‘Because It Hits You a Bit’:

Women, Social Change and Collective Trauma of the collapse of the Soviet Union in Ukraine

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Abstract

This thesis examines social change and the collective trauma for women in Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union by investigating general subjective wellbeing at the intersection of gender, generation and ethnicity. It argues that women had a special position during and after the Soviet regime due to the existing familialistic discourses both in the Soviet Union and independent Ukraine, and therefore experienced social change differently.

The work uses Sztompka’s and Alexander’s theoretical conceptualization of social change and collective trauma, but also incorporates the notion of subjective wellbeing in order to study the social change and collective trauma on both the structural and individual levels. Hence the unique contribution of the thesis is that it connects the large-scale social change to its individually measured impact in the form of subjective wellbeing and a sense of trauma.

The first part of the thesis assesses individual and societal factors influencing general wellbeing of the Ukrainian population as a whole, based on a quantitative analysis of the HITT (‘Health in Time of Transition’) data base from 2012. The second part explores the significance and meaning of the social change through qualitative interviews of Ukrainian and Russian women in Ukraine.

The main findings show that most of the respondents associate different aspects of their life, such as economic situation, health and social environment, with distress which may indicate the existence of a collective trauma. The qualitative findings also illustrate the existence of different types of collective trauma for Ukrainian and Russian women. Economic wellbeing, distress and ethnicity are found to be associated with the collective trauma and shape the strategies for dealing with the social change after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Women are found to be active agents of the social change and differ between generations. The older generations seem to be suffering more distress than younger people, and have been affected the most by the social change.

Key words: social change, collective trauma, women, post-Soviet Ukraine
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Introduction

Soviet Union was not just a political regime, it was also the everyday life of every citizen. The state was everything and everywhere, controlling and teaching. Not surprisingly, therefore, when the Soviet Union collapsed it has caused tremendous impacts on the everyday life of people from former Soviet states. A shift from the overwhelming control of the state to multiple choices for everything that suddenly appeared, did not only imply a change of economic and political institutions, but also adjustment to the new system on the individual level.

In this paper I argue that the collapse of Soviet Union brought about the collective trauma which shattered every individual’s and collective actor’s sense of well-being in the former Soviet states. I investigate Ukraine as a case where social change and social trauma had their peculiarities regarding the impact on different genders and major ethnic groups through the prism of generations.

I argue that the ideas and discourses on women as connected to the family have been intertwined with ethnic aspects and have been the instruments in the creation of identity, discursively kept on from the Soviet times. This maintenance may have caused a specific effect on how women in Ukraine have experienced trauma.

I am investigating these issues from structural and individual perspectives. On the structural level I analyze subjective well-being of different generations of men and women in Ukraine and how it is influenced by the social change, while on the individual, I examine the strategies of overcoming trauma and women’s experiences of social change within their everyday life. I suggest that their strategies and social positions may vary according to their ethnic identity. Therefore, I look at Ukrainian and Russian women in the city of Lviv, Ukraine, where the question of nationality and ethnicity is often raising public attention. In broader terms, I am interested in how women may have experienced the social change and coped with collective trauma caused by the shift from the Soviet regime to post-communist independent Ukraine.

The thesis proceeds as follows: a theoretical chapter, a methodological chapter, a chapter with an analysis of the research, and then a general discussion and conclusions followed by a bibliography and appendixes. In the theoretical chapter I discuss the starting points of the
research and the main ideas and concepts that I am using. In the chapter on methodological considerations I introduce the methodology and discuss my choice of methods. Then I proceed to the chapter containing the quantitative analysis of the data from the HITT data base, which lead to the next chapter containing results and discussions of the qualitative interview study. Finally I draw conclusions from the research, where I also suggest further aspects to study. The thesis contains several appendixes, where I present descriptive statistics, calculations for the quantitative study, my plan for the interviews and the agreement between interviewer and interviewees.
Chapter 1. Theoretical Perspectives on Post-Communist Social Change, Gender and Wellbeing

Women and the transition from Communism in Ukraine

In the 1990s the Ukrainian people lived through one of the most dramatic changes of social systems, that from socialism to capitalism, from being a part of an empire to the gaining of national independence, and from a totalitarian society to democracy. However, these changes were not only structural, they also impacted individual wellbeing of people in Ukraine.

Already in 1989 the first USSR republics began to fall, defeated by the economic stagnation and ideological inconsistencies of the new generation of leaders (Clements, 2004). For Ukraine, 1991 meant not only the positive and anticipated independence, but also a huge economic and political crisis. The prospect of transforming into a Western-like capitalist democracy sounded promising, since the Soviet socialism clearly did not work out well (W. Outhwaite, 2005). However, the change of system appeared to be mostly nominal: capitalist and democratic institutions in Ukraine were still inundated with corruption and informal ways of dealing with business.

A rapid demise of the Soviet system, swift market liberalization and privatization imposed on archaic social relations from the previous system created more inequality and undermined social support. A new group of disadvantaged people has emerged, who were excluded from the labour market and institutions of civil and political society for different reasons, one of them being the lack of informal connections particularly important in the Soviet society (Sztompka, 2004). Thus it is not surprising that the confidence, trust, and social solidarity got weakened even more than during the Soviet time and often were replaced with mistrust, suspicion, and a desire to beat the system, all of which can be called “postcommunist hangovers” (Sztompka, 2004). These quickly transformed into an unprecedented expansion of informal activity (Rose, 1998).

Not only economic indexes fell, when GDP dropped radically from $81.456 per capita in 1990 to $65.65 per capita in 1993, but also the average life expectancy declined from 71 years in 1990 to 67 years in 1994 (The World Bank, 2014) (The World Health Organization, 2014). Major economic and political changes also influenced individual health practices and

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1 Here I use the year 1990 and the 1994 for comparison, since 1990 was the last year of belonging to the Soviet Union, and 1994 was the first major economic crisis. I believe that these two years are showing the peak values
risk behaviours, with rising levels of alcohol and tobacco consumption (HITT-cis, 2014). In addition to this, a dramatic change in mortality could be noticed just within few years after the collapse of Soviet Union. Specifically, suicide rates rose from 20.53 per 100,000 in 1990 to the average 26.6 in 1994 (The World Health Organization, 2014).

Even though the rise of these indicators may be reflecting a general economic and demographic situation overall throughout the region, I would follow a Durkheimian line of argument that suicide rates can be an indicator of social anomie (Durkheim, 2001), and could also be referred to as a ‘collective trauma’ in Sztompka’s terms (Sztompka, 2000). The suicide rates for the 1990-1994 period are particularly telling of the trauma of social change, and show that Ukrainian men were more prone to be affected than women: if for women of all ages suicide rates in 1990 were 7.8 per 100,000 people and grew only with 2 points by 1994, making it 8.9 deaths per 100,000, for men of all ages the change is dramatic. In 1990 the rate was 36.4 deaths per 100,000, while by 1994 it had grown to 48.9 (The World Health Organization, 2014). It can be concluded from this statistics that social change was mainly hitting men.

To further demonstrate the stronger influence of social change on men, the difference in suicide rates by gender becomes even more dramatic when age groups are taken into account: while in 1990 the suicide rates for men younger than 64 were 33.58, they increased to 44.2 in 1994 and continued to grow in the subsequent years (The World Health Organization, 2014). For women under 64 the change was not as dramatic: the rate changed from 6.3 in 1990 to 7.3 in 1994. Furthermore, the gender difference becomes more obvious when we look at the statistics for men and women over 65. For older women the rate grew from 19.6 in 1990 to 21.7 in 1994; for men, from 59.7 to 86.9 (The World Health Organization, 2014).

These numbers suggest that the ways men and women lived through the Soviet collapse were different, and that the traumatic experience of “waking up in another country” was much lighter for women. However, why was this the case? Why was the impact of the social change on women different and what could explain it? In this study, I investigate why women reacted differently to the potentially traumatic collapse of the Soviet Union by comparing subjective well-being in the post-Soviet period for gender groups and generations and by examining women’s accounts and strategies for dealing with social change after the collapse.
Thus I examine how social change may have led to collective trauma both on personal and societal levels.

In comparing men’s and women’s reaction to social change, I differentiate the levels of subjective well-being by its economic, physical, psychological and socio-political components. I expect women to be less influenced by the social change in terms of evaluating their economic situation, health, happiness, and stress. However, they may also evaluate the social change differently, in terms of their nostalgia for the Soviet past and the current political system in the country, which may influence their subjective well-being. These differences then would be explained and elaborated by studying some of the personal attitudes of women from Ukraine.

**A structural view of the Societal Change: The Soviet system and the Collective trauma of Transition**

In the thesis I use several theoretical perspectives on the issue of social change and collective trauma on societal and individual level. These are both general and contextual theories for the post-communist countries. To define social change and collective trauma I mostly use Sztompka’s and Alexander’s notions (Alexander, 2004; Sztompka, 2000; Sztompka, 2004). I use these two authors because they are the researchers who were the first to coin the term of “collective trauma” based on the Durkheimian notion of “anomie of success” in modern sociology, and all the following authors in this area have related to their theories. However, considering that those theorists contextualize collective trauma of postcommunist transitions within such countries like Poland, Hungary and former East Germany (Sztompka, 2004), the case of Ukraine is different from those countries in my opinion, and requires re-contextualization.

Both theories mentioned above lack gender perspective and consider gender only as a social subgroup. Therefore in my analysis on the individual level, where I interview some women and listen to their experiences of collective trauma, I incorporate several theories and concepts suggested by both Western and Ukrainian feminists and gender scholars, including but not limited to Zhurzhenko, Kis, Pavlychko and Gal, Kligman, Ashwin, and Clements (Ashwin, 2000; Buckley, 1997; Clements, 2004; LaFont, 2001; Gal & Kligman, 2000; Spehar, 2005). While Ukrainian gender scholars look specifically at Ukraine, Western ones
are discussing more generally the impact of the Soviet regime on women. This latter generalization is problematic, since Ukraine is not only different from other post-communist countries in terms of history, geopolitical situation and religion, to name a few, but it also has its internal differences in national, regional and ethnic identity connected to different social memories. In this chapter, I will first consider the macro-perspectives on social change, and then link them to the individual notions of subjective well-being, which is discussed in the following chapter.

To start with the structural macro perspective, Alexander differentiates major themes of trauma theory into “lay trauma theory”, Enlightenment Thinking and Psychoanalytic Thinking (Alexander, 2004). According to the lay theory, traumas are occurring naturally and shatter individual wellbeing, meaning that if something abrupt happens in society, it would “naturally” cause trauma for people. Enlightenment and Psychoanalytic thinking are versions of the lay theory, where the first one assumes that trauma is a rational response to abrupt change, triggered by clearly perceived objects or events by actors, and the second –“places a model of unconscious emotional fears and cognitively distorting mechanisms of psychological defense between the external shattering event and the actor’s internal traumatic response” (Alexander, 2004, p. 2). Since all these themes are implying a “naturalistic fallacy” (assumption that there is a certain causal effect between a certain event and response to it, and hence certain events are inherently considered traumatic), Alexander’s suggestion is to look at collective trauma as a ‘socially mediated attribution’, meaning that the event itself is not necessary to create a trauma (Alexander, 2004, p. 6). In this study, however, I assume that the trauma of social change in Ukraine was triggered by the actual moment of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

To understand how Sztompka conceptualizes trauma of social change, it is necessary to mention his idea of social becoming. There are no societies that are stable or that are being, ontologically society always means change, movement and transformation. That is, societies are becoming (Sztompka, 1993, p. 155). Although until the 19th century these movements and transformations were regarded in terms of progress and development, the 20th century’s turbulent changes shed doubt about the association of change with progress (Sztompka, 1993). With this doubt the discourse on traumatic experience of wars and violent events emerges, firstly in the mass media and then slowly acquiring cultural meaning, with the paradoxical realization that even anticipated, dreamed about and fought for changes may turn
out to be painful, the idea previously suggested by Durkheim’s notion of “anomie” (Sztompka, 2004).

Sztompka further emphasizes the drama of system transitions in his theory of ‘collective trauma’ (Sztompka, 2000). He states that although not every major change is necessarily traumatic since societies are in constant “flux”, those which actually are include the following elements: 1) it is sudden and rapid; 2) radical, comprehensive and touching the core of society; 3) it is imposed and external, to which the society itself did not contribute, or if it did, then unwittingly; 4) it has a certain mental frame shared in the society (Sztompka, 2004, p. 156).

The collapse of the Soviet Union was indeed sudden and rapid for the majority of its citizens, even though the last period of the regime was showing signs of destabilization and a shift to more liberal policies. It also touched each and every individual, since the regime’s policies were targeted intrusively into every domain of life, structuring habitus of the ordinary people into one specific – the Soviet. With the collapse, this Soviet lifestyle became questionable. However, the other of Sztompka’s accounts of social change and collective trauma have several problems when applied to the Ukrainian case.

First, we cannot say that the social change was experienced uniformly in Ukraine. In my opinion, different ethnic, gender and class groups experienced change differently. Moreover, some of them had agency to actively contribute to change, while others had not. In addition, some traumas can result both from anticipated and repulsive social change. This would mean that the last characteristic presented by Sztompka is too simplistic: in the case of Ukrainian transition there was no single ‘mental frame’ through which the change was perceived. Rather, the frames differed between different regions and groups of people.

Therefore, it is not clear whether the change in Ukraine could be described as a “trauma of victory” (anticipated and considered to be positive), and still is characterized by the “post-communist hangover”, which implies a decline of trust, social capital, less happiness and a less positive view of the future (Sztompka, 2004), the terms Sztompka uses in his analysis of collective trauma in post-communist Poland, Hungary and GDR. In the Ukrainian case, while for some it might have been the “trauma of victory” indeed, for others it meant “the trauma of defeat”. Years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the collective “trauma” may have reshaped into feelings of nostalgia for the past and the Soviet regime. This nostalgia, as
Todorova and Gille (2010) argue, may be seen as a healing process associated with the disillusionment with the new regime.

Secondly, Sztompka’s description of social change lacks gender perspective, which is necessary considering the statistical differences between men and women regarding how they experienced the collapse of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, given the history of Ukraine, class and ethnicity are important as well. Ethnicity is important since due to Soviet policy people were moved around the country, while class has been important as benefits and access to some spheres are gained through belonging to a certain social class. Moreover, following Acker, I argue that the notion of social class is inherently gendered and racialized (ethnicized), but is still useful for social research and opens up the perspective of inequalities (Acker, 2006).

Finally, Ukrainians may expose specific features of the collective trauma associated with the particular way of life in the Soviet Union, which Sztompka does not develop further. To show these differences in the way of life, I find it useful to invoke R. Rose’s notion of the “double life” in communist and post-communist societies and Bourdieu’s notion of habitus.

Rose suggests the idea of the “double life”, which is an argument that during the Soviet times, as people were excessively pushed into organizations and activities by a paternalistic state machine, they retreated into the private sphere and used informal institutions. Through formal and informal social networks people constructed two worlds, both of which had their own rules and schemes in order to achieve certain goals (Rose, 1998). I argue that people in the former Soviet Union states continued living this “double life”, regardless of a new political system dressed into democracy after the collapse.

To explain this and also to move from the structural level of analysis to everyday life of the individual, I refer to Bourdieu’s notion of “habitus”: a complex term for all the systems of beliefs and values that rule everyday life of people and are based on memory and history (Bourdieu, 2010). Habitus is both “structuring” and a “structured” structure, which on the one hand “organizes practices and the perceptions of practices”, while on the other hand it is a “principle of division into logical cases, which organizes the perception of the world itself” (Bourdieu, 2010, p. 166). I then use the notion of habitus to further enhance Rose’s notion of “double life”, and claim that the Soviet habitus of the “double life” continued after the break-up of the regime. Sztompka’s analysis of “trauma of victory” similarly considers that the
Soviet habitus created the “Homo Sovieticus” identity still influential in the post-communist period (Sztompka, 2004)

For Rose, however, the relevance of the “double life” in the post-communist period links specifically to the impact of informal social capital. In the post-communist life, fraught with “organizational failure” and corruption, people have to use informal networks, and diffuse social cooperation, such as begging or cajoling public officials, using connections to bend the rules or paying bribes, to survive, and a mere reliance on the formal networks leads to social exclusion, since formal organizations of the state and market do not work and they have no other network to fall back on (Rose, 1998, p. vii)

For this thesis this would mean that people mostly rely on their informal networks, such as family, neighbours and close friends. These networks are “closed” relationships where new information does not travel fast. In relation to social trauma that would mean that those who are relying on informal networks the most, would also be the most successful in overcoming trauma, since the family networks may be guarding the individual from the change. Hence, women who are positioned mostly in the familial domain may have benefitted from this “double life” in a different way compared to men and perceive social change differently.

**Social Change from an Individual Perspective: Studying Subjective Wellbeing in the Context of Socio-Economic Change**

To present the theoretical link between the macro concept of social change and individual experience of it, I introduce the notions of subjective wellbeing and a generational approach as useful tools to study the impact of social change at the individual level. This section discusses the major sociological dilemmas in studying subjective wellbeing and its relevance to the study of social change in post-Soviet societies. It shows that studies of subjective well-being in the post-communist countries so far have omitted linking subjective wellbeing to large-scale societal changes.

The question of happiness, life satisfaction or wellbeing has been reflected upon for centuries, but a specific scientific inquiry into it has advanced only recently (Diener, 1984). However, one of the biggest challenges still is to define these notions in a way that would make it possible to measure them, since the conceptions of well-being may be different across societies (Diener, 1984). Generally there is an agreement within social sciences that
general wellbeing consists of subjective and objective aspects: the “things” (the resources) one has and feelings about them (Cough & McGregor, 2007, p. 357). Subjective wellbeing generally refers to an underlying state of happiness and feelings about wellbeing, while the objective one measures what the person actually possesses (Wallace, et al., 2010).

In the thesis I am primarily concerned with subjective wellbeing. I argue that even though subjective wellbeing is an “active agent of adaptation and typically refers to evaluations of the personal domain” (Poon & Cohen-Manfield, 2011, p. 27), and is usually investigated by psychologists, the way people feel about themselves is not based solely within the psyche. It is influenced by many societal factors, such as the economic situation or type of political regime or the level of social cohesion (Wallace, et al., 2010).

There are several issues in sociology of subjective wellbeing that I consider of relevance to the post-communist societies in general and this study specifically. First is whether subjective wellbeing relate only to positive experience, or if the negative experience also should be incorporated. In my opinion, the negative experiences are important in the context of post-Soviet Ukraine, and the possible collective trauma caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. In addition, Diener (1999) argues that incorporating both positive and negative measures is enhancing research capacity. Therefore, for this thesis I suggest that both positive and negative experiences regarding wellbeing could be well combined with the theory of collective trauma.

Therefore, my research evaluates subjective well-being on the basis of at least four components that take both positive and negative influences into account: the subjective health state, the subjective economic situation, the psychological state, and the socio-political satisfaction with the current institutional order. These components are by no means exhaustive, but together with socio-economic and demographic indicators they are the basis on which the general evaluation of one’s wellbeing could take place.

The second issue is whether the subjective wellbeing should be studied at the individual or societal level. Sociologists may leave studying subjective well-being at the individual level to psychologists, concentrating instead on objective (measurable) wellbeing as reflecting “objective” realities (Veenhoven, 2008). Hence many sociological studies are concerned with monitoring the life-satisfaction data in different societies over time, stating that when satisfaction declines, it could indicate possible problems in society, and vice versa.
Life-satisfaction is therefore often used in cross-cultural comparative research on values, e.g. Inglehart and the World Value Survey, and is studied in combination with anomie, alienation or deprivation (Veenhoven, 2008). This research considers the individuals only with regards to how people react to anomie, alienation, inequality, or other societal problems.

Veenhoven (2008) criticizes this tradition, since anomie is associated with both preconditioned wellbeing and wellbeing as a result, and mixing those together when studying anomie is hindering causal statements. For this thesis I believe that subjective wellbeing is an indicator of the general environment in society and is associated with social trauma.

The third issue is concerning internal and external factors that influence subjective wellbeing. In sociology, mostly external factors are investigated from the constructivist perspective (Veenhoven, 2008). This perspective basically means that individual’s wellbeing is totally framed within the collective. However, to reduce subjective wellbeing to the result of the collective ideas may be insufficient (Veenhoven, 1996). In the thesis I agree that while the sense of wellbeing is definitely influenced by collective notions and is relative to a certain society, it is a reductionist way to say that there is no inner drive of it, as Veenhoven (2008) says, no matter the culture, time or space, everyone still feels pain and hunger.

The last issue is to what extent the present subjective wellbeing influences how people evaluate their future life. In line with the constructivist views, Diener and Suh argue (Diener, et al., 1999) that certain social standards internalized by individuals in a certain society may be influential in shaping people’s perceptions about their future (Diener & Suh, 2000). Hence, subjective wellbeing also assesses the feeling of comfort and chances for a good future life (Diener, 1984). These are based both on cultural ideas and on experienced “objective” frames of what is possible to possess in this society. It is an important aspect for this thesis, since the way people think of their future is determining the strategies they may use to cope with social change and collective trauma.

The arguments above show that certain tensions remain in studying subjective wellbeing in the larger context of society or societal change. In this work I aim to overcome this tension by showing that subjective wellbeing should be considered in relation to larger processes in the society, as these processes are influencing people’s lives to a great extent.
Qualifiers of Subjective Wellbeing: Gender, Social Capital, Generations and Ethnicity

Most of the mentioned studies of subjective wellbeing, however, omit theoretical discussions on gender, generational and ethnic differences and social capital in connection to the concept of subjective wellbeing within a country. These factors appear in the research mostly as instrumental variables that describe social subgroups. In my opinion, this is not enough, and gender studies together with sociology should consider subjective wellbeing as more dependent on intersections of gender, age and ethnicity. However, a few influential studies in Europe and the world consider the impacts of gender and age on evaluations of life satisfaction, and should be mentioned here.

Ronald Inglehart (2002) argues that even though a lot of research shows consistent similarity between men and women in the levels of happiness, life satisfaction and other global measures of subjective wellbeing, some significant gender-related differences may be found, though concealed by interaction effects between age, gender and wellbeing (Inglehart, 2002). Considering the aspiration-adjustment model, which implies that the recent progress of gender equality policies globally should have positively influenced women’s subjective wellbeing because they have improved women’s status, Inglehart (2002) expects that women should have considerably higher levels of happiness than men.

Inglehart (2002) describes the differences between different societies, and compares historically Protestant and Western societies with Asian, African and Latin American ones. The study shows that women’s wellbeing is strongly dependent on age, since older women, especially those from Protestant Western societies, experience higher levels of deprivation.

With regards to the post-communist societies, Inglehart indicates that while Soviet policy seemed to be gender equality oriented, the post-communist societies remained totalitarian and patriarchal, where women’s position had not changed significantly, and therefore the gap in subjective wellbeing between men and women in post-communist societies is not big (Inglehart, 2002).

Another example of research contextualized for the post-communist Eastern Europe, is the one about subjective wellbeing as connected to health, based on the Health in Times of Transition survey by Claire Wallace and Pamela Abbott (HITT-cis, 2014). They investigate how the social system disintegration, a similar concept to anomie theory, has influenced
individual health in the post-Soviet countries. Since health evaluations, realities and differences are often based on the unequal access to social benefits, and are intertwined with macro processes of discrimination, deprivation and institutional failure, this research pays more attention to gender, ethnicity and age within the region (Wallace & Abbott, 2009).

As to ethnicity the majority of the studies are country contextual and either focus on the discrimination and limited access to health benefits of ethnic minorities (Gomez; Krause, et al., 2009; Oudhof, 2006; and others), or on the individual subjective wellbeing in the field of psychology. In the case of Ukraine, the question of ethnicity is more complex than that of discrimination. In a regional perspective, Ukrainians may be discriminated in some regions, while in others – Russians, or in others – Tatars, and so on. Moreover, ethnicity and gender are often intertwined when discourses of nationhood are reworked (Yuval-Davis, 2006 (1997)). These discourses came to light with the independence of Ukraine, suggesting that women are the “mothers” of the nation and only they have the capacity to reproduce it, hence should be guarded (Yuval-Davis, 2006 (1997)). Therefore, ethnicity should be looked at as intersected with gender, but also age, not as mere traditional factors in the analysis, but as a category which determines a lot of issues regarding subjective wellbeing when it is studied in Ukraine.

Many theoretical arguments above emphasized the importance of the association between wellbeing and social connectedness (including all forms of social capital) which has also been demonstrated empirically (Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2008; Diener, 1984; Diener & Suh, 2000; Veenhoven, 1996). While in this thesis I follow the idea that subjective wellbeing is shaped both by the social environment and by individual’s inner drivers or motivations, I give particular attention to the impact of social networks, support, general trust, and social capital, in both its formal and informal dimensions (Wallace & Abbott, 2009). In particular, trust is important for wellbeing because it ensures reciprocity and mutual help between people. Social connectedness influences wellbeing because it gives support and ability to rely on somebody in times of crisis, while it also helps in achieving goals.

Another factor that may influence the perception of social change and the feeling of collective trauma is age. Older and middle-age people may perceive social change differently compared to young people born in independent Ukraine and not recalling the period of transition. To demonstrate the influence of generations on the perception of social change, I
invoke R. Rose’s concept about the role of cultural and political socialization in political learning (Rose, 2007).

The cultural paradigm of political socialization claims that the changes in political attitudes are shaped by early childhood experiences and can be only slowly changed in later life. On the other hand, the institutional paradigm states that political relearning or socialization depends on the “net of present values”, i.e. current regime (Rose & Mishler, 2007). Therefore, when the regime is changing, the political attitudes are changing as well, and people who have not experienced the old regime may have dramatically different attitudes to political institutions than the people who did. Rose demonstrates empirically that the paradigms reinforce each other and mean that on the one hand, individuals are conditioned by their cultural experiences, while on the other, they are influenced by the institutional system they live in (Rose & Mishler, 2007).

Therefore it is reasonable to assume that the attitudes to political regimes will differ between generations and that they may potentially influence their sense of wellbeing by contributing, or not contributing, to their sense of trauma. If the assumption about generations holds, people born and living the first years of their lives during Stalin’s regime (before his death in 1953) hypothetically have different attitudes towards the political system and also cope with political and social change differently compared to those who were born and spent their childhood in independent Ukraine.

To test this argument, I use Rose’s categorization to define generations, as I believe that they reflect both the historical background and are empirically legitimate (Rose & Mishler, 2007). The first generation I define along with Rose as the “survivor” generation. It was born before 1945, and is the generation that not only witnessed Stalin’s regime of terror, but also World War II. This generation hypothetically may feel the strongest nostalgia towards the Soviet Union and also strongly experience a sense of anomie in society.

The second generation, born between 1945 and 1965, would be similarly called the “normal” generation. This generation witnessed both the Soviet rule and independent Ukraine, and was brought up under relatively stable and ‘normal’ circumstances. Exactly this group witnessed the expansion of the Soviet system into Eastern Europe and its rise as a world’s superpower (Rose & Mishler, 2007). This generation also lived through the stable but also most cynical
period of the Soviet rule, and hypothetically should show less nostalgia towards the Soviet past (Rose & Mishler, 2007).

The last generation is the “transition” generation that was born after 1965 and consists of those who witnessed “glasnost” and “perestroika”, a relatively freer period, and then the collapse of the regime. However this generation also includes those born too late to remember the Soviet rule (people born in early 1990s and later). Although it may be problematic to define the last generation so widely, empirical evidence shows that there is no significant difference between those younger and those older within the transition generation, at least in the Russian case (Rose & Mishler, 2007).

The research discussed in this section shows that any evaluation of subjective wellbeing in the post-communist countries must consider important qualifiers, such as gender, social capital, generations, and ethnicity. The intersections between these factors may shape people’s perceptions of social change and their outlooks on life. The next section will discuss the gender connection to social change and wellbeing a bit further.

**Impact of Soviet and Post-Soviet gender and family discourses on Women’s Perception of Social Change**

As the previous section suggested, main-stream sociology research deals with the influence of gender on subjective wellbeing somewhat superficially, without taking into account the insights from gender studies and feminist literature on how the gender discourses in the Soviet period and beyond may have influenced women’s perspectives and experience of social change. In this section, I elaborate on this point and suggest that gender discourses and the position of women in the Soviet system should be incorporated into the explanation of the difference between men’s and women’s subjective wellbeing.

The Soviet rule considered itself to be the most progressive in the world in terms of gender equality, and gave women major political rights and education, while also forcing them into employment (Gal & Kligman, 2000, p. 10). However, socialist policies were contradictory both in their rhetoric and the actual implementations of these laws. As Ashwin remarks, “They wanted workers as well as mothers, leaders as well as typists” (2000, p.4). These contradictions remained throughout the regime and I suggest they influenced women’s position both during the Soviet regime and after its collapse.
Thus, Ashwin discusses how the earlier Soviet policies towards women were difficult to achieve due to excessive ideological aspirations to eradicate the family as an institution (Ashwin, 2000). The major goal of the early Soviet governments was to increase female labour force participation and to liberate women from subordination centered in the family as a patriarchal institution. The Soviet state tried to undermine the legal importance of marriage in a church, turning it into the possibility of having a civil marriage or cohabitation status. This was problematic, since the privilege held by men in a family was still there: women still had to make the home the best and most comfortable place for the men and bring up their children, future revolutionaries, who were fighting for the benefit of the great Communist Revolution’s aims (Clements, 2004). This logically created a double burden for women instead of the promised liberation.

During the 1920s and 1930s industrialization, Stalin’s big plan was to liberate the women so that they could help to build and industrialize the Soviet Union. However, the aspiration in his plan was purely functional and it was not really concerned with improving women’s participation in society or fostering their equality (Zhurzhenko, 2004). The industrialization aspirations were still unable to eradicate the family completely, but in 1930s Stalin declared that the “women’s question” to be solved (Clements, 2004).

The changes between the 1920s-1950s showed that the policy was to reconstruct the family in a way, so that the state could become the new “father” for the society (Ashwin, 2000, p. 9). Rather than the family, the Soviet ideology was more concerned with the construction of a new Soviet identity, and its core discourse aimed to situate the self as belonging to a collective. Substituting the traditional patriarch in the family for “the father” state, the state spread its control to the private sphere and fostered a collective identity, constantly empowered by huge demonstrations and the rhetoric of “We” instead of “I”. (Massino & Penn, 2009).

In the 1950s the regime somewhat loosened. However, the new demographic crisis set in and the state needed to make individuals subordinate willingly (Ashwin, 2000). This required an adjustment in the discourses on women and family. The family was now reinvented in the Soviet ideology as a “cell” of society and hence a domain of state power. This meant further intrusion of the state into the private sphere. However, these contradictions made it quite difficult for the family as a “social cell” to work only for the benefit of the state. The family,
therefore, became a closed traditional domain, where reproduction would become a cornerstone.

In the 1970s-80s gender policies had not been changing much, and mainly reinforced the double burden of women as workers and carers of their families. Wives, even given the relative freedom of career choice, were still under the responsibility to follow their husbands (Clements, 2004). The state help was often insufficient, with kindergartens overcrowded, and food scarcity complicating the provision of basic needs with notorious queuing for hours in the shops (Spehar, 2005).

In the end, the Soviet regime did not succeed in creating the new family where men and women would be liberated from the burdens of patriarchy, but instead it created the Soviet family that would substitute the patriarch-father for the patriarch-state.

This excessive control of the private sphere by the state led to the opposite reaction, where the family became the “safe harbor” from the state (Zhurzhenko, 2004). Family as a safe space where one could hide from the overseeing State was also created through the mechanisms of fear. The phenomenon of “talks behind the closed doors” or “kitchen talks” was a vivid example of that. It meant that all the important conversations would often take place behind closed doors. Only the family and close friends could participate in them. In my view, the mechanism that caused this was similar to that of the panopticon (Foucault, 1995, p. 195): people feared the all-reaching supervision of the state and reacted to it by retreating to the private space of the family where they recreated the traditional forms of interaction between men and women.

With independence, throughout the 1990’s, the “politics of women and family” in Ukraine has combined several discourses that were basically following the Soviet ones, such as the still existing ideas of the Soviet egalitarian model, the “protection of motherhood” and continued to reflect the relationship between the state and the women established earlier in the Soviet system. Even now, it is difficult to find a gender equality agenda in the political discourse of Ukraine.

This led many post-Soviet and Western feminist researchers to fear that after all the progress of the Soviet gender policies, women would return to neo-familialism after the collapse (Zhurzhenko, 2004). However, in my opinion, this is not at all the case, since one can conclude that familialism was very much present throughout the regime. Moreover,
familism was enhanced by the same regime indirectly, making it a form of passive protest against the intrusive paternalist state (Clements, 2004). Therefore it is not correct to say that after the collapse in 1991 Ukrainian women were brought back to familism, and all the progress made by the Soviet Union erased.

This section has demonstrated that the Soviet gender policies and the policies of independent Ukraine did not succeed in liberating women and providing gender equality. When the collapse of the Soviet Union occurred, women were “hidden” within the family and may have witnessed the major social change differently than men, whose major domain was outside the family.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have shown that Ukraine went through a dramatic social change which may have been experienced as a social trauma. Various statistics from the 1990-1994 period show that the collapse of the Soviet Union was hitting women less strongly than men, and I set out to investigate why this was the case.

I suggest that one way to study social trauma is to look at subjective wellbeing. Literature on subjective wellbeing shows that it is culturally and contextually relational and specific, but the influence of societal change on wellbeing in the intersection of gender, ethnic and generational aspects is so far studied insufficiently in the post-soviet context of Ukraine.

The gender and ethnicity dimensions may be crucial in determining the impact of social change on wellbeing, especially in Ukraine, for which regional differences are the core of politics. As I showed in my theoretical section on the policies and discourses on women, women were situated mainly in the family domain, and they may have different perceptions of transition and the trauma associated with it.

In addition, the perception of social change is most likely to be different for different generations, because every generation was brought up in different regimes. Therefore all these factors: gender, ethnicity and generation, must be taken into account while explaining the impact of social change at the individual level. I do it in my thesis in a quantitative way, looking at the subjective wellbeing of men and women as indicator of whether social change influenced wellbeing and led to collective trauma in Ukraine, and then in a qualitative way by
investigating the actual meanings, experiences and strategies of dealing with collective trauma on the individual level of the Russian and Ukrainian women that I interviewed.

In studying the effects of social change at macro- and individual level, I am guided by David Lockwood’s (1962) observation that the dual positioning of any social actor-- as a social actor on one hand, as part of the social system on the other -- is artificial. In this paper, similarly to Lockwood, I challenge the functionalist distinction between structure and agency. Using Lockwood’s thesis as analytical tool, I can examine social change on a structural level and from a system perspective while also changing and positioning myself in the social domain of the habitus in Bourdieu’s terms. Furthermore, following M. Perkman, I argue that the dichotomy between agency and structure is less clear if actors are perceived as reflexive and knowledgeable (Perkmann, 1998, p. 501), and therefore structure and agency may be considered in process terms. Seeing them as processes is giving me more analytical power to see the subjects of my study not as victims of social change, but as agents of it. Hence this thesis takes up a perspectivistic position, as a possibility of the researcher to shift between those levels of analysis.
Chapter 2 Methodology of the Project: Studying Collective Trauma in the Former Soviet Union

Research Questions and Focus of the Study

Earlier in the thesis I presented approaches to studying subjective wellbeing and the institutional and discursive position of women as a group during the Soviet Union and the first years after its collapse. Most of the research I reviewed, however, did not specifically look into subjective wellbeing of women as an indicator of how they perceived social change and related it to the social trauma of the Soviet collapse. Secondly, very few studies dealt with the issues of collective trauma and social change in Ukraine. Since I am investigating collective trauma both on the societal and individual levels, my research is divided into two parts, and address and answers different aspects of the research question.

The research question of this study is to understand whether the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing social change led to collective trauma and how it has been experienced by different generations of women in Ukraine. Since Alexander (2004) and Sztompka (2000) argued that major social changes can undermine the wellbeing of people and cause collective trauma, I specify this general question in relation to the quantitative study as how the large-scale social change associated with the Soviet collapse has affected subjective wellbeing of Ukrainians. I answer this question by investigating the subjective wellbeing and the way it is influenced by the social change. Therefore, the unique perspective of this study aspires to link social change with subjective wellbeing in the context of Ukraine, where I am guided by Alexander’s (2004) and Sztompka’s (2000) notion that social change and collective trauma are undermining social wellbeing and investigate whether there are any differences in subjective wellbeing between men and women in Ukraine. Aspects of the research question that I study in the qualitative part are how some Russian and Ukrainian women experienced social change and collective trauma in a specific region of Ukraine, the city of Lviv, and what were their main strategies to cope with it. The ethnic specification is a necessary aspect for this study, since judging from the current events in Ukraine, the question of being a Russian or Ukrainian is causing a lot of public debate and conflict around the country.

While the quantitative study investigates whether subjective wellbeing of the population at large was affected by large-scale social change and collective trauma, only the qualitative research can illuminate the meanings of the collective trauma and social change for a specific group of the population, in this case the women. Qualitative research deals with people’s
experiences of the social change, their fears and hopes. It puts flesh and substance into the abstract notion of subjective wellbeing. Hence I aim to find out how social change affected the lives of the interviewed women and what strategies of dealing with social change they were using. I investigate whether these strategies were conscious or unconscious, active or passive, and whether they differed for the different generations and ethnicities in the families. The life stories and family memories can provide a different understanding of the experience of change and collective trauma.

Therefore, in this study I employ a mixed method research design in order to investigate the stated research questions. In my opinion, the usage of both qualitative and quantitative techniques provides the study with a wider perspective. Even though my quantitative inquiry precedes the qualitative one, I look at them as complementary and enriching tools to study society. One of the great aspects about mixed methods research design is that biases inherent in any single method could neutralize or cancel the biases of other methods (Creswell, 2003, p. 15). In the following sections I outline the methodology for both the quantitative and qualitative parts.

**Quantitative Analysis of Subjective Wellbeing in Ukraine in Post-Communist Period**

**Specification of the Research Question for the Quantitative analysis**

My quantitative analysis considers how social change leads to collective trauma through investigation of how social change is affecting subjective well-being of the people in Ukraine. Therefore, I understand subjective wellbeing as a proxy measure of the collective trauma, meaning that these two notions are interrelated and subjective wellbeing has the power to indicate at least partly the existence of collective trauma.

I examine whether men and women of different generations evaluate their wellbeing differently and whether it is affected by the social change, which I understand through nostalgia for the Soviet Union and evaluations of the current regime. I argue that measuring attitudes towards social change by looking at the attitudes towards past and present is a good way to capture this phenomenon.

On the more specific level I am interested in how specific components of subjective wellbeing are dependent on gender and generation and other qualifiers of subjective wellbeing. In addition, I am interested in what factors, apart from gender and generations,
that are significant in influencing different attitudes towards the past (nostalgia for the Soviet Union) and the present regime (Satisfaction with the current government).

**Model and Argument**

As discussed in the theoretical part, it is of more explanatory value to research subjective wellbeing through its different components (Diener, 1984). In this thesis, I suggest that Economic, Psychological, Physical and Socio-Political components constitute General subjective wellbeing. In addition, the measures of social change, such as nostalgia for the Soviet Union and satisfaction with the current regime, may also affect general subjective wellbeing, and show the possible existence of a collective trauma.

Judging from previous research and theoretical discussions, those four components are logically and empirically associated with subjective wellbeing. Here I present the arguments for the choice of these components

**The economic component:** In the thesis the economic component reflects economic satisfaction of the respondent. Economic wellbeing is one of the crucial components and is always taken into account when looking at the general wellbeing (Diener & Suh, 2000), since the basic needs of every individual depend on the economic situation s/he lives in. I expect in the Ukrainian case this component to have the most influence and explain most of the variance in the General subjective wellbeing. I believe so considering Inglehart’s research that showed that countries with lower economic development tend to put more value on material possessions than “postmaterialist” issues (Inglehart, 1986). As to gender and generational differences, I expect that gender will not be a significant factor influencing general subjective wellbeing, since the economic situation may be equally bad for everyone and affect general statements. However, I suggest that generational differences will be apparent, with younger people being more satisfied with the economic situation, since they may be receiving some economic help from their parents while also working themselves.

**The physical component (health):** Health is one of the most used components for studying wellbeing, since if one is not healthy s/he cannot live fully. Especially a lot of research on health as an indicator of wellbeing has been carried out by international organizations as well as academic researchers (Wallace & Abbott, 2009) (HITT-cis, 2014) (The World Health Organization, 2014). I expect this component to be different for different generations and in
regards to gender, where women will be more likely to state that their health is good than men will.

**The psychological component (happiness and distress):** This component in the literature on subjective wellbeing is often regarded as a synonym for General subjective wellbeing (Diener, 1984) (Veenhoven, 1996). However, in my opinion, it is a separate component that constitutes General subjective wellbeing together with other components discussed here. The peculiarity of this component in terms of this thesis is that, in my opinion, this is the component that would reflect collective trauma mostly.

I divide the psychological component into two indicators – happiness and malaise (or distress). It is important to have both positive and negative measures in the subjective wellbeing analysis, since subjective wellbeing is “the sum of good and bad aspects” (Veenhoven, 2008). It will also show more fully the multidimensionality of the psychological component of subjective wellbeing.

I expect this component to be dependent on gender and generations, with older women feeling worse than everyone else, as according to Inglehart’s study discussed earlier (Inglehart, 2002). Under happiness I understand the underlying psychological state of satisfaction with life (Veenhoven, 2008), and under malaise I understand the anxiety, stress, exhaustion, fatigue and pessimistic ideas about the future.

**The socio-political component:** This component indicates satisfaction with different social policies of the government at the time of interview and is one of the measures of social change. Though it is not the most common indicator used for subjective wellbeing research, I argue that satisfaction with the socio-political system where people live is important, especially regarding research on collective trauma from the collapse of the Soviet Union. It will also show their comfort in living within the current system. In addition, together with the indicator of Nostalgia for the Soviet Union, this component is reflecting respondents’ attitudes towards the change of the political system.

I expect there will be low satisfaction with the present government and the political system due to the general disappointment with politics as corrupted. Moreover, I suggest that there is also a low interest in political life, due to the disbelief that any person could change anything. I consider this to be continuity from the Soviet times, where the totalitarian regime only allowed certain types of political attitudes and activity.
**Nostalgia for the Soviet Union:** This factor indicates (together with the socio-political) attitudes towards social change. It is measured by the attitudes towards the collapse of the Soviet Union. I expect that it will significantly influence general subjective wellbeing. Therefore, together with the socio-political component they both measure the past and the present, and I believe that will indicate the existence of a collective trauma.

Generally all of these components were analyzed in regards to two dimensions. Firstly, I checked how much each component explains the general wellbeing. This was done with the aim of assessing how these components are contributing to the general wellbeing, and what is their comparative impact. The second dimension of my analysis is controlling for gender, age (specified in generations), social connectedness or social capital, social trust and social class (measured by income and education).

Social connectedness creates social capital, which in turn boosts wellbeing and helps to overcome personal moments of crisis, which could be resulting from the collective trauma as well. I use social capital in my study in its informal and formal dimensions, similarly to R. Rose (Rose, 1998). Theoretically, informal social capital, consisting of close ties such as family, friends, neighbours, should be more valuable and more contributive to subjective wellbeing than the formal one, consisting of membership in organizations and participation.

Therefore, it is important to thoroughly consider the relationship between social connectedness/social capital and wellbeing. I also control for social class. It is often that proxies for social class, such as income, rarely reflect social class in the post-Soviet region, since there often is an imbalance between the level of income and status of the work (Wallace, et al., 2010). It may therefore be useful to control for social class with education and subjective positioning on a “social ladder”, which gives an opportunity for respondents to evaluate and put themselves into an appropriate social level. Controlling for generations, as discussed above, I expect differences regarding different components of subjective wellbeing. In summary, the relation between social capital, social class, generations, gender and wellbeing is the main focus of this study.

**Methods and Data**
To check the relationships mentioned above, I am using different correlation tests (with association strength tests), Ordinary Linear Regressions, Binary Logistic Regressions and Multinomial Logistic Regression (Pallant, 2007) (Allison, 1999). I investigate the
correlations between subjective wellbeing and nostalgia in order to conclude whether collective trauma is associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union (Pallant, 2007).

I use Ordinary Linear Regressions for measuring the variance in General subjective wellbeing when it is a scale explained by different components. I also use the Ordinary Linear Regression when investigating the factors that affect satisfaction with the current government.

I use Binary Logistics Regression in order to investigate the likelihood of binary outcome of negative attitudes towards the collapse of the Soviet Union that is investigating nostalgia for the Soviet Union.

I conduct this analysis with the data from the ‘Health in Times of Transition’ project (HITT) carried out in 9 post-Soviet countries in 2010 and 2011, including Ukraine3 (HITT-cis, 2014). The Project provides data to analyze the state of health, healthcare and lifestyles in the region. Apart from health issues, the survey also includes data on health and health risk behaviours', and on challenges and strategies of their overcoming in relation to social policies. This means that the survey also incorporated questions on the social environments of respondents, including such indicators as government policies satisfaction, social trust, social capital and social support (HITT-cis, 2014). Hence, the project examines health and its socio-economic determinants in the countries witnessing transition periods after the collapse of Soviet Union. One of the main attributes of the data is that the survey was held in all the regions of Ukraine. However, there is no question indicating the regional identity of the respondents. This means that the regional variations in respondent views cannot be traced, although in my project they would be important to discern due to cultural and ethnic differences in the regional composition.

3 http://www.hitt-cis.net The project was funded through the Seventh Framework Program of the European Union (FP7-Health) under the leadership of Prof. Haerpher, University of Aberdeen. I am grateful to the Aberdeen team for letting me use the data in this analysis..
Studying Collective Trauma through Qualitative Interviews: Methodology and Reflections

Specification of the Research Question for the Qualitative Part

My specified research questions for the qualitative part of the study are: How did the interviewed women of different generations within the Ukrainian and Russian families experience the social change connected with the collapse of the Soviet Union?

I answer this question by interviewing three generations of women from 5 different families (13 women). In studying these women’s perception of social change, I hope to assess how major social changes are felt at the individual level, i.e. through women’s own assessment. In addition, I wanted to see whether the relationships and positions of the women in those families fit into the familialism models described in the literature, and whether trauma as a memory and a sense is transmitted through generations that remember the actual end of the Soviet Union to those who did not witness it at all. Hence I hypothesized that while different generations of these women will have different evaluations of their wellbeing, they will have similar views on the impact of the Soviet breakdown, because of these shared family memories.

In addition to women, I interviewed two men of the youngest generation. Realizing that two cases are not sufficient for a gender comparison, I view these cases just to see if the youngest generation of women is different to the youngest population of men who were born at the end of the Soviet Union. However, I am not discussing them in this thesis. In my opinion, to study men’s perceptions of social change and their experiences of collective trauma, further investigations are needed.

I study these women’s perception of the social change by answering several specific questions. First, I look if various generations of the family have different feelings regarding the events before and after collapse of the Soviet Union. Secondly, I am interested in knowing whether women from different ethnic groups perceived social change differently, and thus whether those women faced the collective trauma in different ways. If so, what is the essence of this difference, and what strategies to overcome the collective trauma were employed by them? Finally, I examine the generational differences in how interviewees evaluate and experience the current crisis in Ukraine in order to see their attitudes towards the future.
Unlike most research on experiences of women during transitional times, which analyses gender discourses and their implications, I was interested in how ordinary women actually feel about social change and what notions they internalize and reproduce socially. My study intended to analyze subjectivity as the only possible thing to be objective about (Haraway, 1988).

Although the research questions in the qualitative part were designed to illuminate, understand and elaborate some of the findings of the quantitative part of the project, this is not to say that my qualitative study is somehow secondary to the quantitative. Since I am using a mixed method research design, I want to illuminate the meanings of the social change that caused the collective trauma, and to get a limited insight to which strategies was employed by the women that I interviewed. Therefore, it is needed to emphasize that I am not trying to generalize these 15 interviews to the societal level, but to get a clue of possible strategies employed by the interviewed women.

**Method of the qualitative study**
The qualitative part was implemented through unstructured qualitative interviews about women’s experiences of social change. I conducted 15 unstructured interviews in the Western Ukrainian city of L’viv, of which I am a native. My goal was to look into these women’s experiences of social change and the meanings of collective trauma and strategies of coping with it by asking about their personal life story. I wanted the interviewees themselves to talk about the periods in their lives which they considered as the most important, the brightest and the most emotional.

Although I had a guide of conversation in case the interviewee was not able to talk about her life experience unprompted, my themes were open-ended and sometimes even philosophical, so that I could have an interviewee start talking in general and then express the generalities through her own experiences. My preliminary interview guide evolved around questions and topics similar to those in the quantitative research, since I was aiming to relate the two parts and let them reinforce each other.\(^4\)

Moreover, I considered not only how respondents experienced the events, but also how they felt emotionally, physically, and economically in particular political systems (following the logics of the components of subjective wellbeing). I did not address these subtle issues

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\(^4\) For the interview guide see appendix D
directly, but instead asked respondents to answer how they thought people felt and looked like during those periods to make them compare and position themselves within the social environment. Most interviewees were very open to me and provided abundant information.

**Sampling and description of Interviewees**

As discussed above my major sampling unit was families. I collected the life stories of three generations of women in five separate families (women born before 1945, born between 1946-1965 and between 1966 and 1991).

My search for the families had the character of a snowball method. I started with a Ukrainian family, who I found through my mother’s friends. They led me to another Ukrainian family, and those lead me to the third one. This may have caused a problem since there was a big similarity between those families in terms of class. But, considering that those three families were found with the help of different generations from each family, those families were not close to each other.

Apart from gender, another analytical dimension was ethnicity. Thus my sample included three ethnic Ukrainian and two Russian families. The roots of the Ukrainian families are mostly in the Western part of the country; they speak Ukrainian in everyday life and identify themselves as Ukrainians. The other two families identify themselves as Russian or Russian Ukrainians. The first Russian family has its roots in Southern Ukraine. Their ancestor was in military and moved to L’viv in the late 19th century. The family identifies themselves as Russian, but considers Ukraine their country: “Ukraine is our home, our country” (Sonja, pensioner). The second family considers themselves Russian, and the oldest generation they talk about is a 19th century Moscow-born soldier.

Since the interviews were confidential, all the names were changed. However, it is of great importance to know which generation, background and identity respondents associate themselves with. Therefore, in this section I will give a rough description of every interviewee. The following list gives a short description of my interviewees.

**Ukrainian families:**

**Family I:**
- Oxana: in her 80s, worked as a doctor for all her life, pensioner now
- Sofia: in her 40s, dentist
- Taras: in his 18-20s, medical student

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5 The interviewer-interviewee agreement was signed (see appendix)
Family II:
Marta: in her 80s, head of factory, pensioner now
Julia: in her late 40s, head of security at airport
Olja: in her early 20s, unemployed, part time student

Family III:
Kateryna: 80s, was a head teacher, now pensioner
Galja: 40s, high school arts teacher
Sasha: 20s, dentist

Russian families:

Family IV:
Maria: 80s, pensioner, teacher before
Lida: 40s, shop assistant
Tanja: 20s, high school teacher

Family V:
Sonja: 80s, doctor, pensioner now
Svjeta: late 40s, restaurant business owner
Solja: 20s, student, part time work at mother’s restaurants and hotels

Interviewer's Influences on the Outcomes of the interviews

Before proceeding to the actual analysis of the material, I find it important to outline what circumstances might have been influential on the interviews: my demographic characteristics, place of interview, external events and the limited number of the interviews.

First of all being a woman had a significant impact on my research. And together with Oakley, who emphasizes that some areas of female respondents’ lives are often described by them in a way that they would expect only the female interviewer to understand simply because they are both women, I would argue that this impact is positive (Finch, 1993, p. 170).

Secondly I come from an ethnic Ukrainian family, and my mother tongue is Ukrainian. I do speak Russian, but it is not perfect and in terms of research, after thorough thinking which language I should speak with my Russian interviewees, I decided to speak Ukrainian. This was a major implication, but also it highlighted the mechanisms of creating ones identity through comparison or opposition to the “others”. While talking, women from both Russian families (except for the youngest generation, in both cases) constantly used a language like: “unlike you, we just abruptly started to feel what it means to be Russian” (interview 3). Or when I heard Maria struggling with Ukrainian we had this dialogue:
“Self: You can speak Russian if you find it easier, I don’t really care which language you will talk to me.

Maria (emotionally, raising her voice): I can speak Ukrainian! In fact I can speak a lot of languages!!”

This emotional answer to my comment is showing a desire to prove that she is capable of changing her identity and that it is something really specific and unique to her. Moreover, this kind of angry reply is showing that initially Maria is contradicting and opposing the two of us.

Lastly, for me personally it was a challenge to be as much uninvolved in emotional responses as I could. Since I come from a Ukrainian family, certain historical points and ideas, together with my own attitudes towards certain events were often contradictory to what the Russian families would say.

The location of interviews may also have had influences on the outcomes of the interviews. The city of L’viv is unique in some ways. First of all it is the home for very different ethnic groups. During the Soviet period a big amount of Russians were brought to Lviv because of army policy; before World War II there were big Jewish and Polish communities (Wendland, 2008). With that historical multi-ethnicity this region is rich on different memories.

Secondly, it is regarded to be a “nationalist” capital of Ukraine, especially now during the Revolution of 2014. The discourse that L’viv is full of nationalists who hate Russians is really viable, and it is, unfortunately, escalating in the Eastern part at the time of my writing this thesis. This I consider to be an interesting angle for my research, since it gives me the opportunity to study different families in one space.

A new period of social change that developed in Ukraine during my fieldwork undoubtedly has affected my findings as well. The escalation of the events in Ukraine during the interviews particularly influenced the Ukrainian-Russian relationship on the country level. The Crimean crises occurred just when I had half of my interviews done, and influenced the others a lot, especially the general mood of all the people, no matter Russians or Ukrainians.

One may argue that considering the political crisis in Ukraine that for the last few months was escalating and at this point may have all chances to get warlike characteristics, the aim of this part of my research was to see how women perceive higher levels of crisis and how that
affects their personal ideas about the future. This is of interest since theoretically such critical points should create general social cohesion and a sense of unity (Durkheim, 2001).

**Limitations of the Project**

The main limitation of the thesis is that data for the quantitative analysis is dated 2012, and the qualitative part with interviews was conducted in the beginning of 2014, when the revolution in Ukraine was on its peak. This certainly influenced the answers I got and shifted the emphasis of the conversation to the constantly changed realities of revolution. These two materials were also different in terms of social activism, and several measures I believe would show different values if they were asked in 2014. Therefore, the results I got from the data analysis seem sometimes contradictory to the statements I heard during the interviews.

Secondly, I am Ukrainian, and my interest in the topic, especially now through the turbulent times in the country, is influenced by this. It was also my position as a Ukrainian woman that both challenged and helped me to conduct the interviews. Generally I think though that I succeeded in keeping my point of view as much inside of me. Often contradicting my beliefs I had to nod my head and listen to the voices of all the women.

However, each of these limitations also could be seen in a positive light. Having differences between the quantitative data of 2012 and the qualitative material from 2014 highlights the change of behaviour and attitudes in the times of the possible next social change. In addition, asking people about how they feel in times of actual crisis would also be a good visualization of some of the theoretical points discussed in the paper.

Last but not least, the limited number of interviews (only five families) can only give an idea of which experiences, meanings and strategies the women in my study used. Therefore, the study is not generalizable.
Chapter 3 Analysis of HITI data on Subjective Well-Being

In this chapter I am presenting results of my quantitative analysis of the subjective wellbeing, while the next chapter will analyze qualitative interviews on perception of social change and presence of collective trauma among women in Ukraine. Since my quantitative analysis is overarching and reflects not only the positions of women but the overall subjective wellbeing of all Ukrainian respondents, it is logical to present the analysis in this order.

The main goal of my quantitative analysis is to see how social change affects subjective wellbeing of Ukrainians, and the main model I am testing is the following: to what extent subjective wellbeing is influenced by the economic situation, health, distress, happiness, satisfaction with government policies and nostalgia for the Soviet Union. I use this model because the literature argues that health and the economic situation influence subjective wellbeing strongly, while happiness and distress are synonymous to the notion of subjective wellbeing. However, I extend the model with the factors of social change, measured through satisfaction with current government and nostalgia for the Soviet regime. These factors are important in order to check the theoretical basis of subjective wellbeing in Ukraine and whether there are any special aspects of it, and secondly to see how much social change influences general subjective wellbeing while affecting its components.

The main hypotheses I test in the quantitative analysis are:

- General subjective wellbeing is significantly affected by all five factors (health, economic situation, happiness and distress, and social change).
- The economic situation is expected to have the strongest influence on the general subjective wellbeing.
- Health is expected to be the second strongest factor that influences general subjective wellbeing.
- Happiness and distress are both expected to have significantly strong effect on general subjective wellbeing; however, less so than the economic and health factors.
- Social change is expected to have a significant negative effect on the general subjective wellbeing, where dissatisfaction with current regime and nostalgia for the Soviet Union are expected to worsen general subjective wellbeing.

The second set of hypothesis relates to the controls I use: gender, generations, marital status, social class and social capital.
- There are gender and generational differences in how respondents evaluate their general wellbeing. Men are expected to evaluate their wellbeing worse than women. Younger generations are expected to evaluate their general wellbeing better.

- Social capital is expected to be partly significant: informal social capital is expected to have significant positive effect on the general wellbeing, while formal social capital is expected to be not significant.

- Marital status is expected to be significantly influencing general subjective wellbeing, where those who are married are expected to evaluate their wellbeing higher than those who are single, divorced or widowed.

- Social class is expected to highly affect general subjective wellbeing, meaning that those of higher social class are expected to rate their general wellbeing more positively than those who are of lower social class.

My analysis in this chapter consists of two parts. First, I assess the relative importance of economic situation, health, happiness and distress, and social change (satisfaction with government policies and nostalgia for the Soviet Union) in predicting the subjective wellbeing of Ukrainian respondents. Then I rerun the same model in order to control for gender, generations, marital status, social class and social capital. Secondly, I present how these control factors predict attitudes to social change.

**Main Variables and their operationalization**

At this point it is important to highlight and explain all the proxies and indicators, together with created indexes and logics for regressions. I am starting with explanations how I operationalized the main variables.

I measure general subjective wellbeing with the “General life satisfaction” question, which asked respondents how satisfied they are with their lives in general. I advocate this choice with the idea that wellbeing is associated with life satisfaction in theory and this connection has been demonstrated empirically (Veenhoven, 1996). This is my dependent variable. For the economic wellbeing component I use the “Satisfaction with household economic situation”, since household economic situation better reflects the economic situation for survivor and transitional generations, as they are more likely to depend on other people than a normal generation.
The health component was measured by the subjective evaluation of one’s health as good or bad. The choice of using the subjective measure is based on the belief that it better reflects individual wellbeing in terms of health than other “objective” measures such as visits to doctor, using medicine, etc. The psychological component is measured by two indicators that through Principal Component Analysis appeared to be one component. These are the distress index (or malaise) and happiness. The index of distress that I constructed encompasses: stress, anxiety, loneliness, exhaustion, and others (see appendix B). Combining these variables into one index was justified with Cronbach’s alpha test of (0.8). The second proxy for the psychological component is happiness, measured by a single question “how happy are you?”

The last component attempts to capture attitudes to social change by measuring nostalgia for the Soviet Union and satisfaction with the current (for 2012) political regime. It can be named a Socio-Political component, since it also reflects the respondents’ comfort within a certain political system. I investigate this component with a compound measure of several variables: satisfaction with democracy, government, health care system, local authorities, and others (the full list is presented in appendix B). These variables have shown the eligibility to be computed into one scale with Cronbach alpha of .87. The nostalgia for the Soviet Union is measured by a single question: “What was the impact of the end of the Soviet Union on living standards?”

While my first model examines influence of these factors on the general subjective wellbeing, my second one introduces several important control variables. First, the most important for the research topic are the controls on gender and generations. Generations were calculated following R. Rose’s research as described and argued in the theoretical part. I transformed age into three generations, where the first group consists of those born before 1945, and who are now between 67 and 100 years old. They are the “survivor generation”. The second group is the “normal” generation and consists of people aged between 47 and 66 years old, born before 1965, while the third group - the “transitional” generation, consists of those born after 1965 aged between 18 and 46 years. In the case of these three generations it is important to remember that the biggest group is the transitional generation. Since this logically reflects any society (the transitional group is composed of those born after 1965) and considering that standard deviation for every computed group was quite similar between themselves, it is

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6 For the full descriptive statistics, please see Appendix A
possible for me to rely on the theoretical division of generations suggested by Rose and empirically reproduce them in this study. In addition, since the sample is balanced and reflects the general population distribution, with more women than men, in every generation women have a higher representation. However, since women also have a higher life expectancy in Ukraine (The World Bank, 2014) they are also represented in the survivor generation more than men are.

The second important variable is gender, while the third control is social capital. As previously discussed, I operationalize social capital into formal, informal social capital, and generalized social trust. Formal social capital is measured by an index of participation (Cronbach’s alpha .87), that includes questions whether respondent took part in any strikes and demonstrations; and by an index of membership, based on more than .5 Cronbach’s alpha, consisting of questions whether respondent is a member of an organization, including such organizations as non-governmental organizations, women organizations and youth organizations.

Informal social capital is measured by the index of social connectedness (Cronbach’s alpha .5), consisting of questions how often respondents meet with their relatives, friends and neighbors; and by an index of social support (Cronbach’s alpha .7), consisting of questions whether respondent has any person to talk to, to get help from in crisis, to be yourself with, who appreciates you and comforts you when you are upset (see appendix B).

Social class is an important control variable to see the possible imbalances of economic situation and actual economic social class. Since in the post-Soviet area social class is seldom associated with actual earnings, I measure it by subjective positioning on the “ladder of income” and education. The “income ladder” was a single question whether respondents would put themselves on the higher, medium or lower step of income. Education was also measured by a single question. Marital status is an important control in regards to the theme of the study. It is of importance to see whether “familial” networks are influencing subjective wellbeing.

**Subjective Wellbeing of Ukrainian Respondents**

I am starting this analysis with giving the results of the linear regression model for general subjective wellbeing with the five earlier proposed components as predictors, and then for both the predictors and the control variables. The model aims to show how much explanatory
power each of these components has comparatively. Hence subjective wellbeing is regressed on satisfaction with household finances, the index of happiness, the index of distress, health, satisfaction with government and nostalgia for the Soviet Union in the first model, while the second model is the same model with controls.

Table 1. Ordinary Linear Regression Models of General Subjective Wellbeing on Economic Situation, Health, Happiness and Distress, Nostalgia for the Soviet Union and Satisfaction with Current Government; and controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Subjective Wellbeing</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic situation</td>
<td>.642 (.001)***</td>
<td>.610 (.001)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collapse of the SU had negative impact on living standards</td>
<td>-.035 (.189)</td>
<td>-.008 (.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>.086 (.001)***</td>
<td>.049 (.05)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfaction with Government</td>
<td>-.016 (.44)</td>
<td>-.024 (.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distress</td>
<td>-.113 (.001)***</td>
<td>-.117 (.001)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness</td>
<td>.034 (.086)</td>
<td>.031 (.142)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal social capital: Participation</td>
<td>.03 (.165)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal social capital: Membership</td>
<td>.017 (.413)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal social capital: Support</td>
<td>.044 (.05)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal social capital: Frequency of meetings with close ties</td>
<td>.000 (.991)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalized social trust</td>
<td>.028 (.177)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social class: High position on income ladder</td>
<td>.017 (.44)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social class: Low position on income ladder</td>
<td>-.039 (.099)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social class: Primary education</td>
<td>-.008 (.717)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social class: Higher education</td>
<td>.06 (.05)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (men)</td>
<td>-.034 (.115)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Survivor” generation</td>
<td>-.058 (.05)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Normal” generation</td>
<td>-.05 (.05)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>.043 (.05)*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>.3 (.233)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R²                                   | .52     | .54     |
Observations                          | 1223    | 1100    |

a. Dependent Variable: V018 General Life Satisfaction (scale 1 to 10)  
b. Reference category for Nostalgia for the Soviet Union is “Positive and no impact”  
c. Reference category for Income ladder is “Medium”  
d. Reference category for Marital status is “Married”  
e. Reference category for Gender is “Female”  
f. Reference category for Generations is “Transitional generation”  
g. Ref. Educ. “Secondary”
The first model is significant and explains 52% of the variance in General Subjective Wellbeing (p<.001). The strongest predictor is Economic situation, meaning that those who rate their economic situation better also score higher on General Subjective Wellbeing. The second strongest predictor is one of the indicators of the Psychological component – Distress. It has a negative value and means that those who feel less distressed, are scoring higher on General Subjective Wellbeing. The third strongest predictor is Health, indicating that those people, who rate their health as good, are generally scoring higher on General Wellbeing.

The predictors that indicate perceptions of social change through Nostalgia for the Soviet Union and Satisfaction with current Government are both not significant. This may mean that social change is not consciously perceived and may be explained together with control variables. However, interestingly Happiness is not significant. Unlike general literature on wellbeing which states that Happiness is highly associated with General Wellbeing, Ukrainian respondents show that though Happiness and Wellbeing are significantly associated at a certain scale when nothing else is there (exp (b)= .075, p<.001), when other components are added, it loses its significance. This may be a specific aspect of the Ukrainian post-Soviet context, - the “Soviet effect”, - which means that people stop thinking about happiness when they think about economy or health. Instead, they start being distressed.

Model 2 explains 54% of the variance (p<.001) in General Subjective Wellbeing and shows that all the main significant components from Model 1 remain significant, but the values are dropping (except for Distress where the value actually grows). This may indicate that some of the controls are explaining some of the components. In addition, the still not significant Satisfaction with Government gains a stronger value, while the Nostalgia for the Soviet Union remains non-significant, but loses value. This slight shift indicates that control variables are actually explanatory in terms of perception of social change. The controls may be partially explaining the Nostalgia for the Soviet Union and Satisfaction with Government. Therefore, it can still be concluded that social change has an impact on General Subjective Wellbeing.

As to the controls, the strongest are generations, showing a negative value, and hence indicate that both “normal” and “survivor” generations are less likely to score high values on General Subjective Wellbeing compared to the “transitional” generation. In my opinion, this further proves that those generations that actually witnessed the Soviet regime and its collapse are less satisfied with their life than the generation that either witnessed it when they were very
young, or did not witness it at all. The second strongest control variable is the indicator of Informal social capital, social support. This result supports the theory that family and close ties in Ukraine are prevalent and people mostly need to have traditional networks in order to be satisfied. However, the next significant control is marriage, where divorced people are more likely to be satisfied with life than those who are married. In combination those two show that it is important to have a strong familial network, but not that marriage is necessary for subjective well-being. However, this argument needs further research. The weakest yet still significant control is education, meaning that those with higher education are expected to be more satisfied with their lives. Since theoretically I consider education to measure partially social class, it can be suggested that people with higher education have more access to benefits which make their lives better.

Overall, this model shows that the economic situation, distress, health, informal social ties, education and generations do influence people’s wellbeing, while gender and the social change variables did not have the impact I expected. Very importantly, introducing the control variables made happiness, the conventional indicator of wellbeing, insignificant in the Ukrainian case.

**Perception of the Social Change by Ukrainian Respondents: Nostalgia for the Soviet Union and Satisfaction with the current Political Regime**

In the thesis I am interested in investigating how social change connected to the collapse of the Soviet Union affected Ukrainians’ wellbeing. However, in the analysis above, the indicators of social change were not significant, while most probably explained with the control variables, such as generations, marital status, social class and social capital.

Since the generation component were significant and a strong predictor for General Subjective Wellbeing, and its presence changed the values on the indicators of Social Change, the hypothesis that there is a difference in perceiving social change by generations gets its empirical basis. In this subchapter I investigate separately the social change indicators – Nostalgia for the Soviet Union and Satisfaction with the current (2012) Government.
Table 2. Percentage of those who rated the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union vs Satisfaction with current Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact of the end of the Soviet Union</th>
<th>Satisfaction with the current Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>positive and no impact</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>negative impact</td>
<td>716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>31.6%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1023</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen from table 2, the majority of respondents rated the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union on their living standards as negative. In addition those who rate this impact as negative, are also mostly dissatisfied with the current government. This may indicate that negative perception of the social change is associated also with the negative perception of the current regime.

To further check whether this phenomenon may be explained by the control variable from the previous subchapter, I ran Binary logistics regression first for Nostalgia for the Soviet Union, and then for Satisfaction with the current government (table 3).

The model for the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union pictured in table 3 was significant (p<.001). The strongest factor is being widowed, which indicates that widowed respondents are more than two times more likely to negatively evaluate the impacts of the collapse of the Soviet Union on living standards than those who are married. In my opinion, this indicates first of all, that probably those who are widowed are mostly in the older generations and also that their spouse may have died after the collapse. Therefore, the independence is associated with the death of a spouse. The second strongest factor is generations, with “survivor” and “normal” generations being almost two times more likely to negatively evaluate the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union on living standards than the “transitional” generation. The next strongest factor is indicating that those who consider themselves to be on a lower income level are more likely to evaluate negatively the collapse of the Soviet Union. In addition, the same logic goes for those with primary education.

Therefore, it may be concluded that people from a lower social class would be more likely to
feel nostalgic for the Soviet Union. The last factor is participation with a negative value, indicating that those people who participate in demonstrations and strikes are less likely to negatively evaluate the collapse of the Soviet Union.

*Table 3. Binary Logistic Regression on the Impact (negative) of the collapse of the Soviet Union on the living standards with controls*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact (Negative) of the collapse of the SU on the living standards</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>.858 (.217)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social support</td>
<td>.949 (.428)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>.890 (.001)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower social ladder</td>
<td>1.734 (.001)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher social ladder</td>
<td>.771 (.149)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survivor generation</td>
<td>1.862 (.005)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal generation</td>
<td>1.703 (.001)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting with informal ties</td>
<td>1.001 (.927)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>1.197 (.391)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>2.182 (.001)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (primary)</td>
<td>.514 (.005)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (higher)</td>
<td>.851 (.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (male)</td>
<td>1.137 (.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalized social trust</td>
<td>.999 (.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² (Nagelke)</td>
<td>.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1382</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next model is reflecting the same controls for satisfaction with current regime (*table 4*). Interestingly, the strongest factor is higher positioning on the income ladder, indicating that most likely those within a higher social class have more chances to be satisfied with the government. However, lower income is also significant, though at a smaller scale. The second strongest factor for being satisfied with the current government is one of the indicators of the informal social capital – meeting people with whom you have informal ties. This further argues for the hypothesis that those who are within the close networks of family and friends, feel less of the social change. The third strongest factor is being divorced, which gives 1.5 more chances to be satisfied with the government. Perhaps, together with the previous (meeting people with informal ties) this indicates that divorced people have more close networks in comparison to those who are married. The next strongest is the indicator of
formal social capital – participation in strikes and demonstrations. The positive value indicates that those who participate are more likely to be satisfied with the current government.

Table 4. Binary Regression Model for Satisfaction with the current government with controls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfaction with the current government</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>1.082 (.570)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social support</td>
<td>.996 (.958)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>1.092 (.015)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower social ladder</td>
<td>.714 (.031)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher social ladder</td>
<td>2.074 (.000)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survivor generation</td>
<td>1.054 (.814)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal generation</td>
<td>.976 (.872)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting with informal ties</td>
<td>1.052 (.002)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>1.547 (.037)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>1.125 (.619)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education primary</td>
<td>1.149 (.558)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education higher</td>
<td>.842 (.216)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (male)</td>
<td>.896 (.394)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalized social trust</td>
<td>1.000 (.991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² (Nagelke)</td>
<td>.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1382</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusions from the Quantitative Analysis of Subjective Wellbeing and Social Change

To conclude, the most predicative component that affects general subjective wellbeing is the economic one. Therefore, the first main hypothesis is true. In my opinion, since the economic situation of Ukraine is far from good, this result was expected and grounded in Inglehart’s research, discussed in the theoretical part.

Contrary to what was expected, the second strongest predictor appeared to be distress and not significant happiness. This indicates the “Soviet effect”, that when people think of economy, health and social change, they are not feeling happy, but on the contrary - distressed. This finding is the most interesting in terms of Wellbeing literature review that states that happiness has the strongest association with general life satisfaction. Thus, this also shows
that Ukraine is a special case in the sense of subjective wellbeing measurement. Health was significant as predicted, but ended up after the psychological components.

The components indicating perceptions of social change (nostalgia for the Soviet Union and Satisfaction with current Government) contrary to what was expected were not significant. However, the change of values brought by the entrance of the control variables, indicates that generations, gender, marital status, social class and social capital are partly explaining them. With the separate analysis for those indicators, it appeared that “survivor” and “normal” generations feel mostly nostalgic for the Soviet Union. However, social class indicates whether they are satisfied with the current regime (higher social class) or nostalgic for the Soviet Union (lower social class).

Interestingly, informal and formal social capital influences the positive evaluation for the current regime, while participation in demonstrations and strikes is buffering the nostalgia for the Soviet Union. Contrary to what was expected, gender was not significant. However, in my opinion this issue should be investigated further, since from the theoretical background the special position of women is noticeable.

Therefore, it can be concluded that social change hit the “survivor” and “normal” generations most. There is also reason to think that the nostalgia for the Soviet Union may be reflected on the evaluations of the current regime. I suggest that qualitative elaboration of the questions, such as why gender is not significant and whether perceptions of the current state of affairs and nostalgia for the past regime are explaining each other, would show some more information, and explain them.
Chapter 4 Social Change and Collective Trauma as Seen by Women: Results of the Qualitative research in the L’viv

My interview analysis will be presented in the framework of subjective wellbeing and the possible collective trauma from the collapse of the Soviet Union. This part of the thesis is designed to illuminate the meaning of social trauma for women and describe the strategies of coping with it. For this aim qualitative research is indispensable since the meanings, the actual experiences and the understanding of the social change cannot be investigated without qualitative inquiry.

The specified research questions posed in this part of my project are: How did the interviewed women of different generations experience the social change? Are there any differences in evaluation of social change and strategy building by ethnicity, between ethnic Ukrainian and Russian women? To get a glimpse of these possible strategies and experiences I conducted 15 interviews with thirteen women and two men in the Western Ukrainian city of L’viv. With these 15 interviews I am not generalizing the results to the whole Ukrainian society. Rather my goal is to explore the strategies employed by the different women from my study and what the consequences of collective trauma are for them.

The theory and quantitative analysis suggest that younger women should view social change more positively and be more disattached from it, generally better off, less nostalgic for the Soviet Union, and more positive about the post-communist institutions. Women from older generations (“normal” and “survivor”) are generally feeling nostalgia for the Soviet times and evaluate their wellbeing worse than the youngest generation if judging from the quantitative part of this study. Since social change and nostalgia for the Soviet Union empirically showed dependence on generations and the economic situation and correlation with satisfaction with the current government and general wellbeing, but did not significantly affect the evaluations of wellbeing, in my qualitative research I want to further understand the relationship between wellbeing and the meanings of the social change for the interviewed women in Ukraine. I add therefore another dimension of interpretation, ethnicity, and want to see whether there are any specific experiences of the country’s shift to independence between Ukrainian and Russian women in Ukraine.
To start the analysis, the following table presents the strategies of coping with social change by the evaluations of the end of the USSR and interviewees’ wellbeing. It is also showing the ethnic distribution.

Table 5 Distribution of the female interviewees by subjective well-being and evaluation of the collapse of the USSR and strategies of coping with social change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low general wellbeing</th>
<th>High general wellbeing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Positive experience of change after the collapse of USSR on life</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td><strong>Idealistic Optimism as Strategy:</strong> Ukrainian (survivor), Ukrainian (normal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No influence on life at all</strong></td>
<td><strong>Familialism as Strategy:</strong> Ukrainian (normal), Ukrainian (normal), Ukrainian (survivor)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negative experience of the change after the collapse of USSR on life</strong></td>
<td><strong>Nostalgia for the Past as Strategy:</strong> Russian (survivor), Russian (normal)</td>
<td><strong>Adjustment as Strategy:</strong> Russian (survivor), Russian (normal)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although it is difficult to present the general wellbeing by a simple dichotomy of low vs. high the table is used here simply as a good tool for coherent analysis. Introducing the ethnic dimension into the analysis clearly shows that representatives of the “normal” and “survivor” generations from Russian families are all grouped within “negative experience of the collapse of Soviet Union” boxes, no matter their wellbeing; while Ukrainian “normal” and “survivor” generations are all placed in “no influence” or “positive experience”. However, to say that this pattern means that Russian interviewees would want to go back to the USSR and the Ukrainians would not, is over-simplistic.

To understand the attitudes and whether these Russian and Ukrainian women felt trauma of the collapse, I outline the major strategies of coping with social change for different

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7 Women from transitional generation are not presented in the table due to the lack of actual experience of the social change of the collapse of the Soviet Union.
generations within Russian and Ukrainian families, and argue that subjective wellbeing is associated with social trauma and affected by it in their case.

**Social trauma and social change on the individual level**

Sztompka suggested that the notion of trauma may be used in social sciences to describe large-scale social change. He suggests that major social shocks are affecting every individual, making them feel the shock on their own skin. Along with Merton and Giddens (Sztompka, 2000), he looks into the physical effects of major social changes for the society, parallel to the physical traumas that lead to physical feelings in the human body. My study provides a clear support for these arguments from my interviewees, while also noting differences among generations and ethnicities.

For the oldest generation of my interviewees, both Russian and Ukrainian, the effect of social changes on their psychological wellbeing and health levels is stronger in comparison to the “normal” and “transitional” representatives. As one older interviewee remarks,

“Oh, very personally I take them. I have my blood pressure. Recently I try not to watch news anymore. When I see them on TV I switch the channel for the movie or concert. I don’t know what will happen. Nobody knows...” (Maria, survivor generation, librarian/pensioner)

Interestingly, when talking about the current events in Ukraine, the normal and transitional generations of the women interviewed are more similar to each other than to the survivor generation. While the survivor generation actually feels major social changes physically, e.g. like Maria with her blood pressure, “normal” and “transitional” generations either feel them on the psychological level or try to distract themselves away from the issue.

I suggest that because the survivor generation’s memory extends to the older times and compares the current crisis with the memories about World War II, the fear of the future is at least doubled. The survivor generation has already experienced the trauma of war, and takes large-scale social changes more seriously. They may also be devising different strategies for coping with social change compared to the younger generations. These strategies of coping and experiencing change after the trauma also can be highlighted through association with subjective wellbeing. Hence in the next sections I examine different combinations of evaluating the collapse of Soviet Union and levels of wellbeing, which lead to and explain some of the strategies that could be distinguished.
**Nostalgia for the past as a coping strategy: Low wellbeing and negative experience of the Soviet collapse**

This dimension is presented by women from a Russian family. For the oldest respondent—Maria—it was important to build her identity in opposition to mine. She used the “collective” terms of opposition such as “you-we”, “Ukrainians-Russians”, and from the beginning of the conversation this was a theme she continuously wanted to emphasize:

“I have a bit different views [in comparison to most residents of Lʹiviv regarding the national question, and opposing her assumptions about my views as Ukrainian-ed.]. Morally I don’t feel myself comfortable. I have a mixed family, and it is like I am not at home here in Ukraine, but there [meaning Russia, - ed.] I am also not at home.” (Maria, survivor generation, librarian/pensioner)

This quote indicates not only that the interviewee builds her views in opposition to the assumption of what the others around her may think, but also that she feels alien in the social environment that surrounds her. However, this social alienation and framing identity through opposition to the assumed majority is not present when she places herself within the family.

This phenomenon of creating different spaces in one’s life is similar to R. Rose’s “double life” notion, however with one exception. The life spaces of the interviewee are not only unconnected, but also opposing one another. In addition, only in this opposition they are gaining meaning:

“For me personally I was always indifferent to nationality... ... In our family the question of nationality was never raised up” (Maria, survivor generation, school teacher/pensioner)

“We (the family, - ed.) are really nervous about the situation... ...We are really nervous, and we want to have it all better (about current events in Ukraine, -ed.).” (Sonja, survivor generation, pensioner)

Therefore, the identity built through collectives and the “we-vs-they” ideology of the Soviet regime had been transferred into the life of these women after the collapse, shifting its subjects to “we-the family” vs “they-the society we are in”.

The continuity between the older, middle, and younger generations in this Russian family could be considered as a care chain, where grandmothers are looking after grandchildren while their daughters work. In this way they are also implicitly maintaining the ideas and memories that get transmitted to younger generations through the oldest (Maria, Lida, Tanja). Thus, the disparate spaces of the family and the society are constantly reproduced.
Having this constant opposition requires an initial idea about difference, which for some survivor and normal generations from Russian families means looking back at the “world we lost”. Thus, regretting about the past results in low wellbeing associated with the nostalgic thoughts:

“Yes, of course (change happened, -ed.). We had so many events! We had such an interesting public life!! ... Different trade union’s events. What was in my life... I might think in the old way, but at that time I lived better. Not in the economic way, but morally it was better.” (Maria, survivor generation, librarian/pensioner)

In this case nostalgia appears to be not the state the interviewee is in, but an active strategy for coping with change that is chosen by the women.

There is not much difference in how the survivor, normal, and transitional generations in the Russian families evaluate their future. Nostalgia for the Soviet past as a strategy is projected inwards; hence future is often pictured in fatalistic colours.

“Current events? For the future? I think that good things won’t happen. I don’t think that really bad things will happen either. I am not a politician, and I always try to disconnect myself from politics. But regardless of whether we want it or not, we are all part of it.” (Lida, normal generation, shop assistant)

Women who are nostalgic after the collapse of the Soviet Union are often regarded as victims in social research. But the fact that only some interviewed Russian women of survivor and normal generations are reproducing the opposition between the family and society through ethnic identity, may suggest that these women are agents, not victims. This strategy therefore is employed for active reproduction of the oppositions and retreat to the past in order to cope with the present change, which caused trauma.

**Adjustment as a coping strategy: Negative experience of the Soviet collapse and high levels of wellbeing**

The strategy of ‘adjustment’ is mostly characteristic for the survivor and normal generations in the second Russian family I interviewed. In contrast to the first described above, this family emphasizes Ukraine as their homeland. Even though the experiences of the Soviet collapse were negative for them as well, this family now experiences a high level of wellbeing, and talk about the negative sides of the collapse framed only within the first few years of independence:
“It was a difficult moment, because they didn’t want us to transform smoothly, as usual (even now), they just don’t give people any chances. They pushed people to migrate. But afterwards everything was alright. Difficult, but with time it got good. First year was extremely difficult. The head of our course didn’t want to talk to us in Russian. But now we communicate. Life has its own ways.” (Svjeta, normal generation, owner of the hotel chain)

While using the opposing discourse of “us-Russians” vs “they-Ukrainians”, and having negatively experienced the collapse itself, this family “decided” to change themselves with the change of the society. That is why for these women the collapse of Soviet Union was a “moment” after which a period of change followed.

It is important to note that this family is also economically better off. This suggests that those women who are economically better off may have an initial trigger to adjust to new circumstances, which later becomes an active strategy for overcoming the trauma. Unlike the previous Russian women, who were economically less privileged, these women’s strategy to adjust made them rethink their national identity not in terms of “the world we lost” but in terms of “our home is here”:

“They moved to Italy, but didn’t stay there long. I couldn’t stay there. I am tied to my homeland (Ukraine, -ed.), to my country, no matter political stuff. I wanted to have everything here, not somewhere else. I love it more here. In Italy I felt that my life was lived somewhere else. That I just observed it.” (Svjeta, normal generation, owner of the hotel chain)

However, this family is rather cautious in expecting positive outcomes from the current crisis; the predominant position of every generation is still a fatalistic one:

“It’s a pity so many people died, but I see nothing is changing and nothing will. Yes, I love Ukraine, I want everything to work out well, ... ...but I don’t see any change in the nearest future. ...Everything is the same” (Solja, transitional generation, student)

This being said, adjusting oneself to the new circumstances and a new social reality becomes an active strategy for coping with change for some of the interviewed Russians. The type of relationship between wellbeing and adjustment strategy is open for discussion in the following research. While associated with high levels of current wellbeing, the adjustment strategy does not necessarily project positive attitudes towards the future, and the future is still seen in a fatalistic mood.
**Familialism as a coping strategy: The collapse of the Soviet Union and general wellbeing not associated**

This group of Ukrainian women that I interviewed are of survivor and normal generations and are representing very traditional closed families and have very different levels of wellbeing. They are deeply positioned in the family domain, social change was not a rapid one or not even a big change after all. These women have not changed work, friends or place of living since the times before the Soviet Union collapse. These women did not have to think about changing their identity or their habitus:

“*No. Not really. Only the portraits on the walls (“Did anything change for you? Was the question, - ed.”)”* (Kateryna, survivor generation, pensioner)

As discussed in theoretical part, familialism was often a passive protest against the intrusive paternalistic state, and therefore these women that were traditionally positioned deeply in the family, were not required to change their life strategy when Soviet Union collapsed.

It is difficult to talk about familialism as a separate strategy, since it is present in every interviewee’s life, but for some women it may become a major strategy to cope with change by retreating to the family domain. In my opinion, this is also an active choice and a process to avoid the trauma. The strategy of familialism is associated with both high and low wellbeing for normal and survivor generations of the interviewed Ukrainian women.

“*I am happy in my life because I have very good children. I always want to help them with advice, with everything to be good with them. And they live quite good. It is a big happiness when a person lives in a good family. I see my grand grandchildren. It is a big happiness.”* (Maria, survivor generation, librarian/pensioner)

Some description of a rift between the family and public life - is a common theme for all the interviewees:

“*At that time (Soviet,- ed.) it was not possible to go to church, and so on, I could not go out to sing carols. But it was always really warm inside the family”* (Galja, normal generation, school teacher).

Transitional generations of both Ukrainian and Russian families that I interviewed claim that during the current revolution nothing will change and they are afraid to be disappointed (e.g. Solja). In terms of familial life indeed it is gender that brings them even more together. The family domain is strong for both for Russian and Ukrainian families in the study, and suggests that these women are indeed positioned within traditional ideas of family, which is characterized by the care chain.
“Also that everyone is healthy and we are all together with my family. That is why it is really difficult to be alone without them. I need my family all the time. I am really dependent on them.” (Solja, transitional generation, student)

“And grandma. I think she was the one I spent most time with and she played a major role for formation of my character” (Solja, transitional generation, student)

All the families have the tendency to ease the double burden by involving grandparents, mostly grandmothers. Therefore, the youngest generation is building their attitudes towards past and future based on the memory of the grandmother. In that way, the transition of ideas through the care chain keeps the history and memory alive for decades. Moreover, the memory of the older people is often transmitting the idea of familial roots, and also contributes to building the ethnic identity for the majority of interviewees. The memories they carry are stretching to their grandparents in the past and to their grandchildren in the present.

“What do you mean by past? It was so different! So big! The past for me is a very big period, since my father got married late, he was 40 something years old, and we were late children. I also have my grandfather’s memory, I know a lot, my father told me a lot about him. So this is an extremely huge period.” (Kateryna, survivor generation, pensioner)

As to the current events and the attitudes towards future, this strategy is also associated with fatalism and lack of control over their lives:

“We can wish, we can want, but you never can control.” (Galja, normal generation, school teacher)

Familialism is hence both a strategy and a state, depending on how you look at it. Being a result of intrusive state paternalism back in Soviet Union, it is still living in the independent Ukraine. However, reinforced by discourses and policies, it became more of a general state for many women I interviewed.

**Idealistic optimism: Positive influence of the Soviet collapse and high general wellbeing**

The group of idealistic optimists consists of the interviewed Ukrainian women in the higher social positions, who had better jobs throughout life, travelled during the Soviet time, and are now economically and psychologically better off. Even if some of them may feel psychologically worse than others, they still evaluate the collapse of the Soviet Union as positive:
“We felt this change, hope for better, free life, but it was really difficult to change, to just switch into a different lifestyle from that one before. It was not a simple moment, but we had big hopes for the better. Better because of freedom, free speech, dreams for the future.” (Marta, survivor generation, pensioner)

“And after 1990ies everything was perfect. I finished school, went to university, had children, there was Ukraine and everything was very good. I don’t remember any critical points. I mean we felt a bit different, but…” (Sofia, normal generation, dentist)

The “switch” to another regime, though being traumatic, was an anticipated change. This group suggests and backs up Sztompka’s notion of “trauma of victory”, when even though the change was anticipated, it still led to a shock, or trauma. These women have experienced a huge change in their lifestyles, when they suddenly received many choices for everything, starting with food and finishing with movies, and this confusing abundance of choice may also have led to shock.

“Now times are different and you have more possibilities to do something else. We never had it. I only liked cinema, though they only showed one movie in every cinema.” (Julia, normal generation, airport worker)

Although the collapse was originally associated with hope and expectations for these women, in time the negative side of the social change also got apparent:

“You know we went to Poland in 1990 and were there for some time, and I watched what was happening there on TV. One thing that I knew that there was nothing to eat here, so I sent my mom food” (Julia, normal generation, airport worker)

The group of idealistic optimists also has positive firm attitudes towards the future, which may be an actively chosen strategy to cope with the instability of social change:

“It will be better. People won’t go to war. They won’t take away Crimea. There will be no corruption. It has to be better.” (Oxana, survivor generation, pensioner)

Moreover, the interviewees themselves realize that they use the strategy to cope with stress of change; they consciously choose this strategy to be optimistic:

“I try to believe into better future. I just think that what people believe would happen, will eventually happen to them.” (Tanja, transitional generation, school teacher)

This is the only strategy in the interviews that did not have any fatalism implied. It is a pro-active conscious action, highlighting the agency of these women, especially the younger ones:
“Now I want the results to be good. I am happy we had this revolution. It’s a pity so many people died, but I think nothing would happen if they wouldn’t die. I hope next generation would remember our mottos “No to corruption” and so on, those generations that didn’t see it that much... ...The idols, like Yushchenko was or Tymoshenko was, should be dismantled,...Half of the people would scream – nothing changed, and I would hate this! If you want to change something – go and protest!” (Sofia, normal generation, dentist)

Since this strategy is not vectored to the past, but to the future, it associates more with better wellbeing, where they certainly reinforce each other.

**Conclusions from the qualitative study**

From the above exploration of the social change and wellbeing, it is possible to conclude that the experiences of social change has led to a sense of collective trauma among the Russian and Ukrainian women that I interviewed, but was differently felt depending on their generation and ethnicity. The first period of social change singled out by the interviewees is the period immediately around 1991, when the change was very fast and the shock was the strongest. This period is evaluated negatively and definitely felt like a trauma by the interviewed Russian women from the survivor and normal generations. Some of the interviewed Ukrainian women, by contrast, evaluated this change positively, and for them it felt more like a ‘trauma of victory’.

The second part of this experience took longer and implied several strategies of coping with radical change. Every strategy has its own implications and influences for the habitus of both the Russian and Ukrainian women who took part in the study, in normal and transitional generations. However, the strategies differ between the interviewed Russian and Ukrainian families: while Russian women tend to be more nostalgic over the Soviet past, retreat to familiasm or adjust to change, the interviewed Ukrainian women are either similarly retreating to familiasm or becoming ‘idealistic optimists’ about the future. This difference in strategies further suggests that the two ethnic groups of these women may have been experiencing social change differently.

My study reveals that familialism both as a state and as a strategy is represented in all the families, and often is characterized by the familial care chain that maintains family memory. When exposed as a strategy, familialism represents a return to family as a safe harbor, as a
state – the idea of being happy only within the family. Familialism is consistent with Zhurzhenko’s theory, and is intertwined with every strategy named above.

My research also shows that wellbeing, strategies of coping with change and experience of trauma are closely associated with each other in the case of these women. However, it is important to note that social change is also experienced and understood through such factors as informal social capital, traveling outside the Soviet Union, and especially familial networks have big influence on the strategy one chooses to employ.

One of the major conclusions is that it can be stated that for the majority of the interviewed Ukrainian women, the collective trauma of the collapse of the Soviet Union was the “trauma of victory”, while for the majority of the Russian women that took part in the study – simply collective trauma. Finally, the study demonstrates that these women are not passive victims of collective trauma or “trauma of victory”. Rather, they are the active agents that react to social change in different ways.
General Conclusions and Discussion

The mixed methodology of the paper provided many interesting results. The quantitative part persuasively showed that the question of subjective wellbeing in Ukraine cannot be separated from the economic situation of the families. People predictably feel less happy when they suffer from economic deprivation. Moreover, a combination of economic and political problems in society contributes to the feelings of distress and various health problems. Hence, the surprising finding in Ukraine is that the problems of health and distress explain wellbeing better than happiness does. The oldest generations feel nostalgic for the old Soviet time and not particularly happy in the current political regime. This indicates their negative experience of the social change of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although gender was not significant in the quantitative models, the qualitative part suggested that women’s position in the closed family networks influenced their evaluations of the social change.

The main conclusion of this paper is that social change brought with the collapse of the Soviet Union did cause collective trauma in Ukraine. I argue that the discourses on women and family during the Soviet regime disconnected the notions of the state and the family. The all-encompassing state control contributed to the active retreat to familialism and made family the safe harbour. The discourses on women and family have not changed much during the independence period, keeping some of the women in the same safe harbour of familial life and protecting them from the changes in society. In addition, the continued reproduction of the oppositions between the state and the family has often been used as a basis of the self-identification, mostly within a specific ethnicity, and is apparent for both the interviewed Ukrainian and Russian women of all the generations.

The research also found that the way the interviewed women experienced social change depends on their economic situation, their generation and the ethnicity they belong to. These factors also influence whether they were hit by the collective trauma of transition and the way they shaped their strategies for coping with it. For the oldest interviewed women (the “survivor” generation) who spent most of their lives under the Soviet regime the change was the toughest; for all of them the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a collective trauma.

For the middle aged interviewed women, who spent half of their lives under the Soviet regime, the experience of collective trauma depended on the economic situation and their ethnicity. Interviewed Russian women experienced the trauma, regardless of the economic
situation, while the Ukrainian women with a higher economic situation felt the trauma only partially. The youngest women with practically no experience of living under the Soviet regime mostly did not feel the trauma from the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, depending on the family memory some ideas about the collapse of the Soviet Union are reproduced through the “grandmother-granddaughter” care chain.

Subjective wellbeing of the older women interviewed, and generally for Ukrainians in the survey results, was on the one hand affecting how they experienced the collapse of the Soviet Union, while on the other it was also affected by this change. Depending on their wellbeing before the collapse, they created the strategies to overcome the trauma of the collapse. These strategies influenced their wellbeing later on, and framed their views on the future, and the ideas they pass over to the younger generations.

It can be concluded that the collective trauma caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union is still in the process of healing in Ukraine, specifically for the older generations of women. However, the current events in Ukraine indicate that the youngest generation was not hit by the collective trauma directly, but only through the familial memories and reproduction of ideas. These young women are now actively constructing new strategies for concluding the social change started with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Generally, collective trauma proved to be a process depending on several dimensions. Although the similar pattern of familialism is characteristic of all the women that took part in the study, the way they feel the social change and the trauma of it also depends on their generation and ethnicity. I suggest that further studies should be conducted to open up new dimensions of collective trauma in Ukraine. A separate research is needed to investigate how men coped with the transition, since women, as I argued, were hit by the social change in a lesser degree due to the familialism present both during the Soviet Union and in the independent Ukraine (judging from the statistics presented earlier).

To conclude, even though some decades have already passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, we should not underestimate the influences it still has both within Ukraine and around Europe.
Bibliography


The World Bank, 2014. The World Bank


Appendix A

Descriptive statistics tables

**Generations:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generations</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>survivor generation</td>
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<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>normal generation</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>29.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>transitional generation</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
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**Gender:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1157</td>
<td>57.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2000</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B

Calculations of the Indexes for the Quantitative study of Subjective wellbeing in Ukraine

Here I present all the recoding and indexes used in the quantitative analysis.

Distress index:

This index consists of 14 variables computed together. These are: not concentrated; insomnia; constant internal strain; not overcoming difficulties; not enjoying daily activities; loosing self-confidence; nervous shaking or trembling; frightening thoughts; exhaustions or fatigue; stress; feeling lonely; dissatisfied with work; not able to influence things; life is too complicated. Each of the variables had the same values of: 1. Yes; 2. No. The reliability test showed that Cronbach’s alpha is .83\(^8\). To change the vector of the scale following the logics “the higher the value the bigger distress”, all the variables were recoded, where 0.No and 1. Yes. After this change they were computed together and created a scale, ranging from 0 to 14, where 0 means – no distress at all, and 14 – distress on every variable.

\(^8\) Although it is arguable whether Cronbach’s alpha can be used for the dichotomous variables, theoretical logics as well as rule of thumb to have alpha higher than .5, allows me to take this reliability test into account.
Satisfaction with Government Index:

This index was calculated on the basis of: satisfaction with democracy; satisfaction with economy; satisfaction with education system; satisfaction with health care system; satisfaction with government; satisfaction with local authorities; satisfaction with security system. The values for each variable were the same: 1. Very satisfied; 2. Satisfied; 3. Rather dissatisfied; 4. Very dissatisfied. Reliability test showed that Cronbach’s alpha is .87. To change the direction of the scale into the logics of “the higher the value the more satisfied”, the variables were recoded into 1. Very dissatisfied; 2. Rather dissatisfied; 3. Satisfied; 4. Very satisfied. These seven variables were computed together into a scale, ranging from 7 to 28, where 7 means dissatisfied with everything, and 28 – satisfied with everything.

Participation Index:

This index was computed on the basis of: participation in strikes; participation in demonstrations. The values for those two variables are identical: 1. Did it and will do it in future; 2. Did it and will not do it in the future; 3. Did not do it, but will do it in the future; 4. Did not do it and will not do it in the future. The reliability test showed Cronbach’s alpha .87. To change the direction in order to show “the higher the value the higher participation”,

---

9 I consider these to be an ordinal variables
the values were recoded into 1. Did not do it and will not do it in the future; 2. Did not do it, but will do it in the future; 3. Did it and will not do it in the future; 4. Did it and will do it in the future. These variables were computed and constructed a scale, ranging from 2 to 8, where 2 mean no participation at all, and 8 – participation in everything.

![Participation Index Graph]

**Membership Index:**

This index was based on the variables: church or religious organizations; sport organization; art, musical, educational NGO; trade union; political party; charitable NGO; neighbourhood, residents NGO; non-governmental organization; youth association; women organization; other voluntary organization. The values for every variable were the same: 0.No; 1. Yes. The variables were computed into a scale ranging from 0 to 6, where 0 means not a member in any organization, and 6 the highest (since the responses got a maximum 6 on a possible scale of 12).
Social Support Index:

This index was computed on the bases of such variables: person to talk with; person to help in crisis; person you can be yourself with; person who appreciates you; person to comfort when upset. The values are same for every variable: 1. Yes; 0. No. The reliability test showed Cronbach’s alpha .7. The variables were computed into a scale ranging from 0 to 5, where 0 means no support at all, and 5 – a lot of support.
Social Connectedness to Informal Capital Index

This index was calculated on the basis of: meetings with friends; meetings with relative; meetings with neighbours. All of them had the same positive values: 1. Never; 2. Less than once a month; 3. Once a month; 4. Several times a month; 5. Once a week; 6. Several times a week; 7. Every day. These all were computed into a scale, ranging from 3 to 21, where 3 – never meets anyone, and 21 – meets everyone every day.

![Graph showing distribution of Social Connectedness to Informal Capital Index]

Nostalgia for the Soviet Union:

Since the majority of the respondents answered that the collapse of the Soviet Union had a negative impact on their living conditions, it was decided to recode this variable into a dichotomic one. Originally, the values were: 1. Positive effect on the living standard; 2. No influence at all; 3. Negative effect on living standards.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>12,0</td>
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<tr>
<td>No influence at all</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>14,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative effect on living standard</td>
<td>1199</td>
<td>60,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98 Don't know</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>13,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>99,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
After recoding, the two values instead of three appeared: 0. Positive effect or no influence on the living standard; 1. Negative effect on the living standard.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union on the living standard</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive and no impact on the living standards</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative impact impact on the living standards</td>
<td>1199</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1722</td>
<td>86.1</td>
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</table>
Appendix C

Agreement of Confidentiality between the Researcher and the Interviewee

Here I present the agreement between the researcher and interviewer: firstly translated from Ukrainian to English English.

Agreement of taking part in the Interview

We offer you to participate in a study "Women's experience of social changes since the collapse of the Soviet Union in Ukraine" held under the auspices of the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Lund, Sweden.

To keep your interview in the most reliable way, we will make an audio recording of our conversation, with also its written version.

At any time during and after the interview you can:

1. Withdraw from the study at any time.
2. Do not answer any questions without explanation.
3. Establish limits of use of information.
4. Listen to the derived material.

We will appreciate if you agree to talk, and are in agreement with these Terms.

I, ________________________________

Agree to the terms of the interview, and give consent to participate in the interview and subsequent use of the data.

Date ____________________________
Signature of the interviewee________
Signature of the interviewer________
Appendix D

The Plan of the Interview

Basic plan:

*Questions (for youngest generation not all of them are suitable):*
- Tell me about your early life (if interviewee doesn’t know what to say, specify with following)
- Do you think you could name some milestones of your life? What were the most notable memories you have (good and bad)? (If doesn’t want to talk about this ask following)

*If met with difficulty, look through the questions below.*

**EARLY LIFE AND YOUTH**
- Where and when were you born? Tell me about your family (will have to be very careful here)
- Where did you live as a kid? With whom?
- Did you move houses a lot?
- How did you end up in L’viv? (if not originally from there)
- Did you go to school? What kind of (higher) education do you have?
- Who were (are still) your friends? (from around here or not)
- How do you remember your youth? How did you feel at that time? What do you remember most? What comes firstly to your mind when you think of your youth?
- What were your dreams?
- What did you think of future when you were young? What was your “plan” (if you had any)?
- How did you feel about yourself? Were you happy? Why? Why not?
- How was your physical health? (careful)
- How would you characterize the overall political situation? How was it like to live in it?
- Were you a member of any organization?
- **Can you describe how it was to live at the times of your youth? What were people like? (try to make them compare or to use today when talking about past)**

**ADULT LIFE**
- Have you ever got married? Did you live with your partner alone or shared place with relatives or other people? Do you have any children and grandchildren? When did you get them? What are they like? What are they doing?
- What was (is) your job? Did you enjoy it? Did you have any hobbies?
- How did you spend your free time? (Is it any different from today)
- Did you have any unexpected twists of plans or ideas that you made when you were younger?
- Physical health – how would you describe it?
- What was it like to be an adult person at that time? What was expected from you? What were your plans for the future and how did you see it?
- What was overall political situation? Was it any different from the one you lived in while being a child?
• Were you a member of any organization?
• How did you feel generally about yourself? Were you happy most of the time? Why? Why not?
• **How was it to live at that time in your situation?**

**Nowadays**
• What are you doing now? Do you work (working pensioner)? Are you a member if any organization?
• Do you live alone or with partner, family, etc. (careful)
• Tell me about your friends? Are they the same ones? What are they up to? (careful here as well)
• How is your family? (careful)
• How do you generally feel? (Interesting what exactly will they answer here, what will be the first thing they think of!)
• How is your health? (careful)
• Are you happy? Why? Why not?
• How would you evaluate the political situation now?
• **How is it to live nowadays in general? What are the people like? Could you describe your ordinary day now?**

**Future attitudes**
• What are your plans for the future? How do you see yourself?
• How do you think will you be feeling yourself? (health, emotional, economic)
• What is your dream?
• What will the country be like in the nearest future, in your opinion?

**General attitudes block**
• Do you think it is important to trust people? Do you trust most of the people? Why? Why not? Who do you trust most?
• How would you describe a perfect society for you?
• Is it important to live by law? Do you follow rules in everything? Do you think other people live by law?
• How in your opinion country was influenced by Soviet Union and its collapse? What was life like at those times?
• How do you feel about current situation in the country?