

MASTER'S THESIS
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Burden-sharing in EU military operations

The role of adaption of national defence
- the case of Sweden and Finland in operation Atalanta



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*“European defence matters [...] it matters tremendously.
It matters for the security of our citizens and our home countries,
and to uphold our interests and values in the world.”*

Herman Van Rompuy (2013)

Abstract

In 2008, the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) launched the EU Naval Force (NAVFOR) Atalanta, the Union's first-ever naval operation. In this military mission, Sweden and Finland took different degrees of participation. This thesis analyse how adaption of national defence can explain different degrees of burden-sharing in EU military operations. The theoretical framework is based on Foreign Policy Analysis, and a new theoretical model is developed. The paper uses a comparative case study and the research methods are qualitative. From the empirical analyse, the following conclusions can be made. First, adaption of national defence can explain different degrees of burden-sharing by the fact that different EU Member States give different priorities to CSDP military operations in their national defence planning. Second, the concept of adaption is of importance when analysing burden-sharing since CSDP military operations require more than political will; it requires that EU Member States make practical adjustments in their national defence.

Key words: CSDP, operation Atalanta, burden-sharing, adaption of national defence, Foreign Policy Analysis, European Union.

Words: 19842.

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List of Abbreviations

CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DITB	European Defence Industrial and Technological Base
EC	European Community
ECAP	European Capabilities Action Plan
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EU	European Union
EU BG	EU Battle Groups
FCMA	Friendship Co-operation and Mutual Assistance Treaty
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HLG	Helsinki Headline Goal
MDS	Most Different System Design
MSSD	Most Similar System Design
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NAVFOR	EU Naval Force
OHQ	Operational Headquarters
SAF	Swedish Armed Forces
SEA	Single European Act
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
ToL	Treaty of Lisbon
UN	United Nations
WFP	World Food Programme

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1 Introduction

In December 2008, the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) achieved a significant "first" when the EU Naval Force (NAVFOR) Atalanta, the Union's first-ever naval operation, was launched to combat maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia. The operation illustrates, since it is still ongoing, 'a significant step in Europe's nascent security and defence policy'. Atalanta was designed to contribute to the international community's nascent campaign against Somali piracy, which has grown into a major international security problem. As such, the aim of the operation is to protect the World Food Programme's (WFP) humanitarian convoys and other vulnerable vessels in and around Somalia's Indian Ocean coast.¹

However, all Member States of the European Union (EU) contribute to Operation Atalanta, albeit in very different ways. Some Member States provide only mandatory financial assistance to the mission, whereas other countries contribute operationally – by deploying military personnel and equipment. More specific, the Netherlands, Greece, Finland, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Belgium and Sweden have contributed so far with vessels to operation Atalanta. Furthermore, Spain, France, Luxembourg, Portugal and Sweden have also transferred surveillance aircraft to the region. In contrast, Slovenia, Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia – as many as 14 Member States - decided not to contribute with any resources to the operation.²

Nevertheless, EU Member States can chose to take part of EU military operations or not but they also have the possibility to contribute to a high degree in the mission or contribute to a low degree. More specific, Sweden acted as the leadership state for the mission in the summer of 2010, where the country had a surface vessel and a lake reconnaissance in the area. In contrast, Finland contributed to the mission in a more limited way – by only sending humanitarian aid through voluntary organizations and a mine-vessel.³ Interestingly, Sweden and Finland decided to take different degrees of participation in operation Atalanta;

¹ Nováky, Niklas (2012) "Deploying Military Force Under CSDP: The Case of EU NAVFOR Atalanta", University of Aberdeen. Working Paper, UACES Annual Conference in Passau, p. 1.

² Soder, Kirsten (2010), "EU Crisis Management: an assessment of member state's contributions and positions", Draft for the COST Action Meeting on 10 June 2010. Received 2015-01-04 from <http://www.ies.be/files/Soder-D1-NOT4WEB.pdf>. p. 3-5.

³ Statsrådets redogörelse om Finlands deltagande i EU:s militära krishanteringsinsats Eunavfor Atalanta (211/2006), p. 1.

Sweden participated to a great extent while Finland participated to a limited extent.⁴

The observant reader may notice that these two Member States have central similarities. First, none of them is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Second, they have both pursued a policy of neutrality through history. Third, their actions in the security and defence dimension of the Union are often seen to be comparable.⁵ With this in mind, two such similar nations in the EU could be expected to contribute to operation Atalanta to the same extent but instead; the degree of participation in CSDP military operations seems to differ in an inconsistent pattern.

1.1 The research problem

CSDP military operations are collective actions that require economic, military and political resources from the participating states in the EU.⁶ However, due to the fact that all decisions with regard to participation in those missions are still being taken at the national and *not* the EU level, flexibility appears for EU Member States to decide for themselves if, and to what extent, they would like to contribute to a military operation with resources.⁷ In turn, this voluntary base within the dimension of CSDP gives also the Member States a choice when it comes to adapt their national defence or not to the EU framework, a choice that will determinate the operational capacity for each Member State in the Union to take part of military missions. As a result, some Member States participate to a high degree in CSDP military operations and other Member States participate in a more limited way.⁸

Moreover, as a EU military operation may be seen to produce a public good, such as regional stability, this is something that can be enjoyed in equal amounts by both contributing and non-contributing EU Member States. This indicates that Member States can enjoy the benefit from an operation without paying for it. As such, one may argue that the burden between the EU Member States should be more equally shared because today, the Member States can use the opportunity to be free riders in the process.⁹

⁴ Erinkveld, Bob (2014), p. 14.

⁵ Möller, Ulrika, Bjereld, Ulf (2010), "From Nordic neutrals to post-neutral Europeans: Differences in Finnish and Swedish transformation", in *Cooperation and Conflict*, nr 45, p. 354.

⁶ Nováky, Niklas (2011), p. 3.

⁷ Kaddous, Christine (2009) "External Action under the Lisbon Treaty", in *Ceci n'est pas une Constitution - Constitutionalisation without a Constitution?*, Ingolf, Pernice, Evgeni, Tanchev (eds). Nomos, p 182-184.

⁸ Soder, Kirsten (2010), p. 3-6.

⁹ Nováky, Niklas (2012), "Deploying Military Force Under CSDP: The Case of EU NAVFOR Atalanta, Conference papers, UACES 42th Annual Conference, University of Aberdeen, p. 4-5.

Noteworthy, if no EU Member State voluntarily wants to contribute to CSDP military operations, expect others to deal with international crises first or use the free rider card in the EU process, the Union will not be able to live up to its ambitious aim in the future: to be an international security actor and respond rapidly to international crisis.¹⁰

1.2 Purpose and research question

The empirical purpose of this study is to examine why the degree of burden-sharing¹¹ was different between Sweden and Finland when they decided to contribute with resources to operation Atalanta. It is important to know what influence EU Member States to share some of the burden when they launch a new operation, since operational demands, the resources made available by Member States, together determine how successful operations are.¹²

The theoretical purpose of this study is to shed light on a new factor, which assumes to be of importance when EU Member States decide which and how much resources they should contribute with to a CSDP military operation: ‘adaption of national defence’.¹³ This factor assumes to determinate the operational capacity of a country to take part of military missions and therefore, it should affect the degree of burden-sharing between EU Member States.

Moreover, the factor of adaption has hitherto been neglected in the literature, and therefore, this paper intends to contribute to the academic sphere by first, shed light on the use of the concept of burden-sharing when analysing military operations, and second, shed light on how adaption of national defence can explain different degrees of participation between EU Member States. Against this background, the research of this thesis is based on the following question:

How can adaption of national defence explain different degrees of burden-sharing in EU military operations?

¹⁰ Soder, Kirsten (2010), p. 3-6.

¹¹ In this paper, the definition of burden-sharing is EU Member States different degrees of participation in CSDP military operations – which is determinated by the resources they contribute with. In chapter two, this discussion will be furthered examined.

¹² Engberg, Katarina (2014) *The EU and Military Operations, A comparative analysis*, Routledge, p. 2-3.

¹³ In this paper, the definition of adaption of national defence is the role CSDP military operations have been given in EU Member States defence planning. In chapter two, this discussion if further examined. Note that adaption of national defence in this thesis is sometimes only referred to as ‘adaption’.

In order to examine this research question, this thesis will be based on a comparative case study. By comparing Sweden and Finland in the decision-making process of operation Atalanta, it will be examined how adaption of national defence can explain the different degree of burden-sharing in CSDP military operations. The general expectation of this study is that a high degree of national adaption¹⁴ would generate a high degree of burden-sharing¹⁵ in CSDP military operations. In contrast, a low degree of adaption of national defence would generate a low degree of burden-sharing in CSDP military operations.

1.2.1 Relevance

Since 2003, the Member States of the EU have exhibited collective activism in the field of military crisis management by conducting six military operations in the framework of the CSDP. Many scholars have taken keen interest in explaining the emergence and institutionalization of the CSDP, whereas others have focused on specific operations. As a result, there are ever-expanding literatures on the CSDP.¹⁶

However, there have been almost no attempts to form explanations of why the degree of participation varies between the Member States. Or in other words, why some Member States actually decide to participate in CSDP military operations and bear their burden of the collective action, and why other Member States do not participate in a mission and therefore, do not bear their burden to the mission. As such, the absence of research that examine ‘burden-sharing’ in CSDP military operations has left a large gap in our understanding of how Member States share the costs of collective action in ‘out-of-area’ military operations.¹⁷ Moreover, burden-sharing is a relevant issue in EU security governance that is likely to grow in importance as the EU seeks an autonomous ability to act effectively across the spectrum of global and regional security governance challenges. It is also reasonable to expect that a deepening of EU prerogatives in security will only occur if the Member States perceive that the costs and benefits of collective action are fair.¹⁸ Furthermore, the limited research that has identified factors, which may explain why some Member States decide to participate or not in military

¹⁴ A high degree of national adaption is defined as follows: CSDP military operations have been given a central role in national defence reforms.

¹⁵ High degree of burden-sharing is defined as follows: Sweden and Finland’s operational resources are essential in the realisation of operation Atalanta.

¹⁶ Nováky, Niklas I. (2011), p. 2-3.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Dorussen, Han, Kirchner, Emil J., Sperling, James (2009), ”Sharing the Burden of Collective Security in the European Union”, in *International Organization* 63, The IO Fundation, p. 789-810.

operations, focuses mainly on security and political factors. However, the factor “D”, as in defence, with its resource implications, is treated lightly.¹⁹

As such, this paper intends to focus on the substance of the decision and the connection between political military goals and national defence. By adopting this focus, the paper intends to contribute to our understanding of military operations – by shed light on adaption of national defence, which in turn makes the thesis relevant in order to reduce the gap in the literature. Hopefully, building a model with an emphasis on the “D” factor would provide the academic community with better tools to answer important but hitherto neglected research questions.

1.3 Contentual limitations and components of interest

The CSDP military operations in the EU are just one factor related to the Union’s external activities. Among others, this area includes the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), foreign trade issues, development policy and the representation of the EU as an international entity in other international organizations – like the United Nations (UN) and NATO.²⁰ Therefore, a thorough examination of the entire external activities sphere is either possible or intended.

Accordingly and for the sake of clarity, a distinction must first be made between the Unions’ external action and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – where the latter make an implicit reference to security aspects. A distinction must also be made between the CFSP and the CSDP – where the latter explicitly deals with defence issues.²¹ As has already been indicated above, the focus of this paper will be exclusively on CSDP and military operations. Like argued earlier, the reasons for choosing CSDP as the primary object of interest are multifaceted. Briefly revisited, the majority of EU Member States have not been threatened by the target countries of CSDP military operations and they have not had any clear interest at stake in them.²² Moreover, even if the chance is small, it is possible – due to the voluntary base to contribute to military missions – that in the future, no Member State will be willing to realise operations because ‘no other Member State does’. As such, recent development in international security policies are alarming and thus call for military crisis management operations made by the EU.

The degree of participation within each Member State will determinate the EU’s future position in international security policy - today characterized by an

¹⁹ Engberg, Katarina (2014) *The EU and Military Operations, A comparative analysis*, Routledge, p. 2-3.

²⁰ Ramses, A. Wessel (2000), ”The Inside looking Out, consistency and delimitation in EU external relations”, *Common Market Law review*, Vol 37, p. 1151.

²¹ Combarieu, Gilles (2008), p. 67-68.

²² Nováky, Niklas I. (2011), p. 2-3.

incipient American withdrawal.²³ Therefore, if the EU does not want to lose its faintly consolidated stand as an international security actor – the capabilities of its security and defence components in the Member States are essential. The figure below intends to illustrate how the different categories in the Lisbon treaty – EU’s external activities, CFSP, CSDP and military operations – are connected.²⁴




Figure 1: Illustration of the relationship between EU's external activities, CFSP and CSDP.

Furthermore, as illustrated by the figure above, military operations are not the only factor, which forms the CSDP. Another aspect within this area concerns the EU's attempts to develop and establish a European Defence Industrial and Technological Base (DITB) and 'an open and transparent European Defence equipment market'. This aspect will be excluded since its detailed consideration would lead to a perspective angle simply too broad for the limited space of this paper. Further, even though a European Defence market is planning to be 'fundamental for underpinning European military capabilities'²⁵ their economic and political importance for the EU itself but also for its international actorness is hereby acknowledged but not further discussed. Therefore, by eliminating these important but too fundamental aspects from the field of inquiry, a sharper focus on the primary object of study, the degree of participation in military mission, is to be guaranteed.

Furthermore, this paper will not focus on crisis management missions and the civilian capability development process within the EU. It will not either use the common theory of Europeanization, as this concept has been used to a large extent in the literature. Finally, the study will not use traditional game theory and the concept of prisoner's dilemma- type to analyse collective action in the EU. The motivating for this is the fact that incentive structure of a collective action is a

²³ Combarieu, Gilles (2008), p. 67-68.

²⁴ The figure is made by the author in order to illustrate the relationship between the different areas, note that the propositions are only estimated and not absolute in any sense.

²⁵ Cf, Andersson, Jan, Joel (2013) "Defence Industry and Technology – The Base for a more capable Europe", in *The Routledge Handbook of European Security*, Whitman, Sven, Richard (eds.), Taylor and Francis Group, London, p. 105.

prisoner's dilemma only if a procedure is expected to produce a public good and played once. In reality, as mentioned above, the procedures of CSDP military operations have been played more than once.

1.3.1 Thesis outline

This thesis is structured as follows; in chapter two, the theoretical points of departure will be discussed. This chapter evaluates how burden-sharing can be used within the framework of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and it sheds light on a new variable: adaption of national defence. This chapter will also provide discussions about the two concepts in this paper: adaption of national defence and burden-sharing. Within chapter three, the methodological considerations will be discussed. The thesis will be based on a comparative analysis – with the aim to investigate the role of adaption of national defence. Within chapter four, the empirical analysis will be made. This section is structured by first examine burden-sharing and then adaption. Within the last chapter, number five, the conclusions from the empirical analysis will be discussed, with the general aim of examine the role of adaption of national defence in relation to the degree of burden-sharing in CSDP military operations.

2 Theoretical framework

This chapter will introduce the theoretical framework of this paper. First, theoretical points of departure will be presented in order for the reader to understand the theoretical framework and the specific focus in this thesis. Second, a debate regarding CSDP and EU military operations in previously research will be introduced. Third, the framework of FPA is presented and different variables at different levels of analysis are examined. Fourth, the chapter discuss burden-sharing in military operations. Fifth, a discussion about, and elaboration on, the new variable of adaption will be introduced. Finally, theoretical considerations are presented and motivations for the theoretical choices are identified.

2.1 Theoretical points of departure

The theoretical points of departure in this paper are found in the dimension of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). This theoretical school can be seen as a subfield in political science and it sheds light on different theoretical explanations in relation to traditional IR-theory's. The scientific study of foreign policy distinguishes itself from other scholars primary by the fact that it strives to identify how internal decision-making processes affect how states act at the international arena.²⁶

Further, traditional IR-theories have a tendency to focus on states as unanimous actors in order to understand different patterns and actions. In contrast, FPA intends to 'open up' the unanimous state and thereby, it covers also lower levels of analysis. Moreover, FPA offers a more comprehensive analytical approach, which also allow a deeper understanding of individual states action.²⁷ As such, the research problem of this paper requires a more multifaceted theoretical framework like FPA. Thus, this thesis does not reject the traditional IR-theories but it assumes that they are not enough when analysing different degrees of burden-sharing.

However, within the framework of FPA, this paper lays out some foundations for a theoretical model that could be used to analyse burden-sharing in CSDP

²⁶ Hudson, Valerie M. (2005), "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations", in *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 1, p. 1-30.

²⁷ Hudson, Valerie M. (2005), p. 1-30.

military operations. The model will pay focus to a new variable ‘adaption of national defence’ and it will be built on some insights from previous research. As such, in contrast to previous research regarding burden-sharing in CSDP military operations, this thesis pays focus to Sweden and Finland’s adaption of national defence to the EU framework, and thereby, a new theoretical model with emphasis on adaption needs to be developed.

2.2 CSDP and previous research

The speedy development of research on CSDP has gone hand in hand with a rapid growth in the policy itself. The field has comprised overlapping generations of research, ranging from studies on the emergence of the policy area – through investigations of its implementation in the EU Member States, to emerge new theoretical frameworks in order to explain particular aspects of the policy. Furthermore, the military operations have also been examined in the literature to a large extent.²⁸

However, explanations for the emergence of CSDP are often informed by certain theoretical assumptions. For example, the neofunctionalist approach would predict the UK’s change of heart towards an autonomous European defence, the Union’s failure to rise challenge of Balkans wars, Europe’s wish to balance the United States and also, the practical needs of crisis management in a changed security environment.²⁹

Works on policy implementation have often been concerned with the conceptions, deployment and evaluation of CSDP missions. The insights from sociological institutionalism have been particular authoritative in conceptualising the role of EU level bureaucracy, while research on Europeanization in EU foreign policy has sought to explain national positions within the EU security project.³⁰ Furthermore, in a less fashion way, authors have examine CSDP as a ‘discursive battlefield’ – due to the constellations of actors involved in a daily politics over what European security is about.³¹ Research has also focused on, to a

²⁸ Kurowska, Xymena (2011), ”Introduction the Role of Theory: in Research on Common Security and Defence Policy”, in *Explaining the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy*, (edi) Kurowska, Xymena, Breuer, Fabian, Political and International Studies Collection, Series: Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, p. 2-5.

²⁹ P, Van Ham (2000), ”Europé’s Common defence Policy: Implications for the Transatlantic Relationship”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 31(2), p. 215-228.

³⁰ Gross, E (2009), *The Europeanization of National Foreign Policy. Continuity and Change in European Crisis Management*, Basingstoke and New York: Palgarve Macmillian.

³¹ Kurowska, Xymena, Pawlak, P (2012), *The Politics of European Security Policies: Actors, Dynamics and Contentious Outcomes*, London and New York, Routledge, p. 36.

high degree, on the relationship between NATO and the EU³², the role of defence industries within the Member States and the constantly question if the Union will have a common military capacity in the future or not.³³

However, when it comes to the literature regarding specific CSDP military operations, observers may also find some common dominators. First, examinations of success or failure in CSDP military operations are made to a high degree in the academic literature.³⁴ Among commentators, it is fashionable to highlight the persistent military weakness of the EU by comparison with the US or NATO. In contrast, others do shed light on the fact that the Union has established strong political legitimacy in military affairs based on the rule of law and effective multilateralism. Second, many authors highlight the capability gap in the EU and according to them, the capability goals has not been reached – despite all efforts and due to the fact that it has been almost 15 years since the Helsinki Goals were presented and over 10 years after the adoption of a revised version.³⁵ Third, researchers have payed attention to the flexibility in the Union when it comes to contribute with resources to military operations.³⁶ Some have highlighted that contributions vary in force level between the Member States and as a result, some nations contribute more than others in order to realise a specific mission.³⁷ Fourth, authors have highlighted under what circumstances the EU undertake military missions³⁸ and further, why some Member States participate in military operations and why others do not.³⁹

While some of the academic concepts concerning CSDP are of interest for this study, others are less useful for the investigation of the different degrees of participation in operation Atalanta. This is, consequently, an area that calls for further research, which moves beyond some of the more common approaches of political science and international relations mentioned above.

Previously research does, however, remain on a rather general and theoretical level and it needs to be complemented by a further disaggregation of driving factors in order to acquire a more in-depth understanding of the dynamics behind degree of participation in the EU's military operations. As such, the academic literature seldom provides a deeper analysis of the complex interplay between political decisions and military resource factors, which, as noted above, are of particular concern here. As a result, this study will move beyond the convenient

³² Acikmese, Dizdarogly (2014) "Dynamics of Cooperation and Conflict in NATO-EU Relations" in *Uluslararası İlişkiler – International relations*, p. 131-163.

³³ Grand, Camille (2013) "CSDP: Is there a new Chapter?", *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs*, no 3, p. 9-18.

³⁴ Peen Rodt, Annemarie (2011), "The EU: A Successful Military Conflict Manager?", *Departement of Politics, Languages and International Studies, University of Bath, UK*, p. 99-122.

³⁵ Grand, Camille (2013), p. 14.

³⁶ Gierich, Bastian (2010), p. 42-45.

³⁷ Soder, Kristine (2010), p. 4.

³⁸ Engberg, Katarina (2014).

³⁹ Nováky, Niklas (2011).

dichotomy of ‘why and how’ CSDP emerged, if EU military operations may be seen as a success or failure, the Union’s relations with NATO and the reasons for the often highlighted military capability gap. Not because these distinctions are irrelevant altogether, but because it covers mostly clear categories of just ‘why or how’. By doing this, the literature hitherto fails to capture the interaction between decision-makers and the adoption of national defence – and the way they colour each other. As such, by focusing on the EU as an collective use of force in the context of military operations, this study will add to the literature by using the concept of burden-sharing in order to analyse why the degree of participation varied between Finland and Sweden when they decided to participate in operation Atalanta.

2.3 The study of Foreign Policy Analysis

As mentioned above, FPA can be seen as a subfield in the scholar of International relations (IR). As such, the assumption that human decision makers acting singly and in groups are the ground of all that happens in international relations, but FPA is specific positioned to provide the concrete theory that can reinvigorate the connection between IR actor-general theory and its social science foundation.⁴⁰ The explanation of FPA includes the process and resultants of human decision making with reference to known consequences for foreign entities. Moreover, the horizon of interest is limited to decision making performed by those with the authority to commit resource. Furthermore, one may be examining not simply a single decision, but also a sequence of decisions taken with references to a particular situation.⁴¹

However, it is the explanations of FPA wherein one finds its most noteworthy hallmarks: the factors that influence foreign policy decision making and foreign policy decision makers. FPA views the explanation of foreign policy decision making as multifactorial – with the desideratum of examining variables from more than one level of analysis. As such, explanatory variables from all levels of analysis, from micro to macro level, are of interest to the analyst - to the extent that they effect the decision making process. As a result from this multilevel approach, insights from many intellectual disciplines such as psychology, sociology, organizational behaviour, economics and so forth, will be used to foreign policy analysis in their effort to explain foreign policy decision making.⁴²

⁴⁰ Hudson, Valerie M. (2005), "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations", in *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 1, p. 1-30.

⁴¹ Ibid. p. 2.

⁴² Ibid, p. 2-3.

Another important hallmark of the FPA is the emphasis on agent-oriented theory. States are not agents because states are abstractions and thus have no agency. As such, only human beings can be true agents, and it is their agency that is the source of all international politics and all change therein.⁴³ According to Marijke Breuning, the circumstances at the international arena and the individual decision-maker mentioned above can be captured by the concept of levels of analysis. In his research, *Foreign Policy Analysis, A Comparative Introduction*, he presents three different levels that can be used in the framework of FPA: the individual, the state and the international system. Moreover, Breuning highlights that these three levels correspond to the different foci of FPA: individuals ponder options and make decisions, states engage in foreign policy behaviours and the interaction between states in the international system yields outcomes.⁴⁴ In line with Breuning, Hudson also discuss in her article different levels of analysis. Thus, she shed light on a fourth level: the bureaucratic one. Hudson argues that organizational process and bureaucratic politics affects foreign policy.⁴⁵ Together these different authors highlight four levels: the individual level, the bureaucracy level, the state level and the international level. In order to make organizational studies within the framework of FPA; the many different variables are structured in relation to the many different levels of analysis mentioned above. As such, each level of analysis is assigned with one or a few variables. Factors like individual personalities and threat perception do often belong to the individual level.⁴⁶ Factors like structures and laws within a state and the role of administration belong to the bureaucracy level.⁴⁷ Factors like institutional framework, interest groups and public opinion belong to the state level.⁴⁸ Finally, factors like interactions between states and the concept of power often belong to the international level.⁴⁹

As mentioned above, burden-sharing should be rooted in the framework of FPA. This is mostly due to the fact that both FPA and burden-sharing focuses on decision-making and the process leading to a decision.⁵⁰ As such, the next step in the theoretical framework of this paper is to examine burden-sharing and discuss how it can explain different degrees of participation in CSDP military operations.

⁴³ Ibid, p. 2-3.

⁴⁴ Breuning, Marijke (2007), *Foreign Policy analysis, A Comparative Introduction*, Palgrave Macmillian, p. 11.

⁴⁵ Hudson, Valerie M. (2005), p. 9.

⁴⁶ Breuning, Marijke (2007), p. 13-14.

⁴⁷ Gustavsson, Jakob, Tallberg, Jonas (2006), *Internationella relationer*. Third edition, Lund University, p. 269.

⁴⁸ Breuning, Marijke (2007), p. 13-16.

⁴⁹ Ibid. p. 14.

⁵⁰ Nováky, Niklas (2011), p. 3-4.

2.4 Burden-sharing

Many of the early studies of burden-sharing concerned the disproportionate sharing of support for international undertaking such as NATO. The central focus of these studies tends to be on how fair the economic burden of investing in military capabilities was spread across Allies. A famous study within this framework is 'An Economic Theory of Alliances' by Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser. The authors use the size of nation's national income and put it in relation to the percentage of nations defence budget - in order to measure how much a specific country contributed to deterrence.⁵¹

In line with Olsen and Zeckhauser, Todd Sandler also discusses in his work the costs of deterrence within allies. However, in contrast to the research presented above, Sandler shed light on private goods that an alliance may promote – a factor that he highlights as important means for sharing burdens and fostering stability within an alliance. Moreover, Sandler argues that the costs of deterrence were spread more equally across allies than Olsen and Zeckhauser contend; because alliance members are more likely to invest in defence goods that are private within the alliance but public within the state that produce them.⁵²

In 1980, new security structures inspired many academics to shift their attention of alliance organisations to instead study why states participate in military operations and how they determine the resources they contribute to them.⁵³ One of the first scholars who conducted these new types of studies includes Charles A. Kupchan. In his research, Kupchan examine the determinants of intra-alliance behaviour by investigate a single case study: NATO's efforts to address security problems in the Persian Gulf since 1979. Kupchan examine factors that are likely to affect NATO's decision to act: external threat, alliance security dilemma and domestic politics. In his conclusion, he argues specific that the main reason for the decision to act was due to US pressure on other Allies.⁵⁴

There have been extremely few attempts to study burden-sharing in the context of EU and CSDP military operations. However, two different articles can be identified; one made by Dorussen, Kirchner and Sperling in 2009 and one made by Niklas Nováky in 2011. Dorussen et al, compare in their article EU burden-sharing in four different policies: assurance, prevention, protection and compellence. By using the Kendall *tau*-test, they evaluate burden-sharing relative to a country's ability to contribute. The test shows that wealthier EU members

⁵¹ In their research they present a model which indicates that an international organization composed of nations acting in their national interests, there will be a general tendency for the larger nations to bear disproportionality large shares of the costs - and for the smaller nations to make little or no contribution to the common use.

⁵² Sandler, Todd (1977), "Impurity of defence: an Application to the Economics of Alliances", *Kyklos*, Vol. 30, Fasc. 3, p. 453.

⁵³ Nováky, Niklas I. (2011), p. 2.

⁵⁴ Kupchan, Charles A., Kupchan, Clifford A. (1991), p. 344.

carry a somewhat disproportionate burden in the provision of prevention, and large Member States in the provision of compellence. However, the main conclusion is that the aggregated burden of collective security governance in the Union is shared quite equally.⁵⁵ In line with Dorussen et al, Niklas Nováky discusses in his research burden-sharing and CSDP military operations. Thus, Nováky holds an even more theoretical approach than Dorussen et al since he aims to present a theoretically informed model that would explain different degrees of participation in CSDP operations by using the concept of burden-sharing.⁵⁶

As discussed above, previous research regarding burden-sharing refers often to the economic burden of investing in military capabilities – “the cost of deterrence”. However, Nováky uses the concept in relation to Member States different degrees of participation. As such, this paper will operationalize burden-sharing in line with Nováky and therefore, the meaning of the concept will be different degrees of participation in CSDP military operations. Further, the operational resources, which Sweden and Finland have contributed with, are essential when measuring burden-sharing. What kind of degree a Member State takes, is determined by how much or how little operational resources that the country contributes with to a CSDP military operation.

This study will be based mainly on Nováky’s research, since his model of burden-sharing intends to explain a question in line with this paper: why some EU member State contributes to a high degree to CSDP military operations and why some EU Member States only contributes in a more limited way. The next section will examine Nováky’s model.

2.4.1 Explaining burden-sharing: Nováky’s model

In his research, Nováky discusses the overall question of why EU Member States contribute to military operations. In order to analyse this question, Nováky highlights that Member States participate in CSDP military operations due to a variety of interests and pressures. Nováky divides these different factors into two categories: positive and negative dichotomy. The first one, positive dichotomy, refers to contributions that are made in order to realise something as an outcome of that contribution, whereas negative reasons refer to contributions that are made against one’s initial preferences. Moreover, positive reasons include furthering national interests, furthering collective European interests and furthering cosmopolitan interests. In contrast, negative reasons include direct pressure from

⁵⁵ Dorussen, Han, Kirchner, Emil J., Sperling, James (2009), ”Sharing the Burden of Collective Security in the European union”, in *International Organization* 63, The IO Foundation, p. 789-810.

⁵⁶ Nováky, Niklas I. (2011).

fellow Member States and indirect pressure such as fear of being left outside a EU core.⁵⁷

Nováky does also highlight the question of why Member States do not contribute to military operations; some Member States are unable to contribute due to a number of constraints. These constraints can be categorized by distinguishing between resource constraints and political constraints. The first one refers to shortages in material capabilities, such as military overstretch, and the second one refers to political constraints, such as lack of political will and domestic pressure.⁵⁸

However, Nováky argues that these explanations are hampered by a number of problems. First, they are highly empirical – they are influenced by factors from multiple levels of analysis that scholars consider to influence Member States in military operations. Second, these theoretical explanations cannot explain how the variables relate to each other and whether there is a hierarchy between them or not. Third, they give an impression that the reasons why EU Member States participate in CSDP military operations are not shaped in any way by the degree of participation. As such, previous research - according to Nováky – does not consider the possible reasons for why a Member State contributes for example with 5000 ground troops and why another Member State only contributes with a single staff officer to the Operational Headquarters of the operation.⁵⁹

In order to answer to these challenges, Nováky constructs a new theoretical framework that would explain burden sharing in CSDP military operations. By doing this, Nováky argues that one should be able to understand how EU Member State prioritises different influences and which ones are more important than others.⁶⁰ In his new theoretical model, Nováky distinguishes between material and immaterial factors, and between endogenous and exogenous factors.⁶¹ Moreover, he uses variables from four different levels of analysis; the public level, the government level, the regional level and the international level. All factors and levels of analysis are illustrated in Appendix 1. However, it can be argued that Nováky's model needs to be transformed in order to be able to use in empirical studies and also, in order to serve the purpose of this study. As such, the next section will discuss this further and thereby shed light on adaptation.

⁵⁷ Nováky, Niklas I. (2011), p. 6-10.

⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 10-16.

⁵⁹ Ibid, p 16-17.

⁶⁰ Ibid, p. 16.

⁶¹ Ibid, p. 19-20.

2.5 Introducing ‘adaption of national defence’

Nováky argues that a model that aims to explain which variables that affect burden-sharing cannot provide sufficient answers by only focusing on only one level of analysis, like some traditional IR theories tend to do. He bases this statement on the risk of oversimplifying the specific context in which decision-makers in EU Member States have to work when they discuss participation in a new military operation. Moreover, he argues that in order to eliminate such a risk, theoretical models need to be able to link variables from at least four levels of analysis: the international, regional, government and public level.⁶²

However, this paper will not include all variables that Nováky sheds light on and therefore; all levels of analysis will not be examined. This choice is based on the following motivations. First, if this paper would aim to include all 21 factors that Nováky presents in his model (see Appendix 1), it would not be possible to isolate each factor in the empirical analysis. Consequently, it would not be conceivable to examine the significance of all factors in two different countries and therefore, it would be a challenge to identify which variable have the strongest impact on the dependent variable. Second, in his research, Nováky does not elaborate on specific factors. Therefore, it’s hard to interpret how the variables should be used. As such, some variables in Nováky’s research can be argued to be solid to operationalize and therefore, difficult to use in empirical studies.

In addition, this paper intends to gain a deeper understanding of the interplay between political decision-makers and resource factors,⁶³ and how this colour the operational capability of EU Member States. According to Engberg, it is just this process, the interplay between political and resource factors, that determinate the political will of a country to contribute or not to a military operation.⁶⁴

However, even if a country has the political will, it may not have the operational capacity to contribute with resources. In order to gain capacity, countries can adapt their national defence by making resources available to EU military missions. In other words, EU Member States can take practical undertakings towards the advancement of the CSDP.⁶⁵ As such, if EU Member States have adapted their national defence to the EU’s capability targets, increasingly active participation in peace building efforts, there will be more resources available to CSDP military operations. In contrast, if EU Member States have not adapted their national defence, there will be fewer resources available.

⁶² Ibid, p. 20.

⁶³ Some resources are constrained by political decisions, like the scope of the command and control structures available to the Union. Other resources are finite, such as the pool of personnel accorded by parliament.

⁶⁴ Engberg (2014), p. 31-32.

⁶⁵ Quille, Gerrard (2006), p. 120.

Noteworthy, one may assume that if a country does not have the operational capacity to participate, it is obvious that that specific country cannot take part in a military mission. However, according to Engberg, it is not that black or white in reality: political decision-makers often ignore military resource constraints.⁶⁶ This results in overstretching of the forces available for military crises management. Engberg argues that the absolute numbers of forces alone cannot describe the limitations but the time they can be deployed in an area of operation, so called sustainability, represents constraints. As such, high readiness and prolonged sustainability are opposing poles in defence planning.

Moreover, the idea that the 1.8 million troops enlisted in the European forces could readily be transformed into forces with high readiness, does not take resource constraints into account. Engberg does therefore shed light on the fact that sustainability of these forces will eventually reach their limit. This have some countries, like the UK and the Netherlands, experienced in the Iraq and Afghan wars.⁶⁷ Against this background, adaption of national defence seems to be of high importance in order for EU Member States to have the real operational capacity to contribute with sustainability resources and therefore, the interplay of political and resource factors will be analysed through the concept of adaption in this paper. As such, adaption of national defence is central to use in the analysis of the interplay between the driving factors that shape decision-making on military interventions in the EU.

However, the concept of adaption is used frequently in discourse on theorizing security and defence integration. It is usually used in a constructivist context, which implies that a kind of re-adjustment based on socialization and learning has occurred. According to Pernille Rieker, adaption can occur due to a day-to-day interaction at the European level.⁶⁸ In line with Rieker, Michael E. Smith argues that élite socialization, bureaucratic reconstructing, constitutional changes and changes in public perceptions occur through adaption. According to Smith, demands of foreign and security policy co-operation are therefore much greater than those outlined in treaty articles.⁶⁹ This form of adaption tends to assume that external structures can influence actor's preferences. However, according to Nikolaj Petersen, adaption can also be used in a more rational perspective. Petersen explains adaption as a theory, which assumes that policy-makers manipulate the balance between their society and their external environment.

⁶⁶ Engberg (2014), p. 31.

⁶⁷ Engberg (2014), p. 21, 31.

⁶⁸ Rieker, Pernille (2003), *Europeanisation of Nordic Security: The EU and the Changing Security Identities of the Nordic States*, University of Oslo, Departement of Political Science, p. 14.

⁶⁹ Smith, Michael E. (2000) Conforming to Europe: the domestic impact of EU foreign policy co-operation, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 7:4, p. 613-31.

According to this theoretical point of view, the goal is to secure the functioning of societal structures in a situation of growing interdependence.⁷⁰

As discussed above, the concept of adaption has been used in different ways in previous research. However, this study will borrow some thoughts in this previous research when operationalize adaption in a theoretical way. First, the meaning of the word in this paper will be the role CSDP military operations has been given in national defence planning. If EU Member States adapts their national defence in favour of CSDP military operations, this will be given a central role in their national defence planning. In contrast, if they do not adapt their national defence in favour of CSDP military operations, the role of CSDP military operations will be limited in their national defence planning. The degree of adaption will decide which capacity a EU Member State has in order to take operational part of a CSDP military operation.

Moreover, in this paper, the concept of adaption will be used as a theoretical tool in order to examine the importance of practical undertakings in national security- and defence policy. As such, this approach is based on Rieker and Smith's form of adaption: external structures, like the operational demands and capability targets of the EU, may influence national decision-makers in their choice of national defence structures. In turn, this paper does not intend to analyse *why* states adapt. Instead, it will analyse how Member States have adapted to the operational demands and capability targets of the EU. The specific theoretical operationalization of adaption in this paper will be furthered discussed below.

2.5.1 Changing Nováky's model and operationalization of concepts

With the section above in mind, Nováky's model will be modified in order to introduce adaption of national defence in the analytical model of this paper. As such, Nováky's endogenous material variables will be used as material indicators of 'adaption of national defence'. They are all important for the operational capacity of a EU country. Further, the exogenous material variables will be used as indicators of burden-sharing. However, both the indicators of adaption and burden-sharing, taken from Nováky's model, will be complemented by two other indicators. First, adaption will be complemented with the indicator 'priority of CSDP military operations'. More specifically, this indicator intends to analyse Sweden and Finland's national defence planning and thereby see if CSDP military operations are prioritised in new defence developments or not. Second, burden-sharing will be complemented with 'contribution of operational resources'. The motivations for these complements are based on the discussions above.

⁷⁰ Petersen, Nikolaj (1998), "National Strategies in the Integration Dilemma: An Adaptation Approach", in *Journal of Common Markets Studies*, Vol. 36, nr 1, p. 33-42.

However, this means that Nováky's immaterial variables, such as public opinion, threat perception, language of target country and relations with NATO/US will not be included in this study. Instead, adaption of national defence will constitute a new variable. In turn, this means that this paper will not include immaterial factors from four different levels of analysis. Instead, it will pay a central focus to one variable and thereby, reduce the risk of over-determination in the analysis.⁷¹ As such, this choice makes it possible to isolate just one factor and by that, analyse the importance of adaption more in-depth.

Against this background, Nováky's model will be used to some extent in this paper. By changing his model however, the variables will be more possible to operationalize and also, the new variable is possible to examine. The figure below illustrates how Nováky's model has been modified and complemented.




Figure 2: analytical model.

Based on the discussion in this chapter, one hypothesis can be identified. As such, like mentioned in the introduction, a high degree of adaption is assumed to result in a high degree of burden-sharing. In contrast, a low degree of adaption of national defence assumes to result in a low degree of burden-sharing. More specific, since Sweden seems to have taken a higher degree of burden-sharing in operation Atalanta, in comparison to Finland, Sweden should also have adapted its national defence to a higher degree. Therefore, the expectation on Finland is that the country had only adapted its national defence to the EU framework to a low degree. The hypothesis is presented in the box on the next page.

⁷¹ rge, Alexander L., Bennett, Andrew (2005), *Case studies and theory development in the Social Sciences*, BCSIA Studies in International Security, MIT Press, p. 40-45.

H₁: *A high degree of adaption of national defence will result in a high degree of burden-sharing in CSDP military operations.*

2.6 Theoretical considerations

As indicated above, the theoretical model of burden-sharing is embedded in the framework of FPA in this paper. The choice of this theory results in a delimitation of different factors, which are assumed to affect burden-sharing. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, this theory ‘opens up’ the state and thereby, it is possible to gain a deeper understanding of factors within Sweden and Finland. Further, the study is characterized by openness in the empirical analysis. As such, even if the hypothesis is that adaption affects burden-sharing, the outcome can be the following; adaption affect burden-sharing or adaption does not affect burden-sharing. Thus, this paper intends also to analyse the intensity of the causal relationship between adaption and burden-sharing, if a such relationship is to be seen. Moreover, Nováky’s research has inspired the theoretical framework but instead of only using all of his variables, the aim of this study is to complement previous research and thereby shed light on the importance of the “D”-factor; adaption of national defence. The reason for choosing only one factor will be discussed more in the next chapter. As such, the factor ‘adaption of national defence’ assumes to be able to explain why the degree of burden-sharing were different between Sweden and Finland when they decided to contribute with resources to operation Atalanta.

3 Methodological framework

This chapter will present the methodological framework that will be used in the empirical analyse. First, it will introduce the methodological points of departure. Second, it will examine different research strategies in the literature in order to be able to motivate the choice of the research strategy selected in this paper: a qualitative approach. Fourth, it will present the research design – a comparative case study. Fifth, the chapter will examine and discuss process tracing, a method often used in the framework of FPA. Finally, the chapter will reveal how data collections and materials are to be selected and how the factors will be operationalized. The final part will also provide a discussion of methodological considerations.

3.1 Methodological points of departure

The methodological points of departure of this paper is to study Sweden and Finland's decision regarding their different degree of participation in operation Atalanta, within the theoretical framework of FPA. The study includes the decision-making process of operation Atalanta, and it will pay focus to the time period when Sweden and Finland contributed with resources. Further, the paper will also analyse adaption in a longer time perspective. The purpose of the paper determinates that the survey is an explanatory study with the intention to systematic analyse if adaption of national defence affected burden-sharing when the EU Member States realised operation Atalanta.

This study applies a qualitative method and a comparative case study design. Further, it intends to pay attention to the method of content analysis and process tracing. As such, these methods are often used in order to analyse complex decision-making processes. Noteworthy, this paper takes a positivistic approach, which implies that the unity of social science is knowable, due to the link between evidence and inference.⁷²

⁷² Within methodological discussions, terms like ontology (the study of being, "what is knowable") and epistemology (the study of the nature of knowledge, "how it is knowable) are often debated. Thus, this paper will not discuss these approaches and problematize them since this is a pure positivistic paper. For a further discussion of these terms, see Landman (2008), p. 17.

3.2 Methods in social science

Over the years in political science, a division between two methods have been developed: quantitative and qualitative methods. The main differences can be described as follows. Quantitative methods seek to show differences in number between certain objectives of analysis and qualitative methods seek to show differences in kind. Quantitative analysis represents and objects of comparison that can either be counted or assigned a numerical value. There are many such objects in political science today, for example, the method is often used when analysing democratic transitions or when analysing to which degree human rights are protected. As such, quantitative methods are based on the relationship that can be established between numeric variables using simple and advanced statistical methods.⁷³ In contrast, qualitative methods seek to identify and understand the attributes and different characteristics of the objects of inquiry. The nature of the method therefore often requires a focus on small number of countries. As such, in qualitative method, there is no attempt to give numerical expression to the objects of inquiry. Instead, the goal is to provide well-rounded and complete discursive accounts.⁷⁴

However, indeterminate research designs are widespread in both quantitative and qualitative research. When quantitative research is indeterminate, statistical models may provide meaningless substantive conclusions. Regarding qualitative research, nothing so automatic as a computer program is available to discover indeterminate research designs.⁷⁵ Even if both methods have their advantages and disadvantages, one may argue that qualitative researchers often have an advantage over quantitative methods. First, qualitative researchers have often enough information to do something to make their research designs determinate. Second, qualitative studies can analyse complex events to a higher degree and take into account numerous variables precisely because they do not require numerous cases or a restricted number of variables. Third, statistical methods lack accepted procedures for inductively generating new hypothesis.⁷⁶ Moreover, King, Keohane and Verba also highlight that researchers should entail judgements of which phenomena that are 'more' or 'less' alike in degree of quantitative methods or in kind of qualitative methods.⁷⁷ With awareness of the advantages of the quantitative method mentioned above, in combination with the fact that this paper intends to analyse two different countries - a number that is too low in order to use

⁷³ Landman, Todd (2008), *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics, an Introduction*, Routledge, London and New York, p. 20.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 118.

⁷⁶ George, Alexander L., Bennett, Andrew (2005), *Case studies and theory development in the Social Sciences*, BCSIA Studies in International Security, MIT Press, p. 40-45.

⁷⁷ King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O., Verba, Sidney (1994), p. 5.

quantitative methods - the qualitative approach seems to be more appropriate to use in this study.

3.3 Research design

As the last section made clear, there are different research methods in political science. However, since the qualitative approach is to be used, the next step is now to examine which research design that is most appropriate within this dimension. As such, qualitative research covers a wide range of approaches, but as indicated above, none of these approaches relies on numerical measurements.⁷⁸ Instead, this kind of work in the social sciences is often linked with case studies where the focus is on a particular event, decision, institution or a specific issue. Consequently, a particular place or event is analysed closely and in full detail.⁷⁹ Noteworthy, as operation Atalanta is of specific interest in this paper, a particular event, this concludes that this paper is a case study initially. Moreover, case studies can analyse qualitatively complex events and take numerous variables into account, because they do not require numerous cases or a restricted number of variables. As such, case studies are not limited to test only variables that are already stated in previous research, they are often used in order to shed light on new variables.⁸⁰ Noteworthy, since this study intends to test if a new variable, adaption, affects burden-sharing, this argument can illustrate another motive for using a case study in this paper.

In turn, there are different designs of case studies: comparative research – including comparing many or few countries – and single country studies. However, several critiques of case study methods have converged into scepticism of the value of single case studies. Studies involving only a single observation are at great risk of indeterminacy in the face of more than one possible explanation, and they can lead to incorrect inferences if there is a measurement error.⁸¹ In contrast, previous research argues that comparative research is the best method for drawing inferences that are more generalizable. As such, comparing countries can lead to inferences that are better informed by the contextual specificities of the countries under scrutiny. Moreover, as different research designs also should be seen in relation to the specific research question,⁸² this paper intends to use a comparative case study in order to make appropriate inferences.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O., Verba, Sidney (1994), p. 5.

⁸⁰ George, Alexander L., Bennett, Andrew (2005), p. 45.

⁸¹ George, Alexander L., Bennett, Andrew (2005), p. 32.

⁸² Landman, Todd (2008), p. 24-27.

3.3.1 Comparative method and case selection

Despite these more practical considerations above, the central distinction between different comparative methods depends on the key trade-off between the level of abstraction and the scope of countries being studied. Therefore, the inclusion of a large number of countries in a study results in a higher level of conceptual abstraction since concepts ‘travel’ across different contexts. In contrast, focus on one country or a few countries results in the use of less abstract concepts that are more grounded in a specific context under scrutiny. Moreover, comparing many countries is commonly referred to as ‘large- n ’ comparison and comparing few countries is referred to ‘small- n ’ comparison. Here, n is the number of countries.⁸³

However, there are both advantages and disadvantages by comparing many countries and comparing only a few countries. First, the main advantage of comparing many countries is the ability to use statistical controls to rule out rival explanations and control for confounding factors and to make strong inferences that hold for more than one case. Thus, the main disadvantage of this method of comparison includes the validity of measures that are often crude approximations of social science. Moreover, many argue that this method is inappropriate for analysing complex causal mechanisms. Second, the main advantage with comparing only a few cases is that the method results in a deeper understanding of the problem analysed, as they are more intensive and less extensive since they compass more of the nuances specific to each country, as in this thesis. Thus, its disadvantage is the limited possibility to generalise.⁸⁴

However, with awareness of disadvantages and advantages of each comparative method, the aim of this paper is to analyse the decision making process in Sweden and Finland. This means that the study will be based on a comparative case study with the comparison of few countries. As such, the level of abstraction will be reduced but the selections of this method makes it possible to go deeper in the empirical analyse, which hopefully will provide in-depth knowledge of the importance of the variable ‘adaption of national defence’.

In turn, within the comparative method, there are two types of research designs that the researcher can use in order to select cases; the Most Similar System Design (MSSD) and the Most Different System Design (MDSD). By using the MSSD, the researcher will select cases with different outcomes across similar countries. In contrast, by using the MDSD, the researcher will select cases with similar outcomes across different countries.⁸⁵ As such, since Sweden and Finland can be argued to be two similar countries that participated to different degrees in operation Atalanta, this study applies the MSSD.

⁸³ Ibid, p. 24-28.

⁸⁴ Landman, Todd (2008), p. 24-27.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

Moreover, for studies that compare few countries, like in this paper, selection of cases can seriously affect the type of inferences that are drawn. This problem is referred to as ‘selection bias’ in the literature and it arises from the intentional choice of countries. As such, researchers can choose to use random selection of cases or intentional selection of cases. Moreover, if authors choose random selection, selection without reflection, this may lead to serious problems of inference. In contrast, if authors choose intentional selection – this may lead to that the study only includes the cases that support a specific theory.⁸⁶

However, as this study has chosen Sweden and Finland for mainly two reasons, this means that this study uses an intentional selection of cases. The motives of the selection are as follows. First, Sweden and Finland differ in the dependent variable: different degrees of participation in operation Atalanta. Second, the two countries are similar in many aspects – none of them are member of NATO and both have applied a neutral history. As such, the cases have relevance to the research objective of the study. Noteworthy, the cases in this study have been selected on the dependent variable. Thus, according to Landman, this may lead either to an overestimation of effects that does not exist, or to an underestimation of effects that does exist.⁸⁷

However, there are solutions to the problem of choosing on the dependent variable; variance in the dependent variable, the cases will reflect substantive knowledge of parallel cases and the theory has specified certain outcomes and explanations.⁸⁸ Moreover, these solutions can be found in this study. First, this paper has variance in the dependent variable – different degrees of burden sharing. Second, the cases may produce knowledge of parallel cases since EU Member States intend to carry out CSDP military operations in the future and there will be the same Member States then, which have to share the burden of resources. Third, the theory of burden sharing has specified a more accurate range of countries in which certain outcomes and their explanations would obtain. Against this discussion, the selection of the two cases in this paper seems to be justified in the literature.

Based on the discussion above, this paper will use the method of structured, focused comparison. As such, by asking general questions that reflect the research objective of each case, Sweden and Finland will be compared and ‘structured’ in the same manner. Further, the study will be ‘focused’ in that it deals with only certain aspects of Sweden and Finland; the actions of the two countries in operation Atalanta. The following questions will be used in this study:

⁸⁶ Landman, Todd (2008), p. 36-37.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid, p. 39.

- Which degree of burden-sharing did Sweden and Finland take in operation Atalanta?
- Which degree of adaption of national defence did Sweden and Finland take in operation Atalanta?

3.4 Data collection techniques and operationalization of concepts

Since this study intends to examine how adaption of national defence can explain the different degrees of burden-sharing between Sweden and Finland when they decided to contribute with resources to operation Atalanta, this approach require us to think in terms of causes and effects. In order to illustrate a clear picture of this approach, one may refer to the explanation, in this paper adaption of national defence, as the independent variable. Moreover, one may refer to the ‘outcome’, in this paper the different degrees of burden-sharing, as the dependent variable.⁸⁹ As such, the figure below illustrates the direction of impact in the decision-making process of operation Atalanta. Noteworthy, both the dependent variable and the independent variable in this paper has variance – both variables may take different values of ‘high’ or ‘low’.



Figure 3: independent and dependent variable.

However, the case study method will be more effective if the research design includes a specification of the data to be obtained from the cases under study. As such, it is of importance to establish equivalence between the theoretical concepts that are used in a study and the operational indicators of those concepts.⁹⁰ Moreover, by evaluate the data collection method, this thesis strive to maximize the reliability⁹¹ of the measurements. In turn, by evaluate the methodological

⁸⁹ King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O., Verba, Sidney (1994), p. 77.

⁹⁰ Landman, Todd (2008), p. 33.

⁹¹ Reliability means that applying the same procedure in the same way will always procedure the same measure (King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O., Verba, Sidney (1994), p. 25).

operationalizations, the thesis strive to maximize the validity⁹² of the measurements.

As such, this paper will use two data collection methods in the empirical analyse, which intends to examine the independent and the dependent variable separately – in both Sweden and Finland. First, it will examine burden-sharing by using a qualitative content analysis. Second, it will examine adaption of national defence by the use of the method of process-tracing. The two sections below will present the methodological operationalization of the two concepts in this paper: burden-sharing and adaption.

3.4.1 Burden-sharing

As mentioned above, the theoretical operationalization of the concept of burden-sharing is different degrees of participation, which is measured through EU Member States different resource contributions to CSDP military operations. Therefore, burden-sharing is measured in this paper by the operational resources that Sweden and Finland have contributed to operation Atalanta. However, in order to be able to evaluate if the contributions are high or low, Nováky’s research will be used to some extent.⁹³ As such, Nováky’s ‘material-exogenous variables’ will be examined but this paper will only pay focus to one of them: resources required for operation. According to Nováky, this variable can be divided in two variables: ‘profile of operation’ and ‘intensity of conflict’.

Moreover, the examination of the dependent variable burden-sharing will be made in three steps. First, the intensity of the conflict will be examined. This is made by a rich description on how the international security problem maritime piracy has escalated since the 1990s. Further, it will be examined how the number of piracy attacks have increased. The analytical scheme for intensity of conflict is illustrated below.

Intensity of conflict	
Escalation of maritime piracy	
Number of attacks	

⁹² Validity refers to measuring what we think we are measuring (King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O., Verba, Sidney (1994), p. 25.

⁹³ Nováky, Niklas I. (2011).

Second, the profile of operation Atalanta will be examined. The focus here is to identify the character of the conflict, mandate of mission, time period, international actors, task of the mission, availability of relevant forces, scarce resources and availability of financial resources.⁹⁴ This is made by a rich description of operation Atalanta. The analytical scheme for profile of operation Atalanta is illustrated in the box below.

Profile of operation Atalanta	
Character of conflict	
Mandate of the mission	
Time period	
Other international actors in the area	
Task of the mission	
Availability of relevant forces	
Scarce resources	
Availability of financial resources	

Third, in order to be able to analyse Sweden and Finland's different degrees of burden-sharing, the contributions of the two countries will be identified. The following three categories of operational resources will be examined: type of personnel,⁹⁵ material and defence tasks. Note that both Sweden and Finland have also contributed in other ways to operation Atalanta, for example through humanitarian aid, but other contributions than operational resources and military personnel will not be included in this paper.⁹⁶

Operational resources	Sweden	Finland
Type of personnel		
Material		
Defence tasks		

This three-step approach will make it possible to compare Sweden and Finland's resources in relation to the whole operation. Specifically, the approach will identify if the contributions were critical to the realisation of operation Atalanta or not. As such, the degree of burden-sharing in Sweden and Finland will depend on if the national contributions was critical to the realisation of operation Atalanta or

⁹⁴ These are indicators that Engberg use in her research in order to examine CSDP military missions, see Engberg (2014).

⁹⁵ The exactly number of personnel is hard to examine due to classified documents, therefore, the type of personnel is assumed to give a more correct picture of the resources.

⁹⁶ Statsrådets redogörelse för Finlands deltagande i EU:s militära krishanteringsinsats Eunavfor Atalanta, p. 6.

not. As such, if Sweden or Finland have contributed with operational resources that are critical in the realisation of operation Atalanta, they take a high degree of burden-sharing. In contrast, if Sweden or Finland have not contributed with operational resources that are critical in the realisation with operation Atalanta; the countries take a low degree of burden-sharing. Noteworthy, due to the fact that the outcome of the decision-making process is already known, Sweden and Finland participated in different degrees, the dependent variable will either be high or low. As such, the dependent variable will not take the value ‘participated’ or ‘not participated’.

As mentioned above, burden-sharing is analysed by a qualitative content analysis, which is complemented by descriptive statistics. Content analysis is a method for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context, with the purpose of providing new insights and a practical guide to action. The aim of the method is to attain a condensed and a broad description of the phenomenon studied.⁹⁷ In order to examine burden-sharing, this paper will use different forms of secondary sources. It will use previous research regarding operation Atalanta, mainly from Panos Kautrako’s book *The EU Common Security and Defence Policy*” and Katarina Engberg’s book *The EU and Military Operations*. Further, it will use statistics from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which reveals EU Member States operational contributions to EU missions. It will also use documents from the Swedish government.

3.4.2 Adaption

As mentioned above, the theoretical operationalization of the concept of adaption in this paper is based on ‘priority of CSDP military operations in national defence planning’, which assumes to determinate the operational capacity to participate for a EU Member State. However, in this paper, the independent variable adaption is measured in two steps. First, Nováky’s material-endogenous variables, economic resources and military resources, will be used as material indicators of adaption.⁹⁸ These indicators will determinate the operational capacity to participate in Sweden and Finland. As such, if these material indicators take a high value – Sweden and Finland have a high operational capacity to participate in CSDP military operations. In contrast, if the indicators take a low value, Sweden and Finland have a low operational capacity to participate in CSDP military missions. In order to analyse this first step of adaption, descriptive statistic will be used. As such, the data collection method will be ‘rich

⁹⁷ Elo, Satu, Kynga, Helvi (2007), ”The qualitative content analysis process”, JAN research methodology, University of Oulu, Finland, p. 108.

⁹⁸ Nováky, Niklas I. (2011).

description' of the first part of adaption, which means to infer information about unobserved facts.⁹⁹

Second, these more material indicators of adaption will be complemented by the priority CSDP military operations have been given in national defence planning and reforms. This variable will be analysed by using the techniques of process-tracing. As such, this data collection method makes it possible to identify the intervening causal process between adaption and burden-sharing.¹⁰⁰ The key in this method is to analyse a chain of events that leads to a specific outcome in the end and in this process, find crucial moments. More specific, researchers should identify partial decisions that are made by decision-makers.¹⁰¹

The figure below shows the analytical scheme that will be used in the empirical analyse. In total, there are six indicators of adaption but it is the priority of CSDP military operations in national defence reforms that are of high importance in the empirical analyse.

Indicators of adaption	Sweden	Finland
Size of defence budget		
Size of defence expenditure		
Number of deployable forces		
Professional forces/conscription ¹⁰²		
Existing deployments		
Priority of CSDP military operations in national defence reforms		

When using the method of process-tracing in an comparative case study, there is no limitation when it comes to which material researchers can use. As such, every material that can give the smallest hint about causal mechanisms that could have been present in the specific decision-making process, are to be used.¹⁰³ This paper will use both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources will consist of official documents like government bills, reforms and reports of security and defence policy in Sweden and Finland. This will be complemented by secondary

⁹⁹ King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O., Verba, Sidney (1994), p. 34.

¹⁰⁰ George, Alexander L., Bennett, Andrew (2005), p. 205.

¹⁰¹ Esaiasson, Peter, Gilljam, Mikael, Oscarsson, Henrik, Wängnerud, Lena (2012), *Metodpraktikan, konsten att studera samhälle, individ och marknad*, Nordsteds Juridik AB, p. 129-130.

¹⁰² EU national troops are said to be 'not deployable' when they are unsuited for action in EU missions. In this case, if a country has a high number of professional resources, this personnel are more enable to take part in risky expeditionary operations far from home.

¹⁰³ Esaiasson, Peter, Gilljam, Mikael, Oscarsson, Henrik, Wängnerud, Lena (2012), p. 130.

sources and defence statistics from the European Defence Agency (EDA). More specific, Pernille Rieker's research will be used in order to examine adaptation.¹⁰⁴

Moreover, Sweden and Finland have adapted their national defence if the majority of the material indicators change to a higher value during the referent period and if CSDP military operations are given a central role in national defence planning. In contrast, Sweden and Finland have not adapted their national defence if the majority of the material indicators change to a lower value during the referent period and if CSDP military operations only are given a limited role in national defence planning.

3.4.3 Selected time periods

As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, operation Atalanta was launched in December 2008 and it is still ongoing. In time of writing, the operation is intended to continue to December 2016.¹⁰⁵ Thus, it is not the political decision in 2008, when the Union decided to realise operation Atalanta that is being of interest in this paper. Instead, in this thesis, there will be two referent periods – one for burden-sharing and the first part of adaptation, and one for the second part of adaptation. This choice is motivated by the fact that it is important to analyse Sweden and Finland's operational capacity exclusively during their time of contributions to operation Atalanta. Further, adaptation of national defence assumes to be a factor that is developed over a long time period and therefore, this factor needs an extended referent period.

Sweden has contributed to the operation three times with resources: in 2009, in 2010 and in 2013.¹⁰⁶ Sweden will also contribute with resources in 2015¹⁰⁷ but since the whole year is not possible to examine, this year will not be included in the analysis. Finland contributed with resources in 2011 and 2013¹⁰⁸ (see appendix 3). As such, the first referent period, in order to examine burden-sharing and the first part of adaptation, will be 2009-2013. The national defence in both Sweden and Finland started to change after the Cold War. Since then, there have been national defence reforms in the two countries, which are of importance in this thesis. Therefore, the second referent period, in order to examine the second part of adaptation - 'priority of CSDP military operations' - will be 1990-2013.

¹⁰⁴ Rieker, Pernille (2004), *Europeanisation of Nordic Security, The EU and the Changing Security Identities of the Nordic States*, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo.

¹⁰⁵ European Union Naval Force Somalia Operation Atalanta, European Union External Action, p. 1.

¹⁰⁶ Tham, Lindell, Magdalena, Weibull, Anna (2013), "Sveriges militära bidrag till operation Atalanta 2013, en analys av ME03", Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (FOI), 3728, p. 11.

¹⁰⁷ The home page of the Swedish Government, downloaded 2015-02-12, <http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/12119/a/126221>.

¹⁰⁸ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Finland, Pressmeddelande (2010), resived at:

<http://www.formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=207135&culture=sv-FI>, 2010-02-09.

Factors	Selected time period
<i>Burden-sharing</i>	2009-2013
<i>Adaption:</i>	
Material indicators	2009-2013
Priority of CSDP military operations	1990-2013

3.5 Methodological considerations

The general challenge to overcome, when it comes to the study of social science, is an indeterminable research design – when the researcher use too many variables and two few countries. However, this study applies different solutions to the problem. First, this study uses variance in both the independent and the dependent factor, which raises the number of observations. Second, this study uses the MSSD, which seeks to control for those factors that are similar across countries in the study. Third, this study uses only one key explanatory variable, which intends to explain ‘a lot with a little’.¹⁰⁹ At best, according to King, Keohane and Verba, the goal is just this: to use a single explanatory variable to explain numerous observations on dependent variables.¹¹⁰

Moreover, one may notice other challenges when it comes to the study of social science and more specific, case studies. First, by intentionally limiting the number of countries under comparison, the case study method sacrifices in some degree the broad generalization possibilities.¹¹¹ As such, the specific understanding of adaption in Sweden and Finland is difficult to examine in other countries. Second, when it comes to measure if one variable affect another, spuriousness may occur. As such, some unidentified factors may be responsible for the outcome.¹¹²

However, methods of social science demonstrate that we can never hope to know a causal effect for certain. This is a fundamental problem since no matter how perfect the research design is, no matter how much data we collect, no matter how perceptive the observer is and no matter how much experimental control we

¹⁰⁹ Landman, Todd (2008), p. 30-33.

¹¹⁰ King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O., Verba, Sidney (1994), p. 76.

¹¹¹ Landman, Todd (2008), p. 69.

¹¹² Ibid, p. 40.

have; researchers will never know a causal inference for certain.¹¹³ Thus, even if the possibility of coming up with a faultless method is limited in social science, this study assumes that the chosen method in this paper will result in a stimulating inference and thereby, contribute to the academic field.

¹¹³ King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O., Verba, Sidney (1994), p. 79.

4 Empirical Analysis

This chapter will present the empirical analysis of this paper. First, the chapter will provide a brief oversight of the EU's capability targets and operational demands, in order for the reader to know the relationship between the Union and its Member States in the sphere of security- and defence policy. Second, the dependent variable 'burden-sharing' will be examined in first Sweden and then Finland. This is followed by a comparative discussion in order to examine the degrees of burden-sharing in the two countries. Third, the independent variable, 'adaption of national defence,' will be examined in the same way – first in Sweden and then in Finland. This is also followed by a comparative discussion, which examines the degree of adaption in the two countries.

4.1 EU capability targets and operational demands

The European Council meeting in Helsinki in December 1999 defined what came to be known as the Helsinki Headline Goal, a military capability goal Member States tried to implement by the end of 2003. The goal stated that by the year of 2003, by cooperating together voluntarily, the EU Member States would be able to deploy rapidly and sustain force capable of the full range of the Petersberg tasks – including the most demanding operations. Moreover, the European Security Strategy (ESS) was established in 2003, which still provides the overall political guidance for EU's planning for civilian missions and military operations. The EU is supposed to constitute a 'force for good' and to contribute to solving and thus keeping conflicts away from Europe.¹¹⁴

However, 2003 came and went, and even if obvious capability gaps persisted in the Union, Member States presented a new goal in May 2004. This time, the Headline Goal 2010 was introduced. Through this goal, member capitals committed themselves to being able to respond with rapid action to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations – covered by the Treaty on the European Union. To achieve the objectives, the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) was created in 2001. This project compromised 19 project groups, which were supposed to help EU Member States reach their capability goals.

¹¹⁴ Giegerich, Bastian (2010), p. 43-44.

Moreover, in 2004, the creation of the European Defence Agency was also set in order to promote national military capabilities.¹¹⁵

The political guidelines of the ESS were updated in 2009 and have been translated into possible missions and operations in the form of the Petersberg tasks – mentioned above. In article 43(1) in the Treaty of Lisbon, they are stated in their own form:¹¹⁶

“The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmaments operations, humanitarian and resource tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks to combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation.”¹¹⁷

The EU’s prime military instruments today consists of a stabilisation force of some 50.000-60.000 personnel and the Rapid Response Force of two EU Battle Groups (EU BG) of 1,500 persons. The stabilisation force is complemented with air and maritime forces and command and control structures. This force shall be available within ten days after a political decision. The force shall also have a sustainability of four months. Both different forces are meant to be able to interact: with the EU BG serving as a bridging force. This means that this group can halt the escalation of a conflict while the stabilisation force will be used in a later time frame of the event.¹¹⁸

4.2 Burden-sharing

This section intends to first examine the intensity of the conflict in operation Atalanta, i.e. the intensity of the maritime piracy. Second, it will provide a rich description of the profile of operation Atalanta and it will summarize the main findings in a table. Third, it will present which specific operational resources Sweden and Finland contributed with to the mission. Finally, it will present the comparative discussion, which specifies if the countries take a high or low degree of burden-sharing.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Engberg, Katarina (2014), *The EU and Military Operations, A comparative analysis*, Routledge Studies in European Security Studies and Strategy, Series Editors: Sven Biscop and Richard Whitman, p. 37.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

Intensity of conflict

Maritime piracy¹¹⁹ around the Horn of Africa, and more specific in Somalia's coastal waters, is an international security problem and it has existed for decades. The earliest report goes back to the 1950s but it started to get more serious in the 1980s. Many researchers have highlighted that the roots of the problem is the fact that Somalia has been without an effective government since the civil war and therefore, local administrators have been able to control parts of its coastal waters.¹²⁰

In the 1990s, the security problem continued to receive relatively little international attention due to the relatively low frequencies of attacks. More specific, the highest numbers of attacks in Somalia waters were recorded in 1994 and 1999 when 14 ships were attacked during both years.¹²¹

However, during the first half of the 2000s, the number of pirate attacks in Somalia's waters continued to grow and the regional focus started to shift: from Somalia's Indian Ocean coast to the Gulf of Aden. Noteworthy, this narrow sea passage is one of the world's busiest shipping routes and a significant corridor for transporting fossil fuels from the Persian Gulf to Europe.¹²² The figure below shows a picture of the region.



¹¹⁹ According to the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, pirates are described as 'sea robbers': 'passengers or crew members of private vessels who commit armed robberies of commercial vessels in seaports and territorial waters'. Source: United Nations, "Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1630 (2005), p. 25.

¹²⁰ Nováky, Niklas (2012), "Deploying Military Force Under CSDP: The Case of EU NAVFOR Atalanta", University of Aberdeen, Presented by the 2012 UACES Annual Conference in Passau, p. 6-9.

¹²¹ Ibid, p. 6-9.

¹²² Ibid, p. 6-9.

Moreover, in 2006, the international community started to effort to manage the growing problem of piracy through the UN but the number of pirate attacks reached a new peak in 2007. This year, 51 attacks were made. In the beginning of 2007, two WFP vessels were hijacked by Somali pirates resulting in the death of one security guard on board. These attacks stated that it was now increasingly difficult for the WFP to find contractors willing to take the high risks of sailing to Somalia.¹²³

As such, since the problem of maritime piracy increased over time and the attacks got more serious, the intensity of the conflict required the international community to take action to guarantee the safety of WFP vessels to Somalia.

Profile of operation Atalanta

Operation Atalanta has been one of the most high-profile CSDP military operations in the EU. The operation has not only been the first, and so far only, naval operation undertaken by the Union but it has also been tackling a problem which has gain attention over the last few years: piracy. Two dimensions of this problem can be seen. First, the financial costs of piracy are considered significant for the maritime industry. According to the organization One Earth Future Foundation, the cost of Somali piracy has so far been estimated to somewhere between 7-12 billion dollars. Second, piracy is closed linked to organized crimes and terrorism. Noteworthy, the problem of piracy has contributed to the long and brutal civil war in Somali – which has effectively destroyed all structures of the central government.

The emerging significance of piracy is recognized by the Union. In the Security Strategy, from 2003, the EU highlights piracy as a new dimension of organized crime. Only five years later, in 2008, the Union underlines piracy as one of the main issues in its effort to build stability in Europe.¹²⁴

In 2008, the United Nation's Security Council invited States and regional organizations to act in order to protect shipping involved with the transportation and delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia. Only two weeks after the conference, the UN adopted Resolution 1816, which authorized States acting in cooperation with the Somalia Government – to fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia. Later the same year, the UN adopts Resolution 1838, where it mentions specifically the possibility of a EU maritime operation. The Resolution calls upon States to take part in the fight against piracy, in particular by deploying naval vessels and military aircraft in accordance with international law.¹²⁵

¹²³ Ibid, p. 6-9.

¹²⁴ Koutrakos, Panos (2013), "CSDP military operation", in *The EU Common Security and Defence Policy*", Koutrakos, Panos (ed), Oxford Scholarship Online, Print ISBN-13: 9780199692729, p. 17-18.

¹²⁵ Koutrakos, Panos (2013), p. 17-18.

Before the EU deployed a naval force, the Union decided to set up a military cell in Brussels, which intended to coordinate the involvement of certain Member States, which had been providing protection to the WFP's vessels. Two months later, the Council adopted the Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP, which set out the parameters of Operation Atalanta.¹²⁶

As mentioned before, the operation was launched in December 2008, and it was initially scheduled for one year. However, on 8 December 2009, the Council of the EU decided to extend its mandate for another year – until December 2010. Since the operation is still going on, there were two more times when operation Atalanta was extended. On 23 March 2012, the Council of the EU extended the mandate of operation Atalanta until December 2014. At the same time, the Council also extended the Area of Operation to also include Somali coastal territory and internal waters.¹²⁷ Further, on 21 November 2014, the Council of the EU extended the Mandate of Operation Atalanta once again, until December 2016.¹²⁸

The Operational Headquarters (OHQ) is in Northwood UK, and the Force Command is abroad ships in the area. The operation comprises approximately 1,400 military personnel. The tasks of the UN-mandate Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta were formulated to provide the following:

1. The deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia.
2. The protection of WFP vessels delivering food aid to displaced persons and protection of African Union Mission on Somalia shipping.
3. The protection of vulnerable shipping off the Somali coast on a case-by-case basis.
4. A contribution to the monitoring of fishing activities off the Somali coast.¹²⁹

However, the EU's naval operation Atalanta is not the only counter-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia. In fact, a number of international initiatives have been undertaken: NATO has been active through Operation Ocean Shield and the United States have been leading Combined Maritime Forces. Moreover, a number of individual states maintain vessels patrolling the area: China, India, Russia and Japan. Some Member States participate in some of these initiatives in addition to EUNAVFOR.¹³⁰

It is worth noting that operation Atalanta had rather limited resources in order to fight the piracy off the coast of Somalia; no more than seven vessels and four planes. The area of the operation covers the extremely broad zone comprising the

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Bratosin, Irina (2014), p. 2.

¹²⁸ European Union Naval Force Somalia Operation Atalanta, European Union External Action.

¹²⁹ Engberg, Katarina (2014), p. 145.

¹³⁰ Koutrakos, Panos (2013), p. 17-18.

south of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and part of the Indian Ocean, including the Seychelles. This area has the same size as the Mediterranean Sea or ten times the size of Germany.¹³¹

Moreover, the contributions of naval forces offered by Member States did not correspond to one-quarter of the resources necessary to cover the area of the operation. Sea surveillance aircrafts and coast guard's capability provided to be particularly scarce resources.¹³² The profile of operation Atalanta is illustrated in the figure below. The next section will examine specific which resources Sweden and Finland contributed with to operation Atalanta.

Profile of operation Atalanta	
Character of conflict	Naval, anti-piracy operation
Mandate of the mission	UN
Time period	2008-ongoing
Other international actors in the area	NATO, US, Russia, China, India
Task of the mission	Humanitarian, protection of WFP's vessels
Availability of relevant forces	7 vessels and four planes
Scarce resources	Coast guard capabilities and sea surveillance aircraft.
Availability of financial resources	Obtained by the Athena mechanism.

4.2.1 Sweden's contributions

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Sweden has made three decisions regarding contribution of operational resources to operation Atalanta: in 2009, in 2010 and in 2013. In 2009, Sweden contributed with two corvettes: HMS Stockholm and HMS Malmö. Sweden contributed also with the support vessel HMS Trossö and a specially trained protection force from the Amphibious Corps. The total crew and personnel contribution consisted of 150 persons. HMS Trossö completed five escorts of WFP's vessels and it escorted also other merchant ships that had been granted protection in the region.¹³³

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Engberg, Katarina (2014), p. 145.

¹³³ Regeringens proposition 2009:10:84, Svenska deltagande i Europeiska Unionens marina insats utanför Somalias kust (operation Atalanta), p. 12. Own translation.

In 2010, Sweden was in charge of the command of the Force Headquarters of operation Atalanta. The operation was led from HMS Carlskrona, which also entailed ship-based helicopters. The Swedish coast guard contributed with air patrols, which were based on the Seychelles with the task to document and report suspicious piracy activity.¹³⁴ In 2011, Sweden contributed also with five officers to the OHQ in Northwood (UK).¹³⁵

In 2013, Sweden contributed with HMS Carlskrona. In the first part of the year, the Swedish Coast Guard contributed also with air-patrols.¹³⁶ The Swedish contributions to operation Atalanta during the referent period in this paper are summarised in the figure below.

Contribution of operational resources	Sweden
Type of personnel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crew • Officers to OHQ
Material	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HMS Stockholm (corvette) • HMS Malmö (corvette) • HMS Trossö (support vessel) • HMS Carlskrona (warship) • Air patrols
Defence tasks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Escort WFP's vessels • Document piracy activity

4.2.2 Finland's contributions

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Finland contributed two times to operation Atalanta. In 2009, Finland decided to contribute with 10 persons to the operation, one officer to the OHQ and one officer was based on-board of the leader vessel. In February 2011, Finland contributed with the mine vessel FNS Pohjanmaa, which is the flagship of the Finnish army. In 2013, Finland also contributed with an independent vessel protection division with crew strength of 25 persons. Noteworthy, this was the first time the Finnish Navy participated in an international naval military operation with a warship.¹³⁷ The Finnish contributions are summarised in the figure below.

¹³⁴ The home page of the Swedish Government, downloaded 2015-02-12:

<http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/12119/a/126221>.

¹³⁵ Regeringens proposition 2012/13:66, "svenskt deltagande i Europeiska Unionens marina insats (Operation Atalanta).

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Homepage of the European Union External Action, "Finnish Navy Ship Pohjanmaa joins operation Atalanta", downloaded 2015-02-13.

Contribution of operational resources	Finland
Type of personnel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crew • Officers to OHQ • Officer to the leading vessel
Material	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FNS Pohjanmaa (mine vessel) • (Independent vessel protection division)
Defence tasks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Escort WFP's vessels

4.2.3 Comparative analysis

As mentioned in the first part of this section, the intensity of the conflict – in this case piracy activity has escalated during the last years. As such, the numbers of piracy attacks have increased and Somali pirates have hijacked two WFP vessels. This development can be interpreted as a *high intensity of the conflict* in Somalia, which in turn requires resources that can handle this type of resistance in a EU operation. Moreover, the resources needed are specific war and corvette vessels. It should be mentioned that these specific resources could be a challenge for each EU Member State to come up with. As an example, some Member States have only a small marine and others doesn't have a marine at all; like Austria - for geographical reasons.

This high intensity of the conflict in Somalia is also to be seen when it comes to the 'profile of operation Atalanta'. In 2003, the EU highlighted piracy as a new dimension of organized crime, and only five years later – piracy was seen as the main issue in efforts to build stability in Europe. Remarkable, since the Union recognize piracy as such a central problem, it can be questioned why not a higher number of EU Member States contributed to operation Atalanta with war vessels. Accordingly, one reason could be the one discussed above, not all EU member States have a marine. However, Member States could have contributed with other resources – like their Coast Guard.

Further, the fact that operation Atalanta was based on an UN mandate can be seen as particularly important for EU Member States, which have a long tradition of acting within the UN in order to promote peace at the international arena. As such, this specific part of the profile can be seen as a fundamental part for some countries in order to take part of a EU military mission.

Another reflection that regards the specific profile of Atalanta is the fact that the time period of the operation has been extended three times. Moreover, if a higher number of Member States had contributed with more resources - the need to extend the operation would maybe not be present. In line with this, it can also be mentioned that the only goal for the operation was *not* to escort WFP vessels.

A central part of the first goal was also to *prevent* acts of piracy. As such, EU Member States that did not have specific resources in terms of war vessels or corvettes could have been contributing with documentation of piracy by sending a report team.

When comparing Sweden and Finland's contribution of resources and its relevance for the whole operation, one may conclude that Sweden did take a higher degree of burden-sharing in operation Atalanta than Finland did. This can be motivated by the following discussion.

First, Sweden contributed with scarce resources, such like coast guard capabilities and sea surveillance aircraft. Due to the naval profile of the operation, these were resources that were of high importance to the mission but no other country offered this kind of assets. Second, Sweden contributed with corvette vessels. As such, due to the high intensity of the conflict and the high number of attacks, the operation seemed to demand combat ship from the EU Member States. Third, it can also be mentioned that Sweden contributed with resources from the very start of the mission. In contrast, Finland contributed after two years of practice. Fourth, Sweden documented and reported suspicious piracy activity, which can be seen as a way of meeting the goals of operation Atalanta in a higher way.

Moreover, Finland's low degree of burden-sharing in comparison to Sweden can be based on further motivations. First, the country did only contributed with a mine vessel: FNS Pohjanmaa. As such, since the Finnish marine has other different categories of vessels, one option could be to send more than just one or send another category of ship. Second, Finland decided to send an independent vessel protection. This means that the country preferred to act outside the Union and thereby, it did not bear their burden of the collective EU force. In addition, like mentioned above, Finland could have contributed with other resources in order to take a higher degree of burden-sharing. Against this background, Sweden did take a high degree of burden-sharing in operation Atalanta. In contrast, Finland took a low degree of burden-sharing. On the next page, the table summarises the contributions of Sweden and Finland.

Contribution of operational resources	Sweden	Finland
Type of personnel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crew • Officers to OHQ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crew • Officers to OHQ • Officer to the leading vessel
Material	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HMS Stockholm (corvette) • HMS Malmö (corvette) • HMS Trossö (support vessel) • HMS Carlskrona (warship) • Air patrols 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FNS Pohjanmaa (mini vessel) • (Independent vessel protection division)
Defence tasks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Escort WFP's vessels • Document piracy activity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Escort WFP's vessels

4.3 Adaption of national defence

This section will first discuss the material indicators of adaption of national defence. The indicators will be summarised in tables, for both Sweden and Finland. Second, the priority of CSDP military operations in national defence reforms will be examined separately: first in Sweden and then in Finland. Finally, a comparative analysis is made in order to examine to what degree Sweden and Finland have adapted their national defence.

4.3.1 Material indicators

Sweden and Finland

At the end of the Cold War, European countries cut, sometimes radically, their defence budgets. Since the region was faced with peace, heads of state and government thought that they could benefit from the new condition and as such, they could reallocate precious resources to other areas of public spending which were electorally more promising. Moreover, European countries spent, in average,

3.1 percent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence between 1985 and 1989. In 2008, this figure had fallen to 1.7 percent.¹³⁸

In addition, the budgetary crisis in Europe resulted in another reduction in national defence budgets in Europe. In 2010, the main Member States of the EU made major cuts to their defence budgets as an emergency measure. Noteworthy, in 2011, the UK reduced its defence budget by 8 percent. France made cuts equivalent to 3.5 billion euro between 2011 and 2013, after having got rid of 54,000 jobs within its armed forces. In states such as Spain, Ireland and Portugal and even countries from central and Eastern Europe, the situation was even worse.¹³⁹

However, the CSDP had led to that some countries, such as Sweden, actually have increased their defence spending. More specific, in 2009, Sweden's defence budget was close to 4,47 million euros.¹⁴⁰ In 2013, Sweden's defence budget was close to 4,62 million euros.¹⁴¹ Thus, as indicated above, the majority of the European countries reduced their defence spendings. As such, in contrast to Sweden, Finland's defence budget was 2.8 million euros 2009¹⁴² and in 2013, it was 2.4 million euros.¹⁴³

Moreover, planned expenditure remained roughly constant in the relatively healthy economies of Northern Europe, such as Sweden, between 2010-2013. Thus, real defence expenditure in 2012 fell in Finland with 3.5 percent but there was a nominal increase in 2013 as procurement funding was boosted to finance the purchase of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (fighter aircraft).¹⁴⁴ The defence expenditure in Sweden increased with 1122 million euros from 2009 to 2012. In Finland, the defence expenditure increased with 171 million euros during the same period.¹⁴⁵

In the early 1990's, defence planners allowed the Union to assume more responsibility for new crisis management missions. In 1992, the 'Petersberg Tasks' were introduced, which implied radical transformation of the EU's existing capacity to provide deployable, professional intervention forces geared to 'out-of-area' crisis management. The first step in the transformation process was for the EU Member States to end conscription and to move towards all-volunteer forces. As such, conscripts tended to have limited training and skills and therefore, in

¹³⁸ Liberti, Fabio (2011), "Defence spending in Europe: can we do better without spending more?", *Notre Europe*, p. 15-23.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ Budgetpropositionen för 2009, 2008/09:1.

¹⁴¹ Budgetpropositionen för 2013, 2012/13:1.

¹⁴² Europa 2009, "Guide: det här är Finland", downloaded 2015-02-16, <http://www.dn.se/fordjupning/europa-2009/guide-det-har-ar-finland/>

¹⁴³ Armens materiel verk (2013), *Staben för armens materielverk*, viewed 2015-02-16,

http://www.puolustusvoimat.fi/wcm/d9ea088040e699ae92859ae56fa359ff/MAAVMATL_esite_RU+28091013+web+size.pdf?MOD=AJPERES

¹⁴⁴ Chapter Four: *Europé, The Military Balance* (2013) 113:1, 89-198, DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2013.756999, p. 94.

¹⁴⁵ European Defence Agency, *Defence Data Portal*.

combination with political and juridical reasons, it was generally recognized that it produced un-deployable personnel outside of their home countries. France and Spain decided to abolish conscription in 1996 after agonizing debates about the connection between military service and democracy. In 2001, in both states, the last conscripts left the armed forces. Since then, further 17 EU Member States have abolished conscription.¹⁴⁶

Noteworthy, Sweden ‘suspended’ the draft during peacetime, which implies that Sweden changed from conscription to voluntary forces in 2010. In contrast, only six EU Member States out of 28 are still basing their defence on conscription, among them Finland. The motivations for abolishing conscription varied between the different Member States. Some sought to reduce their military budgets, while others like France and Germany were intent to increase deployable forces for over seas crisis management. The motivations for not abolish conscription are in general related to countries desire to be able to protect their national territory against other actors.¹⁴⁷

However, even if the majority of the EU Member States have abolish conscription today, with the motivation to increase the number of deployable troops to out-of-area crisis missions, statistics from the European Defence Agency (EDA) indicates that land forces available for sustainable deployments has decreased from 125,000 in 2008 to 106,000 in 2010. Moreover, active duty forces deployed on crisis management operations by EU Member States had fallen from 68,000 troops in 2006 to 49,000 in 2011. As such, the number deployed on operations has decreased faster than the total number of active service personnel.¹⁴⁸ Regarding deployable forces, Finland belongs to the majority of the EU Member States: its number of active personnel has been reduced from 29,300 in 2009¹⁴⁹ to 22,200 in 2013.¹⁵⁰ This is a reduction with 7100 persons. In contrast, Sweden does not belong to the majority. As such, Sweden has increased its deployable forces from 16,900 in 2009¹⁵¹ to 20,500 in 2013.¹⁵² This is an increase with 3600 persons. Further, according to EDA statistics, Sweden had 1000 existing deployments in 2009 and 693 in 2013. Finland had 670 existing deployments in 2009 and the country had 357 2013.¹⁵³ All the material indicators are summarized in both countries bellow.

¹⁴⁶ Howorth, Jolyon (2014), *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*”, The European Union Series, Nugent, Neill, Paterson E., Willian (ed), Palgrave Macmillian, p. 77-78.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ European Defence Agency, Defence Data Portal.

¹⁴⁹ Chapter Three: Europé, The Militay Balance (2009), 109:1, 99-206, DOI: 10.1080/04597220802709878, p. 174.

¹⁵⁰ Chapter Four: Europé, The Military Balance (2013) 113:1, 89-198, DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2013.756999, p. 129.

¹⁵¹ Chapter Three: Europé, The Militay Balance (2009), 109:1, 99-206, DOI: 10.1080/04597220802709878, p. 184.

¹⁵² Chapter Four: Europé, The Military Balance (2013) 113:1, 89-198, DOI: 10.1080/04597222.2013.756999, p. 178.

¹⁵³ European Defence Agency, Defence Data Portal.

Sweden	2009	2012	2013	Change
Defence budget (million)	€4,47		€4,62	+ €0,13
Defence expenditure (million)	€3510	€4632		+€1122
Deployable forces (active)	16,900		20, 500	+3600
Professional forces	Yes		Yes	Yes
Conscription	Yes		No	Yes
Existing deployments¹⁵⁴	1000	693		-307

Finland	2009	2012	2013	Change
Defence budget (million)	€2.8		€2.4	-€0,4
Defence expenditure (million)	€2686	€2857		+€171
Deployable forces (active)	29.300		22.200	-7100
Professional forces	No		No	No
Conscription	Yes		Yes	No
Existing deployments¹⁵⁵	670	357		-313

Noteworthy, the majority of the material indicators in Sweden have changed to a higher value during the referent period. In contrast, the majority of the indicators have changes to a lower value in Finland.

4.3.2 Priority of CSDP in national defence planning

Sweden

During the cold war, Sweden followed a policy of ‘military non-alignment’. This meant that the country did not take part in military alliances in peacetime – ‘in order to remain neutral in the event of war in its neighbourhood’. The policy was based on armed forces designed to be strong enough to deter an enemy from attacking. Moreover, the Swedish Armed Forces (SAF) could, after mobilization, consist of 800 000 men and women. A central factor at this time was the relatively huge defence industrial sector - and the SAF had weapon with a ‘Swedish profile’. These weapons was specially adapted to be used by soldiers with only a little training and, in order to secure the policy of military non-alignment, they were designed not to be interoperable with those of other countries.

¹⁵⁴ European Defence Agency, Defence Data Portal, downloaded 2015-02-13, <http://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/defence-data-portal/Sweden/year/2012>.

¹⁵⁵ European Defence Agency, Defence Data Portal, downloaded 2015-02-13, <http://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/defence-data-portal/Sweden/year/2012>.

However, Sweden did take part of peacekeeping operations, within the UN, but this engagement was seen as a sideshow by the Swedish military.¹⁵⁶ When Sweden joined the EU, it started to change its security policy by put more emphasis on the country's international commitments in security questions. In 1998, the Swedish government proposed to undertake a major qualitative reform of its national defence forces and even if Sweden explicitly referred to the ESDP process as the main reasons for this, many researchers do shed light on the fact that NATO did also push for changes.¹⁵⁷

However, since both neutrality and a credible independent national defence have been central bases in Sweden's security strategy, it was important to establish national consensus before some radical changes were made. Therefore, the Swedish government decided in 1994 to create a permanent commission, which consisted of representatives of the Government and the Parliament. The aim was to consult the new development of Swedish defence and security policy and the group was named 'the Swedish Defence Commission'.¹⁵⁸

In 1995, the same year Sweden joined the EU; the Defence Commission presented a report – which highlighted that Sweden should give priority to conflict prevention and crisis management. Further, European integration was seen as an important part of Swedish security policy:

*"It is in Sweden's security interest to concretely contribute to peace and security and by the use of its defence resources, both military and civilian, participate in international peace support and humanitarian operations".*¹⁵⁹

This report represents the first significant changes in Sweden's defence policy after the Cold war: the need for more emphasis on Swedish international commitments than on the tradition of national territorial defence.¹⁶⁰ Moreover, the new emphasis on the European dimension becomes also evident in the annual declarations of Swedish foreign policy. In the declaration of 1999, which was presented just after the St Målo summit, the following was stated:

¹⁵⁶ Wedin, Lars (2006), "The impact of EU capability targets and operational demands on defence concepts and planning: the case of Sweden", in *The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy*, Alyson, Bailes, Herolf, Gunilla, Sundelius, Bengt (eds), Oxford University Press, p. 141-150.

¹⁵⁷ Rieker, Pernille (2004) *Europeanisation of Nordic Security, The EU and the Changing Security Identities of the Nordic State*, University of Oslo, Faculty of Social Science, p. 116-121.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Försvarsdepartementet (1995) "Sverige i Europa och världen. Säkerhetspolitisk rapport från Försvarsberedningen", DS 28. Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, p: not specified in the paper. Own translation by the author from Swedish.

¹⁶⁰ Rieker, Pernille (2004), p. 121.

*“The Government wants to strengthen Europe’s crisis management capability. With its breadth and community of values, the EU has great potential in this area.”*¹⁶¹

This recognition of European military capacity resulted in other national reforms in Sweden’s defence policy. As such, the defence decision in 1996 stated that Sweden’s capacity for participation in peace-promoting activities must be enhanced and that participation in these operations is to be regarded as one of the main tasks of the total defence authorities.¹⁶²

However, one of the biggest transformation of Swedish defence policy started to take place in 1999 when the defence Commission proposed the ‘review report for security and defence policy’. The report emphasised the need for a higher priority of crisis management capability,¹⁶³ and states in line with the previous report that Sweden should contribute to the collective security in Europe:

*“Our security and prosperity is to a high degree dependent on developments abroad and in cooperation with other countries. This dependence grows gradually and underlines the importance of joint responsibility for peace and security in Europe and Sweden should contribute to this”.*¹⁶⁴

Based on the advice from the Commission presented the Swedish government a proposal for major defence reforms in November 1999, which were approved by the ‘Riksdag’ in March 2000. The decision represented a clear move to smaller and more flexible forces ready to meet a broad spectrum of challenges. Thereby, the move away from territorial defence was one again illustrated.¹⁶⁵

*“The international development in the last decade has shown that crisis can develop fast and result in far-reaching consequences. Thereby highlights the need to have the capacity to be able to take part of international crisis management missions”.*¹⁶⁶

Noteworthy, in order for Sweden to participate in crisis management operations, an UN mandate was required until 2001. As such, the Government suggested that

¹⁶¹ Statement of Government Policy in the Parliamentary Debate on Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 10 February 1999. Viewed 2015-02-20: <http://www.government.se/content/1/c6/07/02/30/4927d21f.pdf>, p. 6.

¹⁶² Rieker, Pernille (2004), p. 122.

¹⁶³ Rieker, Pernille (2004), p. 122.

¹⁶⁴ Försvarsberedningen (1999) ”Förändrad omvärld – omdanat försvar”, DS 12, Stockholm, Ministry of Defence, p. 29. Own translation by the author from Swedish.

¹⁶⁵ Rieker, Pernille (2004), p. 122.

¹⁶⁶ Regeringens proposition 1999/2000:30, ”Det nya försvaret”, p. 11. Own translation by the author from Swedish.

year a change of this practice. This change made participation possible even in the absence of a mandate from the UN.¹⁶⁷

In June 2004, the Defence Commission presented another new proposals on 'defence for a new time', which suggested that it should be possible to reduce the SAF significantly. At the same time, the report clearly stated that Sweden should increase its contributions gain to international crisis management operations.¹⁶⁸ Moreover, the government bill 'Our Future defence' presented later in 2004 further reforms aimed at transforming the military forces in Sweden. As such, the defence should be transformed from a 'defence force against invasion' to a 'mobile, flexible operational defence' and it should involve 'radical transformation both in terms of size and structure'.¹⁶⁹ As a result, the military defence in Sweden was to be organized into units and systems suitable for defence and operating as part of international missions.¹⁷⁰

In 2009, a new Government bill was handed over to the Swedish parliament. The document suggested major changes in the national defence system, primarily due to the abolition of conscription in peacetime. As such, the provision of personnel should instead be based on voluntariness, which was considered to promote a greater availability for the Swedish defence. As a result, the operational capacity was central to promote in order for the Swedish defence to be able to fast respond to international crises through its engagement in the EU.

*"The defence should be able to use here and now, and it should increasingly contribute both to the security of Sweden but also to the stability in the world. Through increased operational availability and flexibility will the defence be better equipped to meet crises and conflicts, even when they arise at a short notice."*¹⁷¹

In May 2013, the Defence Commission presented a new defence report 'Choices in a globalised world'. The Commission presented its assessment of security policy developments and related impacts on Swedish defence policy. In the report, it is clear that a strong European co-operation with the EU is at heart of the Swedish defence and that international cooperation is crucial.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁷ Försvarsberedningen (2001), "Gränsöverskridande sårbarhet – gemensam säkerhet", DS 14, Stockholm.

¹⁶⁸ Weden, Lars (2006), p. 146.

¹⁶⁹ Regeringens proposition 2004/05:5, "Vårt framtida försvar".

¹⁷⁰ Möller, Ulrika, Bjereld, Ulf (2010), "From Nordic neutrals to post-neutral Europeans: Differences in Finnish and Swedish policy transformation", *Cooperation and Conflict*, 45:363, Sage publications, p. 366.

¹⁷¹ Regeringens proposition 2008/09: 140, "Ett användbart försvar", p. 3. Own translation by the author from Swedish.

¹⁷² Vägval i en globaliserad värld, DS 2013:33.

“European unity, as well as a united, clear and principled European foreign policy, is of central importance for our ability to meet challenges against our security.”¹⁷³

When the Ministry of Defence in Sweden presented their security policy report ‘The Defence of Sweden – stronger defence for a uncertain time’ in 2014, the report from the Defence Commission formed a central base.¹⁷⁴ As such, it is also clear in this report that the participation in international crisis management missions is central in the defence of Sweden.¹⁷⁵ Further, the major changes of the defence in the last decades have given Sweden the operational capacity to take part of EU military operations.

Finland

In the 1980’s, the European integration process accelerated. As such, since the relations between the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Community (EC) become deeper, it was important for Finland to establish closer ties to the EC in order to avoid becoming sidelined in international politics. Thus, due to the fact that Finland recognised an ‘active neutral’ policy during this time, co-operation was only possible in economic terms.¹⁷⁶ However, when the Single European Act (SEA) was signed in 1985, foreign and security political co-operation became an integral part of the EC. Thus, the Finnish government underlined in a declaration that no significant changes had taken place in Finnish policies and that it continued to endorse the traditional element of a neutral policy.¹⁷⁷

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 paved the way for a new security policy doctrine in Finland. The Friendship Co-operation and Mutual Assistance Treaty (FCMA) between Finland and Soviet Union was replaced by a treaty of good neighbourly relations with Russia, and therefore, the primary framework in terms of which neutrality had been practised had disappeared. Thus, even if this new context made it possible to increase international co-operation, national security issues were still important in the Finnish security policy. As such, even if Russia was no longer regarded as a threat to Finland’s sovereignty, the traumas of the past had left traces in foreign policy thinking that were not easy to erase. In addition, the fact that the long joint border with Russia was still fully armed in that time meant that there remained some potential for instability.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷³ Defence Commission presents its defence policy report, home page of the Swedish Government, viewed 2015-02-21, <http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/18638/a/240432>.

¹⁷⁴ Försvarsberedningen, home page of the Swedish Government, viewed 2015-02-21, <http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/16631/a/203076>.

¹⁷⁵ Försvaret av Sverige, Starkare försvar för en osäker tid, DS 2014:20.

¹⁷⁶ Rieker, Pernille (2004), p. 146-147.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 150.

Traditionalism in terms of neutrality continued to dominate Finnish security approach in the early 1990s. This was primarily based on the country's geographical location and its concerning developments in Russia. In turn, this made it difficult for Finland to formulate a foreign policy free from these traditionally oriented security policy considerations. However, the decision to become a member of the EU made it possible to avoid the chance of being isolated in a potential future international crisis. Thus, moves towards EU membership represented a change of policy options rather than a change in the national security and defence policy. Therefore, territorial defence was still the main 'code' that defined the dominant Finnish security discourse during this time period.¹⁷⁹

Moreover, in order for Finland to become a member of the EU, a formula was found to combine membership with basically unaltered Finnish policies: neutrality was reduced to its essence¹⁸⁰ and the consequences of EU membership were interpreted in rather vague terms. While there were several reasons for Finland to apply to join the EU, former president Mauno Koivisto has argued that the decision was primarily based on considerations of national security.¹⁸¹ This mind-set can also be illustrated in a government report from 1992:

*"A capable and unified European Union in which the interest of all member states are taken equally into account will strengthen Finnish security. Union membership will help Finland to repel and military threats and prevent attempts to exert political pressure."*¹⁸²

However, in another government report, only six month after Finland joined the EU, it was announced that Finland was no longer neutral, since this policy was not compatible with the goals of the CFSP.¹⁸³

Further, the governmental report on security in 1995 continued to emphasise territorial defence as the most important task. Thus, the report did call for a 'broad and comprehensive concept of security', which thought to include not only political and military aspects but also respect for human rights, consolidating of the rule of law, economic co-operation and solidarity in protecting the environment. However, according to Rieker, the Finnish government seized the opportunity to contribute to a soft security approach in the EU but the fact that the Union also served to strengthen Finland's traditional and national conception did have priority in national defence choices.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 149-151.

¹⁸⁰ Only the core of neutrality was retained: it was reduced to the military field and narrowly defined in security policy terms (Reike, Pernille (2004), p. 150).

¹⁸¹ Rieker, Pernille (2004), p. 150-151.

¹⁸² Quoted in Rieker, Pernille (2004), p. 151.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

In the White Book on Defence 1997, is the EU membership emphasised as important for Finnish security. It states the following:

*“[The EU membership] increased Finland’s opportunities to influence and broadened its responsibility in a stability policy encompassing the whole of Europe”.*¹⁸⁴

The White Book does also emphasise that the EU membership has strengthened Finland’s ability to work for security in the Baltic Sea region. Moreover, Finland promoted, alone or together with Sweden two central initiatives in the CFSP area: the Petersberg tasks and the Northern Dimension. The initiatives drew a line between crisis management and defence, which made it possible for non-aligned countries to take part on an equal footing with allied EU members.¹⁸⁵

Despite Finland’s central initiatives in the CFSP dimension did the national security strategy continued to give priority to an independent national defence. Moreover, the importance of territorial defence is strongly illustrated in the report ‘Security in a Changing World’. It is made clear that the development of crisis-management preparedness is foremost seen as an element in strengthening Finland’s national defence capability.

*“As well as fulfilling its national defence function, Finland must create and enhance its preparedness for international peacekeeping and crisis management operations, which are more demanding military and also more diversified. Crisis management preparedness must be seen as a growing component in defence policy overall, and as a new tool for security policy and also as an element in strengthening the country’s defence capability”.*¹⁸⁶

As the quote indicates, preparing Finland for increased participation in international crisis management operations was seen as a new way of achieving traditional security policy goals; have a defence capability that could stand up against Russia. However, Finland made some adaptations in order to be able to take part in crisis management mission. The legislation on peacekeeping was modified in order to enable Finland to take part of operations that were mandated by the UN but executed by other organisation – like the EU.

In 1997, the character of Finland’s defence changed. As such, the national focus of the defence was tones down. Instead of maintaining a ‘credible independent national defence’, the new base of Finland’s security policy was now a ‘credible national defence capability’. The need to establish rapid-deployment

¹⁸⁴ Quoted in Rieker, Pernille (2004), p. 155.

¹⁸⁵ Rieker, Pernille (2004), p.155.

¹⁸⁶ Quoted in Rieker, Pernille (2004), p. 158-159.

ground-force brigades was specially emphasised and the Finnish air force was strengthened through investment in American F/A-18s.¹⁸⁷

In 2011, Finland's government presented the report *The Finnish Security and Defence Policy* and for the first time, participation in international co-operation to enhance security and stability was stated as one of three goals in the security policy of Finland. However, Rieker highlights in her research that even in 2001, a traditional security discourse remained dominant in Finland.¹⁸⁸

Moreover, according to Rieker, the changes that have been initiated in the Finnish defence were still based on traditional considerations. The Finnish defence included a strategic strike, which is the most difficult type of outside action to defend. As such, efforts had been made to create an army that could be deployed quickly to counter such a strike. For example, three brigades were made into rapid deployment brigades. However, Rieker argues that even if these brigades were not initially intended for use in international operations, their existence makes the Finnish defence forces better prepared for such operations. Finally, Rieker also shed light on the fact that participation in international co-operation in Finland is understood as a way to rise professional skills within the defence force, which in turn increase the credibility of the Finnish defence effort.

The report from the Finnish government *The Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2004*, follows the same theme as the previous report – military crisis management capability are seen as an essential part of Finland's security and defence policy but at the same time, this development can also contribute to Finland's own defence. According to the report, Finland is developing adequately trained and equipped troops who can be dispatched rapidly to a crisis area and they should be capable of undertaking demanding action.¹⁸⁹

*“International military cooperation is an essential part of Finland's security and defence policy, and it supports Finland's own defence”.*¹⁹⁰

In the report from 2009, the same theme is once again possible to identify. Crisis management is Finland's key foreign policy instrument and through this tool, it aims to promote stability of crisis areas in the world. Thus, crisis management seems at the same time ‘improve Finland's own security and it contributes to national defence’. Further, according to the report from 2009, it is one of Finland's primary interests to actively contribute to EU crisis management operations but major national defence reforms are scarce. As such, the government

¹⁸⁷ Pernille (2004), p. 161. American F/A-18s is a combat jet, designed as both a fighter attack aircraft.

¹⁸⁸ Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2001, report by the government to parliament on 13 June 2001. ISBN: 951-53-2328-2, p. 4.

¹⁸⁹ Finnish Security and Defence Policy, Government report 6/2004, Prime Minister's Office, publications 18/2004, p. 5-6.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 7.

states clearly that Finland's defence is based on territorial defence, general conscription and a large reserve.¹⁹¹

“Crisis management is Finland's key foreign policy instrument by which it aims to promote the stability of crisis areas in the world. Crisis management is about responsibility and participation in international cooperation. At the same time it improves Finland's own security and contributes to national defence and international interoperability”.¹⁹²

In the report from 2012, the same theme still guides the Finnish security and defence policy. As such, the government demonstrates that Finland has a clear ‘willingness to participate in international burden-sharing’ but the country must still prioritise the national territorial defence. However, this report highlights that Finland aims to develop the defence system. As such, a defence capability sufficient to repel any armed aggression is still remained but the preparedness to participate in military crisis management missions aims to be improved. Troops performance will be developed through better skills and training as well as material achievements.¹⁹³

Moreover, Finland's defence has, and will continue, to be reformed between 2011-2015. However, in the Ministry of Defence Strategy 2025 “Security into the future”, the government states that ‘general conscription form a viable foundation for modernizing defence solutions also in the future’. As such, reforms will not change the conscription in Finland. Thus, the strategy highlights that military capabilities must be developed in such a manner that they can be flexibly used in international military crisis management missions. Further, units decrease in size but simultaneously advanced in mobility, firepower and range.¹⁹⁴

4.3.3 Comparative analysis

As mentioned above in section 4.3.1, the majority of the Member States in the EU made major cuts in their defence budgets in the 1990's, – which can be seen as a result of the budgetary crisis at that time. Noteworthy, Sweden was almost unique in this case; the country actually increased its defence budget. Further, Swedens abandon of conscription can be seen as a clear result of the Petersbergs Tasks in 1992, and the country's desire to surely adapt to the EU framework and to keep up with the development in the Union. In turn, this reform in Swedens national

¹⁹¹ Finnish Security and Defence Policy, Government report, Prime Minister's Office, publications 13/2009, p. 81, 99.

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¹⁹³ Finnish Security and Defence Policy 2012, Government report, Prime Minister's Office, publications 1/2013.

¹⁹⁴ Security into the future, Ministry of Defence Strategy 2025, Ministry of Defence, ISBN 951-25-1694-2, p. 16-20.

defence increased the capacity to provide deployable personnel to ‘out-of-areas’ crisis management operations. In contrast to Sweden, Finland were one of few countries in the EU that actually decided to retain their conscription. This can be seen as reluctance to fully adapt to the EU framework but at the same time, Finland’s geographical position – close to Russia – is surely a factor that guided this choice. When it comes to the number of deployable forces, Sweden does once again stand out – in comparison to not only Finland but to the whole Union. The majority of the EU Member States reduced its number of active personnel between 2009 and 2013, but Sweden actually increased this number with 3600 people. As such, Sweden does not only stand out in relation to Finland when it comes to a comparison of this specific material indicators – Sweden seems to be standing out in relation to the whole Union.

Based on the discussion above in section 4.3.2, Sweden and Finland alike accept and underline their willingness and obligations to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management in the EU. As such, both countries express intent to increase and improve their capacity to take part in international missions and both countries had made defence reforms in order to adapt to the new security environment. However, the Swedish government seems to characterize national and international tasks as ‘sides of a coin’, while Finland puts stronger emphasis on the defence of national territory. As such, the main difference is not that Sweden puts more focus than Finland on international missions but rather that Finland emphasizes national defence to a greater extent than Sweden.¹⁹⁵

Moreover, Sweden have also made major changes in the national defence and peacekeeping legislation, for example abandon conscription and reduce the need for a UN-mandate, which in turn extends the operational capacity to take part of CSDP military missions. As such, Sweden has prioritized participation in CSDP military operations and therefore, the country has adapted the national defence to a high degree. In contrast, Finland has not made any major reforms of the national defence, and the discourse that ‘we will defend ourselves’ has been extended to the future.¹⁹⁶ For example, the general conscription is still used in Finnish security and defence policy. As a result, Finland has only adapted the national defence to a low degree since the country priorities national territorial defence.

In addition, the material indicators of adaption do strengthen this standpoint since the values of the majorities in Sweden have changed to a higher value during the referent period. In contrast, the majorities of the indicators for Finland changed to a lower value. Based on this comparison between Sweden and Finland, it is argued that Sweden has adapted its national defence to a higher degree than Finland.

¹⁹⁵ Möller, Ulrika, Bjereld, Ulf (2010), ”From Nordic neutrals to post-neutral Europeans: Differences in Finnish and Swedish transformation”, in *Cooperation and Conflict*, nr 45, p. 373.

¹⁹⁶ Cronberg, Tarja (2006), ”The will to defence: a Nordic divide over security and defence policy”, in *The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy*, Alyson, Bailes, Herolf, Gunilla, Sundelius, Bengt (ed), Oxford University Press, p. 321.

5 Conclusion

This chapter will present the conclusions from the empirical analyse. It will first examine a discussion of the empirical findings in this paper, which aims to answer the research question presented in the first chapter. Second, it will discuss theoretical contributions regarding first the concept of burden-sharing and then the concept of adaption of national defence. Third, empirical and theoretical generalization opportunities from this paper are examined. Finally, the chapter summarizes concluding remarks and provide suggestions to further research in the sphere of CSDP military operations and Foreign Policy Analysis.

5.1 Empirical findings

This thesis raised the question of how adaption of national defence can explain different degrees of burden-sharing in EU military operations. In order to answer this research question, a comparative case study was made. The case study of operation Atalanta showed that adaption plays an important role when authors aim to explain burden-sharing in EU military operations. However, in order to answer the research question, the relationship between adaption of national defence and burden-sharing must first be examined. Step two will be to present specifically how adaption of national defence can explain different degrees of burden-sharing.

In the empirical analysis, a profound correlation between adaption of national defence and burden-sharing in operation Atalanta was seen; when the independent variable took the value ‘high’ the dependent variable did also took the value ‘high’. In the case of Sweden and Finland, this basic finding is illustrated in the figure below.

	Sweden	Finland
Degree of burden-sharing	High	Low
Degree of adaption	High	Low

Since this correlation is to be seen in the empirical analysis, hypothesis number one in this thesis can be accepted.

A high degree of adaption of national defence results in a high degree of burden-sharing in CSDP military operations.

Since a correlation between adaption and burden-sharing is to be seen, step two can now be discussed – how adaption can explain different degrees of burden-sharing. The case study of this paper shows that Finland and Sweden gives different priorities to CSDP military operations in national defence planning. Nevertheless, Finland still does prioritise territorial defence, while Sweden consider national and international tasks as ‘sides of a coin’. Moreover, Sweden has made major changes in the national defence, which have favoured participation in CSDP military operations. As mentioned above, one example is the fact that Sweden has abandoned conscription and changed peacekeeping legislation. In contrast, Finland still has a comprehensive defence and only limited defence reforms have been made in the last decade. For example, conscription is still used and EU missions are seen as a factor that will improve the country’s own defence. However, Finland’s geopolitical position is in turn a central reason for this defence strategy but at the same time, this can be seen as an expression of unwillingness to take responsibility for collective security. In addition, the intentions of Sweden’s defence reforms and priority of CSDP military operations seems to be characterized by the will to protect human rights and contribute to a safer world. In contrast, Finland’s intentions with the defence reforms and participation in international missions seem to be characterized by the will to practice the national defence. As such, through Finland’s participation in EU operations, the country will be better equipped to protect its own national territory. In sum, Sweden’s adaption of the national defence to the EU framework has generated an operational capacity to take part of EU military operations. Consequently, Sweden can and also takes a high degree of burden-sharing in operation Atalanta. Regarding Finland, the degree of adaption is limited in relation to Sweden and therefore, the operational capacity is affected. However, Finland has the operational capacity to take part of CSDP military operations but due to different priorities, the country takes a low degree of burden-sharing in operation Atalanta.

In general, adaption of national defence can explain the different degrees of burden-sharing in EU military operations by the fact that EU Member States gives different priorities to CSDP military operations in their national defence. These different priorities affect the operational capacity of the Member States to participate in CSDP military operations. As a result, Member States have different defence qualifications that affect their practical contributions to EU military operations. However, at first sight, this may seem evident but as mentioned in the

theoretical framework, political decision-makers in the Union does not always take practical resource constraints into consideration when a new operation should be realised. Thereby, a Member State can have the political will to participate in a EU military mission but this approach should be seen as the last element in the process. First, resources and operational capacity is needed – thereby adaption. Second, the political will is required. As such, these two ingredients are both important.

5.2 Theoretical contributions

This thesis has introduced a particular theoretical framework for the purpose of evaluating how adaption could explain different degrees of burden-sharing in EU military operations. The theoretical points of departure were found in the framework of FPA; a framework that has proven capacity to account for the variation between Sweden and Finland's degree of burden-sharing in operation Atalanta. The next two sections will discuss theoretical findings; first regarding the concept of burden-sharing and then regarding the concept of adaption of national defence. At the end of this section, empirical and theoretical generalization opportunities will be examined.

Burden-sharing

As mentioned throughout this paper, the theoretical framework has been developed by the use of Niklas Nováky's research of burden-sharing. The focus has been on the factors that Nováky classifies as 'material' and his endogenous variables have been used in order to measure adaption and his exogenous variables has been used in order to measure burden-sharing. As such, the new model that was developed in this thesis did not take immaterial variables from different levels of analysis into account. Consequently, this paper took a more practical approach when it comes to analyse burden-sharing in EU military operations. As such, a more abstract and theoretical manner could have been obtained if immaterial variables also were included in the analytical model. Furthermore, if more variables have been incorporated in the new model, it would be possible to further examine and compare which factor that had the greatest impact on the dependent variable and also discuss different levels of analysis. Thus, by only focusing on one variable – adaption of national defence – a more in-depth analysis has been made and the causal relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable is stated with more significance.

Specifically, the concept of burden-sharing was measured through the indicators of resources required for operations (profile of operations and intensity of conflict) and contributions of operational resources. As such, the contributions of operational resources were put in the context of operation Atalanta and the degree of burden-sharing was based on if the specific contributions from Sweden

and Finland were critical for the realisation of operation Atalanta or not. This three-step approach made it possible to analyse national contributions not only in terms of numbers but also in terms of the military context. As such, this thesis has evaluated burden-sharing relative to the significance of specific contributions. Further, in relation to previous research regarding burden-sharing, this thesis has also shown the importance to include the flexibility that EU Member States have when it comes to adapt to the EU framework or not.

Further, Nováky's immaterial variables are more in line with classical FPA, where factors like 'threat perception' and 'political will' gives a lot of priority. However, it can be mentioned that the connection between operational capacity and decision-makers should be identified to a higher extent within the framework of Foreign Policy Analysis.

Adaption of national defence

The theoretical framework in this paper treats also adaption in a more practical manner: it suggest that EU Member States need to take practical undertakings in their national defence in order to adapt to the EU framework, and it continues to guide participation in CSDP military operations through operational capacity. As such, adaption has been measured through the material indicators of economic resources (size of defence budget and size of defence), military resources (number of deployable forces, professional forces/conscription and existing deployments) and priority of CSDP military operations (national defence planning). As the observant reader may notice, the first two indicators – economic and military resources – are more practical indicators while the last one – priority of CSDP military operations – is of a more abstract manner. As such, while the practical indicators account for some of the degree of participation in Sweden and Finland, they are not capable of producing a comprehensive explanation alone. Therefore, it is worth mentioning that the analytical framework takes these factors into account due to their inherent logics. To make clear, the analysis departed from the proposition that the operational capacity of a specific EU Member State, in time of a military operation, was critical for the question to participate or not. However, these practical indicators needs to be complemented with an indicator of a more theoretical approach – priority of CSDP military operations, a factor that is also possible to analyse during a longer time period. As such, it is of high importance to analyse not only the time-period of the operation but also to extend the referent period and go back in time in order to analyse priority of CSDP in national defence reforms.

However, adaption can be used and measured in many different ways. For example, it can be measured through socialization, or it can take a more rationalistic approach. Depending on which dimension of the concept the researcher use, different conclusions are surely to be seen. As mentioned, the approach of adaption in this paper takes a more practical manner and this has its both advantages and disadvantages. As such, when using the concept in this way, it facilitates for the researcher to measure adaption. In contrast, it can be

challenging to make it fit into a theoretical model. However, since the practical indicators were complemented by ‘priority of CSDP’, this thesis intended to make the model more theoretical but at the same time – usable in empirical studies.

5.2.1 Empirical and theoretical generalization opportunities

So, what are the generalization opportunities in this paper? Can this findings fly? In general, the empirical findings can be argued to be able to apply to other military operations where similar countries participated in different ways. More specific, adaption of national defence assumes to be able to explain different degrees of burden-sharing, not only in EU military operations but also military operations made by other organisations – like NATO. Further, adaption of national defence can also be applied to other countries than Sweden and Finland – material indicators and national defence planning are indicators that can be applied to almost any country in the world. In addition, the theoretical findings in this paper can also be argued to fly. As such, the findings shows that the relationship between political decision-makers and resource constrains are of importance to include in theoretical frameworks regarding burden-sharing in military operations. As Engberg has argued before, this relationship is not that black or white in reality and this is a factor that needs to be included in the theoretical context of FPA and burden-sharing.

5.3 Concluding remarks

As concluding words, although the theoretical model in this paper cannot adequately explain all aspects in the case of different degrees of burden-sharing in operation Atalanta, it has been relevant to look at adaption of national defence when analysing CSDP military operations. More specific, if EU Member States doesn’t adapt their national defence to the EU framework, the Union will maybe not be able to carry out CSDP military operations in the future due to the lack of operational capacity. As such, CSDP military operations require more than political will – it requires that the EU Member States take practical adjustments in their national defence and work together as a collective use of force. However, as long as flexibility appears for the EU Member States to decide for them self if, and to what extent, they would like to adapt their national defence to the EU framework – adaption can explain different degrees of burden-sharing. This by shed light on the difference of operational resources and the different priorities of CSDP in national defence planning between EU Member States.

5.3.1 Further research

Like the first chapter of this paper mentioned, there is a gap in the literature when it comes to analyse burden-sharing in CSDP military operations and the role of adaption. Therefore, this relationship needs more research and the use of FPA makes it possible to analyse other operations than Atalanta and also, other countries than Sweden and Finland. Thus, a comparison of Sweden and Finland can be complemented by including Austria, a EU Member that is not either a member of NATO and also has applied a neutral policy in history. Moreover, it would be interesting to compare countries contributions in different CSDP military operations, in order to analyse adaption in a different way.

6 Appendixes

This chapter will present the Appendixes in this paper. Appendix 1 illustrates Nováky’s model of independent factors affecting burden-sharing. Appendix 2 illustrates how the profile of operation Atalanta will be examined. Appendix 3 illustrates Sweden and Finland contributions.

6.1 Appendix 1

Independent Variables Affecting Burden-Sharing		
	<i>Material</i>	<i>Immaterial</i>
<i>Endogenous</i>	Economic resources: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Size of defence budget • Size of defence expenditure Military resources: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of deployable forces • Professional forces/conscription • Existing deployments 	Public-level: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public opinion • Visibility of conflict (“CNN effect”) Government-level: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Threat perception • Parliamentary approval • Political will • Support for CFSP/CSDP • Solidarity towards other EU states
<i>Exogenous</i>	Resources required for operation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Profile of operations • Intensity of conflict Relations with target: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic relations 	Regional-level: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Language of target country • Previous experience from target region International-level: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UN mandate • Political relations with target • Relations with NATO/US • Pressure from other EU Member States

6.2 Appendix 2

Profile of operation Atalanta

Character of conflict	
Mandate of the mission	
Time period	
Other international actors in the area	
Task of the mission	
Availability of relevant forces	
Scare resources	
Availability of financial resources	

6.3 Appendix 3

Nation/year of contributions	Sweden	Finland
2009	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marine contribution 	
2010	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marine contribution 	
2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Officers to OHQ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marine contribution
2012		
2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Marine contribution 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contribution of 25 soldiers

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