The Kimberley Process, a new actor on the conflict resolution scene?

a case study of the effectiveness of the sanctions targeted on conflict diamonds from the Central African Republic and the Marange Fields

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Abstract

In 2003, the Kimberley Process, a public-private partnership gathering governments, the diamond industry and several civil society organizations, entered into force. This international scheme, aiming at fighting against conflict diamonds, imposed export bans on diamonds from the Marange Fields in the Eastern part of Zimbabwe and from the Central African Republic. Indeed, evidence of violations of the minimum requirements of the Kimberley Process were found in the two countries, due to their fragile political situation. By sending targeted sanctions against conflict diamonds, the Kimberley Process acted as a conflict resolution body, which makes these sanctions the first partially imposed by the private sector. In order to measure the effectiveness of the sanctions, a two-level approach was used, first focusing on whether the sanctions attained the political objectives of the sanction, and then on assessing whether the enforcement of the sanction impaired the achievement of the objectives. I found that the two sanctions targeted on conflict diamonds from the Marange Fields and from the Central African Republic failed on both levels of analysis. The study points out that the Kimberley Process has neither the capacity nor the ability to resolve conflict autonomously.

Key words: Targeted sanctions, Effectiveness, Kimberley Process, Conflict diamonds, Zimbabwe, Central African Republic.

Words: 9028
List of abbreviations

AD: Administrative Decision
CAR: Central African Republic
CSO: Civil Society Organisation
CPJP: Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace
CPSK: Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country
CSR: Corporate Social Responsibility
DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo
EPO: Exclusive Prospecting Order
FDPC: Democratic Front of the Central African People
GW: Global Witness
ICG: International Crisis Group
JWP: Joint Work Plan
KP: Kimberley Process
KPC: Kimberley Process Certificate
KPCS: Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
PAC: Partnership Africa Canada
PPP: Public-Private Partnership
UNITA: National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
WDC: World Diamond Council
WGAAP: Working Group on Artisanal & Alluvial Production
WGDE: Working Group of Diamond Experts
WGM: Working Group on Monitoring
WGS: Working Group on Statistics
ZANU-PF: Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
ZMDC: Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation
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1 Introduction

The 1990s are famously known as the sanctions decade for the United Nations (Cortright, Lopez, 2000). After the end of the Cold War and the easing of East-West tensions, the consensus needed among the five permanent members of the Security Council to pass a resolution was reached more easily. Consequently, the UN was allowed to intervene more aggressively in international affairs (Wallensteen, Staibano, 2005, p.3). Indeed, between 1990 and 2003, the UN imposed as many as fourteen economic sanctions, whilst between 1945 and 1990, only two were imposed – against Rhodesia and South Africa (Brzoska, 2003, p.519).

However, economic sanctions imposed in the 1990s, in particular those imposed on Iraq, Yugoslavia and Haiti, were criticized by a number of scholars, humanitarian organisations, as well as UN member governments, who denounced their disastrous humanitarian impact (Doxey 1971, Cortright and Lopez 2002, Brzoska 2003). For instance, in Iraq, the population suffered while the targeted elite close to Saddam Hussein was left unscathed (Brzoska, 2003, p.520).

As the ethics of comprehensive sanctions were put into question, scholars found a new way to destabilize some key targeted individuals without harming the population: the 'smart' or 'targeted' sanctions were created1 (Drezner 2011, p.98). Targeted sanctions are « directed against significant national decision-makers (political leaders and key supporters of a particular regimes) and resources that are essential for their rule » (Wallensteen, Staibano, Erikkson, 2003, background).

In December 1998, Global Witness, a British NGO specialized in the fight against the plundering of natural resources in developing countries, published a report describing how diamonds fuelled the civil war in Angola (Global Witness, 1999). Indeed, diamond trade was used by the rebel group UNITA to fund hostilities targeted against the Angolan government. The UN reacted by imposing a sanction targeted on rough diamonds from UNITA from 1998 to 2002. In addition, the UN mandated bans on

1 In this study, the term 'targeted' will be preferred to 'smart' sanction.
the trade of diamonds from Sierra Leone and Liberia which also financed civil wars.

The diamond industry decided to take part in the banning of illegal mining and trade of conflict diamonds (Sethi, Emelianova, 2011, p.213). In 2003, the Kimberley Process (KP), a public-private partnership together gathering 81 governments, the diamond industry and several civil society organizations, such as Partnership Africa Canada (PAC), entered into force. Through an international certification scheme, the KP aims at preventing conflict diamonds from entering the international market, and thus at preventing conflicts (KP 1).

The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), the core document of the KP, imposes a certain number of requirements on its participants before allowing them to certify that their sales of rough diamonds are ‘conflict-free’, inter alia implementing legislation and national institutions, as well as controls of export, import and domestic trade of diamonds. They must also commit to transparency of activities related to diamonds and to conducting statistical data exchanges. Furthermore, international shipments of rough diamonds must be accompanied by a certificate guaranteeing they are not used to finance armed conflict. More importantly, participants must trade only with each other\(^2\) (KP 2a). Any participant violating these minimum requirements would be expelled from the scheme.

However, the Central African Republic and Zimbabwe were judged non-compliant with the KP standards. In effect, from 2009 to 2011, the KP banned the exports of diamonds from the Marange Fields, located in the Eastern part of Zimbabwe. Indeed, amongst other things, the government perpetuated human rights abuses on illegal miners. Similarly, the CAR has been expelled from the KP since May 2013 and is still suspended today. Indeed, the civil war that initiated the KP decision of suspending the CAR from the KP continues. The decision was taken because the rebel groups operating in the CAR appeared to finance their activities through the illicit sale of rough diamonds. But is it not paradoxical that the KP suspended the CAR because rebels groups sold diamonds illegally? If the CAR is not allowed to sell any diamonds, would it not reinforce the illegal diamond trade? Have the embargoes stopped the conflicts?

These are some questions I intend to clear up in this study.

\(^2\) The requirements for participation are outlined in Sections II, V (a) and VI (8,9) of the KPCS (KP 2).
1.1 Purpose and research question

I will use the export bans on raw diamonds from the CAR and the Marange Fields imposed by the KP to conduct a case study, as I seek to investigate the effectiveness of sanctions targeted on diamonds imposed by this public-private partnership (PPP). These sanctions were imposed autonomously by the KP, i.e. non-mandated by the UN, which makes them exceptional since they are the only ones imposed by a PPP and thus the only ones partially imposed by the private sector (Wallensteen, Stainbano & Eriksson, 2003).

Scholars have measured the effectiveness of targeted sanctions imposed by the UN (Cortrights & Lopez 2002), as well as by new actors operating targeted sanctions such as the EU (De Vries & Hazelzet 2005) but there is no research aimed at measuring the effectiveness of the private sector as a sanction sender. My thesis contributes to the accumulated research by focusing on the effectiveness of the only case of a public-private body imposing a targeted sanction.

This research is also a contribution to research on the private sector’s role in conflict. By sending sanctions, the KP has become the first partially private entity to incorporate conflict resolution in its activities. Therefore, by measuring the effectiveness of the targeted sanctions against conflict diamonds from the CAR and the Marange Fields, I intend to assess the effectiveness of the KP as an autonomous conflict resolver body. My research question is thus:

*How effective are the sanctions targeted on diamonds from the Marange fields and the CAR imposed by the Kimberley Process?*
1.2 Hypothesis

The KP has an interesting composition since it is a coalition between governments, the diamond industry and civil society organisations. At first glance, these actors seem to have antagonistic interests. Indeed, the diamond industry's trade issues seem inescapably inconsistent with the humanitarian aspirations of the CSOs.

However, given the notion of corporate responsibility\(^3\) which emerged concomitantly with the creation of the KP, I suppose that the diamond industry has a strong interest in guaranteeing that the diamonds it sells are conflict-free. Finally, I presume that since the diamond industry and NGOs specialized in the link between natural resource and conflicts and human rights abuses are part of the tripartite composition of the KP, the latter has a considerable asset in regard to expertise – the industry being an expert in the diamond trade and the NGOs in problems arising from the diamond trade. The KP seems to encompass a well-balanced composition and thus provide prima facie evidence that the KP is an expert in the field of conflict diamonds and human rights. Therefore, I suppose that the KP sanctions targeted on diamonds from the Marange Fields and the CAR have been effective.

1.3 Theory

Scholars have used different methods to measure the effectiveness of economic sanctions. This is due to the fact that there is no consensual definition of an effective sanction. Therefore, evaluating the effectiveness of targeted sanction is difficult on a conceptual, methodological and analytical level (Biersteker 2009, p.8). Most of the theories aiming at measuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions have focused on comprehensive sanctions.

The theory which I chose to use for measuring the effectiveness of the KP targeted sanctions is the most relevant for measuring the effectiveness of targeted sanctions. This

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\(^3\) See part 3.1.1 for more details on corporate responsibility
theory was developed by Jan Grebe, in an article where he discusses the effectiveness of UN and EU targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe. He used a two-level approach to measure targeted sanction effectiveness (Grebe, 2010, p.10).

The first level deals with the political objectives. The latter are specific to each sanction and formulated in the official documents which impose the sanctions (Ibid.). Establishing human rights, democratization, regime change are all examples of political objectives. In order to assess the success of the primary objectives, I need to examine whether the objectives set in the official documents of the KP starting the enforcement of the sanctions on the Central African and the Marange Fields conflict diamonds have been attained.

The second level measures the result of the sanctions and the potential influence of the sanction on the attainment of the primary objectives (Ibid, p.11). In other words, in order to measure the second level of effectiveness, I need to conduct an empirical analysis in order to determine whether sanctions have been successfully implemented. Thanks to this two-level approach, a sanction can be qualified as successful on one level and unsuccessful on the other one.

1.4 Method

This research is a type of qualitative case study where two countries will be studied in depth: the CAR and Zimbabwe. I will use Jan Grebe's theory of sanction effectiveness in order to measure the effectiveness of the KP sanctions imposed on the diamonds from the CAR and Zimbabwe. It is a disciplined-configurative study since it uses an established theory to explain two cases (George, Bennett 2005, p.213).

A usual criticism made towards case studies as a method is that it is not possible to draw any generalizing conclusions (Lundquist, 1993, p.105). However, this study is not aimed at making any generalization about how other PPPs would behave in the event that they imposed a targeted sanction to a country in conflict, but rather about how they could behave. The research area of targeted sanction is relatively new, and as stated
above, no research has been conducted on the effectiveness of the KP as a conflict resolver and I regard this essay as a contribution to the scientific discussion.

Since this is a case study, the choice of cases is important. Teorell and Svensson have outlined four important principles for choosing cases: to choose relevant, generalizable, variable cases, and to aim at complementing extensive results (Teorell & Svensson, 2007, p.222).

Zimbabwe and the CAR are not the only countries failing to meet the basic requirements asked of diamond producing nations by the Kimberley Process. A lack of political will and weak internal controls in the Republic of the Congo (ROC) led to its expulsion from 2004 to 2007. Indeed, the ROC was expelled because it could not prove the origin of the diamonds it sold – most of them are believed to originate from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). However, the suspension of the ROC is not relevant for my study since I focus solely on sanctions imposed by the KP on countries in conflict situation. On the other hand, the case of Côte d'Ivoire, whose diamonds were used to finance rebel groups is neither relevant for my study since the export ban on diamonds from Côte d'Ivoire was mandated by the UNSC.

Therefore, in order to assess the effectiveness of the KP as a conflict-resolver, I had to analyze the only two cases relevant for my research: the sanctions targeted on diamonds from the Marange Fields and from the CAR.

1.5 Material

This study is primarily based on second-hand sources, such as books and articles written by scholars on the research context of the study, namely targeted sanctions.

When I searched for literature on economic sanctions, I first used the book of David Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft*, a key reference in sanction theory and Johan Galtung's article stated above, which was the seminal work regarding the effectiveness of economic sanctions. However, these authors' works were not appropriate for my subject because they focused on comprehensive sanctions. Therefore, I turned to more targeted
sanction-specific scholars, such as Cortright and Lopez, Grebe, and Brzoska. In addition, I mainly used the publications of the principal research institutes on targeted sanctions – the Interlaaken Process, the Bonn-Berlin Process and above all the Stockholm Process, conducted by the Department of Peace and Conflict Research of Uppsala University.

In order to conduct my case study on the CAR and the Marange Fields in Zimbabwe, I have used NGO reports, such as those published by Human Rights Watch, Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada in order to assess the situations before and after the sanctions. Finally, my study is largely based on the KP's publications, reports and Administrative Decisions.

1.6 Disposition

The study starts by presenting the research context of the study, i.e. targeted sanctions – and more specifically targeted commodity sanctions. The practical difficulties of enforcing a sanction targeted on diamonds are explained. We will then see whether the UN successfully managed to counter these difficulties by briefly analyzing the effectiveness of the UN sanctions against conflict diamonds. In order to understand how the KP functions, I will in a third part, describe the mechanisms and the design of the KP. Based on the literature on businesses in global governance, the role of the KP in conflict situation will be explained. Then, the background context to the conflicts in the Marange Fields and the CAR, as well as the sanctions' goals are presented. Finally, the study proposes an analysis of the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed by the KP, and thereby its ability of being an autonomous conflict resolving body.
2 The research context of the study

2.1 Targeted sanctions

2.1.1 From comprehensive to targeted sanctions

As we have seen in the introduction, comprehensive sanctions were strongly criticized by political circles, diplomats, scholars and humanitarian groups. The most prominent area of concern identified with comprehensive sanctions was the humanitarian consequences they involved. Indeed, comprehensive sanctions proved to impose severe humanitarian costs to the population. This is what Eyler calls the 'cruel paradox' of comprehensive sanctions (Eyler, 2007, p.73).

The discussion on how sanction senders should take into consideration both the economic and the humanitarian costs of their sanction began with Doxey in 1971 (Eyler 2007, p.74). However, the most prominent scholars in this field arrived later, in particular with the work of Cortright and Lopez, who dedicated a chapter to targeted sanctions in their book (Cortright, Lopez, 2002). Since then, targeted sanctions have been studied by a certain number of scholars (Brzoska 2003; Drezner 2003 ; Risa Brooks 2002 ; Clara Portela 2008 ; Elliott 2005).

Around fifteen years ago, targeted sanctions became the subject of several research institutes. Indeed, the Swiss, the German and the Swedish governments launched research programs in the framework of an international process dealing with targeted sanctions. This was first launched by Switzerland, focusing on financial sanctions with the Interlaken Process. Thereafter, Germany initiated the Bonn-Berlin Process which put the focus on arms embargoes, aviation sanctions and travel bans. Finally, the Swedish government started a research program at the department of Peace and Conflict Reasearch at Uppsala University, the Stockholm Process. The latter focused primarily
on the implementation of targeted sanctions imposed by the UN (Wallensteen, Staibano, Eriksson, 2003).

2.1.2 How are targeted sanctions supposed to work?

By definition, targeted sanctions are discriminating and focus on a target and its activities, not on the entire population of a country (Biersteker, 2009, p.3). In order to do so, the sanction senders have to find the sanction that is best suited to the situation of the receiving country. There are several types of targeted sanctions, such as targeted financial sanctions against individuals and entities, travel bans against individuals, arms embargoes or commodity bans, on which we will focus in the next part (Ibid.).

Therefore, targeted sanctions need to be flexible and to fit to the situation of the targeted country. Since they are more complex to administer and to implement than comprehensive sanctions, targeted sanctions may require greater political will to be effective (Ibid., p.4). Indeed, groups of experts need to study the situation in the receiving country to find the most suited sanction, in order to make the sanction as effective as possible.

As we have seen, targeted sanctions are designed to hurt elite supporters of the targeted regime while imposing minimal hardship on the mass public (Drezner, 2011, p.96). However, it is important to note that targeted sanctions also have some inevitable humanitarian consequences, both for the targets and for the population (Biersteker, 2009, p.4). Targeted sanctions are effectively aimed at avoiding the 'cruel paradox' of comprehensive sanctions but we have to keep in mind that all economic sanctions have negative consequences, including humanitarian consequences.

Targeted sanctions have three purposes: to coerce, to constrain and to signal (Ibid., p. 4-5). If the goal is to make the target do something, the sanction aims at coercing. On the other hand, the sanction's purpose is to constrain if the goal is to prevent the target from doing something. Finally, the sanction aims at signaling if the goal is to send a signal or a message to an external audience.
2.2 Targeted commodity sanctions

Targeted trade sanctions aim at reducing revenues and at controlling flows of strategic commodities going to particular actors (Wallensteen, Staibano, Eriksson, 2003, p.123). These import or export bans, concern most of the time exports of particular commodities such as tobacco, timber, oil and rough diamonds (Ibid.). Trade sanctions targeted at particular commodities are not new. Nowadays, however, they are aimed at ensuring that they do not finance parties deemed to be illegitimate, and particularly of those engaged in armed conflict (House of Lords, 2007, p.28). Theoretically, commodity sanctions can be applied to an entire country but handicap only the actor most benefiting from that commodity (Le Billion, Nicholls, 2007, p.616). Thereby, they should avoid some of the classic problems of comprehensive sanctions as they are not intended to harm the entire economy (Wallensteen, Staibano, Eriksson, 2003 p.123).

2.2.1 Problems in the implementation of sanctions targeted on diamonds

In practice, however, commodity sanctions are difficult to implement. The Stockholm Process identified the typical problems encountered when enforcing a targeted commodity sanction:

1. Goods that are subject to targeted trade sanctions such as oil, diamonds or timber are frequently difficult or impossible to distinguish from similar goods that are not subject to such sanctions.

2. The control of these commodities can be evaded by mixing banned goods with those that are allowed to be freely traded.

3. Certification systems for targeted goods are not internationally standardized or may not be used in practice (e.g. end-use certificates for arms purchases or rough diamonds). The use of false documents creates opportunities for sanctions evasion.
4. Commodities, such as oil, that might be included in targeted sanctions regimes generate their own problems. Oil companies and governments may not monitor fuel stocks and movements in areas adjacent to conflict zones.

5. Targeted actors may shift from trading in one sanctioned commodity to other non-sanctioned resources (e.g. from rough to polished diamonds, from diamonds to timber).

6. Targeted actors subject to import bans will frequently stockpile the goods in question prior to implementation of sanctions.

7. Targeted trade sanctions may produce unintended consequences, such as black markets and expanded opportunities for corruption. The beneficiaries of black markets and corruption may be the target itself (Wallensteen, Staibano, Eriksson, 2003, p.124).

As highlighted by the Stockholm Process, all these typical problems may be encountered when the sanction is targeted on diamonds.

Additionally, diamonds are particularly lootable natural resources. Indeed, the diamond trade is difficult to control because of the gems' small size and the difficulty to determine their origin. Furthermore, their composition make them impossible to be detected by millimeter wave scanners in airports.
2.2.2 Effectiveness of UN sanctions targeted on diamonds

As we have seen in the introduction, the UN Security Council (UNSC) imposed several export bans on diamonds (Table 1). Le Billion and Nicholls conducted a quantitative study aiming at assessing the effectiveness of UN military interventions, revenue sharing initiatives and economic sanctions in the case of ‘Resource Wars’, i.e wars financed by natural resources, between 1989 and 2006 (Le Billion, Nicholls, 2007). They concluded that sanctions targeted on specific resources were successfully implemented only 57 per cent of the time, while military interventions were successful at 89 per cent and revenue sharings 83 per cent (Ibid., p.620). However, sanctions seem to have slightly better results when it comes to resolving conflicts (50 per cent), whereas military interventions brought durable peace only 47 per cent of the time.

Table 1: UN sanctions on conflict diamonds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Resolutions starting the sanctions</th>
<th>Aim of the resolution</th>
<th>Resolutions ending the sanctions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RES/1643 (2005)</td>
<td>On all rough diamonds and re-establishment of group of experts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The UNSC imposed sanctions against Angolan diamonds, because UNITA rebels exchanged them for weapons and sold them to pay their combattants. A report calculated that in 1999, despite the embargo imposed in 1998, UNITA collected approximately $3-4 million through the sale of conflict diamonds (Fowler, 2000). Furthermore, in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the sanctions did not stop the human rights abuses nor the illegal diamond trade (Haufler 2009).
3 The Kimberley Process in global governance

3.1 The evolution of corporate ethics and the creation of the Kimberley Process

3.1.1 Corporate responsibility

Already in the 1950s, Howard Bowen described a globalized society where only a hundred multinational corporations (MNC) were the vital centers of power that shaped the lives of the citizens. Bowen proposed a very innovative concept of the social responsibility of businesses: « it refers to the obligations of businessmen to pursue policies, to make those decisions, or to follow those lines of action which are desirable in terms of the objectives and values of our society »(Carroll 1999, p.269).

Throughout the second half of the 20th century, this idea developed, until the arrival of the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the late 1990s. MNCs began to be receptive to the NGO critics which pushed for them to being more ethical. The UN launched Global Compact in 1999 and in 2011 the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights under the direction of Professor John Ruggie. As Slim notes, corporate social responsibility was based on the three 'P's : 'people, planet and profit', a model developed by the NGO innovator John Elkington (Slim 2012, p.909).
3.2.1 The creation of a new governance system

As highlighted above, the UN sanctions targeted against diamonds in the late 1990s failed. The emerging global norms of corporate responsibility as well as the ideas of the international community's responsibility to protect civilians boosted the rapid creation of the KP (Haufler, 2009, p.407). Additionally, the campaign against conflict diamonds led by NGOs such as Amnesty International, Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada threatened the whole diamond industry (Annex 1). By 2000, some industry leaders became aware of the fact that the mass public began to associate diamonds with violence, conflicts and human rights abuses, rather than with their mythical symbols of eternal love and commitment4.

Moreover, the diamond industry being one of the most oldest and most successful cartels in history, is highly hierarchichal and organized. De Beers Group of Companies, founded by Cecil Rhodes in 1869, controlled the diamond market from the extraction to the distribution (Haufler, 2009, p.405). Indeed, in the 1990s, De Beers mined half the world's stones and controlled 80 per cent of the sales (The Economist, 2011). Because of the highly concentrated diamond industry, negotiations for the creation of the KP were easily reached. This also explains why the creation of the KP only took three years from start to finish (Haufler, 2009, p.407).

In 2000, the South African diamond producing states, representatives of diamond industry and civil society organisations gathered in Kimberley, South Africa to discuss an action-plan to prevent conflict diamonds from entering the rough diamond market (KP 1). The same year, the United Nations adopted Resolution 1385, fostering the creation of an international scheme for rough diamonds and the World Federation of Diamond Bourses and the International Diamond Manufacturers Association jointly created the World Diamond Council (WDC) in order to develop a tracking system for trade in rough diamonds (Sethi, Emelianova, 2011, p.215).

Finally, in 2003, the Kimberley Process entered into force gathering 40 member countries, the WDC and the two NGOs who singled out the conflict diamond issue –

4 In an article published in Business Insider, Rohin Dhar explained how De Beers created diamonds' symbolic value of eternal love, in particular through their advertisements for engagement rings (http://www.businessinsider.com/why-diamonds-are-a-sham-2013-3?IR=T).
Global Witness and Partnership Africa Canada – thus bringing together national
governments, private sector players and NGOs to form a public-private partnership
(Haufler, 2009, p.409).

3.2 The implementation of the Kimberley Process

3.2.1 The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme

The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is a document consisting of a
Preamble and six sections where the goals of the project, its governance-system
deliberative bodies, organization and decision-making structures, responsibilities for
monitoring performance and public disclosure are described (KP 2).

The first section of the KPCS contains the definitions of terms that are used in the
certification system, starting with the definition of conflict diamonds:

«rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance
conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments, as described in
relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions insofar as they remain in effect, or in other similar UNSC resolutions which
may be adopted in the future, and as understood and recognised in
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 55/56, or in
other similar UNGA resolutions which may be adopted in future»
(KP 2).

It also defines the concepts of Participant («a state or a regional economic integration organisation for which the Certification Scheme is effective»), Observer («a representative of civil society, the diamond industry, international organisations and non-participating governments invited to take part in Plenary meetings»), Parcel («one or more diamonds that are packed together and that are not individualised»), Shipment
("one or more parcels that are physically imported or exported") and of the Kimberley
Certificate which is «a forgery resistant document with a particular format which
identifies a shipment of rough diamonds as being in compliance with the requirements
of the Certification Scheme» (KP 2).

The second section sets out the principles governing the certificates. Each participant
must indeed ensure that a certificate complying with the minimum requirements of the
Kimberley Process accompanies each shipment of rough diamonds to be imported; in
addition to the minimum requirements of the agreement, participants can add other
elements to their certificates and inform the other participants.

The heart of the system is defined in the third section. Each participant should ensure
that

(a) a Kimberley Process Certificate (hereafter referred to as the Certificate)
accompanies each shipment of rough diamonds on export;

(b) its processes for issuing Certificates meet the minimum standards of the
Kimberley Process as set out in Section IV;

(c) Certificates meet the minimum requirements set out in Annex I. As long
as these requirements are met, Participants may at their discretion establish
additional characteristics for their own Certificates, for example their form,
additional data or security elements;

(d) it notifies all other Participants through the Chair of the features of its
Certificate as specified in Annex I, for purposes of validation.

In other words, no trade of rough diamonds without certificate and no trade outside the
circle of participants in the Kimberley Process, either import or export, is allowed.

The fourth section deals with the internal controls each participant is committed to
implement, for instance the designation of an Importing and Exporting Authority. On
the other hand, section five deals with the transparency issue, such as the commitment
of each participant to share data regarding their diamond production.
3.2.2 The design of the Kimberley Process

The official texts of the KP do not only contain principles, obligations or recommendations that participants must enforce: they also present the mechanisms, procedures and organs that control the operation of the system and organize dialogue among the participants. The organs consist of the Chair and the Secretariat of the plenary meetings, committees and specialized working groups.

The Chair oversees the implementation of the certification system, the proper functioning of the working groups and committees and the general administration of the KP. The Chair is appointed for one year by the Plenary among the participants. The Chair is also in charge of the Secretariat, whose task consists of organizing meetings, distributing documents to participants, and the website. However, only states can be appointed Chair and vote during Plenary meetings. Furthermore, Administrative Decisions are made by consensus, implying that a minority of participants can block a decision. Therefore, despite its tripartite structure, the KP is a state-dominated system (Cullen, 2013, p.62).

The Plenary Meeting, held annually, is open to the Participants, Observers and Applicants. A final release reporting the decisions and events of the meeting is published on the website of the KP.

There are also four working groups: the Working Group of Diamond Experts (WGDE), the Working Group on Monitoring (WGM), the Working Group on Statistics (WGS) and the Working Group on Artisanal & Alluvial Production (WGAAP)\(^5\).

The WGM, chaired by the European Union, is a particularly important group, since it is responsible for monitoring and evaluating the implementation of the process by the Participants. The WGS, chaired by the United States of America, is responsible for reports and analysis of statistical data on production and trade of rough diamonds in order to detect any anomaly and enable the effective application of the system certification. The WGDE, chaired by the WDC is responsible for identifying problems of a technical nature relating to the implementation of the Kimberley Process, such as

\(^5\) The KP noted that « Working groups can be added according to the necessity of the work ». http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/working-groups-and-committees
the proposed changes to the Harmonized System codes of the World Customs Organization; the classification of diamond powders; international diamond samples for exploration transfers. Finally, the WGAAP, chaired by Angola aims at promoting optimal effective internal controls on the production and trade of alluvial diamonds\(^6\).

### 3.3 The role of the Kimberley Process in conflicts

#### 3.3.1 The Kimberley Process and Human Rights

The aim of the KP was and still is to halt the traffic of conflict diamonds, which are directly linked to the fuelling of armed conflict, the activities of rebel movements aimed at undermining or overthrowing legitimate governments, and the illicit traffic in, and proliferation of, armaments, especially small arms and light weapons (KP 2).

As a report of the PAC recalls, «armed conflict is the ultimate thief of human rights» (Létourneau & Smilie, 2009, p.9). Therefore, the KP's main goal was to stop human rights abuses linked to diamond trade (Ibid.). Moreover, the KPCS recognizes the devastating impact of conflicts fuelled by the trade in conflict diamonds on the peace, safety and security of people in affected countries and the systematic and gross human rights violations that have been perpetrated in such conflicts (KP 2).

Thereby, the core document of the KP which presents the objectives of the scheme

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\(^6\) As noted by the KP, the creation of the WGAAP was necessary since more than 10 million diamantaires, miners and diggers worked in alluvial diamond mines. http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/artisanal-and-alluvial-wgaap-0
presents the eradication of human rights abuses linked with the trade of diamonds as being one the primary objectives (Global Witness, 2010, p.19).
4 Empirical research

4.1 The conflict diamonds of the Marange Fields

4.1.1 Background context to the conflict

From the early 1980s, De Beers held an Exclusive Prospecting Order (EPO) in parts of the Marange district, in the Eastern part of Zimbabwe, near the Mozambique border (See Annex 2). On March 28th 2006, the company's EPO and licence of exploration expired (Létourneau & Smilic, 2009, p.7). The British-registered Africa Consolidated Resources Ltd (ACR) received exploration rights (Shaik-Peremanov, 2014, p.336). In June 2006, the Marange diamond fields were discovered. These diamond mines are said to be the biggest diamond discovery of a generation. In June 2006, ZANU-PF authorities officially declared the Marange fields open and «free to anyone wishing to search for diamonds» (Human Rights Watch 2009, p.14). As a consequence, from July 2006, a diamond rush started.

In December 2006, ACR's licence was abrogated when then-minister of mines Amos Midzi granted exclusive mining and exploration of mines to the state-owned Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) (Shaik-Peremanov 2014, p.336). The government justified this decision by claiming that they aimed at restoring order in Marange after the diamond rush (Human Rights Watch, 2009, p.13).

However, the government take-over accelerated the diamond rush. By mid-December 2006, around 15,000-20,000 illegal artisanal miners were working at Marange. Food, water, shelter and sanitation crises were developing (Létourneau &

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7 Minister of Mines Obert Mpofu estimates that Marange represents 25 percent of the world’s global rough diamond production. Source: “Inside the Marange Diamond Fields”, CNN documentary, March 16, 2012
8 The Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) led by President President Robert Mugabe is the ruling party in Zimbabwe since independence in 1980.
From early 2007, miners had to work in syndicates under the control of the police. Civilians who were found to dig independently\(^9\) from a syndicate were beaten, raped or killed\(^10\). The violence reached a peak in October and November 2008 during the Operation 'Hakudzowki' or 'No Return', perpetuated by the army. More than 800 soldiers in helicopters encircled the Marange fields and shot over 200 miners (Global Witness, 2010, p.6). The army then took control of the mines, took over the police's role by forcing people to search for diamonds for them and continued to perpetrate human rights abuses.

Human rights abuses were also accompanied by severe corruption. The unlicensed miners sold the diamonds directly to the police controlling the diamond mines. However, not a single dollar went to the Zimbabwean Treasury. PAC wrote a report denouncing the fact that the revenues of diamond sales went directly to elected members of the government, senior officials of ZANU-PF and their spouses (PAC, 2012, p.17-26). GW also reported that the ZMDC admitted that the company had not paid any dividend to the Zimbabwean state for over twenty years. This is problematic given that this state-owned company was the only body charged with the exploitation of the Marange (GW, 2010, p.12).

Because of Zimbabwe's economic circumstances, the government began to fail to buy the diamonds from the miners. As a consequence, an important black market developed (Létourneau & Smilie, 2009, p.3). The geographical situation of the Marange Fields rendered smuggling very easy. Mutare, the closest city to the Marange Fields is only a few kilometers away from the Mozambique border. On the Mozambican side, the streets of Manica, a border city, was full of diamond dealers who offered higher prices for the diamonds than the government (PAC, 2012, p.12).

To conclude, as PAC noted, the Marange diamond fields' potential was ruined by smuggling, violence and corruption (PAC, 2012, p.1). PAC even qualified the Marange Field theft as « the biggest single plunder of diamonds since Cecil Rhodes » (Ibid.).

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\(^9\) People digging outside syndicates are called 'Snipers' (Martin, Taylor, 2010, p.20).

\(^10\) For detailed information on human rights abuses perpetuated by the police in the Marange fields before the sanction was imposed in 2009, see Human Rights Watch, 2009.
4.2.2 The KP sanction against conflict diamonds of the Marange Fields

In 2008, NGO investigations denouncing the situation in the Marange Fields were not taken into consideration by the KP participants. Indeed, some governments responded by saying that the situation in the Marange Fields did not violate KP standards because Marange diamonds did not contradict the UN's definition of 'blood diamonds' used by the KP, which is, for the record, diamonds «used by rebel movements to finance their military activities, including attempts to undermine or overthrow legitimate governments». Therefore, using this definition, the KP did not consider that governments perpetuating human rights abuses on illegal diamond miners should be punished. This narrow definition even led then-KP Chair Bernard Easau to state that «the Kimberley Process is not a humanitarian organisation» (Global Witness, 2010, p.9). However, as we have seen above, the protection of human rights is at the heart of the KP's goals.

The WGM sent a review mission to Marange from June 30th to July 4th 2009 and concluded that Zimbabwe was effectively in non-compliance with the minimum requirements of the KP. They noted human rights abuses, armed soldiers managing syndicates of miners, as well as important smuggling operations (KP 13). The team recommended that the country should be suspended from the KP for at least six months (Ibid.).

When KP Participants and Observers met from November 2nd to 5th 2009, in Swakopmund, Namibia for the annual Plenary Meeting, the situation in Zimbabwe was at the heart of the discussions. Observer NGOs called for Zimbabwe's expulsion and had gathered 150,000 signatures for a petition asking the expulsion of Zimbabwe. However, the KP did not expell Zimbabwe but imposed an export ban on Marange diamonds and agreed for a Joint Work Plan (JWP) developed by Zimbabwe aiming at bringing back Zimbabwe in compliance with the KP standards (KP 3, 2009). The objectives of this Administrative Decision (AD) were to

provide security and strengthen internal controls, curb illegal digging, regulate alluvial mining according to best practices (KP 2).

The WGM specified that the JWP consists in

providing a supervised export mechanism under which exports of Marange diamonds are subject to prior KP verification and confirmation (KP 2).

This JWP was to be supported by KP technical assistance and the KP included the appointment of a KP Monitor for the Marange Fields, whose task was to

1. Monitor and inform the Kimberley Process, and liaise with the Zimbabwean Ministry of Mines, about implementation of the Joint Work Plan;
2. Represent the Kimberley Process, with regard to the supervised export mechanism for Marange diamonds (KP 2).

As noted by GW, the JWP did not address all the issues with which Zimbabwe was non-compliant, and failed to mention human rights (Global Witness, 2010, p.10). KP official documents are indeed vague when it comes to identifying political objectives. However, the AD refers to the WGM Review Mission of June 2009, by recalling that the WGM found

“credible indications of significant non-compliance” by Zimbabwe with the minimum requirements of the KPCS (KP 3).

Although KP official texts are vaguely worded, the AD on Zimbabwe refers to the WGM Review Mission Report which, as we have seen, identified many violations of KP standards in the Marange Fields. We can therefore assess that the objectives of the sanction were to:
4.2 The conflict diamonds of the Central African Republic

4.2.1 Background context to the conflict

The CAR may be the perfect example of what is ironically a 'gemocracy'. Indeed, since its independence from France in 1960, the diamond sector in the CAR has always been corrupt, marked by massive fraud and opacity. From the bloodthirsty regime of "Emperor" Bokassa (1966 -1979) to the one of President François Bozizé (2003-2013), only a small elite of politicians and businessmen linked to diamantaires received juicy profits from the diamond trade. However, while the elite benefitted from this blessing, the population suffered. Indeed, the CAR is ranked 180 out of 187 countries in the 2012 United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index (Malpeli & Chirico, 2014, p.250). Therefore, the political crisis of the CAR led to a humanitarian crisis.

Recently, the situation took a turn for the worse. Since December 10th 2012, the country is torn by a civil war, known as the Central African Republic Conflict. In September 2012, political parties and rebel groups opposed to the regime of François Bozizé, gathered and formed a rebel group known as the Séléka-CPSK-CPJP-UFDR or 'Séléka' (Malpeli & Chirico, 2014, p.249). The Convention of Patriots for Justice and

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12 In Les gemmocraties : l'économie politique du diamant africains, François Misser an Olivier Vallée describe how many African states base the major part of their economy on gems.
Peace (CPJP), the Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country (CPSK), the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR), the Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC) and the Alliance pour la Renaissance et la Refondation (A2R) were united under the leadership of Michel Djotodia. The Séléka was a mainly-Muslim group in a country composed of 80 per cent of Christians.

The hostilities began when the Séléka seized several major cities in the northern, central and eastern part of the country. On March 24th 2013, the Séléka coalition seized the Presidential Palace while Bozizé was escaping to Benin. Michel Djotodia proclaimed himself president of the CAR.

After the escape of Bozizé, elements of the Central African Armed Forces (FACA), territories rich in diamond were exploited by the Séléka. The ICG qualifies the Séléka's expansion as 'rapid' and 'strategic' (ICG, 2013, p.10). Indeed, the rebels targeted the West of the country, where the biggest diamond deposit of the country is found. Consequently, miners and villagers tried to resist in Garga and Gadzi, which ended almost systematically in bloody clashes. This triggered many Central Africans to join the anti-balaka, the rebel group mainly composed of Christians, opposed to the Séléka (Ibid.).

4.2.2 KP sanction against the Central African Republic

On December 28th 2012, after the Séléka took control of several diamond-producing areas including Bria, Sam Ouandja and Bamingui, the KP Chair published a note asking all participants and observers to be «vigilant» concerning

the possible illicit introduction of rough diamonds into the supply chain by Seleka or its allies (KP 6, 2012).

In order to enhance vigilance measures, a footprint of the diamond production from the Eastern region around Bria, giving the characteristics of the diamonds from this region, was prepared by the WGDE and was attached to the vigilance note (KP 7). In addition,
a map of the situation in the CAR highlighting the different diamond deposits, the rebel movements and the geomorphic landform units was published (KP 8).

One year later, on April 18th 2013, the KP Chair released a similar vigilance note about the deteriorating situation in the CAR (KP 9). Once again, the note asked the diamond industry and participating governments to remain vigilant regarding the activities of the rebel groups. It added that the

KP would request the Working Group on Monitoring to organize a team of experts for a review mission and provide the KP authorities from the CAR and the KP Chair with recommendations for possible further steps to be taken (Ibid.).

Noting that the situation in the CAR was not improving, the KP proposed the expulsion of the CAR from the scheme. The deadline for the submission of the votes was May 10th 2013. The requirements for approval by written procedure were met through the support of 19 participants, including the EU and the USA (KP 10, 2013). Thereby, the Administrative Decision announcing the temporary suspension of the CAR was published on May 23rd 2013 (KP 11, 2013). It noted that

the Decision and the situation in the CAR are to be reviewed by the Working Group on Monitoring, in consultation with other working bodies, at the Intersessional meeting of the KPCS taking place in Kimberley, South Africa, from 4-7 June 2013 (KP 11).

Similarly to the AD concerning the embargo on diamonds from the Marange Fields, the AD initiating the suspension is vague. However, based on the NGOs' and the WGM's reports, the objectives of the AD with regard to the situation in the CAR consist in:

- stopping forced labor
- ending smuggling
- ending corruption
5 Theoretical analysis

5.1 Effectiveness of the export ban on Marange diamonds

5.1.1 Primary objectives

Four months after the AD on the Marange Fields, in March 2010, the appointed KP-Monitor for Marange Abbey Chikane was sent for a review mission in Marange in order to inspect whether the JWP was in progress. He concluded that Zimbabwe should be allowed to sell its diamonds from the Marange Fields because he judged that the situation met the minimum requirements (KP 14).

In June 2010, the KP sent a second review mission which judged that Zimbabwe violated the minimum requirements, and therefore maintained the embargo.

In 2011 the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was the KP Chair. In March 2011, the DRC pushed for the lift of the embargo on Marange diamonds. At the Plenary Meeting in Kinshasa from October 31st to November 3rd, the participants endorsed the proposition of the DRC, and the Administrative Decision lifting the embargo was published (KP 5). This turnaround shocked the CSOs, and even led Global Witness to leave the KP one month after this decision. In a message announcing Global Witness' departure, founding director Charmian Gooch declared that

the decision to endorse unlimited diamond exports from named companies in the Marange region of Zimbabwe - the scene of mass killings by the national army - has turned an international conflict prevention mechanism into a cynical corporate accreditation scheme (Global Witness, 2011).
5.1.2 Enforcement of the sanction

In spite of the export ban on diamonds from the Marange Fields, diamonds were found on the market between November 2009 and November 2011. As noted by PAC, South Africa was the principal gateway for smugglers (PAC, 2012, p.12). However, large quantities of Marange diamonds have also been found in the DRC (Ibid.). Moreover, according to Global Witness, Zimbabwe exported shipments of diamonds from Marange to the United Arab Emirates (GW, 2010, p.10). Indeed, according to a reportage from Dhadija Sharife and John Grobler, Marange diamonds were smuggled out of Zimbabwe to DRC, which sent them to the tax haven of Dubai. In the Dubai Diamond Exchange, 'clean' diamonds are mixed with conflict diamonds and then sent to Antwerp with a KPC from the United Arab Emirates (Sharife & Grobler, 2013, p.69).

5.2 Effectiveness of the export ban on Central African diamonds

5.2.1 Primary objectives

The intersessional meeting in Shanghai from 9th to 12th June 2014 devoted a special attention to the situation of the CAR (KP 12, 2014). The KP acknowledged that despite the CAR suspension, Central African diamonds had been found on the international market of rough diamonds. Therefore, the export ban was maintained.

The deteriorating political situation of the CAR led France to launch a military intervention on December 5th 2013, known as the Operation Sangaris, the 7th French military intervention in the country since its independence in 1960. Four months later, on April 10th 2014, the UN send the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilizations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), a peacekeeping mission mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
5.2.2 Enforcement of the sanction

Despite the export ban, diamonds from the CAR were found on the international market after May 2013. Indeed, according to the ICG, the activity has slowed down but smugglers seem to have found a way to get around the embargo (ICG, 2014, p.11). The ICG revealed how smugglers passed by Cameroon, member of the KP since 2012, and Sudan which is not a participant of the KP. The Cameroonian route for smuggling existed before the embargo was imposed – Central Africans sold their diamonds to Cameroonian gems dealers on the other side of the border. However, the ICG noted that the smuggling through Cameroon was particularly controlled by the KP which was alerted and now conducts investigations whenever diamonds from suspect origin are caught. While diamond smuggling diminished in Cameroon, according to the ICG, more and more diamonds are smuggled out of the country via the North, through Sudan (Ibid, p.13).
6 Conclusions

6.1 Results

In this study, I have focused on the following question: How effective are the sanctions targeted on diamonds from the Marange fields and the CAR imposed by the Kimberley Process? I thus focused on two KP participants whose political situation put their membership at stake.

In Zimbabwe, the dictatorial regime of President Robert Mugabe inflicted severe human rights abuses on illegal miners from the Marange Fields. Furthermore, the whole diamond industry of the Marange Fields was corrupt, since the income generated by the diamond trade never reached in the Zimbabwean Treasury but rather went to senior members of Mugabe's government. In addition, diamonds from the Marange Fields were smuggled out of the country without any KPC, thus delegitimizing the whole KPCS. Therefore, ending human rights abuses, corruption and smuggling were the three primary objectives of the KP sanction targeted on conflict diamonds from the Marange Fields imposed in November 2009. However, two years after the imposition of the sanction, the KP lifted the sanction even though no clear improvements of the situation had been made. Indeed, as we have seen, smuggling was still ongoing, human rights abuses were still perpetrated and corruption still present.

On the other hand, the situation in the CAR was very similar to that of the resource wars of the 1990s, such as in Sierra Leone and Angola. Indeed, rebels took control of the alluvial diamond-producing areas of the country and forced people to search for diamonds for them. Therefore, the conflict did not pose any definitional debate unlike the situation in the Marange Fields.

One year and a half after the imposition of the sanction in May 2013, the Central
African Republic conflict is still ongoing. Moreover, both the Séléka group and the anti-balaka control the diamond-producing areas and use the diamonds to finance their activities. France sent a military intervention, followed by a UN peacekeeping mission, as a consequence of the deteriorating political situation in the CAR. Indeed, both the anti-balaka and the Séléka have the control of the majority of the diamond-producing areas in the East near Bria and in the West of the country.

The major enforcement issue of the KP sanctions is therefore diamond evasion, through smuggling. The major problem is that, except for the CAR's diamond evasion through Sudan and the Marange Fields diamonds via Mozambique, most of the smuggling takes place inside the legal KP system (PAC, 2012, p.12). As the report on the Dubai Diamond Exchange has shown, most of the smuggled Marange diamonds were found on the international market thanks to this subsidiary company, mixing 'clean' gems with conflict diamonds (Sharife & Grober 2013).

According to my findings, the targeted sanctions against conflict diamonds from the Marange Fields have failed both on the first level of analysis, i.e. the political objectives and on the second level of analysis, regarding the enforcement of the sanction. In a similar way, the sanction against the conflict diamonds from the CAR failed on both levels.

6.2 Discussion

Targeted sanctions are more difficult to administer than comprehensive sanctions. They are indeed more complex and more difficult to implement and demand a certain amount of political will. By analyzing the Administrative Decisions officializing the sanctions against the conflict diamonds from the CAR and the Marange Fields, we have seen that all official KP texts are very vague when it comes to identifying the objectives of the sanctions. Moreover, they never mention human rights abuses, which are the core of the conflict diamond issues. Human rights are indeed mentioned in the KPCS Preamble, but the lack of clarity of the KPCS Preamble regarding its task vis-à-vis human rights has
led some governments to state that the KP was not a humanitarian organisation and was therefore not compelled to sanction Zimbabwe. Indeed, the Marange Fields was an unprecedented case for the KP since the perpetrators of human rights abuses linked to diamonds were not rebels but the government itself.

CSOs such as GW have requested the KP to include the protection of human rights. At the Plenary Meeting taking place in Johannesburg from November 19th to 22nd 2013, the South African state opened the Assembly by claiming that the Kimberley Process was not intended to stop the abuse of human rights (RFI, 2013). In an interview, Director of Southern Africa Resource Watch (SARW) Claude Kabemba argues that the diamond-producing countries, especially with the recent case of Zimbabwe, fear that Western countries want to use human rights as an excuse to overthrow regimes that they do not trust. Therefore, like South Africa, several African diamond-producing countries argue that it would be dangerous to include human rights in the KP since human rights are not clearly defined (RFI, 2013). Therefore, as the case of Zimbabwe has shown, the KP seems to be an inappropriate body for resolving crises in dictatorial regimes.

In economic sanction theory, scholars have made the distinction between expressive and instrumental purposes of sanctions. Galtung classified sanctions into two categories expressive and instrumental. An instrumental sanction is a sanction aimed at influencing the receiving country, while an expressive sanction is a symbolic instrument, aiming at signaling or expressing internal tensions (Baldwin, 1985, p.97). It is difficult to assess whether the KP sanctions targeted on the Marange Fields and Zimbabwe were instrumental or expressive. Indeed, in both cases, efforts were made to improve the situation through the different working groups, such as the Working Group on Monitoring.

However, regarding the two goals of the KP targeted sanctions, namely coercion and signaling, I would say that in the case of the CAR, the sanction did not fulfill its coercive purpose since the illegal traffic of diamonds is still ongoing today and the government has still no control over the diamond exploitation. The UN resolved the conflict by sending the UN peacekeeping MINUSCA operation. However, the sanction sent a clear signal and was coherently monitored, since the KP maintains the embargo. In the case of Zimbabwe, the signal to the government was blurry; indeed, the lifting of
the embargo without any clear improvement of the situation was unexpected.

My hypothesis turned out to be wrong; the tripartite structure of the KP did not particularly enhance the effectiveness of the sanctions. The KP is almost predominantly state-controlled, since only states are allowed to be KP Chair and to vote in Plenary Meetings. Moreover, Administrative Decisions are made by consensus, which means that a minority of participants can block a proposed decision. This structure exasperated in particular Global Witness, who decided to leave the KP after the Zimbabwe case.

Nevertheless, we cannot blame the KP for everything. We have to keep mind that the diamond is one of the most lootable natural resources in particular because of its small size and the difficulty of assessing its origin. Moreover, as we have seen in Le Billion's and Nicholls' study on the effectiveness of military interventions, revenue sharings and economic sanctions in resource wars, economic sanctions have only one chance in to two of being successfully implemented. Therefore, the problem may also arise from the targeted sanctions themselves. For further research, it would be interesting to turn the question the other way around, and question the relevance of commodity sanctions in the situation of a conflict linked with diamonds.

To conclude, I would say that through my case studies on the conflict diamonds of the Marange Fields and from the Central African Republic, we can see that the Kimberley Process has neither had the capacity nor the ability to resolve the conflicts autonomously.
7 References

Scientific books and articles


NGO and Research Institute reports and publications


Press articles


KP reports, administrative decisions and work plans

KP 1: KP Basics.
http://www.kimberleyprocess.com/en/about

KP 2a: Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.

KP 2: Temporary KP Monitor for Marange.

KP 3: Administrative Decision Zimbabwe and Work Plan, 2009

KP 5: Administrative Decision on Zimbabwe, 2011.


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KP 8: Situation Map, December 31st 2012.


KP 12: Administrative Decision on ensuring that diamonds from the Central African Republic are not introduced into the legitimate trade, 2014.


KP 14: Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, Fact Finding Mission By Abbey
Chikane, KP Monitor for Marange, Zimbabwe 21 March 2010
Annex 1: Amnesty International France poster for the conflict diamond campaign

« What price for these diamonds? »
Annex 2: Location of the Main Diamond Producing Sites in Zimbabwe

Source: Létourneau, J., Smilie, I., 2009