Turkey: Sly as a Fox?

Explaining the successive development of Turkey’s multilateral cooperation efforts

By
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Abstract

Since the European Union membership application in 1987, twenty-six years have passed and the status of Turkey has only progressed from a “potential candidate” to an “official candidate”. At the same time, a successive expansion is traceable in Turkey’s efforts for multilateral cooperation with other parts of the world. While being seemingly random at the first sight, it is possible to observe distinct and specific periods where these efforts were escalated. The explanation for this phenomenon rests upon the presented harmony between these specific periods and the contributable insights given by the realist tradition. The applied congruence method shows that the use of “balance of threat” arguments does not demonstrate a great deal of correlation with times of strained relations between the USSR/Russia and Turkey. On the contrary, the deliberated “balance of influence” arguments present an interesting parallel with these efforts throughout the periods of significant deadlocks in Turkey-EU relations.

*Key words*: Turkey, EU, Foreign Policy, Balance of Power, Russia

*Words*: 19.646
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1 Introduction

The hope of the Turkish Republic to be accepted by their fellow Europeans stems from as far back as the foundations of the country itself. The establishment of the new Turkish government in 1923, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire set its identity and norms, through modernization principles of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk with a strong belief of belongingness to “Europe” or the “Western Civilizations”. Inevitably, these foundations drive the motivations of Turkish foreign policy to orbit around the idea of being accepted as European. ¹ This desire was recognized by the European Economic Community (EEC) in the Ankara Agreement of 1963 setting the foundations of the association of both sides. At the ceremony, the statement of the then President of the European Commission (Commission), Waller Hallstein emphasized that “Turkey is a part of Europe”² as well as Article 28 of the agreement itself envisaging the possibility of full accession.³ The hopeful picture of the initial formalization of those relations led Turkey to follow and accept European standards in the belief of achieving the envisaged membership. Ultimately, on April 14, 1987 the Turkish Government submitted an application for full membership to the European Community (EC).⁴

After the historical leap of faith to finalize this wish, twenty-six years have passed and the status of this desire has only progressed from a potential candidate to an official candidate. The intensification of cooperation between the sides slowly pursued; the application’s recognition by 1990, its Customs Union (CU) by 1996, official candidate status by 1999 and opening up of the negotiations by 2004. Meanwhile, the EEC of “the Six” countries that Turkey had applied to join evolved successively into a European Union (EU) of twenty-eight countries as of 2013. Sixteen of those additional members came after the Turkish application of 1987. As the sphere of cooperation of the EU expanded, a similar tendency in the Turkish cooperation efforts became observable. As well as successively expanding bilateral cooperation with countries in other regions through various mechanisms such as Free Trade Agreements⁵ or Bilateral Agreements for Cooperation on Culture,⁶ Turkey also expanded its cooperation efforts in the

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² The Economist 2010.
³ Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey 1963, Art. 28.
⁴ Commission of the European Communities 1989, Art. 1.
⁵ Ministry of Economy 2012a. Since 1996, a total of 19 FTA agreements have been concluded with countries outside EU after the establishment of the Customs Union.
⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012a. To give an idea, a quick look will show that out of the total 77 agreements concluded since the establishment of 1923, more than half (43) have been concluded after 1987.
collective multilateral sense of the word. As such, collaboration of political, economic, cultural and military means was realized outside the realm of the EU.\(^8\)

Why is it that Turkey, who dedicated twenty-six years of multilateral cooperation efforts for its membership pledge with the Europeans, successively expands its reach with other regions? Keeping in mind the establishing mechanisms for international cooperation takes substantial amount of time, effort and money even for bilateral means, a country who actively seeks to create or join multilateral cooperation mechanisms continuously in other regions is intriguing. In the sense that, since its application to an already existing and significant multilateral cooperation unit like the European Union already holds up a significant portion of space in its foreign policy objectives. The question becomes more fascinating when one gives attention to the circumstances that encircle this occurrence. It is an established fact that up until the 1990’s, Turkish foreign policy regarded itself as cautious and unquestionably oriented to the West.\(^9\) It is also a fact that the Turkish position in the Cold War era international system stood aside with Europe and the United States as Turkey actively sought, contributed and secured memberships in organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Council of Europe. The Turks were for a very long time reluctant to cooperate with the regions that were under the Soviet umbrella. This was also the case in the regions of the Southern Islamic nations where religious influence of Islam is vast on state government which contradicts the secularist Western principles of Turkey’s foundations.\(^10\) In other words, we are witnessing a traditionally cautious country, on entering multilateral cooperation with the other sides of the world, to successively cooperate with the very same regions that it was cautious to since its official intention to increase and deepen cooperation with the EU.

The study, motivated by these observations, thus aims to provide explanations for the successive establishments of multilateral cooperation mechanisms by Turkey outside the EU after the application of the membership pledge. More specifically, the study will examine two different theoretical suggestions to elucidate the successive expansion of the Turkish multilateral cooperation efforts, in order to present the most important driving-forces in process.

For necessity, it is important to clarify at the very beginning what the study does not intend to do. While focusing on the successive associations of Turkey’s multilateral cooperation mechanisms, success of these establishments or their possible effects after Turkey joins or creates a mechanism, is not a matter of analysis in this research. To pursue such a study, different theoretical and methodological approaches are needed and some examples can already be found

\(^7\) From this point onwards the word “efforts for multilateral cooperation” will be used interchangeably with “efforts” or “cooperative efforts”.
\(^8\) The specifics of these cooperation efforts will be further discussed in the following chapter.
\(^9\) Akgün 2009, p. 2; Cagaptay 2013, p. 803.
\(^10\) Oran 2010a, p. 7.
on the individual level. Another issue which is also not in focus here is the question of why the Turkish candidacy could not move forward. The question of why the EU still does not accept to finalize the cooperation between the sides has already been discussed extensively in academia. Amongst others, the general conclusions from these studies point at concepts such as incompatible demands, lack of political will and importance of identity differences. There are many reasons why the cooperation process took so long to be found. On the other hand, the question of why Turkey is successively giving effort on cooperating with other regions and deepening relations has no such obvious answers that are unequivocal. Even the question, “is there an identifiable shift in the Turkish cooperation focus?” itself already started to take a lot of attention in the last few years, therefore identification of these movements trigger more interest. Finally, the study does not aim to capture all the complexities of Turkish foreign policy, nor giving detailed descriptions of the real life processes. Rather, the aim is to provide a detailed and systematic explanation over time for the overall multilateral cooperation efforts of Turkey.

1.1 Why study Turkish Multilateral Cooperation in relation with the EU?

In the international relations discipline, questions of power and influence sit at the center stage in relation to states, actors or ideational flows. These questions increasingly take attention especially when a state or a group of states seek efforts on cooperation and collaboration in a collective manner. Inevitably, the questions take concern on the participating states as well as “to the functioning of (and effects on) the international system.”

To give an example, substantial amount of studies that focus on Turkish foreign policy in the last decade emphasized the regional power, soft power or regional economic power dimensions of Turkey while discussing the Turkish efforts to cooperate with other regions. Indeed, the emphasis on power when discussing the active Turkish foreign policy stands vital to the motivations of such engagements, where they are referred to be under the objective of consolidating power and prestige. To be fair, irrespective of how much of these engagements are perceived as power or how much they actually have an effect, it is an undeniable fact that how Turkey perceives power rotates around the idea of cooperation. Therefore, it is essential to include this aspect when analyzing the external relations of Turkey. Furthermore, while analyzing Turkish external

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13 Strømvik 2005, p. 5
relations, it is impossible to not take the EU into consideration. Due to the extensive space the EU candidacy covers in the Turkish cooperation objectives, the effect of the EU in the general framework has also been reiterated in the influential book “Strategic Depth” by the current Minister of Foreign Affairs Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu. The book sets out Turkish cooperation efforts by an analogy of the “bow and arrow” where the external relations of Turkey should resemble a “bow” that extends its coverage to Asia as far as possible in order to be able shoot the “arrow” in to Europe. The analogy pictures the objectives of the successive cooperation efforts in other regions, as an essential tool to increase the geopolitical importance of Turkey in order to be an indispensable ally by the West.\textsuperscript{16}

The importance of Turkey in the structure of the international system has also received attention in the last decade. Turkish power in the international system has debatably been discussed if it is starting to be among the rising powers like the BRICS bloc or near BRIC countries or even if it can be described as an unfitting candidate to any of the rising power classifications\textsuperscript{17}. The lists of adjectives continue with other classifications such as mid-sized power or Strategic Medium Power (SMP).\textsuperscript{18} All of these studies may suggest and analyze Turkish power in different ways or come up with different conclusions. However, their lowest common denominator is that; Turkey has an impact in the regional developments and at least marginal influence in the international system mainly considering amongst other things, its geostrategic position.\textsuperscript{19} Therefore, a potential rise coupled with a potential orient shift in the trajectory of the Turkish power, will have potential effects in the balances of the system let alone the region. In relation, for those who would rather study the normative power and values in the global system, Turkey is gaining a lot of attention in terms of its responsibility as being a role model\textsuperscript{20} for the Islamic nations of the Middle East and North Africa. It is possible to identify this discourse by the Western countries as well as the Turkish leaders who are presenting Turkey as a successful unique example, which managed to merge democracy with a predominant Muslim population who promotes humanitarian values.\textsuperscript{21} The self-assumed responsibility to stand as a norm pursuer usually gets identified with the EU.\textsuperscript{22} However, considering the common cultural values with the Muslim countries and the long-lasting relations with the West; there exists a significant possibility for Turkey to make a difference in a field where the EU holds substantial interest.

Inevitably, to cover all of the aspects mentioned above a bigger study is needed. Nevertheless, they should be seen as mere motivations and a general

\textsuperscript{16} Davutoğlu 2001, p. 562.
\textsuperscript{17} For related arguments, see Cagaptay 2013; Önış & Kutlay 2013; Oğuzlu 2013.
\textsuperscript{18} Balcer 2013; Oran 2010a, p. 9
\textsuperscript{19} Oran 2010a, p. 9
\textsuperscript{20} For recent contributions, see Göksel 2012; Rubin 2012; Kubicek 2013; Perekli 2012; Al-Azm 2011; Younis 2011.
\textsuperscript{21} Todays Zaman 2011; Küçükkoşum 2011.
\textsuperscript{22} Dal 2013, p. 710
framework that this study hopes to contribute for explaining why multilateral cooperation efforts of Turkey are successively expanding in relation to the EU. These explanations can be regarded as important constituents of the general structure of how we can interpret the developing image of Turkey as well as its relations in the international scene. Truth be told, even though an increasing interest exists, there have only been few attempts to conceptualize and theorize the main systematic and regional factors that are at play in the particular conditions of Turkey.\(^{23}\) Thus, this study aims to contribute to the empirical occurrence of the successive Turkish multilateral cooperation efforts as well as to the theoretical debate over causes that push for cooperation mechanisms among states by showing the Turkish case.

1.2 Existing studies on the effects of Turkish-EU relations on Turkish multilateral cooperation behavior

While analyzing the Turkish cooperation efforts with other regions, some arguments seem to be focusing on how the inflow and outflow of the Turkish economic relations started to shift and diversify to other regions due to the reluctance of the EU.\(^{24}\) Some interpretations even claim that increasing and diversifying cooperation engagements of Turkey weaken (or are as a result of) the complicated relations with the EU.\(^{25}\) In addition, substantial amount of scholars tried to identify the possibility of interpreting these engagements in other regions as an “axis shift”\(^{26}\) in the foreign policy orientation of Turkey. The arguments from these types of studies would generally help to illustrate whether the current cooperation efforts could count as an indication of Turkey moving further away from the EU and the West. In essence, these arguments can be mostly regarded as evaluative researches which tend to describe the policy efficiencies and their implications for the later periods. However, it is also necessary to keep in mind that “questions of policy efficiency are not necessarily the same as questions about the existence or not of some policy activities”\(^{27}\) which this study aims to answer. To be clear, the existing literature on Turkish foreign policy that focus on the EU, presents the general tendency to seek for wide ranging research outcomes in the hope of explaining impacts of various factors at different levels.\(^{28}\) Judging from the research, it is also possible to say that there are no set categorizations for analyzing the cooperation efforts in relation to the EU and the use of descriptive

\(^{23}\) Oğuzlu & Dal 2013, p. 618
\(^{24}\) For recent contributions on similar arguments, see Esfahani & Gürakar 2013; Kirişçi 2012; Babacan 2011.
\(^{25}\) For such claims, see “Turkey: EU Accession Increasingly Doubtful” 2011, p. 16; “Turkey Turns East Once focused on the EU, shifting focus to Asia and Middle East” 2012, p. 14
\(^{27}\) Strömvik 2005, p. 9
\(^{28}\) Yazgan 2012, p. 179-180
and empirical analyses are more common approaches. An analyst, in an interesting survey of International Relations studies concerning Turkish foreign policy also pointed out that the use of theory and theoretical outcomes have not been given high priority. While the literature tends to develop the empirical occurrence of Turkish cooperation behavior, systematic testable theoretical explanations tend to be unelevated. Thereby, through the use of various theoretical insights, this study aims to contribute and distinguish when and why we should expect successive Turkish multilateral cooperation efforts at certain times.

Other similarities are evident in timeframe and scope of research that is focused on. Nearly all of the latest studies, which analyze Turkish cooperation engagements in other regions, tend to agree from the beginning that this type of behavior overlaps or increases with the time period spanning from 2002. In addition, the research scope is usually specified to bilateral relations or single regional engagements. Certainly, the rising attention on the axis shift arguments owes its base to the “new” dynamic foreign policy of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) who came to power in Turkey. Nevertheless, though some interpretations of the previous multilateral cooperation engagements on specific case levels exist, the literature on changing cooperation behavior lacks systematic comparisons or total analyses that include prior decades. The general highlighted linkages with the EU, seems to be parallel to the foreign policy objectives set by the “bow and arrow” analogy, in terms of the necessity that cooperation with other regions presents Turkey to be an indispensable ally to the West. Therefore the behavior is interpreted as something of a means to the end. In relation, other interpretations are not uncommon, as Marc Pierini, a former French ambassador and Director of European Commission’s Delegation to Turkey states in an article: “in the eyes of Turkey’s Western partners, Ankara frequently fluctuates on international issues, displays a distinct lack of consistency in dealing with its friends and allies, and occasionally gives off the scent of an imperial attitude… [] making it difficult—and at times perplexing—to make sense of Ankara’s foreign policy aims”. Needless to say, this study does not follow these types of claims thus, aims to look from a different angle to primarily seek for other factors for why the “bow” is expanding and if there are other factors at play. Maybe, when observed from an alternative wholesome stand point, there may be an identifiable “consistency” in the “inconsistent” behavior after all?

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29 Yazgan 2012, p. 183; Aydin & Yazgan 2013.
30 See for an early claim on Black Sea Economic Cooperation as a regional challenge to European integration by Turkey, Gençkaya 1993.
31 Pierini 2013.
1.3 Thesis Structure

Keeping in mind the according motivations, this study will continue progressively. The following section will first outline the research design while explaining the methodology and theoretical base of the study. From the realist tradition two different hypotheses are obtained for explaining when an attempted multilateral cooperation effort can be predicted. The third section will present all attempts of the multilateral cooperation efforts outside the EU by analyzing the dates of all International Organizations which Turkey has applied to or created since 1987. The dates of the first decision to create or join an organization and the dates of establishment or memberships will be pinpointed on a timeline. If possible to observe, intensity will also be highlighted. The two latter chapters will be based on this presented data, specifically analyzing and testing the two suggested hypotheses. In chapter four, accordingly to the presented balance of threat hypothesis, the proposition of an important external force to cause such behavior will be analyzed. However, the proposition from the balance of threat thesis will be argued to show insufficient harmony with the data. Therefore, another hypothesis will be highlighted in chapter five. It will be shown that the proposed balance of influence hypothesis is very significant to show congruence, leading from the disputes between the EU and Turkey. Finally, the last chapter will summarize the findings and show that there is sufficient proof for believing the existence of a consistent behavior from an appearing “inconsistent” relationship.
2 Catching the “Fox”

At first glance, it can be deceptive to interpret the foreign policy behaviour of Turkey in terms of inconsistency or randomness. As such, the similarity with a “cunning fox” is perhaps the most metaphoric way to describe the details of this decision making. To begin with, while analyzing Turkey’s successive expansion of multilateral cooperation efforts, there is also an inherent assumption within the statement: that there actually is an existent successive development. In relation, this also presupposes a comparable reality as in there may not be an existent successive effort for cooperation before. The assumption however is still debated and far from being determined. Nevertheless, the increasing debate among the analysts, at least gives us hints on how to handle this discussion. As mentioned above, the axis-shift arguments seem to appeal more after the introduction of the JDP government in to the Turkish politics. For some, criticizing Turkish foreign policy during the JDP leadership for turning away from the West is a common way to label this behavior.32 These types of criticism to a certain degree, blame these attempts for their hidden agendas to “de-westernize” or “Middle-Easternize” Turkey.33 Others, agree that there is some type of transformation, not in the aim of such criticized labels but instead to create “an autonomous, self-regulating, and self-confident foreign policy agenda and normalize the previous crisis-driven foreign policymaking of Turkey.”34 Thereby, stating that pre-JDP Turkish foreign policy under the constant Western-oriented conditions comes as standard. Accordingly, an initial interpretation of these discussions under these terms can tell us that we should rather focus on post-2002 developments.

However, this study aims to picture changes of the multilateral cooperation efforts consistently over time under a systemic level of analysis. That means the “actor’s characteristics are given by assumption rather than treated as variables; changes in outcomes are explained not on the basis of variations in these characteristics, but on the basis of changes in the attributes of the system itself.”35 Measurement of multilateral cooperation efforts in other regions, regardless if you are criticizing or not, through a time period further back from the 2002 yardstick with a systemic focus, can shed significant light on even the arguments of today’s debates if there exists a trend of effort away from certain past tendencies.

Therefore, the presented paper will enable us to show first, how the successive multilateral cooperation efforts took place over time spanning from the application for membership until today, secondly to identify the most noteworthy

33 Kanat 2010, p. 205
34 Ibid, p. 206
35 Keohane 1982, p. 328
explanation in terms of why this possible trend takes place. This paper’s inherited way of reasoning with the congruence method aims to describe the explanatory power of theories and scientific data. The general approach is to find and identify an indicator of when these efforts take place or intensify, to ask the question of what types of occurrences or events should have predated these developments. In order to claim that congruence exists between the theoretical explanations and the empirical outcome, these periods will be contrasted with hypotheses extracted from the theoretical explanations. This is under the aim of successfully distinguishing occurrences which is in correlation preceding the efforts for multilateral cooperation.

This way of engaging the study also offers considerable flexibility and adaptability. It also enables the possibility to contribute with theory development by showing that “the theory employed in the congruence method may be well-established and highly regarded, or it may be formulated or postulated by the investigator for the first time on the basis of a hunch that it may turn out to be important.”\textsuperscript{36} In essence, this way of analyzing the cooperation efforts will give us an overall image and idea as opposed to studies that focus on single cases or certain periods. The following sections of this chapter will draw the methodological and theoretical aspects of the paper.

2.1 How to describe successive effort for multilateral cooperation?

2.1.1 Conceptualizing the effort for multilateral cooperation

To analyze change in cooperation patterns, the general academic approach is to conceptualize in terms of decisive thresholds, where a history-making event, a revolutionary decision or an institutional change may be regarded as pivotal points. Justifiably, this way of interpreting or reflecting change in cooperation would mean a step by step process, gradually continuing at specific points.\textsuperscript{37} Indeed, analyzing change in the Turkish cooperation patterns for example with the EU generally reflects along specific developments in the relations such as changing statuses (like declaration of candidacy and potential candidacy before that) or treaty changes (such as an establishment of a Customs Union between the sides).\textsuperscript{38} The same type of focus could easily be observed while looking at the Turkish-US cooperation patterns where most reflections generally touch upon the NATO agreement at some point. Thus, for the sake of simplifying these two examples, we can say that while the EU example focuses on a policy development

\textsuperscript{36} George & Bennet 2005, p. 182
\textsuperscript{37} Strønvik 2005, p. 22
\textsuperscript{38} For an example, see Yazici 2012.
resting upon an economic paradigm, the U.S example rests upon a development on military cooperation. Inductively thinking, focusing on some kind of *gradual development in different fields of policy coordination* should not be too far-fetched while defining successive effort for multilateral cooperation. Charles E. Lindblom has touched upon this way of defining cooperation as a required aspect where actions that do not stand in pre-existent harmony within different fields of policy must be brought in to conformity through a negotiation process.\(^{39}\) Building upon Lindblom, this study will reformulate Robert Keohane’s explanation on cooperation to occur when:

> actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination. To summarize more formally, intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination.\(^{40}\)

Although, this definition then can be regarded as a solid starting point for defining cooperation, it does not necessarily help us to identify the prospects of effort for cooperation. This is derived from the belief that an effort for cooperation functionally does not mean the same thing as cooperation itself. A state may propose to cooperate with another actor, however, the effort is existent notwithstanding the success or failure or even the efficiency of the later developments. It is a rather neglected detail within the literature on analyzing cooperation. A modified definition is needed to put it into context. In order to narrow the focus, this study will apprehend the effort for cooperation as:

*an observable intention by the actors* to adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination. To summarize, *an effort for* intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the *desired* policies actually followed by one government are regarded as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as *an intended* result of the process of policy coordination.\(^{40}\)

As mentioned, not all the cooperation efforts fall within this conception. Turkey’s foreign policy conducts multiple engagements with other actors through mechanisms such as bilateral agreements, development aid and *etcetera* which fall out of the scope of this study. There are no pre-defined boundaries for an effort of cooperation to be in this definition. Thus, this paper rather focuses upon *observable efforts for multilateral cooperation*. These engagements can be considered in different fields of policy cooperation namely in political, cultural, economic and military paradigms where an effort for strengthening cooperation is identifiable.

\(^{39}\) as cited in Keohane 1984, p. 51

\(^{40}\) Keohane 1984, p. 51-52
2.1.2 Operationalizing the effort for multilateral cooperation

Although narrowing down the scope is helpful under these circumstances, a task for analyzing systematic successive development still tends to be tricky. As it would be with any other state, the absence of some kind of comprehensive documentation or record of this sort in Turkish foreign policy, requires a researcher to seek for undertaking other alternatives. To show a feasible and objective image on the efforts for multilateral cooperation, creative thinking would give hints on how to handle this type of dead-lock. At this point, a “conscious thinker” should realize the limitations of the task but “still manage to say a great deal simply by saying hot and cold, warmer and cooler.”41 Thereby, a logical possible way to apprehend would be by finding an indicator that shows the efforts for multilateral cooperation in Turkish foreign policy.

Keohane argues that, a possible way to analyze cooperation is to “focus on particular actions as the unit of analysis.”42 Such an atomistic perception has attractive features however; this is argued to be not preferable as “instances of cooperation and discord could all too easily be isolated from the context of beliefs and behavior within which they are embedded.”43 Implying that, future expectations on “patterns of interaction” or assumptions about economic arrangements along with political activities should be taken into consideration. The argument suggests that an analysis of cooperation should be “within the context of international institutions, broadly defined as in terms of practices and expectations… [these] act[s] of cooperation or discord affects the beliefs, rules and practices that form the context for future actions.”44 Building upon, if one would like to attempt analyzing patterns on the efforts for multilateral cooperation instead of the cooperation itself then, digging into international institutions can be a justifiable indication. Assuming that international institutions are significant aspects of cooperation and they play a significant role in the understanding of the concept, surely a way to study efforts for multilateral cooperation could be based upon looking into the attempts of establishing or applying these mechanisms. While being solicitous upon the fact that the focus stands outside of the later developments of these mechanisms, zooming in on the particular actions (in this case the Turkish application or creation of an international institution) as the unit of analysis could prove to be valuable.

Before we continue a short deviation has to be made on defining these international institutions to smooth the understanding of the operationalization in the study. The introduction of the concept was by John Ruggie who defined it as “a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states.”45 Furthermore, an expanded, plural and collective definition was dubbed by Stephen

41 Sartori 1970, p. 1033
42 Keohane 1984, p. 56
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 as cited in Keohane 1984, p. 57
Krasner who emphasized the decision-making procedures of these sets of converged expectations as “prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.” This kind of a general definition is a useful starting-point however still needs to be narrowed down for further operationalization. To make it possible, the 1978 Yearbook of International Organizations presents a highly relevant reproduced article by A. Judge which gives a comprehensive list and classification categories for the concept. This study praises that the given categorizations follow a rational qualitative approach which facilitates “an appreciation of the variety of bodies which could be incorporated into any such scheme.” The general approach to distinguish which international organizations to look at is first through highlighting the three main types identified in the study; inter-governmental organizations, international non-governmental organizations and multinational enterprises. Because this study focuses on the official cooperation efforts, only the organizations that have cooperation on state level will be selected, thus, inter-governmental organizations are chosen. To add on this initial condition, this study aims to explain Turkish multilateral cooperation efforts with other states and regions except the EU after the application of the membership pledge. Therefore, another natural selection criterion would be on including only the international organizations that have their origin outside from the EU since 1987. Next in order is highlighting the types of these organizations. Judge identifies four different types of organizations namely; conventional, special, minimal information and other. In table 1 the detail of these types are presented for easier understanding.

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<th>Conventional</th>
<th>Special</th>
<th>Minimal</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<td>1) Inactive or dissolved international organizations</td>
<td>1) Recently reported bodies -- not yet confirmed</td>
<td>1) Organizations emanating from places, persons, proprietary products or other bodies</td>
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<tr>
<td>2) Universal membership Organizations</td>
<td>2) Multinational enterprises</td>
<td>2) Subsidiary and internal bodies of other internal bodies</td>
<td>2) Organizations having a special form, including foundations and funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Intercontinental membership Organizations</td>
<td>3) National organizations</td>
<td>3) Currently inactive non-conventional or unconfirmed bodies</td>
<td>3) Internationally-oriented national organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Regionally defined membership organizations</td>
<td>4) Religious orders, fraternities and secular institutes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5) International meeting series</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the purpose of this study, organizations that would match with the category of the conventional international organizations constitute the most

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46 Ibid.
47 Judge 1978.
48 Ibid.
49 The table is produced from the information given in, Judge 1978
significant group. This is emanating from the motivation that the organizations which would belong to that category should construct at least an ideal minimum picture as an indicator for the Turkish multilateral cooperation efforts.

In order to pursue the selection, a reliable and complete list is needed, demonstrating Turkey’s engagements in international organizations. Luckily, this was a straightforward task. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents such a list of the names of the engaged international organizations in its official website. According to the set criteria, the most relevant candidates will be pinpointed on a time span from 1987 to 2013. The establishment dates as well as the initial introductions to negotiation tables will be considered. Moreover, if there is an existent possibility to claim frequency within a specific period, the study will also be able to take notice. An ability to observe these different periods where an abundance of efforts are identifiable, makes it possible to scrutinize on the explanation of these occurrences. The descriptions of the sub categories and the cross-check results will be presented in chapter three. To sum up, after discovering all the needed international organizations for the research, the study will be able to continue searching for congruence between the empirical data and the theoretical explanations.

2.1.3 What is missing?

Other than the deliberate choice of excluding efforts for various types of cooperation, the study faces an inherent limitation. While drawing an image of the efforts for multilateral cooperation over time with such a comprehensive list, the biggest problem stands over distinguishing some kind of hierarchy between these organizations. That means the study is structurally unable to distinguish and give value to “importance” and “unimportance” of these mechanisms. Some organizations may be more important or credible than others or their policy fields may constitute a larger interest for Turkey. This type of neglected limitation regrettably is existent however; the value for being able to systematically outline the efforts of Turkey should outweigh the imperfection from not covering all the constituents of the Turkish foreign policy. Although it may be regarded as a minimal simplification, such an approach can subsequently create an ability to compare possible explanations as to why Turkish multilateral cooperation efforts successively expand to other regions over time.

50 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011b
2.2 How to explain successive effort for multilateral cooperation?

2.2.1 Theoretical guideline

To compare that a specific hypothesis has a better capacity for explaining why a state would give effort to multilateral cooperation, an initial explanation is needed on the theoretical bases.\textsuperscript{51} In this study, the accepted base assumption is that, states are regarded as \textit{rational} and conscious choice makers where their accepted strategies are the result of rational calculations.\textsuperscript{52} Albeit, alternative ways of explaining international relations exist, commonly known with their attached \textit{“post”} prefixes, those types of theories are regarded as to generally not have the goal or the capacity to produce falsifiable hypotheses, so they are not further included.\textsuperscript{53} To go more into detail with the rationality premise, two additional assumptions are also necessary to study cooperative behavior. Firstly, states devise their preferences in relation to their preferred consequences and in relation to their favored way of achieving these preferences. Secondly, these preferences are situated to the expected attitudes of others.\textsuperscript{54} Thereby, an effort for cooperation is perceived as a consequence of strategic interactions among actors.

To continue on this line, an observation of cooperation at its simplest point means: overlapping interests and the identification of agreeing a way of pursuing these interests among actors.\textsuperscript{55} This general formulation proposes an advantage for highlighting the “agreement among theories in its empty form, it also helps to clarify how various theories differ in their propositions about evolving cooperation … [and] emphasizing the research problem over the labels.”\textsuperscript{56} To put it simply, explanatory power is highlighted instead of theoretical contest which is the aim of this study.

Moving forward on this reference point, conditioning on the theory, other types of variables can be introduced. The current international relations theories offer two helpful ways for explaining cooperation under this framework.\textsuperscript{57} They cannot be considered mutually exclusive explanations but one would focus more into the institutions while the latter to the events of the external environment. Nevertheless, for explaining the successive \textit{effort} for multilateral cooperation mechanisms, realist hypothesizes stand at a better point for deduction here. The primary reason for that comes from the “power struggle” focus of this study.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item George & Bennet 2005, p. 181
\item Wallender & Haftendorn & Keohane 1999, p. 5
\item Strömvik 2005, p. 36, 37
\item Ibid.
\item Keohane 1984, p. 78
\item Strömvik 2005, p. 38.
\item Ibid, p. 39
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
where the cooperative efforts are regarded as means to achieving power in relation
to other actors.

As highlighted, this study does not aim to seek explanatory power of theory on
efficacy of these efforts but seek to develop the explanatory power of theory on
the effort itself. Maria Strömvik’s study on the EU’s collective foreign policy in
“To Act as a Union” is a good example of this point, where the analysis looks into
reasons for why states in the EU successively attempt to develop cooperation in
foreign policy.\(^{58}\) The study uses both of the theories, however, in that case an
established EU mechanism already exists for pursuing cooperation. Whereas, this
study aims to analyze the efforts of establishment or application of these types of
mechanisms that are yet to exist with different states successively. The
motivations for focusing on the realist tradition at this point can also be inferred
by authors who focus on institutions as Robert Keohane says; “writers who are
concerned principally with international institutions and rules, or analysts in the
Marxist tradition, make use of some Realist premises.”\(^ {59}\) Consequently, two
different propositions will be highlighted in the following sections of this chapter.

2.2.2 The threat of the external?

When a study aims to seek out an explanation on efforts for cooperation stemming
from an aspect such as power struggle, the realist explanations can be regarded as
one of the first places to look at. Nevertheless, while a positive eagerness to
explain such phenomena exists by this tradition, the same synergy however cannot
be claimed on its opinions. The underlying reason is the well-known realist
assumption that states are by default inclined to conflict with the international
institutions having only a marginal effect.\(^ {60}\) Therefore, conceiving conflict as the
centrality of the international politics tends conclude somewhat pessimistic views
on the idea of cooperation even when states have common interests\(^ {61}\). Howbeit,
the mainstream realist framework presents two considerations for approaching
this occurrence.\(^ {62}\)

The first way to account for this phenomenon is the opinion that cooperation
is the result of a single powerful actor controlling its environment. An overall
simplification can be made as; any formation or maintenance of formation in the
international system depends on its hegemon.\(^ {63}\) However, this explanation cannot
be taken into consideration within this study for some obvious reasons. The
primary reason, emanates from the belief in the “hegemonic stability thesis” as
not possibly accounting for an explanation on Turkey’s active and successive
efforts for cooperation with multiple numbers of divergent actors simultaneously.

\(^{58}\) Strömvik 2005.
\(^{59}\) Keohane 1989, p. 35
\(^{60}\) Gilpin 1984, p. 304
\(^{61}\) Grieco 1990, p. 3-4
\(^{62}\) Strömvik 2005, p. 44
\(^{63}\) Keohane 1984, p. 31
Secondly, this point of view would not be able to sufficiently explain the efforts on “system-wide patterns of cooperation that benefit many countries without being tied to an alliance system directed against an adversary.”\textsuperscript{64} These types of efforts are also identifiable for Turkey.

Thereby, the next opinion is considered to be more viable which proposes to explain cooperation on the grounds of balancing a significantly powerful actor. Accordingly, an expectation of such a cooperative behavior is assumed to rise by the states for protecting “themselves from states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a threat.”\textsuperscript{65} Nonetheless, few clarifications are needed for using the “balance of power” theory under the motivation of creating a falsifiable hypothesis.

First, there exists a need to further expand on the term “actor”. It is true that the realist tradition centers the state as the main actor within the international system, however, the conceptualization is not by default limited to the contemporary understanding of the term. Robert Gilpin has also touched upon this issue by acknowledging the fact that the state is the principle actor:

in that the nature of the state and the pattern of relations among states are the most important determinants of the character of international relations at any given moment. This argument does not presume that states need always be the principal actors, nor does it presume that the nature of the state need always be the same and that the contemporary nation-state is the ultimate form of political organization. Throughout history, in fact, states and political organizations have varied greatly: tribes, empires, fiefdoms, city-states, etc.\textsuperscript{66}

Thus, while seeking balancing behavior towards an actor, the word actor can take place in the form of a state as well as a coalition of states under a unitary collective umbrella.

Secondly, the concept of “power” is also in need for further conceptualization because “depending on how we define power […] we will arrive at very different expectations”\textsuperscript{67} about when the Turkish efforts for multilateral cooperation should escalate. Jeffrey Hart’s insights prove to be helpful for defining power at this instant.\textsuperscript{68} His study highlights three approaches to take account for power. The first approach; power over resources is presumably the most widely accepted and pursued way of studying the national power in international relations.\textsuperscript{69} A leading figure in this tradition, Kenneth Waltz, supported this view by arguing that the most powerful states are often the ones who have the biggest rankings in terms of population, territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military and

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid, p. 7  \\
\textsuperscript{65} Walt 1987, p. 18  \\
\textsuperscript{66} Gilpin 1981, p. 18  \\
\textsuperscript{67} Strömvik 2005, p. 44  \\
\textsuperscript{68} Hart 1976.  \\
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid, p. 289
\end{footnotesize}
competence.\textsuperscript{70} Thus, a prediction is made on “nations which score high on some indicators but low on others will tend to behave in a hostile manner toward other nations”.\textsuperscript{71} Under the set boundaries of power then, material power is interpreted as the most significant constituent. Usually within this tradition, it is not a far-fetched claim to see military resources as the most important aspect of material power.\textsuperscript{72}

Rationally, an observation to balance then should be along an inspection on efforts for increasing material assets against the adversary. If this was the case, the efforts would be expected to constitute attempts on international organizations for increasing certain material resources, preferably military assets. Conversely, this is not observable in the Turkish example. Within this type of balance of power, an observable behavior for the Turkish cooperation efforts can be argued to exist during the Cold War period when Turkey sought to be a member of the NATO against the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{73} However, such a claim would be weak for the cooperation efforts of the time period covered here. Primarily because, no effort can be observed on joining or creating organizations for pooling of military resources directed against an adversary. In addition, the explanation would not be communicable for the efforts on cultural and political multilateral cooperation organizations. Therefore, the conception of power as resources is not accounted to be within the interest of this study.

The next definition stands at a more relevant place and it is also a conception well known to the students of international relations.\textsuperscript{74} Robert Dahl’s constitution of power as the capability of an actor to get another to do something which would not have been the case otherwise\textsuperscript{75} is the conceptualization of power as control over actors. Here, power is not only regarded as the amount of material power but as also the ability to pursue another actor to act in a desired way. Power can be coercive and non-coercive which implicitly means an actor can get another “to do something which he would not have done by using threat or persuasion.”\textsuperscript{76} With the coercive aspect of power, Stephen Walt’s “balance of threat” interpretation reflects upon this conception. The emphasis is given to the importance of an aggressive power. The argument proposes a powerful actor or overwhelming material resources to not necessarily generate balancing behavior by itself; instead it is argued to be generated against the actor who poses the most threat.\textsuperscript{77} The term “threat” is not limited to a certain spectrum however the most general way of identification is by distinguishing “aggressive intentions”. Thus, any kind of perceived aggressive intention would be a possible foundation for the inception of a threat.\textsuperscript{78}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{70}Waltz 1979, p. 131
\bibitem{71}Hart 1976, p. 290
\bibitem{Rummel}Rummel 1971, p. 30; Strömvik 2005, p. 45
\bibitem{72}Weitz 2010, p. 61; Harris 1972, 6
\bibitem{73}Hart 1976, p. 291
\bibitem{74}Dahl 1957, p. 202
\bibitem{75}Hart 1976, p. 291
\bibitem{76}Walt 1987, p. 21
\bibitem{77}Ibid, p. 26
\end{thebibliography}
Walt also identifies another significant difference from the balance of power theory; the possibility of a balancing behavior with political means. The argument exemplifies the inter-Arab relations where the observed balancing was through political cooperation directed against the legitimacy of the threatening states.\textsuperscript{79} The significance is the presentation of militarily insignificant alliances having profound effects with political cooperation. For adapting the suggested examples then, under the pressure of a threatening actor, such a balancing behavior may possibly emerge through efforts of applying or creating these mechanisms like international organizations. In short, a perception of threat may pursue states to adapt the set strategies and push the need for further cooperation efforts in international organizations.

To see if this theoretical explanation has any accountability to explain the Turkish efforts, chapter four will be dedicated to try out and analyze the relations with the Soviet Union/Russia as a significantly threatening actor for Turkey’s national security in the timespan covered within this study. The contrast will be made between the efforts of multilateral cooperation and the periods of threatening relations with the Soviet Union/Russia. The sources of materials to identify “periods of threatening relations” will be mainly based on the given facts, analyses and documents in Baskın Oran’s “Turkish Foreign Policy 1919-2006,”\textsuperscript{80} which can be regarded as an encyclopedia comprehensively covering the major events that are in focus here. In addition, multiple secondary sources will be used for supporting reliability.

2.2.3 The desire for influence?

The last definition is the power as control over events and outcomes. Arguably, this approach to power is regarded as the most conducive conceptualization in contemporary international relations.\textsuperscript{81} The suggestion is to measure power in terms of an actor’s capability to influence events in its surrounding environment with a differentiating stand point from the “power over resources” and “power over actors” frameworks. Simply, the justification is that “unless the actors regard control over other actors or resources as valuable in themselves, then the ability to control actors and resources will be considered secondary to the ability to control events.”\textsuperscript{82} Here, influence is not regarded as coercive threats or persuasion but more of an ability to achieve preferred outcomes.\textsuperscript{83} The preferred outcomes are detailed in terms of their production of a “net increase in the actor’s utility, where utility is simply a function of the actor’s preferences over the set outcomes.”\textsuperscript{84}

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid, p. 149
\textsuperscript{80} Oran ed. 2010
\textsuperscript{81} Hart 1976, p. 289
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid, p. 297
\textsuperscript{83} Rothgeb 1993, p. 22
\textsuperscript{84} Hart 1976, p. 296
To analyze balancing behavior in EU foreign policy development, Strömvik has revised three initial assumptions. Firstly, states are regarded by default to seek maximization of influence. Then, in contrast to the balance of threat argument, the second assumption is based on the balancing behavior to be “in relation to the most influential actor in the system”. Lastly, an analogy has been made with the formational reasons for military alliances among states where institutionalized cooperation in high politics is assumed to be the result of a cost-benefit calculation between influence gains and autonomy losses.85

While supporting the first assumption, this study aims to elaborate with few additional insights on the latter two for important reasons. Even though the importance of the most influential actor in the system is vital in most cases, disregarding the significance of geographic proximity may lead to somewhat neglecting conclusions in explaining complex balancing behavior for specific actors or regions. An additional analogy from the constituents of Walt’s arguments can be useful for consideration. This is motivated from the presented different sources of threats in the balancing acts of the Middle-East.86 To complement the assumption of geographic proximity, the agenda priority of a state needs to be deliberated. This emanates from the points made within the balance of threat theory on the necessity of having a threatening state with aggressive intentions for triggering a balancing behavior. To put it simply, the identification of the most influential actor within proximity can be debated; however, the additional criterion of agenda priority will help us to neglect further subjective discussions because of the simple fact that the most influential actor within the proximity of a state, may depend on the state itself. Thus, the analogous consideration of the aggressive intentions as the most prioritized influential actor within the proximity can prove a more precise focus.

The last issue rests upon the third assumption of the understanding of “institutionalized cooperation in high politics field”. Although, the discussion about cooperation in high politics may be regarded simply on matters concerning national security, the traditional distinction with matters of economics as low politics has been argued to become somewhat obscure in the contemporary literature.87 Norrin Ripsman argues such a division to be artificial and inappropriate within the political realist and neorealist tradition. Rather, the arguments suggest the realist acknowledgement of the complimentary attributes that economic policy has on defense policy. In this fashion, the argument concludes that “the realist hierarchy of issue areas has been greatly exaggerated by the security studies literature to exclude economic matters, which has led to an unwarranted dismissal of the political economy of the national security.”88 To say the least, such an interpretation on explaining efforts of cooperation becomes even more complicated. To illustrate, in the realist tradition an emphasis needs to be

85 Strömvik 2005, p. 142
86 Walt 1987, p. 153
87 Ripsman & Paul 2005, p. 223
88 Ripsman 2006, p. 15
given on the necessity “to distinguish between say, economic policies that are undertaken for their own sake and economic policies that are the instruments of a political policy—a policy, that is whose economic purpose is but the means to the end of controlling policies of another nation.” Hence, as also pointed out within the reformulated definition of effort for cooperation, the forethought of intention proves itself to be essential for any sort of future application. That means, an assumption is needed on the intention of any type of cooperative behavior as means for complementing national security. Supposing that, the intention of economic cooperation is regarded to be complementing the intention of cooperation in high politics field, then, the consideration of efforts for economy based international organizations becomes crucial. The same allegory also applies for efforts on cultural multilateral cooperation mechanisms.

The explanatory power of the balance of influence predictions will be tested in chapter five with the proposition: the Turkish successive efforts for multilateral cooperation should be observable when the desire for influence in the external environment is at a need for balancing. The need should be at its strongest when the most prioritized influential actor in proximity pursues policies which may significantly reduce the influence capabilities of Turkey. This study interprets the most influential actor in the agenda and proximity of Turkey as the European Union. If the explanatory power of the theory is in harmony with the empirical data, we should observe establishment or application of international organizations as an effort of multilateral cooperation following times of considerably differing preferences or clash of interests within the EU-Turkey relations. These occurrences will be considered to have a triggering effect for the Turkish will of multilateral cooperation efforts to gain and secure the ability to influence in its external environment. As with the previous, the material in this chapter will mainly follow Baskın Oran’s “Turkish Foreign Policy 1919-2006” supported by multiple secondary sources.

2.2.4 The questions of congruence, causation, comparison and generalization?

The general aim for tests of congruence in case studies is to establish “harmony” between the relative strength, duration of hypothetical predictions and observed outcomes. The research should address whether the hypothetical causes amplify or diminish the theoretical reasoning through the presentation of congruity in the explanations. Although, providing consistency between theoretical prediction and empirical data often support causal interpretation, a reliable analysis ideally needs to present “safeguards” to deter spuriousness. The aspect of causality with congruence is that even if consistency can be observed between a prediction and a

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89 Morgenthau & Thompson 1985, 36
90 Marini & Burton 1988, p. 369
91 George & Bennet 2005, p. 183
variable through immense numbers of cases, there will not be certainty. The appearance of congruence does not necessarily support causality nor able to deny it. Moreover, a claim of congruence does not presuppose necessity or sufficiency of the predictions.\(^{92}\) Strictly speaking, a discussion about causality in international relations is largely settled on the grounds of the “likelihood” of a theoretical explanation.\(^{93}\) Therefore, the evidence of congruence mostly proves the causality to be rather as “contributing.”\(^{94}\) Even if an outcome is incongruent with the proposed arguments in the future cases, there cannot be denial to the chance of observing an established congruence argument. Here, the advantage of congruence analysis is the inherited vertical and horizontal methodological elements for control against epistemological relativism. The _vertical element for control_ emerges through “deducing specific propositions and concrete predictions from abstract theories; and comparing these deduced expectations with empirical observations."\(^{95}\) After the establishment of congruity with the theory and data, _horizontal element of control_ is secured through the presentation of “higher level of empirical congruence than other theories, that it predicts crucial aspects of the empirical process more correctly than other theories or that it leads to additional causal implications that are empirically corroborated and useful for theory development.”\(^{96}\) There is stronger indication for confidence in the explanations by precisely deducing the implications of general theories.\(^{97}\) Thus, by comparing the two hypotheses within this study and their congruence between the predictions and the data, we may possibly arrive to convincing arguments on whether a set of causal explanation is powerful and valid.

On a final note, ideally a congruence analysis should also identify if there may be other cases which the argued enabling factors give out similar observable implications.\(^{98}\) That is, to see if there can be a possibility of generalization for a divergent numbers of cases. At this instant, it is necessary to point out that the conclusions from this study apply exclusively to the “black-box” of the Turkish foreign policy. The study can only stand as an example for further cross-case comparative studies. To say the least, to conduct such a study few elemental enabling factors need to be taken in to considerations which are not discussed in detail here. For further speculation on these factors an analyst should “immerse himself or herself in the rich details of the historical case being examined.”\(^{99}\) One major example of an enabling factor would be the _belief_ within the importance of Turkey’s geostrategic and geopolitical position in the international system for the cooperation efforts to be taken seriously by the engaged states and actors. Without such leverage, an actor pursuing these efforts possibly would not meet with as

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\(^{92}\) Ibid, p. 186

\(^{93}\) Yin 1984, p. 113

\(^{94}\) George & Bennett 2005, p. 190

\(^{95}\) Blatter 2012, p. 12

\(^{96}\) Ibid.

\(^{97}\) George & Bennett 2005, p. 184, 190

\(^{98}\) Ibid.

\(^{99}\) Ibid.
welcoming answers. Another factor would be the particularity of Turkey’s relations with the EU. While being the only country to be integrated as much without holding the membership of the EU, Turkey is also the champion of the duration of time spent at the door of the waiting room. With such a unique relationship, a possibility for a unique foreign policy behavior is surely significant. A comparable candidate would ideally need to have in common some of the characteristics that are existent in the Turkish example.
3 Twenty-six years of multilateral cooperation efforts

As discussed in the previous chapter, the 1978 *Yearbook of International Organizations* identifies four different categories or types of international organizations. The motivation to choose the *conventional* category emanates from the hope of distinguishing various types of international organizations from the focus. As with many countries, Turkey engages in multifarious cooperation mechanisms which most probably cannot be counted for (or as a result of) the explanations argued within this study. Within the *special* and *minimal information* categories, the reason for exclusion is pretty obvious. As shown on Table 1; the organizations that belong to those categories generally are either inactive at present date or incapable of presenting enough information. On the other hand, exclusion for the international organizations belonging to the category of the *other* is motivated from the exclusive characteristics of the tasks pursued within these organizations. Some examples can be entertained here for easier understanding. One aspect of this category includes the “organizations emanating from places, persons, proprietary products or other bodies.” Organizations like the European Communications Office (ECO),\(^{101}\) the European Mediterranean Plant Protection Organization (EPPO),\(^{102}\) and the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (BIPM)\(^{103}\) or International Transport Workers Federation (ITF)\(^{104}\) fall within this category. Another aspect is the “organizations having a special form, including foundations and funds”. Typically, these are “international banks, courts, training institutes, libraries, laboratories, etc.”\(^{105}\) However, due to their specific tasks, the arguments in this study cannot account (nor have the aspiration) for explaining the efforts spent for these types of organizations, therefore they are not included.

The category of the conventional international organizations is at the most general level specified as bodies that have members in at least three member states and do not pursue their activities in favor of any particular state. Judge’s study sets out various problems on defining set criteria for distinguishing inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations where complications arise from occurrences like “agreements signed on behalf of national government

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\(^{100}\) Judge 1978

\(^{101}\) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011c)

\(^{102}\) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011d)

\(^{103}\) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011e)

\(^{104}\) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011f)

\(^{105}\) Judge 1978
agencies” or “bilaterilization of treaties.”\(^\text{106}\) Therefore, the proposed solution (which is followed by this study) is to “assume that an organization is intergovernmental if it is established by signature of an agreement engendering obligations between governments, whether or not that agreement is eventually published. If any organization declares itself to be non-governmental, it is accepted as such.”\(^\text{107}\)

The list of the engaged international organizations from the official government website presents \textit{seventy-one} candidates in total.\(^\text{108}\) According to the set criteria of time, non-EU country origin and conventional category; eighteen international organizations can be selected for the purposes of this paper. As a whole, the efforts are presented in the following \textit{Figures 1, 2, 3} for clear continuous visualization. The rest of the chapter is devoted for briefly summarizing the initiations and details of these findings.

\(^{106}\) Ibid
\(^{107}\) Ibid
\(^{108}\) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011b)
Figure 1
Figure 2
3.1 The Timeline

The earliest identified organization in the timeline is the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). The initial foundations of the organization began in 1990 with the proposition of former Turkish Ambassador Şükrü Elekdag. The idea was enthusiastically followed by the then Prime Minister Turgut Özal and was concluded with the Bosphorus Statement in Istanbul in 1992. The initiative sets out to be the “most inclusive and comprehensive organization in the wider Black Sea area” with twelve member states. Its sole purpose lied in the establishment of political and economic cooperation among the countries of the Black Sea region to serve as a forum for cooperation in wide ranging issue areas. To add, within the same year, the International Organization of Turkic Culture (TURKSOY) began its foundations in the meetings conducted by the six founding member states of the Turkic world. The efforts were finalized on July 1993 with the agreement on Principles of Activities and Establishment of TURKSOY. The aspired aim was to create a mechanism for cultural cooperation exclusive to the countries with Turkic background. In the past, this was considered to be a somewhat “utopia” due to the attachment of most of the founding countries with the former Soviet Union.

Continuing on, in 1996, two different efforts for multilateral cooperation are identifiable. The first of which is pinpointed in June with the participation of Turkey in the foundation of the Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP). The organization aims to strengthen cooperation in economic, political and security related (fighting organized crime, drug trafficking and etc.) issue areas. Most significantly, the SEECP is the first and the only forum of regional cooperation which was founded and managed by the member states of the region. Although, the initiative was by Bulgaria; a member state of the EU, the organization is counted to fit into the non-EU criteria since Bulgaria was not a member in 1996. The second effort is identified in late 1996 with the initiative of Turkey to establish the Developing Eight (D8). The idea behind the organization was put forward by the then Prime Minister Dr. Necmettin Erbakan during a seminar in Istanbul with the participation of eight predominantly Muslim

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109 Gençkaya 1993, p. 550
110 The Bosphorus Statement 1992
111 BSEC-Organization
112 The term “Turkic” implies the countries with historically Turkic origin. These countries are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkey and Turkmenistan.
113 TURKSOY
114 Ibid.
115 Romania Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010
116 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011g
populated states\textsuperscript{117} stretching from South East Asia to Africa. The efforts were finalized by June 1997 with the Istanbul Declaration,\textsuperscript{118} envisaging a multilateral forum for economic cooperation among its members to strengthen their place in the global economy in a similar fashion of the Group of Eight (G8).

The year 1998 marked the initiation of relations with the continent Africa. Until then, the relations between Turkey and Africa were regarded to be very minimal. However, with the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem’s initiative, Turkey declared the “Africa Action Plan”\textsuperscript{119} for setting up the bases of cooperation between the sides. These efforts later evolved into the setting up of Turkey’s relations with the African Union.\textsuperscript{119} Another important initiative in 1998 was the proposition by Turkey to establish the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR).\textsuperscript{120} The initiative envisioned a joint naval task group not as a military alliance towards other states, but rather as an organization for stimulating naval cooperation among the six Black Sea littoral states.\textsuperscript{121} The significance of the initiative was that Turkey who stood aside with the Western Pact during the Cold War proposed a military cooperation mechanism most significantly with Russia and the other former Soviet Union states. This was a “first” for a NATO country. The last development in 1998 was the Permanent Observer application by Turkey to the Organization of American States (OAS) in September. It is an inter-continental organization including all thirty-five states of the Americas for regional solidarity and cooperation. The application was accepted and granted in the same year leading to the subsequent developments of various cooperation agreements with the organization.\textsuperscript{122}

The year 1999 includes the establishment of Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA). Turkey participated as a founding member which in total involves twenty-four member states in Asia. It is an inter-governmental forum to enhance cooperation by promoting peace, security and stability.\textsuperscript{123} Turkey is considered to be one of the most active members of the organization where its 2010-2012 chairmanship of the organization had been approved to be extended for additional two years by the member states.\textsuperscript{124}

The year 2000 had witnessed an important development in the topic of Black Sea naval cooperation. After the initiative, the littoral states of the Black Sea signed the Letter of Intent for the establishment of BLACKSEAFOR in June,\textsuperscript{125} which led to the final milestone of “The BLACKSEAFOR Establishment Agreement” in April 2001.\textsuperscript{126} The second development of the same year was the announcement of Turkey to be an observer member in the Association of

\textsuperscript{117} D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation 2014
\textsuperscript{118} Istanbul Declaration 1997
\textsuperscript{119} Özkan & Akgün 2010, p. 533
\textsuperscript{120} Turkish Naval Forces 2014
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid
\textsuperscript{122} Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011h
\textsuperscript{123} Secretariat of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia 2008-2013
\textsuperscript{124} Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011i
\textsuperscript{125} Turkish Naval Forces 2014
\textsuperscript{126} Agreement on Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group 2001
Caribbean States (ACS). The organization’s primary aim is to enhance trade and sustainable development among the countries of the Caribbean Basin. As with the OAS, the grant of this observer member status led to further cooperation agreements between the sides. In addition, Turkey actively contributed with increasing financial assistance to the organization in the subsequent years.

After the initiation with Africa in 1998, the continued efforts successfully led Turkey to be able to secure Guest Country status in the African Union by 2002 and finally the Observer Country status by 2005. The strengthened and institutionalized efforts can be accountable for the declaration of Turkey’s “2005 The Year of Africa” in its foreign policy which later led to the “first ever Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit” in 2008, where Turkey became the African Union Strategic Partner.

The timeline identifies the next effort for cooperation in September 2004 when Turkey started initiatives with the Arab League. The organization was created in 1945 with the aim of strengthening the relations between the Arab countries as well as to stimulate bilateral cooperation in economic, cultural and social fields of policy. The initial engagement later evolved to the setting-up of the “Turkish-Arab Cooperation Forum” (TAF) in 2006 and its establishment in November 2007.

In 2005, the relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) were founded by signing of a cooperation agreement in May 2005. The organization is a political and economic union of the states of the Persian Gulf. Subsequent to the initiations, Turkey secured a Strategic Dialogue Partner status in 2008.

In 2007, Turkey initiated efforts to be an observer member in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM); an organization for economic integration among the Caribbean nations. The process has not been finalized yet. However, subsequent meetings and financial contributions to the organization by Turkey are observable. The same year also includes the first application for Guest Member status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Although the responses were regarded not to be much favorable, the application was repeated in 2009 and 2010 which finally led to the application as Dialogue Partnership status in 2011.

In 2008, Turkey initiated efforts for signing framework cooperation agreements with the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) which is an...
economic and political bloc promoting free trade among its members in South America. The bloc is a constituent of the integration of the region under the Union of South American Nations (USAN) umbrella. Consequently, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) establishing a political consultation and cooperation mechanism between the sides was signed in 2010.139

The year 2009 witnessed the creation of the Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States (Turkic Council) with Turkey being the host country. Through the development of successive historical summits spanning from 1992,140 the final decision to create a comprehensive inter-governmental political cooperation organization was accepted by Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.141 The organization also granted open membership to the other Turkic States.142

The following year, in 2010, Turkey became a signatory of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in SouthEast Asia (TAC). Thus, established the foundations for sectorial cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN);143 an international organization for economic and political cooperation between ten countries.144

In 2011, Turkey applied for observer membership in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The organization is composed of eight South Asian states for geopolitical and economic cooperation. Turkey stated that the application was necessary upon the growing connections with the region and the member states over the years. The application is still under process as of 2014.145

This brings us to the last year of the timeline. An important development in 2013 was the signing of the Dialogue Partnership Status with the SCO, making Turkey the first NATO member state ever to have ties with the organization.146 Finally, the last identified development is the application by Turkey to the Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) upon its invitation. The organization aims at enhancing political dialogue and economic cooperation in the Asian continent. The membership agreement was signed in September within the same year.147

3.1.1 Diversity and Intensity

The overall image presents a possibility for highlighting diversity on the intensity of efforts through different periods. The possibility to distinguish periods of high and low intensity concerning efforts for multilateral cooperation will give us the

139 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011
140 Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States 2011
141 Nakhchivan Agreement 2009
142 Ibid, Article 22
143 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011p
144 The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) 1967
145 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011r
146 Kucera 2013
147 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013
ability to contrast the two theoretical frameworks to see if there may be possible explanations for these occurrences. In Figures 4, 5 and 6, these intensities are highlighted. Judging from the empirical data, a possibility exists for interpretation through two perspectives. The total number of events and the total number of engagements concerning new actors through our timeline presents the period of 1987-1991 with relatively low observable efforts followed by a relative increase in the intensity after 1992 up until 1995. The charts present a significant spike in the efforts within the years of 1996-2001 followed by a relative decrease up until 2006. Although there are observable efforts within this period, however, from 2007 onwards; another significant spike and piling up in the efforts can be identified. This may not necessarily mean the previous 2002-2006 period had low intensity of efforts however it does certainly mean a decrease in relative terms. The following chapters will be dedicated for contrasting the different theoretical predictions according to these overall findings.

Figure 4:

![Total Number of Events and Number of New Engagements](image)

Figure 5:

![Total Number of Events](image)

Figure 6:

![Number of New Engagements](image)
4 Balancing a Security Threat?

The driving forces behind Turkey’s foreign policy emanating from external stimuli can be emphasized as a well-known standpoint. Ahmet Davutoğlu elaborated on this fact by highlighting the strengths of Turkey’s foreign policy as reflecting on “historical depth” with the consideration of geographical positioning. Furthermore, Davutoğlu’s description involved an understanding on the flow of history where an inability to read rationally the “long-term historical trends and an understanding of where we are situated in the greater trajectory of world history” would lead to greater consequences to pay. Therefore, self-reflection is understood to be crucial in terms of acquiring the revisions to be made on Turkey’s position in times of necessity.

This way of interpreting the driving forces inevitably leads to questions of what kind of historical trends or self-reflection in regards to whom that Turkey positions itself in its foreign policy? Simply then, the actual question should be: what kind of external stimuli drives Turkey’s foreign policy?

4.1 The Balance of Threat Argument in a nutshell

For the students of the realist tradition, an observation of cooperation between states most often imply that a balancing situation may be taking place as weaker actors attempt to alter the power ratios with regards to the powerful actors. As discussed in chapter two, the general balance of power propositions assume the constant need for security in the anarchic international system where an increase in power is necessary for increasing security. Therefore, an observance of cooperation is an indication for attempting a change in power. Building upon this base line, the balance of threat argument differentiates on its reasoning for causation on why such a balancing behavior takes place as well as the means to exert such behavior. First, the rising power needs to have aggressive intentions for triggering a balancing behavior and that such a balancing act can be through political cooperation as well as military. The concept of aggressive intentions for simplicity can be summarized as “expansionist ambitions.” In addition,
within the concept of a “threatening state”, variables like “aggregate power” where the total resources of a state as well as its ability to direct this aggregate power at an acceptable cost as an offensive power against other states, need to be considered.\textsuperscript{153} Lastly, the importance of the geographic proximity is emphasized due to the converse parallel between distance and power projection.

With these aspects in mind, it can be claimed that an observation on efforts for cooperation may have been triggered by changes in the perception of a threat facing the national security. The changes in a “major power’s resources, its offensive capabilities, or its geographical proximity may affect the perceived need for balancing.”\textsuperscript{154}

4.1.1 The need to balance USSR/Russia and the expected empirical development

The discussion of cooperation against the USSR/Russia is a rather familiar one in Turkey’s foreign policy. The antagonist relations throughout their historical span of 500 years with “economic, political, historic and cultural bearings have impacted each other, and the other countries and communities with which they entered into relations.”\textsuperscript{155} Especially, the arguments discussing causation for Turkey’s cooperation efforts during the period of 1991 to 2001 tend to commonly refer to the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of new Turkic Republics in Central Asia. These types of arguments develop on the new horizon of opportunities for cooperation which Turkey had encountered for altering or filling the vacuum left of the Russian dominance in the region.\textsuperscript{156} This is not surprising considering Prime Minister Özal’s opinions on USSR’s collapse in 1991, as an important opportunity to apprehend leadership for the first time in 400 years, which the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TGNA) must not miss.\textsuperscript{157} Conformably, the Economist’s controversial review of “Turkic world from Adriatic Sea to the Chinese Wall” became highly popular amongst the researchers and the officials at the time.\textsuperscript{158} This development inevitably resulted in a strained relationship with the displeased heir Russia.\textsuperscript{159} Thereby, in order to establish a somewhat balance and deter Russia from possible future threats, Turkey found itself a part in a new “Great Game” for power in Central Asia.\textsuperscript{160} Accordingly, in periods where an assertive Russian foreign policy and mutual confrontations are identifiable, an increase in the efforts could be justified. Perhaps, the

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid, p. 22,24
\textsuperscript{154} Strömvik 2005, p. 122
\textsuperscript{155} Özbay 2011, p. 69
\textsuperscript{156} Yanik 2007, p. 351; Aydin 2010, p. 756; Fidan 2010, p. 110; G. Özkan 2010, p. 121; Kardaş 2012, p. 82, Weitz 2010, p. 62
\textsuperscript{157} The Grand National Assembly of Turkey 1991, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{158} Aydin 2010, p. 756; Winrow 1996, p. 136
\textsuperscript{159} Yanik 2007, p. 351
\textsuperscript{160} Edwards 2003, p. 86; Shams-Ud-Din 1997, p. 333; Aydin 2010, p. 763; Yanik 2007, p. 353
repercussions from this power struggle are accountable for explaining the foreign policy behavior of Turkey after all?

4.2 The Impact of Soviet Union and Russia

The 1987 decision to apply for full membership into the European Union took place at a point where “change” could have been one of the primary labels which described the developments in the new world order. The events which lead to the expiration of the USSR from the political arena were inevitably going to have repercussions among the political strategists of Turkey’s foreign policy. Highlighting and reflecting upon the structural changes that took place between the sides may give light to the needed insights.

4.2.1 The period for “change” 1987-1991

Arguably, after the period of stagnant relations in early 1980s due to the military coop taking place in Turkey, the bilateral relations witnessed a new opening in the second half of the decade. Turkey was going through a grand phase of economic restructuring from the import-substitution lead policies to the export-led growth. Meanwhile, the USSR was introducing the new comprehensive restructuring guidelines of perestroika for economic and foreign policy in 1985. Partly owing to these grand changes within the internal propellants of the sides, the introduction of new bilateral cooperation arrangements witnessed many “firsts” in regards to economic and political relations. The year 1987 was the agreed commencement for the Natural Gas Agreement which was signed back in 1984. Its significance was that Turkey had agreed to buy 120 million cubic meters of gas for the duration of twenty-five years from the USSR. In exchange, the USSR agreed on spending 70% of the earned foreign exchange from these sales on Turkish goods and services. It was regarded as a chance to enter the Russian market for the first time before the collapse of the Berlin Wall which was a breakthrough for Turkey. Although the ability to diversify the energy sources with the other block can be regarded as a substantial political development in itself, the exported products from Russia also radically increased from 25% to 70% within the period of 1986 to 1991. Furthermore, in 1989, the Agreement on Border and Coastal Trade was signed which stimulated the economic development in the bordering regions.

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161 Tellal 2010a, p. 619
162 Hoekman & Togan 2005, p. 210
163 Ozertem 2011
164 Tellal 2010a, p. 620
165 Ibid.
Following the rapid improvements in bilateral economic cooperation, the political relationship also began to see an unprecedented rise. The period of 1986 to 1990 was the agreed outset of the Agreement for the Exchange of Goods and the Cultural and Scientific Exchange Program by the bilateral visits of 1984. In addition, in 1988, few important developments took place. The decision of the USSR to give up on the demand of solving the Cyprus conflict through international conference and the removal of the SS-20 missiles located in Kapustin region near Turkey, resulted with the opening of the Sarp border passage. Moreover, with the signing of a protocol, the twenty year old Flight Information Region (FIR) line was changed, resulting with an answer to the problem of movement of a political refuge in the Turkish embassy in Moscow. Lastly, the years 1989-1990 witnessed the negotiations for the limitation of conventional forces in Europe. Its critical importance was the consent of the USSR on excluding the southeastern region of Turkey for limiting the number of forces from the agreement.

In regards to the general structure of the relations, the period was undeniably positive bilaterally due to the increased nature of economic and political cooperation. This was supported especially with the advantageous developments for Turkey concerning the surrounding military status quo. Thus, for the arguments of a threat for Turkey, the pre-collapse period of the USSR could only be labeled as a diminishing one. This is identifiable at the time of the 1990 Russian intervention in Azerbaijan. The initial official level response was to consider it as an “internal” problem of the USSR which Turkey was not a side of even with the highly negative internal public reaction. As for the timeline, the diminishing Soviet threat before its collapse then may be regarded accountable for explaining the observable low intensity of efforts for multilateral cooperation in this period.

4.2.2 “Turkic world from the Adriatic Sea to the Chinese Wall” 1992-1995

After the drastic developments of 1991, the establishment of the new world order brought about many unexpected results to the relations. The new independent states in Central Asia as well as the internal turmoil of the USSR steadily created an impact where the bilateral relations were moving towards a period of “uncertainty.” Without much resistance to the pressure by the public and the press for apprehending the responsibilities in the region, Turkey completely delineated the Moscow focus to the new successor states by the end of 1991.

\[166\] Ibid, p. 621
\[167\] Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1990, Article II, Point 1 (B)
\[168\] Aydin 2010, p. 753
\[169\] Ibid, p. 751
\[170\] Ibid, p. 754
During the Cold War, the security and foreign policy of Turkey was based on the strategic importance it associated to the Western allies. However, while the conclusion of the Cold War may have meant a more secure environment for the Europeans, Turkey was faced with an emerging turbulent environment of regional conflicts on all frontiers which created the perception of threat. Further complications derived from the fear of abandonment by the Western Allies which “shook Turkey’s security policies to the core and led to an urgent reappraisal of possible threats to its security in the post-Cold War era.” This meant an active engagement with the region for eliminating Russian dominance in its own favor. The declaration of Azerbaijan’s independence on October 1991 could be regarded as one of the early signals for the traits of this period. By not declining the request, Turkey became the first country recognizing Azerbaijan. However, cautious steps were taken on not recognizing other declarations until the agreement on Minsk for establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). After the agreement clearly concluding the USSR, Turkey took the first spot in the list of recognition for all the fifteen newly independent states.

By 1992, through the initiative of Turkey, the first “Summit of Head of States of Turkish Speaking Countries” was conducted with the opening speech of the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel on the “creation of a Turkic World from Adriatic Sea to Chinese Wall.” Further advice was given on leaving the Soviet currency and the Russian alphabet as well as propositions on military aid and construction of pipelines by Demirel. These statements started to alarm the Russian officials who were especially antagonized to see attempts on the future routes of oil and gas pipelines. The unwelcoming reply from Russia disapproved such meetings on the basis of ethnicity and labeled them as an expression of “militant nationalism” which Demirel responded as the right of free will of the CIS leaders.

Meanwhile, the dissolution of the USSR already had elevated the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh into full scale warfare. The initial neutral stance back in 1990s disappeared and together with the support of public, Turkey was officially the only country from the beginning supporting Azerbaijan. The TGNA started to discuss the need for direct military intervention with full support from all the parties especially after the Khojaly Massacre by the Armenian and CIS forces taking place in 1992. However, by

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171 Ibid, p. 756
172 Ibid, p. 752
173 Ibid, p. 755
174 German 2012, p. 222
175 Aydin 1996, p. 163
176 Peimani 1998, p. 50
177 Aydin 1996, p. 163
178 Aydin 2010, p. 759
179 Yanik 2007, p. 353
180 Aydin 2010, p. 766
181 Cornell 1998, p. 51
182 Cornell 1998, p. 60; Aydin 2010, 768
late 1992, Armenia had agreed to sign an arrangement with Russia giving the permission for Russian military bases and deployment of troops near Turkey’s borders. After the intensification of public outcry and discussions for military intervention, a serious warning from Russia came through the General of CIS Armed Forces Yevgeny Shaposhnikov’s statement on the possibility of a Turkish intervention in the conflict to “lead to the third world war.” Being aware of the risk of direct confrontation with Russia and low support from the NATO, cautious steps were taken. One example is the rejection of the request by Azerbaijan to Turkey for sending helicopters to evacuate civilians. Nevertheless, the Armenian occupation of Kelbedjer in 1993 elevated the official state level responses even so far as President Özal’s daring statement; “what if some bombs fell on the Armenian side of the border in the course of military exercises in the region?” The tension did not seem to decrease after the death of Özal within the same year. His successor, Tansu Çiller announced ambition for authorization of the TGNA for declaring war if Armenia was to invade Nakhchevan and violate the Kars Treaty signed in 1921. Turkey is a side of the peace treaty which marks the borders in the Caucasus region. The ultimatum was due because of further suspicions on an invasion by Armenia to Nakhchevan over the course of the conflict. As Turkey was unable to resist its public sentiment and began to adopt the situation as a matter of national security with Russia on full support with Armenia, the question of danger for Turkey can be said to become an unfortunate reality.

The relations were further deteriorated when Turkey accepted a visit by the Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev who was fighting for independence with Russia in 1993. The meeting resulted with the summoning of the Turkish ambassador in Moscow for asking Turkey to not to take part in this question. Chechens had gained substantial support by the Turkish public even so far as volunteers for fighting their cause in the region. The main partial reason for this emanated from the religious communality of Islam. Russia accused Turkey for turning a blind eye on these developments and interpreted these acts as support. At the same time, the party of the Kurdish separatist movement (PKK) in Turkey was gaining support in Moscow which was an indication of the answer of Russia.

The second Turkic Summit was scheduled to take place in 1994. By then, the opposition of Russia on these meetings became visible among the participants. Under the request of Yeltsin, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan requested a

183 Collective Security Treaty 1992
184 Hale 2000, p. 212; Aydin 2010, p. 774
185 Souleimanov 2011, p. 6; Aydin 2010, p. 768
186 Cornell 1998, p. 63
187 Aydin 2010, p. 774
188 Aydin 2010, p. 774; Yanik 2007, p. 355
189 Winrow, 1995, p. 43; Aydin 2010p. 782
190 Olson 1998, p. 217; Yanik 2007, p. 355
postponement for the Turkic Summit.\textsuperscript{192} By 1995, The Kurdish Parliament in exile had conducted its third meeting in Moscow with the support of the Russian Duma.\textsuperscript{193} With the introduction of the “Kurdish card”\textsuperscript{194} “Turkey was highly alarmed about Russia’s intentions in the region” which inflated the need to deterrence in the interest of Ankara.\textsuperscript{195}

As for visible effects on the timeline, the number of new engagements and the number of events were increased implying harmony with the theoretical predictions. However, there can be two different possible conclusions from these findings, both of which will not present strong arguments for congruence. First and foremost, in the period of 1992-1995, the focus was directed upon multilateral engagements with most significantly Russia as well as the successor states which could be interpreted rather as a step-up policy. A supporting bilateral example would be the 1993 comprehensive arms sale of armored vehicles, helicopters and conventional weapons from Russia to Turkey, which was a first for a NATO country.\textsuperscript{196} Clearly, this would not be the prediction of a policy development by the balance of threat proposition. Secondly, with arguably the worst period of bilateral relations within this study, the identified activeness of Turkey’s foreign policy seems relatively low with no significant spikes which become clearer when observed with the following period. Thus, with diverging results; this period is at best inconclusive to show harmony with the predictions.

4.2.3 Normalization 1996-2001

The period of 1996 to 2001 initially began with political repercussions stemming from the previous tensions. In 1996, the treaty for limiting the number of conventional forces in the Caucasus was revised upon the rejection of Russia where the Turkish position was disregarded by the compromise with the West.\textsuperscript{197} Thus, the military presences around Turkey’s borders reappeared which subsequently altered the military balance of the region in 1997 “creating a new source of tension in Turkish-Armenian relations.”\textsuperscript{198} Additionally, the sale of S-300 missiles by Russia to Cyprus received highly distressing responses for its potential to alter the Turkish military balance on the island.\textsuperscript{199} The following year, in 1998, the tensions were elevated with the leader of the PKK refuge in Russia where the Russian Duma appealed for the cause.\textsuperscript{200}

\textsuperscript{192} Aydin 2010, p. 765
\textsuperscript{193} Olson 1998, p. 214
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid, p. 212
\textsuperscript{195} Aydin 2010, p. 782
\textsuperscript{196} Yanik 2007, p. 356
\textsuperscript{197} Olson 1998, 216; Aydin 2010, p. 782
\textsuperscript{198} Aydin 2010, p. 775
\textsuperscript{199} Yanik 2007, p. 356; Tellal 2010b, p. 852
\textsuperscript{200} Yanik, 2007, p. 354; Tellal 2010b, p. 853
Meanwhile, as with Azerbaijan, Turkey was intensifying cooperation with Georgia. However, the pro-Turkish president of Azerbaijan’s Abulfaz Elchibey was removed from office to the ex-KGB agent and a representative of the pro-Russian faction Heydar Aliyev in 1993 which Turkey had felt great resent. Similar internal rivalries were also taking place in Georgia. The support of the Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze for oil pipelines to go through Turkey was antagonist to the Russian demands. After surviving an assassination attempt in 1995 and a military uprising in 1998, Shevardnadze blamed the involvement of Russia for supporting the perpetrators. To support Georgia on stabilizing national security, Turkey undertook military cooperation and aid arrangements in 1997. A strategic partnership was concluded in 2000 for granting permission to the Turkish Air Force to use air bases in Georgia.

Nonetheless, the relations within this period could be argued an improvement bilaterally. The missile crisis in Cyprus was calmed down with the installation to Greece and the Duma’s request for the Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan was rejected. The Turkish stance on the second Chechen War in this period also differed in contrast to the first with the coinciding high level visit of Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit in Moscow resulting with a joint declaration on combatting terrorism in 1999. The political high level visits were joined by military cooperation with the initiative of Turkey to create the collective joint naval task force BLACKSEAFOR, marking a first time for Turkey to be in a joint contingent with Russia as well as a first time for a NATO country. An agreement for building a pipeline for gas (The Blue Stream Pipeline) was signed in 1997 envisaging an annual purchase of 16 million cubic meters for twenty-five years. In economic terms, the Turkish trade was sticking to the Russian market even after the difficulties of 1998.

As shown on the timeline and the intensity trends, the period witnessed the second highest observation of efforts covered within this study. Hypothetically speaking, notwithstanding the efforts for bilateral cooperation arrangements, if the identified tensions were to be accounted for Turkey’s increase in efforts then, the argument would be weak to explain mutual multilateral cooperation in terms of military within this period. On the other hand, if the interpretation was based on diminishing threat, then, the same weakness would apply to explaining the abundance of observable efforts. Therefore, this period can only be claimed contradictory with the theoretical predictions.

201 Cornell 1998, p. 51; Winrow 1996, p. 132
202 Aydin 2010, 780
203 Ibid, 779
205 Weitz 2010, p. 62
206 Aktürk 2006, p. 345
207 Ibid.
208 Tellal 2010b, p. 855
209 Weitz 2010, p. 62
4.2.4 Substitution of power struggle with cooperation 2002-2006

Naming the tension driven relations of the previous decade as “lost years” in the bilateral relations of Turkey and Russia can be eminently justifiable.\textsuperscript{210} On the contrary, the new millennium brought about diverging improvements. As mentioned in chapter one, a new understanding of foreign policy implementation in Turkey had been argued to come forth after 2002. In regards to relations with Russia, these developments could be addressed with two significant examples in this period. The first would be the stance of Turkey on the American operation in Iraq. After heated debates on whether to open a frontier for deployment of American troops in Turkey, on the infamous 1\textsuperscript{st} of March 2003 voting, the TGNA declined the implementation of such a decision.\textsuperscript{211} This remarkable development was speculated as a possible indication for the “departure from the traditional Western-oriented Turkish foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{212} In parallel, Russia was also opposing such an intervention and showed appreciation to the result. Vladimir Putin enthusiastically claimed the crucial rejection of the decision as the “event of the week.”\textsuperscript{213}

The second example would be the amount of bilateral high level visits that took place during this period. In 2004, as an exception, the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül was received at the level of “Prime Minister”. In the following year alone, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Putin met four times which was regarded as an “\textit{annis mirabilis} (‘exceptional year’).”\textsuperscript{214} Within the same year, Putin joined the inauguration of the Blue Stream Pipeline and in 2006 the first presidential visit since the founding of the Russian Federation took place.\textsuperscript{215} Notwithstanding minor hiccups like the Russian veto in the UN Security Council call for the end of the seclusion of the Turkish Cypriots in 2004,\textsuperscript{216} this period has been generally described as a major development in bilateral relations with the political rivalry turning into cooperation.\textsuperscript{217}

In comparison with the previous observations, this period with diminishing rivalry and assertiveness in the relations also presents a significant decrease in the efforts for multilateral cooperation. Although, a contradictory unsupportive argument can be made on the intensity of efforts within this term piling up around the 2004-2005 \textit{annis mirabilis}, when handled in the general comprehensive scheme, the balance of threat predictions seems to show congruence with the empirical results.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{210} Özbay 2011, p. 70
\bibitem{211} Kaya 2011, 69
\bibitem{212} Özdamar & Taydaş 2013, p. 217
\bibitem{213} Radikal 2003; Özbay, 2011, p. 81
\bibitem{214} Özbay, 2011, p. 76
\bibitem{215} Ibid, p. 77
\bibitem{216} Ibid, p. 85
\bibitem{217} Flanagan 2013, p. 166
\end{thebibliography}
4.2.5 Moving into a new stage in relations and beyond 2007-2013

The previously improving bilateral relations had begun to bear their fruits in this period. In order to put it into context, by 2008, “Turkey imported 65 percent (22 million cubic meters) of its natural gas and 25 percent (8 million tons) of its oil from Russian sources” and concluded “59 construction projects worth USD 3.6 billion in Russia in 2007… [in which the] construction sector was involved in 20 billion USD worth business in 2008.” The assertive Russian rhetoric could be argued non-existent and bilateral cooperation was enhancing in other areas than just economic and military. The year 2007 was named the “Russia Year” in Turkey and vice versa 2008 was named the “Turkey Year” in Russia which contributed to the establishment of the “Russian-Turkish Societal Forum” during President Medvedev’s visit in 2010. The improving relations can also be observed on the increase of universities teaching Russian in Turkey, where the numbers saw an escalation from only five universities in 2000 to seventeen in 2011. In addition, the negotiated “steps towards the visa exemption were in effect realized, and it was declared that the visas would be removed in April 2011.” Most spectacularly, the discussions on the relations began to center around the possibility of a “strategic partnership” in which Turkey arguably showed clear perseverance with its successive requests to be an observer member in the SCO. As such, one of the most remarkable milestones on this aim would be the signing of the “Dialogue Partnership” within the SCO in 2012. It should be noted that even with such promising relations, significant obstacles have faced the bilateral relations. The stance of Turkey on the Syria crisis since 2011 and the stance of Russia on the decision for a NATO missile defense system in Turkey since 2010, created the most current discontents. Nevertheless, unlike the previous periods, the criticism of Russia was careful on not to harm the ongoing strategic interests between the sides.

In contrast, this last section of the Turkish-Russian relations coincides with the second biggest spike in Turkey’s efforts for diversifying and increasing the number of multilateral cooperation mechanisms. Clearly, congruence cannot be established between the balance of threat propositions and the empirical observation within this period.

4.2.6 The feasibility of the balance of threat argument

To sum up, the findings of this chapter demonstrate that the changes in the perception of a threat from Russia are not in congruence with the developments in

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Kanbolat 2009
\item Aras 2008, p. 7
\item Özbay, 2011, p. 80
\item Ibid, p. 78
\item Guner 2010
\item Erşen 2013, p. 50
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Turkey’s efforts. The analysis presents the argument to be coinciding with the empirical development only twice in connection with the pre-dissolution period of the USSR and the improved relations in 2002-2006. Interestingly, with the most significant tensions in the relations in the 1992-1995 period, the observable outcome suggests a rather escalation in the Turkish cooperation efforts towards Russia which would not be an anticipated prediction for balancing behavior. Moreover, the two highest spikes of the efforts highlighted in the timeline coincide with the periods of improving relations and deepening cooperation between the sides. At this instance, an argument can be made on whether Russia was actually perceived as a threat after 2000s, thereby weaken the relevance of the findings. However, the plans for the reconsideration of Russia’s status as a threat factor in Turkey’s National Security Policy document (the infamous “red book”), was only very recently in 2010 which principally suggest otherwise. Thus, it is possible to claim that the balance of threat arguments cannot by itself present satisfactory harmony to explain the empirical development. The findings would in fact suggest an opposite where there is lesser threat from Russia the efforts for cooperation intensified. The next chapter will seek to find if there may be better suited explanations for this occurrence.

224 Hurriyet Daily News 2010; Voice of Russia 2010
5 Balancing Influence?

The second proposition is the third conception of power: power as control over events and outcomes. Looking at the international order under the perspective of power as the ability to influence events can be regarded as an “overlooked” argument. In terms of theory development, the study of Maria Strömvik in “To Act as a Union” is the most scrutinized version yet that this study is aware of. Therefore, the insights that will be developed here will be contributing to the skeleton of that balance of influence framework for future adaptability and calibration.

5.1 The Balance of Influence Argument in a nutshell

As pointed out, states seek out to maximize their influence capabilities in the hope for gaining power. To add, the second assumption, then, would be upon considering the effort for cooperation as the result of a balancing strategy which is endeavored in relation to the most prioritized influential actor in proximity. Lastly, effort for institutionalized multilateral cooperation is assumed to be intentionally necessary for the future influence capability. A state may well spend effort for institutionalized multilateral cooperation in different fields with the intention of possible infrastructure for future cooperation in high politics field for securing influence capabilities. Thereby, an effort for multilateral cooperation is proposed to happen when an actor intentionally considers the benefits of influence gains as higher than the hindrance of autonomy losses. This pressure for an effort rises when the most prioritized influential actor in proximity poses disagreements that potentially will damage the self-influential capabilities and thereby the power of the state. Thus, the need for an effort in multilateral cooperation mechanisms will emerge in order to balance the possible future incapability. Conversely, if the most prioritized influential actor in proximity pursues strategies that fall in line with the balancing state, the need to cooperate, thereby, the need to influence would be lower. To highlight, this need to balance “may equally materialize among the closest of allies”, where there are disagreements in the context of security.

225 Strömvik 2005, p. 142
226 Ibid, 143
5.1.1 The need to balance the EU influence and the expected empirical development

The Turkish case with the candidacy can argued to be one of a kind in the history of the EU, largely owing to Turkey’s “longest waiting applicant” title. It may be ironic to suggest that a country, who persistently seeks to become part of the EU, pursues strategies to balance its influence in the external environment. However, when one looks into the details of this interesting relationship, significant features answer this dilemma. At this point, basic facts will be helpful to understand briefly why this argument may not be ironic at all. Turkey is part of the Customs Union as envisioned for the possibility of full membership. Not surprisingly, the top trading partner is the EU, taking up 37% of Turkey’s total trade with the world. In contrast, Turkey holds only 3.7% within the EU’s total trade. The biggest foreign direct investment (FDI) to Turkey comes from the EU, with 70% of the total FDI. Thus, in terms of economics, Turkey is highly dependent on the EU. In terms of security, Turkey was part of the Western European Union (WEU) and one of the early contributors to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with extensive input regarding aerial support in the military operations. In total, Turkey participated in seven EU missions especially within regions where a substantial historical Turkish interest exists. The contributions in these frameworks also partly emanated from the candidate status. To put it simply, the possibility of a negative result in the candidacy bears a significant possible impact for the status-quo of Turkey’s many current alignments. Such an impact would undeniably affect influence capabilities mainly considering Turkey’s relative lack of independent relations with the rest of its external environment. Notwithstanding the likelihood of such a result, rationally, a country who seeks to lay out its foreign policy aims on the grounds of global influence should at least be expected to consider the slightest possibility of capability degradation emerging from its contemporary positioning.

This discussion on the need to balance the EU for securing influence capabilities can often be implicitly identifiable among the Turkey-EU relations analyses. The arguments generally touch upon Turkey’s specific cooperation engagements with its external environment as a somewhat result of different disappointments in the bilateral relations. Thus, to present a congruent balance of influence argument, the empirical developments should be expected to observe an increase in the efforts of multilateral cooperation following the times of disunity in Turkey-EU relations, especially during periods of significant threats to

227 Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey 1963, Art. 2.
228 DG for Trade (2014)
229 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011s
230 Blockmans 2010, p. 16
231 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011s
232 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2011t
233 For example see, Gürsel 2013
the candidacy. Conversely, the efforts should be expected to decrease when the process witnesses significant positive developments.

5.2 The History of the EU-Turkey Disunity

At this instant, it is necessary to announce a brief disclaimer. The following presentation of disagreements and disappointments in the bilateral relations of the sides emanate from the need to test the theoretical predictions. Therefore, the incidents that are highlighted here do not intend to display an image of constant conflict based relationship but rather demonstrate a selective story.

5.2.1 The initiation of hope and the first disappointment 1987-1991

The membership application coincided with a period of growing relations with the EU (European Communities at the time) which was partly due to the post-coup structuring in Turkey starting from 1983. While the application could be regarded untimely, nevertheless, the then Prime Minister Özal decided to go through with the decision and structured the application on important initial elements.

First, Turkey decided to grant its citizens the right of personal application at the European Commission on Human Rights in the early stages of 1987 which earned a lot of credit by the European Communities (EC). Secondly, by 1988, the Greek request to change the 1964 decree on forbidding the sale of Greek properties in Turkey was accepted. This second move was greatly appreciated by Greece which in turn approved the signing of the adjustment and supplementary protocol of Turkey’s Ankara Agreement prior the meetings of the Council of Association (CoA) in the same year. The positive developments in the bilateral relations with Greece were most often regarded essential for the accession by Özal who continued with an additional high level visit to Athens in 1988. Thirdly, further demands on the debated free circulation of Turkish workers in Europe were decided to be dropped.

After the application, the Turkish government intensified its efforts for an early consent by the EC through subsequent visits to Bonn, London and Paris. Unfortunately, the first disappointment came through Commission’s 1988 decision to not to admit a new member for enlargement before 1992. The Turkish reaction could be regarded as “sharp disappointment” with official statements suggesting a change of focus in the foreign policy towards east.

234 Erhan & Arat 2010, p. 573
235 Ibid, p. 578
236 Ibid.
237 Ibid.
Moreover, if Turkey was to be declined, a shift towards an Islamic Union was brought up by the then President Kenan Evren and even a possibility of revision on the status of Turkey’s NATO membership became vocal.238 As far as the EC was concerned, the decision was unchangeable which consisted of forethought of its own future agenda and Turkey’s unlikelihood for meeting the criteria in the short-term.239 By late 1989, the Commission’s opinion was submitted recommending a suspension of the application. The document also included a “Cooperation Program” which was envisioning the handling of Turkey’s application through an initial establishment of a Customs Union which was approved by the Council of Ministers by early 1990.240 To curb the negative domestic reaction, the Turkish government appreciated the program for the continuation of accession.241

Nonetheless, this period also witnessed the beginnings of discussions which were going to create significant problems for Turkey in the unforeseen future. The European Parliament (EP) increasingly voiced criticisms on Turkey’s internal problems. The Kurdish minorities started to take considerable attention in the agenda of the EC as the number of human rights violations in Turkey grew through 1988 and 1989.242 In addition, Cyprus243 submitted its own application for accession in mid-1990 and was found admissible, creating greater frustration to Turkey’s objections.244 Lastly, the positive developments with Greece marooned uncompleted by 1989 as the year witnessed a government change after Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou lost the elections.

This period with the hopeful initiation of application and focus in the EC coincides with a low observation of efforts for multilateral cooperation in Turkey’s foreign policy. Moreover, the first initiation of establishing a multilateral cooperation organization surrounding the Black Sea area started to take root in 1990 following the first disappointments within the process which was speculated as a mere retaliation to these negative developments.245 Considering the period consisted of developments on the initiation of the application, it would not be feasible to classify simply as positive or negative. However, the observation of the first effort in the timeline being in correlation with the first disappointments may at least suggest that there is no contradiction but rather harmony with the theoretical predictions.

238 Ibid.
239 Bac 2002, p. 80
240 Commission of the European Communities 1989, Art. 1
241 Baykal & Arat 2010, p. 726
242 Akpınar 2010, p. 643
243 Turkey does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and treats the northern part as a different independent state under the name of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).
244 Yesilada & Sozen 2002, p. 263
245 Akgün 2009, p. 26
5.2.2 The change of dynamics and focus 1992-1995

The year 1992 was significant for Turkey’s accession hopes as much as it was significant for the EU’s own agenda. The signing of the Maastricht Treaty was one of the most crucial events for the bilateral relations within this period. For Turkey, the treaty had two important outcomes. Firstly, the Article 257 of the Rome Treaty was amended to “All European States may apply for membership in the Union” which created concerns for Turkey as the definition did not give a clear scope.246 Secondly, the WEU was incorporated as the implementing institution of the new CFSP which gave Turkey an associate member status due to its NATO membership. Although taking part in Europe’s security and defense structures was at the upmost importance for Turkey,247 the exclusion of associate members in most of the decision making procedures created yet another disappointment.248 Later that year, the Lisbon Summit declared the initiation of accession talks with the EFTA countries and concluded “no further accessions talks” regarding other candidates.249 In addition, the news from the EP kept on coming with more criticisms as Turkey’s record on human rights worsened. An example would be the adoption of a resolution on the Rights of Kurdish People by the EP in June.250 On a positive note for this year, the Vice President of the Commission Martin Borgemann initiated the working program which presented the eagerness of the EU to continue the Customs Union process that led to its first committee meeting on December.251

The following year, 1993, witnessed the Copenhagen Summit which included a statement reiterating the priority of the CU process for Turkey while announcing the Central and Eastern European countries for future full membership.252 These developments for the first time indicated that Turkey had lost its privileged status of the associate membership as the EU was shifting its enlargement focus. As Turkey was falling behind from the rest of the enlargement goals, the CU process marked the establishment of its Steering Committee and agreement on the subjects by the CoA at the end of 1993.253 Another indirect development was the signing of a Common Defense Doctrine between Cyprus and Greece which Turkey and TRNC answered with a similar alignment the following year.254

In the year 1994, the Essen Summit announced that Cyprus would be among the next round of enlargement without any mentioning of Turkey.255 Furthermore, the EP adopted another resolution for the suspension of the scheduled CoA

246 Baykal & Arat 2010, p. 727
247 Demiralp 2003
248 Baykal & Arat 2010, p. 727
249 The European Council 1992, p. 7
250 Lecha 2005, chp. 4
251 Baykal & Arat 2010, p. 730
252 The European Council 1993, p. 12
253 DPT 2001, p. 189
254 Firat 2010, p. 803
255 The European Council 1994, p. 14
meetings. The main reason was the ongoing closure trial of the Kurdish dominated political party in the TGNA which indeed led to postponement of the meetings until early 1995.

The last year within this period, 1995, witnessed the adoption of the CU decision which was declared at the rescheduled meeting in March. Unfortunately, when the CoA gave consent on Turkey for meeting the required conditions, the EP opposed again by arguing on the human rights violations and put the decision up to a vote. At the end, the decision was voted by majority for adoption on 13 December 1995.

As for the observance of possible effects on the efforts for cooperation, the period could be regarded as diminishing hope for Turkey’s candidacy and a change of focus in the EU’s enlargement goals. Especially in the first half, increasing amount of disappointments are apparent for Turkey which also coincide with the observable efforts within this period. The second half is relatively inactive which corresponds with the crucial developments in the CU as the focus of the candidacy is diverted. Thus, with important warning signals to Turkey, the subsequent increases in the observable efforts of this period can be regarded accountable for the arguments on establishing congruity.

5.2.3 The worst period in the Turkey-EU relations 1996-2001

The beginning of 1996 marked the establishment of the CU and the relations were expected to progress into a new phase. However, shortly after, an unexpected turn of events shadowed the positive developments and became one of the first indications that the relationship was about to divert into a totally different path. On 31st of January 1996, the Greek and Turkish Naval forces came as close as few hundred meters for direct confrontation over a territorial dispute on the rocky islet Imia/Kardak within the Aegean Sea. Although, the Kardak Crisis was quickly averted by the intense interference of the American officials, the repercussions were going to cost dearly to Turkey. The Commission declared solidarity with Greece by emphasizing Greece’s borders as the EU’s borders and signaled a warning to Turkey on the respect of international law for a performing Customs Union. The promised measures and financial aid for the CU became defunct later on. An indirect reason was most probably the EU Council of Ministers decision on 24 July 1996 which placed the responsibility fully on Turkey. Another reason was the EP’s opposition for blocking the EU’s financial

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256 Baykal & Arat 2010, p. 731
257 Alpkaya 2010, p. 846
258 Plening 1997, p. 4
259 Togan 2012, p. 1
260 Arapoglou 2002, p. 17
261 Firat 2010, p. 806
Thus, the intensification of the CU process reached an early challenge at its very beginning.

From this point onwards, the expected new phase in the relations continued in a manner that only lead downhill. The year 1997 marked the first significant objection to the candidacy process. At the end of the Christian Democratic Party Summit of Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Italy and France, the Prime Minister of Belgium Wilfried Marten’s stated that; “Turkey had no place in the European Civilization Project” which placed the topic on the matter of cultural differences. In July, the Commission report on Agenda 2000 presented the new pre-accession strategy which included the Central and Eastern European countries as well as Cyprus. Turkey was excluded from the accession announcements constituting a huge letdown for the expectations based on the succession of the CU. The disappointments reached climax at the Luxembourg Summit on December 1997. While waiting for an announcement of the candidacy, Turkey saw the introduction of four political conditions. The Presidency Conclusions stated that further relations depended on:

1. the pursuit of the political and economic reforms on which Turkey has embarked, including the alignment of human rights standards and practices on those in force in the European Union;
2. respect for and protection of minorities; the establishment of satisfactory and stable relations between Greece and Turkey;
3. the settlement of disputes, in particular by legal process, including the International Court of Justice;
4. and support for negotiations under the aegis of the UN on a political settlement in Cyprus on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.

The reaction was very sharp as the singled out issues in the conclusions bared vital importance to Turkey’s domestic and external policies. All political dialogue was unilaterally suspended and the subsequent partition in the 1998 European Conference was canceled. The suspension continued until the end of 1999 Helsinki Summit’s unanimous declaration of the Turkish candidacy. The same year also brought the significant development of the Kurdish Leader Abdullah Öcalan’s capture in Kenya while leaving the Greek Embassy, which shook the political standing of the Greek government.

The declaration essentially implied two important outcomes. The pre-conditions laid out in the Luxembourg Summit for the candidacy were dropped and Turkey would now benefit the aid that would come with the title. Following the worst duration the bilateral relations have ever seen, the CoA conducted its first meeting on April 2000 to start the screening process. The Accession

262 Baykal & Arat 2010, p. 734
263 Ibid, 735
264 Ibid, 736
265 The European Council 1997, point 35
266 Baykal & Arat 2010, p. 737
267 Öniş 2003, p. 12
268 The Economist 1999
Partnership Document (APD) was signed by the end of the year together with the first Progress Report on Turkey.\textsuperscript{269} Adversely, on December, the Nice Summit took place projecting the future changes in the EU executive order with the enlargement of twenty-seven member states. Turkey was not included in the unforeseen projection which created the first discontent after the announcement of the candidacy. Nonetheless, just before the Summit, the APD was adopted by the Council of Ministers containing the Framework Regulation for the financial aid.\textsuperscript{270} In essence, this passed the buck to Turkey for taking necessary steps and shortly after, on March 2001, “The National Program of Turkey for Adopting the European Union’s Acquis” was introduced, forecasting constitutional reform packages for enactment in the following years.\textsuperscript{271}

The years between 1996 and 2001 presents one of the most active periods within the timeline. Especially after the suspension of relations in 1997, the subsequent year, 1998, demonstrates the highest number of new engagements pursued within the extent of this study. In the three years of suspended dialogue, Turkey has successively initiated efforts for five different international organizations. As the candidacy was announced by the end of 1999 and the relations resumed, there is an observable decrease in the efforts within the following two years. Thus, with severe disappointments to the candidacy process and significant escalations in the efforts, this period presents one of the most concrete examples of the theoretical predictions.

5.2.4 The “golden age” 2002-2006

The approval of the APD and the adoption of the National Program activated a period of mutual appreciation. The significant developments in the first half of this period are generally regarded as the “golden age” of the relations.\textsuperscript{272} Especially with the entrance of the JDP into the Turkish politics, the envisioned reforms were accelerated and extensive constitutional changes were underway.\textsuperscript{273} By 2002, with the new National Program, considerable rights were granted to the Kurdish minorities and the death penalty was abolished in peace time.\textsuperscript{274} In addition, the new government declared unconditional support for the Annan Plan on the peaceful settlement of Cyprus. These developments were praised in the 2002 Progress Report which also announced the first deadline for the initiation of the accession talks to be by 2005.\textsuperscript{275} The marking of the negotiation date was well received which led to the broadening of the introduced packages in alignment

\textsuperscript{269} Öniş 2003, p. 12
\textsuperscript{270} Baykal & Arat 2010, p. 747
\textsuperscript{271} Ibid, p. 747
\textsuperscript{272} Kubicek 2013, p. 42; Robins 2007, p. 293
\textsuperscript{273} Kubicek 2013, p. 42
\textsuperscript{274} Alpkaya 2010, p. 849
\textsuperscript{275} Robins 2007, p. 292, Cengiz & Hoffmann 2013, p. 422
with the EU Commission’s second APD. In 2003, the death penalty was abolished all together.\footnote{Alpkaya 2010, p. 849; Oran 2010b, p. 923}

By the end of 2004, the first Progress Report and an EP resolution declared the accession talks to be initiated for October 2005. However, the escalating good relations had steadily begun to stagnate by mid-2004. In essence, the most solitary reason was the aching problem of Cyprus. The Annan Plan was put on referendum on the island and the Turkish side had voted “yes” as promised. Unfortunately, the plan was found unacceptable by the Greek side which voted against the settlement. A month later, in May, the southern part of the island became a member of the EU.\footnote{Robins 2007, p. 298; Oran 2010b, p. 923} The Turkish reaction was an announcement on the extension of the EU agreements to the new member states which excluded Cyprus. The declaration was found inadmissible by the EU which pressured Turkey for the signing of the protocol for every new member state. At the end, Turkey did sign the additional protocol on July 2005 with a released communiqué stating the signature to not to imply recognition of the Republic of Cyprus.\footnote{Oran 2010b, p. 924} Nevertheless, the screening for negotiations started at the set deadline and the first chapter was taken up in June 2006.\footnote{Ibid, p. 925} Soon after the initiation, due to Turkey’s exclusion of trade with Cyprus, eight chapters relevant to the internal market were decided to be frozen until unforeseeable notice by the European Council. Thus, the membership process and the accession negotiations bumped into a “de facto halt.”\footnote{Cengiz & Hoffmann 2013, p. 424}

As for the effects on the timeline of cooperative efforts, accounting a general affiliation of these developments necessitate a divided interpretation between the first and second half of this period. An additional reason for this motivation can be found in the difference amongst the Commission Progress Reports. While the period between 2001 and 2004 holds the most positive assessments, “the following years, the Commission considered the progress in democratic reforms as well as the reforms concerning the Kurds as ‘limited’ at best.”\footnote{Ibid, p. 423} To say the least, in contrast to the former period in the timeline, the 2002-2006 section presents a significantly lower amount of observable efforts. Especially during the first half, the timeline presents one of the most inactive years while marking a steady increase after 2004. Therefore, a positive conclusion can be made on this period of enhancing relations in the first-half together with the turn of events after 2004, which are both congruent with the expected empirical development.

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{Alpkaya 2010, p. 849; Oran 2010b, p. 923}
\item \footnote{Robins 2007, p. 298; Oran 2010b, p. 923}
\item \footnote{Oran 2010b, p. 924}
\item \footnote{Ibid, p. 925}
\item \footnote{Cengiz & Hoffmann 2013, p. 424}
\item \footnote{Ibid, p. 423}
\end{itemize}
5.2.5 The frozen relationship 2007-2013

After the reached stalemate within the accession negotiations, the following period between 2007 and 2011 could be labeled with very little progress bilaterally. In addition, by 2007, the opposition to Turkey’s membership explicitly grew among the EU leaders. One example is the presidential election campaign that took place in France where one of the promises by Nicholas Sarkozy touched upon never admitting Turkey as a full member into the Union. 282

The criticisms were also enhanced in the Progress Reports starting from 2007; the mention of failure to continue the reform process became an annual discourse. 283 By 2008, only thirteen out of thirty-five chapters were successfully opened for negotiation. The following year, 2009, brought about another obstacle for the candidacy as additional six more chapters were frozen on further talks by the Commission. 284 The EP also adopted a resolution on Turkey demanding a presentation of satisfactory will for the continuation of the process. 285 The little progress within the negotiations brought about opinions on whether an alternative option of a “privileged partnership” should be considered, which met with sharp rejections by the Turkish side. 286

In 2010, Turkey took up a referendum to bring comprehensive reforms to its constitution which received positive reactions by the Commission. 287 However, the relations were again strained after the EP adopted a resolution within the same year, sharply criticizing the lack of will the Turkish government was putting on the candidacy. The response by Erdoğan stated that the report was “unbalanced” and “written by people who did not know Turkey.” 288 By 2011, no new chapters received an initiation and the already opened chapters were still at minimum progress. 289 Moreover, the same year also witnessed the first signal by Erdoğan for the suspension of political dialogue with the EU during the upcoming Cypriot presidency in July 2012. 290 Lastly for this year, the new Progress Reports were issued with the by now usual tone of criticisms with a note of concern on the threat of freezing talks. 291 As expected, the reaction came through Erdoğan’s harsh statement claiming the reports to constantly “sling mud” and showing “serious eclipse of reason at the EU.” 292

In terms of any significant developments, the years 2012 and 2013 could be regarded not much different from the rest of this period. For the purposes of bringing fresh dynamism into the stagnant relations, in May 2012, the EU

282 Morelli 2013, p. 6
283 Cengiz & Hoffmann 2013, p. 424
284 Hartwell 2013
285 Morelli 2013, p. 5
286 Ibid, p. 6
287 Ibid.
288 Hurriyet Daily News 2011a
289 Morelli 2013, p. 7
290 National Turk 2011
291 European Commission 2012, p. 5
292 Hurriyet Daily News 2011b
launched the new “positive agenda” for complementing the accession negotiations. Nevertheless, the freezing of political dialogue during the Cypriot Presidency could not be averted and the relations reached another pause until 2013. The Progress Report of 2012 received even worse reactions as the opinion on the context was regarded to be “bias” and “unbalanced.” After the Presidency passed, the relations resumed and an agreement on the opening of Chapter 22 was achieved.

On a final note, domestic turmoil had erupted in Turkey by mid-2013 over protests on the government decision to build a shopping mall in a public park in Istanbul. The handling of the protests with severe police crackdown led to discussions of postponing the initiation of the agreed chapter. The EP adopted a resolution on the incidents with “deep concern” and several EU leaders gave voice for the delay. Not surprisingly, the warnings met sharp reactions where Erdoğan stated to “not recognize decisions made by the EP” and the EU should “get lost” if such a decision was undertaken.

This last period with unquestionably stagnant relations and unforeseeable conclusions to the Turkish candidacy, coincides with the second most active period in the timeline. Especially after the first stalemate to the negotiations in 2006, almost every subsequent year presents a new cooperative engagement. By some analysts this picture is also speculated for the specific efforts of this period. As pointed out by Kadri Gürsel; the successive applications to the SCO after 2006 were not a coincidence but a mere result of the disappointments emerging from the accession negotiations. Thus, together with the 1996-2001 periods, this last section of the timeline presents the second most significant example of the theoretical arguments.

5.2.6 The feasibility of the balance of influence predictions

In sum then, it seems that every time there was a problem between Turkey and the EU, through the whole timespan covered here, Turkey decided to intensify its cooperation with other parts of the world. Especially, the follow up of the significant peaks within the intensity trends, demonstrate an observable congruence with the times of stagnant relations. Thus, we can now claim with confidence that the balance of influence propositions have a great deal of explanatory power. The analysis suggests that an explanation on Turkey’s successive development of efforts for multilateral cooperation needs to consider the EU factor, whereby the bilateral disagreements toppled with possible threats to the candidacy, present a rather interesting consistency with the observable behavior.

293 Morelli 2013, p. 12
294 Hurriyet Daily News 2013a
295 Hurriyet Daily News 2013b
296 Today's Zaman 2013
297 Gürsel 2013
6 Conclusion

This study was set out to explain the successive development of Turkey’s multilateral cooperation efforts outside the EU since the membership pledge. The study focused into the sequences of events over the period of twenty-six years in the hope for achieving a congruent explanation. The contrast of findings according to the theoretical predictions eventually led to the materialization of the answer. Notwithstanding the uncertainties that are inherent in this kind of a study, a confident contributing claim can be made on the recurrent trend of the development of Turkey’s efforts for collective cooperation. The observable foreign policy behavior has intensified during (or subsequent to) disagreements with the EU, especially in concern over the candidacy process. Another claim is possible on the extent of the Russia factor for Turkey’s foreign policy within the timeframe here. As demonstrated, the assumption of a threatening Russia did not seem to provide an important significance on the empirical presentations. The empirical conclusions also give way for comments on the explanatory power of the highlighted theoretical predictions. The study identifies a crucial detail for the analysis of cooperation. That is, the apprehension of the aspect of effort within the concept of cooperation which may lead to different considerations. In addition, an initial deconstruction of the balance of power propositions brings out the possibility for interpreting the theoretical implications in three different paths. Relevantly, the balance of threat proposition was tested and found to be insufficient for the claim of congruity with Turkey’s efforts.

On the other hand, the balance of influence arguments helps to identify one negligence amongst the realist scholars: the possibility of a balancing behavior not against but rather in relation to an actor. The consideration of the EU as an enemy within Turkey’s proximity will not adhere rational predictions. However, deliberation on the EU’s impact capabilities by virtue of its status within Turkey’s agenda, proposes effective results which can contribute the debates on the cooperative behavior of states. The paper also disentangles the arguments which try to depict the foreign policy behavior of Turkey. The initial perception of an inconsistent foreign policy behavior is now enlightened and demonstrated to be rather opposite. Furthermore, a comment can be made on the understanding of these efforts as mere bases for increasing the geostrategic importance of Turkey for the Western world. In that stance, the demonstrated linkages rather suggest this behavior to be as precautions taken in relation to the possible influence impacts deriving from these alliances. A final comment can be made on speculations which discuss whether the post-JDP Turkey is comparably more prone to move further away from the EU. As the paper presents, this argument is void considering the observance of the existent recurrent behavior through the pre-JDP periods. Thus, these conclusions give light to the many aforementioned
and untested predictions which underline such behavior on specific engagements on a wider systematic level.
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