The Conditionality of the European Commission’s Leadership

What makes Team Juncker strong?

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Abstract

Jean-Claude Juncker’s Commission entered European political arena with a style that wasn’t seen in Brussels since the times of Jacques Delors. It introduced a fresh way of communicating with citizens and stakeholders, as well as it presented a new way of structuring Europe’s executive body. Its emphasis on holistic approach to policy making in many aspects resembles the way of work we know from Delors Commission. Moreover, the Juncker Commission aims to pursue grand bold initiatives that have a potential to change our continent in a similar way Delors did. This thesis wants to explore the source of the current Commission’s confidence. The author explores both the institutional aspects that can lead to development of a powerful institution, as well as the personality of the President of the European Commission, Mr Jean-Claude Juncker. The author also evaluates the importance of both tiers and attempts to present conditions of President’s success. The author does so through academic literature, newspaper articles and a several discussions with experienced personalities that have a hands on experience with European politics.

*Key words:* European Commission, European Union, political leadership, institutions, Delors Commission, Juncker Commission

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1. Introduction

Since the very beginning, Jean-Claude Juncker’s Commission presented itself as a very efficient and strong player that is ready to overcome the challenging obstacles of the leadership of the European Union, with confidence. The Commission Work Programme describes several policy directions that, if subjected to analysis, prove as very ambitious with regard to the existing inter-institutional balance, that we have seen so far.

The Investment plan, designed to give a boost to jobs, growth and investment in Europe, is aiming to generate approximately EUR 315bn. This money will be put in projects selected by designated committee at the European Union level. Furthermore, the funds will be distributed to projects across the Member States regardless of how much each Member State contributed to the whole fund. The plan is generally seen as a way to bypass the reluctance of some Member States to invest and therefore stimulate the pro-growth measures that the Commission insists on.

The emphasis on cutting red tape (so called Better Regulation), creation of the energy union and the digital single market together with the leading role in the negotiations of the free trade agreement with the United States of America (TTIP) present the example of close interaction with some highly political issues.

Furthermore, the European elections in May 2014 introduced several new aspects. These were never observed in the context of the elections to the European Parliament before. The concept of *spitzenkandidaten* brought the first personalized campaign at this level of EU public vote after the European Parliament’s ambitious interpretation of the Article 9d of the Treaty of Lisbon.¹ The article states that the European Council needs to take into account the results of the European elections before submitting the proposal for the President of the Commission to the European Parliament. Hence, the situation before the Election Day seemed as if the Parliament will not wait for the Council’s decision. On the contrary it considered the appointment of the Commission’s highest official by the national heads of states as a mere confirmation of the European Parliament’s will and the acknowledgment of the election results. The win of the European People’s Party designated Jean-Claude Juncker as the President of the Commission to be. Moreover, it clearly caught the Member States by surprise. After a round of tough negotiations, the European parliament claimed their win after the European Council approved their political candidate.²

As one can see, the Juncker’s Commission has the prerequisite to form a strong player in the arena of European politics and so far it appears to be exactly

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that. It puts emphasis on the efficiency and clarity that is evident already from the way it chooses to publish the communications and the legislative proposals that are often shorter and with less jargon. More importantly, however, it is evident in a way Jean-Claude Juncker structures the institution he leads. He decided to tackle the high number of the Commissioners with often futile portfolios by structuring the Commissions’ political leadership without taking away the Member State’s right to propose their own member of the College. Instead, he created a seniority principle within the College that elevates the role of some Commissioners above the others and creates portfolio teams. Juncker employs his managerial skills and again bypasses the influence of Member States by choosing his closest team according to other merits than just nationality.

The Member States don’t stay silent while they observe the bold moves within the Commission and actively publish their views. Moreover they try to influence the processes that have been started within the Commission. Oftentimes, however, they see themselves coming into the play too late. Also, this Commission isn’t afraid to object and stand head to head with the Member States in order to have their way. This way of conduct was in no way typical to the Commissions of Jacques Santer, Romano Prodi or José Manuel Barroso. Thus, this interesting development caused the current Commission to be compared with the one of Jacques Delors that governed from 1985 until the beginning of 1992 (or 1994 respectively³). The Delors Commission is responsible for a breakthrough in European integration and its efforts led to the creation of the European Union as we know it today. Only time will tell if the Juncker Commission would enjoy similar ovations. One thing, however, is clear today – we see the Commission with grand planes that are pursued with confidence that hasn’t been seen since the Delors Commission departure. The author of this text believes, that this deserves attention.

1.1 Political leadership

The existing development points to the fact that the Juncker’s Commission is much more politicized that its predecessors. It clearly shows that it is not afraid to form its own strong policy strategy and that is ready to keep finding support, build coalitions and pursue it. In addition it is not hesitant to come into the open fight with the Member States.

The author of the thesis would like to investigate the concept of political leadership with regard to the new Commission. The analysis will require the initial assessment of what it means to be politicized in the institutional context. The author will have to differentiate between several types of political leadership. The institution can be a subject of politicization against its will as a consequence of power game between two or more actors or due to its inner potential that can be

³ A short, third term of Delors Commission was designed to align the term of the Commission to the one of the European Parliament.
of use to an external actor. Politicization of an institution or an issue can be observed in the general discourse most often as a critique and accusation. Many authors also analyzed this issue for instance in the connection with the politicization of World Bank or UN Human Rights Council.\(^4\)

The author of this text however, would like to approach politicization from a different angle. The European Commission is a product of the European integration and therefore European Union as a project *sui generis* that doesn’t have an equivalent in today’s world. Throughout the last decades, the Member States gradually gave up more sovereignty to the supra-national level via numerous treaties. The European Commission as an executive body, one of the three legislators and the only institution that can propose legal acts is rising in influence. It becomes more confident and generates the real political power that comes from its inner structures. The author of this thesis would like to assess what allowed the Commission to become more politicized and what are the conditions of success in this respect.

The strong political leadership of the Commission isn’t a phenomenon that would be hitherto unknown. The political scientists refer to Jacques Delors Commission as highly politicized and strong institution. This period of European integration in the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s brought a series of highly significant steps that formed the future of the continent for the years to come. Delors Commission was very different from the other Commission terms that are regarded as rather bureaucratic and administrative. Also, for this reason there are scientific analyses available and the author of this thesis would like to explore the concept of Commission’s leadership in depth. The findings will be then compared with the nature of the Juncker Commission and can help to understand where the leadership strength of this institution rests.

1.2 Measuring politicization

The successful assessment of leadership of the current Commission depends on the thorough knowledge of examples of behaviour that can be seen as political and where the instruction likely clashed with other legislators. The aspects of polarization can lie in the degree of the Commission’s involvement in the political matters. That is especially, if the subject of involvement presents a sensitive issue for the Member States. The politicization can also depend on the way the leading personalities of the Commission have been put in their office and the strength of their mandate. It can be related to the duties and tools available that derive from the treaties. Not every legal tool must necessarily mean more power, if used without the right amount of confidence that also must have its reasoning or source.

The latter leads the author’s thoughts towards finding a proper way how to identify the source for strong mandate or the political confidence allowing for strong leadership. The author aims to conduct a series of interviews with civil servants in Brussels, both current and former ones. These will take a form of a discussion. Interviews should act as an extra material that will help the author to understand the theory and his own research. In any case should the interviews provide the complete answer for the research question without their impartial assessment with other findings.

Therefore, the main sources of material that will allow to categorize and measure the Commission’s leadership will be found in the academic research; policy proposals coming from the European Commission and other EU institutions; news articles and commentaries and the assessment of the relevant theoretical approaches.

1.3 Key concepts and next steps

The topic can seem rather broad, general and hard to grasp at the first sight. Therefore, it is necessary for the author to clearly acknowledge the subject of his studies. The idea of the work should be based on concepts of leadership and politicization, new institutionalism, European integration and inter-institutional balance and interaction. The questions that the author plans to explore include:

What is the role of the Commission in EU political system? What makes Commission a strong leader? What are the conditions necessary for a strong and productive European Commission?

The author must get acquainted with the theoretical basis, concepts and various streams of thought. He aims to get proficient enough in the topic to be able to ask correct people the correct questions. The theoretical knowledge will also serve as a food for thought with regard to current situation and lead the author into his own exploration of the subject. One must understand that theory only will not be a sufficient for answering the research questions. Author thus attempts to theorize upon his own analyses and information gathered during his research.
2. Concepts of leadership meet political science

2.1 Institutions

A perception of the meaning of institution _per se_ has been developed throughout the time. The general understanding and attempts to describe what an institution is has been summarized within the institutional theory. The theory itself went through the development of its own. The old institutionalism would see the concept of institution as a set of formalized legislation that steers the human behaviour. Stuart McConnell describes it as a century old tradition of thought where state plays a central role as an implementer of policy in both political and cultural sense. The most radical change came in 1960s. The thinking turned towards complexity, rather than simplification, trying to encompass as much variables as possible. We call it structural functionalism. It took into account the modernization of 1950s across the globe with an attempt to avoid generalization. It is necessary to say, that the subject was in that time assessed from the American point of view for the most part. Konstanze Senge mentions “The Organizational Revolution” by Kenneth Boulding from 1953 as one of the key works from that era. McConnell names the clash of economic interests, the cultural influence over electoral politics, the racial and gender questions in bureaucratic practice as some of the aspects left out of old institutionalism that perceives state as something that is simply destined to grow and protect itself from the competition. With this in mind the new institutionalism started to occupy the political thinking of that time. The political scientists started to explore this perspective as a reaction against the idea that organizations can be adequately explained through economic and technological variables. The new institutionalism takes into account various influences, including those from non-governmental sphere or those that exercise more cultural rather than just political power. All of those complete a society full of mutual influences that must be taken into account when trying to asses a nature of contemporary institutional body.

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7 Ibid.
The institutions of the European Union and namely the Commission are looked upon in the aforementioned fashion, in its complexity and as a part of integrated world, rather than standing apart. Although it is true that the very beginnings of the European integration may be most likely classified as a top down process very much driven by the will of an elitist national institutions in the individual member states, the author of this paper would like to attempt to argue, that today’s Commission is not afraid to confront the ones who put established it. Moreover, it started to live a life of its own and therefore, it needs to be approached from a neo-institutional point of view. The neo-functionalist approach established by Ernst Haas provides us with a good tool to describe the beginnings of integration. This very elitist approach presumes the national government’s need for a supranational platform in order to facilitate cross-border cooperation in a given policy area. The emerged spillover effect then broadens the cooperation on a different policies and results in a creation of supranational entity. But the influence of national governments at the development of European institutions is much weaker today, then in the past.

2.2 Politicization as a term

The term of politicization can be approached in a number of ways. It is quite abstract concept that can resemble many different things. The key issue is its exact classification and, on top of that, the way we can measure it. The concept of issue politicization is well summarized by Ole Elgström and Christer Jönsson. They abandon the mainstream perception of high and low politics as something that is hard to operationalize and illustrate on the example of mad cow disease that even a very technical issue can become a subject of heavy politicization. They suggest looking at several things when we try to study politicization of an issue. To begin with, it is to see what kinds of issues are handled at what level. Or in other words, what issue is handled by bureaucrats and which issue is on the agenda of top officials and politicians. Elgström and Jönsson suggest choosing John Peterson’s recommendation to take a strategy that encourages us to look for identifiable patterns of decision-making at different levels of analysis, to specify which actors tend to dominate decision-making at which levels, and to think about the implications for EU policy outcomes. We ought not to forget that they perceived the politicization from an issue-based perspective.

To stretch the above to the institution-based perspective we might want to look at what level, or in this case by which institution, the issue is handled. In other words, what issue the institution dares to take up its agenda and how does it

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treat it with regard to the other legislators. Peterson further makes a distinction between history-making decisions as those that are highly political and policy-shaping decisions at a meso-level that are rather technocratic.  

To look at the core of politicization, we see that it is a process of increasing the power to take socially binding decisions and thus penetrating previously non-political fields such as private life or private economic activity. Schmidt’s definition clearly suggests the importance of the type of the issue highlighting the private sphere as a key variable. This complies with the previously said - the distinction between issues there are to be seen as solely technocratic and those that aren’t. Therefore, with regard to this research, the most suitable approach seems to look at the politicization as “de-technocratization” of supra- or international decision-making processes. Political issues are seen as politicized when drawn into the public light. The notion of de-technocratization is very valid for the current Commission and will be further explored in the later stages of this analysis. It also means that in order to correctly assess this concept with regard to the European Commission, one must have in mind the development of issue handling within the EU governance up to this date.

2.3 Tools to measure political leadership

One of the most striking examples of a political issue is foreign policy and has been in a center of debate throughout the time. Thus it can serve as one of the issues that can be used to assess the degree of political leadership of an institution. Consideration of the division of decision-making on foreign policy between the three EU legislators can serve as one of the pointers. Some studies choose the public awareness as a tool to measure the politicization with regard to the theoretical belief that politicization means more public attention. The lack of comparable data could however stand in the way of a correct assessment. Nevertheless, some attention to this aspect is desirable since Andrew Moravcsik would argue that while the European Union has the authority in certain policy areas, it is only where there is no public interest or where decision doesn’t require democratic legitimacy.

The legitimacy and the EU is a frequent topic of political science. Michael Zürn argues that the international institutions that exercise or are expected to exercise international authority a politicized. He adds that the degree of politicization depends on the legitimacy of given institution. The recent changes

12 Ibid.
brought by the Lisbon Treaty and exercised during the May 2014 election campaign are worth looking into when considering the politicization of the current European Commission. The European election with a never before seen “spitzenkandidaten” as an element that sets this Commission apart of its predecessors. Hence, it is not an exhaustive argument for assessing the politicization of the institution.\footnote{Zürn, Michael, Martin Binder & Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012. “International authority and its politicization”. International Theory, 4, p. 69-106.}

Jacques Delors Commission was highly politicized and strong institution that shifted European integration miles ahead it was before. This fact expands possible reasons of Commission’s strong leadership beyond the notion of Member States giving up their sovereignty to the benefit of supranational institutions. Public opinion regarded the Commission's as a weak body during the 1960s and 1970s. However, in 1980s and 1990s, the years of Delors Commission, the public would consider the institution to be a strong leader (Crombez and Hix 2011: 292)\footnote{Crombez, C, & Hix, S 2011, 'Treaty reform and the Commission’s appointment and policy-making role in the European Union', European Union Politics, 12, 3, pp. 291-314, Political Science Complete, EBSCOhost, viewed 18 May 2015.}. The degree of power that the European Commission (and the European Parliament) has today is incomparably higher than in the times of Delor’s Commission long before Maastricht Treaty’s introduction of co-decision procedure or expansion of the cooperation and the assent (consent) procedure to new policy areas. Or long before the Amsterdam Treaty that reinforced Commission’s influence in the politically sensitive areas such as immigration or asylum.
3. The political Commission of Jacques Delors

Jacques Delors is praised in retrospective by the current leaders of the Commission as well as by the stakeholders in the professional community. According to them, Jacques Delors, although he was a civil servant, was able to present a strong team of Commissioners who expressed the ideas of the day with one voice. He was able to formulate those ideas and present something new to the citizens compared to what the previous Commissions put on the table. Delors actively mobilized many important and brave projects in the mid 1980s. Single Market or Euro as a common currency, were among the concepts initiated by Jacques Delors.

According to the current president of the Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, Jacques Delors was a man of a great ability to debate, listen to different opinions and give them an appropriate attention in his proposals in addition to his willingness to push things forward very eagerly if necessary. Delors wasn’t afraid to initiate large political projects, such as the monetary union which, according to Juncker, Delors wanted to see alive from 1st January 1994. At the end, this wasn’t the case, but it illustrates the brevity of a politician that Juncker designates as one of his role models.

According to Juncker, it was also Delors who laid basis for the Social dialogue, that refers to discussions, consultations, negotiations and joint actions involving organizations representing two sides of industry (employers and workers).1920 According to public affairs professional with two decade experience in interest advocacy in Brussels, the system of public involvement in decision making was highly disorganized at the beginning of 1990s. There was an attitude in the Commission administration that supported a non transparent negotiation practices and a small accountability of the Commission officers. Also, one has to realize that the might of this institution and thus also the consequences of its will were emphasized by the institutional power balance where the European Parliament wasn’t as strong and confident as it is today. The work Jacques Delors began helped to fight the anti European sentiment.

3.1 Delors' recipe of success

Jacques Delors himself describes several qualities of a President of the successful Commission:21

1. Firstly, with regard to his fellow Commissioners and to the other institutions, the successful President of the Commission should not consider himself as *primus inter partes*. The President of the Commission needs to realize that the Commission isn’t by itself to decide about Europe. In the contrary there still are other legislators with the Council, in particular.

2. Successful President of the Commission must establish a good synergy among the members of the College of Commissioners. The Commissioners must not be afraid to hold frank discussions, but for the outside world they should appear as collegial and united.

3. The Commission should realize its powers, especially the right of initiative. It is also the Commission's responsibility to make sure that European Council and the Council of Ministers are prepared and that the decisions are taken.

4. The Commission should be patient and persistently push for its initiatives that can often be shattered in a very short time. It is thus of great importance to keep the energy to pick them up and start again.

Delors also said that the organization of institutions made his governing much easier that it is today. There were times that the Commissions were relegated to the second tier as a simple subordinate. It is not justified with regard to the Commission's institutional powers that accounts, for example, for the control of the Euro area. Thus, when the Commission vacates the playing field in some of its powers, other will step in and fill its shoes.

With this said, it is clear that today's institutional setting is far more complex than it was in the times of Jacques Delors and demands smarter, more complex and persistent strategy for one institution, in our case the Commission, to exercise power. According to Jacques Delors, the current biggest obstacles for the Commission to be strong a strong leader are:

1. Firstly, it is the current public opinion. The trauma of globalization led all sides of the political spectrum to create populist movements. Therefore, the pro-European camp is weakened. These movements need to be tackled at the national level. The activities that can help to address the issue at the European level are limited in their scope as well as their efficiency.

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2. Another obstacle rests in the high number of Member States and their duality - some members are a part of the euro area whilst others aren’t. This supports national egotism by referring to the core of integration to be at the euro zone.

3. Finally, the high number of the Member States called for the changes in the organizational structure of meetings and the President of the Council function was created. Today, the original architecture doesn’t work as it did before. Previous system was far more simpler with the European Council deciding only on priorities prepared by the Commission. Today, the European Council takes decisions that should have already been taken by the Council of Ministers. At the end of the day, the introduction of more leading functions undermined the role of the Commission it had in the decision making process.

To complement Delors’ idea of strong Commission leadership, Etienne Davignon, a former Commissioner at Roy Jenkin’s and Gaston Thorn’s Commissions, considers the most important virtues to be the ability to maintain good relationships with other stakeholders in the EU political system; strong knowledge of complex policies, because Commission has a superior role to the Member States; and strong knowledge of the reality of Member States. In addition to be a good boss within the team of Commissioners who can motivate and encourage.22

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4. The nature of the Juncker Commission

There is a great mutual respect between both Juncker and Delors who know each other since 1990s when Jean-Claude Juncker served as Luxembourgish Minister of the Treasury, Prime Minister and later as the President of the Eurogroup. Jacques Delors talks about Juncker as an essential element of consensus building at that time.

Jean-Claude Juncker started his term in the Commission by an introduction of significant changes across different sectors since the very beginning. He re-established the offices of vice-presidents of the Commission that allowed for more efficiency and organizational hierarchy of the College. This helps the College to be more effective in handling of numerous legislation. Especially the one that was inherited from the previous Commission which wasn’t particularly penurious on the number of proposals it tabled. This came under the scrutiny of the current Commission that scrapped a lot of proposals on important topics, including the Circular economy package. These steps were widely criticized because they meant that a lot of years of work went to trash and all three legislators will have to start over.23

The author’s interviews with various stakeholders registered the notion of importance of division of the College of Commissioners and the rest of the administration that shouldn’t be attached to the top. This allows for the top of the Commission to become more ideological and political. Such College of Commissioners, therefore, can be more courageous in coming up with more bold initiatives and can address issues that the previous Commissions avoided. On the other hand, the division between the administration and the political “management” of the Commission opens door for more efficient, professional and continual body. It keeps its know-how, as well as the network of connections that allows for a better assessment of the situation on ground. This will make the adopted legislation better prepared for the real world and thus implementable.

The way this Commission deals with the rest of the administration is apparently quite important to the current Commission’s president. According to the decision on mobility of senior Commission staff from 1999, the Director-General have to change their posts every five years.24 This change is done by the current Commission as well to adhere to the laws previously adopted. The

President of the Commission, however, calls these laws unwise, because they undermine the professionalism of the administration.

### 4.1 Playing prime among the three legislators

The direction of the European integration is shaped by the inter-institutional balance between the three legislators. Each institution plays its traditional role within the system. This setting, however, never stands still, hence is a subject to very dynamic changes since the beginning of the modern European integration. The concept is based on the idea that each institution plays its role that is limited by the scope of the powers defined by the Treaties. In the European Union, as an entity *sui generis* however, these powers were subject to evolution. This development was more dramatic than what we could have been seeing in case of the national political systems that progressed throughout the centuries. That causes strong competitiveness between the institutional players in the EU political arena. The frequent ambiguity of Treaties also provide for a lot of space until the rules settle down. There is however a principle of institutional balance, defined by Meroni judgement by the Court of Justice from 1958 that prohibits one institution to step out of the limit on the expense of different institution. Therefore, it is mainly the Court of Justice of the European Union that is responsible for keeping this principle alive.

The institutional triangle as we know it today started as a bi-polar relationship between the Council and the Commission. We can say that it was the Council that played the leadership role in the beginning as an overseer of the administrator - the Commission.

The interviews suggest that the situation of the Commission in the system looked very different during the Delors' times. The levy the Commission had was much broader than it is today. On the contrary, the number of responsibilities and areas entrusted to the EU level was much lower. In order to analyze the aforementioned notion, the author would like to look at the main developments in the EU institutional system since Delors Commission. And also focus at the situation the Juncker Commission faced after the embodiment of Lisbon Treaty. The comparison with recent history will allow to understand the nature of this Commission's leadership and the position of the Commission (as an institution) in the system.

Crombez and Hix claim the role the Commission plays in the system is closely tied to the changes made by reforms of the Commission appointment and EU legislative process. In the beginning, the Council was setting policies and appointed the Commission by unanimous vote. The policies were therefore characterized as a status-quo among the views of the Member States. The change

came in mid 1980s with the Single European Act. It allowed for a more frequent use of majority voting in the Commission. This unlocked a lot of options for the Commission. It ultimately caused, that the creation of the single market, one of the major policies adopted in the EU history, was possible.

Until the early 1990s, the political game was mostly developing between just the Council and the Commission. But in that time, the European Parliament began to be an important player in the arena, as well with the introduction of the codecision procedure. Commission could no longer control the amendment process. Thus, the notion of engagement with the European Parliament in order to be influential originates in these times. Stronger Parliament also caused that the Member States' intention of keeping policies ideally somewhere in the middle, at the status quo, was more difficult due to the unpredictable assembly. The Council's choice of the Commission could not guarantee the policy outcome anymore. The only way how to keep the situation stable was to prefer the Commissioner's who are as close as possible to the status quo. After 2003, the Commission started to be appointed by the Council by a qualified majority. The question of political alignment and ideology is more important and the Commissions are therefore more open toward braver policy decisions.

Treaty of Lisbon has been initially seen as an obstacle for the expansion of the Commission's role in the European Union decision making. The creation of both permanent President of the European Council and the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy were considered to be signs of more intergovernmentalism in the EU system. In theory, the Commission was to be no longer the only responsible actor for Union's foreign policy and external representation. The measures establish too many presidents with too many responsibilities. Moreover, the Council decided to abandon the idea of a charismatic personalities that would occupy both posts. Charismatic and outspoken leader, such as Tony Blair, could undermine the role of the Council and its calibre within the legislative triangle. Thereof, in 2009, the Council elected Herman Van Rompuy as the President of the European Council and Catherine Ashton as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Their election was a statement of the Council that no other leader will overshadow the heads of states. Their assumption, that both Van Rompuy and Ashton won’t steal the show of German chancellor Angela Merkel or French president Nicolas Sarkozy was correct. Van Rompuy was predominantly unknown politician at the European stage as the Belgian Prime Minister who served in his

role less than one year. Nevertheless, both leaders proved themselves to be great administrators and finders of consensus. Van Rompuy was also useful during the economic crisis as an expert for economic questions, as well due to his long time experience as a minister of finance. They fulfilled the initial intention of those who drafted the Lisbon Treaty as both position’s should put a halt to too much charisma at the top of EU’s leadership. According to the interviews, the measure was initially drafted during the times when Italians assumed the Council Presidency and the controversial Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconni used the position to pursue Italian national interests.

The 2014 choice of the Council for the top EU jobs came with a surprise given the previous experience with the leaders of the European Council and EUs external policy as a mere administrators. The political situation in the midst of the crisis in Ukraine and the unrests in the Middle East (especially in Syria), that caused immigration crisis to Europe, forced the EU heads of states to use the top EU positions created by the Lisbon Treaty as a diplomacy tool. Donald Tusk, a long time Prime Minister of Poland, as well as an experienced opposition leader in Sejm, was a symbol of German-Polish relationship and a message to both Ukraine and Russia. Poland neighbours both Russia and Ukraine. The crisis therefore very much occupies polish policy makers. At the same time, Poland sometimes feel that Germany doesn’t take its eastern neighbour seriously enough. The projects, such as Nord Stream, that Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski called “the Molotov-Ribbentrop pipeline”, certainly do not add to the relationship of these two major EU Member States. Tusk’s appointment was a proof that Germany is not willing to overlook and sacrifice the interests of Poland. With regard to Federica Mogherini, her nomination as the EU foreign policy chief was intensively pushed ahead by Matteo Renzi, the Italian Prime Minister. Angela Merkel chose to agree with the nomination in order not to alienate Rome more when she had serious disagreements with Italians on economic policies.

Today, both the president of the European Council and the President of the Commission share political affiliation. Jean Claude-Junker comes from Christian Social People’s Party in Luxembourg and Donald Tusk Civic Platform in Poland. Both political parties are affiliated with the European People’s Party at the

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35 The Financial Times, 2014 “EU leaders name Donald Tusk president of the European Council” Newspaper article. 30.08.2014. [Electronic] http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4a7e403c-306d-11e4-9914-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3ZIBoDjqN. Download date: 02.05.2015
European level. This isn’t the case of Federica Mogherini who is also ex-officio Vice-President of the European Commission. Her political background is from Italian Democratic Party that is affiliated with the Party of European Socialists at the European level. Nevertheless, her first actions as a new High Representative demonstrated that foreign policy and the functioning of the European External Action Service (EEAS) will be much more tied to the Commission itself that in case of her predecessor Cathrine Ashton who kept both institutions separate. In a Mission Letter sent to Federica Mogherini by Jean-Claude Juncker, he announces her appointment as a chair of Commissioner’s Group on External Action and the move of her seat to Berlaymont building to constitute an office with officials coming from the Commission: “To liaise more effectively with the other Members of the College, following your suggestion, you will have your Headquarters in the Berlaymont, and the Commission will put a Cabinet of an appropriate size at your disposal, about half of which will be Commission officials.”

Ms Mogherini also explained her intention to make a better use of the Commission expertise and resources.

4.2 Redesigned structure of the Commission

The attempt to highlight the foreign policy as an area that won’t have to be in a sole responsibility of the national states (respectively the Council) was only a part of the institutional changes triggered by Jean Claude Junker when he assumed office as the president of the Commission. He dramatically reorganized the structure of the College of Commissioners.

The structure of the Commission suffered from two main problems. First is the high number of the members of the College that is tied to the number of the Member States. This encouraged a silo mentality when each Commissioner paid attention to his or her own portfolio without taking into account other Commissioner’s agenda. This caused a rise in incoherence of the work of the Commission and questioned its overall direction and programe. It also sometimes resulted in contradictions among the Commissioners. The reduction of number of Commissioners was on table many times before. It is, however, politically nearly impossible to carry through due to unwillingness of the Member States.

The other problem rests in the conflict between the idea of the Commission as a monitoring and administrative agency and its role as the political institution. This dispute became very hard to handle especially after the elections to the European Parliament and the way it resulted in the appointment of the Commission’s President. The questions of budget or the issues connected to


competition policy are very political in its nature, thus this relation needed to be addressed. Jean-Claude Juncker decided to create a new structure of the Commission by appointing seven vice-presidents who are to steer and coordinate the work of other Commissioners within the project teams. Having several vice-presidents within the Commission isn’t a new idea. But the position was always rather honorary, rather than possessing some more powers. The move was designed to allow for a better focus and a stronger cooperation amongst Members of the College by delegated powers of the Commission’s President down. The idea was discussed by the policy makers for the past several years. The Vice-Presidents not only have a coordinating role, but also a power to take decisions over the work of other Commissioners. Moreover, the vice-presidents hold a veto power over the work of others, which is an unprecedented development. Legally speaking, the proposals are adopted by the College of Commissioners by a simple majority of the 28 members of the College. But only given that such proposal will appear on the agenda of the College meeting. Only the President of the Commission can decide whether the item will appear there or not.

The most prominent amongst the members of the College is the first Vice-President of the Commission, former Dutch Foreign Minister, Mr Frans Timmermans. His portfolio covers Better Regulation, Interinstitutional Relations, the Rule of Law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. He is the right hand of the President, oversees the relations with other institutions and at the same time, makes sure that every proposals respects the principles set out by the Commission. In other words, he is the one who decides if the proposal, that is put on table by any of the members of the Commission, will be taken on board or dismissed. Frans Timmermans is also known for his intelligence, rhetoric skills, charisma and knowledge of many languages that he is always ready to demonstrate on numerous occasions.

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5. The lead of the Juncker Commission

With his jovial way of speaking, familiarity and first name basis with key Brussels personalities, Jean-Claude Juncker significantly differs from his predecessors in the Commission since Delors’ times. In this chapter, the author would like to discuss the key aspects of Juncker Commission’s strong leadership. The President of the Commission is a central figure that gives an overall direction to the institution. We saw in the past that it was the President’s style of leadership as well as organizational and policy decisions that influenced the legacy of his term. One mustn’t forget, however, that the College isn’t closed in the bubble. It has to deal with its own administration, the other legislators and is influenced by the general political and socio-economic attitudes in Europe and around the world.

Team Juncker, as the current College calls itself, consists of 27 Commissioners, apart from the President of the Commission. Nine members are former Prime Ministers or Deputy Prime Ministers, nineteen members served as Ministers in their home governments, seven served in previous Colleges of Commissioners and eight members of the current college have experience from the European Parliament where they served as MEPs. Eleven members of the Commission come from a solid economic and finance background and eight have an experience with foreign relations. Juncker also emphasized the political nature of this Commission by noting that one third of the Members of his team were involved in the campaign during the May 2014 European Elections.

5.1 The charismatic president

Max Weber defined three pure types of authority in his book Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. They differ according to their source: legal, traditional and charismatic. The first authority comes from the legal basis, for example the Constitution or a law. The traditional is based on something that Weber calls “the authority of eternal yesterday”, for example the monarchy, where the leader is respected due to the historical context. Weber enriched the typology of authority with the new concept of charisma. He describes charisma as “certain quality of

45 So far, no woman occupied the post of the President of the European Commission (respectively the bodies that preceded it). France, Italy and Luxembourg are three countries of origin of most Presidents of this institution.
47 The name of the book can be translated to English as “Economy and Society”.
an individual personality, by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader.\(^{49}\) Weber would also see the charismatic authority rest on “devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him.” As some would say that Weber was in the time influenced by the theological thinking in that time, namely the Second Vatican Council, his definition might seem a bit far-fetched from today’s perspective when applied to current leaders.\(^{50}\)

Nevertheless, it provides a good introduction when one wants to analyze something so abstract as charisma and apply it as an argument for a strong leadership of a political institution. Personal qualities are especially important at the top of the institution that finds itself surrounded in the legislative triangle, where the members of the other two actors came to power via popular vote. As this setting is quite special for the European Union system, it is important to realize this context in order to be able to assess the Commission’s leader’s role and its importance.

Jean-Claude Juncker is no newbie to Brussels bubble. Thanks to his education and knowledge of French and German languages, he was very close to the French and German diplomats while he worked as a Luxembourgish Minister of Finance. His political background is in the largest political party in Luxembourg, the Christian Social People’s Party. His political views were shared by Jacques Delors who was a member of French Socialist Party, the largest centre-left party in France. Juncker has been present during the meetings and negotiations in European stage since mid 1980s. In 1989 he suffered a serious injury after a road traffic accident. But made a successful comeback after the treatment a year later.

His engagement with Brussels was further strengthened when he became the President of the Eurogroup in 2004. The Eurogroup is an informal body where ministers of the euro area Member States discuss shared responsibilities related to euro. It coordinates economic policies of the respective Member States. Juncker began his presidency as a Minister of Finance and finished already as a Luxembourgish Prime Minister and the member of the European Council in 2013. Presidency of the Eurogroup allowed Juncker to interact with many different actors within the EU system much more actively than if he were to be just a regular member of the Council: not only that the President of the Eurogroup chairs the meeting and sets an agenda, but he also represents the Eurogroup to the other legislators, namely the European Parliament. He is also a representative of the


group in G7 or IMF.\textsuperscript{51} This all allowed for an extraordinary exposure to a politician coming from a country of only 520 000 inhabitants.\textsuperscript{52}

\section{5.2 The source of confidence}

In his opening statement in the European Parliament Plenary session in July 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker referred to three great Europeans who, according to Juncker, contributed to a strong and confident EU and can be considered as his role models. It was Francois Mitterand who said that nationalism leads to war, Helmut Kohl, and finally Jacques Delors, whom Juncker calls his teacher and a source of inspiration.\textsuperscript{53} This seemingly unimportant courtesy of the current President of the Commission points us to better understanding of Juncker's direction as a leader of EU's executive body. On another occasion, Juncker called Kohl a European patriot who was always persistent in pushing his European policy goals. Mitterand's idea about the danger of nationalism is considered as proven by Juncker as well.\textsuperscript{54} And finally Delors' is also considered a crucial personality in Europe's integration. He is one of the main characters behind the Single European Act and he brought Europe towards the Maastricht Treaty. This all suggest that Jean-Claude Juncker is not aiming low and clearly wants to leave his own mark on EU's history.

With regard to the research on the source of Juncker's political power and confidence, one has to look on the important characteristics of his rise to power, especially during the 2014 European Parliament elections. The 2015 elections to the European Parliament saw a game-changing concept of 'Spitzenkandidaten' as a new notion in the EU political arena. It is a product of interesting political development and to some extent an interesting legislative engineering as well. The idea is present in the EU political discourse since 2002 Congress of EPP in Estoril, attended by 10 EPP Prime Ministers (including Jean-Claude Juncker). It attempted to provide for more democratic legitimacy by introducing the notion of European Council taking into account the outcome of European elections when proposing the candidate for the President of the European Commission to the European Parliament for approval. It built upon Amsterdam and Nice Treaties that established the idea of Member States' governments (the Council) nominating the President of the Commission to the European Parliament.

The election-oriented emphasis was taken up by the Convention on the Future of Europe tasked by the Laeken Declaration to draft a constitution for the


European Union. The final text proposed by the Intergovernmental Conference, that reviewed the draft Constitutional Treaty, as a part of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe stated:

_The President of the European Commission_

1. Taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and after having held appropriate consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to the European Parliament a candidate for President of the Commission. This candidate shall be elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its component members.

If he or she does not obtain the required majority, the European Council, acting by qualified majority, shall within one month propose a new candidate who shall be elected by the European Parliament following the same procedure.

The process of adoption of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe hit the wall when it was rejected in referendums in France and in the Netherlands in 2005. Nevertheless, after a period of reflection, the EU leaders came up with a new document. The Lisbon Treaty assumed the textual proposal without any amendments in the exact wording as Article 17(7). It added declaration No 11 on Article 17(6) and (7) calling for consultations between the European Council and the European Parliament preceding the actual selection of the Commission President.

The legal bases thus started to live its own life and waited for the right incentives that would wake up the idea of European Parliament's first party group leaders for the elections. The European Commission, the supranational element in the European Union institutional framework, the guardian of Treaties and the main pusher for closer integration, made the initial step through its then president José Manuel Barroso. It ought to be said that his political past is tied to Portuguese Social Democratic Party that belongs to the European People's Party in the European Parliament. In his 2012 State of the Union speech before the European Parliament he called upon the European political parties to present their candidate for the post of Commission President before the European Parliament elections in 2014.

Later that year, the European Parliament responded to this call with a resolution addressed to the European political parties where it asks them to adhere to Barroso's idea and present the candidates that would contribute to creating a closer link between the European elections and the leadership of the Commission. Same call was echoed by the European Commission in a Commission Recommendation and Communication in 2013. The Commissioned further reasoned the importance of lead candidates as a means to increase a voter turnout.

This interesting development and a decade-long coordinated interaction between the European Parliament and the Commission resulted in Martin Schulz, from S&D, being elected as a top candidate of his political group. Other parties,

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55 José Manuel Barroso was a leader of Partido Social Democrata (PSD) between 1999 and 2004.  
including EPP, followed. The Member State’s representatives were caught by surprise by the sudden EP’s move. The Council, especially its major members from Germany, missed the dynamics of the whole process. Angela Merkel, German chancellor, tried to put the European Parliament’s efforts down arguing that there is no provision like that in the Treaties. Jean-Claude Juncker’s steadiness, UK’s Prime Minister David Cameron’s pertinacity and the determination of the Members of the European Parliament ultimately forced Angela Merkel to come in terms with the new inter-institutional practice and agree to support Juncker as a new Commission President.

The actors’ roles described in the Article 17(7) of the Lisbon Treaty switched completely providing an example of the significance of non-written rules, attitudes and persistency in politics. The May 2014 elections to the European Parliament set a precedence for the elections to come and the Council vote on the President of the Commission will be reduced to a mere confirmation of the European Parliament’s will. More importantly for this research, however, the author identifies the newly acquired confidence of the Parliament that has been transferred to the Commission as one of the key sources of strength of Juncker’s cabinet. Furthermore, should we be considering the Commission to be the executive body of the European Union, the new development shifts the whole system much more towards the scenarios known from the national levels as far as the organization of the government is concerned. The whole system of European Union governance made a huge leap towards parliamentarianism.

It has an important consequence on the Commission’s political power. The source of its legitimacy in the European Parliament isn’t only through Parliament’s approval of the Council’s proposal. The European Parliament has now de facto put in office the President of the Commission, in addition to approving the Commission as a whole after the hearings. Furthermore, he served as a face of the political group in the election campaign. He simply became a political candidate already before the Council could have a say on the matter. The inter institutional balance was changed.

Juncker himself said, that this created a strong alliance between the European Parliament and the European Commission that will be able to resist the attacks of the Council. The Council, therefore, goes through one of its major declines in power within the European Union. This notion is further supported by the nature of policies proposed by the European Commission. This will be described more in detail in another part of this paper.

5.3 The cross-sectoral approach of the leader

What sets Juncker apart from his predecessors in the seat of the Commission’s President, Mr Jacques Santer, Mr Romano Prodi and Mr José Manuel Barroso, is

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57 DW, 2014 “Juncker wins center-right backing as candidate for top EU job” Newspaper article. 07.03.2014. [Electronic] http://www.dw.de/juncker-wins-center-right-backing-as-candidate-for-top-eu-job/a-17482309. Download date: 25.03.2015
his previous function in domestic politics. In the contrary it is another of the crucial features Juncker shares with Delors. Both men were previously serving as Ministers of Finance. Santer was a Prime Minister, Prodi was a Minister of Industry and Justice and Barroso served as a minister of Foreign Affairs. Finance Ministry is an area where experience and knowledge about various sectors proofs itself to be the key of success. Much more than the ideological leaning. Jean-Claude Juncker served in this position for 19 years, which can be considered as an exception in Europe. His cross-sectoral approach is evident when one has a look at the changes he made in the College structure, where many portfolios are shared among more Commissioners.

The horizontal approach allows the President to better coordinate the pace of the Commission’s work and implement rules more efficiently due to his knowledge of various setbacks that are typical for different policy areas. Juncker was able to delegate his work load to lower ranking officials and thus free up his hands to ensure the oversight over the general work of the Commission. Juncker does that in coherence with the catch phrase in use by the current Commission: “small on small things, big on big things”.

The author already covered this aspect from the institutional point of view in the previous chapter. Here, he would like to point out how this setting supports the horizontal approach of Juncker’s leadership. Unlike Juncker, Barroso kept the portfolios and responsibilities separate and prevented blending of policy areas. He wanted to present himself as a strong leader at the expense of creating a strong team instead. In contrary, the nature of his negotiation practices within and outside of the College created some bitter relationships during his term. Juncker turned this strategy around and instead of pursuing the direct top down approach, he created a system, where the members of the College will be mutually dependent on one another. This was achieved within the teams that are not static, but their membership changes according to the policy area or initiative. In practice, a regular Commissioner needs a support of his or her team leader, the Vice-President, in order to bring a new initiative into the Commission Work Programme or on the agenda of the College meeting. On the other hand, the Vice-President depends on the contribution of his or her Commissioners in order to successfully complete the task that has been assigned by the President of Commission.

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58 Moessinger, M 2014, ‘Do the personal characteristics of finance ministers affect changes in public debt?’, Public Choice, 161, 1/2, pp. 183-207, Political Science Complete, EBSCOhost, viewed 14 May 2015.
5.4 New leadership transformed to policy action

To come back to the Commission’s slogan, the mentioned division of labour allows the Commission to fulfil its meaning – to focus on grand history-making projects that cannot be easily achieved by single national states themselves, and pay less attention to small projects that can be done within Member States on the basis of principles of proportionality and subsidiarity.\footnote{Juncker, Jean-Claude, 2014. “A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change”. [Electronic] Available: http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/docs/pg_en.pdf#page=5 Download date: 24.04.2015.}

This strategy of horizontal approach has proven to be effective in case of Delors Commission. During his term, the College facilitated large historical projects that shaped the European Union for decades to come. Schengen agreement, Single European Act, Single Market Act or the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, to name a few. The EU adopted almost 280 legislative acts to allow twelve sets of national regulations to be replaced by common EU law. Consequently, it had to be agreed by twelve national governments, on top of that. This resulted in the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, that established the Union as we know it today and laid basis for the Euro as the common currency.\footnote{European Commission, History of the Single Market. [Electronic] Available: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/20years/singlemarket20/facts-figures/history_en.htm Download date: 20.04.2015.}

The nature of these grand initiatives required a close cooperation of the Commissioners across sectors. Delors was able to create an efficient working team were all members had an equal say when they took decisions, according to the interview with a member of Delors Commission.

The Juncker Commission attempts to follow Delors’ footsteps. In line with its political guidelines, it came up with very ambitious projects in its Work Programme. The Commission acknowledges the Juncker Investment Plan, the creation of Digital Single Market and the Energy Union as its three most important initiatives.\footnote{COM(2014) 910 final = European Commission, 2014. “Commission Work Programme 2015: A New Start”. Strasbourg: European Commission.}

The closer look at the mentioned initiatives reveals the importance of multi disciplinary approach and their magnitude for the continent, in line with Commission’s priorities. It also shows how similar is Juncker’s approach to policy making when compared to Delors’.

Investment plan was announced on 26 November, 2014. It is a major in initiative that aims to boost employment across the continent, stimulate growth of Member States’ economies and allow capital to be spent in major infrastructure projects by creating better environment for investment. The plan prioritizes investment to four main, very different areas. These include broadband, energy networks and transport infrastructures; education, research and innovation projects; renewable energy and energy efficiency; and projects related to youth employment.\footnote{European Commission, Boosting Jobs, Growth and Investment. [Electronic] Available: http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/jobs-growth-investment/index_en.htm Download date: 23.04.2015.} In his political guidelines, Juncker slashed the role of national
governments as the traditional driver for investment in their territory, stating that it is companies that create jobs, not the governments or institutions. This bold attitude was later reflected, in spite of displeasure of the Member States, in the operational character of the initiative. The plan counts with involvement of the European Investment Bank through newly created European Fund for Strategic Investment. The fund serves as a guarantee to cover risk of investment. The money will come mainly from private sector. The capital will be spent on projects chosen by supranational committee across Europe, regardless the country. The initiative is promoted and administered by the Vice-President of the Commission, Mr Jyrki Katainen who leads the team of Commissioners involved in this project. This team consists of eight core and ten affiliated Commissioners.

Another issue that the Commission focuses on is the creation of the Energy Union. The team, that consists of seven core and six affiliated Commissioners, is led by the Vice-President Maroš Šefčovič. The package, that was presented on 25 February 2014, includes three main communications. It proposes a framework strategy that aims to redesign and overhaul the electricity market by ensuring more transparency in gas contracts and substantially developing regional cooperation as an important step towards an integrated market. This with a stronger and regulated framework, new legislation to ensure the supply for electricity and gas, increased EU funding for energy efficiency or a new renewable energy package. In addition to focusing at the European Research & Innovation energy strategy and reporting the results annually at the “State of the Energy Union”. The Juncker Commission emphasizes a horizontal approach towards its initiatives by explicitly linking the Energy Union to the Investment Plan with a view to achieve the 10 per cent interconnection target. This addresses not only the internal retail market with energy and thus its affordability, but also contemporary geopolitical environment with the aim to lower import dependency. The package also focuses at the ambition to conclude a new agreement to tackle global climate change in Paris in December 2015. One initiative contains several streams of interests ranging from purely market oriented focus, through growth related incentives, energy security questions and finishing at climate change.

Finally the third main component of Juncker’s doctrine is the creation of Digital Single Market. The initiative is led by the Vice-President Andrus Ansip who chairs a team of seven core and six affiliated Commissioners. The strategy,

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that was presented on 6 May 2015 is built on three pillars. The first is an attempt to improve online access for consumers and businesses across Europe. It aims to harmonize EU rules for online purchases of digital content, provide protection for customers of digital goods, ease access to digital content across the continent (tackle so called geo-blocking practices), harmonize cross-border parcel delivery rules and reduce VAT related to burdens and obstacles when selling across borders.

Second pillar aims to create the right conditions and a level playing field for advanced digital networks and innovative services. It focuses on a higher level that involves digital platforms, such as networks and telecom providers. It tackles advertising rules and issues connected to handling of personal data.

Third pillar of Digital Single Market addresses high-level issues related to competitiveness of European economy. It reacts on technological development of the past 20 years - the last time the legal acts addressing these issues were implemented was in the middle of 1990s, long before the internet was used at today's level. The Commission will launch an integrated standardization with a focus on the technologies and domains that are deemed to be critical to the Digital Single Market, including essential sectoral interoperability in areas such as health (telemedicine, m-health), transport (travel planning, e-freight), environment, and energy. It plans to further integrate national business registers or ensure a full e-procurement of governments across Member States.

Digital Single Market gained a lot of attention from business stakeholders across sectors including automotive, e-commerce, medical devices, mobile providers, aerospace, but also manufacturing industry that moves towards further digitalization. All in all, the three main initiatives of Juncker Commission tackle wide policy areas from very general approaches all the way to the end customer/user. Other initiatives that are being pursued by the Commission include, for example, the EU-US Free Trade Agreement (TTIP), Capital Markets Union or initiatives related to migration from third-countries.
6. Conclusions

Juncker Commission presents a blow of fresh air in the Commission leadership since the end of Jacques Delors term in January 1995. It stands in a strong contrast with Jacques Santer Commission that had to resign after the corruption scandal in 1999. His Commission dwelled on a strong legacy of Delors initiatives and worked on their implementation. It also failed to come up with their own policies. Romano Prodi was the next up to take the Presidency of the Commission. His biggest achievement was a successful introduction of Euro as a common currency. However, it was Delors who introduced this idea into the European political discourse and it was the Commissioners from Delors’ administration who were drafting the major documents pursued during Prodi’s Commission, such as the European Constitution, that ultimately resulted in the Treaty of Lisbon.

The last College before Juncker’s was the one of José Manuel Barroso. Overall, his Commission has been regarded by the Members of the European Parliament as a “lap dog” of the big members of the Council. The large gestures and speeches in the Parliament often didn’t meet with concrete actions. The initiatives such as the Lisbon strategy, negotiations during the Doha Development Agenda proceedings or the EU climate change package are often seen as a failure. Some would say, that after the activism of Delor’s Commission and the needed reorganization of the Commission after Santer’s resignation, Barroso had to invest all his political capital and efforts into a slow consolidation and normalization of relationships with the other legislators.72

Juncker’s initiatives seem to find support, or at least a consent of political leaders. Moreover, the Council isn’t a driver of initiatives anymore, but rather a spectator who is being consulted more then followed. Thus the author would like to summarize the conditions of a successful leadership with a focus at the European Commission. Such conditions have to be looked at from two perspectives. One is perspective is set at the institutional and technical level that is modified by current legislative environment and procedural rules in the Treaties. It also includes current attitudes in the member states, relationship between the three EU legislators and contemporary global political situation. Second tier are the personal qualities of the Commission President. The behaviour towards stakeholders, his or her ability to connect with other influential personalities inside and outside of the EU institutions, skills to convey a message and to “sell” the political goals to the citizen’s and to the other decision makers.

With regard to the first group of issues, the author maintains that it is mainly the ability of the Commission’s coalition building with another EU institution that helps it to succeed within the legislative triangle. The concept of *spitzenkadidaten*

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outflanked and impaired the Council. It drove it to the corner and turned the
decision on the President of the Commission around. The one who previously
decided on this issue, gives consent today. It is also a precedent that is likely not
to be renounced in the future. Therefore, it contributed to the change of roles in
the legislative triangle for the years to come. More importantly, however, it
allowed the Commission to connect more closely to the Parliament and its leading
governmental group, the EPP. The initiatives of this Commission are welcomed by the
Members of the European Parliament during the Parliamentary Committee
meetings or the Plenary sessions. The Members of the European Parliament thus
feel that it is their President who leads the EU’s executive. The power struggle
within the EU institutional triangle is an ongoing phenomena where loss of one is
a gain of the other. It was a smart move from Jean-Christophe Juncker to make an ally
from an institution that is was gradually getting stronger since the beginning of
1990s to become an adequate player at the EU arena. Interviews also suggest that
a political bargaining took place long before Juncker Commission had a chance to
present its legislative initiatives. Investment Plan is an example of this, as
Juncker’s concession for the Commission endorsement by the Progressive
Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament.

Although the author sees it as the Commission’s great opportunity, the current
development could potentially have some negative consequences. A partisan
choice of the President of the Commission makes it harder for the Commission to
control the fiscal discipline. It also undermines its role as the guardian of the
Treaties. It upsets the EU institutional balance because such president needs to
keep the largest political group in the European Parliament satisfied. Therefore, it
can be harder for him to keep the commitment to support a broad interest of the
European Union, the original responsibility of the European Commission. Moreover, in the case of the current Commission, it doesn’t only adhere to
Juncker’s political group, the EPP. Due to the inner political bargaining, also to
the second largest one, the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the
European Parliament with Martin Schultz as its leader, as described previously.
There is a danger that the Commission will be too much in the grasp of the
European Parliament in the future. This might support the national governments
who would sideline the Commission and do deals among themselves in addition
to them exercising the control over the Commission through the Members of the
European Parliament who are very depended on national parties. Only time will
show if the Council will be able to make use of these ties and regain its influence
over the legislative triangle.

Nonetheless, the personality of the President of the Commission, might play
even a greater role that the current institutional setting. Etienne Davignon claims it
is due to the particular nature of the Commission, where the President’s
personality is reflected in the whole institution. The successful President of the


Commission must be a leader with vision. It needs to be someone, who is able to refute the notion that the European Commission is an administrative body. And that’s something that the Commissioners before Juncker didn’t succeed to do. Both Romano Prodi and Jacques Santer fulfilled a role of technocratic controllers at the top of the Commission. Barroso, even though his ambitions and managerial skills would speak in favor of strong leadership, clashed with the extraordinary personalities within the European Council, Mr Jacques Chirac, Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy, Mrs Angela Merkel or Mr Silvio Berlusconi. The chaos of financial crisis and consequent economic unease within the Member States, called for a situation where intergovernmental negotiations came before his policy plans.

Barroso also missed another skill that is typical for a President that leaves a legacy. He kept the portfolios and the responsibilities of members of his College separate. He insisted on everyone to deal only with his or her policy area. This approach, however, doesn’t comply with intentions to achieve large pan European projects. These often focus at a large number of overlapping policies. Jacques Delors and Jean Claude Juncker took a different approach and managed to delegate responsibilities within their team. They combine individual experiences of the Commissioners to create comprehensive legislative frameworks that are implementable in reality. Thus, a necessary ability of successful President is the skill to allow other Commissioners to establish links among each other to create an atmosphere of cooperation rather than confrontation. One of the first of Juncker’s (and some would also say Frans Timmermans’) steps was the withdrawal of 73 pending legislative proposals, including a highly anticipated Circular Economy package, with a view to present new proposals. The aim is to allow to cut red tape. But more importantly the Commission wants to introduce new holistic approach to policy making, where all aspects are evaluated, all Commissioners are involved and all impacted sectors studied.75

Another aspects play an important role for successful leader of the Commission as well. Interviews revealed the importance of political views and the candidate’s membership at the political party at home. The top of the College must be appropriately balanced in this respect. The country of origin is also an aspect that will be more considered in future. The European Council will tend to push through candidates from smaller Member States. For one, it will be a symbolic acknowledgement of larger Member States, that the small members matter. The second reason is an attempt not to jeopardize the balance between the large members of the European Union. Jacques Delors was supported by both Francois Mitterand and Helmut Kohl. Being perceived well by the largest of the Council is an important part of the success.76 Junkers’ long time experience at the European political stage is an important aspect that, in connection with his horizontal approach to issues due to his former position as a Minister of Finance, makes him a great candidate for Delors’ successor.

The future development of the institutional balance will be observed with a great interest. A lot of questions remain unanswered. Hence they are crucial in order to assess the future role of the Commission in the EU system. It is still unclear if the important element of *spitzenkandidaten* will become a stable part of European politics. Another issue that deserves more attention is whether a strong Commissioner is a phenomena that can appear only once in some time, or whether we can see strong leadership at EU’s executive body in every term, given that some conditions are fulfilled. A proper research of EU’s executive body is a long-term project. Re-visiting this topic after Juncker Commission’s term ends would be a great follow-up to this study.
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José Manuel Barroso was a leader of Partido Social Democrata (PSD) between 1999 and 2004.


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7.1 Interviews

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Interview 3 = Civil servant at the Permanent Representation of the Czech Republic to the EU. Interview. 16.04.2015.
Interview 4 = Public Affairs professional with twenty years of experience in Brussels. Former member of Swedish government. Interview. 21.04.2015.
Interview 5 = Former Member and the Vice-President of the Delors Commission. Interview. 04.05.2015.
Interview 6 = Civil servant at the European Commission (DG Connect). Interview. 05.05.2015.
Interview 7 = Public Affairs professional in Brussels. Interview. 06.05.2015.