SOCIAL INVESTMENT POLICIES IN URBAN PLANNING

- AN ARGUMENTATIVE DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE REGENERATION DIALOGUE IN LINDÅNGEN, Malmö

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1. Introduction

In Western Europe today, an estimated 6 million people live in so-called high-rise housing estates. Together with Central and Eastern Europe (excluding former USSR), the total estimate amounts to 40 million (Wassenberg et al., 2004, pp. 1-12). Most of these large-scale, pre-fabricated estates were built during the 1960s and 1970s. Today, many of these housing estates are in imminent need of regeneration as they suffer from physical deterioration – a deterioration often interconnected with a plethora of social issues (ibid., pp. 11-12).

According to SABO (2009), the Swedish Association of Public Housing Companies, this is also the case for a large number of housing estates in Sweden. Even though the physical deterioration of the estates might not be as advanced as in some other countries (especially on the other side of the former ‘iron curtain’), it is very much a pressing political issue – where ‘sustainability’ seem to be the main argument for regeneration, and funding possibilities seem to be the main obstacle. In Sweden, roughly 650,000 out of the 830,000 apartments (in multi-family estates) built during the so-called ‘record years’ (1961-1975) are said to be in need of some form of renovation (Industrifakta, 2008, p. 28). The most common issue being the need for new electrical systems capable of handling the increased use of electrical appliances; but also kitchens, bathrooms, windows, facades, and main piping systems are believed to be in need of replacement or renovation (ibid.). According to SABO (2009, p. 7), the need for renovation can be divided into four categories: technical flaws, stricter societal demands, social factors, and the need for market adjustment (valid only for public housing companies, see section 3.3 for a more detailed account). Indeed, the problem at hand is presented as a national problem of how to sustainably renew these neighbourhoods with regards to social, environmental, and economical factors.

Unlike in many European countries, Swedish urban policies aimed at combatting segregation, poverty and ‘social decline’ have traditionally not involved physical regeneration measures directed towards specific so-called disadvantaged neighbourhoods. This has mainly to do with the perception that the social problematic attributed these neighbourhoods is fundamentally not a result of poor urban design or milieu, or, even less so, poor housing standards. This problematic has traditionally rather been understood as the expression of structural, racialised social exclusion (Andersson, 2006, p. 787-91; Andersson et al., 2010, p. 250). Therefore, Swedish urban policies concerning the ‘social’ have largely been focused on educational and labour market measures rather than physical regeneration ditto.

In recent years, however, efforts interconnecting social and physical measures in targeted so-called disadvantaged neighbourhoods have surfaced. One such effort is the municipal-led Regeneration Dialogue (Bygga om-dialogen) in Lindängen, Malmö. Lindängen is a neighbourhood with a rental housing stock exclusively owned by private landlords. The aim of the initiative is to develop an area-based social and environmental

1 As Industrifakta is a private corporation, the source should be regarded as potentially questionable. Even so, this is also the source SABO (2009) refers to when estimating the renovation need of Sweden’s public housing stock.
investment fund, through which private and public actors’ future savings could finance investments made today, making these future savings possible. In Lindängen, a large share of these investments would be directed towards renovation of the privately owned rental housing and a regeneration of the neighbourhood centre. The development of the Regeneration Dialogue was suggested by the so-called Malmö Commission as a social investment measure aimed at reducing residential segregation and to use physical investments as a driver of local job creation and urban development.

The so-called Social investment perspective entails a certain understanding of social policy, where social expenditure is seen as investments rather than mere costs. However, the meaning of social investments can range from seeking an entire restructuring of the modern welfare state, to more or less shallow reformulations of anything ‘social’ into economic terms.

In many similar Neighbourhoods throughout Sweden, both public and private landlords struggle with the seeming conundrum of funding renovation of their rental housing stock without consequently having to greatly increase rents. The establishment of an area-based social and environmental investment fund in Lindängen is believed to make such renovations possible without resulting in renewal-induced rent increases too great to bear for its more precarious tenants. As of now, Trianon, one of the three private landlords in Lindängen, have committed to partake in such renovation strategies. These regeneration efforts are not solely direct towards the physical housing stock, but they are also aimed at improving the social circumstances for its tenants. This is believed to be realised, to a large extent, through so-called social mobilisation and local job creation measures – where existing tenants are employed to work in the actual renovation process or maintenance of the buildings and their surroundings. Furthermore, the neighbourhood regeneration at large is believed to create a number of different jobs besides the aforementioned jobs in construction and maintenance.

In this thesis, the argumentation for such social investment strategies, as suggested by the Malmö Commission, is traced – from its ideopolitical origin to the substantiation of them through the development of the Regeneration Dialogue.
1.1 Aim and Research Questions

Targeted urban renewal schemes, especially in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, tend to stir up debate concerning the supposed positive or negative social implications of its outcome. On the one hand, proponents argue for its positive neighbourhood effects, economic growth stimulation, and potential for bonding and bridging social capital, not uncommonly coupled with ‘social mix’ overtones. On the other hand, critics are concerned with the (in)justices of existing residents, indicating that urban renewal schemes, especially extensive housing renovations, sometimes result in rampant rent increases causing financial dire straits for existing tenants, or even, at worst, displacement. The Regeneration Dialogue initiative expresses a concern for the matter of rampant rent increases as a potential negative outcome of urban renewal. It does so by explicitly drawing on storylines of social investment strategies and calls for a physical regeneration of the neighbourhood stimulated in concurrence with social change. Not only does it conceptualise a symbiosis between the social sphere and the physical environment in the renewal process, it also expresses awareness of social justice and a will for deflecting negative social effects. The purpose with this thesis is to study the discursively constructed need for social investment strategies as reproduced in the municipal-led initiative the Regeneration Dialogue in Lindängen, Malmö. Therefore, the aim with this thesis is to (discursively) addresses the following central research question:

*Is the implementation of social investment strategies in the regeneration of Lindängen said to help deflect renewal-induced negative social outcomes for existing tenants?*

In order to address this central research question, two supporting questions are raised. First, the emergence of social investment policies and strategies in Swedish urban planning, particularly as expressed in the Regeneration Dialogue, needs to be examined. Therefore, the first supporting question reads:

*What is the Social Investment Perspective and can it be discerned in the works of the Malmö Commission and in the regeneration of Lindängen?*

This question is answered both empirically and with the aid of literature. Secondly, to understand what the social investment strategies possibly can help deflect or counteract, such potential outcomes and a scholarly overview of them will be examined. Therefore, the third supporting question reads:

*What negative social outcomes for existing tenants could potentially be induced by neighbourhood regeneration?*

This question will be addressed in chapter 3 with the use of literature concerning urban regeneration, gentrification, and housing renovation.
1.2 Thesis outline
This Master’s thesis is divided into seven chapters. Following this thesis outline, and concluding this introductory chapter, is a short presentation of the neighbourhood Lindängen. Chapter 2, Methodology, starts by outlining the philosophical and theoretical foundations for this study. Then the theoretical and methodological ‘package-deal’ that is discourse analysis is explained. Here particular emphasis is given to Maarten Hajer’s so-called argumentative discourse analysis as it aids the operationalization of my analysis. Thereafter I explain what concrete methods I have used to produce my data, and I give an account of how the study as been conducted, what considerations I have taken, and so forth. In chapter 3, Urban Regeneration and Social Justice, an auxiliary theoretical frame of reference for this thesis is presented. This chapter is an overview of academic literature on the subjects of gentrification, housing renovation, and the concept of ‘renoviction’. Also, the concept of Social Justice is discussed in relation to planning. Chapter 4, The Social investment Perspective, is an overview of literature on the so-called social investment perspective. This chapter differs a little from chapter 3 because it starts to slip into the subsequent analysis part. Chapter 5, The Malmö Commission, is the first of two analytical chapters in which I present and analyse my empirics in relation to the literature presented in chapters 3 and 4. Here I start to discern discourses identified in the works of the Malmö Commission. Chapter 6, The Regeneration Dialogue, is the second analytical chapter in which I move onto studying the Regeneration Dialogue. Here I identify an overarching discourse-coalition united by a common understanding of what the Regeneration Dialogue is and what it entails. This is done by discerning storylines that seem to enable this common understanding. Chapter 7, Concluding Remarks and Reflections, concludes this thesis and reconnects to the research questions. I also present some critical reflections on the findings.
1.3 A Brief Account of Lindängen

Lindängen is a neighbourhood at the southern fringe of Malmö just outside the Inner Ring Road, a motorway encircling most of the conurbation that constitutes the city of Malmö. The neighbourhood was developed during the Million Homes Programme, a grandiose national planning programme that spanned between 1965-1974, during which approximately one million new dwellings were built (Hall & Vidén, 2004, p. 301). However, in reality the construction boom stretched from 1961-1975, the so-called record years, during which some 1.4 million dwellings were built. The distribution between apartments and single-family houses built during the record years (and the Million Homes Programme too) was 66 and 34 per cent respectively (Hall & Vidén, 2004, p. 304). The bulk of buildings and neighbourhoods developed during the record years are in fairly good condition, and has kept so with routine maintenance. However, some multifamily housing neighbourhoods are in need of more or less extensive renovation (Hall & Vidén, 2004, p. 301), Lindängen (arguably) being one such neighbourhood.

The first general plan for Lindängen was developed in 1967 and most buildings were built between 1969-1973, with some additional buildings added around 1980 (Tykesson, 2002, p. 108-19). The buildings are exclusively multifamily housing, ranging from 3 to 8 storeys high (and one 16 storey building). Lindängen can be divided into two distinct areas based on housing tenure; one area consists of some 1 000 apartments that are tenant-owned (Bostadsrätt)², and the other area consists of some 1 700 rental apartments (Malmö municipality, 2013a, p. 5). The rental housing estates constitute the core of what is perceived as Lindängen, whereas the tenant-owned housing estates called Högaholm, although statistically also part of Lindängen, are geographically separated from the rental housing estates. Three private landlords manage the rental housing estates in Lindängen; Stena owns 631 apartments, Willhem owns 681 apartments, and Trianon owns 400 apartments (Blomé, 2013, p. 5). Residential turnover (in rental apartments) has in recent years been around 20 per cent (ibid.). From here on in this thesis, reference to Lindängen will entail only these rental housing estates. In 2009, the whole of Lindängen, including the tenant-owned housing area Högaholm, had a population of 6 700 residents, out of which 67 per cent was of ‘foreign origin’³, and an employment rate (of people 18-64 years) at 47 per cent; this compared with Malmö as a whole that had an employment rate at just over 60 per cent (Malmö municipality, 2013a, p. 5; Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, p. 163). In the school year of 2010/2011, 46 per cent of the 9th grade secondary school pupils passed all subjects; this compared with nine years earlier, when 68 per cent passed (Blomé, 2013, p. 5).

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² A tenant-owned apartment is ‘neither owner-occupation, nor rental. Instead, the occupier of an individual residential unit /…/ is a member and shareholder of a co-operative /…/ that itself owns the unit in question, together with one or more others /…/ To acquire a share in the co-operative, a new resident pays a fee; in return, he or she gets the right to use a specific dwelling unit for an unspecified, unlimited period of time, and to transfer this right to a new resident/shareholder’ (Christophers, 2013, p. 889)

³ A person born outside Sweden or a person whose both parents are born outside Sweden is considered to be of foreign origin (Statistics Sweden, 2008, p. 76)
Trianon’s apartments in Lindängen are situated in the sub-neighbourhood of Fruängen, consisting of three eight-storey buildings and three three-storey buildings. Fruängen is located just south of the southeastern bend of Munkhättegatan as show in figure 1.

Figure 1. Map of Lindängen. The dashed black line encircles the administrative sub-district Lindängen. Source: Malmö municipality, 2014a

Figure 2. Map of Lindängen in Malmö. Red circle indicates Lindängen’s position in Malmö. Source: Malmö Municipality, 2014b
Lindängen could be described as a so-called disadvantaged neighbourhood. Malmö, along with many other Swedish and European cities, is to a large extent spatially divided between the native and immigrant population. In Sweden, this ethnic segregation is also coincident with a socioeconomic segregation, or as Åsa Bråmå (2006, p. 9) asserts, ‘Swedish high-income households live in certain parts of the cities while low-income immigrant households live in other parts, often at a considerable distance from one another’.

In a longitudinal study of population dynamics and socioeconomic conditions in Lindängen from 1990 to 2010, Tapio Salonen, professor of Social Work at Malmö University, shows that (the rental housing part of) Lindängen over the past two decades have been a neighbourhood in transition. From 1994 to 2010, the population in Lindängen grew from 2,312 to 3,588; that is an increase of 55.2 per cent. Noteworthy is that this sharp population increase has occurred without the construction of any new buildings. Simultaneously, Lindängen has also had a high turnover rate, and between 1990 and 2010, two thirds of the population lived in Lindängen no longer than five years; 25.3 per cent lived in Lindängen no longer than one year, and only 2.3 per cent lived in Lindängen all years (Salonen, 2014).

The data presented in Salonen’s study is a high-resolution statistics at the neighbourhood or housing estate-level⁴. As such, the tenant-owned housing area Högaholm is excluded. Trianon’s housing estates in Lindängen are confined to a single SAMS, while Stena and Willhem’s housing estates together make up one SAMS. These two SAMS combined constitute the rental housing part of Lindängen. In the tables below, statistics for Lindängen is shown in comparison with Malmö as a whole and the neighbourhood of Herrgården – arguably the most socioeconomically disadvantaged neighbourhood in Sweden. The neighbourhood of Herrgården is confined to a single SAMS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordic/Western Europe</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outside Western Europe</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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⁴ The data is from Statistics Sweden (Statistiska Centralbyrån) and its research database LISA (Longitudinal integration database for health insurance and labour market studies). The data is for the geographical statistical area of SAMS (small areas for market statistics)
Table 2. Source of Income, Individuals 18-64 years, 2010. Source: Salonen, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of income, 2010</th>
<th>Lindängen</th>
<th>Herrgården</th>
<th>Malmö</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>2247%</td>
<td>2522%</td>
<td>194753%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disposable income</td>
<td>2054</td>
<td>2224</td>
<td>176859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No income</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>17894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from employment</td>
<td>1224%</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>137596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student grants</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>26492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental insurance</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>27091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing benefit</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>1462</td>
<td>19002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social welfare</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>1451</td>
<td>18689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment insurance</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>12421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour market related payments</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>13167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 shows that Lindängen and Herrgården both have a larger share of residents born outside Sweden, and outside Western Europe for that matter, than Malmö as a whole. Table 2 shows that income from employment is substantially less in Lindängen and Herrgården than in Malmö, and that income from public transfers are greater. The combination of table 1 and 2 expresses the fact that socioeconomically disadvantaged neighbourhoods in Sweden often have a large share of immigrants and/or residents of foreign origin (Andersson, 2006, pp. 787-91; Andersson et al., 2010, p. 250; Bråmå, 2006, p. 10). Bråmå (ibid.) argues that the poorest neighbourhoods in Sweden almost always have a large share of immigrants. Residential segregation in Sweden is thus constituted by both socioeconomic and ethnical factors. Andersson and Andersson et al. (ibid.) explain this spatial division as the expression of structural racialised social exclusion.
2. Methodology

This chapter begins by establishing the philosophical foundations for this thesis. Thereafter discourse and discourse analysis is discussed, with a further examination of Maarten A. Hajer’s discourse analytical approach called argumentative discourse analysis. The chapter is then concluded with practical notions of concrete methods used when conducting this study. As such, the chapter moves from the abstract and philosophical, through the meso-level of discourse analysis, to explaining concrete research actions and considerations taken. This thesis rests on a discourse analytical ‘package-deal’ of theory and methodology, and, therefore, this chapter is also very much my theoretical framework.

2.1 Philosophical Foundations

When conducting a discourse analysis, no matter what discourse analytical theories and methods one chooses to work with, there are always a number of assumptions about reality one needs to reconcile with. The most fundamental assumption is that all knowledge is socially constructed, and, therefore, reality can never be unambiguously reflected (Börjesson & Palmblad, 2007, p. 9). In other words, there is no independent (meaningful) reality unbound from perspective. Such assumptions are characteristic of what is usually termed ‘the linguistic turn’ – a historical shift away from the strict positivist epistemology. The linguistic turn implies a consideration of the importance of language for the social, and that language is perceived as an action, an activity, and not as a complete system or a reflection of reality; as soon a language is used to represent things and occurrences context is created, and, thus, reality is constructed (Börjesson & Palmblad, 2007, p. 10). What has been described above is fundamental to social constructionism as a theory of knowledge. Vivien Burr (1995, pp. 2-5) speaks of four key premises that are essential to the social constructionist perspective. If one identifies any of these four premises as foundational for ones understanding of knowledge, one can be said to hold a social constructionist position. The four key premises are:

- **A critical stance towards taken-for-granted knowledge**
  Our knowledge about the world is not a reflection of reality. Reality is made accessible to us only through categories that shape our conception of the world. There is no objective truth.

- **Historical and cultural specificity**
  Our knowledge of the world is shaped by our history and culture, i.e. everything we see and understand is historically and culturally relative. This suggests an anti-essentialist perception in which humans does not have a predetermined ‘inner essence’.

- **Knowledge is sustained by social processes**
  As our knowledge of the world is not something derived from nature – something objectively ‘out there’ – knowledge is created between people, through social interaction.
Knowledge and social interaction go together

Our socially constructed knowledge about reality creates different forms of action, as certain actions are perceived as ‘natural’ while other are perceived as ‘inconceivable’.

Whereas the die-hard social constructionist standpoint is that nothing exists outside the discourse and that there is no independent reality unbond from perspective, critical realism can offer a more ‘nuanced’ ontology. From a critical realist perspective, there is a reality independent from humans’ perception of it; that is, so to speak, the realist part of it. Its other constituent, the critical, is about being critical of what appears to exist; what appears to be reality cannot be taken for granted, neither can what is said or though about reality (Stigendal, 2002, p. 56). Amalgamating these two perspectives – social constructionism and critical realism – can very much be possible (depending on ones conception of either philosophy). It is also the standpoint from which this thesis is written; namely the assumption that there is a reality independent from humans’ perception of it, yet all knowledge we have of reality are just constructions, which, in turn, must be perceived of critically.

As I am constrained by limited time and scope for this thesis, the analysis is consequentially confined to a ‘less critical’ approach. I will, however, bring up some critical remarks in the concluding chapter.

2.2 Discourse and Discourse Analysis

Although frequently used in the humanities and social studies, there is no clear consensus as to what constitutes a discourse or how to analyse them. One all-encompassing definition of discourse is that it is a certain way of speaking about and understanding the world (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, p. 7; Börjesson & Palmblad, 2007, p. 13). For an aspiring discourse analyst, this might not seem to be of much help. But, because discourse is a certain way of speaking about and understanding the world, what follows is that these linguistic representations are bound to a structure in which these representations are made acceptable and perceived as true or reasonable. Concurrently, language can always offer different, alternative versions of ‘reality’ outside this structure. Therefore, there is no single valid representation of ‘reality’, just different versions of it (ibid.); and, as Chantal Mouffe argues, ‘[t]hings could always be otherwise and therefore every order is predicated on the exclusion of other possibilities’ (Mouffe, 2005, p. 18).

Echoing discourse analysis’ social constructionist legacy, every (historically specific) representation is bound to a particular perspective; that is, every articulation is selected and produced from a certain perspective and a certain position. This makes the representations themselves – the discourse(s) – the subject of study in a discourse analysis, and the analyst is not seeking some underlying, actual explanation of what someone ‘really thinks’ (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, p. 28; Börjesson & Palmblad, 2007, p. 16). In other words, because reality is a social construct, ‘the analysis of meaning becomes central’ (Hajer & Versteeg, 2006, p. 176). A discourse can theoretically be perceived of as ‘closed’ or fixed in meaning; it does, however, always have ‘loose-ends’ or ambiguous elements (Wreder, 2007, p. 35). A discourse is always contingent, that is, always floating in
significance and never completely fixed. At best, a discourse can temporarily be fixed in meaning and significance within a certain domain (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, p. 33).

One scholar that has made seminal contributions for discourse-informed research is Michel Foucault. Foucault describes discourse not just as language but as other forms of social practice as well. To Foucault, a discourse both define and produce what we have knowledge of and it governs how people can speak, write or relate to a subject meaningfully. As such, at the same time, a discourse excludes any other representations of that same subject (Hall, 1997, p. 73). One of Foucault’s contributions to discourse analysis is that a discourse can be seen as ‘a complex set of competing ideas and values, all of which are actualised in our everyday practices’ (Jacobs, 2006, p. 44). To Foucault, discourse plays a key role in establishing so-called ‘regimes of truth’, which acts as the foundations from which our understanding of the social world is asserted, and where formulations of problems and solutions are rendered acceptable (ibid.). A concept that is closely related to regimes of truth is hegemony.

**Hegemony**

Discourses that at a given moment have the privileged position to define reality are called hegemonic (Thörn, 2007, p. 71). Hegemonic discourses are perceived as natural or ‘objective’ and are so rooted that they exclude other ways to perceive reality. This ‘objective’ status is attained through historical sedimentation. Chantal Mouffe calls the order of, or the struggle between, the hegemonic and the counter-hegemonic ‘the political’. On the contingent nature of a discourse and the constant struggle for hegemony, Mouffe argues that

What is at a given moment considered as the ‘natural’ order – jointly with the ‘common sense’ which accompanies it – is the result of sedimented practices; it is never the manifestation of a deeper objectivity exterior to the practices that bring it into being […] Every order is political and based on some form of exclusion. There are always other possibilities that have been repressed and that can be reactivated. The articulatory practices through which a certain order is established and the meaning of social institutions is fixed are ‘hegemonic practices’. Every hegemonic order is susceptible of being challenged by counter-hegemonic practices, i.e. practices which will attempt to disarticulate the existing order so as to install another form of hegemony (Mouffe, 2005, p. 18).

Hegemony can thus be understood as an organisation, or an order, of consent. This consent can neutralise and make power relations appear as natural and unquestionable (Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, p. 39). With this struggle for hegemony in mind, Hajer’s argumentative discourse analysis will be discussed.
2.3 Argumentative Discourse Analysis
In aiding the discourse-informed analysis in this thesis, and as a way to ‘operationalize’ discourse analysis, Maarten A. Hajer’s ‘conceptual apparatus’ of discourses, discourse-coalitions, and storylines will be employed. Hajer developed what he calls argumentative discourse analysis analysing environmental politics and the emergence of ecological modernisation in the 1980s and 1990s – yet it is an approach that is highly suitable for analysing any form of hegemonic or contesting policy. Hajer argues that it is important to study specific constructions of reality, whether it may be the hegemonic status quo sought to be upheld by key actors, or forces seeking to oppose such constructions (Hajer, 1995, p. 55).

A struggle for hegemony
While studying environmental politics in the 1980s and 1990s, Hajer was intrigued with how the so-called ‘acid rain’ controversy seemed to play a pivotal role in environmental politics. This informed his thesis that ‘acid rain’ functioned as a vehicle to discuss environmental issues at large, and that acid rain ‘seemed emblematic of the bigger “problematic”’ or, more precisely, for understanding that problematic at the time’ (Hajer, 2005, p. 298, original emphasis). To Hajer, then, acid rain functioned as a metaphor – it stood for something else, something broader. In the 1980s, acid rain was seen as the reason for various environmental problems, such as the fact that a large number of trees were dying throughout Europe’s forests. As such, acid rain functioned as a way to make sense of, for example, dead trees (Hajer, 2005, 299). Given this construction, the dead trees were seen as the victims of acid rain pollution as opposed to dying from ‘natural causes’. Thus a ‘pollution’ narrative, as opposed to a ‘natural causes’ narrative, constructed a particular political problem where the metaphor ‘acid rain’ facilitated a new understanding of rain as potentially environmentally dangerous. Therefore, Hajer argued, ‘[l]anguage has the capacity to make politics’ (Hajer, 2005, p. 300) as it can construct problems and offer solutions, potentially impacting institutional arrangements and policy-making. As language in use, i.e. discursive interaction, can alter the way people think and act, or construct new identities for themselves and other, discourse play a significant role in political change (Hajer, 1995, p. 59).

Like Mouffe, Hajer understands politics as the struggle for discursive hegemony, a struggle ‘in which actors try to secure support for their definition of reality’ (Hajer, 1995, p. 59). In the argumentative discourse analysis approach, the dynamics of this struggle is determined by three factors: credibility, acceptability, and trust. An argument needs to be credible for actors to ‘permit’ their own position in the structure the discourse implies for them; that position must seem attractive or necessary for actors to accept it and; trust refers to the securing of confidence in the author of the argument, e.g. through a person’s or an institution’s reputation, or the ‘trustworthiness’ of the practice through which the argument is produced, e.g. a sound democratic process or in a scientific journal (Hajer, 1995, pp. 59-60). These factors then can determine actors and arguments ability to convince, rendering them plausible or unreasonable. Mapped out below are concepts key for Hajer argumentative analysis, which will also be employed in the forthcoming analysis in this thesis.
Discourses

What constitutes and defines a discourse, and subsequently how it should be analysed, varies across time, institutional setting, scientific discipline, application, and, not least, the analyst. According to Hajer, a discourse can be seen as an argumentative structure, and as an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices (Hajer, 2005, p. 300).

A discourse analysis, then, is the analysis of this argumentative structure and ensemble, and the practices through which they are produced and reproduced (Hajer, 2005, p. 299). A discourse can be understood as a structure of binding moments and elements to which coherence is made dependent on context. For, as Hajer argues, coherence ‘is not an essential feature of discourse’ (Hajer, 1995, p. 44). Routinized practices within a certain institutional setting make a discourse coherent; a discourse, through these practices, produces thus its own criteria of credibility. To use the case of acid rain as an example, a discourse can be a certain way of understanding and dealing with environmental problems like acid rain, e.g. an environmental activist discourse, a political discourse or a natural science discourse. Although coming from diverse backgrounds and ‘representing’ different discourses, various actors can somehow come together and agree on the meaning of certain phenomena and argue for the same cause, like combatting acid rain. Hajer explains this ‘communicative miracle’ with the concepts of storylines and discourse-coalitions.

Storylines

A storyline is a narrative on social reality that enables the ‘communicative miracle’ that allows actors from different domains (and discourses) to somehow form coalitions and common understandings regarding particular matters (Hajer, 1995, p. 62). Storylines can reduce discursive complexity and help to achieve discursive closure of otherwise fragmented and incoherent discourses (Hajer, 1995, pp. 62-3). Through repetition and increased patronage, storylines can achieve ritual-like character and become almost ‘figures of speech’. A storyline is often centred around shallow and ambiguous discursive practices, such as metaphors, ‘analogies, historical references, clichés, appeals to collective fears or senses of guilt’ (Hajer, 1995, p. 63). Hajer calls a storyline a ‘condensed statement summarizing complex narratives, used by people as “short hand” in discussions’ (Hajer, 2005, p. 302); assuming that, because of its ‘figure of speech’-like character, others will understand what they mean. This assumed mutual understanding is, however, often false, and ‘[e]ven when actors share a specific set of storylines, they might interpret the meaning of these storylines rather differently. Interestingly enough, actors that can be proven not to fully understand each other can still produce meaningful political interventions’ (Hajer & Versteeg, 2006, p. 177). Storylines are what positions actors in a discourse-coalition, much like how the acid rain storyline rendered dead trees victims of pollution, it can render actors as problem solvers or perpetrators, credible or absurd; a storyline can also
attribute actors and occurrences certain ideas, like “blame” and “responsibility”, and of “urgency” and “responsible behavior” (Hajer, 1995, pp. 64-65). However factual or scientific it might be, a storyline must be plausible to be successful, and ‘the power of story-lines is essentially based on the idea that it sounds right’ (Hajer, 1995, p. 63). A storyline is the ‘discursive cement’ that binds together different actors drawing on elements from various discourses in a discourse-coalition in which the discursive complexity is concealed (Hajer, 2005, p. 304).

**Discourse-coalitions**
Hajer defines discourse-coalitions as ‘the ensemble of (1) a set of storylines; (2) the actors who utter these story-lines; and (3) the practices in which this discursive activity is based’ (Hajer, 1995, p. 65). By adhering to a specific set of storylines, various actors, often from different backgrounds and drawing on different discourses, can be united in a discourse-coalition (Hajer, 2005, p. 304). These actors often have different, if not contradictory, goals and interests and gives different content and meaning to the shared storylines. This implies that just because actors are connected to the same discourse or discourse-coalition, they do not necessarily share opinions, values, or even a common goal (Hajer 1995, s. 14). As an example, Hajer illuminates this ‘intra-coalition’ dynamics with the notion that the economic models that ‘neoliberal’ economists draw upon, and the science of environmental problems, are indeed so complex that even ‘experts’ draw upon storylines to be understood. Also, as these are ‘experts’ in their respective fields, they are depended on other ‘experts’ within the discourse-coalition to see the ‘full picture’ (Hajer, 2005, p. 3).

**Structuration and institutionalisation**
In order to apply the above presented concepts ‘in practice’, Hajer argues that one should ‘be able to link discourse to power and dominance’ and one should also be able ‘to assess their influence as well’ (Hajer, 2005, p. 303). To do this, and to determine whether a discourse or a discourse-coalition can be seen as dominant in a particular domain, Hajer introduces the terms discourse structuration and discourse institutionalization. When the rhetorical power of a discourse is so powerful that it dominates how a social unit (a person, a corporation, a political institution, a policy field, etc.) conceptualizes the world, discourse structuration can be said to have occurred. If that discourse also ‘solidifies in particular institutional arrangements’ (Hajer, 2005, p. 303) for that particular social unit, i.e. if the practices of that social unit ‘is conducted according to the ideas of a given discourse’ (Hajer, 2005, p. 305), then also discourse institutionalisation can be said to have occurred. A discourse can be said to be hegemonic if both these two criteria are fulfilled (Hajer, 1995, p. 61).

**Discursive affinity**
In a discourse-coalition, a given phenomena may mean different things for its actors, but although their arguments may vary in origin, they can still share a mutual conceptualisation of the matter at hand. Hajer calls this discursive affinity. He exemplifies this with the moral argument in pollution politics that ‘nature should be respected’. The scientist’s argument could be that nature is a complex ecosystem, and the economist’s argument could be
that pollution prevention is the most economic solution. Although their arguments differ, both actors can, from respective positions, agree with the other argument because it sounds right and does not contradict the central argument that ‘nature should be respected’ (Hajer, 2005, p. 304).

2.4 Method
In accordance with my discourse analytical approach, my research process does not follow the conventional procedure of data collection followed by data processing and analysis. A discourse analytical study is rather a ‘wholeness’ of analysis, and the aforementioned methodological ‘package-deal’ that is discourse analysis is very much my method (Börjesson & Palmblad, 2007, p. 16; Winther Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000, p. 10). Therefore, my ‘produced data’, whether it may be interviews, texts, or images, is all equally treated as discursive interactions, i.e. language in use. Nonetheless, my empirics are divided into (1) primary data, such as interviews, observations, and any form of personal communication, and (2) secondary data, such as policy documents, newspaper articles, and academic literature.

Primary data
Four semi-structured interviews were conducted for this thesis. The interviews lasted for circa 30 to 50 minutes. Three of these interviews were recorded and transcribed shortly after the interview. These interviews were with Municipal commissioner for labour market affairs, a Housing inspector with the Department of Environment, and the Project manager for the MIL project (a project closely related to the Regeneration Dialogue, explained further in section 6.1). The Municipal commissioner for labour market affairs was chosen because he had appeared in media on behalf of his interest in the Regeneration Dialogue and its potential as a local job creating effort. The interview with the Housing inspector was conducted to get a fuller picture of the municipal appreciation of the ‘situation’ in Malmö’s Million Homes Programme, Lindängen in particular. The interview with the Project manager for MIL was conducted both as a way to get access to ‘tacit’ information otherwise hard to obtain, such as current situation for Regeneration Dialogue, but also to get a detailed account of the aim and purpose with the regeneration. It should be mentioned that I met with the Project manager for MIL on two other occasions in less informal manner. The fourth interview was with the CEO of the private Landlord Trianon who owns 400 rental apartments in Lindängen. This interview was not recorded, and instead notes were taken. A problem with this is that some details and specificities might have gotten lost in the process. Especially for a discourse analysis, this can be problematic because the use of certain words or articulations can be meaningful for the analysis. Because of this, to get answers to some uncertainties a second meeting was appointed and conducted as a guided tour in Fruängen, Lindängen. During this tour I also hade the opportunity the see one of the renovated apartments. The CEO of Trianon was chosen because Trianon is the landlord in Lindängen that, as of now, has come the furthest in renovating their housing stock in Lindängen, and, in doing so, has also implemented certain socially related aspects in renovation process. Apart from these interviews, a telephone interview was conducted with the head of commercial policy for the southern regional
subsidiary of the Swedish Property Federation, a national property owners’ trade association. The intention with this interview was to inquire whether they, as a trade association, had certain policies or guidelines for landlords engaging in local job creation or so-called social value-based real estate management. This interview was not recorded but notes were taken.

In accordance with my discourse analytical approach, my interviewees are not referred to by name, as it is their respective subject positions in the discourse(-coalition) that matters rather than who they actually are. All interviews were conducted in Swedish and I translated the excerpts that are presented in the thesis to English. A list of personal communications can be found in the list of references and all the translated excerpts are presented in Swedish in the appendix Translated Excerpts.

I also had the opportunity to observe a half-day workshop with public actors related to the regeneration Lindängen. The topic for the workshop was the suggested area-based investment fund for Lindängen and how these concerned public actors, e.g. the Social services, the Employment agency, etc., perceived this suggested investment fund – its potentials, obstacles, etc. – and its demanded inter-sectorial co-operation. Besides this I also had, on several occasions, the possibility to meet with Professor Tapio Salonen, member of the steering committee for the MIL project, as well as Malmö Commissioner. These meetings helped me with orientating my subject of study and Salonen supplied me with connections and material relevant for my study.

The selection of interviewees was made according to their respective roles in my discerned discourse-coalition regarding the regeneration of Lindängen. I did seek an interview with the project manager for the Regeneration Dialogue without any luck. Surely such an interview could have given me certain insights that now might be lacking. As Trianon is the landlord that has actually committed to partake in certain socially related renovation efforts, I considered Trianon to be the most important landlord to hear. Another approach could have been to also interview the other two landlords to inquire their ‘less advanced’ role in the Regeneration Dialogue. Also, my initial intention was to do a comparative study between Trianon and their efforts in Lindängen and Victoria Park and their similar efforts in Herrgården. This idea was shelved due to limitations in time, and also on a stronger focus on the Regeneration Dialogue as a direct ‘derivation’ of the Malmö Commission.

Secondary data
My secondary data consist of, for example, public policy documents, planning documents, newspaper articles, academic articles and books, maps, illustrations, etc. Also, much of my secondary data was obtained via personal communications, especially such data that concerns the Regeneration Dialogue and the MIL project. This type of data mostly consists of internal material that would otherwise be hard to come by, like project descriptions, halfway reports, etc. All documents regarding the Regeneration Dialogue and the Malmö Commission is in Swedish and thus translated to English by me, with the exception of an essay written in English by the project manager for the Regeneration Dialogue.
My position
As a discourse analyst, I have myself constructed the framework for the subject of study by discerning discourses, the ‘abstraction level’ of them, and who is included or not. My research questions and my selection of data constructs this framework, and, in other words, it is I that contextualises and deems something meaningful or not. As such, I am also part of the production and reproduction of the discourses that I study (Börjesson & Palmblad, 2007, p. 19). Therefore, it is important to justify ones selections and to account for whose context is studied.
In this chapter, theories and practices related to urban regeneration and social justice will be presented. This chapter serves as an auxiliary theoretical frame of reference informing this thesis. It also answers the third supporting research question *What negative social outcomes for existing tenants could potentially be induced by neighbourhood regeneration?* But first, a brief account of Swedish housing policy is in place.

### 3.1 Swedish Housing Policy

Sprung out of a severe housing shortage and widespread unsanitary living conditions, the Commission on Housing and Redevelopment of 1933-1947 (bostadssociala utredningen) set the stage for Swedish housing policy that for decades remained a staple of the Swedish social democratic welfare state. Fundamental to this housing policy was the notion of sound and affordable housing for all (Boverket, 2007, pp. 9-10). In the 1960s, this policy culminated in the Million Home Programme and the goal to build a million new dwellings between 1965 and 1974 (Boverket, 2007, p. 12). However, just a few years into the 1970s, the housing shortage had in some places turned into a housing surplus and many buildings, indeed whole housing areas, were half-empty (Hall & Vidén, 2005, p. 304).

The policy advocated for by the Commission on Housing and Redevelopment remained for the most part in ‘effect’ up until the early 1990s (Clark & Hedin, 2009, p. 176). From here on, the Swedish housing sector came to experience radical transformations inline with a more neoliberal trajectory. The Carl Bilt government of 1991-1994, the first liberal-conservative government in Sweden since 1930, engaged a series of state ‘roll-backs’, including nullification of housing legislation, the closing of the Department of Housing, and the discontinuing of housing related subsidies, etc. (Clark & Hedin, 2009, p. 180). Although the Social democrats regained office for two consecutive terms between 1994-2006, little was done to reinstate what had been ‘rolled-back’, but ‘[r]ather, under the leadership of Ingvar Carlsson (1994-96) and Göran Persson (1996-2006), the system switch was tacitly endorsed’ (Clark & Hedin, 2009, p. 181). Since 2006, a liberal-conservative coalition government has been in office further abolishing welfare systems and pursing over-all privatization schemes. In 2008, the long-standing goal of sound and affordable housing for all was thwarted, and the goal for housing was now instead said to be a ‘well-functioning housing market where consumers’ demands meet a supply of housing which correspond to their needs’ (Clark & Hedin, 2009, p. 183). In 2011, another formative shift towards increased marketization took place with the instating of a new law, the so-called Allbolagen (SFS 2010:879). In short, the legislation stipulated that public housing companies now also must conduct their activities in a ‘business-like’ manner, altering the public benefit role of Swedish housing companies (for discussions on what this might entail, see for example Christophers, 2013, p. 893; Baeten & Listerborn, Forthcoming, p. 11).

On the back of this this development, many scholars have commented on the far-reaching neoliberalisation of the Swedish housing sector, although not entirely alike. For example, whereas real estate economists
Lind & Lundström argue that Sweden has ‘gradually become one of the most liberal market-governed housing markets in the Western world’ (Lind & Lundström, 2007, cited in Hedin et al., 2012, p. 444), Christophers, on the other hand, maintain a slightly more reserved position, arguing that the Swedish housing system rather should be seen as a (monstrous) ‘hybrid of legacy regulated elements on the one hand and neoliberalised elements on the other’ (Christophers, 2013, 885). Either case, the situation today is that Sweden is again facing a shortage of affordable rental housing, at least in the larger cities. The recently established Housing crisis committee (Bokriskommittén) – a private initiative run by the chambers of commerce for Stockholm, western, and southern Sweden, and the Swedish Property Federation – suggest that this should be addressed through (1) further down-scaling of rent regulation (towards, although not completely, market regulated rents), and (2) further legislation intending to ‘speed up’ the planning process (Housing Crisis Committee, 2014). Noteworthy is that the law that regulates planning and construction was revised as recently as 2010, very much with the intention to do just that (Plan- och bygglag 2010:900).

SABO, together with The Swedish Union of Tenants and the Swedish Property Federation offers another outlook on why there is a shortage of affordable housing. They argue that the lack of affordable housing – both low production of new ‘affordable’ housing and ‘affordable’ rent levels for the existing stock – is largely because of tenure bias in favour of the private and tenant-owned tenancy forms. They argue that these tenancy form are premiered, partly because of tax cuts and subsidies (both for residents and constructions companies), but also because of the abolished, previously substantial, subsides for the production of rental apartments (SABO et al., 2010).

One factor that relates to the housing shortage is the fact that Sweden has the highest construction prices in the EU. According to Eurostat, the price level for investment was 36 per cent higher in Sweden than the EU average; this compared with Finland and Denmark who both had a price level of investment at 13 per cent above the EU average (Eurostat, 2012). The price index for housing construction in Sweden increased with 1 800 per cent between 1968 and 2010, this compared with the consumer price index which increased with 700 per cent for the same years (SABO, 2013, p. 2).

So in conclusion, soaring construction prices, state ‘roll-backs’ and further marketization, unbalanced economic conditions between tenancy forms, the new role of public housing companies, and an over-all switch from perceiving affordable housing as a ‘right’ to just another commodity – this all suggests a rather uncertain future for the Swedish housing sector and a bleak situation for the financially precarious.
3.2 Gentrification
When dealing with the matter of urban regeneration in disadvantaged neighbourhoods it is hard to disregard the ever-debated concept of gentrification. Although gentrification has over the past decades taken many different forms and the definition of it has expanded, whether it is a suitable theoretical process by which to study the regeneration of Lindängen can be questioned. Nevertheless, since the Regeneration Dialogue is a municipal-initiated regeneration effort operating in a disadvantaged neighbourhood, an examination of the concept of gentrification is due.

Gentrification is in this thesis principally understood as ‘the transformation of a working-class or vacant area of the central city into middle-class residential and/or commercial use’ (Lees et al., 2008, p. xv). Although, as ‘working-class’ might seem a little narrow, it is here expanded to include also the poor or the disadvantaged; and ‘central-city’ is expanded to also include more peripheral parts of the city.

In 2001, Hackworth and Smith examined the changing state of gentrification in the USA and identified three consecutive waves of gentrification intermitted by periods of economic recession (Hackworth & Smith, 2001, pp. 465-68). Emerging in the 1990s, the third wave of gentrification took place further from the city centre and was often more linked to large-scale capital, where developers could invest in larger parts of, if not entire, neighbourhoods. Also characteristic of this third wave of gentrification is that the reworking of neighbourhoods was often done with state support. This state supported form of gentrification, often called state-led gentrification, entails gentrification as (explicitly or implicitly) posited as a governmental strategy. State-led gentrification might, if any, be the most suitable gentrification ‘variant’ for this thesis as the Regeneration Dialogue is in fact a municipal-led regeneration effort. State-led gentrification has been discussed by Hackworth and Smith (2000), Cameron (2003), Porter and Barber (2006), Larsen and Lund Hansen (2008), Davidson (2008), and Watt (2009), only to name a few.

Just as the definitions of gentrification has evolved and multiplied, so have also opinions about it. Since the beginning of the 2000s, proponents arguing for the benefits of gentrification have emerged united by the so-called ‘emancipatory city’ rhetoric. In short, gentrification proponents argue that gentrification is the result of a healthy and thriving real estate market and that it creates attractive environments and opportunities for further economic development (Hedin, 2010, p. 25). One way to forward gentrification policies is to relate it to the idea of ‘social mix’, which, highly simplified, means to build new or renovate existing housing for high-income groups in neighbourhoods predominantly inhabited by low-income groups (ibid.). Even though proponents of gentrification and ‘social mix’ strategies have emerged, Loretta Lees contends that the language of pro-gentrification policies never uses the word ‘gentrification’ and thus consistently deflects criticism and resistance. Terms like urban renaissance, urban revitalisation, urban regeneration and urban sustainability are used instead, avoiding the class constitution of the processes involved and neutralising the negative image that the process of gentrification brings with it (Lees, 2008, p. 2452).
By this understanding, an urban regeneration project like the Regeneration Dialogue certainly falls within the scope of what might be ‘concealed’ gentrification policies. However, although the class constitution of the project is avoided per se, there are certain aspects of social justice and beneficence within the purpose of the project suggesting that gentrification is neither an explicit nor an implicit aim. Also, the (socio-)geographical or urban morphological preconditions might not be favourable for ‘typical’ gentrification, such as the rent-gap being too narrow to suggest a potential disruptive restructuring of the neighbourhood, or that the Million Homes Programme estates’ arguably bleak architectural aesthetic is undesirable to ‘typical’ middle-class gentrifiers. Nevertheless, displacement can be a concern even though the regeneration might not entail processes of gentrification. For as Lees et al. (2008, p. 81) argues, ‘reinvestment has moved beyond the comparatively small enclaves of gentrification, and is moving deeper into other parts of the devalorized urban environment’. Thus, one concept that might be more suitable for this thesis is the concept of ‘renoviction’ that is presented in the following section.

3.3 Renovation and ‘Renoviction’

A large share of the large-scale, or multi-family estates that was during the Million Homes Programme (1965-1974), or more accurately, during the so-called ‘record years’ (1961-1975), are in need of some form of renovation. Industrifakta, a private corporation specialising in market analysis concerning the construction and real estate industries, have in a report concluded that around 650,000 out of the 830,000 apartments built during the ‘record years’ are in need of some form of renovation (Industrifakta, 2008, p. 28). SABO, the Swedish Association of Public Housing Companies, have divided the needs for renovation of their member companies stock (that is most, but not all, of Sweden’s public housing companies) into four factors: technical flaws, stricter societal demands, social factors, and the need for market adjustment (SABO, 2009, p. 7).

The technical flaws are commonly old main piping and drainage systems that needs to be replaced, worn waterproofing in kitchens and bathrooms, etc. By stricter societal demands they mean, for example, that the demands for energy efficiency and health aspects like the sanitation of PCB and asbestos, are stricter now than when the buildings were constructed. By social factors they mean that some of the neighbourhoods built during the record-years are disadvantaged in terms of unemployment, low-income levels, and social welfare dependency. The factors mentioned, although formulated for SABOs members companies, very much apply to privately owned housing estates as well. The fourth factor – the need for market adjustment – concerns, however, only public housing companies and their need to adjust to ‘business-like’ principles since fairly recent legislation (the so-called Allbolagen, 2011, explained earlier in section 3.1).

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5 Neil Smith describes rent gap as ‘the disparity between the potential ground rent level and the actual ground rent capitalized under the present land use’ (Smith, 1979, p. 545)
**Renoviction**

The aforementioned replacements of main piping and drainage systems are large and costly interventions. Therefore, such interventions are often coupled with major bathroom and kitchen overhauls. While the former is considered regular maintenance, the latter, and this is what can become ‘problematic’, is considered value-adding renovations, permitting the landlord to increase the rent as it could increase the apartment’s utility value (Westin, 2011, p. 16). As Sweden is facing forthcoming renovations of the Million Homes Programmes’, or the record-years’, housing stock on a large scale, a growing fear is that such renovations would create ‘unaffordability’ for existing tenants, and that what would be created is systematic ‘renoviction’; that is, evictions as a result of rampant rent increases induced by value-adding renovations.

This fear is in no way unwarranted. Renovation efforts in disadvantaged neighbourhoods that have included value-adding renovations have been shown by Baeten & Listerborn (Forthcoming), Ärlemalm (2014), and Westin (2011). Westin illustrates instances where neighbourhoods have been subjected to extensive renovations resulting in soaring rent increases upwards 50-60 per cent (2011, p. 11); for example in Drakenberg, Stockholm (Svenska Bostäder, public housing company), Södra Kvarngärden, Uppsala (Uppsala Hem, public housing company), and Norra Kvarngärden, Uppsala (Stena Fastigheter, private housing company). All three examples are relatively centrally located Million Homes Programme neighbourhoods.

Baeten and Listerborn (Forthcoming, p. 12) presents yet another example in Uppsala, where private landlord Rikshem have made renovations leading to increased rent levels up to 34 per cent. The examples of Rikshem in Uppsala and Drakenberg in Stockholm both led to protests and wide media attention, and in the case of Drakenberg protests led to a renegotiation of rent levels, bringing them down from circa 60 per cent to circa 28-30 per cent (Westin, 2011, p. 11).

Some commentators have expressed a concern for the overestimation of renovation needs. In her report on renovations in Million Homes Programme areas in Stockholm and Uppsala, Sara Westin (2011) studies the effects of ‘renoviction’ from tenants’ perspectives. One interlocutor in the study, a representative of the Swedish Union of tenants, expresses that the supposed ‘need’ for renovation is not so much affected by the actual need for renovation, but that it is rather induced by the landlord’s ambition to increase rent levels, and that main piping replacements are often used as a ‘front’ for being able to conduct value-adding renovations, increasing the utility-value of the property which in turn allows for rent increases (Westin, 2011, p. 30. On the subject, Baeten and Listerborn says that ‘[t]he need for renovation, so it seems, is invoked to renew the social fabric of neighbourhoods where housing profits have not yet been ‘optimised’ (Forthcoming, p. 13).

Baeten and Listerborn (Forthcoming) have studied the city of Landskrona, Sweden, and their controversial so-called Crossroads plan. In short, the plan, which is for the central and eastern inner-city Landskrona, hopes to reduce the influx of (unwanted) immigrants, it wants incorporate more tenant-owned housing, and it seeks to attract a more mixed population, i.e. ‘social mix’. These are the more controversial aspects of the plan, but
the plan also seeks to, for example, locate more service and business establishments to the area. The plan is hoped to be realised through renovation, tenure conversion, and demolition of the rental apartments (Baeten & Listerborn, Forthcoming, p. 6). Baeten and Listerborn argue that such policy formulations are an overthrow of ‘traditional’ Scandinavian social concerns and ideas about how to ‘navigate’ disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Baeten & Listerborn, Forthcoming, p. 7). Moreover, they contend that ‘[i]nstead of getting low-income groups into cities and houses – an ordinary social aim for decades – places like Landskrona are now actively pursuing the opposite’ (Baeten & Listerborn, Forthcoming, p. 10). In conclusion they argue that Landskrona is an example of the introduction of ‘renoviction’ efforts in (even small cities in) Sweden. Also, it is seen as an example of how the provision of affordable housing is no longer considered a ‘cornerstone of the Swedish welfare model’, but it is rather part of the problem, ‘since it attracts the “wrong kind of people”’ (Baeten & Listerborn, Forthcoming, p. 14).

Thus it seems, from what has been discussed about ‘renoviction’, that extensive and costly value-adding renovation efforts have been made both by private and public housing companies with, at least in some cases, the implicit motive to either increase rents and/or to attract other tenants. These renovation efforts can not only have detrimental effects for individual residents, but also have great impact as ‘vehicles’ for social restructuring at the neighbourhood level.

3.4 Social Justice

According to Flyvbjerg (2002, p. 353) and Fainstein (2010), the prevalent communicative focus in planning theory has led to research and practice often being too narrowly oriented towards the procedural aspects of planning, equally ignoring the substantive or distributional outcomes and its significance for social justice. This procedural focus in planning, often informed by Habermasian communicative rationality, can in a sense be explained as being rooted in a deontological ethical reasoning – where right or wrong is derived from the intent of an action rather than its outcome, and as long as the procedure is immaculate the outcome is justifiable (Johansson & Khakee, 2008, pp. 29-30). In contrast, from a teleological ethical perspective, i.e. consequentialism, what is right or wrong is derived from the outcome of an action. Of course, in practice, these concepts are not dichotomic, and the line between the concepts might not always be clear-cut.

Fainstein argues that the prevalent procedural focus in planning lacks ways of dealing with structural inequalities beyond the reach of the ideal process or dialogue, or in other words, it lacks conceptualisations of substantive justice (2010, p. 20). Fainstein contends that (blind) faith in the efficiency of open communication often ignores underlying hierarchies of power (2010, pp. 29-30). In a similar vein, Flyvbjerg argues that this is partly because ‘[i]deals seem to block the view to reality’ (Flyvbjerg, 2002, p. 354), as the separation between rationality and power tend to obscure the Realpolitik and ‘real rationality’ of political institutions.

Fainstein argues that the claim that meaningful justice can be attained within the system of global capitalism can induce two different responses; one either believes that (1) ‘it is impossible to work within this system and
achieve a modicum of justice”, or that (2) ‘the pressure for nonreformist reform can lead to incremental changes in the system that place it on a pathway toward justice’ (Fainstein, 2010, p. 170). Fainstein adheres to the latter position and, further, calls for the application of an equity criterion in policy evaluation, a criterion in which emphasis is on providing affordable housing for low-income people, very much reminiscent of the now abolished conception of the right to affordable housing that functioned as a lodestar in Swedish housing policy for the most part of the 20th century.

This perspective of seeing planning research and practice having been too narrowly focused on procedural aspects is a noteworthy background to have in mind when studying the social investment ‘informed’ polices forwarded by the Malmö Commission, particularly the development of the Regeneration Dialogue and its ‘take’ on urban regeneration.
To explain the concept of social investments as something new would indeed be misleading. It has however in recent years become somewhat of a fad, particularly for Swedish municipalities and regional organisations, to formulate policies as social investment efforts. So then, why this reformation of social interventions, and if it is not something new, where did this rationale originate? In this chapter the origin and ‘resurgence’ of the social investment perspective will be traced – from 1930s Sweden, through the Lisbon Strategy to the concretisation of social investment strategies in Malmö.

Although emerging as attempts to reformulate the welfare state in the 1990s (as will be explained later), the social investment perspective can be traced back to the 1930s and the cradle of the Swedish social democratic welfare state. On the back of the Great Depression, unsanitary living conditions and a severe fertility crisis in Sweden, prominent Social democrat’s Alva and Gunnar Myrdal outlined what they would call productive social policy (Morel et al., 2012a). The Myrdals argued that a healthy and educated population was necessary for achieving economic growth and high productivity, even in periods of economic crisis. As such, social policy was made essential, not only for providing income redistribution and individual security, but also for the efficiency of the organisation of production. This view merged the national need for economic growth and efficiency with the strive for individuals to productively partake in the economy. The structural societal impediment that Gunnar and Alva Myrdal recognised in Sweden in the 1930, and which eventually led to the formulation of their so-called productive social policy, can be paralleled with the structural impediments identified by the Malmö Commission, which in turn led to the formulation of social investment informed policies; the former being embedded in a social democratic discourse and the latter in a neoclassical or neoliberal discourse.

A Welfare state in crisis

The new socioeconomic context of the post-industrial era has arguably strained the capacity of the modern welfare state. As a way to reformulate the welfare state, various attempts to redefine its goals and instruments emerged in the late 1990s (Morel et al., 2012a). Central to these redefinitions was the focus on policies aimed at ‘preparing’ rather than ‘repairing’ (ibid.). Such efforts have called for a ‘developmental’, ‘activating’, ‘enabling’, ‘third way’, or ‘social investment’ welfare state (Cantillon, 2011, p. 439). Whatever the term, what unifies such various definitions is their common overall pre-emptive rather than remedial logic. In this thesis, such definitions are united under the term social investment perspective.

Whereas the early modern welfare state was structured according to Keynesian demand-side macroeconomics and in which welfare was seen as a precondition for economic growth, thus making welfare expenditure
productive, the prevalent neoliberal state, on the other hand, is structured according to supply-side neoclassical macroeconomics, perceiving social expenditure merely as costs, and thus, as hindrance for optimal economic growth. In neoliberal policies, social expenditure is only acceptable if it leads to activating or stimulating people to search for jobs – any jobs – regardless of quality or security (Morel et al., 2012a; Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, p. 22).

In the 1990s, the social investment perspective in many respects emerged as a critique of the neoliberal agenda (Morel et al., 2012a; Grander, 2014). This social investment perspective aims to transform the welfare state according to the conditions of the so-called knowledge-based economy; and in a society where knowledge is key, human capital enhancement becomes critical. From a social investment perspective, as with Keynesianism, social policies should be seen as a productive force and a precondition for economic growth (Morel et al., 2012a, p. 2). On the other hand, and similar to neoliberal policy, emphasis is on ‘active’ rather than ‘passive’ social policies, in the sense that individuals should be encouraged to actively strive for economical self-sufficiency, and not rely on ‘passive’ benefits. Anthony Giddens, who coined the term the social investment state, and who is commonly associated with the term the ‘Third way’, describe this

The guideline is investment in human capital wherever possible, rather than the direct provision of economic maintenance. In place of the welfare state we should put the social investment state, operating in the context of a positive welfare society (Giddens, 1998, p. 117, italics in original).

In the EU, explicit social investment policies began to take form in the late 1990s, very much inspired by Anthony Giddens’ book The third way: The Renewal of Social Democracy (1998). These policies envisioned a welfare state transformed from a state reliant on ‘passive’ benefits systems to a capacity building, ‘activating’ social investment state (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 46). This idea of the social investment state functioned as a broader framework for the early formulations of the Lisbon Strategy – a EU agenda that was devised in 2000 and ended, arguably as a failure, in 2010 (Cantillon, 2011, p. 439, Diamond and Liddle, 2012, p. 285; Morel et al., 2012a). The Lisbon Strategy was formulated on the back of rising inequalities in the EU during the 1990s. The strategy is said to have grown out of discontent with the prevalent neoliberal trajectory; of which critics formulated policies united under the social investment parole, suggesting a development of economic growth in tandem with a reducing of segregation. Even though initially being very much rooted in the notion of a social investment state, due to a revision of the strategy in 2005, focus shifted towards creating more jobs and economic growth, more or less abandoning its initial social investment signature (Grander, 2014, p. 13).

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6 Neoliberalism is here understood as ‘an overriding belief, verging on the theological, in the efficiency of free markets; an associated belief in the unnecessary and malign impact of government interventions in the economy; a commitment to winding back government regulation and privatizing publicly provided goods and services and; a parallel commitment to reducing taxes and transfers, resulting in a further shrinking of the public sector’ (Berry, 2014, p. 2)
The Social Investment Perspective Post the Lisbon Strategy

In the article *the paradox of the social investment state: Growth, Employment and Poverty in the Lisbon Era*, Bea Cantillon seek to explain how, even though employment and average income rates have increased, relative income poverty remains stagnant or, for some Member states, have even become worse after the Lisbon Strategy. A trend that might contribute to this development, she argues, is that spending aimed at producing new jobs have increased, while ‘passive’ income support, e.g. cash transfers, has declined (Cantillon, 2011, p. 445). Even though the social investment strategies advocated by the EU have helped to increase employment, the jobs created have been of ‘low quality’, e.g. temporary and part-time jobs. Therefore, such ‘activating’, pro-employment measures have failed to reduce relative income poverty (Cantillon, 2011, p. 437).

The social investment perspective lost influence as a result of the arguable failure of the Lisbon Strategy, and as Grander explains ‘[a]fter the revision of the Lisbon strategy in 2005, the social investment perspective cannot be said to have influenced European social policies on macro level’ (Grander, 2014, p. 14). However, Diamond and Liddle points out that the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008, a crisis that some argue was the culmination of the failures of the prevailing political-economic system (Berry, 2014; Diamond and Liddle, 2012, p. 288) ‘[h]ave added a new urgency to the debate about the future of social investment’ (Diamond and Liddle, 2012, p. 285). Whereas the policies that emerged in the late 1990s inspired by Giddens had a strong focus on ‘activation’, more recent proponents of the social investment perspective have sought to ‘capture a politics in which future welfare costs are to be contained through the focusing and targeting of social investment’ (Newman and McKee, 2005, p. 658). Morel *et al.* describe the (contemporary) social investment perspective as focusing on public policies that ‘prepare’ individuals, families and societies to adapt to various transformations, such as changing career patterns and working conditions, the development of new social risks, population ageing and climate change, instead of simply generating responses to ‘repair’ damages after markets fail or existing policies prove inadequate. By addressing problems in their infancy, the social investment paradigm stands to reduce human suffering, environmental degradation and government debt (Morel *et al.*, 2012b, p. 354).

Much seem to point to the social investment perspective as a response to the seeming inadequacy of the modern welfare state in the post-industrial era, which in turn has been spurred by rising inequalities in the EU, and which further gained momentum by the GFC of 2008. The social investment perspective is in this thesis understood as a counter-discourse to the prevalent neoclassic economical and ‘overall-neoliberal’ hegemony. There are, however, structural and institutional constraints that hamper the implementation of social investment strategies in the EU (Diamond and Liddle, 2012, p. 286). The recent decades of the ‘rolling-back’ of the state, and most notably the new public management paradigm, has led to a dispersion of responsibility and accountability; a development which in turn has created a – to say the least – challenging basis for the counter-arguments
of the social investment perspective to effectively enact social investment policies in the EU (Diamond and Liddle, 2012, p. 301); and ‘[t]here would have to be significant change in the prevailing economic orthodox that provides the context for social investment ideas and strategies’ (Diamond and Liddle, 2012, p. 286). Even so, ‘[w]e are currently seeing that around 75 of Sweden’s 290 municipalities are introducing social investment funds, in many cases based on a social investment perspective’ (Grander, 2014, p. 15). Furthermore, different regional bodies, such as Skåne Regional Council (Region Skåne), and Region Västra Götaland (Västra Götanlandsregionen), are also creating social investment funds or otherwise engaging in social investment efforts (SKL, 2014). As such, it has proved to live on nationally and locally, being seen as a tool for creating socially sustainable cities. Despite the duality of the perspective, we are seeing that the social investment perspective is described as an alternative to the neoliberal development, for example in the Commission for a Socially Sustainable Malmö’ (Grander, 2014, p. 14).
5. The Malmö Commission

This chapter introduces the analysis of this thesis. Here the social investment argumentation found in the works of the Malmö Commission is traced and relevant discourses are identified. The next chapter follows the development of the Regeneration Dialogue in Lindängen and here a discourse-coalition united by a common understanding of regeneration in Lindängen is identified. But first, a brief presentation to the Malmö Commission is needed.

5.1 The Malmö Commission: A Brief Introduction

In 2010, Malmö city council appointed the ‘politically neutral’ Commission for a Socially Sustainable Malmö (from here on simply the Malmö Commission). The Malmö Commission was appointed to investigate the growing inequalities of health in Malmö, and in March 2013 the Commission published their final report, Malmö’s way towards a Sustainable Future. Health, Welfare and Justice (Malmös väg mot en hållbar framtid. Hälsa, välfärd och rättvisa). The purpose of the report was to illustrate growing health inequalities within the city of Malmö and to suggest measures to tackle this undesired development.

This rationale builds on the works of WHO’s Commission of Social Determinants of Health (CSDH). In the report Closing the Gap in a Generation (2008), The CSDH, spearheaded by professor Michael Marmot, explains how the circumstances in which people live gives rise to health inequalities, and, ‘[t]he conditions in which people live and die are, in turn, shaped by political, social, and economic forces’ (CSDH, 2008, p. i).

That is, social and economic policies are determinative for peoples’ health. The CSDH views the reducing of health injustices, between and within countries, as an ethical imperative. The Malmö Commission adheres to the view that reducing intra-municipal health inequalities is an ethical imperative, consequently making it one of five key principles on which the Commission’s report is based on. The other four key principles are: a holistic sustainability understanding, a sociological and a gender perspective, and, of particular interest for this thesis, a social investment perspective (Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, p. iii).

The final report is written and edited by commissioners Mikael Stigendal, professor of sociology, and Per-Olof Östergren, professor of Social Medicine. The report is however founded on 31 independent background reports written by all the sixteen commissioners. Most of the other commissioners are prominent scholars or city officials. In the final report, the Malmö Commission suggests 24 goal and 72 measures that the city needs to address in order to combat the rising inequalities of health. One of these goals is that urban development should contribute to the mitigating of residential segregation. One suggested measure to meet this goal is to invest in two grand urban renewal projects, namely the Admiral City (Amiralstaden) and the Regeneration Dialogue (Bygga om-dialogen); projects for which (rather ambiguously formulated) levels of ambition are said to be equal that of the investments made prior to the regeneration of the now renowned waterfront project the Western Harbour in Malmö (Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, p. 73, p. 163). Another goal expressed in the report is to
actively find new ways to stimulate labour market development and the growth of new jobs’. The suggested corresponding measure to achieve this goal is said to be the ‘use physical investments as a driver for local job creation and urban development’. Here the Regeneration Dialogue is said to serve as a pilot for the development of a social investment perspective in urban planning (Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, p. 110).

5.2 The Malmö Commission’s Social Investment Rationale

As mentioned in the previous section, the Malmö Commission’s final report rests on five key principles: a holistic sustainability understanding, a sociological and a gender perspective, a social investment perspective, and the principle that reducing intra-municipal health inequalities is an ethical imperative (Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, p. iii).

When conducting a discourse analysis informed by Hajer’s methodology, these five principles can be translated into five corresponding discourses. However, as relevant for this study, only three of these are discerned and deployed as analytical distinctions, namely the (1) sustainability discourse, (2) the social investment discourse, and, the principle dealing with producing more equal outcomes and/or equality of opportunity, which will here be termed (3) the social justice discourse. Let’s start by discerning what is here termed the social investment discourse in the works of the Malmö Commission. This discourse is also given the most attention, as it is in many ways what informs this thesis.

5.3 The Social Investment Discourse

The Malmö Commission [advocates for] a social investment perspective. It is basically about viewing social interventions and efforts as investments, not as costs. Investments in people, especially during childhood, yield profits in the long term. This leads to, for example, that more people finish school and goes on to university, and more people work and are able to support themselves and lead a healthy life. Fewer people end up in long-term social and economic exclusion. From a social investment perspective, it is also important to strengthen the relationship between growth and equality of welfare, improve the quality of jobs and to emphasize safety as a value in itself (Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, pp. i-ii).

In the excerpt above, taken from the Malmö Commission’s final report, the Malmö Commission expresses their understanding of what social investments are and what they should be directed towards. First and foremost, and the tenet of the social investment rationale, the Malmö Commission argues that social expenditure should be seen as investments and not as mere costs. The Malmö Commission stresses a greater connection between economic growth and welfare, and, furthermore, equality of welfare is believed to be a precondition for economic growth. Also, social investments are expressed as investments in humans, and such investments give the greatest return if they are directed towards children. This relates to what different conceptions of social investment strategies have in common, namely the advocacy of social policy as a productive force, and if social policy is productive, then social expenditure should be
rechanneled from ‘passive’ to ‘active’ policies (Morel et al., 2012a, pp. 8-9). Moreover, from a social investment perspective, social policy and economic growth is not only mutually reinforcing, but social policy is rather a precondition for economic growth (Morel et al., 2012a, p. 11).

This view of social policy as potentially productive put forward by the Malmö Commission suggests a break with the neoliberal hegemony, which posits a trade-off between the social and economic efficiency (Hemerijck, 2012, p. 46). This ‘break’ is expressed further

One obstacle to think in terms of social investments is that the current municipal management reflects a worldview of economic growth at the centre and economic sustainability as the only interesting aspect. This leaves no room for the idea of social investments. Since economic growth is given priority, all expenditure in the social sphere, such as school and health care, are seen as costs that ‘divert’ resources from economic growth (Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, pp. 49-50).

Here the Malmö Commission recognizes a ‘growth-first’ hegemony, which is expressed as an inadequate foundation for the notion of social investments. As such, the solution – being the implementation of social investments – invalidates the prevalent hegemony, for so long as economic growth is given unassailable priority, social expenditure will continue to be perceived as mere costs diverted from it. Further on in the report, the function of social investments is illustrated with the analogy to large-scale infrastructure interventions, such as the building of a bridge or a highway, which are often justified by their supposed long-term economical benefits, making long-term amortisation of them possible; suggesting that social interventions too should be perceived as investments, and, as such, also amenable to long-term amortisation (Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, pp. 49-50). This differentiation of social vis-à-vis more ‘tangible’ interventions – where the social receives more residual attention – is explained by the current prioritisation of economic growth, in which social expenditures are perceived as diverting resources from economic growth (Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, pp. 49-50).

Martin Grander, also studying the works of the Malmö Commission, argues that the Malmö Commission’s social investment policy ‘could also be seen as a discourse, in the way the Commission could be said to represent an alternative to the neoliberal trajectory of the social sphere by emphasising the weight of social’ (2014, p. 16, Italics in original); and, he argues that this suggests ‘a more Keynesian development of economics’ (ibid.). Further, Grander perceives the social investment discourse as a discourse of alignment (Grander, 2014, p. 20). The argument to see social expenditures not as costs but as investments, he argues, is suggesting a resurrection of the social sphere, making the discourse ‘social’. On the other hand, as the discourse is produced through the use of financial language, e.g. costs and investments, it also contributes to a financial discourse. This, he argues, entails the alignment of the economical with the social, and by adapting financial language, the social can be quantified and made adaptable

\[\text{For studies arguing that economic benefits from infrastructure interventions often are overestimated, c.f. Flyvbjerg, 2007}\]
to new demands and as such function as a justification of the social. However, he also asks whether the emergence of the social investment perspective might just be an aligning of the social sphere with the prevalent market-oriented development. Janet Newman and Bob McKee, tracing the social investment discourse in the policy of New Labour, explains this integration of economic and social policy as ‘thinking about the social implications of resource decisions at all levels, and focusing investment in ways that deliver sustainable social outcomes’ (Newman and McKee, 2005, p. 659).

In this thesis, the Malmö Commission’s social investment policy is also seen as a discourse, in which investments in human capital is stressed, an equalisation of social and more tangible interventions is made, and, perhaps most importantly, the view that sound and equal welfare is a precondition for economic growth.

I would, however, argue that the social investment policy is particularly different from ‘traditional’ Keynesian ditto, in that the ‘productiveness’ of social policy is emphasised more profoundly, entailing a much more long-term investment in human capital. Although welfare is seen as productive and a precondition for economic growth in Keynesian economics, accommodating sufficient welfare (for example through temporary cash transfers in the case of unemployment or sickness) is very much oriented towards meeting the need of the here-and-now, whereas the social investment rationale is more oriented towards ‘strategic’ human development (Morel et al., 2012a).

In any case, there seem to be a suggested break with the current neoliberal trajectory, in which social expenditure is seen merely as costs. The policies propagated by the Malmö Commission are deemed credible on the basis of the ‘trustworthiness’ of its originators (prominent scientists from a wide array of disciplines, as well as high-ranking city officials). Also, the very practice in which these policies are produced, namely by a ‘politically neutral’ commission, further contributes the trustworthiness of the arguments forwarded.

In conclusion, by drawing on the social investment discourse, the Malmö Commission presents the prevalent neoliberal ‘growth-first’ hegemony as the main obstacle for dealing with the inequalities of health in Malmö, to which the concept of social investments is formulated as a counter-discourse potentially capable of solving the problems Malmö faces. This resonates with contemporary proponents of the social investment perspective, in which the social investment state is seen as a ‘package-deal’ where deep-rooted assumptions of social policy and economics – indeed the entire welfare regime – need to be reappraised.

In an attempt to link the discerned Social investment discourse to power and dominance by assessing its influence, as Hajer suggests (Hajer, 2005, p. 303), there have occurred a structuration of the Social investment discourse within the Malmö Commission, given that the social investment rationale takes a prominent role in conceptualising what should be done in Malmö. Likewise, there has occurred an institutionalisation of the Social investment discourse within the Malmö Commission; the actual forming of the commission and the producing of the report suggests this. Also, and more importantly, through the Malmö Commission’s final report there seem to have, to some degree, occurred both structuration and institutionalisation of
the Social investment discourse in Malmö municipality’s social policy domain. This contention is rooted in the assumption that an articulated shift – from perceiving social expenditures as remedial costs to pre-emptive investments – has (at least rhetorically) taken place. It appears that, through explicit policy formulation, the social investment discourse has been translated into institutional arrangements at the municipal level, (partly) manifested in the development of the Regeneration Dialogue and the suggested implementation of an area-based social investment fund. Given Hajer’s methodology, this would suggest the discourse to be hegemonic.

I would, however, not argue that the social investment discourse is hegemonic in the domain of social policy as this would entail that the discourse would be perceived as the ‘natural’ order and that all other perceptions of how social policy is to be conducted would be considered inconceivable.

5.4 The Holistic Sustainability Discourse

As shown above, elements of the social investment discourse have certain prominence in the Malmö Commission’s final report. However, the social investment discourse does not stand on its one as a counter-argument against predominant public policy. As will shown, it seems that the social investment discourse draws on ideas and concepts from the more established discourse of holistic sustainability. The following excerpt from the Malmö Commission’s final report illustrates an intricate relationship between the holistic sustainability and the social investment discourses.

We need measures of all three aspects [of sustainability] to be able to determine whether a development is really sustainable […] purely economic investments alone are not sufficient. Environmental and social investments, that is, investments that benefit environmental and social sustainability, are also needed. Malmö has been internationally acclaimed for its environmental investments, but the same approach has not been developed regarding social sustainability (Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, p. 49).

Here investments are described as what promotes or leads to sustainability, e.g. social investments lead to social sustainability. At the same time, investments are also the measures by which one can determine whether something is sustainable. As such, social investments are expressed as needed, not only to promote social sustainability, but also to determine its actual sustainability. Or as Grander argues, ‘[i]n the [Malmö Commission’s] discussion of social sustainability, the social investment perspective seems to be regarded as part of a solution to the social problems of modern cities’ (Grander, 2014, p. 15). The social investment discourse is here fuzzily interconnected with, and structured according to, more ‘uncontested’ concepts of the holistic sustainability discourse.

The credibility of the social investment discourse is thus somewhat dependent on the sustainability discourse; and the social investment discourse is made acceptable by drawing on and connecting to the more established sustainability discourse. Simultaneously, it appears that the sustainability discourse is itself transformed through financial language. For example, what previously might have read something like ‘Malmö has been
internationally acclaimed for its work with environmental sustainability’, now instead reads ‘Malmö has been internationally acclaimed for its environmental investments’. So, it appears, the sustainability discourse is here reformulated to draw on economic language reproduced by the social investment discourse. Perhaps it is just, in this particular articulation, a way to further establish the social investment concept. It might also be that the sustainability discourse reproduces ‘economic’ concepts of the social investment discourse as a way of making the sustainability discourse more readable and accepted. Perhaps the sustainability discourse, like the social sphere as expressed by Grander in section 5.3, draws on economical language to be made credible.

5.5 The Social Justice Discourse

As mentioned in section 5.1, The Malmö Commission believes that reducing intra-municipal health inequalities is an ethical imperative, and this is expressed as one of five key principles guiding the commission’s work. As this concerns the actual health outcomes and its unequal distribution, this is here discerned as a social justice discourse.

The Malmö Commission’s final report proposes two general recommendations that they argue should be considered in order to address the inequalities of health in Malmö. The first recommendation deals with what should be done, which is to establish a social investment policy to equalise the disparities in living conditions and to make society more equal (Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, p. 49). This resonates with what could be described as substantive or distributive social justice (Fainstein, 2010; Ferrari, 2012; Nylund, 2014; Rawls, 1973; Cornelius & Wallace, 2011). The second recommendation deals with how it should be done, namely, in short, through the creation of knowledge alliances and more democratic governance processes (Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, p. 452). This resonates with what could be described as procedural social justice (Fainstein, 2012; Ferrari, 2012; Nylund, 2014 Rawls, 1973; Cornelius & Wallace, 2011).

In a recent publication, Katarina Nylund, professor of Urban Planning at Malmö University, recognises the emergence of the Malmö Commission as somewhat contradictory when compared to the prevailing comprehensive planning discourse in Malmö (2014). Nylund’s analysis takes its point of departure in the concept of social justice and its division between procedural and substantive justice (2014, p. 4). Compared to the current and previous comprehensive plans for Malmö, the pending but not yet appointed Comprehensive Plan 2012 has, according to Nylund, a downplayed focus on substantive justice. The Malmö Commission, however, presents in their final report radical and far-reaching proposals for a more just city (2014, pp. 11-12). The most promising of these proposals, she argues, is the suggestion to ‘invest the same amount of money in two of the poorest districts [Lindängen and Rosengård] as has been spent in the western harbor’ (Nylund, 2014, p. 18). This focus on improving substantive justice in Malmö is noteworthy, especially as it stands in direct contrast to the pending comprehensive plan, which lacks such conceptualisations of justice. One possible explanation for their differences regarding social justice, Nylund discusses, might be the serious riots that occurred in December 2008 in Herrgården, Malmö, propelled by the closing of a basement-mosque
The revision of the comprehensive plan is a long process that was well under way when the riots occurred, thus making the process less responsive of such specific events. The Malmö Commission, however, was founded only one year after the riots and was therefore much more attentive to the riots, which was seen as symptomatic of social injustices affecting certain groups of people living in certain areas of the city (Nylund, 2014, p. 16). Another reason, Nylund discusses, might be that the riots, as a politically destabilising event, actually opened up a possibility for counterforces contending the hegemonic growth-first discourse (as explained in section 5.3) to further their ideas about social justice in the city (Nylund, 2014, p. 17).

Despite this focus on social justice in Malmö, Nylund finds ‘it is strange that there is no serious discussion of redistribution, though reallocating resources from one district to another would seem to be a precondition for bridging the present implementation gap between great visions and poor results in practice’ (2014, p. 18). Further, Nylund questions the actual political significance of the Malmö Commission’s policies, as she argues that ‘[t]he status of the report from the Social Commission [the Malmö Commission] vis-à-vis comprehensive planning is, however, still quite unclear’ (2014, p. 12). Nevertheless its somewhat unclear status, the Malmö Commission’s report have led to substantive actions, not least by the very establishment of the Regeneration Dialogue and the potentially forthcoming investment fund. Also, a new Department of Care and Welfare has recently been instated in Malmö. The new department is the result of a reorganisation of the City Office and is a merger of three previous departments, with the added responsibility of certain planning issues, such as the Malmö Commission, the Area Programmes, and public health issues (Malmö municipality, 2014c). As such, policies forwarded by the Malmö Commission drawing on a social justice discourse have, at least to some degree, been institutionalised in the domain of municipal social policy.

As explained in section 3.4, both Fainstein (2010) and Flyvbjerg (2002) considers the prevalent communicative focus in planning theory to have led to research often being too narrowly oriented towards the procedural aspects of planning. Given this procedural focus, it is noteworthy that the Malmö Commission takes a stand for considering substantive justice outcomes of urban policy.

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8 For an in-depth study on the events, see Hallin et al., 2010
6. THE REGENERATION DIALOGUE

In this second part of the analysis I will illustrate what I have a discerned as a discourse-coalition united by a common understanding of how and why a regeneration of Lindängen should be conducted. Also discerned are three storylines that functions as its ‘discursive cement’, making such a dispersed communicative network ‘with different or at best overlapping perceptions and understandings’ possible (Hajer, 1995, p. 63). But first, a presentation of the Regeneration Dialogue is needed. In this analysis, the Regeneration Dialogue figures as the substantiation of a social investment strategy as advocated by the Malmö Commission.

6.1 The Regeneration Dialogue: A Brief Introduction

The Regeneration Dialogue can be explained as an area-based urban regeneration initiative lobbying to achieve a major regeneration of Lindängen. As suggested by the Malmö Commission, the project was initiated in the summer of 2012 and is run by the Environment Department in cooperation with the City Planning Office. The project aims to renovate the rental housing stock, regenerate the neighbourhood centre, and to renovate the local primary school. In this thesis, focus is on the aim to renovate the rental housing stock. This aim is pursued by trying to encourage the private landlords in Lindängen to take part in so-called social investment strategies when renovating their housing. How this social investment-informed regeneration is to be conducted rests on two fundamental notions: (1) the landlords are to actively engage in local job creation measures. That is, they should employ local residents in the process of renovating the buildings and surroundings. In this thesis, this argumentation is discerned as a social mobilisation storyline. But, since it is hard to motivate private landlord to engage in major renovation efforts without having to greatly increase rents, a (2) social and environmental investment fund needs to be created. This investment fund would entail a merger of public and private monies to create a fund where ‘future savings’ can be used today to finance these investments; investments that, in turn, is what makes these future savings possible (Stigendal and Östergren, 2013, p. 163). This fund, then, is believed to make the suggested extensive regeneration of Lindängen possible. In practice, such a fund would somehow require the public to lend, or ‘invest’, money that private landlords and other related businesses could take part of. In this thesis, this argumentation is discerned as an investment fund storyline. The two storylines presented above, which are expressed as fundamental to how the regeneration is to be carried out, both rest on an assumption of why regeneration is needed. This assumption is that Lindängen has a certain ‘problematic’ that needs to be addressed. In this thesis, this assumption is discerned as a deterioration storyline. Before these three storylines are presented in detail and shown how they relate to a ‘regeneration in Lindängen’ discourse-coalition, the works of two macroeconomists that have been formative for this argumentation is presented. Also, a project that is closely related to the Regeneration Dialogue, the MIL project, will be described.
‘Costs of exclusion’

One academic source that is pivotal for the regeneration of Lindängen is the works of macroeconomists Ingvar Nilsson and Anders Wadeskog. During the last few years, their model for calculating the ‘costs of exclusion’ have been highly influential, not least for municipalities across Sweden. This model can generally be explained as simultaneously tackling the physical real estate problem – deteriorating buildings – and the social problems; or, as they themselves call it, the physical and the social capital. The fundamental idea is that restoring the physical capital, i.e. restoring real estate value, is pointless if not done in tandem with the far more comprehensive problem of restoring the social capital, which in turn is expressed as a precondition for reducing social exclusion (Nilsson & Wadeskog, 2013, p. 2; Nilsson & Lundmark, 2012, p. 39).

In their report on Lindängen, Nilsson and Wadeskog roughly estimates that the cost of the physical regeneration need is estimated to 1 Billion SEK, whereas the cost of the social regeneration need is estimated to 5-10 Billion SEK (Nilsson & Wadeskog, 2013, p. 9). In other words, reducing the social costs is the major task at hand. These ‘social costs’ consists of four parts: the loss of production value as a consequence of people not working; the costs of different pre-emptive interventions, such as health care or drug rehabilitation; public transfer payments, such as social welfare or unemployment insurance, and; the loss of taxes due to unemployment (Nilsson & Wadeskog, 2013, pp. 12-13). Nilsson and Wadeskog calls the process of ‘restoring the social capital’ – i.e. reducing the aforementioned social costs of a neighbourhood – social mobilisation. As most of the aforementioned social costs derive from people not working, their understanding of social mobilisation is to a large extent about creating jobs.

To sum up Nilsson and Wadeskog’s approach, both the physical, real estate problems and the social problems of a neighbourhood need to be addressed simultaneously. The physical problems are addressed by restoring real estate value, which is done by renovating the buildings. The social problems are addressed by reducing the social ‘costs of exclusion’ (tax losses, loss of production value, etc.). This is done through a social mobilisation process, principally entailing that people need to ‘move’ from unemployment to employment. Nilsson and Wadeskog (2013, p. 2) use the term the social investment perspective to describe this approach.

The MIL project

The MIL project (Method, Information, and Learning concerning Million Homes Programme regeneration as a tool for integration) is a project closely related to the Regeneration Dialogue. The MIL project is run the Environment Department in cooperation with the City Planning Office, and Malmö University. The MIL project, like the Regeneration Dialogue, also builds on the recommendations of the Malmö Commission and its main aim is to develop methods and strategies for how to carry out ‘integrative’ regeneration of Million Homes Programme neighbourhoods, particularly by drawing on the Regeneration Dialogue as an example (Malmö municipality, 2013a, p. 9). As such, it operates sort of like a ‘knowledge (re)producing’, ongoing evaluation project (principally) following the development of the Regeneration Dialogue.
6.2 Discerning a Discourse-coalition

By adopting a discourse analytical perspective informed by Hajer’s Argumentative discourse analysis, I have discerned a discourse-coalition of actors united by a common understanding of how and why a social investment ‘informed’ regeneration of Lindängen is needed.

This common understanding is ‘enabled’ by storylines that act as credible and/or attractive narratives that gives meaning to the matter at hand, namely the regeneration of Lindängen. As told through a ‘meta-narrative’, the discerned storylines binding this discourse-coalition are (1) the housing produced during the Million Homes Programme is physically (as well as socially and environmentally) deteriorating and must thus be regenerated. This regeneration will be extensive and costly; but, fortunately, (2) this (physical) regeneration can, if coupled with social investment strategies, result in social as well as ecological benefits. This will be realised through a process of social mobilisation, which, in turn, can also help deflect regeneration-induced negative outcomes, and as such, if attained, justifies the regeneration efforts: and (3) the development of an area-based investment fund will make this development possible. The potentially successful implementation of such a fund depends on a holistic understanding of the ‘costs of exclusion’.

Each of the storylines presented in this chapter can be understood as the reduction and temporary closure of much broader underlying discussions and understandings of that particular matter, or as Hajer explain, ‘[e]ach story-line replaces complex disciplinary debates’ (1995, p. 65).

6.3 The Deterioration Storyline

The first and most fundamental storyline for the discerned discourse-coalition defines and constructs the problem at hand, namely that many Million Homes Programme areas (along with their European counterparts) are physically deteriorating. This physical deterioration is often expressed as going hand in hand with a spectrum of social and environmental issues. As this storyline defines the problem, it is also what enables the other two storylines that are more solution and implementation-oriented.

The deterioration storyline is here seen as emblematic in the sense that it is a way to understand and relate to a larger problematic. By talking about deteriorating buildings in Lindängen one can also talk about the neighbourhood as being in ‘social decline’, or about how these buildings are consuming too much energy, etc. Deterioration becomes a trope on which to ‘hinge’ other issues. For example, defining the neighbourhood as deteriorating allows for raising issues of who is to blame, or how to address it, etc. Thus, for example, new forms of welfare polices can be presented as solutions, as ‘needed’.

As such, the deterioration storyline is in many ways emblematic for contemporary municipal and (national and European) welfare policy in the same way that Hajer’s acid rain storyline was for European environmental politics in the 1980s and 1990s. For Hajer, the storyline of acid rain and the meanings attached to it served as an emblematic starting point from which one could study wider trends in the environmental discourse.
Neglected buildings, green-house emissions, child poverty—this is the situation in many of Europe’s tower-blocks. Could these problems be turned into the foundation for new forms of cooperation, better use of public money and true place-making with people at the centre? This approach is now being tried out in the “Regeneration dialogue” in Lindängen, an area of apartment blocks built in the 1970s, with employment levels below 50% in Malmö, Sweden (Stenquist, 2013, p. 76).

Here the deteriorating state of many high-rise housing estates across Europe is evoked, indirectly suggesting this is also the case for Lindängen. This deterioration—‘these problems’—comprises physical or tangible (‘neglected buildings’), environmental (‘green-house emissions’) and social (‘child poverty’) problems. This problem description is then followed by suggested viable solutions like ‘new forms of cooperation’, ‘better use of public money’, and ‘true place-making with people at the centre’. These solutions concurrently also imply that public money is spent unwisely and that bottom-up place-making and sufficient forms of cooperation does not exist, and that this is also part of the problem. This can be related to the social investment discourse and to how Lundvall and Lorenz understand social investments, namely as ‘public expenditure that combines the solution of social problems with enhancing economic performance’ (Lundvall and Lorenz, 2012, cited in Morel et al., 2012b, p. 354).

The deterioration storyline is a powerful metaphor of ‘Europe’s tower-blocks’, in which ‘neglected buildings’ evokes images of run-down, pest-infested apartments. ‘Child poverty’ is here seen as the reproduction of the social justice discourse, as this unjust situation—children in poverty—justly needs to be addressed. ‘Greenhouse emissions’ reproduces the sustainability discourse and indicates a well-established environmental problem. As such, doing something about the ‘situation’ seems hard to disagree with, especially if ‘these problems can be turned into the foundation’ for viable solutions. For, as Hajer argues, ‘the power of story-lines is essentially based on the idea that it sounds right’ (Hajer, 1995, p. 63).

Furthermore, The term ‘neglected’ infers that someone is to blame. Also, it entails certain actors’ failures, more specifically the failure of the landlord to provide sufficient maintenance. ‘Green-house emissions’ does not suggest specific actors’ failures, but rather points to environmental inefficiency of the buildings due to old age and new understandings of environmental risks. Environmental inefficiency is also what connects the regeneration of Lindängen with Malmö municipality’s overall environmental goal, which is to reduce energy consumption with 20 per cent per person by 2020, and yet another 20 per cent by 2030. Also, the goal is that the entire city’s energy consumption should by 2030 be from 100 per cent renewable energy (Malmö Municipality, 2009, p. 7). ‘Child poverty’ and low employment levels does not infer that someone in particular is to blame, but rather, if anything, it points to a structural flaw of the European welfare states that fail to prevent child poverty and spatial segregation. Even so, it is
ascribed locally to Lindängen or ‘Europe’s tower-blocks’.

To sum up, the utterance above ascribes the Regeneration Dialogue a ‘problem solving’ position and a sort of ‘responsible behaviour’ as it sets out to address the dire situation illustrated. This suggests the deterioration storyline’s emblematic nature as actors can ‘hinge’ on other matters to it. For example, the possibility to discuss the precarious social situation in ‘Europe’s tower-blocks’, which in turn, allows discussing the need for new modes of governance.

The CEO of Trianon (Interview C, 2014) expresses a slightly different perception of the buildings’ deteriorating state. He argues that when ‘they’ (the politicians) talk about the need for renovating the Million Homes Programme stock, ‘they’, on the one hand, ‘aim too high’. That is, he means that the renovation does not have to be as extensive as is often suggested, and he refers to Trianon’s own model for ‘basic’ renovation (explained later in this section), which, he argues, is sufficient yet would not burden residents with rampant rent increases. On the other hand, he believes that ‘they’ exaggerate the supposed poor condition of the Million Homes Programme housing stock. He says that some neighbourhoods (in Sweden) have been in such poor condition as described but that this is a disappearing problem as landlords increasingly have to (sometimes forced to) renovate their stock. On this notion he also refers to the state of Lindängen, saying that ‘it is not as bad as some describe it’, and ‘surely there are problems but not at that scale’. Even though he disagrees with the extensiveness of renovation needed and the supposed poor condition of Million Homes Programme housing stock, he still acknowledges the need for renovation. He does explains that there is a difference between owning and managing housing in Lindängen as opposed to housing in other parts of the city, and he mentions, for example, that vandalism has been more of a problem in Lindängen than elsewhere.

As such, even though he distances himself from some descriptions of the situation in Lindängen and the Million Homes Programme at large, he does seem to agree with the most basic notion of the matter at hand, namely that Lindängen needs to be physically regenerated (as Trianon in fact are renovating their buildings); that there are social issues that could be addressed through this renovation (as Trianon are, as will be shown later, applying certain social measures in their management in Lindängen); and that there are certain environmental issues, however mostly expressed as energy efficiency issues (as some of the renovation measures Trianon are conducting are aimed at becoming more energy efficient). This common understanding of the deterioration storyline suggests a shared discursive affinity.

Costs and extensiveness
A substantial part of the deterioration storyline regards the extensiveness and costs of the ‘needed’ renovations. For example, the number of dwellings that are in need of renovation, the extensiveness of renovation that is needed, and, ultimately the price of these renovations, is very much unclear and open for debate. These factors can be argued for differently depending on estimations of the current state of the buildings and the desired renovation outcome standard. However, in order to achieve discursive closure, the discourse-coalition must reduce the complexity of the
issue, for ‘story-lines lines have the functional role of facilitating the reduction of the discursive complexity of a problem and creating possibilities for problem closure’ (Hajer, 1995, p. 63). Therefore, as the issue needs to be temporarily fixed, certain estimations need to be made and conveyed. In doing so, different estimations of the cost of renovation have been presented by the Regeneration Dialogue. In a PowerPoint presentation for the Regeneration Dialogue, cost estimations are given based on examples of previous renovation efforts of Million Homes Programme areas. The volume of investment in these examples ranges from 250 000 to 1 million SEK per apartment (Malmö municipality, 2013b). In a scientific report commissioned by Malmö municipality and the landlords in Lindängen, Gunnar Blomé performs an economic analysis of possible housing renovation measures in Lindängen. He draws up five different scenarios ranging from no measures carried out to full-scale renovation or demolition and the production of new housing. The analysis concludes that a volume of investment ranging from 200 000 to 350 000 SEK per apartment is realistic; investments exceeding that would most likely result in significant rent increases. This excludes the latter two scenarios, full-scale renovation or demolition and the production of new housing, as desirable (Blomé, 2013, p. 3).

Trianon can be said to have created an own model for basic renovation of their buildings in Lindängen (Interview C, 2014). This renovation is separated in to two distinct procedures, one that deals with the renovation of the exterior of the buildings and their surroundings, and one that deals with interior renovation of the apartments. Exterior renovation efforts include: renovated laundry rooms, new elevators, new windows, re-roofing, new motion-activated exterior lighting, electronic tag-keys for all shared spaces, and new heat pumps that enables individually priced heat consumption. These efforts apply to all buildings. The costs for this renovation is accounted for by Trianon themselves and will not be levied by the tenants, and, as such, will not result in rent increases. Trianon believes that these investments does not necessarily require long-term ownership in order to pay off as the investments are believed to be returned through increased property values.

The other procedure that deals with interior renovation of the apartments includes efforts such as: refurbished hardwood floors in the living rooms and bedrooms and new linoleum carpets elsewhere, repainted walls and kitchen cabinets, new and fully-tiled bathrooms (a renovation made when tenants move out) and new security doors. The costs for this interior renovation is approximately 100 000 to 120 000 SEK per apartment. This will result in a fixed rent increase of 600 SEK per apartment and month, regardless of apartment size. Some of these efforts are made to intentionally keep down final rental prices. For example, as new hardwood floors are considered an increase in apartment standard and new linoleum carpets are not, the latter was chosen to keep rental increases as minimal as possible.

As expressed by the CEO of Trianon, this strategy is not based on benevolence and a concern for current tenants’ welfare, but rather on the understanding that too expensive apartments in fringe Million Homes Programme neighbourhoods in Malmö, such as Lindängen, are hard to rent out. In other words, landlords’ intentions with the extent of renovation vary
depending on the economic capacity of potential tenants. This equation is very much dependent on local housing market dynamics.

For example, as mentioned in section 3.3, in Drakenberg, Stockholm, and Kvarngärdet, Uppsala, respectively relatively central Million Homes Programme neighbourhoods, there have been instances of extensive renovations that have resulted in soaring rent increases upward 50-60 per cent (Westin, 2011, p. 11). This has been possible, although protested against, because the local housing market has allowed for such ‘traumatic’ measures. But in in Lindängen, too rampant rent increases might lead to difficulties for the Landlord to lease out the apartments (Interview C, 2014).

In other words, the rent gap, which Neil Smith describes as ‘the disparity between the potential ground rent level and the actual ground rent capitalized under the present land use’ (Smith, 1979, p. 545), is possibly wider in Drakenberg and Kvarngärdet than in Lindängen. For as Eric Clark argues, ‘[i]n cases where the potential land rent is to be had through housing attractive to households with strong purchase-power, it may be seen that this process is fundamental to gentrification’ (Clark, 1988, p. 244). Arguably, relatively centrally located residential neighborhoods in Stockholm and Uppsala are more subjected to the possibility for gentrification or ‘renoviction’ because of wider rent gaps. Or as Baeten and Listerborn puts it, ‘[r]enovation in combination with forced migration is and will be occurring more in high-growth regions (particularly Stockholm) where landlords will find new tenants who are prepared to pay (sharply) increased rents’ (Forthcoming, p. 12).

As has been shown, the volume of investment per apartment, regarding the Million Homes Programme at large, can range between 100 000 to 1 million SEK depending on various factors such as current condition, aspired apartment standard outcome and aspired energy efficiency measures, geographic location, and, quite crassly, the economic capacity of attainable tenants. In the case of Trianon, the relatively low renovation costs are set according to the economic capacity of their expected costumers, namely current tenants.

In other words, the renovation is done in accordance with the present (perhaps fairly narrow) rent-gap. It does, however, make sense for the Regeneration Dialogue to rhetorically be on ‘the high end of the investment spectrum’ to get their message of the magnitude of the issue across and in order to suggest that the creation of a investment fund would be a viable and necessary solution for the regeneration of Lindängen.

In conclusion, the deterioration storyline is driven by the well-anchored perception within the discourse-coalition that some Million Homes Programme areas are physically deteriorating and that regeneration of them is duly needed. Also, social and environmental aspects are often interconnected with this deterioration. Indeed, the ‘integration’ of the needs for ‘environmental regeneration’ and ‘social regeneration’ is what renders the Regeneration Dialogue plausible. Although defined by different actor with different motives and goals, the deterioration storyline is here seen as a fairly coherent storyline. The extensiveness and cost of the ‘needed’ regeneration is, however, less fixed. Overall, the storyline seems credible to concerned actors.

The storyline is accepted for various reasons. The fact that public actors accept it is perhaps to be anticipated, as they are in fact the ones advocating
the regeneration. Indeed, the socioeconomic statistics for Lindängen presented in section 1.3 is also part of this storyline as it was produced as as part the MIL project to ‘manifest’ this ‘deterioration’. The CEO of Trianon opposes some elements of this construction. Nevertheless, he (partly) accepts it (and the position it ascribes Trianon).

Since the deterioration storyline seem to have the rhetorical power to conceptualise the actors’ understanding of Million Homes Programme areas (and their European counterparts) as ‘problematic’, and because this conception has led to the development of the Regeneration Dialogue, the storyline has translated into institutional arrangements. This suggests that the storyline is hegemonic. It is, however, important to point out that this storyline has only been discerned as hegemonic in a domain of planning practice (in the widest sense) in Malmö. Where the domain instead, for example, planning academia, this discerned level of dominance might not at all be valid.

Whereas the presented deterioration storyline defines the ‘problem’, the following two storylines are more solution and implementation-oriented and thus ‘follows up’ on this problem definition.

6.4 The Social Mobilisation Storyline

The argumentative ‘core’ of the social mobilisation storyline is that the suggested extensive (physical) regeneration would be possible only if coupled with a social mobilisation process. This regeneration would not only have positive environmental effects, but it would also have positive effects for the residents’ social circumstances. Thus, making it a ‘social’ investment. As it is deployed in in the case of regeneration of Lindängen, the plausibility of the social investment discourse is dependent on the premises that better physical environments lead to better social life, and that the regeneration itself needs to create a ‘sufficient’ amount of jobs to alter the social circumstances of ‘enough’ residents to ‘break segregation’ and ‘social exclusion’. This makes the social mobilisation storyline ‘essential’ for the discerned discourse-coalition.

However, social mobilisation can mean different things to different actors. Yet still it is uttered as a coherent discursive fixity. As such it functions as a storyline, around which various actors from different discourses form a coalition wherein ‘social mobilisation’ evokes a shared narrative – albeit each actor ascribes it different meaning.

For the Employment Agency, social mobilisation can mean job creation and an active labour market policy – a way to take people out of unemployment; for the urban planner, it can be a justification for interventions in the urban environment; for the macroeconomist, it can mean more production value and less social expenditure; for the sociologist, it can mean social and system integration; and for the private landlord, it can be a corporate strategy that produces more monetary and good-will value than business as usual. For each of these actors, social mobilisation means different things. Even so, they can all argue for its cause, not necessarily knowing the complexity of all other actors’ arguments for it, yet knowing enough to share the same affinity for it. This is what Hajer (2005, p. 304) calls discursive affinity.
In their report on Lindängen, macroeconomists Nilsson and Wadeskog expresses the ‘core’ of the social mobilisation storyline

One of the basic ideas in this report is that societal exclusion is expensive, very expensive. We have also shown this in a number of sample calculations. It is then natural to see a social mobilisation process, not only as a good human and social contribution, but also as a wise investment. A social investment at the individual level enhances human capital, and, at the collective level, social capital (Nilsson & Wadeskog, p 38).

The social mobilisation storyline is articulated by drawing on a social justice discourse, as the proposed action (‘social mobilisation’) would suggest an act of benevolence. This is then, by drawing on a social investment discourse, related to the idea that the investment would be an investment made in ‘people’. But what really makes the storyline credible is that it draws on a macroeconomic discourse – as the calculations have shown that this is a ‘wise’ investment. This can be seen as the alignment of ‘economic ‘and ‘social’ discourses that Grander argued for in chapter 4. Also, the utterance above shows a particular understanding of the social investment discourse. Here ‘social mobilisation’, which more or less can be equated with local job creation (discussed later in this section), is explained as the actual investment, an investment that ‘at the individual level enhances human capital, and, at the collective level, social capital’. This suggests an understanding of human and social capital as being ‘created’ through employment. As such, it presupposes that any job is a good job, disregarding the quality of that job in terms of security, duration, etc. This resonates with the ‘strand’ of the social investment discourse related to the more ‘activation’-oriented policies of the so-called Third way, as opposed to the more ‘contemporary’ definitions that implies a stronger focus on quality of the social investments (as presented in chapter 4). This can be seen as indicative of the ‘fluidity’ of meaning within a discourse.

Further in the same report, when calculating different scenarios for when break-even will occur, they contend that

If we succeed with a total of 54 people (roughly 7% of the unemployed in Lindängen) in the social mobilisation process, after 30 years this is equivalent of the cost for half the housing renovation in Lindängen. If break-even is to be reached in 15 years, it takes around 85 people (Nilsson & Wadeskog, 2013, p. 42).

Language like ‘break-even’ clearly draws on a macroeconomic discourse, giving the social investment claim particular ‘factuality’. Also, the ‘Third way’ meaning of social investments is again articulated, where a certain quantity of jobs determine the successfullness of the investment. Also, the term social mobilisation, as opposed to local job creation, is used. This term is also used repeatedly elsewhere, not just by Nilsson and Wadeskog, but by several other actors connected to the discourse-coalition as well (Interview A, 2014; Malmö municipality, 2013a; Stenquist, 2013). This slightly
ambiguous term suggest a sort of ‘more-than-just-plain-jobs’ rhetoric. Social mobilisation, more so than local job creation, has a certain ‘figure of speech’-like character in that it is used as shorthand in discussions assuming that others understand the meaning of the term. It very much functions as a metaphor for local job creation as it is used *instead* of it to describe the creation of jobs. However, it is also used to denote something ‘more’, something ‘larger’ at play than ‘simply’ the creation of jobs. Social mobilisation, as it is used in Nilsson and Wadeskog’s rapport for Lindängen, is the overall process by which the ‘costs of exclusion’ are reduced to a break-even.

This illustrates the emblematic character of social mobilisation, but it also shows the contingency of the term and the ‘fluidity’ in discursive meaning. This more-than-just-plain-jobs’ rhetoric is also expressed in a slide-presentation for the Regeneration Dialogue, presented as figure 3 below.

![Slide presentation for the Regeneration Dialogue](image)

**Fig. 3. Illustration from a slide-presentation for the Regeneration Dialogue. Source: Malmö municipality, 2013c**

Figure 3 suggests the prospective magnitude of the regeneration in Lindängen. What is here expressed can be said to draw on the social investment discourse as this intervention – this ‘social investment’ – can potentially create this thriving ‘new’ neighbourhood, with ‘pre-emptive’ social investment elements like ‘nursery care’ and ‘school’ (both of which already exists today). If the same illustration would be used in a context where social investments were not propagated, it could still easily fly as your ‘generic’, advocated for positive effects of neighbourhood regeneration.
Below, the Project manager for the Regeneration Dialogue discursively reproduces Nilsson and Wadeskog’s macroeconomic-informed arguments

This balance sheet needs to include the investment needed to “future proof” 1,700 apartments with 4,000 inhabitants and direct and indirect costs for social exclusion in Lindängen. Preliminary figures suggest a pent up investment need of €120 million (of which half is directed towards energy savings) while costs for social exclusion accumulated over four years runs at €140 million. These numbers can then be used to find a “break-even” where a certain level of job creation and social mobilisation results in measurable savings in public systems, as well as in energy and maintenance costs. Savings that, through a social impact investment approach, can be used to put the necessary investments in these neglected areas in place (Stenquist, 2013, p. 76).

The ‘costs of exclusion’ rhetoric and the macroeconomic discourse is reproduced as local job creation and social mobilisation is expressed as the solution to both the pent up investment need and to social exclusion in Lindängen. As such, local job creation and social mobilisation is what will enable social investments in Lindängen, i.e. the funds that eventually would be released for regeneration is guaranteed only if a certain level of jobs are created. This makes job creation and social mobilisation key elements of the social investment discourse.

Even for someone with a lay understanding of economics, this equation of costs for pent up maintenance and cost for social exclusion on the one hand, and ‘a certain level of job creation and social mobilisation’ on the other, seems readily comprehensible. This shows a major strength of the social investment discourse, namely that its arguments are truly difficult to counter intellectually. Another important aspect with the reasoning for social investments as it is presented above – where investment need and social expenditure is set against job creation – is that it is coherent and factual. Not only is the social investment discourse factual and intellectually coherent, it is also seemingly apolitically constituted. It is hard, from an ideological standpoint, to argue against it – it is just a matter of ‘crunching numbers’ (i.e. calculating the ‘costs of exclusion’). This can to some extent elucidate its increasing structuration in public policy formulation, as with the case of the Malmö Commission. It seemingly holds political bloc affiliations aside, which might facilitate its implementation over office terms. What could pose problems, however, are the prevalent institutional arrangements constraining the implementation of such ‘factual’ ‘number crunching’ strategies. For, as mentioned in chapter 4, it would take drastic changes of such institutional arrangements and of the economic hegemony to successfully enact deep-rooted social investment polices.
Below, Municipal commissioner for labour market affairs expresses his understanding of ‘job creation’

So far there has been no economic equation for how to make this [Million Homes Programme regeneration] profitable [...] those equations that exist, they point to a will to build new [housing]. And that’s what’s exciting about the Regeneration dialogue, that we can solve all those problems in one stroke. By renovating and regenerating these Million Homes Programme areas, partly by creating jobs in the process and thereby get people to stay, partly by building new [housing], and to build new in a new way, where you also employ more people living in the neighbourhood. So what’s exciting is that we can gain all these benefits: both economic sustainability, that is, the economy is there; environmental sustainability, in the sense that it is about the environment, energy efficiency; and social sustainability, in the sense that it actually creates jobs. So that’s what’s exciting, it connects everything (Interview B, 2014)

The Regeneration Dialogue, and more specifically local jobs created in the process, is expressed as ‘exciting’, ‘a new logic’, and a measure that could make regeneration of Million Homes Programme areas possible – it can ‘help solve all problems at once’. Both the renovation of existing housing and the possible building of new housing are interlinked with the creation of new jobs locally. Also, job creation is equated with social sustainability. Here the holistic sustainability discourse is drawn on as a communicative tool conceptualising the phenomenon of local job creation. As such, this is an occurrence of structuration of the holistic sustainability discourse, as the subject draws on ideas or concepts from it in order to render the job creation argument plausible.

In the same interview, Municipal commissioner continues

I oppose the current public debate that it’s all about jobs, at any cost. Because that’s not the case, but that’s my ideological standpoint – there are crappy jobs. And when I say crappy jobs I mean jobs that you can’t make a living on, or jobs that you probably won’t be able to keep. That’s crappy jobs to me. So that’s why it’s important that we make demands, the right demands, on the [created jobs], that they would mean education and good conditions for individuals to either work for that employer for a longer period of time, or, at least, the possibility to apply for similar jobs in that profession. And it really needs to equip that individual [...] and you have to make sure that the education people get is of good quality (Interview B, 2014).

Here, the concept of local job creation is itself problematized. This has the subject evaluating the measure that is seen as key for societal inclusion (job creation) in relation to the quality of that measure, e.g. ‘all jobs are not good jobs’. This together with utterances such as ‘equip the individual’ and ‘good quality education’ relates to the need for human capital enhancement as argued for by social investment proponents (in chapter 4). As such, he expresses affinity for the social mobilisation storyline at the same time as he
expresses a certain scepticism regarding what the created jobs would actually entail in terms of quality. Even so the storyline is plausible to him, making him accept the position within the discourse-coalition that the storyline ascribes for him.

Trianon is the landlord in Lindängen that has come the farthest as far as embracing social mobilisation strategies are concerned (Interview A, 2014). The CEO of Trianon (Interview C, 2014) describes how they have signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Malmö municipality that they themselves call a ‘mini-Regeneration Dialogue’. In accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding, they have employed ten people in the renovation process, out of which five are local residents. Another eight employments are pending and yet another five are planned. Also, as designed on their own accord, any suppliers that wish to engage in business with Trianon must agree to certain social terms stipulated in the contract. This entails that the supplier in question must employ a certain amount of unemployed residents to get the contract. For example, the construction company Skanska have signed a contract to replace all the windows in Trianon’s buildings in Lindängen, and stipulated in that contract is that Skanska must employ five unemployed residents for that specific job. This means that these residents will gain project employments designed for that particular job only. He describes the measures the company has taken as having positive neighbourhood effects that has the potential for strengthening the social capital, which, in turn, could reduce maintenance costs in the long run. As a result, he mentions that vandalism has decreased in the neighbourhood. He also describes the measures as something they believe in, as if acting on a hunch more than on evidence, and as an act of good-will. He explains that the Regeneration Dialogue has provided a rationale appealing to him as a landlord, in that it has ‘opened his eyes’ for the benefits of this type of ‘value-based’ real estate management. To him, the social mobilisation storyline renders the discourse-coalition credible, as he ‘permits’ the position within the discursive structure the storyline implies for Trianon, i.e the ‘responsible landlord’. This position is also accepted because it is attractive, both because it entails economic gains as a result of lesser maintenance costs and decreased vandalism, but also because it entails a certain good-will façade, rendering him a sort of ‘problem solver’ in the discourse-coalition. To him, social mobilisation might mean less vandalism, more economic gains, good-will appearance, and an overall better neighbourhood. For the municipality it might mean a possibility to meet the City’s energy efficiency goals, or a means to create better living environments for residents and a lesser burden for the public economy. Even so, both actors can agree with each other’s arguments, as it does not contradict the core argument that social mobilisation in neighbourhood regeneration is desirable. Both actors share discursive affinity.

Another actor on the very ‘fringe’ of the discourse-coalition is the Swedish Property Federation. The Swedish Property Federation is a national property owners’ trade organisation that lobbies for property owners’ interests. In a telephone interview, the head of commercial policy for the southern regional subsidiary of the Swedish Property Federation says that they are sympathetic with landlords engaging in local job creation measures and ‘value-based’ management and that they are happy to highlight such efforts. Their stance as a trade organisation is, however, limited to them
‘applauding it from the stands’ (Interview D, 2014). This expresses a distant affinity for the discourse-coalition. Still, as a representative for Landlords, he accepts this position as it attributes a certain ‘responsible behaviour’ to the profession he represents.

Below, the project manager for MIL describes the MIL project’s ‘informing’ role

We work a lot with, partly with informing all different actors, anyone from the Social Insurance Agency to the landlord, about how these connections are interrelated, how the costs for vandalism and graffiti, how this affects the landlord and the value of their property, and so on. That is the so-called physical cost; we work close with the landlord on that issue (Interview A, 2014).

Trianon’s aligning to the storyline can be seen as the reproduction of the social investment discourse and the arguments of ‘costs of exclusion’ articulated in the excerpt above. This utterance, in turn, can be seen as the reproduction of the Malmö Commission’s argument for social investment policies and as the reproduction of Nilsson and Wadeskog’s more ‘tangible’ conception of ‘costs of exclusion’. This suggests that the argument for social mobilisation as a solution for successful neighbourhood regeneration has ‘gone full-circle’, although somewhat transformed along the way.

As shown in chapter 4, ‘contemporary’ proponents of the social investment perspective argues for a profound restructuring of the modern welfare state – entailing that to merely create ‘any jobs’ possible is not sufficient. Attention most also be given to the quality of the created jobs, such as duration, security, advancement possibilities, etc. The social mobilisation ‘solution’ advocated by the Regeneration Dialogue, and the actual jobs being created by Trianon, seem, on the other hand, less connected to such notions of ‘quality’. This aspect is somewhat articulated by the Municipal commissioner, as he argued for the importance of ‘quality’ rather than ‘quantity’. Even so, he shares discursive affinity for the social mobilisation storyline.

In conclusion, the rhetoric of the social mobilisation storyline seem to have affected how actor’s within the discourse-coalition perceive social mobilisation (or local job creation), namely as a solution for, or an important ingredient of, successful neighbourhood regeneration. It also seem to have translated into institutional arrangements, such as the development of the Regeneration Dialogue itself propagating for social mobilisation, and the fact that jobs are created locally (or at least, people are recruited locally). Therefore, the social mobilisation storyline is here seen as hegemonic in the domain of planning practice for ‘disadvantaged’ neighbourhoods in Malmö, a domain that seemingly offers no counter-hegemonic arguments against social mobilisation. However, the concerns for ‘quality’ express some intra-discursive incoherence.

Also, something that is not brought up in this study but worthy of mentioning is the so-called Area Programme. In short, the Area-programme is an area-based project targeting five neighbourhoods in Malmö, Lindängen being one. The project spans from 2010 to 2015 and revolves around the notion of interconnecting physical interventions with social aspects (Malmö Municipality, 2014c). Unlike the Regeneration Dialogue, it does not
explicitly propagate social investments. Perhaps the Area programme could offer discursive struggle regarding how ‘to do’ targeted area-based interventions in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. As such, it could pose as counter-hegemonic, representing the ‘old’ non-social investment-informed practice.

6.5 The Investment Fund Storyline
As will be shown, the investment fund storyline is ‘floating in significance’ within the discourse-coalition, yet very important for the Regeneration Dialogue. This storyline is basically the advocacy for a social investment fund, which more or less ‘makes or brakes’ the suggested regeneration. Whereas the social mobilisation storyline presents a solution to reduce the ‘costs of exclusion’ and ‘turn’ the neighbourhood around socioeconomically, the development of an investment fund is expressed as a precondition to regenerate Lindängen to the extent that is suggested.

Below, the project manager for MIL explains why an investment fund is needed

We have at the moment different development scenarios. One development scenario is that they, the private landlords, will do nothing. In other word, they will slum-manage the apartments […] The second scenario is that we have landlords that invests, that fixes a little here and a little there –‘now we need to make this more energy efficient’, or –‘we need to replace the windows’. They do a little at the time. The problem is that this constraints them from doing these really comprehensive energy efficiency measures that actually needs to be done in order to meet the [City’s energy efficiency] demands in 20-30 years. The third scenario, which has happened in other parts of Sweden, is that they do everything, they do everything that we want them to do […] but then we get the rent increases, and then you force people out. What we want is really the fourth scenario. That is the one we are looking for (Interview A, 2014)

What this investment fund – this ‘fourth scenario’ – would look like is still unclear. It would however involve the development of a fund for ‘social and environmental purposes’, and the ‘public’ (the municipality, the state, and/or the EU) would have to make the ‘investment’. Then both public and private actors could use this fund for various ‘social and environmental purposes’ related to the regeneration, such as employing local residents to do ‘environmental conducive’ renovations.

What is made clear though in the excerpt above is the exclusion of other discourses, or ‘scenarios’. To eliminate slumlords as a possible alternative might not seem remarkable. That fact that the third scenario, where landlords do the suggested renovations only they increase rents and potentially displace people, is expressed as an undesirable option can be seen as a social justice discursive argument pitted against ‘market forces’. Why the second scenario, where landlords maintain their housing stock on a rudimentary level, is seen as undesirable is clearly expressed, as ‘this constraints them from doing these really comprehensive energy efficiency measures that actually needs to be done in order to meet the [City’s energy efficiency] demands in 20-30 years’. This is an argument that particularly
draws on the sustainability discourse. So far, neither the social justice nor the social investment discourse contributes to the argumentation.

However, this changes when ‘integrative’ or ‘holistic’ aspects are introduced

Another important aspect of the Regeneration Dialogue is putting the work with environmental sustainability in Million Homes programme areas in tune with, and as a tool to reach, social and economic sustainability. Environmental regeneration of estates strengthens the work with both environmental and integration issues (Malmö municipality, 2013a, p. 6).

As ‘environmental sustainability’ becomes a catalyst for ‘social and economic sustainability’, and as environmental regeneration strengthens the work with integration, the need to meet the City’s environmental goals (a sustainability discourse argument) becomes a tool for achieving social sustainability and integration (a social justice and social investment discourse argument). So now, arguments for an investment fund comprise arguments from the sustainability, social justice, and social investment discourses.

The investment fund storyline excludes the alternative scenarios as either doing ‘too little’ or ‘too much’. The fourth scenario – the investment fund – is not only expressed as the ‘the middle-way’ but also as creating new synergetic effects. The investment fund storyline thus constructs a ‘reality’ in which only an extensive regeneration effort is an adequate solution, as the other options are deemed unattractive. As such, this ‘regime of truth’ excludes the other discourses in a ‘hegemonic practice’. However, this hegemony is only viable in certain practices and to certain actors, namely to the actors propagating it and the practices through which they propagate.

The CEO of Trianon (Interview C, 2014) expresses intra-discourse-coalition incoherence as he adheres to the ‘second scenario’ discourse. He explains that he is critical of the conception that the problem at large, that is the physical deterioration of some Million Homes Programme areas and the renovation of them, is a ‘political’ issue. On the contrary, he explains it as solely a landlord issue. Therefore, he is critical of the suggested investment fund, saying that this ‘subsidising’ of renovation efforts in Million Homes Programme areas might contribute to landlords systematically neglecting their housing stock, ‘expecting’ state funding to pay for renovation and maintenance. And, therefore, he fears that such subsidies would favour disreputable landlords.

The municipal commissioner also fragmentises the storyline by asking

Is it really fair that landlords for several years fail to maintain or renovate? I’m not saying that’s the case [in Lindängen], but generally speaking, if we take this model elsewhere. Is it fair that a landlord who fails to maintain his building for several years, and the ‘turns to some fund’ and asks society to bail them out? Because that’s how it can be interpreted. So it’s a fine balancing act. Everyone can see the benefits, but there are huge risks involved, huge risks (Interview B, 2014)
The investment fund storyline seemingly has the ‘traits’ of a storyline; it is a rather ambiguous metaphor, and a ‘condensed statement summarizing complex narratives, used by people as “short hand” in discussions’ (2005, p. 302). However, it is a storyline of ‘floating significance’ fragmenting the discourse-coalition rather than a storyline that reduces discursive complexity and help to achieve discursive closure. Therefore, it is a non-storyline struggling to achieve the ‘cementing’ features of a ‘real’ storyline. Thus, through this analysis, the investment fund argument is invalidated as a storyline.
In chapter 3, gentrification and renoviction’ is presented as processes that potentially could lead to negative outcomes for existing tenants by inducing rent increases, or at worst displacement. This answers my supporting question: What negative social outcomes for existing tenants could potentially be induced by neighbourhood regeneration?

In chapter 4, the social investment perspective is presented as a discourse characterized by a pre-emptive rather than remedial understanding of social policy with elements of both Keynesian and neoliberal economics. This discourse is rather fluid in meaning as it can entail everything from a radical restructuring of the welfare state to ‘one-dimensional’ notions of job creation.

In chapter 5, three discourses were discerned as prominent in the Malmö Commission’s work: a social investment discourse, a sustainability discourse, and a social justice discourse. The social investment discourse is formulated as a counter-discourse to the prevalent neoliberal ‘growth-first’ hegemony and has both rhetorically and substantially influenced social policy in Malmö. The development of the Regeneration is an example of that. Arguments from both a social justice discourse and a sustainability discourse aid the reproduction of the social investment discourse, rendering it plausible. Also, certain economical aspects of the social investment discourse seem to have influenced a reformulation of the sustainability discourse. This answers my supporting question: What is the Social Investment Perspective and can it be discerned in the works of the Malmö Commission and in the regeneration of Lindängen?

In chapter 6, a discourse-coalition united by a common understanding concerning the regeneration of Lindängen was discerned. This discourse-coalition is made coherent by three storyline: the deterioration storyline, the social mobilisation storyline, and the investment fund storyline.

The deterioration storyline is problem-defining as it presents Lindängen and other high-rise housing estates throughout Europe as problematic. Most actors permit this description and accept the position it ascribes for them in the discourse-coalition. This storyline explains the ‘current situation’ from which actors can ‘act’ certain ways. Much like Hajer’s acid rain storyline functioned as metaphor to make sense of dead trees, so does the physical deterioration of buildings function as a metaphor to make sense of the social problematic of Lindängen and similar ‘disadvantaged’ neighbourhoods. By drawing on a social justice discourse and a sustainability discourse, public actors propagating the regeneration represent themselves as ‘responsible’ for addressing this ‘deterioration’. At the same time as the deterioration storyline defines a problem it also presents a ‘need’. This ‘need’ is also expressed as urgent. This, in turn, justifies the suggested regeneration of Lindängen.

The social mobilisation storyline is solution-oriented as it presents local job creation as a means to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the neighbourhood by taking resident from ‘exclusion’ to employment. This argumentation is particularly informed by a macroeconomic discourse expressing the ‘social problematic’ in terms of ‘costs of exclusion’. It thereby presents a ‘solution’ to the situation described through the deterior-
ation storyline. Most actors permit to this storyline because its arguments seem plausible and attractive. For example, the ‘act’ of employing local residents can for Trianon both be financially profitable at the same time as they are ascribed a certain ‘responsible behaviour’, rendering Trianon’s position in the discourse-coalition acceptable and attractive.

The investment fund storyline, like the social mobilisation storyline, also present a ‘solution’ to the situation defined by the deterioration storyline. This ‘solution’ is the development of a social and environmental investment fund. However, the argument for such a fund is contested. On the account of potential political implications, all actors do not accept the storyline. Therefore, as the investment fund argument fragmentises the discourse-coalition rather than help to achieve discursive closure, it is invalidated as a storyline.

By drawing on the social mobilisation storyline and by arguing for the development of an investment fund, the Regeneration Dialogue contends that by implementing such ‘social investment’ strategies, an extensive regeneration of Lindängen is possible without inducing negative social outcomes, such as rampant rent increases and displacement. This answers my central research question: Can the implementation of social investment strategies in the regeneration of Lindängen help deflect renewal-induced negative social outcomes for existing tenants?

**Reflections regarding the subject of study**

One aspect that has been apparent to me is the difficulty of transferring polices from the abstract ideopolitical plane – where social investments are defined as long-term investments in human capital made to ‘prepare’ individuals for the conditions of the knowledge-based economy – to concrete actions, such as the Regeneration Dialogue. Because the social investment perspective is a ‘package-deal’ it is also easily fragmentised and circumscribed. For example, whereas the notion of the quality of jobs rather than the creation of any jobs is pivotal for social investment advocates, the focus of the Regeneration Dialogue seems rather narrowly directed towards ‘creating jobs’, notwithstanding the quality of those jobs in terms of job security, duration, education, or vocational advancement. As such, the propagated social mobilisation resembles a job activation strategy reminiscent of ‘Third way’ policies, aiming to create ‘any jobs’ possible. This renders the social investment ambitions somewhat flat.

An issue related to this is whether the regeneration itself actually creates new jobs. Perhaps social terms stipulating to employ local residents only creates a situation where residents are employed ‘instead’ of someone else. Then what value does this local recruitment add? Is it thus perhaps a question of affirmative action based on residency, and, if so, how is the value of such efforts evaluated?

Another aspect that has become apparent is the potential political implications of the suggested investment fund. As the development of such a fund entails a merging of public and private funds, this raises both ethical and democratic issues. However you turn it, it is a case of the public ‘lending’ money to private enterprise, whether the ‘public’ is the municipality, the state, or the European Union.
One obvious problem is the ‘enabling’ of mismanaging landlords to postpone renovation needs, hoping to enjoy the fruits of public ‘subsidies’, so to speak. For this, rigorous preventions measures must be considered. Some possibilities might include keeping track-records of landlords’ previous ‘behaviour’, stipulating certain durations of owning and managing, ensuring a certain level of security in terms of quality of the employments, etc. Apart from this, surely there are other issues of accountability and responsibility concerning such transactions. Indeed, such uncertainties warrants the question whether this is actually the ‘way to go’, in terms of how to renovate the Million Homes Programme stock.

Even so, perhaps the social investment fund should be seen as a response to Nylund’s (2014, p. 18) assertion that ‘it is strange that there is no serious discussion of redistribution [in the Malmö Commission’s final report], though reallocating resources from one district to another would seem to be a precondition for bridging the present implementation gap between great visions and poor results in practice’. Maybe the suggested investment fund could be a new form of ‘innovative’ welfare redistribution potentially capable bridging this implementation gap?
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Appendix: Translated Excerpts


Page 34, One obstacle to... Ett hinder för att tänka i termer av sociala investeringar är att de nuvarande styrsystemen för kommunen reflekterar en världsbild med ekonomisk tillväxt i centrum och ekonomisk hållbarhet som den enda intressanta aspekten. Det ger inte utrymme för tanken om sociala investeringar. Eftersom ekonomisk tillväxt sätts i högsätet så definieras alla utgifter i den sociala sfären, till exempel skola vård och omsorg, som kostnader vilka “avleder” resurser från ekonomisk tillväxt (Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, pp. 49-50).

Page 36, We need measures... Vi måste ha mått på alla tre aspekterna för att kunna bedöma att utvecklingen verkligen är hållbar. Ledande ekonomer har redan föreslagit sådana paneler av utvecklingsmått. Av detta följer att det inte räcker med renodlat ekonomiska investeringar. Det krävs även ekologiska och sociala investeringar, det vill säga sådana som gynnar en ekologisk såväl som social hållbarhet. Malmö har blivit internationellt prisat för sina ekologiska investeringar, men samma tänkande har inte utvecklats då det gäller den sociala hållbarheten (Stigendal & Östergren, 2013, p. 49).

Page 47, One of the basic... En av grundtankarna i denna rapport är att utanförskapet i samhället är dyrt, mycket dyrt. Detta har vi också visat i ett antal räkneexempel. Det ligger då nära till hands att se en social mobileringsprocess inte bara som en god mänsklig och social insats utan också som en klok investering. En social investering som på individnivå stärker humankapitalet och på kollektiv nivå det sociala kapitalet (Nilsson & Wadeskog, p. 38).

Page 47, If we succeed... Vi ser då att om vi lyckas med totalt 54 personer (ungefär 7 % av de arbetslösa i Lindängen) i den sociala mobileringsprocessen så motsvarar detta efter 30 år kostnaderna för halva fastighetsrenoveringen i Lindängen. Om Break even-målet ska uppnås på 15 år, krävs det ungefär 85 personer (Nilsson & Wadeskog, 2013, p. 42).

Page 50, So far there has... hittills har det inte funnits någon ekonomisk ekvation för att det ska löna sig […] Utan de ekvationer som finns dom visar på vilja att bygga nytt. Och det spännande med Bygga om-dialogen är just där, kan vi lösa alla de problemen, i ett slag liksom. Genom att renovera och rusta upp de här miljonprogramsområdena, dels genom att vara jobb-


Page 52, we work a lot... vi jobbar väldigt mycket med att, dels med att informera alla olika aktörer, allt från försäkringskassan till fastighetsägaren, om hur de här sambanden, hur det hänger ihop, hur kostnaderna för skadegörelse och klotter, hur det påverkar fastighetsägare och värdet på husen och liknande. Det är liksom den fysiska kostnaden, den jobbar vi väldigt med tätt med fastighetsägare (Interviewee A, 2014).


Page 54, Another important aspect... En viktig aspekt av Bygga om-dialogen är dessutom att sätta arbetet med miljömässig hållbarhet i miljonprogramområdena i samklang med, och som ett redskap för att nå, social- och ekonomisk hållbarhet. Miljömässig upprustning av fastigheter stärker både miljö- och integrationsarbetet (Malmö municipality, 2013a, p. 6).