Municipal co-financing - *voluntary extortion*?

*A case study of the introduction of passenger trains on the Söderås Line*

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Abstract

This thesis investigates the rationales of municipal co-financing. The introduction of passenger trains on the Söderås Line is used as a case study to investigate this concept. The empirical analysis is primarily based on 10 in-depth interviews – with decision makers, politicians and officials. Focus lies on Svalöv Municipality, who is co-financing the introduction of passenger trains on the Söderås Line (together with the other municipalities, the Region of Scania and the Swedish Transport Administration). Additionally, a questionnaire has been sent to Sweden’s 290 municipal mayors to examine if the patterns emerging from the in-depth interviews can be generalized.

It is concluded that municipal co-financing primarily is a way to distribute costs between the different agents who sign the agreement of co-financing. At the same time a large degree of information asymmetry is present. The Swedish Transport Administration is providing the calculations and the projections. Additionally, municipal co-financing is becoming increasingly common. In the case of the introduction of passenger trains on the Söderås Line, Municipal co-financing was required – as the project would otherwise not have been conducted.

Key words: Municipal co-financing, The Swedish Transport Administration, bargaining, infrastructure, railway
1. Introduction

Municipal co-financing of large infrastructure projects has become increasingly common in Sweden (cf. SKL, 2014). This way of financing is based on the concept of cost-sharing. This means that costs of projects are covered by both the state, municipalities and, often, the county where the investment is made. Academic literature in this subject is scarce and we therefore investigate the underlying rationales of this way of financing.

In this thesis we examine the Söderås Line and the introduction of passenger train on the railway running through the north-west part of the Region of Scania (Scania County) in Southern Sweden. Clearly, new railway lines and updates of existing ones are associated with vast costs and great levels of cost uncertainty. Yet, they are often considered crucial for regional growth and economic development (cf. Banerjee, Duflo and Qian, 2012). In other words, many different opportunities might emerge from investments in infrastructure. Therefore, it is often considered to be of nationwide interest to give companies and residents access to a well-functioning railway system.

In Sweden, the agency responsible for the transport system is the Swedish Transport Administration. Large infrastructure investments in Sweden have historically been primarily state funded, but recently co-financing has become more prevalent (cf. SKL, 2011; Mellin et al, 2012). The Swedish Government Official Reports (SOU, 2011) highlight several fundamental reasons for co-financing. The main points in their report are listed below:

1. A larger number of projects can be conducted
2. Increased shared responsibility (edi. rem. between the different agents agreeing to co-finance the project)
3. It gives the municipalities and the region increased influence on planning and execution of the countrywide infrastructure.
4. More resources can lead to an acceleration of the foundation of existing project.

SOU (2011, p.39-40)

Abovementioned points highlight that co-financing can result in more projects, and increase the volume of resources that can be used for such investments. Put differently, infrastructure projects can be financed through both municipal and state taxes. The report from the Swedish Government Official Reports (SOU, 2011) then continues and lists the following points that could have a positive effect on the willingness to co-finance project.
5. Some local benefits such as environmental, accessibility, estate values and regional development are not captured by traditional socioeconomic estimation methods.

6. Municipal co-financing might decrease the risk of overestimation and underestimation of costs.

7. The investments can complement the state budget (were investments are granted on annual basis).

8. There are possibilities to exploit the market benefits, mainly through usage fees, and this would decrease the public burden.

9. Informal signals regarding co-financing sends out the message that co-financing decreases the risk for projects to be excluded from the national infrastructure plan.

SOU (2011, p.39-40)

Still, there are different types of critique directed towards the concept of municipal co-financing – despite the aforementioned justifications of co-financing and the incentives for municipalities (and regions) to co-finance. This critique is highlighted in this report, and some of the main points emerging from this analysis are listed below:

1. A consequence of municipal co-financing could be that infrastructural investments are prioritized depending on the wealth of the municipalities; and not on the over-all societal benefits.

2. The residents of the municipality that are co-financing a project is faced with a greater financial burden, as they are financing infrastructure through their taxes to the municipality, as well as through the taxes to the state.

3. The relationship between the state and the municipality is uneven. The municipalities’ possibilities to influence the final contracts are limited.

4. The possibility for the municipality to opt out from an investment is limited.

5. The municipalities face larger budget limitations and are not always able to carry out independent cost-benefit analysis and future projections (this affecting the municipalities ability to make informed decisions).

These critical points highlight some rather crucial questions when analyzing the use of municipal co-financing to finance large infrastructure investments: What rationales lie behind municipal co-financing? How can this way of financing be criticized? And what positive effects are associated with this way of financing large infrastructure projects?

Answering those questions is important as we, as a society, are striving to use our resources in the best possible way. Using the agreement to co-finance the introduction of passenger trains on the Söderås Line as a case study to investigate the underlying
mechanisms of municipal co-financing allows us to put these different concepts into an actual case. It is important to note that the introduction of passenger trains has long been discussed. Politicians, and citizens, have demanded that passenger trains should traffic the route since early-90s (cf. Appendix 2). The decision to co-finance the introduction of passenger trains was then finally decided in 2014 as all co-financiers signed an agreement defining each participant’s role, investments and responsibilities in the project (Appendix 1, 2014; Trafikverket 1, 2014)

Consequently, despite the fact that different objectives might exist for the state and the municipalities; for each agent the overlooking goal is to allocate their resources in the best possible way. Analyzing whether municipal co-financing is a societally desirable method of financing is crucial. Such attempts are scarce and clearly; this paper fills a knowledge void in the academic literature of the subject.

1.1 Research question

The main objective of this thesis is to analyze the rationales of municipal co-financing by examining the incentives for the construction of the Söderås Line.

What rationales lie behind municipal co-financing?

This research questions includes many different levels of analysis. Treating the different agents independently enables us to understand what information the different agents have and connect this to each agents ability to act rational. An important part of the question is the municipalities and the options they face - whether they have the information, the tools and the knowledge to make economically optimal decisions?

We therefore focus on the municipality of Svalöv and the negotiation and bargaining process when developing the partnership between all the involved agents; Swedish Transport Administration, Region of Scania, Municipality of Svalöv and the other municipalities. That is, focus lies on rationales to co-finance the construction of the Söderås Line from the perspective of Svalöv Municipality. We ought to answer how the concept of municipal co-financing is connecting to economic literature, and whether this method of financing is based on mutual agreement and cooperation. Our hypothesis is that the municipalities can provide the Swedish Transport Administration with information regarding infrastructure investments in the local municipality. At the same time the
municipality knows what project they need, and are therefore willing to pay for the investment. This is resulting in greater decision making.

1.2 Method

The decision to co-finance the introduction of passenger trains ultimately depend on local politicians; as well as the region of Scania and the government agency in charge of infrastructural maintenance, construction and planning - namely the Swedish Transport Administration. To understand the bargaining position, the negotiations and the underlying economic rationale we base this study primarily on in-depth interviews with decision makers and municipal officials. That is, we base our analysis on a qualitative approach.

The conducted interviews follow a script with pre-decided questions, which are linked, to an extensive literature analysis to frame the research. This literature is built upon the foundation of transport economics, behavioral economics, bargaining theory and investment literature. The structure of the interviews has been made taking Merriam (1988), Bewley (2002) and Quinn Patton (1990) into consideration. Additional policy papers that are analyzed include both notes from meetings regarding the decision to implement passenger trains on the Söderås Line and actual policy decisions agreed upon by local politicians and other agents. Finally, to put the analysis in a wider perspective, and to investigate the possibility for us to generalize our results, a questionnaire have been sent out to all mayors in Sweden’s 290 municipalities.

Throughout this thesis we are examining co-financing of large infrastructure projects. That is defined as projects in the National Transport Plan, and the cost of each these projects are exceeding a total of SEK 50 million (Trafikverket 3, 2010; Trafikverket 4, 2014).

1.3 Structure

In this introductory chapter (Chapter 1) we have introduced our topic and the research question. In the next chapter (Chapter 2) the theoretical research is discussed and analyzed in relationship to concept of municipal co-financing. This is then followed (Chapter 3) by a presentation of the case study – namely the introduction of passenger train traffic on the Söderås Line. The next chapter (Chapter 4) presents the empirical analysis in this thesis. This is divided into two different parts. The first part (Part A) presents the outcomes from 10 in-depth interviews with decision makers, politicians and officials. The questions are based on the previously introduced topics (in particular the theoretical discussion in
Chapter 2) to frame the interviews. Patterns emerging from the in-depth interviews have been taken into account and used to create an on-line questionnaire addressed to Sweden’s 290 mayors. The results from these answers are presented in the second part of the empirical presentation (Part B). Finally, in the last chapter (Chapter 5) we discuss the outcomes from the empirical analysis as well as the conclusive points (10 in total) emerging from this thesis.
2. Theoretical foundation

This part discusses the theoretical concepts of Public-Private Partnership (PPP), and how it is related to municipal co-financing as a way to finance public projects. The discussion is introduced by explaining the concepts of welfare and socioeconomic efficiency of infrastructure investments. This in turn highlights the question of to what extent each agent is responsible for providing the infrastructure and connects to the theory of negotiating and bargaining power and consequently strives to bring us answers to the questions: Why is co-financing used? What problems does this financing technique create? And what problems does it solve? The theoretical answers and discussion in this chapter will frame the coming empirical analysis and presentation.

2.1 Welfare and Kaldor-hicks efficiency

We start our discussion with the Kaldor-Hicks criterion which is a theory explaining how an allocative optimal situation is obtained. It states that “a policy should be adapted if and only if those who will gain can fully compensate those who will lose and still be better off” (Boardman et al, 2014, p.32). According to the theory this ensures that resources are allocated in the best possible way. Consequently, that is why agents often strive towards such a situation. Yet, obtaining such a situation is not an easy quest. The high costs associated with the constructions hinder entrance of private agents. Hence, this situation is often referred to natural monopoly (cf. Boardman et al, 2014), as independent agents are not able to freely enter the market. Even so, infrastructure projects that are not financially viable could still be societally beneficial as it creates spillover effects to various branches of society (for instance the environment, the labor market etcetera).

The Swedish Parliament has sustained their position in the legislation, stating that it is vital to ensure “societal-economic efficiency and long-term sustainable transport system for the citizens and the economy” (prop.2005/06:160, VTI, 2007, s.11).

Nonetheless, ensuring socioeconomic efficiency is often a concept far from straightforward. Previous researches have noted that many projects and investments are surrounded with obstacles rendering such attempts hard in practice (for instance due to cost-overruns, time-overruns etcetera – cf. Flyvbjerg et al, 2003; Flyvbjerg, 2009; Boardman et al, 2014). One method to investigate whether an infrastructure investment should be undertaken is to examine the net social benefit of the project, which in turn has to exceed
the net social costs in order for the investment to be socioeconomically efficient. This is done in the Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) framework.

Nonetheless, since infrastructure investments involves high costs and risks there has been several discussions on how to create incentives for the public sector to provide sufficient amounts of infrastructure.

State funding of large infrastructure investment projects does not always reflect that municipalities can have different objectives and goals. Therefore, a solution by the government has been to motivate municipal co-financing. It is promoted by the fact that if state and municipalities can co-ordinate its provision of infrastructure, it can provide substantial benefits for the municipality such as increased attractiveness for new businesses to start operating, exploitation of estate areas and increased municipal population which generates tax income (SKL, 2008, p.7). The concept of municipal co-financing is still unexplored in academic literature, and therefore we have used the concept of Public-Public Partnership to take the academic view of the matter into concern. In order to apply the relationship between the state and the municipalities into the PPP context, we refer to the relationship as State-Municipal Partnership. This means that the state and municipality co-operate to fund different investments (as such projects might benefit both partners).

2.2 Public Private Partnership

Infrastructure investments are scarce; as new investments require vast cost and the existing ones needs continuing maintenance. This problem has resulted in the need for alternative solutions to finance infrastructure projects. Consequently, there has been an increased interest of the Swedish Government to turn towards the municipalities to assist funding (SOU, 2011, p.12).

Municipal co-financing resembles to what we refer to is known as Public Private Partnership (PPP) (SOU 2011, p.12). The main difference is that the state is working with the municipality; and not a private agent.

Furthermore, PPP is long-term agreements of different types of investments that are conducted by government agents and private sector agents. Some investments benefit both agents. This increases the incentives to find such agreements.

Looking at the concept of PPP in relation to municipal co-financing one key argument is that some investments are beneficial on local level and would not have been initiated if one were to examine the project from state level. This means that municipal co-financing stance from the incentive of the municipalities (cf. OECD, 2014; Regeringen 1, 2012).
Additionally, it is assumed that such agreements could create greater risk sharing among the agents. This means that a more efficient way of dividing responsibilities, between the municipalities and the state, is created (Cars et al, 2011). This will be further discussed in section 2.2.2 when we introduce the concept of State-Municipal Partnership.

PPP agreements can take different shapes, depending on the responsibilities of each agent. We are presenting three of the main types of PPP agreement. These different models, allow different degrees of private responsibility of the projects as well as different level of implicit bargaining power;

*Design Build Arrangements (DB)*: The private sector takes on the construction risk and is responsible for the design and building of the project given the guidelines of the public sector. However, after the completion of the project the risk is taken over by the public sector, as they are now responsible for the operational aspects and maintenance of the infrastructure.

*Design -Build - Operate - Maintain (DBOM)*: The private sector is now facing both the construction risk as well as the operational and maintenance risks.

*Design - Build - Finance - Operate (DBFO)*: By adding the financial aspect the private sector is also affected by the financial risk. Now the project involves the designing, building, financing of the project according to an agreement where the project will be handed back to the public sector by the end of the agreement. The contracts are usually long term (between 20-30 years) and have detailed outlines of payment and service standards.

*Auditor General British Colombia (2011); Grimsey and Lewis (2004)*

### 2.2.1 Characteristics of PPP

Still, even though projects come in different shapes, there are some key characteristics that identify PPP-agreement. Some main characteristics are presented by Grimsey and Lewis (2004) and these include:
Some partnerships are predominately economic whilst others take welfare and socioeconomic benefits into account. In terms of infrastructure being a high-cost investment, it involves long term contracts where the aim to increase welfare.

Focus on services: This characteristic highlights services received by government. Subsequently, this means that government pays for the services that are provided by the private party, which then are delivered through the rented infrastructure.

Whole-of-life cycle costing: An important characteristic is that PPP contracts allow for complete integration, from design and operational costs to maintenance costs. This becomes especially important in infrastructure projects as those projects are usually long term, involving thorough planning and account for great costs. It is argued that having a PPP contract can therefore reduce the whole life cost of the project.

Innovation: Since PPP involves several parties, this gives greater opportunities for innovative solutions.

Risk allocation: Infrastructure investments involve a lot of costs in terms of operating and owning, where the costs can be difficult to measure. Therefore transferring the risk to a private party can lower the cost burden on the government.

Combining the abovementioned characteristics highlights the main idea of PPP-arrangements, being that risks are allocated between the different agents to generate greater efficiency and benefits throughout the entire life cycle of a project. Thereby, the different agents can invest away the risks by providing the changes that are needed locally (Adhazi and Bowles, 2001). Subsequently, these characteristics of PPP provide some explanation for the rationale to co-finance.

2.2.2. State-Municipal Partnership

The above reasoning (section 2.2 and 2.2.1) presented the main theory behind Public-Private Partnerships, which can be extended further to represent a State-Municipality Partnership and discuss the rationales explaining why municipalities co-finance and further
evaluate the costs and benefits of the concept. The reasoning should be linked to the aforementioned characteristics of a partnership, as it also sets the requirements for the contract. In terms of a contract between the state and municipality, both aim towards a rational use of their resources. They are both striving towards an effective resource allocation (taking the societal consequences in the region where they act into account).

According to Hart and Moore (1988) the function of a long-term contract is to facilitate trade between two parties with the aim to make relationship-specific investments. However, the authors also highlight the problem that contracts usually are done ex post. This means that when drafting the contract; it is hard to anticipate all costs that may arise during the whole project (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2009).

During a railway project there might be additional costs that are not accounted for initially such as new pavements connecting to the passenger railway, signaling systems, parking lots, soil conditions that hinder the construction (or prolong it etc.). In order to face these unexpected contingencies, this discussion evolves into the bargaining position of the agents: who is responsible for paying the additional costs? Does the burden fall on the state or municipality?

In the PPP process, Adhazi and Bowles (2004) have identified the negotiation phase to be the critical stage. They argue that 85% of the PPP projects run over time because of inefficiencies in the initial contracting procedure, which then result in cost over-runs (Adhazi and Bowles, 2001). Additionally, the increase in costs is further emphasized by Grimsey and Lewis (2004), who argues that if the government solely is to be responsible for the design and construction – then there are greater risks of time and cost overruns. This is due to the attitudes of the governments which sometimes are less considerate about the local infrastructure projects.

Studies have shown that cost overruns of around 50-100 percent (in fixed prices) are common and that project forecasts are over optimized by 20-70 percent compared with actual developments (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). Consequently it is argued that the complexity of the contacts is a great disadvantage of the PPP projects, which also becomes prevalent in the State-Municipality Partnership. In order to fully evaluate the arguments behind, one needs to consider the importance of the bargaining positions of the agents involved.
2.3 Bargaining theory

As alluded to earlier, the ex post characteristic of railway projects can lead to unanticipated costs and the question regarding which agent is accountable for paying becomes a bargaining issue. This issue is settled in the contract. The agreed terms in the contract are vital especially in large scale projects, like railway infrastructure, as they are conducted on long terms. The risks of cost overruns are increasing if not all partners have agreed on all the terms.

2.3.1 Hold-up problem

Subsequently, the long-term settlement of infrastructure projects can create a hold-up problem in infrastructure. This can occur since the investment creates a lock in for the investor, as the investment cannot be redeployed to another user or for another use (Sawant, 2008). For example, if agent A has made their required investments and agent B decides to change the terms of the agreement. This could result to unequal bargaining position for the agent A, as his/her investments cannot be redeployed. Hence, agent B is susceptible to hold-up agent A.

2.3.2 Bargaining with asymmetric information - State/Municipality

As presented above, the arrangement of the PPP include different levels of private risk taking. These are crucial when evaluating the socioeconomic benefits. PPP can be seen as a way to pre-finance of the project by monetizing future costs/revenues.

In the case of State-Municipal co-financing agreements, this means that the debt is transferred from the state to the municipality. This sets the agents into different bargaining positions (Dehormoy, 2012, p.4). Subsequently, the different incentives and information between all agents makes it important to thoroughly evaluate the contract. In order to achieve this, a cost perspective can be used to evaluate the motives of the municipality and state.

Studies (cf. Riksrevisionen, 2012:21) show that municipalities have a rather cost driven approach since their objective is to have a good railway with for instance additives for noise reduction and environmental aspects – these aspects are important and affect the inhabitants of the municipalities. Consequently, the interests of the municipalities might lead to higher costs than those initially calculated for (in the state cost-benefit analysis).
This shows the importance to include all terms in the contract (Riksrevisionen, 2012:21, p.54).

These types of agreements result in a bargaining situation where the agents have asymmetric information. The municipalities know the need for their infrastructure and how the local society would benefit from an improved railway. On the other hand, the state produces cost-benefit estimations on nation-wide basis and they make their decision on those results. They use this information to decide if a project is socioeconomically beneficial and should be invested in, and they do not account for additional costs. This means that the agents are holding on to different information. This type of information asymmetry can give rise to different incentives amongst the agents.

Several theories highlight that if the costs are not fully taken into account and negotiated there are great risks of cost over-runs. Additionally, the Nash bargaining model discusses what is referred to as “threat points” (or constraints), which are the outside options for each participants. That said, different agents might have different outside options, which in turn could influence their bargaining position (cf. Chiu and Yang, 1998)

2.3.3 Optimism bias/self-serving bias

The aforementioned discussion regarding costs deviating from the original calculations have been a highly scrutinized topic for a long time. Several authors have tried to find an explanation. As was concluded above (section 2.2.2), it is the negotiation phase that is the critical point to overcome cost decays. Additionally, Flyvberg (2006) points out two main drivers for cost over-runs: optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation. Optimism bias is related to positive beliefs about the future of the project. It might the case that municipalities ignore information that is not favoring their interest and they do not consider rational weighing of gains and losses (Boardman et al, 2014). Strategic misrepresentation on the other hand is a more deliberate action to underestimate costs and overestimate the benefits of a project in order to get the project through (Flyvbjerg, 2006). Subsequently, both can be seen as deceptions, where the first is self-deception but where the latter is intentional. The effect is however argued to be the same, resulting in less accurate forecasts and deviating cost-benefit ratios. Incorrectly specified calculations can in turn result in that “faulty” projects are conducted that actually are not socioeconomically beneficial. Subsequently, it becomes a question of who has the greatest power to pursue and enhance the importance of a project. This in turn affects the bargaining situation and the way projects are ranked in relationship to other projects (Riksrevisionen, 2012:21; SKL,
Studies have shown that 84% of rail passenger forecasts are wrong by more than +/- 20 percent and that 9 out of 10 rail projects have overestimated traffic (Flyvbjerg et al, 2003).

Therefore, examining potential optimism bias and self-serving bias become very important when assessing who is responsible for the misinformation and how the costs will be accounted for – especially if the investment is co-financed (since the contract has to be well-defined to provide proper cost allocation, cf. section 2.2.2).

2.4 Externalities and effects

When evaluating the benefits and costs from a railway investment it is important to consider the externalities of the investment. Externality is defined as an effect that production, or consumption, has on third party agents – agents that are not involved in the production or consumption of the good (Boardman, 2014).

In terms of positive externalities, a well-functioning railway solution will result in time savings when commuting. This applies to the theory of commuter’s non-linear response to time distances presented by Johansson et al (2003). The study highlights that the willingness of individuals to commute is highly dependent on the time distance which can be divided into intra-municipal (short time distances), intra-regional (medium time distances) and extra regional commuting (long time distance). Moreover a distinction is also made between preference for a job in the home region or home municipality. Given that individuals are utility maximizing, the study shows that those who have to commute long distances are the most time sensitive and that the greatest preference is to work in the home municipality (Johansson et al., 2003, p. 316). This therefore highlights the importance of how efficient the railway system is in providing effective commuting and thereby provides socioeconomic benefits. Studies show that 10-15 minutes of commuting time is considered a short time distance whilst 50-60 minutes is considered a commuting region and perceived as a long time distance (Johansson et. al. 2003). Lower commuting time gives employers a greater area with potential workers, and it gives prospective employees access to a larger area with potential work-places. Other positive externalities could for instance include environmental aspects that occur from an investment in railway infrastructure (cf. SOU, 2011). On the other hand, a negative externality could occur for third-party individuals in the city due to, for instance, increased noise levels, following the introduction of train-traffic.
3. Municipal co-financing of the Söderås Line

The Swedish railway system has been under constant development ever since the train was first introduced in the 19th century. Today, the Swedish Transport Administration is responsible for long-term planning of the railway system and its maintenance (Trafikverket 2, 2014). The Swedish Transport Administration is a government agency, and its activities are ultimately decided by the Swedish Parliament. The latest National Transport Plan was approved the 8th of April 2014. It emphasizes on the role of the railway system to create work opportunities and states that that “(...) with a well-functioning transport system both work and growth is benefitting” (Regeringen 2, 2014, p.1). According to this view, the transport system is seen as a way to bring regions closer and increase opportunities for both employees and employers.

Apart from the positive spillover effects that might be created for the labor market following large infrastructural investments, several additional benefits could emerge from a well-functioning, and developed, railway system.

On the left side, the current rail lines across the eastern part of the Region of Scania is depicted – with the so called Freight line of Scania marked in red. The Freight line of Scania runs from Ängelholm in northern Scania and connects with the Lomma Line and the Marieholms Line. The railway line which is analyzed in this essay is a part of this greater line. It is the line running from Ästorp to Teckomatorp and it is known as the Söderås Line. The Söderås Line is currently trafficked by freight trains, and passenger trains are expected to be introduced between Malmö and Ästorp in 2020 (Trafikverket 1, 2014; Appendix 1, 2014).

The decision, and the nature of co-financing, to introduce passenger trains was agreed upon and signed by the Municipality of Svalöv, the Municipality of Bjuv, the Municipality
of Lomma, the Municipality of Kävlinge, the Swedish Transport Administration and the Region of Scania. This agreement covers both the Söderås Line and the Lomma Line (as aforementioned, both belonging to the greater Freight line of Scania). Put differently, these different agents are co-financing the introduction of passenger trains along the Söderås Line (and the Lomma Line).

This process of developing the Söderås Line (as well as the Lomma line) is conducted in three different stages (Trafikverket 1, 2014). The first stage involves the creation of the Freight Line, which runs through the region of Scania (see depiction: fig. 2). In the next two stages the capacity of freight trains is increased and it involves the initiation passenger trains. Currently only four freight trains can pass per day and there is a need of more passenger platforms (in Municipality of Svalöv two new platform will be built, in Kågeröd and in Svalöv). New platforms and further development of existing ones is needed in in Billesholm, Kågeröd, Svalöv and Teckomatorp (Appendix 1, 2014; Trafikverket 2, 2014).

Subsequently, the need to reconstruct the current railway is made in order to meet the requirements of increased railway traffic (Banverket et al, 2009). The need for the reconstruction is also done in order to make the Freight Line though Scania more effective (as it allows full utilization of the benefits from the Hallandsås tunnel). Subsequently, it is also expected that commuting will increase, where a travel prognosis has been conducted by Skånetrafiken who estimate that the number of commuters along the Söderås Line in Svalöv municipality will increase from today’s value 1260 to 1600 in 2020 (Skånetrafiken, Appendix 5, Mats Améen, 2014-05-06). Thus, there can be argued to be positive externalities with respect to the environment by people using the train instead of car or bus. A further argument supporting an incentive to commute is the benefit of a cut in travel time when taking the train, where Skånetrafiken estimates that it will take 35 minutes from Svalöv to Malmö using the Söderås Line, compared to the current 60 minutes.

An outdated report done by Trivector (2000) for Söderås Line show that the time distance between Kågeröd and Teckomatorp was going to be 11 minutes (with the X10-trains) compared with to the other public transport option at the time – which was a 23 minutes bus-ride. Even though this figure is outdated, it still shows the saved commuting times following introduction of passenger train traffic (as discussed in Chapter 2).

The very same study (from Trivector, 2000) shows also that if the train is only going to depart once an hour - then the bus is a better option for public transport. The report states that “financially, no alternative is better than to today’s bus-routes” (Trivector 2000, p.17). Also, according to a cost-benefit analysis conducted by in 2009, the project is not
socioeconomically beneficial. The costs are estimated to be greater than the benefits by 116.4 billion SEK and the net present value is -0.6 (Banverket et al, 2009). Nevertheless, it is argued that the decreased burden on Markaryd line is a positive effect which is not possible to price and take into account in the cost-benefit analysis.

Other positive non-priced effects that are not considered in the analysis is the benefits of long term sustainable transport support in terms of decreased emission due to more freight transportation compared to large truck transportation (Banverket et al, 2009). In order to provide a clear view of the whole process of the initiation of Söderås Line, a timeline is presented below;

**Fig. 2: Time-line, passenger traffic on the Söderås Line**
3.1 Agents

Distinguishing between the different agents involved financing the Söderås Line requires a separation to be made between the different agents and their place in the administrative division of Sweden.

The left side illustration shows these agents and their relation to the introduction of passenger trains on the Söderås Line (and the Lomma Line). The main agent in this depiction is the Swedish Transport Administration, the region of Scania, Svalöv Municipality and the other municipalities that are co-financing the introduction of passenger trains Söderås Line.

The Swedish Transport Administration acts upon decisions from the Swedish Government and is state funded. The municipalities of Sweden collect taxes from local residents, while the Region of Scania is acting on behalf of the county of Scania and their investments in infrastructural projects are state funded (cf. SKL, 2011).

3.1.1 The Swedish Transport Administration

The Swedish Transport Administration is acting on behalf of the Swedish Government. Consequently, the investments in the railway system are decided through the national budget (Regeringen 2, 2014). One goal for Swedish Transport Administration, highlighted in the proposition 2008/09:35, is that they should sustain socioeconomic efficiency in their long-term transport investments. This goal should be reflected in the National Transport Plan and ought to be followed accordingly. According to the proposition (2008/09:35), the Swedish Transport Administration has the responsibility to evaluate models, which might result in more effective infrastructure investments (Regeringen 4, 2008; Regeringen 5, 2008).

Furthermore, co-financing can be divided into municipal, commercial grant, EU support, user-fees (infrastructure charge, road toll and congestion tax) (cf. SKL, 2011; Mellin et al, 2012).
In terms of financing infrastructure investments the main investment rule is that the governments should be responsible for all cost according to the budget law (2011:203) (Riksrevisionen, 2012). However, in order to meet the goals of socioeconomically efficient infrastructure investments, there has been increased interest for cost-sharing. The idea of co-financing has contributed to the legislation DS 2008:11, which enables co-financing by municipalities of regional infrastructure projects (Banverket et al, 2008). Further legislative changes in order to enhance co-financing include allowing municipalities to present the co-financing of public infrastructure on their balance sheet (SFS 1997:614) (Cars et al, 2011).

The Swedish Government decided to allocate SEK 417 billion for the National Transport Plan 2010-2021 (SOU, 2011). The cost of the projects that were co-financed added up to SEK 128 billion, and these state were funded to 48 %. Approximately, SEK 19 billion were municipal co-financed (which were primarily funded by municipal taxation) (SOU 2011:12, p.41-42).

A governmental decision from 2012 frames the directives for the present infrastructure plan (Trafikverket 4, 2014) (Regeringen 3, 2012). Accordingly, the Swedish Transport Administration should follow these sets of guidelines (Regeringen 3, 2012, 11-13):

- The initiation of a infrastructure project should be based on the transport-political goals (which requires that, as a main rule, projects should be socioeconomically beneficial and that co-financing will not enable municipalities to “pay” to have their projects prioritized”)
- The share of main responsibility in terms of state and municipality should not be changed
- All co-financing should voluntary
- The initiative to co-finance should be based on the utility of the contributor.
- Co-financing should mainly consider improvements or add-ons to projects, which the Swedish Transport Association already is considering to conduct.
- If the project is co-financed from its initial state, it has to be thoroughly motivated
- The Swedish Transport Administration has to present expected benefits of the co-financiers, as a part of the complete assessment. Particular attention should be paid to this presentation if the co-financing refers to initial projects or if the expected benefits of co-financiers are greater than what the Swedish Transport Administration anticipated (e.g. with regard to the exploitation values).

*Regeringen 3, 2012, p. 12*
Noticeable is, according to these abovementioned requirements, that the co-financing should only be used if there is a need for such investments and if there is a desire to participate in co-financing.

Yet again, a proposition (approved by the parliament in 2012), considering investments for a strong and sustainable infrastructure system (Regeringen 1, 2012), states that the financing should mainly be the government responsibility. It also states that if “a state funded investments to some extension is to be considered primarily a municipal matter; then it might be reasonable that municipal taxpayers contribute to the investment” (Regeringen 1, 2012, p.52). This means that municipal co-financing should be based on the municipal utility of the investment (Regeringen 4, 2012).

The 8 of April 2014 the Swedish government presented a new national transport plan for 2014-2025 (Regeringen 2, 2014; Trafikverket 4, 2014). This plan explains of how the state funded investments adding up to SEK 522 billion (of which SEK 86 billion in railway infrastructure) should be distributed among the infrastructure projects.¹

### 3.1.2 Region Scania/Skânetrafiken

Investments from the Region of Scania are depending on the regional transport infrastructure plan (RTI-Plan, 2014-2025). The most recent one is covering the period 2014-2025. The infrastructure investments that Region Scania depends on the state funds allocated to the region. In the present RTI-plan these funds added up to SEK 4356 million. SEK 500 million of these are used to co-finance projects in the National Transport Plan (RTI Skåne, 2014-2025). The division of financial responsibilities between the State, Region Scania and municipalities are clearly stated in the RTI-plan 2014-2025 in the following way:

- **For new railway stations:**
  
  New railway stations including commuting- and bicycle parking, bus stops, additional attached roads to the station *should be financed by the municipality*. This is a “ticket” for the municipality to be part of the railway system.

¹ In the process of writing this thesis, 2014-05-22, it became apparent in the news that the Swedish Transport Administration has provided faulty calculations with respect to the 522 billion in the national transport plan for 2014-2025. Internal documents show that around 20 billion is missing for the provision of railway construction (SVT, 2014). This is something that might have great cost consequences for the projects in the Swedish national transport plan, such as Söderås Line.
• **For reconstruction of stations:**

Railway line reconstruction such as weather protection and station extensions should normally be financed by Swedish Transport Administration/Region Scania. Surroundings such as commuting- and bicycle parking, bus stops, additional attached roads to the station should be financed 50% by the municipality and 50% by the state, usually by financials provided for the RTI-plan. In case of constructions based solely on the interest of the municipalities, then it should be fully financed by the municipality.

• **For reconstruction regarding increased capacity and standard improvements:**

Swedish Transport Administration /Region Scania finances capacity measures and standard improvements. Municipal co-financing could be suggested if there are great local benefits.

**RTI-Skåne (2014-2025)**

Abovementioned requirements are also presented in the Söderås Line contract, where the financial responsibilities are stated and discussed (Trafikverket 1, 2014; Appendix 1).

The RTI-plan of 2014-2024 also highlights that the decision of transport alternatives varies with distance. The train usage increases with travel distance (RTI 2014-2025, 2014). The plan shows that one third of the residents use the train if the travel distance is longer than 50 km. As for the Söderås Line, enabling passenger traffic would increase possibilities for local residents to travel to the larger cities in Scania (namely, Lund, Malmö and Helsingborg). That is, improvements in railway infrastructure bring the region closer and this is one fundamental reason for the infrastructure investments of the Region of Scania. It is assumed that this will have a positive effect on the productivity (cf. RTI, 2014-2025).

The RTI-plan (2014-2024) also links to a study conducted by OECD showing that the population in the county is expected to increase by 100 000 in 2020, thus requiring a further developed labor market which is supposedly benefitting from a more developed infrastructure.
3.1.3 Municipality - Svalöv

As stated in the introductory part of this thesis (Chapter 1), citizens\(^2\) and politicians of the municipality has long demanded the introduction of passenger trains along the Söderås Line. Important to note is that passenger trains used to traffic this route (until 1991). To investigate whether passenger trains should be introduced in Svalöv a pre-study was conducted in 1995 (Trivector, 1995). In 1997 an agreement was signed stating that passenger trains should be introduced along the route (Appendix 2). This agreement was then followed by an additional pre-study by the Swedish Rail Administration (1999, todays Swedish Transport Administration). It emphasizes the possibilities for introduction of passenger trains through Svalöv and Kågeröd.

Nonetheless, it is important to highlight that the co-financing was neither discussed in these report; nor in the agreement of intention that was signed in 1997. Noticeable is that a later report from 2000 (Trivector, 2000) concluded that no alternative way of public transport, to the ones investigated with passenger trains going through Kågeröd and Svalöv, was economically viable in comparison with the bus lines (Trivector, 2000: 17). Still, it is important to point out that this report does not take all socioeconomic aspects into account. Therefore, it is not possible to rule out the train as the most favorable alternative (when examining the report from Trivector, 2000). Despite previous studies and negotiations, Söderås Line was not part of the national transport plan in 2010-2021 since the Swedish Rail Administration, todays Swedish Transport Administration, never signed the contract. Subsequently, the decision to introduce passenger trains was not signed and finalized until 2014. Given this long process to finally get Söderås Line in the national transport plan 2014-2025, makes it interesting to further look into the terms of the contract.

\(^2\) With respect to the long-term development of the Söderås Line rail. As we were looking though the archives in the town hall (2014-05-07), one letter from a resident caught our eye. The letter is from 1995. It contains detailed descriptions of the readers view on the matter. Claiming that it is doubtful whether our environment can handle more car and bus traffic. The letter continues “At the same time you let the rail way decay (...)” “is this economics?” (Letter from a resident of Svalöv, addressed to the Swedish Prime Minister, 1995)
3.2 Contract regarding co-financing Söderås Line

The contract of co-financing (considering the Söderås Line and the Lomma Line) describes how the responsibilities ought to be divided among the financiers. The project is conducted in three steps; Step 1 includes the reconstruction of the freight line in order to increase the freight traffic. Step 2 and 3 are needed in order to increase the capacity of trains, which will include additional constructions such as stations to enable passenger trains (Appendix 1; Trafikverket 1, 2014).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agent</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th>Step 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Swedish Transport Association, of which</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- National level</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Regional level (Region Scania)</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bjuv municipality</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svalöv municipality</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kävlinge municipality</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lomma</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>640</strong></td>
<td><strong>440</strong></td>
<td><strong>200</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Cost division between the different agents (Trafikverket 2, 2014)

The contract of co-financing (table 2) shows that the costs of introducing passenger trains on the Söderås Line and the Lomma Line adds up to an estimated total amount of 640 million SEK (2014) (Appendix 1; Trafikverket 1, 2014). According to the contract, the municipalities are financing the construction of train stations as well as the connecting local infrastructural needs, such as parking spaces, bicycle stands and connecting pavements. The table also highlights that Svalöv is contributing with SEK 93 million, being the greatest amount when comparing the municipalities. This is mainly because they will have to undertake the construction of two stations (in both Kågeröd and Svalöv). The applicable project construction in line with the PPP model (discussed in Chapter 2) would be the Design - Build - Finance - Operate (DBFO). In terms of Designing, Building and Operating, a contract has been conducted with Strukton Rail. The financing will be shared by Region Skåne, Trafikverket and the affected municipalities. This PPP combination of Söderås Line can be combined with the partnership characteristics outlined in the theory part: The type of Söderås Line is shared responsibility of the services of the constructional
part and financing, which allows for better allocation of resources in terms of having an experienced entrepreneur operating the project.

Moreover, according to the contract, changes in costs from what is stated in the National Transport Plan and the Regional Transport Plan should be divided between the participants. It also states that if the costs were to increase with more than 10% at the time of procurement of construction; then each participant is allowed to re-negotiate the contract (§7, Trafikverket 1, 2014). The contract also states that all additional costs that arise due to the will of a unilateral partner, should be covered by the partner to 100% (§7, Trafikverket 1, 2014).

When comparing the contracts from the two time periods (the agreement of intention in 1997 and the current 2014), it becomes evident that having co-financing in the current National Transport Plan played an important part, which will be further developed, in the empirical case study.

3.3 Operationalization of the theory on the case of the Söderås Line

Following the previous discussion, regarding the main agents of the project, it is important to note that the process of introducing passenger train on the Söderås Line has been developed in different stages, with initial discussions going back to the early 90s. Therefore it has becomes really interesting to investigate the negotiation process since the initiation of Söderås Line.

Subsequently, the process highlights the rationales of the decision, and reasons behind the investment; why to co-finance the Söderås Line? What problems does co-financing create and solve? The theoretical part in section 2 has provided a thorough explanation of the rationale behind co-financing with the expected benefits of risk sharing and increased investment in infrastructure projects with respect to incentives and benefits on local municipal level. In terms of costs, it becomes the responsibility of the municipalities to co-finance in order to get a project in the national plan. Therefore the municipalities are faced with the financial burden. Subsequently, the next section will provide an empirical study of how co-financing is perceived by Svalöv municipality. Finally, in order to thoroughly address the rationale behind co-financing, the last section provides the views of all the 290 Swedish municipalities. Conclusively, these studies will enable a case study evaluation to the questions; why municipal co-financing and what are the perceived costs and benefits?
4. Empirical Analysis

Part A: Interviews

4.1 Method

To understand the economic rationale of the decision for the municipality of Svalöv to co-finance the Söderås Line a total of 10 in-depth interviews have been conducted. These interviews follow a script, with open-ended questions, to cover the previously introduced topics (section 2 and 3). Each question has been formalized in such a way that they operationalize the theory we have previously introduced. All interviews were conducted semi-structured, with the explicit purpose to understand the different agents and their view of the concept of co-financing, and in particular in relationship to the project of the Söderås Line.

Quinn (1990) discusses what is referred to as the general interview guide approach, which has been used in these interview set-ups. The topics covered have been pre-determined in advance, and some questions have been added depending on the position of the interviewed participant. Furthermore, some questions have been altered to more clearly address the respondent. This form of interview technique allows for follow up questions, which was often needed to make clarifications. The interviews took between 45 minutes to 1 hour and 30 minutes to conduct. Most of them were carried out in person, but two interviews were conducted via telephone.

4.2 Respondents

Naturally, as noted earlier in Chapter 1 and 3, the main agent of interest in this analysis is the Municipality of Svalöv – as it is from their perspective we base our research. To understand the behavior of the municipality, and the underlying rationale behind the decision to co-finance the Söderås Line, we have interviewed respondents primarily on the basis of their position in Svalöv and their role in the introduction of passenger trains on the Söderås Line. Moreover, to understand the relationship between Svalöv and the other agents in the project, additional interviews have been conducted with representatives from the Swedish Transport Administration and Skånetrafiken (the public transport operator in the Region of Scania). The politicians, the officials and the decision makers we have interviewed, and their role in the organization can be viewed below,
As aforementioned, the interviews are based upon pre-defined questions and the participants are selected on the basis of their role in the organization. Following a semi-structured interview form gave us the opportunity to explore various views regarding the decision to implement passenger trains on the Söderås Line and determine patterns in our answers.

Nonetheless, it is important, once again, to highlight that negotiations regarding the introduction of passenger trains on the Söderås Line have been carried out since the 90s. It was been a long process. To understand the concept of municipal co-financing in relation to the Söderås Line we must understand this entire process - going back to the mid-90s and the agreement of intention in 1997 (cf. Chapter 3). We have therefore decided to interview Karl-Erik Kruse, answering on behalf of himself. Karl-Erik Kruse is the previous mayor of the municipality (succeeded by the current mayor Birgitta Jönsson). All other respondents have been working on the project in the finalizing stage (during the time of signing).

### 4.3 Structure of the analysis

In this section we use the theoretical presentation in chapter 2 – to capture the essence of the interviews. The questionnaire, which the interviews were based upon, is built upon this theoretical foundation. Do note that this study is aiming at finding different patterns and to
uncover the different agents’ motives and argumentation. A limitation of such an approach is that the respondents’ answers are depending on their knowledge and their memory (cf. Quinn, 1990). At the same time, this approach enables us to cover topics and discussions that are not written down in documents and policy papers. It allows us to direct the question of the rationale of municipal co-financing to the officials, and the decision makers (to those individuals who led the work of finalizing the agreement of co-financing). In this presentation of the interviews we focus on these main topics: Economic Rationale, Negotiations, Risk sharing, Externalities and effects and Alternative opportunities.

### 4.3.1 Economic rationale

Important to note is that the partners that signed the co-financing agreement is all striving towards a rational allocation of their resources (cf. Chapter 2). That is, they all ought to distribute their own resources in the best way possible. Since the objectives for the agents differ – so does the expected benefits emerging from the investment.

During our interviews several different positive effects following the introduction of passenger trains, on the Söderås Line, was presented. In particular, increased attractiveness was highlighted by the participants representing the municipality of Svalöv. Jan Bengtsson (2014-05-07), financial manager, stated that the introduction of passenger trains on the Söderås Line is “a way to put Svalöv on the map”, which highlights the argument of increased attractiveness following the introduction of passenger trains. During our interviews many respondents argued that higher attractiveness could lead to an increase in the number of citizens in the municipality (as more individuals decide to move to the municipality of Svalöv). Additionally, many of the respondents argued that the investment might have positive effects on the labor market. The region becomes closer and more job alternatives appear for the citizens. Employees are given access to a larger area with prospective workers (more applicants see Svalöv as an option of occupancy, mainly as one can travel to the municipality faster). At the same time, workers are given access to more work places, as the entire Scania region becomes closer. Additional societally endeavoured reasons, presented by the respondents, that motivate municipal co-financing was recreation and comfort.

Fredrik Löfqvist (2014-05-21) pointed out that this investment shows a belief in the future, meaning that the investment can have positive spill-over effects to future generation. A final incentive for the investment was the environment, as trains have less effect on the environment.
Nonetheless, a tendency among the respondents was to emphasize on the benefits. This was in particular the case during our interviews with representatives from the municipality of Svalöv. Whether the, abovementioned, positive effects would actually occur was less certain. Mats Améen (2014-05-05), chief strategy officer at Skånetrafiken, argued that the “structure of commuting is viscous” and that it takes time before new commuting structures appear in practice (he estimated that it might take 5-10 years until we can observed differences in commuting patterns among local residents).

Additionally, the respondents representing the municipality of Svalöv tended to direct critique towards municipal co-financing as a way of financing. Mats Dahlberg (2014-05-07), environment manager, argued that “municipalities have to pay too much” and that co-financing is not optimal for the municipality. This was also noted by the former mayor of Svalöv, Karl-Erik Kruse (2014-05-07), who argued that residents of municipalities that participate in municipal co-financing are “faced with a double burden”. They are paying for infrastructural improvements both via the municipal tax and via the state tax.

Still, we observed that few reports have been made regarding the socioeconomic effects of the construction of the Söderås Line for the municipality of Svalöv (and the Region of Scania). It was made clear by the Mats Améen, chief strategy officer at Skånetrafiken, that: “if Skånetrafiken would be a profit maximizing company – then introduction of passenger train on would not be considered”. He stated that they are only expected to cover the cost by 30-40 % (from ticket sales and tax revenues). Even if the bus line along the Söderås Line is stopped, the calculations show less than 50 % cost coverage.

It became apparent (in our interviews) that the respondents are taking much more into consideration than just economic figures (even though no reports of local socioeconomic effects have been produced).

4.3.1.1 Economic welfare and economic efficiency

Examining whether a project is socioeconomically desirable is hardly possible in practice. The respondents pointed out that it might be the case that the positive effects do not appear. The financial manager of Svalöv, Jan Bengtsson (2014-05-07) pointed out that he had not read the report examining the effects of the construction from 2009 (Banverket et al, 2009) and that he had not come across any calculations of expected effects following the introduction of passenger trains along the Söderås Line. He also argued that the expenses will be covered through an increased number of inhabitants or increased taxation. Yet again, no papers have been made that calculate the effects of implementing rail way traffic
– and no assessment of profitability have been conducted (that justify the project from municipality of Svalöv, taking socioeconomic effects into account). Instead some respondents referred to previous studies, some of which was conducted in the 90s, and other studies carried out by the Swedish Transport Administration.

Jan Bengtsson (2014-05-07), like others, noted that the positive effects might not occur. He stated that “it could be case that 3000 people move to the municipality – and perhaps that would make the decision financially beneficial. But, the politicians did not request any such calculations”. During our interviews it was also argued that even if people were to move to Svalöv, it does not necessarily mean that the municipality will gain in monetary terms (mainly in terms of increased taxes). This once again highlights that financial motives was not the driving force of the initiation of passenger train traffic on the Söderås Line. The decision was based on a “belief in the future” and the individual belief that the effects will occur (especially increased attractiveness) and a strong conviction. Jan Bengtsson (2014-05-07) stated that “people want it”. That is, the introduction of passenger trains is highly demanded by the citizens and the politicians– even if the positive effects are neglected.

### 4.3.1.2 State-Municipal Partnership

Here we use the theory discussed in chapter 2, regarding State-Municipal Partnership, to uncover the mechanism underlying the decision for the agents to invest in the Söderås Line. Consequently, all respondents are striving towards making decisions that are socio-economically beneficial – with an optimally designed public transport system.

In the case of the Söderås Line; it is obvious that the different agents have different, and sometimes even conflicting, reasons to co-finance the introduction of passenger trains. As stated earlier, in section 4.3.1, the financial gains of the decision to co-finance are negligible. That said, many more factors than the purely financial ones have to be taken into account (apart from cost coverage in terms of usage fees or ticket purchases).

Still, during our interviews we observed that many of the respondents lacked information regarding the effects and future projections (following the investment). Hence, this might go against the principle presented by the government, which highlights that projects should be evaluated and prioritized depending on their socioeconomic benefits (cf. Chapter 3).

Mats Dahlberg (2014-05-07), environment manager, noted that the problem with this type of agreement, e.g. state-municipal, is that the agreements are not striving towards cost-effectiveness. He argued that the municipality was faced with a “accept the deal or the
project will not be carried out”-situation (Mats Dahlberg, 2014-05-07). He then argued that if the participants was co-operating throughout the entire planning and decision making process, then this would lead to more informed decisions (as both partners would benefit from such an co-operation).

Additionally, Mats Améen (2014-05-05) stated that few projects are able to fit into the National Transport Plan (which lists all coming large infrastructure projects, cf. Chapter 3). Subsequently, he highlights that “co-financing is not officially a requirement, but in practice, if the partners to Swedish Transport Administration want to see their infrastructural project realized and be part of the National Infrastructure Plan, the municipalities have to co-finance”.

### 4.3.2 Risk sharing

When it comes to the risks associated with the project it is apparent that the signed contract emphasizes on how expected costs deviations ought to be distributed among the co-financiers; and this was pointed out by many of the respondents. Jack Bårström (2014-05-13), urban and regional planner at the Swedish Transport Administration, pointed out that the contract states that if costs were to increase by more than 10% at the time of procurement of construction, then the co-financiers stand free to renegotiate the contract (Trafikverket §7, Appendix 1, Jack Bårström, 2014-05-13).

Another risk, or possibility, is that the Swedish government opt out from the contract. This has pointed out by Karl-Erik Kruse who argued that “the state can always retreat; but the municipalities are not able to do so” (Karl-Erik Kruse, 2014-05-07). He was referring to a section in the contract saying that the decision is binding under the condition that the Swedish Government (see: the Swedish Parliament) approves the measure and the financing in the coming, and future, national transport plans. The contract is also requiring that the regional council approves the measure in its plan for Regional Transport Infrastructure (RTI-plan, cf. Chapter 3). This means that Svalöv do not only face the risk of cost over-runs (as discussed by Flyvbjerg 2003, cf. Chapter 2) – but they also the risk of having the agreement revoked (for instance following a shift in the political landscape).

Furthermore, Jan Bengtsson (2014-05-07), financial manager, and Mats Dahlberg (2014-05-07) pointed out that investigations in the municipality of Svalöv have shown environmental pollution. Jan Bengtsson (2014-05-07) said that they have to wait until this matter is investigated; and that it might result in the need to find an alternative location for the platforms in Svalöv. He then estimated that it would take approximately one year to
come up with a new detail plan (if they were forced to change the location of the train station). It was also pointed out that this would not necessarily require a new contract between the different co-financiers (as long as the new detail plan it is line with the contract).

Another risk pointed out, and discussed in section 4.3.1, was that the positive effects would not appear. Karl-Erik Kruse (2014-05-07), former mayor of Svalöv, argued that it is highly questionable if Svalöv are able to reclaim their expenditures.

4.3.3 Externalities and effects

To investigate the consequences that will occur from passenger train traffic on the Söderås Line, we asked our respondents what effects they expect to see following the construction of the Söderås Line. This goes into the discussion regarding economic effects. A tendency among the participants was that they argued that the introduction of passenger trains on the Söderås Line would increase the attractiveness of the municipality. Hence, the population would increase. Mats Améen (2014-05-05), chief strategist at Skånetrafiken, argued that families might consider living in Svalöv following the introduction of passenger trains (as they would be able to live in smaller city with reasonable distance to working places).

Additionally, Michael Andersson (2014-04-10), administrative chief at Svalöv, pointed out that one effect that have been discussed was that the introduction of passenger trains would give the residents (and the non-residents) access to recreation areas (in particular the Söderås National Park). Another effect discussed, in particular by the mayor of Svalöv (Birgitta Jönsson, 2014-05-07), was that the introduction of passenger trains would result in less car use, as the public transport system would provide residents with easy-access to work places in other municipalities and more cultural opportunities (as it becomes easier to travel to other municipalities).

A negative effect of the introduction of the passenger trains that was presented in our interviews was that it might result in closed bus lines, and this would affect the residents living in remote areas of Svalöv. Fredrik Löfqvist (2014-05-21), head of the municipality, pointed out that this is not certain, as the contract is not requiring such a development (cf. Trafikverket 1, 2014; Appendix 1).
4.3.4 Negotiations

The respondents from the municipality of Svalöv expressed a strong will to introduce passenger train traffic on the Söderås Line. Fredrik Löfqvist (2014-05-21), head of local government, pointed out that “We [edi. rem. Svalöv] have been one of the driving forces in the negotiations and tried arrange some of the meetings. We tried to get all parties to agree when something was unclear”. This quotation shows the great degree of engagement for the Söderås Line from the Municipality of Svalöv. Mats Dahlberg (2014-05-07), environmental manager, pointed out that “we [edi. rem. Svalöv] have felt that it was important that all parts [edi. rem. all co-financiers] wanted to have traffic on the railway”. This was also noted by Fredrik Löfqvist (2014-05-21) who argued that they struggled to create a contract that everyone was willing to accept, that it was “a process with constant changes”.

During our interviews, another aspect that pushed the decision, to introduce passenger trains on the Söderås Line, was brought up. Mats Améen (2014-05-05) argued that due to its location (on the west side of Scania) one important reason to develop the railway (the entire Freight Train Line of Scania) was the construction of the Hallandsås Tunnel. The Hallandsås Tunnel will create a link for traffic from Sweden’s west coast (and create a greater freight line, providing a connection of goods traffic from the West Coast to the European continent, cf. RTI-plan, 2010-2021). Therefore, it might be the case that the expected completion of the Hallandsås Tunnel in December 2015; pushed the contract to start developing the Söderås Line.

Despite rather long negotiations, it is important to understand that no alternative measures (or alternative solutions to create a better way of public transport) were really discussed. A tendency among the respondents was to highlight the superiority of the passenger train – favoring this alternative to the possibility of a further development of the bus lines. Birgitta Jönsson (2014-05-07), mayor of Svalöv, stated that these alternatives are not mutually exclusive. Nonetheless, Mats Améen (2014-05-05), pointed out that Region of Scania has negotiated the possibility to stop some of the current bus lines, having less than 50 % cost coverage, along the Söderås Line (when passenger trains are introduced). Still, whether such a development will take place is not certain (cf. section 4.3.3).
4.3.4.1 Bargaining

We asked the respondents to explain the bargaining situation towards the other agents in the project (Svalöv, other Municipalities, Swedish Transport Administration and the Region of Scania). A tendency among some of the respondents was to describe the bargaining situation rather mutual, but most of the respondents from Svalöv argued that the Swedish Transport Administration had an advantage in the discussions.

Birgitta Jönsson (2014-05-07), mayor of Svalöv, pointed out that whether Bjuv would sign the final contract of co-financing was uncertain during a period. It was necessary to have at least two municipal co-financiers to close the deal.

Nonetheless, many of the respondents from Svalöv had less positive views on the relationship towards the Swedish Transport Administration. Mats Dahlberg (2014-05-07), environment manager, described the relationship between the municipalities and the Swedish Transport Administration as a “big brother and little brother”-relationship. He pointed out that the Swedish Transport Administration has more resources; and in the end they were deciding whether passenger trains ought to be introduced. Karl-Erik Kruse (2014-05-07), previous mayor of Svalöv, went even further in his critique. He argued that the “possibility to influence the contract was extremely limited”. He also pointed out that the bargaining, and the negotiations, is directed one-way (meaning that Svalöv have to adapt to decisions of the Swedish Transport Administration). Karl-Erik Kruse (2014-05-07) stated that “you [edi. rem. the municipalities] are either taking part of the game, or standing on the side – there is no room for negotiations [edi. rem. or bargaining]”.

During our interviews we also saw a tendency showing that the Swedish Transport Administration had a leading role in the discussions, and during the bargaining. Jack Bårström (2014-05-13), urban and regional planner at the Swedish Transport Administration, partly confirmed this when he noted that the Swedish Transport Administration has the greatest possibility to influence the negotiations.

In fact it was also pointed out (by Birgitta Jönsson and Karl-Erik Kruse) that co-financing, of large infrastructure project, to a large extend is a political decision on state level. Birgitta Jönsson (2014-05-07) pointed out “the politics are turning fast”; which means that Swedish Parliament can opt out from the agreement (in other words, alter the National Transport Plan). This in turns puts the municipalities in a rather unfortunate situation; and highlights the unequal bargaining situation that many of the respondents described.

Additionally, both Fredrik Löfqvist (2014-05-21) and Birgitta Jönsson (2014-05-07) noted that it was of great interest to have terms of co-financing decided upon before the National
Transport Plan was finalized (in April 2014). Fredrik Löfqvist (2014-05-21) stated that it was important to create terms that are consistent with the view of all parties and added that “the Swedish Transport Administration have to respond to that [edi. rem. to the question of whether it was important to finalize the contract before the National Transport Plan was accepted] – this is what they have told us”. Once again, this highlights the bargaining position of the construction of the Söderås Line – the Swedish Transport Administration is favored.

4.3.4.2 Optimism bias/Strategic misrepresentation

It became clear during our interviews that the Söderås Line might include a high level of optimism bias. During our discussions it was obvious that the introduction of passenger trains on the Söderås Line has long been demanded by both politicians and local residents. Birgitta Jönsson (2014-05-07), mayor of Svalöv, said that there has been a “political consensus” in the municipal board in support of the introduction of passenger trains on the Söderås Line. Some of our participants pointed out that this was necessary as it shows that the municipality is determined which enables them to stand united in the negotiations. This could in fact contradict the notion of optimism bias, as this high level of consensus could be strategically beneficial in the negotiations.

Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, Fredrik Löfqvist (2014-05-21) pointed out that the decision to introduce passenger trains on the Söderås Line shows “a belief in the future. You [edi. rem. the municipality] strive towards development.” This shows the great level of belief in the investment.

4.3.4.3 Information Asymmetry

Arguably it might be the case that a certain degree of optimism biasness has been present. It is important to understand that if true, this could have an impact on the ability to make informed decisions and in extension – to act rational. Another tendency we captured is the presence of information asymmetry. This could have had an impact on the municipality’s ability to make informed decisions regarding the final contract.

During our interviews it became clear that the general terms and responsibilities in the contract are well-defined in the contract. However, the Swedish Transport Administration has been writing the contract and they have provided the municipalities with the cost calculation. This has led to a situation where the Swedish Transport Administration has been providing the information, and the municipality has been receiving this information.
Fredrik Löfqvist (2014-05-21), head of local government, said that “(...) it is difficult to question the calculations from the Swedish Transport Administration”. This is due to the limited amount of resources of the municipality, and these types of infrastructural investments are very specific and require extensive analysis (and financial ability). Hence, as pointed out by the respondents, no locally produced calculations have really been made on expected effects of the introduction of passenger trains. It was, however, pointed out that a few estimations have been made (though not including all socioeconomic effects associated with the introduction of passenger trains on the Söderås Line). Instead of locally produced calculations, it was noted that the decision to a large extent was dependent on the calculations provided by the Swedish Transport Administration. This shows a certain information advantage of the Swedish Transport Administration. In fact, Jack Bårström (2014-05-13), urban and rural planner at the Swedish Transport Administration, pointed out that there has been a degree of lack of trust among the respondents from the Municipality of Svalöv.

4.3.4.4 Hold-up problem

In our interviews it was made clear that large infrastructure projects (such as the Söderås Line) are long term investments, and these investments create partners that last for a long time period.

Mats Améen (2014-05-05), chief strategist at Skånetrafiken, noted that they (the Region of Skåne) have felt obliged to fulfil their commitment (since the Region of Skåne signed the agreement of intention in 1997, Appendix 2). Therefore it could be the case that if they were to take all negotiations into account then this could have created a hold-up situation for the agents (Region Skåne, Svalöv and the other municipalities) to the project. A consequence of such a hold-up could be that problems are overlooked. Still, the respondents from Svalöv did not agree with that notion (that the long negotiation process has created an early project hold-up). Mats Améen (2014-05-05) argued that it is important to fully commit to these types of large projects (that have long time horizon include more than economic mere benefits).

Additionally, a hold-up situation might also occur due to the long negotiations. Mats Dahlberg (2014-05-07) stated that “(...) it becomes harder to back out when commitments have been made and costs have been taken into account”. During our interviews we found the respondents very determined – this determination could even result in acceptance of cost over-runs (even if large ones were to occur). It is a long term commitment. On the
other hand, such an argumentation might be hasted. During the discussions it was argued, as alluded earlier in this section, that long term determination is crucial to finish these types of deals. Also, as noted by Karl-Erik Kruse (2014-05-07), a conclusion of an early stage hold-up due to the long negotiation process is highly questionable. He argued that the early stage discussions (mainly during the 90s) did not include discussions of the finance structure – meaning that municipal co-financing was not really discussed.

4.3.5 Alternative opportunities

As discussed in the earlier sections in this chapter, there was a general consensus among the respondents favouring the introduction of passenger trains to other ways of public transport. Still, as noted chapter 2, a well-rounded analysis should take other measures into consideration – to rule out the possibility of over-looking other more socioeconomically efficient alternatives. Yet, the respondents were not considering alternative solutions. It was also noted that the bus lines in Svalöv (and to other municipalities) have been developed; during the time before the agreement of co-financing was signed. In fact, when we asked the respondents if any other alternative solution was considered in the discussion it was argued that there is no comparable way to develop the public transport system to the introduction of passenger trains.
Part B. Questionnaire

Examining our interviews allowed us to discover patterns in our analysis. To see if the patterns that we observed in Svalöv hold, a questionnaire was constructed to extend our analysis. This questionnaire was sent out to every mayor in the 290 Swedish municipalities.

4.4 Method

As noted, our interviews allowed us to discover different patterns. We therefore decided to create a questionnaire – to test the tendencies we saw in the interviews. The process of developing and executing the questionnaire was done step-wise.

The first step was to operationalize the main points emerging from our interviews and hence, to create questions based upon these points (cf. Part A, Chapter 4). The second step was to determine the appropriate person to contact in each municipality. The questions that emerged from the answers, from the interviews in Chapter 4 (Part A), required us to find someone in the organization that is well-informed of the political discussion and the entire organization. Also, some questions included a certain degree of normative valuation. This was needed to explore different individuals’ perception and view of municipal co-financing in our interviews. What this means is that we, with the help from our interviews, have created questions that gives an answer to how municipal co-financing is related to underlying economic theory (or the economic rationales of the decision to co-finance large infrastructure projects). It is important to understand that the Swedish Administrative chain allows for a great level of municipal independence. The head of the municipal board is referred to as the mayor of the municipality. This individual is leading the work in the municipal board, which can be viewed as the “government” of the municipality. They are politically elected; and they reflect the will of the voting residents (cf. Göteborg, 2014; Linköping, 2014). Directing our questions towards them allowed us to both take the will of the municipalities into consideration, as well as the will of the different regions of Sweden (as we asked the mayors to fill in their region). At the same time we were able to direct questions to someone with a leading role in the organization, with knowledge of the entire organization (namely the mayor).

The third step was to make the questionnaire easy to understand, and structurally well-disposed. One problem was the definition. In our letter to the mayors, and in the questionnaire, we used the term “large infrastructure projects” (as defined in Chapter 1).
We then defined large infrastructure projects as road- and rail infrastructure projects which costs more than SEK 50 million (from all co-financiers). This is how the Swedish Transport Administration defines projects that are included in their National Transport Plan and it therefore includes projects that are comparable with the Söderås Line (with cost expenditures comparable to those of the introduction of passenger trains on the railway).

We asked the respondents about road- and railway infrastructure projects in order to force the respondent to consider projects that are comparable with the Söderås Line (for instance, air-traffic or ship traffic is not a feasible to the Söderås Line). It was also brought to our attention, after discussions with Svalöv, that different types of co-financing projects exists and therefore we needed to make clarifications – which we did. The last step was to send out the forms to all mayors in Sweden.

4.5 Questions

This questionnaire contains of three different parts. The first part is a background part, aiming at categorizing the answers. Since municipal co-financing might be politically sensitive, we wanted to make the answers confidential. Therefore we did not ask the participants to name their municipality. Instead the respondents were asked to select the county to which the municipality belongs. The respondents were also asked to answer whether their municipality are, or have been, co-financing any “large infrastructure projects”.

The next section of the questionnaire asks the respondents to consider different statements and then state whether they “agree”, “tend to agree”, “tend to disagree” or “disagree” with the following,

Statement 1: Municipal co-financing allow financially strong municipalities to jump to the front of the queue

Explanation: According to legislative decision all co-financing is voluntary. Still, in the case of the Söderås Line we have seen that it was a requirement. It was argued that those municipalities who want to see their infrastructure investments become reality have to co-finance. If this is the case, then naturally rich municipalities would be able to see their projects prioritized.

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3 This include going through 290 online municipal web-pages, and hours of web browsing, to find email addresses to each municipal mayor.
This is a problem, as it does not take the use of alternative measures into account and the expected benefits from the different investments. Less financially stable regions might still benefit from infrastructure investments.

**Statement 2:** *Assessments of socioeconomic profitability are decisive for investments in large rail- and road infrastructure projects*

**Explanation:** The second statement looks upon the importance of conducting a cost-benefit analysis.

**Statement 3:** *Some large road- and rail infrastructure projects should be executed, even if they are not economically profitable*

**Explanation:** The third statement is an extension of the second question, in order to investigate if more than economical profitability is be considered when investing in infrastructure projects.

**Statement 4:** *Agreements of municipal co-financing clearly divides the risks between the agents that sign the contract*

**Explanation:** One feature of public-private partnerships is that risks are shared among the agents. Risk sharing supposedly creates benefits, as the agents themselves face less risk than they would if they themselves would carry all risks associated with the project.

**Statement 5:** *Municipal co-financing moves decision to a lower administrative level*

**Explanation:** Moving decisions to a lower level could allow decisions to be made closer to the residents. This could enable the possibility to make better decisions (as the agents can share information).
Statement 6: Municipalities have a great influence on the final contract

Explanation: In Svalöv the view of the influence on the final contract was polarized. Some argued that it was some kind of extortion, while other argued that they had some influence on the decision to introduce passenger train traffic. In the case of contracts between even agents, all partners are able to influence the final outcome of the project.

Statement 7: Municipal co-financing is a political question on national level

Explanation: It was argued in some of our interviews that municipal co-financing was been forced upon them and decided by higher level politicians. In this question we test whether this is something we can generalize.

Statement 8: Municipal co-financing has become a standard for large road- and train infrastructure projects

Explanation: It is stated in the legislation that all municipal co-financing is voluntary. Still, it was a requirement for the introduction of the Söderås Line. In this question we test if municipal co-financing is a rule and not a voluntary.

These different statements allow us to use the answers from the interviews and quantify them, such that we can observe whether a larger pattern can be obtained. We also added a final, third, section in our analysis. In this section we ask the respondents to state the need for infrastructural investments (in roads, bus-traffic and railway traffic) on a scale. The scale is running from 1 to 5 (were 5 indicates large need and 1 indicates no need).

In the third section we also asked the participants to state up to four different main reasons for investments in railway-traffic. This was done to control for variations and to understand if the rationales from the perspective of the municipality of Svalöv also holds for municipalities nation-wide.
4.6 Results

We got answers from roughly 40% of all Swedish mayors. 30% of the respondents were female and 70% were male. Actually, most Swedish mayors are male – so the gender differences are explainable (cf. Dagens Samhälle, 2013; Wide, 2011).

We received answers from all Swedish counties, except of Gotland. This is understandable, as Gotland is Swedens’ smallest county (containing of only one municipality, namely Gotland). The regions fluctuate in area size, number of citizens and number of municipalities.

The answers concerning the first statement showed that 72% of the respondents either agree or tend to agree to the statement that municipal co-financing enables financially strong municipalities to jump to the front of the queue. One respondent also added that co-financing is beneficial for financially strong counties, meaning that differences in regions also should be accounted for.

The second figure show that 65% of the respondents answered that they agree of tend to agree to the statement that assessments of socioeconomic profitability are decisive for investments in large rail- and road infrastructure projects.
The third question deals with prioritization of infrastructure projects, and the importance of economic profitability. Roughly 68% of the respondents answer that some projects should be executed even if they are not economically profitable. The fourth statement shows a more polarized view, it is hard to draw any strong conclusions (or any conclusion at all) from the above depiction (in figure 6). According to the previous results from the interview section you might suspect that they would be rather decisive in their answer, stating that a division is made clear. On the other hand, the studies from Svalöv showed that some risks are linked with the municipality (for instance the risk of having to change location of the platforms, cf section A) and hence, not clearly defined in their nature in the contracts.

The fifth statement also shows the polarized view as in the previous question. One main argument for municipal co-financing, discussed in part A, is that it allows municipalities to move decisions to lower level – closer to the citizens. A small majority of the respondents answered that they would agree with this view. Nonetheless, such conclusions are hasted
(and with respect to our hypothesis we would expect that a larger share of the respondents would be agree this statement).

In the sixth statement we asked the respondents about the statement that *municipalities have a great influence on the final contract*. The results show that a small majority disagree or tend to disagree to this statement. Once again it is hard to draw any hard conclusions.

The seventh statement deals with the notion of whether *municipal co-financing in reality is a question that are not decided on municipal level, but primarily on state level*. A majority of the respondents (76%) agree or tend to agree with this statement. Whether this is a problem, or not, is not revealed in these answers. But it could contradict the governmental notion (cf. Chapter 3) stating that all co-financing should be voluntary (and that instead it is something forced upon municipalities). Then finally, the last statement asks whether *municipal co-financing has become a standard for large infrastructure projects*. The previous interviews with the respondents from Svalöv showed a general consensus confirming this view. Similarly, a majority of the responding mayors answered that they either agree or tend to agree to the statement (69%).

In the final part of the questionnaire we asked the respondents to state *the need for additional infrastructure improvements*. This was done to control for the need for further investments, and hence give us a proxy of whether there might be a need to explore new ways to receive more fundings for infrastructural investments (such as municipal co-financing). That said, the respondents were asked for their view on the municipal need for additional investments in train-, road-, and bus traffic infrastructure investments. A majority of the respondents answered that the need for additional investments are high (putting either 4 or 5 on the scale). 68,7 % answered that the need for additional
investments in road is high, 84.3% answered that the need for additional investments in railways are great and 67% answered that the need for additional investments in bus traffic are great (that is putting either 4 or 5 on the scale).

Then, to understand the underlying rationales for the decision for the municipalities to co-finance infrastructure projects we asked the respondents to select (or state themselves) up to four main reasons for additional improvements in large infrastructure projects. 82% of the respondents (92 mayors) answered that commuting was one of the main reason for additional investments in railway traffic. 60% (69 mayors) answered increased attractiveness for the municipality, and 60% (69 mayors) answered environmental aspects. Increased number of citizen was given as one of the main reasons for additional investments by 49.5% or the responding mayors (57 mayors). Favoring employees was given as one of the main reasons for additional rail investments by 22.5% of the respondents (26 mayors). Additionally – a small fraction of the respondents answered recreation, environmental aspects, comfort and larger cultural offering as reasons for additional investments in railways.
5. Discussion and Conclusion

In this report we have investigated the rationales behind municipal co-financing. This way of financing large infrastructure investments is becoming increasingly common. To analyze this concept we have examined the introduction of passenger trains on the Söderås Line through in-depth interviews. We then created a questionnaire, which was sent out to Sweden’s 290 mayors. The purpose with the questionnaire was to see if we can generalize our results.

After thorough operationalization of theoretical research (which we have applied to our interviews and in extension to our questionnaire) we have been able to determine patterns and come to conclusions regarding the questions we stated in the introductory chapter. That is, what rationales lie behind municipal co-financing? How can this way of financing be criticized? And what are the positive aspects of municipal co-financing?

Starting with the first question – namely what rationales lie behind municipal co-financing? According to official documents (cf. Chapter 3) the rationale for this type of financing is primarily based on the assumption, and the estimations showing, that some projects ought to be carried out if they are benefitting the municipality – even if they are not beneficial for the entire country (or even the entire county). The case of the Söderås Line is emphasizing this. The municipality of Svalöv has for a long time demanded passenger trains – but the degree of cost coverage is negligible. Therefore, according to this type of argumentation, it should lie in the interest of the municipality to co-finance the introduction of passenger trains. It divides the costs between the partners who are affected by the project, and reflects the fact that prioritizations of municipalities differ (since non-financially viable projects can be carried out). At the same time, this type of agreements divides risk between the partners who sign the agreement. As the partners are affected by the decision to introduce passenger trains – they also ought to take some of the risks involved in the project. Still, the view on the risks is highly polarized. On one hand side, not using municipal co-financing might result in less incentives for municipalities to themselves act such that risks, and problems, with the project is taken into account. On the other hand, the risks are unevenly distributed across the country and between the partners. A municipality which is large in size but small in population, like Svalöv, have more limited ability to cover costs involved in these type of projects – compared to smaller and more populated municipalities (assuming that both municipalities have the same average tax income per citizen). At the same time the agreement of co-financing (in the case of the
Söderås Line) showed that the state has the possibility to opt out; and this is not possible for the municipality.

Another opportunity that emerges from municipal co-financing is the ability to influence the contract and the project itself. This means that decisions are shared between different agents. We call this phenomena decision sharing. Decisions are taken by the agents who are actually affected by the decision to implement passenger train traffic. This means that decisions are made closer to the citizens (on municipal level). It can be argued that it lies in the interest of both agents to come up with the best possible way of solution in agreements of municipal co-financing (such that the resources are allocated in the best possible way).

Let us continue and investigate our conclusions regarding the two last questions in our quest. What are the positive aspects of municipal co-financing? And how can this way of financing be criticized?

First, the most important conclusion is probably that we are not dealing with two even partners with the same ability to influence the agreement. The Swedish Transport Administration has more economic strength and a larger influence on the decision to make a certain infrastructural investment or not. There is also a large degree of information asymmetry. The decision for Svalöv to introduce passenger trains on the Söderås Line was not based on economic calculations – but on a “belief in the future” and on the notion that “people want it”. This means that they, the politicians (and in extension the residents of the municipality), believe that passenger trains might increase the number of citizens and make the municipality more attractive. They believe that the passenger train traffic might help the labor market, increase house prices and give citizens access to comfortable travelling and more culture in surrounding areas as well as recreation areas. Now – we cannot with certainty say that these effects will not occur. But there is certainly no way to say that they will occur (or state if they are worth-while). There are no estimations of effects that show the socio-economic effects of the introduction of passenger trains on the municipality of Svalöv. The municipalities do not have the tools to make informed decision, nor the ability to do so. The result from the questionnaire partly confirms this view. A small majority of the responding mayors answered either that they disagree or tend to disagree to the statement that municipality have a great influence on the final contract.

The second conclusion is that municipal co-financing might create what we have chosen to call “decision sharing” (said earlier in this section). A majority of the responding mayors agreed with the statement that municipal co-financing brings decisions to a lower level – closer to the citizens who live in the area were the investment is made. At the same time
our respondents from Svalöv had different view on the matter. Some argued that Svalöv was able to influence the contract, while others argued that this way of financing is comparable with a type of extortion were the municipalities are faced with two option – pay or you will not get passenger train traffic. It is argued that it in fact is some type of voluntary extortion – were one partner forces costs upon another partner who has to agree with the terms (due to the political consensus and the demands from the residents) (cf. discussion regarding threat point, Chapter 2). Yet, the legislation argues that all co-financing should be voluntary (cf. section 3.1.1) – but the degree to which it is voluntary is highly questionable. In the case of the Söderås Line it is voluntary in the sense that they can either agree or disagree to the terms. Still they were able to make changes in the contract – but their ability to influence this contract was negligible and questionable (cf. statement 6 and section A in chapter 5). The municipality is faced with a “take it or leave”-situation, as they do not have any outside options (cf. Chapter 2). Put differently, they can either accept the requirements (with few adjustments) from the Swedish Transport Administration – or be left without passenger train traffic.

Our third conclusion has to do with risk sharing. One of the main features of agreements of co-financing is that they divide the risks, such that all partners bear responsibility. However, in the case of the Söderås Line it was seen that the state have the opportunity to opt out of the investment – which is not an alternative for the municipalities agreeing to co-finance the introduction of passenger trains on the railway. At the same time, risks of financial character have clearly been divided in the contract – and the distributions of cost over-runs are stated. It is hard to determine if the risks are in reality shared mutually between the partners, or if the state opportunity to opt out puts the municipalities in a tough situation – as they also face the risk that decision changes on state level will put the project on hold – rendering the risk division uneven. This polarized view of the risk division was confirmed when we asked the respondents about the statement that municipal co-financing clearly divides the risk between the partners who agree to co-finance large infrastructure investments. 20 % answered that they agree, 20 % answered that they tend to agree, 30 % answered that tend to disagree, 21 % answered that they disagree and 9 % answered that they do not know. This highly polarized view does not allow us to draw any real conclusions regarding the risks (if they are uneven or more prevalent for the municipalities).

The fourth conclusion is that state-municipal partnerships are not comparable with public-private partnership agreements. In public private agreements one partner is aiming towards
economic gains. But in state-municipal partnerships both agents are striving towards socio-economic efficient use of their own resources (in relationship to the area were they act). Also, another difference is that a private agent is, almost, always able to decline an offer of partnership. This is not always the case for municipalities. In the case of the Söderås Line this was due to the political pressure, large hold-up and residential demands. It seems as if municipal co-financing has become a necessity for those municipalities who want to see their infrastructural investments being made. It was certainly a requirement in the case of the Söderås Line. This was confirmed in our questionnaire. A majority of the responding mayors answered that municipal co-financing has become standard for large road- and train infrastructure projects.

The main feature of municipal co-financing is, as we discussed earlier in this section, that the two agents are starting from different grounds – and with different tools and financial ability. The municipality is not always able to conduct proper research and investigate whether an investment is actually suitable. This is our fifth conclusion, namely that the decision to co-finance for municipalities is not necessarily based on economic analysis but on “a belief in the future” and on the notion that “people want it”. This was also discussed earlier in this section. It is also a pattern we observed in our questionnaire. A majority of the respondents answered that assessments of socioeconomic effects are decisive for investments in large infrastructure projects. We then asked the respondents whether some projects should be conducted even if they are not economically profitable. A majority agreed with this statement, which further could indicate that the municipality takes more into account than calculations. This could be this “belief in the future” which was used as an argument among some respondents from Svalöv, but it could also reflect the fact that municipalities are acting upon a political and residential demand (a demand which is not necessarily built on economic research or reasoning).

The sixth conclusion is that interest of the municipality is in conflict with the interest of the state. It is in the interest of the municipality to see that this trend of increased degree of municipal co-financing is revoked. Still, if the state were to only build projects that are socio-economically beneficial – it might be the case that some projects would not have been conducted. It could also be the case that different agents (state, municipalities and regions) value different effects in different ways. For instance, Svalöv might value less car traffic more than the state (environmental effects). At the same time municipal co-financing is, according to responding mayors in our questionnaire, a question on state level politics.
The *seventh conclusion* is that the residents of a municipality that agree to co-finance an investment are faced with an extra tax burden. Some municipalities do not have to co-finance their infrastructural investments (in particular those who have had their infrastructural investments made before the trend of municipal co-financing started).

Our *eighth conclusion* is that it might be the case that rich municipalities, with more financial ability, can spend more on infrastructural investments. They can therefore have their projects prioritized. This was highlighted in the answers from the responding mayors when they were asked to consider the statement that municipal co-financing allow rich municipalities to jump to the front of the queue. According to economic theory, this could be a problem – as the costs are unevenly distributed across the country. The marginal productivity varies across the country, and it could be the case that benefits on the margin differs in different regions. The expenditures following the investment in the Söderås Line could have been used for alternative measures.

Our *ninth conclusion* is that a degree of hold-up problem has been present in the case of the Söderås Line. They have long demanded passenger trains. The agreement of intention, which was signed in 1997, show that two of the main partners (the Region of Scania and the Municipality of Svalöv) has already been agreeing to work towards an introduction of passenger trains. Such a hold-up could influence the ability of the agents to work independently, and to make the best possible use of their resources – as they have decided to conduct the project on forehand. However, on the other hand, the respondents from Svalöv argued that long term nature of infrastructure projects, and the long decision making process, require that agents are decisive and determined if they want to see their projects become reality.

Finally our last conclusion is that in the end municipal co-financing a way for the Government to decrease their financial burden. One main argument for Public-Private Partnerships is the greater degree from cost-sharing that stance from such agreements. Similarly, municipal-state agreements ought to divide costs accordingly. Still, as noted earlier in our thesis, it might not be socioeconomically desirable (mainly due to the information asymmetry, the inability for municipality to make informed decisions, the inability for municipality to influence the agreements etc.).

Conclusively, our hypothesis in the introductory chapter (section 1.3.1) stated that the municipality can provide the Swedish Transport Administration with information regarding infrastructure investments in the local municipality. At the same time the municipality knows what project they need, and are therefore willing to pay for the investment. We then
suggested that this would result in better decision making. However, in this thesis we could not confirm this hypothesis. The Swedish Transport Administration has been providing the municipalities with calculations and measures, and the municipality of Svalöv has not been able to produce own calculations. This has also been confirmed in the questionnaire we sent to Sweden’s 290 mayors (in particular in statement 5 and 6). We also observe that the municipality of Svalöv has been ruled by a hold-up, due to the long term commitment to initiate passenger train traffic on the railway. Subsequently, we cannot with say that municipal co-financing result in greater decision making.
Acknowledgement

Thank you!

We would first of all like to thank our supervisor Erik Wengström for all his helpful inputs. We would also like to thank our teacher in cost-benefit analysis Fredrik Hanson.

This thesis would not have been possible without the help from the Municipality of Svalöv and in particular Michael Andersson.

Finally we would like to thank all our respondents, and the Swedish mayors who answered our questionnaire, our families, students and staff at the university (for inputs, suggestion and creating a work-friendly atmosphere at the University) and the Alfa building (our home during the last couple of months).

________________________________________________________

Konstantin Macheridis                                             Lund, 28th of May, 2014

________________________________________________________

Maarja Vaikla
Summary

In this thesis we investigate the use of municipal co-financing to finance large infrastructure project. We study the introduction of passenger trains on the Söderås Line. The following research question is examined,

*What rationales lie behind municipal co-financing?*

We also state our hypothesis – suggesting that municipal co-financing result in more informed decisions and the municipality is willing to pay to see their investments become reality. In order to frame our research we give a theoretical presentation, using the theory of bargaining, public-private partnership, transport economics and behavioral economics.

We present our empirical analysis, which is divided into two parts. In the first part (Part A) the results from 10 in-depth interviews with decision makers, officials and politicians are presented. These questions are based on a questionnaire, which has been emerging from the theoretical presentation in this thesis. The emerging patterns from the interviews have been used to construct a questionnaire, which has been sent to Sweden’s 290 municipal mayors. This allows us to fully investigate the underlying rationales of municipal co-financing. In conclusion, 10 main points emerge from our thesis. These three points can be highlighted,

1. The agents do not have the same ability to influence the agreement. The Swedish Transport Administration provides the projections, the requirements and the calculations. The municipalities do not have the ability to make their own analysis.
2. The municipality of Svalöv is faced with a “take it or leave it”-situation. They can either choose to agree on terms in the contract (they can make few adjustments) or be left without passenger train traffic.
3. The decision to co-finance the introduction of passenger trains on the Söderås Line was mainly based on a “belief in the future” and a political will to see project become reality. It was not based on socioecononic analysis.

After all municipal co-financing is a way for the Government to decrease their financial burden. Municipal co-financing results in more money for investments in large infrastructure projects.
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Appendix 1

Agreement of co-financing

§1 Parter

Trafikverket, Region Syd, org.nr. 202100-6297, 781 89 Borås

Björs kommun, org.nr. 212000-1061
Svalövs kommun, org.nr. 212000-0693
Kävlinge kommun, org.nr. 212000-1058
Lomma kommun, org.nr. 212000-1066

Region Skåne, org.nr. 23.61 00-0255

Mellan parterna har följande avtal träffats.

§2 Syfte och bakgrund

Detta avtal avser ett samlat åtgärds paket för att införa persontrafik på godssträcket genom Skåne (Söderåsbanan och Lommabanan) med bibehållen utvecklingsmöjlighet för godstrafiken.

Åtgärdspaketet innehåller både kapacitetshöjande mfl. åtgärder samt åtgärder för nya stationer.


Genom samfinansiering mellan nationell och regional plan tillsammans med kommunal samfinansiering av åtgärder för nya stationer har parterna sakrat en helhetsfinansiering av ett åtgärds paket för att kunna införa ny persontrafik i tittmestraltfik mellan Malmö och Äs torp med nya stationer i Lomma, Furulund, Svalöv, Nageröd och Billesholm.

Efter att detta samfinansieringsavtal är tecknat ska detaljerade genomförandeavtal tesckras med respektive kommun. Ambitionen är att dessa ska upprättas under 2014.

Framtida trafikering

När samtliga åtgärder i detta avtal är genomförda är inrättningen en ny Pästrägdslinje i tittmestraltfik på sträckan Äs torp-Teckomatorp-Lomma-Malmö. Region Skånes inrättning är år 15-18 dubbelturer på vardagar och något lägre turutbud på helgerna Målet på sikt är utbyggnad till halvtrummstrafik under
rusingtid på sträckan Kävlinge-Malmö. Detta kräver dock ytterligare infrastrukturrinvesteringar. På
sikt kan även ytterligare tågupphåll bli aktuella på sträckan Kävlinge-Malmö.

Utgångspunkten för Region Skåne är att inte bedriva tågparallell busstrafik i sträket, med mindre
kostnadsställning än 50%. Idag bedömer Skånetrafiken att detta ej finns på sträckan Svalöv-Ästorp.
Reduserad busstrafik bedöms vara motiverad på distriktet Svalöv-Malmö. Busstrafiken anpassas till
resandeunderlaget. Erfarenheterna från den samordnade skol-/jug- och linjetrafiken i
Söderåsens projektet tas till vara.

Följande nyttor bedöms palla för genomsnittändes av åtgärds-paketet:

- Förbättra regionala pendlingstätheter i västra Skåne (regional och lokal nyttiga)
- Avlastning av det nationella och regionale vägnätet (nationell och regional nyttiga)
- Ökad attraktivitet för orter med nya stationer (lokal nyttiga)
- Rekommendationer för att mer miljöanpassat transportsystem (nationell, regional och lokal nyttiga)
- Avlastning av det kommunala vägnätet i större stadsområden (lokal nyttiga för parter som ej
umfattas av avtalet)

Tidigare studier och utredningar avseende detta objekt är:

- Förstudie Kapacitetsförstärkning på Lommarbanan (2001)
- Förstudie Söderåsbanan, anpassning av Billeholmsbergård och nya mötesstationer Ulvad Kögeröd
  och Svalöv (1999)
- Järnvägssamt mötesstationer och regionaltägstationer i Kögeröd och Svalöv (ej utställda och
  fastställda, behöver revideras)
- Idéstudie Godsträket genom Skåne, delen Ängelholm-Ästorp, Kapacitetsanalyser och investeringsnivåer
  (2009)
- Järnvägsutredning Lommarbanan Malmöbanan Kävlinge-Ästorp (pågående)

Åtgärdsvalstudi
Åtgärdsval persontrafik på Godsträket genom Skåne och Marieholmsbanan. TRV 2014/1466

§8 Tidigare överenskommelser, avsiktsförklaringar och avtal mellan parterna
avseende åtgärds-paketet

Parterna har tidigare träffat följande överenskommelser och avtal avseende medfinansiering av
åtgärds-paketet:

- Överenskommelse om planering för införande av persontrafik på Söderåsbanan, del av Godsträket
  genom Skåne, TRV 2013/42407, tecknad 2013-06-10 (mellan Trafikverket, Region Skåne, Ästorp
  kommun, Bjäres kommun och Svalövs kommun)

- Överenskommelse om planering för införande av persentrafik på Lommarbanan, del av Godsträket
  genom Skåne, TRV 2013/42415, tecknad 2013-06-10 (mellan Trafikverket, Region Skåne, Kävlinge
  kommun och Lomma kommun)

- Ramavtal angående planksatsningstgärder för Lommarbanan i Furulând, 2006-03-26 (mellan
  Bara/verket och Kävlinge kommun)

TDOV 2013-0116
§4  Beskrivning av åtgärder och kostnader

1. Kapacitets-, hastighets- och säkerhetsbärande åtgärder samt miljöåtgärder

Kostnaderna nedan bygger på Trafikverkets kalkyl i ett tidigt skede.

Söderåsensbanan etapp 3 (Astorp-Tekomatorp)
- Långa mötespår i Kågeröd och Svalöv (förutsätter järnvägsplan)
- Hastighetsbärande åtgärder
- Åtgärder på Tekomatorps station (två nya platförråd samt förändring plattformövergång)
- Ban-, el-, signal- och teleåtgärder på banan
- Bullerskyddsåtgärder

Bedömd totalkostnad inklusive projektering/byggherrekostnader: 242 miljoner kronor (2013-06)

Larvsbanorna (Kävlinge-Anläggning)
- Långt mötespår i Ställe (förutsätter järnvägsplan)
- Planskilda korning i Fäldre för bil och gång/cykel [samordning med vägprojekt 3 Årred-Fäldre, väg 2013 i regional plan krävs]
- Gång- och cykeltrafik för Farulund, Bryggan (enligt avtal 2006-08-16)
- Ban-, el-, signal- och teleåtgärder på banan
- Bullerskyddsåtgärder

Bedömd totalkostnad inklusive projektering/byggherrekostnader: 197 miljoner kronor (2013-06)

2. Nya stationer


Billesholm (i Bjuks kommun)
- 2 st. sidoplattformar å 160-170 m
- Plattformutrustning (belysning, trafikinformation, väderskydd, biljettautomat, kraftinstallation, bänkar) x 2
- Ramp och trappa från gång- och cykelport till västra platfformen

Bedömd totalkostnad inklusive projektering/byggherrekostnader: 34 miljoner kronor (2013-06)

Extra kostnad för gång- och cykelport kan tillkomma på grund av förändringar om den inte kan byggas 2015 som planerat.

Kågeröd (i Svalövs kommun)
- 2 st. sidoplattformar å 160-170 m
- Plattformutrustning (belysning, trafikinformation, väderskydd, biljettautomat, kraftinstallation, bänkar) x 2
- Gång- och cykelport inklusive rampar/trappor, vägöverföring, pumpstation, ledningsflytt etc. (närmast efter utformning i detaljplan)

Bedömd totalkostnad inklusive projektering/byggherrekostnader: 45 miljoner kronor (2013-06)
Svalöf (i Svalövs kommun)
- 2 st. sidoplattformar á 160-170 m
- Plattformsutrustning (belysning, trafikärintformation, väderskydd, biljettautomat, kraftmattning, bänkar) x 2
- Gång- och cykelport inklusive ramper/trappor, stödmurar, pumpstation, ledningsflytt etc.
(beräknad efter utformning i detaljplan)
Bedömd totalomkladstnad inklusive projektering/byggherrekostnader: 48 miljoner kronor (2013-06)

Funafjord (i Kävlinge kommun)
- 1 st. sidoplattform à 160-170 m
- Plattformsutrustning (belysning, trafikärintformation, väderskydd, biljettautomat, kraftmattning, bänkar) x 1
- Gång- och cykelport inklusive ramper/trappor, stödmurar, pumpstation, ledningsflytt etc.
(beräknad efter utformning i järnvägsutredning)
Bedömd totalomkladstnad inklusive projektering/byggherrekostnader: 30 miljoner kronor (2013-06)

Lomma (i Lommas kommun)
- 2 st. sidoplattformar á 160-170 m
- Plattformsutrustning (belysning, trafikärintformation, väderskydd, biljettautomat, kraftmattning, bänkar) x 2
- Gång- och cykelport inklusive ramper/trappor, stödmurar, pumpstation, ledningsflytt etc.
(beräknad efter utformning i järnvägsutredning)
Bedömd totalomkladstnad inklusive projektering/byggherrekostnader: 53 miljoner kronor (2013-06)

Tillkommande åtgärder som krävs för stationer och stationsmiljöer är ej kostnadsberäknade. De sista
kann inkludera: planläggning, eventuell fastighetslösning för platformar/rampar, angoring/parkeringsplats
eventuella rampar/trappor/sänker mot platformar från omgivande marknivå, anslutande gång- och
cykelvägar, gränsar etc. Var financieringsangivenheten ligger framgår under §5.

Avtalet omfattar följande åtgärder, vilka beskrivs närmare ovan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr</th>
<th>Åtgärder</th>
<th>FYRESTEGSPRINCIPEN</th>
<th>Utförande</th>
<th>Kostnad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kapacitets-, hastighets- och säkerhetsblanda åtgärder samt miljöåtgärder</td>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>Trafikverket</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nya stationer</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Trafikverket</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totalkostnad för alla åtgärder i detta avtal</td>
<td>540</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Den totala kostnaden för åtgärdsplakten som omfattas av detta avtal uppgår till 540 miljoner kr i slutet, juni 2013.

TDOK 2013:0116
§5 Finansiering

Trafikverket och Region Skåne via nationell och regional plan finansierar kapacitetshöjande mfl. åtgärder på banderna (åtgärd 1) medan respektive kommun finansierar sina egna nya stationer (åtgärd 2).

Sammanfattningsvis fördelas således enligt nedanstående tabell:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finansiär</th>
<th>Åtgärd 1</th>
<th>Åtgärd 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trafikverket, varv</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Nationell plan</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Regional plan (Region: Skåne)</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bjurs kommun</td>
<td>34*</td>
<td>34*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svartö kommun</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kävlinge kommun</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lomma kommun</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summa</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Extra kostnad för gång- och cykelport kan tillkomma på grund av förändringar om den inte kan byggas 2015 som planerat.


Medfinansieringen från kommuner för åtgärder i den statliga anläggningen har vid tidpunkten för detta avtalits tecknande beräknats upp till totalt 200 miljoner kronor. Medfinansieringen betalas genom rekvisition till Trafikverket.

Utbetalade kostnader som regleras i detta avtal tillkommer det kostnader för respektive kommun som handlar om planläggning samt byggnation av stationsmiljöerna, t.ex. fastighetsindelningen, angöring/parkering, eventuella rampor/trappor/sättnor mot plattformar från omgivande marknivå, anslutande gång- och cykelvägar, gräsvägar etc.

Nya eller ändringar av befintliga detaljplaner som krävs för genomförande av åtgärd 1 och 2 bekostas av respektive kommun.

§6 Ånsvarsfördelning för genomförande

Trafikverkets ansvar:
1. Trafikverket skall utföra eller låta utföra de åtgärder inom det statliga åtagandet som upptas av detta avtal 64.
2. Trafikverket ansvarar för att tillämpliga lagar och andra förordningar samt myndighetsbeslut införts vid genomförande av åtgärderna/projekten som Trafikverket ansvarar för.

Respektive kommunens ansvar:
1. Respektive kommun ansvinsar för framtagande av detaljplaner och hantering av bygg- och marklov som krävs för projekterna genomförande.

TDOK 2013:0116
Generella principer

Trafikverket ska äga de nya järnvägsanläggningarna inklusive järnvägsbronar samt svara för drift, underhåll och reinvesteringar. För drift och underhåll av platssystem med platssystemutrustningar ska drift och underhåll ske i eftersyn med gällande avtal mellan Trafikverket och Skänetrafiken.

Trafikverket ska äga trafikinformationssystemutrustning inkl. kablage för strömförsörjning samt svara för drift, underhåll och reinvesteringar.

Respektive kommun ska äga eventuellt pumpstation i gång- och cykelport och svara för drift, underhåll och reinvesteringar.

Respektive kommun ska svara för kostnadsreduktion i gång- och cykelport.

Respektive kommun ska svara för kostnadsreduktion i gång- och cykelport samt svara för drift, underhåll och reinvesteringar.

Respektive kommun ska svara för drift, underhåll och reinvesteringar.

Respektive kommun ska svara för drift, underhåll och reinvesteringar.

Respektive kommun ska svara för drift, underhåll och reinvesteringar.

Respektive kommun ska svara för drift, underhåll och reinvesteringar.

§7 Hantering av kostnadsförändringar

Porter svarar för kostnadsförändringar inom sitt åtagande enligt § 4 och § 5. Fördelning av kostnadsförändringar som gäller åtgärd 1 mellan nationell och regional plan ska ske enligt principen:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beräkningsavvikelse</th>
<th>% av kostnadsförändringen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Söderåsensbanan etapp 3</td>
<td>50 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linnébanan</td>
<td>50 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Kostnadsbäggar till följd av porters ensidiga åtagande tillägg belönsas till 100 % av den porten som är ansvarig överenskommits skriftligt i förväg.

Skulle kostnaderna i detta avtal öka med mer än 10 % vid tidpunkt för upphandling av entreprenad (då ny/slutlig kalkyl upprättas av Trafikverket), med hänsyn tagen till prisupprättning enligt index samt justerande efter eventuella tillägg, äger varandra porten rätt att omförändra avtalet.

§8 Betalning av medfinansieringar

Trafikverket rekommenderar medfinansieringar. Rekommendationen förställs i det genomförandeavtal som ska upprättas med respektive kommun. Utgångspunkten är att rekommendation sker tre alternativa fyra gånger per år.

TDOK 2013-0116
§9 Projekterorganisation och former för parternas samarbete:
Projektet ska bedrivas i samverkan mellan alla parter och alla parter ska beredas inrym under projektets genomförande. Parterna ska samarbeta i alla frågor som kan påverka projektets tidplan, ekonomi och innehåll.
Trafikverket är ansvarigt för genomförandet av åtgärd 1 och 2 enligt §4 och har därför beslutsrätt i projektfrågor.
Ömsesidiga informationsmenyn ska genomföras med den regelbundenhet som parterna besluter i särskild ordning. En gemensam samrådsgrupp ska tillsättas.

§10 Tidplan
Ambitionen är att gång- och cykelportarna i Kägeröd och Svalöv ska byggas under 2015 (samlordan på genomförande av Södersjöbanan etapp 2) samt att de befintliga planksöringarna i Kägeröd (gångfåll) och Svalöv (Christner Bengs våg) skapas.
Ambitionen är att om möjligt genomföra projektet så att trafik mellan Malmö och Kävehälla alternativt: Täckmellanor kan öppnas tidigare, före fysiska tillbyggnader Malmö-Lund går in i sitt intensivaste skede. Syftet är att avlasta Södersjöbanan från viss trafik som går norrut från Malmö samt att Kävehällan kan fungera som omledningsbanor i högstra utvecklingen om kapacitetsbörjande åtgärder kan göras på banan.

§11 Avtalets giltighet
Detta avtal är giltigt från och med den tidpunkt när det undertecknas av parterna och under förutsättning av att de signerande godkänner åtgärden och finansieringen i kommande och framtida nationella infrastrukturplaner, dels att regionfullmäktige godkänner åtgärden och finansieringen i länspol för regional transportinfrastruktur i Skåne 2014-2025 samt under förutsättning att övriga parter/hulft följer sina åtaganden.

§12 Övrigt
Andringar eller tillägg till detta avtal skall undertecknas av parterna för att vara giltiga.
Av detta avtal är sex exemplar upprättade och utvisklade.

Lägghemmet 2014-04-10
Ort och datum

Skåne

Trafikverket (Lennart Andersson)

Räged 2014-04-11
Ort och datum

Region Skåne (Anna Annerby Jansson)

Björne 2014-03-17
Ort och datum

Björne kommun (Stefan Svärd)

Lomma 2014-03-10
Ort och datum

Kävlinge kommun (Pia Almström)

Svalövs kommun (Birgitta Jönsson)

Lomma kommun (Anders Bergstrom)

"IDOK 2013:0116"

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Appendix 2

Agreement of intention

Avsiktsförklaring angående Söderåsbanan.

Malmöhus Trafik, Länstrafiken Kristianstad, Klippan, Äshtorp, Bjuv och Svalöv kommuner har denna dag enats om följande avsiktsförklaring ang trafikering av Söderåsbanan.

Klippan, Äshtorp, Bjuv och Svalöv kommuner har tagit fram ett underlagsmaterial för ställningstagande till möjligheterna att återuppta persontågstrafik på Söderåsbanan.

Trafikunderlaget för olika-delsträckor har bedömts i en separat utredning.

Mot bakgrund av att Söderåsbanan ger tydliga fördelar jämfört med vägtrafik och att det bedöms att återupptagen persontågstrafik på banan leder till bättre utvecklingsmöjligheter för de berörda kommunerna föreligger det ett regionalt intresse för att återuppta persontågstrafik på Söderåsbanan och får goda förbindelser till Lund/Malmö.


Tågtrafiken bör utföras med tågtyp X11.

Parterna ska verka för att trafiken kan vara igång så snart som möjligt, dock senast i juni 1999.

Trafikhuvudmännens ansvarar för en trafik som från övergripande synpunkter tillgodose rimliga anspråk på en god lokal och regional kollektivtrafiks service.

Det uppkomna underskottet för trafiken på Söderåsbanan, med hänsyn taget till marginaleffekter av avtal med entreprenörer, fördelas i enlighet med de principer som gäller för övrig lokal- och regionaltågstrafik i den nya organisationen med ny huvudman för länets kollektivtrafik.
Ett stort antal förändringar av den lokala och regionala trafiken kommer att ske inom de närmaste tiotalet är, såsom öppnandet av ny västkustbanesträckning Kävlinge-Helsingborg, ny trafikering på Rådalsbanan (tre hållplatser är här finansierade i Malmöhusavtalet), öppnandet av Öresundsförbindelsen och Citytunneln samt ny trafik med Öresundståg. Parterna är överens att det är av yttersta vikt att planeringen är sådan att de olika satsningarna samverkar och att etablerade resmönster längs Söderåsbanan kan upprätthållas.

Parterna kommer att teckna avtal om trafikering och investeringar i infrastruktur.

Lund den 6 februari 1997

Svalövs Kommun
Karl-Erik Kruse

Klippans kommun
Bengt-Åke Nilsson

Bjuvs kommun
Bertil Bengtsson
Appendix 3

Questionnaire for the in-depth interviews

Frågeformulär:

Bakgrundsfrågor:

1. Namn, position och titel
2. Seden hur länge har du varit involverad i projektet Söderåsbanan?

Organisationen

Här klargörs hur organisationen ser ut som respondenten verkar i och dennes roll i projektet.

3. Vilken roll har du i organisationen? (Vad gör du?)
4. Vilken roll har du inom trafikverket spelat för beslutet att införa persontrafikståg på Söderåsbanan?

Finansiering

Här fokuseras på konceptet medfinansiering och den syn organisationen och respondenten har på fenomenet.

5. Hur ser du/ni som på konceptet medfinansiering (samfinansiering)?
   Följfråga: Vilka incitament ser du för kommunen att vara med i en medfinansiering?
6. Hur ser finansieringen (av medfinansieringen) ut för [din organisation]?
7. Vilka fördelar ser du med kommunal medfinansiering?
8. Vilka nackdelar ser du med kommunal medfinansiering?

Avtalet

Fokus ligger här på det avtal som tecknats mellan kommunerna, Region Skåne/Skånetrafiken och Trafikverket

9. Hur ser du på projektets samhällsekonomiska lönsamhetsbedömning?
   Följfråga: Finns det en genomförd för efter 2009?
10. Hur har möjligheten sett ut för kommunerna och Region Skåne att påverka?
11. Var det av vikt att få avtalet av skott innan den nationella transportplanen?
12. Hur har er förhandlingsposition sett ut gentemot [Region Skåne/Svalöv/Trafikverket]?
13. Hur har er förhandlingssituation sett ut gentemot [Region Skåne/Svalöv/Trafikverket]?
14. Hur ser du på samtalen som förts med övriga kommuner i avtalet (Bjuv, Lomma, Kävlinge och Burlöv etc.)?

15. När väl projektet först initierades. Hur såg diskussionerna ut när idén om Söderåsbanan utvecklades?

_Följdfråga:_ Planeringen av Söderåsbanan inleddes redan på 90-talet, har det påverkat förhandlingssituationen (risk för lösning av projektet)?

16. Skulle projektet genomföras om det inte fanns någon medfinansiering? [Var det ett krav]

_Följdfråga:_ Varför/Varför inte?

**Åtgärdsval**

_I denna del fokuseras på de alternativ som fanns med i diskussionen när Söderåsbanan initierades._

17. Fanns några tänkbara alternativ, t.ex utbyggda busslinjer, med i diskussionerna kring avtalet?

18. Bilen framställs ofta som överlägsen tåget med högre flexibilitet och direkt anslutning till arbetsplats. Hur ställer du dig till detta?

19. Skulle du säga att det finns andra skäl bortom de ekonomiska som gör att trafikverket är med och finansierar projektet?

20. Vilket underlag har ni haft för beslutet att medfinansiera införandet av Pågatåg längs med Söderåsbanan

_Följdfråga:_ Vem har gjort analysen?

**Effekter**

_Denna fokuserar på de effekter som Söderåsbanan ska få._


22. Har ni räknat på några effekter av införandet av persontågstrafik?

_Om nej_/ _Om ja:_ Vad/Vem initierade beslutet?

_Om ja:_ Möjlighet att få tillgång till underlaget?

**Risker**

_Fokus ligger här på de risker som finns med projektet och möjliga åtgärder för dessa._

23. Vilka risker ser du med projektet?

_Följd:_ Tas detta i beaktning?

24. Hur ser du på fördelningen av risker mellan parterna som ingått avtalet?
25. Ser du någon risk för ”fördyrning”, alltså att kostnaderna kommer att justeras upp?
   
   *Om ja:* Hur tas detta i beaktning?

**Övrigt**

26. Har ni fört samtal med SKL?
27. Möjlighet att få tillgång till statistik över kommunen? *Demografi/Pendling/etc*

Övriga synpunkter.
Appendix 4

Questionnaire addressed to Sweden’s 290 mayors
Kommunal medfinansiering

Infrastrukturautsåtningsar

Infrastruktur behov
I den här delen får du som respondent avvika på frågor på en skala 1 - 5. Frågorna handlar om behovet av infrastruktursatser på politisk nivå.

Finns behov av ytterligare satsningar på tidig infrastruktur i kommunen?
En nya pälstädning, förhållandevis färre gångares, nya spår

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Finns behov av ytterligare satsningar på brösttrafikinfrastruktur i kommunen?
En fler busstopp, utvecklade busstopp

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Finns behov av ytterligare satsningar på bilinfrastruktur i kommunen?
En ny vägledning, nya mindre avsnitt

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Handelskliga anedningar till att utveckla väginfrastrukturen i kommunen

- Kommunikations
- Övriga infrastruktur
- Berkavägnings
- Byggmässigheter
- Miljöaftagelse
- Arbetssäkerhet
- Gymnasialhuvud
- Stora kulturbyggnader
- Och:  

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Hej!
Här kommer avsiktsförklaringen för Söderåsbanan.

Resandeprognosen för Svalöv år 2020 är 1 600 av- och påstigande per vardag, medan Kågeröd har 650. Som jämförelse kan nämnas att Svalöv i nuläget har 1 260 resor per dag i Södersåsbanestråket och Kågeröd har 405.

Restiden Svalöv-Malmö med ett byte är i dagslaget 1 timme, medan det blir ca 35 minuter med Pågatåg utan byte.

/Mats

Mats Améen
Chefsmäander
Att Affärs och Marknads, Planeringsenheter
Skånetrafiken

Postadress: 281 83 HÄSSEHOLM
Besöksadress: Andre Avenyen 7, Hässleholm