From Bullets to Ballots

A comparative case study of the political transition of ANC and Hamas

Christian Eklind
Christopher Angenfelt
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Abstract

In this paper the authors perform a comparative case study between the political groups ANC and Hamas. Using the theoretical framework of Mimmi Söderberg-Kovacs as well as Anniseh Van Engeland and Rachel M. Rudolph the authors has constructed a set of variables to determine what allows a terrorist group to transition to a political party. The dependent variable is constructed as the successful transition to a political party. The independent variables consist of friends, factions and followers. These independent variables are operationalized through indicator-question constructed by Söderberg-Kovacs theory regarding rebel-groups. The two cases are presented on the basis of the independent variables and the indicator-questions. The paper continues with a within-case analysis as well as a between case analysis and concludes that the cases differed in regards to the independent variables. The variables friends and factions do not seem to be essential in the transition from terrorist-group to a political party.

Keywords: ANC, Hamas, terrorist group, terror group, political party, transition, transformation

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1. Introduction

“Ending this war in Gaza begins with recognizing Hamas as a legitimate political actor.”
(Carter, 2014)

Our opening quote from Jimmy Carter raises an important question. How do we respond to terrorist groups and their transition to a political actor? This question intrigues us and raises even more questions.

The act of terror and terrorism are today well-established subjects in the studies of peace and conflict. How do terror groups operate and how should they be dealt with are important questions that arise when meeting this sort of violence. The discourse surrounding this phenomenon focuses mostly on those defining characteristics that mark terrorism. The use of terror and horrible violence for political means as well as the structures inside and outside of terror groups are well researched puzzles and rightly so for the sole purpose of understanding them. This paper will focus on another puzzle that we regard as equally important to study. The phenomenon that is the transition from terror groups to political parties. This means another way of looking at terrorist groups as something other than a violent political group. Instead observe the phenomenon that is the transitions of terror groups. This simply gives us another perspective in which maybe another approach to terrorism can be viable.
2. Research question

The fact that some terrorist groups are able to transition to political parties tells us something. The fact that not all terror groups makes this transition tells us even more. There is something that defines what and why some terror groups are able to make this transition while others do not. This transition and what it requires of the terror group as an organization and of its surroundings could shed light on new approaches to dealing with terrorism.

This paper aims to answer the following research question:

- *Why do/can some terrorist groups transform into political parties while others cannot?*

With the starting point in Söderberg-Kovacs theoretical framework regarding rebel groups transition to viable political parties we mean examine the same transition in terror groups. By studying and comparing two cases where a successful transition from terror group to a political party, while looking at the variables from Söderberg-Kovacs as well as Van Engeland and Rudolph regarding the transition, we mean to explain this research question.
3. Theoretical framework

3.1 Previous literature

This subject has not been overly represented in the academic studies of conflict and peace. We found two theories relevant to our research question and have chosen to address both of them. The theory that we will mainly focus on is Mimmi Söderberg-Kovacs theory on the transition form rebel groups to what she names viable political parties.

The other theory we found applicable to our research was the theory by Anisseh Van Engeland and Rachael M. Rudolph. Their theory on the transition from terrorist-group to legitimate political party is slightly different from the one described by Söderberg-Kovacs. However the variables each set of scholars presented were very similar and comparable.

3.2 Theoretical premises

The notion that terrorist-groups can convert into peaceful political parties is an idea that entices many. The contemporary literature however seldom tries to distinguish the different variables in a way that allows us to connect the transition-period of various terrorist-groups. Instead of looking at each case individually we intend to look at each terror-groups transition-process collectively, thus enabling us to find the patterns for a successful transition to a legitimate political party.

Söderberg-Kovacs argues that there is a particular set of variables that will determine whether a rebel-group can achieve a successful transition or not. Söderberg-Kovacs research is limited to “rebel-groups” instead of terror-groups, which is more defined in the literature of Van Engeland and Rudolph. Nevertheless their research is very similar.
Anisheh Van Engeland and Rachael M. Rudolph have tried to locate the variables necessary for a successful transformation from terror-group to a political party. They have conducted a series of comparative case studies, narrowing the transition into five incumbent variables. They argue that recognition, policies, political will, political ideology and leadership structure are necessary for the transition and survival of the terror-group if they are to embrace a democratic approach and become a legitimate political party (Van Engeland & Rudolph. 2008 p.9).

3.3 Dependent variable - Political party

The dependent variable in Söderberg-Kovacs theory is named “viable political party” and establishes in what cases a successful transition is made. The indicator-question Söderberg-Kovacs uses is “Did the rebel-group transform into a viable opposition party?” Söderberg-Kovacs states two important groups of indicators in the determination of the variables. The first group aims to capture the group’s abandonment of armed struggle in communications and actions. The other groups aim to capture the groups continued political development during and after the transition. In other words the other group of indicators will try and capture whether the group are able to survive as a political party (Söderberg-Kovacs, 2007: 52).

Van England and Rudolph suggests that violence does not exclude a transformation but argues that the desire for political participation might lead to disarmament and consolidation. Therefor she views a viable political party differently than Söderberg-Kovacs (Van England, 2008: 5). The authors points out that Western powers are quick to put a label on terrorist-groups attempting to make a transition. She sees this as problematic and makes the case that violent rebel or terrorist-groups also must be taken into consideration as they make a transition towards a more political stance. Basically she states that each group must be looked at differently and viewed in the perspective of their own history and culture. To simply dismiss a terrorist-groups transition just because it still has a violent character is foolish argues Van England (Van England, 2008: x)
3.4 Independent variables: Friends, Followers, Factions

3.4.1 Söderberg-Kovacs

Söderberg-Kovacs limits her independent variables to the following; friends, factions, and followers.

*Friends* she argues is determined by how much international support you have as a rebel-group, is the support strong the more likely you are to succeed making your transition. The degree of legitimacy received by “key international actors” is critical regarding the transition to a viable political party. The legitimacy received from international third parties provides the rebel group with the political and material/economic support required for the transformation to a political party. The question that Söderberg-Kovacs uses as an indicator for her independent variable *friends* is “Was the rebel group granted a high degree of international legitimacy during the peace process?” (Söderberg-Kovacs, 2007: 54-55).

*Factions* is represented by the cohesiveness in the group, is there a lot of internal disaffection or is the group harmonized. Söderberg-Kovacs makes the case that a party’s unity is often more fragile than one would assume. She argues that during a possible transformation the cohesiveness of the party might be at its weakest. This is because officials within the party might realize that their current positions are threatened if the party decides to go in a different direction. If said officials feel they might not be needed the same way as before it is possible they will object to the transformation (Söderberg-Kovacs, p. 27-28). Power struggles are therefore the main threat to a successful transition and what embodies “factions” as Söderberg-Kovacs sees it. The question that Söderberg-Kovacs used as her general indicator for this variable is “Was there a high degree of cohesion within the rebel group at the time of the peace process?” (Söderberg-Kovacs, 2009: ibid.)

*Followers* is basically the domestic population and where the groups recruit most of their members. For a transition to take place it is important that is has the support of the groups “followers” (Söderberg-Kovacs, 2009: 8). It is important for the party’s survival that there
are not any other similar groups competing for members. What is more important is that the support of members of the rebel or terrorist-group can translate into electoral votes. When a rebel-group becomes a political party it is utterly critical that the party maintains its support from all its members. Söderberg-Kovacs means that for a party to achieve a successful transformation it must make sure it creates a political landscape where their previous support remains strong. So in other word; manage to maintain the domestic support even tough the direction of the party has turned. The question that Söderberg-Kovacs uses as her general indicator is “Did the rebel have a high degree of popular support at the time of the peace process?” (Söderberg-Kovacs, 2009: 53-54)

4. Research design

4.1 Our method of design

This research paper will be a comparative case study regarding two successful transitions from terror group to political party. We aim to explain the process of terrorist groups transitioning to a legitimate political party, and therefore a comparative method is a necessary (Van Engeland, 2008: 9).

With a starting point in Mimmi Söderberg-Kovacs work regarding the same sort of transition in rebel groups, we mean to test this theory on terror groups. Even though Söderberg-Kovacs has narrowed down her research to only involve rebel-groups we will try to use her thesis in a way where terrorist-groups are the main subject and see if her thesis is applicable for that particular group as well. We have chosen to modify the variables in which we study in accordance to Anniseh Van Engeland and Rachel M. Rudolphs theoretical framework regarding terrorist groups. This methodological approach allows us to adjust some variables to make Söderberg-Kovacs theory applicable in the cases of terrorist groups.
4.2 Case-selection

We are aiming to explain this phenomenon. According to John Stuart Mills the first step to explain a phenomenon is to study cases where it has occurred. The meaning of this is simply that we need to study cases where the dependent variable is the same, namely cases where a transition from terror group to political party has occurred. Our starting point in our research question is therefore based on our dependent variable. We follow Mills recommendation and choose Mills method of agreement as the design regarding our research (Esaiasson, 2012: 115).

We have chosen the ANC and Hamas as our cases in this study. ANC was chosen for its significant transition from a terrorist group to a political party, which makes it an essential case to study. The second case is Hamas, which is more controversial in terms of successful transition. We find that by choosing an extreme case we can establish more strength to our theory.

We are aware of the methodological problems that arise in our study regarding not being able to include non-successful transitions in our research. This means that the strength in Mills methods of difference will not be present in our research. A stronger deduction would be possible if our variables could explain similarities between successful transitions as well as eliminating the unsuccessful ones (Esaiasson, 2012: 116-117).

4.3 Defining our variables

Our dependent variable is the successful transition from terrorist-group to political party. When using Söderberg-Kovacs theory regarding rebel-groups and applying it on terrorist-groups, we have concluded that we need to alter our parameters in which we measure. The case made by Söderberg-Kovacs states that a political party “... seeks to attain power exclusively through non-violent means in electoral completion with one or more similar organisations within the political system” (Söderberg-Kovacs, 2009: 17). To be able to test this theory to even include terror-groups in the grey zone of Söderberg-Kovacs definition, we must question the term “viable political party”.

In accordance to the definition made by Van Engeland and Rudolph we find that the
definition given by Söderberg-Kovacs is too narrow and insufficient in explaining terror- 
groups. We argue that Van Engeland and Rudolphs points regarding what defines a political 
party and when a successful transition is made, as mentioned in our theoretic framework-
section. We define “a political party” as a democratically elected party with a political 
ideology, will and policy as well as a political legitimacy in its own context.

Our independent variables that we will use in this study consist of Söderberg-Kovacs three 
independent variables and are the following: friends, factions, and followers. We argue that 
these three independent variables will be able to explain our dependent variable. We have 
found many similarities between the two theories, regarding their independent variables, used 
in this paper and therefore find these three as appropriate to study. The following section will 
explain our operationalization of our variables.

4.4 Operationalization

Our independent variables need to be deconstructed for a better understanding of our 
research. We will start of by distinguishing the variables of Söderberg-Kovacs. Her three 
variables can be clarified as three questions, acting as main indicators, as she have done in 
her study. Söderberg-Kovacs also presented several secondary indicators within these three 
main questions. We have chosen to use her three primary questions as our indicators and 
chosen three of her secondary indicator-questions in each question.

**Main indicator-question (Friends):** Was the terror group granted a high degree of 
international legitimacy during the transition?

**Secondary indicator-questions (Friends):**

- Did they provide confidence-building measures?
- What kind of support? Non-material (diplomatic and political) or material (financial 
  and technical)
- Any significant third-party pressure?
  (Söderberg-Kovacs, 2009: 54-55)
In accordance with this definition we will try to map out all the international support both ANC and Hamas received before and during their transitions from key international actors. We will survey both material and non-material support. We will try to conclude to what extent the international support helped the rebel-groups to transform and achieve legitimacy.

**Main indicator-question (Factions):** *Was there a high degree of cohesion within the rebel group at the time of the transition?*

**Secondary indicator-questions (Factions):**

- Did the prospects of abandoning the armed struggle and entering into legal politics threaten to change the distribution of selective benefits within the organisation and the intra-party balance of power?
- Did the group become internally divided over the merits of the peace process due to the prospects of these changes?
- Did military commanders or mid-level officers challenge the leadership’s decision? (Söderberg-Kovacs, 2009: 53-52)

In accordance with this definition we will try to look at the ANC and Hamas from a unity perspective where we record the internal fight each party went trough. We will emphasize the part of internal struggles at the point of party-transition and see how it might have affected the outcome of the party.

**Main indicator-question (Followers):** *Did the terror group have a high degree of popular support at the time of the transition?*

**Secondary indicator-questions (Followers):**

- Did the rebels appeal to grievances among the population?
- Did the rebel group use violence on the civilian population?
- Did the political actors, including the government compete with the rebels for the same domestic support in the post-settlement period? (Söderberg-Kovacs, 2009: 53-54)
In accordance with this definition we will try to see about the support of the domestic people and if that support might have shifted come transformation. We will focus on the political landscape at the time; see if there were other political parties (or even the regime) attempting to steal members from the parties. Above all we will look upon the support from the domestic population during the transition itself. To some extent we will also see if the party managed to keep their popular support or if it wavered when all the goals were achieved.

4.5 Material

In this study we have established three variables that we deemed, in unison with our theories, as important in our case-research. These variables and their indicator-question served us as directions for what empirical data was necessary to be able to answer out research question. Our theories are taken from Mimmi Söderberg-Kovacs “From rebellion to politics” and from Anniseh Van Engeland and Rachel M. Rudolph’s “From terrorists to politics”. We found that regarding empirical data from our cases, there was a lot of material. Both groups are well represented in the academic research community even though the area of this paper is not.
5. Cases

This is the section in where we present our empiric data on our cases. We will start with a very brief background to the group where we present the groups past and present status in a concise manner. We later go on to the transition of the groups from terror-groups to political parties. Last we present our empiric data regarding the variables that we are to analyse in our next section.

5.1 Hamas

5.1.1 Background

The group emerged in the Palestinian territory shortly after the outbreak of the first intifada 1987, named The Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya i.e. Hamas. The group initially acted as the militant wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic religious movement, and has since its founding been connected with Islamic militancy. The group has been actively using violent tactics such as mortar attacks and suicide bombings against the state of Israel and its citizens. The group has also been continuously active in movements regarding social welfare for Palestinians. Hamas works through a network of social welfare organizations in the West bank and Gaza strip and devotes large amount of resources and energy towards the Palestinian community (Sing, 2012: 531).

5.1.2 The transition

In 2006 Palestine held its second election in the state’s history. The first election was held in 1996 and was boycotted by Hamas. The elections of 2006 were of significant importance for the situation in the area due to it being the first election after the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza settlements and the death of Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian leader (Zweiri, 2006: 675). Leading up to the election there were conflicts between Palestinian political groups about
who would be controlling the Gaza strip after the Israeli withdrawal. Hamas as well as the former ruling group Fatah, both claimed to be responsible for the Israeli withdrawal. The situation in Gaza had been difficult for the Palestinian interim regime, the Palestinian Authority (PA), to handle and Hamas used this opportunity to establish its influence in Gaza (Zweiri, 2006: 676). The election was held in January 2006 and Hamas held 76 seats out of 132 and gained a majority in parliament (Zweiri, 2006: 657).

5.1.3 Friends

Britain was the first country to engage in talks with Hamas officials during the period leading up to the election in 2006. It became clear that one of the biggest reasons Hamas took part in the democratic process was so the international community would stop its boycott on Hamas. They estimated that the party and its officials once elected would become recognized globally and be seen as the legitimate representatives of Palestine. They were therefore very keen on establishing international support at that point, thus working heavily to emerge as the electoral winners (Tamini, 2011: 214-215). However Hamas should not have made the assumption that the election would grant them indisputable legitimacy in all corners of the world. Israel and USA were still reluctant to recognize Hamas as a true representative of Palestine. George W. Bush made it clear that Hamas was a terrorist-group that should not be allowed to take part in the election and if they were to win the outcome should not be recognized (Tamini, 2011: 214).

In terms of material support Hamas and Iran has had ties involving financing during the late 1980 and through the 1990s. Leading up the election and thereafter the relationship between Hamas and Iran evolved to a more extensive partnership, meaning Hamas chief military supplier as well as financial support. Hamas also had a supporter in the form of Egypt, despite their relationship between Iran (Frisch, 2007: 1-2).

Until in February 2012 Hamas had been supported by the Syrian government and its leader Bashar al-Assad. The cooperation was ended by Hamas and was replaced with an increase in backing from anti-Syrian Islamist regimes in Turkey supported by Qatar (Byman, 2013: 65). The situation regarding Syria caused a rift between Iran and Hamas, which cause Iran to cut off financial support the Hamas-lead government in Gaza as well as aiding political rivals to Hamas. During a speech in Egypt in February 2012, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh denounced
Syrian leader Assad while at the same time representatives for Hamas in Iran praised the Iranian regime and its importance to Hamas (Byman, 2013: 66).

Hamas image internationally is quite dual in its nature. The organization has had support regarding material needs and to some degree diplomatic, but it has also experienced setbacks in terms of international legitimacy. Many nations, including the United States have been critical towards Hamas legitimacy. (Byman, 2013: 65) The united front against Hamas, consisting of Israel and the United States as well as Europe and leading Arab governments, is argued to be “cracking”. Leaders from Egypt, Qatar, Turkey and the Arab League have been in Gaza with the assurance of support and legitimacy towards the Hamas government (Byman, 2013: 64-65). At the moment countries that declare Hamas as a terrorist group include: the United States, Israel, Canada, Egypt and Australia. Countries that do not regard Hamas as a terrorist group are: Russia, China, Iran, Turkey and Qatar.

5.1.4 Factions

Following the election victory members of Hamas were divided in the stance towards the new circumstances that were facing the party. On one hand some were optimistic and hoped that the democratic election had made the party more rightful and perhaps more desirable to deal with. Others were quick to realize that without international recognition the election meant nothing (Tamini, 2011: 225-226).

There is a lot of inter-clan warfare and disaffection in the Hamas movement. For instance one senior official of Hamas, namely Nizar Rayan strongly opposed the democratic transition the party undertook in 2006 through electoral votes. Rayan refused to recognize his prime ministers authority and deliberately tried to steer the party towards a more violent path without compromise. The argument can be made that many high officials within Hamas do not view a democratic approach as something that would ensure the party’s legitimacy. There is also a lot of scepticism and resentment towards the Western powers and the UN. There might not however be a coincidence that Rayan, whom is a high ranked official in the party’s military wing might see his own value diminished if Hamas was to undertake another more peaceful approach (Platt, 2009: 20-21).
From 2010 onwards it seems as the military wing of Hamas is ascending into greater power than previous years. The military wing is now starting to assume control over the movement’s political course, getting more and more involved in the actual policymaking of the party. Hamas continues to struggle with the on-going debate regarding the direction of the party it is has become evident that the future course is far from set in stone (Yaari 2012).

5.1.5 Followers

During the political campaign during the 2006-elections Hamas had six main issues that were used by the candidates to convince the voters. These issues were corruption, negotiations with Israel, the use of violence, Jerusalem, refugees and borders. These were issues the Palestinian Authority had have problems dealing with during the Israeli presence in Gaza. Hamas and its candidates were aware of the strategically importance of these main issues and pressed on them instead of their performance regarding their military or resistance activities. At the same time Fatah, the opposing political group, have had issues regarding corruption in the own organization, which Hamas used to their advantage (Zweiri, 2006: 676-677).

In preparation to the election Hamas issued a truce to the state of Israel, in which stated that Hamas would not attack Israel if Israel ceased their offensive against Palestinian cities. Hamas also issued a manifesto, which addressed their participation in the election. The manifesto was named “Change and Reform List” and focused on the daily-life issues of the Palestinian people. It also pressed on the issues of corruption, unemployment and security as well as a plan for reform of the Palestinian administration (Zweiri, 2006: 677).

Hamas charitable work amongst Palestinian population was an important factor in them winning the election. The network of social welfare organisations caused considerable grassroots support among the voters and helped them build political legitimacy and longevity (Sing, 2012: 531-532).

The political climate regarding Hamas and its political opponents is described, during Hamas take-over of Gaza as violent and ruthless on the behalf of Hamas. The violence was directed towards Palestinian rivals, primarily Fatah. The justification for these actions works through the narrative that the secular opposition is an obstacle for the objective towards a national independence (Sing, 2012: 533). After the elections the tensions between Hamas and its main
political opponent Fatah became more intense. Fatah had control over the Palestinian Authority and the West bank while Hamas had control over Gaza. Even though Hamas had secured the victory in the election, Palestine was torn between two contenders for representing the Palestinian people (Byman, 2013: 64).

As mentioned before the provision of social services, the resistance towards the Israeli occupation and its strong points regarding corruption granted them a broad-based support among the Palestinian population. Statistics estimate 65% of education below secondary school level in Gaza is provided institutions influenced by Hamas (Bhasin, 2012: 82).

5.2 ANC

5.2.1 Background

ANC means the “African National Congress”. It is a democratic political party founded in 1912. The main objective of the ANC was to abolish apartheid and bring an end to the racial discrimination that took place in South Africa at the time. The ANC was long seen as a vicious terrorist-group, often due to their military unit the MK. MK was responsible for a series of terrorist-attacks and killed a large number of civilians during their tenure (Maharaj, 2008: 7-8, 30-31).

5.2.2 The transition

In 1994 South Africa became a constitutional state and the ANC won the upcoming election by a vast majority. Since then the party has continued to dominate the politics in South Africa and has maintained most of its early supporters. The ANC is in many ways the definition of a successful transformation where a terrorist-group ended up as the biggest and most legitimate political party in a country torn apart by racial struggles (Maharaj 2008: 8).

5.2.3 Friends

A big reason the ANC was able to convert violence to peaceful negotiations and eventually be able to run for power was the fact that the party had immense international support during
the later years of the apartheid. In the 1980s the Western powers that previously had bolstered apartheid in South Africa now came under heavy pressure from their own citizens. As this growing phenomenon continued the ANC actively tried to gain more support on the international arena. For example the ANC led a campaign for boycott of South African goods. This campaign was first launched in the UK. The ANC also led the campaign for releasing Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners as well as forming very good relations with the world council of churches (Maharaj 2008:16).

As support for the ANC continued to grow abroad many anti-apartheid movements began to show. It first came into place in Britain and after a few years it was pressuring governments all around the world. In the USA some community level actions forced many institutions to withdraw their investments in South Africa. The Chase Manhattan Bank for instance declined to roll over its credits to the South African regime, making a clear stand in the struggle for power within the country (Maharaj 2008: 16-17).

An interesting aspect was that the West started to no longer be dependent on the utility of South Africa due to the diminishment of the Cold War. This of course helped the ANC to gain support internationally (Maharaj 2008:16-17).

5.2.4 Factions

The road to politics has not always easy for the ANC as becomes evident in the long history of the party. Internal political battles were very common within the ANC leading up to the abolishment of apartheid in 1992. The disagreements could vary from fighting-tactics to which political ideology that best suited the party. Another internal problem within the party was the fact that many members just worked in the party in order to promote their own private interests, thus weakening the unity of ANC even more (Zwelethu, 2011).

The biggest challenge when it came to the unity of the party was in the 1950s when the PAC broke away from the ANC claiming ANC had betrayed the material interests of the African people. The PAC was no more than a breakaway party to the ANC but non-the less they depicted the challenges the ANC was facing in regards to maintaining the unity of the group. As mentioned before there were wide ranges of approaches members wanted to take which often led to quarrels and fall-outs within the party (Meli, 1988: 137).
There was always a notion of communism lurking in the ANC-ranks. Communism was also a dividing factor within the party. Throughout the year there have been many attempts to break the bond with communism but it is still present with the ANC to this day (Zwelethu, 2011).

When peace talks began to take place in the late 1980s Mandela and other high officials in the ANC were worried that their supporters would think they had become submissive and did no longer stand on the side of the people in their struggle. They acknowledged that the cohesion of the party was extremely important to maintain. It was with the help of great leadership that helped the party stay fairly cohesive during the transition-period even tough many members were suspicious of the new approach the party undertook. One example that helped strengthen the cohesiveness of the party was the fact that Mandela and his officials formed a negotiations committee during the negotiations, which then briefed the entire party sections during the process. This helped the party remain cohesive and in touch with their members (Maharaj 2008: 22-23).

5.2.5 Followers

There was always a sense of unity amongst the black communities in South Africa. Since they all suffered the same fate and shared the same experience they could form a sort of brotherhood. This made it easy for the domestic black population to relate to parties like the ANC. However what really made the ANC a desirable party form the majority of black South Africans was the declaration of the Freedom Charter in 1955. The charter embodied all the thoughts about liberation and when it was presented it undoubtedly made the ANC gain a significant amount of members (Maharaj 2008: 7-8)

There seemed to be an eternal dialogue within the ANC to determine to what extent the civilian population should be targeted in terrorist-attacks. The ANC never really intended for innocent civilians to die but contra wise many civilians were killed by the ANC before its transition. For example there was the shopping centre bombing in 1985 conducted by an ANC-member, which left 5 civilians dead. The debate that followed stirred heated emotions in the party. On one hand the ANC-officials had renounced violence towards civilians but on the other hand the masses were screaming for payback against the harsh state-brutality that frequently occurred. This was and remained a big problem for the ANC throughout its early
years and even though the party never claimed to be willing to kill innocent civilians, civilians were still subject to attacks and other operations (Maharaj 2008: 30-31)

The ANC maintained a strong support during the entire peace process as becomes evident in the first democratic selection that took place in 1994. The ANC received 62% of the votes becoming the by far biggest party in South Africa (Maharaj 2008: 8).
6. Analysis

In this section we will analysis our empirical data in two forms. First we will take each case and analyse each independent variable to explain our reasoning in the determined value of the independent variable. We call this part our within-case analysis. Secondly we will proceed to our between-case analysis, where we aim for a comparative approach regarding the two cases. In the second section we will put the variables from each respective case in contrast to each other, in order to question our theory.

6.1 Within-case analysis

6.1.2 Hamas

Friends

**Main indicator-question:** *Was the terror group granted a high degree of international legitimacy during the transition?*

The international support Hamas received before their transition was mainly from other Arab nations and groups aiding them with material aid, mainly through financial support, military training and supplies.

In regards to non-material support, before the election the diplomatic and political support was scarce. Regarded by many nations as a terrorist group and shunned by the United States and Israel. During and after the elections the united front against Hamas was dissolving, with Hamas denouncing the Assad-led Syrian government new allies were to be found in the Arab nations. However the political manoeuvring by Hamas caused a rift between their ally Iran and resulted in a loss in financial support. The literature tends to mention Hamas dual nature
in regards to it gaining more legitimacy from other nations while still being supplied weapons and military training from Iran.

It was always debatable to what extent Hamas would receive international legitimacy following an electoral victory. The notion that they might become legitimate however seemed to encourage Hamas to undertake more democratic measures and to strive for a more democratic transition.

We conclude that there was not a high degree of legitimacy towards Hamas during the transition-process. In terms of support there was material aid but regarding diplomatic and political aid the support was scarce.

**Factions**

**Main indicator-question:** *Was there a high degree of cohesion within the rebel group at the time of the transition?*

Hamas was subject to internal disaffection during and after the transition towards democracy. There have been several instances where high-ranking officials within Hamas have been vocal about their resentment towards negotiations and change from violence to democracy.

Hamas still seem to undergo internal struggles to this day. One can argue that there still lies a great deal of scepticism within the party, directed towards the Western Powers and the UN. Since the road towards legitimacy has become even harder, members of the party may have started to trend in a different direction.

We extrapolate that both during and after the election there was to some degree internal struggles regarding the groups’ political direction.

**Followers**

**Main indicator-question:** *Did the group have a high degree of popular support during the transition?*
The political landscape for Hamas during their transition was turbulent, where rivalling groups was fighting for the chance to represent the Palestinian people. Leading up to the election Hamas and Fatah, the previous leading party, was contending for the electoral votes. During the election there was certainly a high level of competition for the domestic support.

Hamas had a great deal of local support through these social welfare-networks. Their political platform pressed issues important to the daily life of the Palestinian people. Issues like corruption and the current governing administration as well as dealings with Israel and the use of violence was declared important in Hamas issued manifesto.

The local support after the election and transition to a political party was harder to define. Hamas is still considered to have strong support within the region but generally has the population less confidence in both opposing parties, according to recent studies. What is clear is that Hamas has been diligent in providing social services and welfare to population and that they still are an important provider of these in the day-to-day life of Palestinians. We find that this motivates the argument of a high degree of local support during and after election. They appeal to grievances in the population and did not perform military attacks on the own population.

We conclude that during the transition Hamas experienced a high degree of popular support during the transition.

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Table 1

6.1.2 ANC

Friends

**Main indicator-question:** *Was the terror group granted a high degree of international legitimacy during the peace process?*
ANC had an immense support during their transition-period. Even tough there might not have been scores of regimes actively calling for democracy there was still a vast number of big lobby-groups in especially Europe that lobbied for the legitimacy and recognition of ANC.

The support the ANC received internationally was mostly non-material. The majority of the support can be limited to political campaigning as well as political pressure on the current regime to recognize the ANC. Pressure on the regime however could be achieved through material means, as evident in the actions of the Chase Manhattan Bank that froze the regimes credits in 1985.

The apartheid regime in South African suddenly found itself in a hard-manoeuvring situation where their own support wavered simultaneously as countries in favour of the ANC started to revoke their investments in South Africa. This amongst other things forced the apartheid regime to engage in negotiations with the ANC.

Basically the ANC would end up having a very strong support from the international arena, thus making their transition and road to legitimacy much more easier. The international legitimacy was strong from countries like Russia and in countries where regimes were less keen on actively rooting for the ANC strong lobby-groups made their voices heard.

We conclude that there was a high degree of international legitimacy during the transition.

**Factions**

**Main indicator-question:** *Was there a high degree of cohesion within the terror group at the time of the transition?*
One can argue that the unity within the ANC always remained fairly strong. Since all members strived for the same goals, namely democracy and the end of apartheid it was in the beginning easy to maintain the cohesiveness of the group. The real challenge came once the party entered into negotiations with the leading regime. It was at this point the cohesiveness of the party was at its weakest. Many members did not trust the regime and feared what the outcome may be.

It is fair to say that the party managed to exit negotiations with the party’s unity intact, making the transition smoother and party stronger. The ANC remained cohesive in the face of adversity and it seemed to have paid off immensely in the long run.

We found that there was a relatively high degree of cohesion within the terror group at the time of the transition.

**Followers**

**Main indicator-question:** Did the group have a high degree of popular support during the transition?

The argument can be made that the ANC managed to transform itself successfully because of their strong domestic support. Even tough there were many anti-apartheid parties in South Africa during the 20th century no one was as big as the ANC. The party received 62% of the votes in 1994 clearly establishing itself as the most dominant party at the time.

The case of ANC is unique in the sense that almost an entire ethnic group supported the party which not only made ANC powerful but also very empowering when it came to making statements and voice its opinions.

We found that there was a high degree of popular support at the time of the transition.

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Table 2
6.2 Between-case analysis

Friends

In both cases we found evidence of third party pressure. In the case of ANC we found that British and American lobby groups were responsible for most of the political as well as financial pressure on the South African regime. In the case of Hamas we found that to some degree there was pressure from a third party in the conflict. Hamas experienced pressure from Iran, which at the moment of the election both contributed financially and military material. The pressure was related to Hamas denouncing of the Assad-led Syrian government and their political direction toward an increased legitimacy from other anti-Syrian Arab nations.

Regarding the international support both groups was supplied with material and non-material aid, though to different extent. ANC had a high degree of material support in the form of diplomatic and political aid. ANC was widely regarded as a legitimate political actor in South Africa and was granted a high degree of legitimacy. Hamas degree of legitimacy from key-players internationally is complicated. Firstly one must understand the duality of Hamas operations. While transitioning into a political party the group still practices its violent resistance against Israel. This makes the question of legitimacy problematic. The countries denouncing Hamas and categorizing it a terrorist group includes Israel, the United States, Canada, Australia and Egypt. Countries that don’t choose to do so includes Russia, China, Iran, Turkey and Qatar. This means that the international community is divided and that even though Hamas may have less legitimacy in the eyes of the western hemisphere, it still holds political legitimacy elsewhere. Hamas had also a higher degree of non-material support from international actors when comparing to ANC.

In the cases of the ANC and Hamas confidence building seemed to be significant in the process of transition. The ANC in particular was greatly encouraged by the vast international support it received in the 80s, contributing to its will to become legitimate and recognised not only unofficially but officially as well. Hamas did not process the same amount of international support as the ANC did. That however did not change their conviction that once they were democratically elected they would be viewed as the legitimate party of Palestine.
In our analysis we find that ANC had a high degree of international legitimacy from key international actors while Hamas had a more limited degree of international legitimacy and was not recognised by key international actors.

**Factions**

Both groups experienced internal struggle regarding the organizations political direction. In the case of ANC the struggle mainly surrounding what approach was most suitable in order to achieve their goals. During the transition the cohesiveness of the party was challenged the most, in regards to whether negotiating with regime was the best option. In the case of Hamas there were internal struggle regarding the political direction towards a political party. High official members of the group were outspoken of their distrust of negotiations with Israel and the United States and in general of western powers.

What separates the two cases is that ANC managed to in a higher degree stay cohesive in a time where the unity was tested. Hamas also stayed fairly cohesive during its transition. However the ANC managed to keep its cohesiveness to a larger extent after the transition whereas the cohesiveness of Hamas wavered after their electoral victory.

In our analysis of the two cases regarding factions we find that both groups had internal struggles during the transition, but Hamas more than ANC.

**Followers**

In both cases we found that a strong local base of support for the group during the transition to a political party. Hamas work through its social programmes and welfare had an established base of support from the Palestinian population.

Both the ANC and Hamas perceived themselves as righteously fighting against an oppressor. The differing aspect is that Hamas was at the same time fighting rivalling groups for the support of the Palestinian people, whereas the ANC was indisputably the sole representative of the abolishment of apartheid.

Hamas the ANC conducted several terrorist-attacks on civilian population. ANC conducted their operations in South Africa leading up to their electoral victory in 1994. This did however not seem to change the stands of the ANC members whom almost never wavered in their unconditional support for the ANC. Hamas terrorist operations were aimed at the Israeli
government and population, and we did not find evidence of any operations aimed towards the Palestinian people.

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*Table 3*
7. Conclusion

Why can some terrorist groups transform into political parties while others cannot?

In this study we aimed to test the theory of Söderberg-Kovacs to also include terrorist-groups. Our findings show us that there are limits to our original theory and its application on terrorist groups. Measuring our independent variables we observe that our two cases differ on the variables friends and factions. Söderberg-Kovacs theory explains that these three variables are essential to the process of a successful transition. According to our study we found that Hamas does not possess the needed factors according to our theory. This tells us that these variables are not essential in a terrorist groups transition to a political party. Instead we observe the variable followers as the common independent variable in both cases.

Our own analysis of this research is that the independent variable followers is an important factor when explaining terrorist groups and their transition. We argue that a strong domestic support is one of the key factors to be able to transition from a terrorist group to a political party. We also argue that the need for a high degree of international legitimacy is not a essential factor in these cases. We found that even though both groups strived for a international legitimacy, the case of Hamas showed us that the search for legitimacy in key international actors was detrimental to the variable faction. The need to uphold the struggle against an oppressor surpassed that of international acknowledgment.


