsibility to coordinate Member States and EU action by preparing positions and policy proposals enables the external action service to affect the strategic available choices of actors and thereby their preferences. Furthermore structures and rules aiming at increasing exchange of information decreases the uncertainties, thereby increases the collective action. Therefore, according to a rational choice version of institutionalism we should expect the changed structural procedures of
coordination, in comparison with the 64th session, to increase the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy at the 65th session.

6.3.1 EU Statements at the Sixty-fifth Session

The EU held statements at the 2nd, 9th, 12th, 13th, 17th, 18th and 19th meeting of the sixty-fifth session at the First Committee (United Nations, 2012b:8-164). Member States held national statements on agenda items in connection with the five latter meetings. Even though Malta held a statement at the 17th meeting; Hungary, the Netherlands as well as Poland gave national statements during the 18th meeting; and the fact that national statements were given by France, Ireland, Italy and Slovenia at the 19th meeting neither one of them addressed the same agenda items as the EU (United Nations, 2012b:62-126). During the 12th meeting on October the 18th, both the Netherlands and Austria held national statements on agenda item 99a ‘Report of the conference on disarmament’. Furthermore, at the same meeting Italy held a national statement on agenda item 97q ‘Reducing nuclear danger’ (United Nations, 2010a). Consequently during the 12th meeting Member States delivered national statements under the same agenda items as were addressed in a statement by the Union. At the 13th meeting the EU held a statement under agenda items 97s ‘Regional disarmament’ and 97z ‘The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects’ (United Nations, 2011b:8-164; United Nations, 2010b). However, both France and Finland also held national statements on agenda item 97z (United Nations, 2011b:51).

In sum, during the 65th session the Member States of the European Union delivered national statements on the same agenda items and at only one meeting as the EU.

6.4 2012-2013: Time for Institutional Changes to Rise and Shine

During the 67th session at the United Nations General Assembly, the Disarmament and the International Security Committee held in total 22 meetings between October the 5th and November the 7th, 2012 (United Nations, 2013a:x). From a normative institutionalism perspective we should continue to underline that the changes in the normative foundation of institutions are occurring through reformers political rhetoric on the symbolic changes and Member States interaction thereon. For instance, in a speech September the 11th 2012 to the European Parliament on the Annual Report on CFSP Catharine Ashton underlined the importance of a European diplomatic service by stating that:

The network of EU Delegations is the greatest asset we have. […] The great strength of the EU, working with Member States and international partners, is
the range of diplomatic tools at its disposal. By mobilizing them all in the appropriate way, we can be more effective at preventing crises, and swifter in resolving them (European Union, 2012).

Except of underlining the building of a diplomatic service “to meet Europe’s needs and the needs of the European citizens”, Catherine Ashton also stressed for the effectiveness and strength of small and large Member States working together on issues such as Iran, the Middle-East Peace Process and Syria (European Union, 2012). Nevertheless, we should expect from a normative institutionalism perspective that the political rhetoric on the EEAS and EU delegations, since the formalization of the Lisbon Treaty, has led to some developments, even if marginal, in the normative foundations of coherence. In that regard we should also assume that Member States have started to recognize the new symbols. Accordingly, in a joint letter on December the 8th, 2011 the Foreign Ministers of: Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden submitted a letter to the High Representative on suggestions for enhancing the effectiveness of the EEAS. In the joint letter the Foreign Ministers underlined that:

“The European External Action Service (EEAS) has the potential to significantly enhance the effectiveness and coherence of the EU’s external action. From the start we have strongly backed this view and have a major interest in a strong and efficient EEAS” (Joint Letter, 2011).

Accordingly, from a normative version of institutionalism we should assume that Member States act in accordance with the developments of the normative foundation of coherence. In a report to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, Catherine Ashton further emphasized the importance of an external action service to EU’s role in foreign policy and external action by emphasize it as an “important milestone in strengthening the EU’s institutional capacity”. Furthermore, as emphasized in former speeches regarding international security challenges Catharine Ashton argued that “the scale of challenges dictated as strong coherent response from the EU, and therefore need for the EEAS to play its full role under the Treaty” (EEAS, 2011:1). Although Catherine Ashton submitted a report to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on December the 22nd 2011, we should from a normative institutionalism perspective encompass its content during the 67th session. Even though the report was published before this session a normative argument would be that as the 66th session were held on October 31st 2011 and ended with one meeting on September the 4th 2012 (United Nations, 2013b:x), the political rhetoric in December 2011 should rather have effects on Member States’ action at the 67th than at last meeting of the 66th session.
6.4.1 “On Behalf of the EU” or “On Behalf of the EU and its Member States”: The Issue of Competences

The Lisbon Treaty changed the legal structure of EU competences by making a distinction between three types of competences: the executive competence of the Union; the competence of Member States; and the shared competence of the Union and the Member States (Article 3-6 TFEU). The question of EU competences in foreign policy matters led to disputes between the Member States of the Union in 2011. The disagreements derived from the question of how to address foreign and security policies within both the Union and the Member States competence jurisdiction. Which in turn meant that several EU statements at international organizations were not delivered (EEAS, 2011:17).

The General Secretariat of the Council submitted therefore a document to the EU Delegations on conclusions from a meeting on October 22nd 2011 regarding general arrangements for EU statements in multilateral organizations (Council of the European Union, 2011). From a rational choice institutionalism perspective these ‘arrangements’ means new constraining structures and rules which affect the strategic choices available for actors, meaning what kind of issues EU can deliver an EU statement on. According to a rational choice version of institutionalism these new rules adopted by the Member States, thereby ought to enable increased vertical coherence by the 67th session.

6.4.2 EU Statements at the Sixty-seventh Session

During the 65th session the EU held statements at the 2nd, 9th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 17th, 19th First committee meeting. The European Union held a statement on agenda items at the 17th meeting, without Member States stating their national position on the same item or meeting (United Nations, 2012b:10-179). Nonetheless, during the 2nd meeting Sweden held a statement on the agenda items 8 ‘General debate’; 102 ‘Revitalizing the work of the conference on disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations’; 90 ‘Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East’; as well as on item 94cc ‘Reducing nuclear danger’ (United Nations, 2012a; 2013b:142-143). Consequently, Sweden gave statements on four out of ten agenda items on which the EU held statements (United Nations, 2013b:50-51). Moreover, during the 9th meeting EU had statements on seven agenda items, from which France held statements on five of these: 90’Establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East; 94ee’Nuclear disarmament”; 94cc’Reducing nuclear danger”; 100’Comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty”; and 102’Revitalizing the work of the conference on disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations’ (United Nations, 2012b; 2013b:53-55).

Furthermore, at the 12th meeting Latvia held national statements on agenda items 94t ‘Implementation of the convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction’ and on 94dd ‘Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass
destruction’. During the same meeting Ireland, Poland and France also gave national statements on agenda item 94t. Nonetheless, both Ireland and the Netherlands expressed their national positions through statements at the 12th meeting on item 101 ‘Constitution on the prohibition of the conference on disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations’. Moreover, France and Ireland delivered national statements on items 94ff ‘Missiles’; and 94l ‘The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic missiles proliferation’. Consequently, the national statement by France, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands and Poland during the 12th meeting were held on the same agenda items as the European Union (United Nations, 2012c; 2013b:55-122).

Member States continued to have national statements at the 13th, 14th and 17th meeting, on which the EU also delivered statements on behalf of the Union. For instance, during the 13th meeting France held a national statement on agenda item 92 ‘Prevention of an arms race in outer space’, thereby delivering their national position on the agenda item as the EU statement where held on (United Nations, 2012d; 2013b:53-55). Subsequently, at the 14th meeting France as well as the European Union held statements on both agenda item 94b ‘Towards an Arms Trade Treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms’ and on item 94bb ‘The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its respect’. Furthermore, at the 17th meeting the EU expressed the position of the whole Union through a statement on agenda item 7 ‘Work organization’, on which also Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden gave national statements on (United Nations, 2012e; 2012f; 2013b:10-11, 42-59, 76, 136-143).
The Effects of Institutional Changes

Following section compare the theoretical arguments of this research propositions, derived from normative and rational choice versions of institutionalism, in relation with the empirical findings. In doing so, we will be able to determine which proposition that is more likely to explain the effect of institutional changes on state behavior, than the other. The section starts by comparing the amount of statements the EU has held, during the different session meetings, without member states having a national statement at the same meeting and on the same agenda item. Accordingly, we will be able to see whether or not the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy on disarmament and matters of international security has increased or decreased since the establishment of the EEAS and EU delegations. Thereafter, I will reason about the explanatory power of the propositions.

7.1 Increased or Decreased Vertical Coherence of EU’s foreign policy

During the 53rd session of the First Committee at the United Nations General Assembly the coordination on actions at international organizations was set out in the Treat of Maastricht. At this session EU held statements on different agenda items at six meetings and even though Germany, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom gave national statements during these meetings neither one of them were on the same agenda items as the EU addressed in the statement on the position of the Union. At the 54th session the Treaty of Amsterdam had entered into force and thereby also the role of the Secretariat General and High Representative aimed at coordinating the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union. The EU held during the 54th session statements on the same amount of meetings as the previous session, namely on six meetings. Nonetheless, Member States gave statements on the same agenda item and at the same meetings as the EU. Therefore, instead of the vertical coherence of the European Union’s foreign policy to increase it decreased in comparison with the 53rd session.

The 63rd session of the First Committee at the United Nations General Assembly occurred before the formalization of the Lisbon Treaty, and thus was the legal structures for coordination of EU’s foreign policy at international organizations set out in the Treaty of Nice. Nevertheless, its structure on the coordination responsibilities was the same as during the Treaty of Amsterdam. Therefore, we should start of by comparing this session with the 54th session as the normative version of institutionalism expects changes to develop over time. Since the symbolic means of the Secretariat General and High Representative was
introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty we should expect changes in the normative foundation after ten years and if so, Member States actions should have changed therewith. During the 63rd session in 2008 the EU held in total statements at seven meetings on different agenda items, whereof Member States only at one occasion had statements on the same agenda items as the EU and at the same meeting.

One year after, at the 64th session the Lisbon Treaty had entered into force, thereby also the establishment of EU Delegations and the EEAS. At the 64th session the European Union gave statements, similarly to the 63rd session, during seven meetings on different agenda items. On the other hand, at the 64th session Member States held national statements on agenda items at four of the meetings where the Union had statements. Consequently, during the 64th session the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy decreased compared to the 63rd session, as the Member States increased their action in having statements on the same agenda items and at the same meetings as the EU. During the 65th United Nations General Assembly session at the First Committee the European Union held statements at seven meetings on different agenda items, from which Member States only held statements on the same agenda items at two of these meetings. Whereas the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy during the 65th session decreased in comparison with the 63rd session, the vertical coherence increased in comparison with the 64th session.

At the 67th session of the First Committee in 2012, the EEAS was formally established and the General Secretariat of the Council had formulated arrangements for EU statements in multilateral organizations. The EU gave during the 67th session statements at seven meetings and on different agenda items therein. Nevertheless, Member States held national statements on the same agenda items as the Union during six of the seven meetings. Consequently, the vertical coherence of the EU decreased in comparison with both the 65th and 63th sessions.

7.2 A Consequence of Symbolic or Structural Action

In this subsection is the theoretical explanations to why institutional changes should have any effect on the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy discussed. Therefore, the section begins with the proposition derived from explanations of the normative version of institutionalism. This is followed by the proposed proposition of the rational choice institutionalism. Thereafter, follows a comparison between them.

7.2.1 Changing the Normative Foundation of Vertical coherence

As regards this thesis proposed proposition derived from explanations of normative institutionalism we should expect changes, or at least developments, in the normative foundations of vertical coherence to affect state behavior by changes of organizational symbols and frequent political rhetoric about them. Nevertheless,
changes in the normative foundation of institutions occur through a long termed learning process. Therefore should we according to a normative version of institutionalism not expect the normative foundation to change shortly after the establishment of organizational symbols. In connection with changes in the normative foundation of institutions are actors’ behavior changing, as actors preferences are shaped by institutions. A normative institutionalism argument would then be that at the 54th session during which the Treaty of Amsterdam established the High Representative Member States would act in accordance with the 53rd session. Nonetheless as observed above, the Member States held more national statements on the same agenda items and at the same meetings as the EU delivered the statement on behalf of its Member States. Even though, a normative version of institutionalism emphasizes the long term perspective in order to determine whether reorganizations through symbolic means affect the normative foundation of an institution, and thereby the actors behavior, it is also recognizes that actors might change their behavior temporary. Consequently, actors may change their behavior during a limited period of time as a result of established reforms.

This assumption is also applicable to the 64th session during which the Lisbon Treaty entered into force and thereby the symbolic establishment of EU delegations and the EEAS. During the 64th session Member States, compared with the 63rd session, held more national statements on the same agenda items and at the same meetings as the EU. Moreover, this assumption can be further applied to the increase of vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy during the 65th session, as a reaction on the adaptation of the EEAS by the Council. As regards why this period should be viewed as a temporary reaction of Member States is first and foremost because of the time period. From a normative version of institutionalism to short time between the establishment of the EEAS and its adoption by the Council for the reformers to affect the normative foundation of vertical coherence, and thereby actors’ preferences. Moreover, as the vertical coherence during the 65th session were similarly the 63rd session and in turn decreased at the 67th session, we can from a normative version of institutionalism argue that the normative foundation of vertical coherence had not changed nor stabilized long term effects on state behavior at the 65th session.

Therefore, should these fluctuating reactions not be viewed as a result of changes in the normative foundation of an institution. In order to determine whether the reorganizations of reforms have had an effect on the normative foundation of institutions we should compare over time. Accordingly, by comparing the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy at the 54th with its vertical coherence at the 63rd session we might be able to argue that a change in the normative foundation of vertical coherence has occurred as a consequence of the establishment of a High Representative and frequent political rhetoric thereof. The reasons for why we may be able to argue for a change in the normative foundation of vertical coherence is that the Member States have changed their behavior in terms of diminishing their national statements on the same agenda items and at the same meetings as the EU delivers a statement on the position of the Union and its Member States.
In that regard, from the normative proposition presented in this research we should expect that the political rhetoric on the establishment of EU delegations and the EEAS since 2009 has at least resulted in developments of the normative foundation of vertical coherence by 2013 and thereby actions preferences. Accordingly, we should expect developments of Member States’ action and the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy at the First Committee’s 67th session. The figure below illustrates delivered statements by the EU and Member States at the sessions, studied in this thesis, at the First Committee over time. Moreover the blue graph illustrates the number of national statements delivered by the Member States of the EU at session meetings. While the gray graph represent the number of statements delivered by the EU at session meetings, the orange graph constitutes this thesis definition of vertical coherence, namely the number of EU statements delivered at session meetings in which Member States has not held a national statement on the same agenda item as the Union.

As illustrated by the orange graph in the figure, the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy has decreased between the 63rd and the 67th session. The decrease of the vertical coherence as a result of changing organizational symbols on coordination of EU’s foreign policy is in accordance to a normative version of institutionalism not unexpected, as result of shifting symbols of organizations and political rhetoric thereto do not always lead to the expected result. Nonetheless, we are not able from the time period between the 63rd and 67th session to draw the conclusion of a normative institutionalism perspective that changing organizational symbols by the Lisbon Treaty have per se decreased the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy. This because the study between the 53rd and the 63rd session shows an increased vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, by

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8 For further information on which Member States who held national statements at the session meetings see Annex 1.
underlining the normative version of institutional change we should emphasize that changes in the normative foundation of an institution affect the behavior of actors. Therefore, by looking at the blue graph which illustrates Member States national statements between the 63rd and the 67th session we can thus also see a changed behavior in time. Accordingly, by the graph we can see that Member States’ national statements increased over the same time period as Member States increased their national statements on the same agenda items and at the same meetings as the EU. Accordingly, we should from a normative institutionalism perspective on the effect of institutional change be able to argue that a development in the normative foundation of vertical coherence has occurred since the reorganizational shifts of symbolic means for coordination of EU’s foreign policy.

7.2.2 Changing Structure on Coordination of EU’s Foreign Policy

This thesis proposition derived from explanations of rational choice institutionalism proposed that changes in the hierarchical structure on coordination, by centralized responsibilities for coordination decreased available strategic choices, and increased information sharing, affect states behavior and thereby the collective outcome. Therefore from a rational choice perspective on institutional change we should expect both the creation of the role of High Representative with the Amsterdam Treaty and the establishment of a European external action service as well as EU delegations with the Lisbon Treaty to increase the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy. Furthermore, the assumption that we should assume that states behave in accordance with the new structures and rules on coordination of EU’s foreign policy is based on the definition of institutions as contributing with short-termed constrains on the behavior of actors. Nonetheless, during the session after the establishment of the High Representative with the Treaty of Amsterdam the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy decreased compared to the 53rd session. In other words, instead of decreasing the number of national statements on the same agenda items and at the same meetings as the EU held a statement during the 54th session, the Member States expressed to a greater extent than before the national position when EU stated the position of the Union.

Accordingly, compared with the 63rd session, during the 64th session the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy decreased after the establishment of EU delegations and the EEAS with the Lisbon Treaty. Consequently, the EU established an administrative body aiming at increasing the exchange of information and preparing positions at international organizations, which should be expected to affect actors’ available choices and preferences and thereby lead to collective beneficial outcomes. Nonetheless, instead of coordinating positions Member States rather increased their national statements at different meetings during the 64th session. In line with a rational choice version of institutionalism we should have expected to see an increase, at least a stable, amount of collective actions. As such one might argue that the normative version of institutionalism has
greater explanatory power as to why institutional changes should affect state behavior than rational choice institutionalism.

However, this further raises the question of how we according to rational choice version of institutionalism rather explain decreased instead of their focus on increased collective outcomes. In doing so, we can argue that only because structures and rules on coordination have changed in order to enable increased exchange of information does not mean that actors adopt to this new structure of coordination shortly after its establishment. As assumed by a rational choice version of institutionalism institutions change because actors ‘demand’ an increased ‘supply’. However by continuing on this argument by scholars of rational choice institutionalism we should therefore assume that when supply increases the demand do not necessarily immediately follow. Consequently, we should rather expect an increase in the vertical coherence of EU at the 65th session and not in the 64th session.

At the 65th session the EU held statements once again during seven meetings and in comparison with the 64th session Member States national statements at the same meetings and on the same agenda items as the EU decreased. Accordingly, the vertical coherence of the European Union’s foreign policy increased. Therefore, by addressing the assumption that the actors needs some time to adjust to the fact that structures and rules of coordination on the Union’s foreign policy has changed and increased. In that regard, a centralized administrative body for increased coordination of national interest and with authority to prepare proposals should affect the Member States’ strategies and preferences, thereby increase the vertical coherence. In accordance with the assumption that actors need time to adjust to structural and rule changes we should as a result of the Council decision on the EEAS in 2012 expect the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy to decrease during the 67th sessions. Accordingly, during the 67th session the number of meetings during which statements by the EU on certain agenda items not addressed by the Member States national statements decreased, meaning that Member States had more often statements at the same meetings and on the same agenda items at the Union, compared with the 65th session. This argument can than also be applied to the decreased vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy at the 54th session compared to the 53rd session.

Accordingly, the argument that the rational choice version of institutionalism needs to give actors time to recognizes the ‘supply’, meaning centralized coordination responsibilities and increased information sharing, and thereby to be affected by the institutional constrains enable to some extent to encompass decreases of collective outcomes. Nonetheless, the supply-demand reasoning from a rational choice version of institutionalism does not deal with the question of why the Member States have between the 63rd and the 67th session increased expressed their national position through national statements at the meetings. Nonetheless, a rational choice version of institutions emphasizes that actors are constrained by rules and structures of institutions upon which they act. Therefore should we assume that Member States also acts upon national structures and rules of institutions which in turn contain them. Accordingly it is not a matter of which rules and structures that constrain an actor more than the other, rather as states are
strategic calculators they need to assess the strategies in accordance which more than one institution.

In that regard, we can argue from a rational choice version of institutionalism that the Member States of the EU have to calculate their strategies in accordance with two institutions, which in turn are assessed against each other and thereby determines the collective outcome. In other words, the effects of changed institutions on state behavior is that they can be forced to assess the institutions against each other which in turn may lead to collective beneficial outcomes depending on which institutional rules and strategic states calculates on. Accordingly, after the changes in the hierarchical structure of coordination introduced by the Lisbon Treaties, Member States calculated their action both in relation with the national coordination structure and the coordination structure of the EU which affected the policy outcome by decreasing the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy in international organizations.
The research question that this thesis aimed to explain was why would institutional changes affect the vertical coherence of European Union’s foreign policy, especially in international organizations such as the UN? In order to answer the research question of this study two possible propositions were derived from normative and rational choice versions of institutionalism on why institutional changes would have any effect on state behavior, and thereby the policy outcome. In accordance with the proposition derived from a normative version of institutionalism, namely: changes in the normative foundation of institution, we should expect institutional changes to affect the behavior of states provided that the reform or reorganization in question shifted the symbolic meaning of an organization and that reformers conducted a political rhetoric on the expectations of that shift. Moreover, the proposed proposition derived from rational choice institutionalism assumed that changes in the hierarchical structure on coordination, by centralizing responsibilities of coordination, increasing information sharing and decreasing available strategic choices, would affect the state behavior and the collective beneficial outcome. Furthermore, the normative and rational choice versions of institutionalism define institutions differently, thereby simultaneously underlining different aspects of reforms as important. On the one hand, the normative version of institutional changes emphasized shifts of symbolic coordination means, such as the creation of a High Representative with the Amsterdam Treaty and the shift to EU delegations as well as the establishment of EEAS with the Lisbon Treaty. On the other hand, the rational choice version of institutionalism emphasizes changes in terms of formal structures and rules on coordination.

The propositions from normative and rational choice institutionalism were compared over a time period of 1998-2013 to the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy at the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. The proposition derived from the normative institutionalism: on the change of institutions’ normative foundation, had greater explanatory power on why institutional changes would affect the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy in international organization. While the proposition from the normative version of institutionalism emphasized both increases and decreases of the vertical coherence, the rational choice version of institutionalism was only able to explain the increases. Nonetheless, by including a rational choice institutionalism reasoning on supply and demand as well as states interaction with more than one institution, we were able to also assess the decreases of vertical coherence from a rational choice version of institutionalism.

Even though the normative explanatory power of the propositions are compared with each other they are also to be viewed as complementary in the sense that their
findings complement each other and thereby enable an explanation as to why institutional changes effect the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy in international organizations. The vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy at the First Committee decreased in 1999 during the 54th session and in 2008 at the 64th session. This occurred as a reaction to the symbolic shift on coordination responsibilities of the European Union’s foreign policy. Nonetheless, at the 63rd session the symbol of a High Representative changed the normative foundation of vertical coherence, thereby the state behavior, and its mandate to increase information sharing and preparing positions enabled strategic states to calculations: which lead to increased vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy. Furthermore, frequent rhetoric on the expectations with the symbolic shifts of EU delegations and the creation of EEAS have developed the normative foundation of vertical coherence and thereby the state behavior. This has led Member States, who are constrained by rules and structures at both national level and the EU level, to strategically comply with rules and structures at the national level. One could therefore argue that the institutional changes on coordination so far have led to decreased vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy at the First committee of the United Nations General Assembly. Consequently, by viewing the findings of the competing theories as complementary one might argue in more general terms that the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy has between 2008-2013 decreased as the hierarchical structures of coordination on the European Union’s has changed and as the normative foundation of vertical coherence has developed.

8.1 Further Research

Further research needs to be conducted both regarding the theoretical as well as the empirical findings. In connection with the latter, further theoretical studies on the effects of institutional changes on state behavior according to the normative and rational choice versions of institutionalism need to be conducted and to develop their scope on institutional change as an explanatory variable. As regards the latter, further empirical studies needs to be done in the future in order to assess whether the vertical coherence of EU’s foreign policy increases in the long term. Nonetheless, empirical studies going further back than the Amsterdam Treaty should also be carried out in order to strengthen the findings in this thesis.
9 References


Hall, Peter A. – Taylor, Rosemary C. R, 1996. ”Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms” in


Thomas, Daniel C. – Schimmelfennig, Frank., 2009b. “Normative Institutionalism and EU Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective” International Politics, Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 491-504.


9.1 Electronic Documents


Annex 1

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(United Nations, 2011b: 8-149).

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(United Nations, 2011b: 8-149).
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