The Resource Curse on a Micro Level:

A Case Study of Mining in Malawi

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Abstract

The scramble for Africa’s natural resources has never been more prominent. Rather than contributing to development through means of mineral rents, countries such as Malawi appear to be suffering as a result of increased investment from multinational mining corporations. Also known as the resource curse, Malawi’s high natural resource endowment is hurting its citizens, rather than benefitting them. While the majority of studies within the resource curse thesis focus on the adverse effects on a national scale, this paper is centered on a natural resource curse in a local context, where mining has its most immediate and largest impact. This study is based on qualitative field research in the capital, Lilongwe, and in the rural mining town of Karonga in Malawi. My findings have indicated that symptoms of the resource curse go beyond national and economic indicators. As a result of mining, the resource curse in Karonga has translated to livelihoods being compromised due to: displacement and resettlement, employment by mining companies, corruption; and unfulfilled promises of new schools, hospitals, and amenities such as running water and electricity. In addition to communities, mining firms have shown little concern for the environment and the spread of toxic waste. The overall lack of transparency and accountability by mining companies and government have shown to be the main contributors to a resource curse in Karonga.

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Resource Curse, Micro level, Communities, Environment
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<td>CRIIRAD</td>
<td>Commission for Independent Research and Information on Radioactivity</td>
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<td>SIDA</td>
<td>Swedish International Cooperation Development Agency</td>
</tr>
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# Table of Contents

1 Introduction .........................................................................................1
   1.1 Background ..................................................................................1
   1.2 Aim and Significance ....................................................................2
       1.2.1 Research Question .................................................................2
   1.3 Delimitations ................................................................................2
   1.4 Outline of Study ...........................................................................2

2 Methods ............................................................................................3
   2.1 Research Design ............................................................................3
   2.2 Data Collection ............................................................................3
       2.2.1 Selection of Case and Sampling .............................................4
       2.2.2 Interviews ...............................................................................4
       2.2.3 Observations .........................................................................5
       2.2.4 Reports ................................................................................5
   2.3 Data Analysis ................................................................................5
   2.4 Ethical Considerations ..................................................................6

3 Literature Review ..............................................................................6
   3.1 The Resource Curse on a Local Scale ..........................................6
       3.1.1 Conflict ................................................................................7
       3.1.2 Inequality ..............................................................................8
       3.1.3 Surviving the Local Resource Curse ....................................8
       3.1.4 Concluding remarks .............................................................9

4 Theory ................................................................................................9
   4.1 The Resource Curse ......................................................................9
       4.1.1 The Role of Institutions .........................................................9
       4.1.2 The Role of MNCs .................................................................10

5 Empirical Material and Analysis .......................................................11
   5.1 The Resource Curse on a Macro Level .......................................11
       5.1.1 Malawi’s Mining Legislation ...............................................11
       5.1.2 MNCs in Malawi and the Resource Curse ............................12
   5.2 Micro Level Resource Curse .......................................................14
       5.2.1 Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement ..............15
       5.2.2 Livelihood Effects of Mining ............................................16
       5.2.3 Corruption and Conflict ....................................................17
       5.2.4 Mining and the Environment .............................................18

6 Conclusion ........................................................................................20

7 References ........................................................................................22
1 Introduction

1.1 Background

The 21st century has sparked a new wave in the scramble for Africa’s minerals and mining investors are no longer predominantly Western. Countries such as China have also entered the scene due to their rising economic levels and their shift from export-led manufacturing towards internal consumption (Harvey 2014). Despite Africa’s abundance of rich minerals and increased levels of foreign direct investment (FDI), the generating of linkages between natural resource endowment and development appears to be no easy task. “Africa is a rich continent, because of the abundance of natural resources it contains; Africa is a poor continent, because the vast number of its population remains in poverty” (Grant et al. 2012).

Until recently the mining sector in Malawi has contributed relatively little to the economy and Malawi was not recognized as a mining country, unlike its neighbors Tanzania with large reserves of gold, and Zambia, a major producer of copper. Nonetheless, in the last decade, mining has taken off in Malawi with several foreign companies, mainly from the United Kingdom, Australia, Portugal and China actively exploring amidst expanding global demand for natural resources to feed their developed or emerging economies.

Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the world. The worldwide anti-smoking campaign has translated to a decrease in tobacco sales, Malawi’s largest export crop. Therefore, the country is dire need to expand to other sectors of the economy. To express their commitment to economic growth and development, the Malawian government has named mining a priority sector in the Growth and Development Strategy II 2012-2016 and the Economic Recovery Plan.

While developing the extractives sector could translate to an abundance of much-needed economic development for Malawi, there appears to be a paradoxical relationship in which the country’s high natural resource endowment seems to be hurting Malawian citizens, rather than benefitting them. It is recognized however, that this puzzling juxtaposition is no new phenomenon. Dating back to the 17th century for example, the pouring of gold and silver into Spain from their colonies still left the country with a weak economy, compared to resource-poor Netherlands (Duruigbo 2005). Today, countries such as Nigeria, South Africa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Angola suffer from the same predicament.

This paper argues that Malawi is suffering from symptoms of a resource curse. Rather than focusing on Malawi’s resource curse on a national scale, the focus of this study is on how mining is affecting Malawi on a local level - a subject rarely discussed in the general resource curse literature. This will be achieved by contributing to a more
collaborative study of the natural resource curse thesis and to show how the impacts of mining go beyond national and economic indicators.

1.2 Aim and Significance

Studies have shown that mineral extraction is one of the most socially and environmentally disruptive activities (Bebbington et al. 2008). As a result of the current and increasing interest in Africa’s natural resources, it is urgent to explore the impact that mineral extraction is having on its host countries. A dominating debate in the resource curse thesis is the relationship between development and economic growth on a national scale, yet the local effects, where resource extraction has its immediate and largest impact, are seldom explored.

A majority of existing studies on the micro level resource curse are dominated with a large anthropological focus (Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis 2015). Despite these studies providing valuable information on the subject at hand, there is a need to compliment these findings with those in the field of political science in order to influence the formation of better and more responsible social and environmental policies in extractive industries. In order to contribute to this, this qualitative research intends to fill in the gap of the resource curse thesis by providing a case study of Malawi’s mining sector and the effects on local residents. Therefore, the research question is as follows.

1.2.1 Research Question

- What are the effects of a resource curse on Malawi’s local mining communities?

1.3 Delimitations

Although the role of institutions and mining corporations are heavily involved in the resource curse theory, I have conducted few interviews with civil servants and no interviews with mining corporations. This was a conscientious decision, as I wanted to conduct this research from the perspective of civil society; and in order to find out about the local effects of a resource curse, I was obliged to interact with local mining communities.

Furthermore, it was acknowledged that sensitive issues such as corruption and lack of good governance were more easily discussed with members of civil society organizations (CSOs), media and academia, rather than with members of the civil service. This was observed first-hand during an interview I conducted with the Senior Chief of Karonga and will be discussed in the empirical analysis of this paper.

1.4 Outline of Study
The following chapter will discuss the methodology of this research and a reflection of the ethical considerations during my fieldwork in Malawi. Chapter three is comprised of a literature review, discussing existing empirical studies on the resource curse in its local context. In chapter four, the theoretical framework will be presented with a broader focus on the resource curse. Chapter five will encompass an empirical analysis of my findings in Malawi, with continuous reference to the selected theory and its local implications. The final chapter will summarize the findings and provide a conclusion of the study.

2. Methods

This research is structured in the form of a case study, as it was essential for me as a researcher to explore the interplay between all variables and provide a comprehensive understanding of the issue at hand. Furthermore, due to my particular research question, it was necessary for me to undertake this research in its naturalistic setting in order to obtain thorough material about the perspectives of people and communities in the mining areas and the situation in which they find themselves. Therefore, this research is also ungeneralizable.

The specific type of case study is in between an illustrative and critical case study, as the goal is to equip readers with a better understanding of the resource curse in its local context. The aim is to also compliment the mainstream resource curse thesis that rarely sets focus on the local impacts of mineral extraction. As the research is qualitative in nature, this study can be considered as more ‘credible and confirmable, rather than valid and reliable’ (Merriam 1985).

2.1 Research Design

Funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), I conducted a minor field study (MFS) in Malawi on the 10th of January 2015 for a total of 8 weeks. Research was first carried out in the capital, Lilongwe, where I met with various CSOs that provided information on the local and national effects of mining in Malawi. The information obtained by informants was then put into perspective during my visit to the rural town of Karonga when I visited two mines and met with local communities.

A qualitative approach was chosen due to the nature of the research being exploratory and my intent to ‘understand the social world through an examination of the interpretation of that world by participants’ (Bryman 2008: 365). During my engagement with the interviewees, I was determined collect material through meaningful interaction, rather than merely treating them as respondents to research instruments (Bryman 2008: 26). This is especially true for the mining communities who provided detailed accounts of their lives prior and post-mining operations, as well as the experiences of their families and neighbors.

2.2 Data Collection
2.2.1 Selection of Case and Sampling

The case study of Malawi was chosen due to the country’s relatively infant mining sector and the current heightened interests in exploiting its natural resources. Furthermore, another, more personal reason for choosing Malawi is due to my existing cultural sensitivity that was developed during my childhood years spent in Malawi. It seemed advantageous to conduct research in a country I was familiar with and “attentive to histories of colonialism, development, globalization and local realities in order to avoid exploitative research or perpetuation of domination and control” (Sultana 2007). Nevertheless, I cannot claim that there were no ethical dilemmas that surfaced; however, they will be discussed in section 2.4.

In order to learn more about the relationship between mining and development in Malawi, I decided to base the majority of this research on interviews with civil society. The advocacy work of civil society organizations (CSOs) such as the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), Citizens for Justice (CFJ) and Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) assisted me in identifying some of the most pressing challenges associated with Malawi’s mining sector. In turn, many of these challenges were observed first-hand during my engagement with communities in Karonga whom reside around the mining sites. I was provided an insight into how their livelihoods have been affected from mining activity, the relationship that communities have with mining investors, and how government has responded to the adverse effects associated with mining. Other members of civil society, including academics, were also interviewed to gain perspectives on the investment environment of Malawi. Key themes that were discussed include politics, corruption, and lack of transparency and accountability.

Civil servant participants such as the Senior Mining Engineer from the Ministry of Mines provided a governmental perspective on mining in Malawi and equipped me with information regarding the formalities of the mining-license application procedure, the legislation that governs mining, and the relationship of government with civil society and mining investors. An interview was also conducted with the Senior Chief of Karonga who is a local authority in Karonga and employed by the Malawian government.

2.2.2 Interviews

To carry out my qualitative research, eleven semi-structured and unstructured interviews were employed in order to obtain in-depth information and learn about the perceptions of my participants in a way that does not limit the field of inquiry. Not only did these interviewing methods suit my particular research question, but it also allowed me to minimize the status differences with the participants, thus creating an environment of openness and trust, and contributing to richer data (Punch 2005: 173).

A focus group was used with eight members of a community that reside around the Mwabulambo coal mine. I was able to facilitate the discussion by asking general, open-ended questions and allowing the participants to answer freely and build upon each other’s responses. The use of a group interview proved to be an attractive data-
collecting method as it stimulated people in making ‘explicit their views, perceptions, motives, and reasons’ (Punch 2005: 171) that otherwise wouldn’t be possible in an individual interview setting.

Two individual interviews and the group interview with community members in Karonga required a translator. The responses were documented manually in my notebook during the data collection process and the remaining interviews were digitally recorded. All of the material was transcribed on my laptop following the interviews.

2.2.3 Observations

Data was also collected through means of participant observation. I attended two meetings in Malawi - one in Lilongwe and one in Karonga. The first meeting was an assembly of members of government, civil society and media where CSOs discussed concerns and recommendations for Malawi’s mining legislation that is currently in its drafting phase. The themes of this meeting included the shortfalls of current mining policies, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), safety health and social welfare, environmental management and human resources development.

The second meeting (in Karonga) was also organized by CSOs, and was intended to spread awareness to local communities about the health hazards associated with mining and to provide information on the results of radiation testing on the mining sites and surrounding villages. As Malawi lacks the expertise in this area, a nuclear physics engineer from the Commission for Independent Research and Information on Radioactivity (CRIIRAD) in France was invited to conduct the testing and participate in the discussion with community members on his findings.

2.2.4 Reports

Following the interviews with members of CSOs, I was given various reports and studies by them regarding the adverse effects of mining in Malawi and their lobbying efforts in relation to the governance of mining. Examples of these recommendations include increased transparency and the mainstreaming of environmental and social safeguards in Malawi’s mining sector. The reports provided by the CSOs complemented the existing material, as it entails descriptive information that would have been difficult to cover during the interviews due to limited time. Furthermore, it helped to answer questions that I had not thought of during my field study in Malawi, and mutually accounted for any shortage of information given by the informants.

2.3 Data Analysis

This research has employed an inductive approach, in which observations generated patterns, and patterns pointed towards a suitable theory. In contrast to deductive research, I chose not to limit my findings through categorization of the data, and instead chose to be more sensitive of the responses and observations of the participants. This allowed me to be more open and focused on exploring new
phenomena, rather than narrowing the scope of study. Themes were identifiable during the data collection process, thus influencing the choice of theory following the data analysis.

2.4 Ethical Considerations

Returning to Malawi to conduct research rather than visiting one of the places I once called ‘home’ has insofar proven to have its positive and negative aspects. Despite my feelings of having strong linkages with the country, I needed to remind myself to refrain from feeling too comfortable and confident in this familiar setting in order to avoid being ignorant of possible ethical concerns that may arise during the research process. Similar to the account of Sultana and her experience of returning ‘home’ to Bangladesh to conduct fieldwork, I felt my positionality and identity on the field as being in the ‘in-between status’ of simultaneously being an insider, outsider, both and neither (Gilbert 1994 and Mullings 1999, cited in Sultana 2007). I noticed a difference, although small, in how I was treated once I had mentioned that my mother was Malawian and I had spent some of my childhood in Malawi. I wasn’t just another mzungu (white person) coming to Malawi to collect data and then leave for good. One of the informants went as far as to call me his ‘African sister’ and seemed to have felt more open and comfortable in the interview following our introduction and minor moment of ‘bonding.’ I felt that the closeness that was established, however small in this particular interview, enriched the data as it somehow ‘bridged our differences and fostered mutual interest in the interviewing process’ (Miraftab 2007).

In addition to the power relations associated with being a researcher and the ability to ‘name categories, control information about the research agenda, define interventions and come and go as a research scientist’ (Staeheli and Lawson 1995: 332, cited in Rose 1997), I had to be mindful of the social and economic differences between the participants and myself, predominantly during my visits with the mining communities. I attempted to appease these discrepancies by stating that I am a student and the focus of my research was for me to learn from them. Furthermore, I did not bring any expensive devices, such as my laptop, and instead decided to take notes using a pen and paper. As it is difficult to determine how my interactions with community members would have been different had I not taken the aforementioned measures, I feel confident that it better showed my respect and helped to make them feel comfortable during the interviewing process.

3 Literature Review

This section is intended to shed light on existing literature that explores the relationship between natural resources and development. Literature on the general resource curse thesis was also used for this research, however, as it is covered in the theoretical framework of this paper, it will be more elaborated upon in the next chapter. In the meantime, this section is dedicated to discussing the few cases in which the effects of the resource curse are examined at a micro level.

3.1 The Resource Curse on a Local Scale
The macro level impacts of natural resource endowment on development have been widely investigated by social scientists and economists, yet its local impacts have rarely been explored. In regards to the few cases in which it has been discussed, the empirical work (mostly anthropological) generally holds that the “very basic level of cultural difference (based on conflicting and incompatible social, political and economic forms of organization) creates very basic human problems - conflict, social fragmentation and dislocation, poverty and inequality. Indigenous (or ‘non Western’) populations with non-market, transitional or recently hybridized economic systems of organization accommodate the peculiarities associated with mineral extraction in line with their own social, economic and political idioms” (Gilberthorpe and Papyrakis 2015). Drawing from the aforementioned themes by authors and the existing literature, the following sections will explore the resource curse in its local context and focus on conflict, inequality, and the role of local government and mining companies.

3.1.1 Conflict

When focusing on the resource curse at a micro level, much of the existing empirical work agrees that a major consequence is the creation of conflict (Aguilar-Støen and Hirsch 2014; Revesz and Diez 2006; Arellano-Yanguas 2006). Furthermore, in places where conflict already exists, authors argue that mining activity perpetuates conflict (Billings 2015, 1998; Elmslie 2002; Kirksey 2012).

The sensitive and detrimental colonial relationship with Indonesia and the resistance built by local communities of West Papua were further penetrated with the commencement of mining and the search for wealth and land by Indonesia in efforts to support their expanding population (Billings 2015). Indigenous communities in West Papua essentially had their ‘lands stolen for other peoples’ development projects,’ therefore making them vulnerable to oppression and dispossession (ibid). The protests for independence have led to torture, assassinations and widespread discrimination of local populations in West Papua (Kirksey 2012; Billings 2015).

Without addressing prior and current issues associated with colonization, the introduction of mining activity essentially added fuel to the fire. In the case of West Papua, perhaps the indigenous populations would have achieved their independence and not endured such hardships had mining not commenced on their lands and attracted the likes of Indonesia.

In other cases, authors have also shown that mining can cause conflict within the local indigenous communities, such as the proliferation of pro-mining and anti-mining groups (Lusterio-Rico 2013). The disparity in perceptions is related to the impact that mining has had on livelihoods. For example, in the case of mining in Rapu-Rapu in the Philippines, community residents that relied on fish as a source of food and income were more adversely affected as a result of toxic waste in the water due to the mine; while others (who did not rely on fishing) were pro-mining due to the benefits of employment and scholarships provided by mining companies (ibid). The following section also correlates with this argument.
3.1.2 Inequality

In addition to conflict, studies show that ‘resource wealth may increase income inequality in divided societies’ (Bhattacharya 2012). Gilberthorpe and Banks (2012) have found that when social factors, such as kinship, socio-political exchange, migration and land tenure are not taken into consideration, the implementation of CSR policies by mining companies can actually be detrimental as a result of long-standing socio-cultural constructs.

This is pertinent in Szablowski’s (2002) illustration of the impact of copper mining on local communities in the remote district of Andean Peru. The sensitive and complex ethnic structures between the campesino (peasant) ethnic group, and the mestizo (who are mixed with Spanish blood) led to the varying degrees of benefits from mining activity as the mestizo were the predominant landholders in the mining area and also held more formal positions of employment (ibid).

According to Szablowski (2002), the few campesino landholders that were compensated for their pastoral land were reported to ‘losing their resettlement land and money received by the mining company after only two years, most likely due to their inexperience of handling large sums of money and the limited knowledge and opportunities for investment.’ Essentially, the lands they once used for agriculture and livestock were commodified, however, as they are a non-capitalist society, its not as simple as restoring their livelihoods with money.

While some transnational mining companies actually have good intentions and strive for a ‘social license’ to operate, their actions on ways to achieve this are based on Western ideals, and have thus proven to have ominous consequences for indigenous populations in the Global South. It is therefore crucial for mining corporations to understand the cultural and social constructs in the areas of operation prior to implementing their CSR policies.

3.1.3 Surviving the Local Resource Curse

In terms of surviving the bouts of conflict and increased inequality associated with the resource curse on a local scale, Zeng and Zhan (2015) hold that it can be overcome through means of redistribution of resource wealth by local government. Drawing from their empirical case study of coal-rich Chinese locality, Zeng and Zhan (2015) claim that the locality was able to overcome a resource curse by: ‘the local state providing their citizens with an attractive economic package in the event of relocation; increasing social welfare of residents - e.g. enhanced coverage of medical insurance; and by creating employment opportunities.’

It is important to recognize, however, that in relation to a local resource curse in the case study of Zeng and Zhan (2015), the role of local state actors and their redistribution policies do not suffice to surviving a local resource curse. While it might ease some situations involving inequality and conflict, studies show that often the actions of corporations, specifically environmental degradation associated with mining, have been a cause of conflict (Billings 2015). As the role of the state is important in the survival of a local resource curse, the role of mining firms are equally
important in terms of controlling the adverse effects of mining on the environment and being socially and environmentally accountable.

3.1.4 Concluding remarks

Based on the aforementioned literature, the study of the resource curse on a micro scale is predominantly conducted within the field of anthropology, perhaps with exception of the last case study of Zeng and Zhan (2015) that concentrates on the nature of local institutions in relation to overcoming the adverse effects of mining. Notwithstanding, the anthropological focus on the resource curse greatly compliments the more general resource curse thesis and there is a need for these findings to be mainstreamed. With the involvement of researchers from other fields, such as political science and economics, I believe that the possibility of creating more socially and environmentally responsible policies within the extractive industry could improve.

4 Theory

4.1 The ‘Resource Curse’

A term coined by Richard Auty (1993), the ‘resource curse’ is a theory that describes the paradoxical outcome of natural resources being a curse, rather than a blessing. It holds that resource-rich countries tend to perform relatively poorly on overall economic growth and good governance in comparison with non-resource-rich countries (Sachs and Warner 2006). This can be due to the nature of the natural resource sector being detached from political and economic processes and the risk of rent-seeking by both government officials and corporations (Humphreys et al. 2007). Hence, the resource curse does not necessarily refer to countries being cursed as a result of their resources, but cursed as a result of the leadership (Duruigbo 2005). The following sections will explore the role of institutions and mining corporations that is often referred to in the broader resource curse scholarship.

4.1.2 The Role of Institutions

According to Sarr and Swanson (2012), ‘poor institutional quality is one of the main drivers of economic underdevelopment, particularly in resource-rich economies.’ In explaining the resource curse theory and the role of institutions, scholars such as Auty and Gelb (2001) and Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2002) have divided countries/institutions into two categories - benevolent/producer friendly and predatory/grabber friendly. Resource-rich countries that have remained poor despite their high resource endowment have commonly been found to be predatory/grabber friendly in nature and have been less inclined to align their interests with the majority. Rather, ‘revenue from resource rents have been diverted to the powerful elite, leading to relaxed market constrains and misallocated resources’ (Auty and Gelb 2001).

A favorite case in the resource curse scholarship is the experience of Nigeria, Africa’s largest exporter of oil. Estimates of Nigeria’s revenue from its crude oil exports between 1970 and 1999 indicate that the country earned up to $320 billion, an amount
that could certainly help with poverty alleviation. However, studies show that poverty increased from twenty-eight percent of the population in 1980, to forty-six percent in 1985, to sixty-six percent in 1996 (Duruigbo 2005). As a result of Nigeria’s ‘weak rule of law, malfunctioning bureaucracy and high levels of corruption’ (Mehlum et al. 2002), the trickling-down of resource wealth was blocked from reaching its citizens.

The argument on the ‘role of institutions’ in relation to a resource curse is further strengthened when exploring the case of Botswana, ranked as the least corrupt African country by the Groningen Corruption Perception Index (Mehlum et al. 2002). As described by Gwebu (2012), Botswana took on the role as a developmental state and successfully used their mineral revenue to foster development through ‘shaping mining policies that supported infrastructural and service development and poverty reduction.’ Furthermore, Botswana’s honest bureaucracy and prudent economic management also helped the country in creating an equally beneficial extractive industry and helped attract foreign investment into the country (ibid).

4.1.3 The Role of MNCs

In addition to the state, multinational corporations are the major actors in extractive industries and have been found to contribute to symptoms of a resource curse. The impact of corporate actors go “beyond providing revenue and employment and maximizing profits and hence increasing shareholders value, that they have power and influence (actual and potential) beyond their formal location within legal and political structures, particularly those of developing countries and that they should be recognized as conscious and influential participants in activities with a broad range of consequences” (UNECA and AU 2010 cited by Campbell 2012). In spite of the positive influence that corporate actors can have in extractive industries in the Global South, scholars have suggested that they often focus more on profit-maximization at the expense of other, more vulnerable actors such as governments who lack knowledge in mineral extraction (Hilson 2012; Humphreys et al. 2007; Slack 2005). According to Humphreys et al. (2007), as firms have more expertise in the extractives industry and are more familiar with the value of the natural resources, they often get the better end of the deal.

In terms of contributing to a resource curse, it has also been found that weak states attract extractive corporations due to the opportunities of engaging in corrupt activities. For example, ‘international mining companies that seek to maximize their income can do so by obtaining natural resources at below market value through bribing government officials, rather than figuring out how to extract the resources more efficiently (Humphreys et al. 2007). Essentially, mineral revenue is misallocated and is only benefitting corrupt mining companies and government officials, rather than the majority.

Furthermore, conducting business with weak states also eases the pressure for mining companies to adhere to their CSR policies. Government oversight of extractive industries operations have been found to be weak or nonexistent and has therefore hindered corporate commitments to CSR and respect of environmental and human rights standards (Slack 2005).
5 Empirical Material and Analysis

In order to understand Malawi’s micro level resource curse, it’s important to begin the analysis with an understanding of the resource curse in its national context, as this is where many of the local issues stem from. The following sections will provide information acquired from the interviews and reports by informants that discuss the current ‘mining climate’ in Malawi. The focus of this section will be on Malawi’s institutions, mining governance, and mining corporations.

5.1 The Resource Curse on a Macro Level

Malawi is a democratic, multi-party government that is currently under the leadership of Peter Mutharika and his Democratic Progressive Party following his election (albeit believed to be rigged) in May 2014, the same year marking Malawi’s 50th anniversary of independence. Malawi can be classified as a ‘predatory’ or ‘grabber friendly’ state and corruption remains endemic in the country. The ‘Capital Hill Cashgate Scandal’ is demonstrative of this claim and it is the largest money-laundering scandal in all of Malawian history. It is estimated that Joyce Banda, Malawi’s then president, and her cronies obtained millions of dollars during her two years of office.

Malawi has an agro-based economy, with tobacco being its largest export crop. Due to the worldwide anti-smoking campaign, tobacco sales have waned in the country, calling for the need to venture out into other sectors of the economy. To express their commitment to economic growth, Malawi’s government has named mining a priority sector in the Growth and Development Strategy II 2012-2016 and the Economic Recovery Plan. It has been estimated that mining can contribute up to 20% of GDP by 2016, yet these figures are believed to have the potential of reaching double if the sector is managed efficiently (Interview 3). The available and recognized mineral resources in Malawi are uranium, heavy mineral sands, strontianite, rare earth minerals, phosphate, bauxite, gypsum, vermiculite, precious and semi-precious stones, limestone, dimension stone, silica sand, sulphides and coal (NCA, CCJP 2013). Currently, there are over twenty mining companies engaged in mineral exploration with exclusive prospecting licenses or mining licenses in Malawi.

5.1.1 Malawi’s Mining Legislation

The main body of legislation that covers mining in Malawi is the Mines and Minerals Act (MMA) of 1981 (Interview 2). The law was created during Malawi’s one-party rule, known as the ‘Banda Era’¹, and gives a significant amount of power and ownership of minerals to the President and the Minister without any checks and balances such as a mining advisory board (NCA, CCJP 2013). This can be due to the patrimonial politics that emerged in Malawi (and many other Sub-Saharan countries) following its independence from colonial rule. The huge discretionary power of the

¹ Kamuzu Banda is Malawi’s first president following the country’s independence from Britain in 1964.
President and the Minister of Mines on the ownership of Malawi’s minerals and natural resources is inconsistent with the country’s current democratic dispensation. It conflicts with the Malawian Constitution, which vests the ownership of natural resources to the country of Malawi, rather than its leader (ibid). With the sole jurisdiction of the Minister of Mines to: appoint the Commissioner of Mines and Minerals; enter into agreements with prospective mining investors on behalf of Malawi; and grant, limit, amend or cancel mining licenses (CCJP 2014), it appears to harness an environment in which corruption could easily thrive. Simply put by political analyst, Jimmy Kainja, ‘It takes only one person to corrupt in order to corrupt the entire sector’ (Interview 5).

In addition to the huge discretionary power vested in the Presidency and Minister of Mines, other weaknesses as a result of the outdated and patrimonial nature of Malawi’s mining legislation includes the inconsistent and arbitrary deals between mining investors and government. ‘Many of the key terms under which a company operates in Malawi are determined by bilateral negotiations rather than consistent application of the law’ (NCA, CCJP 2013). In other words, agreements between government and mining firms are on an individual, rather than a standardized basis. This gives more freedom for mining corporations to negotiate in their favor in a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of what they provide Malawi in return. This includes provisions for the company to source a proportion of their supplies from Malawi; the recruiting and training of Malawian citizens for mining operations; and ensuring that communities in mining areas will financially benefit from mining revenues. Furthermore, all of the agreements between mining firms and government are kept private from the public and mining contracts are sealed with non-disclosure agreements (NCA, CCJP 2013).

With regards to Malawi’s bouts and histories of corruption; the patrimonial nature of the mining legislation; the inconsistent application of the law; and the lack of transparency of mining agreements; I believe that together, these factors combined are a recipe for a resource curse. Due to problems of transparency on Malawi’s total revenues from mining, it is difficult to determine exactly how much the government has profited and how much has been lost. However, focusing on Malawi’s tax regime on its mining sector, studies have estimated that Malawi has ‘lost more than $217 million between 2008 and 2012’ (NCA, CCJP 2013) due to various tax incentives and concessions offered to mining investors. In a review of Malawi’s mining sector, the World Bank (2009) specifically warned about a possible resource curse stemming from inappropriate safeguards of substantial tax leakage (cited in NCA, CCJP 2013). This was believed to ‘contribute to reducing the value of mineral resources to Malawi, undermine the integrity of the fiscal regime, and breed mistrust and opposition to mining’ (ibid). These 2009 predictions by the World Bank appear to be already taking place in Malawi and will be identified throughout this paper.

5.1.2 MNCs in Malawi and the Resource Curse

Drawing from the resource curse theory, one of the main problems supporting that natural resources have a dismal track record in terms of being a ‘tool for development’ is that countries do not get the full worth of their natural resources. This is especially true for countries such as Malawi due to its relatively infant mining
sector and the lack of expertise in mineral extraction. This section will discuss the presence of the Australian multinational corporation, Paladin, in Malawi and how they are contributing to a resource curse on a national scale.

The opportunities to maximize benefits are readily there when conducting business with a less knowledgeable counterpart. The mining agreement between Paladin and the Malawian government is representative of this claim and has sparked much controversy from CSOs in Malawi. In exchange for their tax cuts and other concessions, Paladin granted government a fifteen percent share in their Kayelekera uranium mine, which was estimated by Paladin to provide the country with dividends of between $3 and 10 million a year once the mine becomes profitable (NCA, CCJP 2013). This means that during the timeframe of when the mine becomes ‘profitable’ (which it may never), Paladin is still earning millions of dollars whilst paying extremely low taxes. Internal figures estimate the company paid $1.6 million in taxes on exports worth $127 million (ibid).

Furthermore, there appears to be a significant amount of discrepancies in regards to payment for royalties, taxes, and purchases from Malawian businesses that have been obtained from Paladin and the figures listed on Paladin’s public reports. Figures from Paladin indicate that the company paid $2.58 million - a rate of .87 percent - in royalty payments between 2009 and 2012; however, Paladin’s public reporting states they paid 1.5 percent (NCA, CCJP 2013). A similar discrepancy is identified on the report by Paladin on their exports and imports of uranium. On Paladin’s website, they claim to sell uranium to ‘major utilities and other entities located mainly in the USA, Australia, China, Taiwan and UK,’ however, according to UN Comtrade’s2 records, all the uranium exports are going to Canada or Namibia, also where Paladin operates their subsidiary companies (NCA, CCJP 2013). While it hasn’t been proven, it can be hypothesized that Paladin is selling the uranium to their subsidiary companies at below market value, thus ‘cheating the system’ and holding back potential revenue for Malawi.

While there is always a possibility for MNCs to conduct business in an ‘unethical’ manner due to the absence of regulation for MNCs in international law, the effect that this poses for Malawi are particularly detrimental due to the quality of Malawi’s institutions. Furthermore, while it is not the role of MNCs such as Paladin to take over the state’s duty in achieving development goals, it appears that they are in fact perpetuating the deep-rooted structural problems that already exist in Malawi such as lack of transparency and accountability in government. Without addressing these issues, Malawi’s prospects of surviving a resource curse appear feeble.

Evidence of a resource curse is more prevalent on a local scale, as it is where mining has had its largest and most immediate impact. Furthermore, due to mining in Malawi being relatively new and the low levels of transparency, it is difficult to determine exactly how the country is being affected by mining on a national scale (Interview 4). Nonetheless, many of the challenges that have been discussed in previous sections closely relate to the local resource curse in mining communities, especially in Karonga where Malawi’s largest mine (Kayelekera) is located. Exploring beyond national and economic indicators of a resource curse, the following sections will

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2 UN Comtrade is a repository of official trade statistics and relevant analytical tables
5.2 The Resource Curse on a Micro Level

In response to the adverse effects of mining and as a result of weak accountability and transparency by government and mining investors, civil society has played an active role in Malawi’s mining sector. Some CSO staff have expressed their disagreement with mining taking place in Malawi at all. According to Reinford Mwangonde from CFJ,

“Malawi is simply just not ready for mining. However, we can’t stop it so we must influence it wherever possible and advocate for community benefits”

The advocacy work of CSOs such as CCJP, CFJ and NCA assisted me in identifying some of the most pressing challenges associated with Malawi’s mining sector from a development perspective and I was able to identify the impacts of a resource curse on a local community level. Interviews with various CSOs provided information on the repercussions of Malawi’s mining sector by outlining their intervention projects, Tonse Tipindule and TIWONE II, and the ways in which these projects advocate for a more transparent, accountable, inclusive and responsible extractive industry in Malawi.

‘Tonse Tipindule’ translates to ‘each one of us should benefit’ and the project is intended to promote inclusion, accountability and responsiveness in Malawi’s mining sector (Interview 3). These goals are strived for through the promotion of engagement of civil society, mining investors and governments; increased citizen participation; and community empowerment. Through the Tonse Tipindule project, communities that surround the mining areas in Karonga have been educated and informed on the
effects of mining, the policies that govern it, and the concept of CSR. ‘This measure is not to only help community members, but to give them the tools to help themselves through holding government and mining investors accountable’ (Interview 3).

Similar to the Tonse Tipindule project, the TIWONE II project’s aim is to promote engagement of all stakeholders in Malawi’s mining sector, however, its main foci are compensation and relocation of communities that have been displaced or forced to resettle. According to Success Sikwese of CCJP (Interview 1),

“There are no proper guidelines to guide how people should be resettled and as a result, people end up in places they can’t access water or basic services such as schools and hospitals.’ The project advocates for a resettlement plan specifically tailored to the extractives sector; and that in the event of resettlement, the livelihoods of communities are not compromised”

Many of these challenges revealed by CSOs were observed first-hand during my engagement with communities in Karonga whom reside around the Mwabulambo coal mine and the Kayelekera uranium mine, and I was provided an insight into how mining has contributed to a resource curse at a micro level. The key themes that will be discussed in the following sections include mining-induced displacement and resettlement; livelihood effects of mining; corruption and conflict; and mining and the environment.

5.2.1 Mining-Induced Displacement and Resettlement

Displacement and resettlement in Malawi has led to a number of social and economic disruptions amongst local community members that reside around mining sites. Previous studies (CCJP 2014) on Malawian mining communities by CSOs have indicated that social disruptions include host-community hostility, in which resettled communities face marginalization or opposition as a result of being ‘outsiders’ in their new location. Often times there are also differences in kinship structures of communities. For example, social disruptions can occur as a result of relocation when patrilineal populations are combined with matrilineal. In regards to economic disturbances, single women have been found to be most vulnerable as they usually rely on male in-laws for help with labor (CCJP 2014). Furthermore, the overall loss of income by resettled communities also translates to increased rates of children dropping out of school.

The findings during my fieldwork research in the rural area of Karonga coincided with the aforementioned studies piloted by CSOs. The focus group interview in which I conducted near the Mwabulambo coal mine provided detailed accounts of the hardships endured by community members following the resettlement from their lands. They claimed that they, and most of their neighbors, had a positive initial reaction when learning about potential mining activity in their area.

“We were told there would be employment for us, that new clinics and schools would be built and that we would have portable water and electricity… But these promises have yet to be fulfilled”
It appears that mining companies have made promises in order to gain the initial ‘social license to operate’, however, they have failed to deliver on these promises of development. Furthermore, community members were let down during the compensation process of their land. Compensation was described to be insufficient, as many were paid a random price at the discretion of the evaluator rather than from a set formula or policy. One man described his inability to pay school fees for his children due to the inadequate payment for his land and the loss of income after losing his crops. When asked what he thought would be a better resettlement plan, he claimed,

“A standard house and a startup package. Without these, it’s difficult for us to rebuild the lives we once had.”

While mining activity was perceived to have positive developmental effects on local villages such as employment and new infrastructure, my interviews with community members indicate a paradoxical effect. In addition to promises by mining investors not being fulfilled, the livelihoods of community members have not been restored. These adverse effects are not limited to the result of mining-induced displacement and resettlement. The next section will discuss the general effects that mining has had on communities that have not had to resettle.

5.2.2 Livelihood Effects of Mining

During my trip to Karonga, I visited the Kayelekera uranium mine to meet and discuss with community members about how mining has affected their livelihoods. 23-year-old Towera Mtambo (Interview 9) gave me her account of how uranium mining has affected her household. Prior to mining activity, Mtambo’s father earned an income through farming, however due to poverty, he was eager to earn extra income to support his family. He was employed part-time by Paladin and worked with processing the uranium. Mtambo claims that her father’s health began to deteriorate after a couple years of being employed and until now, he suffers from chest pains and chronic coughing³. Mtambo claims,

“Before mining my father was strong and a hardworking farmer. After mining, my father is ill and sickly and doesn’t have the strength to work on the farm anymore”

The Kayelekera mine has been closed for maintenance since February 2014 and Mtambo’s father has been unable to voice his health concerns to Paladin, as they are inaccessible due to their restrictive security measures. The livelihood of Mtambo and her family have deteriorated since the uranium mining commenced. Her father is unable to return to farming due to his acquired illness and the family can no longer afford to employ part-time farming labor.

Maskin Tuta Gondwe, 31, (Interview 10) also gave me his account of how mining has affected his livelihood. Similar to Mtambo’s father, Gondwe was employed by Paladin and worked as a driver and a pit-surveyor between 2004 and 2010. He claims

³ The most common illness associated with uranium mining is lung cancer. The symptoms that Mtambo claims her father has appear to correspond with lung cancer.
that 3 years after working at the uranium mine, he started developing chest pains and a chronic cough, similar to the symptoms of Mtambo’s father. In order to treat his illness, the doctor at Paladin’s clinic gave Gondwe regular, non-prescribed painkillers. Louis Nkhata, my translator and also a member of a CSO that works closely with mining communities, provided information as to how Paladin handles radioactive healthcare:

“Government had a deal with Paladin to train radioactive specialists. The government specifically gave Paladin two doctors that they could send abroad to obtain the necessary radioactive training in order to work at the Kayelekera clinic. However, once the doctors had been trained, they decided to remain in the bigger cities for better wages, rather than staying in Karonga. The current doctor has no knowledge on radioactive healthcare” (Interview 7)

In addition to treating mining-related illnesses, Paladin was supposed to continuously monitor the urine of their employees. It is claimed that Paladin used to monitor urine but has since stopped. As the reasons of this are unknown, it could be due to the cost and time of continuously having to monitor all of the employees.

In contributing to a resource curse on a local scale, it appears that Paladin has only been concerned with obtaining cheap labor for their uranium mining at the expense of the wellbeing of communities and their employees. Furthermore, government has been indolent in terms of protecting their citizens and holding Paladin accountable. Government and Paladin could have done more to keep the radioactive specialists in Karonga, rather than turning a blind-eye as the specialists remained in the cities. Furthermore, Paladin could have continued with the monitoring of urine of their employees to prevent illness and disease. As a result lack of accountability and responsibility of government and Paladin, it appears that human capital is the expense of mining in Karonga, and has thus contributed to a local resource curse.

5.2.3 Corruption and Conflict

The increase of mining activity in Karonga has also bred corruption between mining investors and the local authorities, such as the Karonga chiefs. According to Sydney Mwakaswaya (Interview 6) of CCJP, the local authorities, also employed by the Malawian government, have previously been bribed by mining companies in order to silence the concerns of community members and keep the peace. The Senior Chief of Karonga obtained expensive gifts from Paladin, such as a new automobile and a house. Despite conducting the interview outside the Chief’s acquired house, understandably, it was difficult to obtain information from him directly about his corrupt engagement with the mining company. Nonetheless, he did claim that his relationship with Paladin has ‘since deteriorated’ (Interview 11), indicating that perhaps they do not have the same close relationship as before and the Chief has now sided with the communities. Notwithstanding, it does appear that corruption persists and mining investors are now bribing the village headmen instead. The local CCJP diocese offices in Karonga open their doors to community members every week in order to provide a forum to voice mining-related concerns, which are then forwarded to government. According to Mwakaswaya,
“What we have noticed now is that members of communities have started coming to represent themselves, rather than the village headmen that are supposed to be the ‘voice’ of the communities. Community members have complained that the village headmen prefer to side with the mining companies” (Interview 6)

It is claimed that traditional authorities have been used as puppets by mining investors, which has sparked much criticism from communities, and in some cases, even conflict. The July 2011 poor governance themed demonstrations across Malawi led to the arson of Senior Chief of Karonga’s car. ‘Community members were simply fed up with being controlled and silenced by the Chief, especially after witnessing the extravagant contributions he received from Paladin’ (Interview 6).

Other conflicts that have occurred have directly involved mining companies. Demonstrations have been held when mining corporations have not upheld their Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) after signing an agreement with mining communities. Prior to commencing their mining operations, Eland Coal Mine Company (ECM) promised to construct new schools, hospitals, and amenities such as electricity and running water. However, after beginning mineral extraction, ECM claimed that they first needed to make profit (Interview 8). Several years have gone by with no construction taking place and little feedback from the mining company. The informants claim that every time an attempt is made to set up a meeting with mining officials, they are turned away due to the ECM manager being abroad (ibid). This has led to numerous protests by communities who are tired of waiting for their MoU agreements to be upheld.

The actions of mining corporations and corrupt civil servants have contributed to a local resource curse in Malawi. Mining companies such as Paladin have influenced the spread of corruption in Karonga and have not only ignored local communities, but have caused the local leaders to ignore them as well. Furthermore, MoU agreements by mining companies have not been transparent in terms of specifying when they intend to fulfill their pacts with communities. This, along with corruption, has sparked conflict in the mining communities. These clashes are expected to continue if the concerns and interests of communities are consistently ignored.

5.2.4 Mining and the Environment

The issue of radioactive waste has been on the radar since the beginning of mining activity in Karonga. Mining companies have offered little information, especially Paladin, in regards to the environmental cost of uranium mining and the ways in which they intend to handle it. CSOs have stated that they have waited two years for Paladin to provide comprehensive reports to determine whether underground water has been contaminated due to leakages from the mine. However, Paladin continues to hold that it is the government’s responsibility to release information, and has shown little concern for being held accountable to local mining communities.

As previously stated, mining in Malawi is relatively new; consequently, there is an absence of professional expertise in the sector to conduct monitoring of the radiological impact of uranium mining. In the event that Paladin does systematically
provide comprehensive reports on their monitoring of the mine, there still lacks a secondary monitor, such as government, to assure that Paladin’s findings are correct and that they are successfully treating water that is contaminated.

While conducting research in Karonga, I attended a meeting (Meeting 2) in which Bruno Chareyron, a nuclear physics engineer from France, was invited to conduct tests at Kayelekera and speak with community members about the health hazards associated with uranium and his findings from the samples collected at the mine. Community members were eager to have some answers as to why dead fish were washing ashore and whether it had anything to do with the contamination of rivers and the lake as a result of uranium mining. As it was not possible to test the dead fish due to the lack of proper lab equipment in Malawi, Chareyron was unable to determine the exact cause of death of the fish. However, it was assessed that contamination of water supplies could be very possible as Paladin has failed to cover their radioactive ‘waste rock’ dump at the mining site. Without covering the waste rock with at least one meter of soil, the chances of radioactive dust, radon and gamma radiation emission are significantly higher as it can be transferred through air and can be spread as a result of rainfall. Furthermore, the leakage of tailings4 from uranium mining has a large impact on the environment. According to Chareyron,

“No country has a permanent solution for the disposal of tailings. In France, we have had spillages on the road, which have spread from rainfall. It has even infiltrated in the infrastructure, with acid destroying the paper on walls in peoples’ homes. A woman sent a sample of her wallpaper to determine the amount of radiation. The results were very negative”

An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) study in 2006 reported Paladin as stating that the Kayelekera tailing dam was very safe and that the design is good enough to resist seismic and high rainfall (NCA, CCJP 2013). They committed to creating an emergency plan in case the tailing dam would collapse. When Chareyron visited the Kayelekera mine (a day before the Karonga meeting) and asked Paladin for a copy of their emergency plan, they stated that no such plans exist. Furthermore, Paladin was also asked whether they had a draft of the mining closure plan for when they intend to shut down their mining project in Karonga. Explained by Chareyron,

“We asked, ‘How long will you have to collect the water in those dams and how long can you treat that water? Who will pay for that?’ They couldn’t provide any answers to our questions”

What was gathered from this meeting in Karonga and the account provided by Chareyron about his visit to the Kayelekera mine and his engagement with Paladin is the overall lack of transparency and accountability on behalf of Paladin and their mining operations. The people of Malawi are kept in the dark as to how their environment is being affected and how Paladin is currently monitoring the mine; what their emergency plan is in case the tailing dam were to collapse; and how they intend to rehabilitate the mining area once mining activity has ended. Also, they have failed to cover their waste rock, which can further contaminate the surrounding areas. If in the event that rivers and Lake Malawi were to be contaminated due to toxic waste, it

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4 Tailings: waste produced from mining. In this case, radioactive mud waiting for final disposal.
would have dire consequences for Malawians as many rely on fishing as a source of their livelihood. Furthermore, without the consistent monitoring and controlling of radiation on the land, communities that live around the mine are also at risk of developing illnesses such as lung cancer. If Paladin isn’t showing any concern for their own employees, what are the chances they will care for other members of the communities? And what about the environment?

6 Discussion and Conclusions

The purpose of this study is to explore beyond the orthodox resource curse thesis by placing the concept of a resource curse within a local context. While the resource curse theory generally focuses on economic indicators and the negative impact of mining on a national scale, this study has focused on the resource curse’s most immediate effects in the villages surrounding the mines. Furthermore, it has incorporated social and environmental indicators, rather than purely economical.

In order to carry out the research, I conducted a qualitative field study in Malawi and based the majority of my findings on interviews with civil society. Various CSOs in Lilongwe and Karonga assisted me in the initial stages of identifying the challenges associated with mining on a local scale. Thereafter, my visits to the Kayelekera uranium mine and the Mwabulambo coal mine in Karonga put much of the acquired information into perspective. I was able to meet with members of affected communities in person and learn about their struggles and the ways in which mining has affected their livelihoods. What was gathered is that, indeed, Malawi’s resource curse is evident on a micro level in the mining villages. Community members have not had their livelihoods restored as a result of resettlement due to inadequate payments of land and crops, and as a result of the lack of policies to guide and evaluate the compensation process. Furthermore, mining investors have expressed their initial ‘social license to operate’ by promising new infrastructure and amenities in attempts to gain the support of communities. However, many of these promises remain unfulfilled and there is a growing resentment brewing amongst community members against mining firms.

Another indicator of a local resource curse stems from the neglect of mining companies and government in protecting members of the mining communities, particularly workers of the mine. Workers are reported to be suffering from chronic coughing and chest pains as a result of working close with uranium and have received either some [inadequate] healthcare, or none at all. As a result of their illness, many cannot return to their other modes of work, such as farming, and are thus unable to earn an income. Additionally, mining companies have also been negligent in responding to the needs and concerns of communities. Rather, they have been engaging in corrupt deals with traditional authorities in order to control the communities and keep them silent. While mining companies have turned their backs on these communities, they have also caused some of their local leaders to abandon them. This has created conflict and in response, communities have protested and held demonstrations against local authorities and mining firms.

Furthermore, the commencement of mining activity in Karonga has not been limited to the social impacts on mining communities. It also appears that mining companies
have been careless of environmental concerns and have failed to provide plans on how they plan to restore the land that they have exploited, and any emergency-action plans in the event of the spillage of tailings. If the toxic waste were to contaminate surrounding rivers and Lake Malawi, the consequences would be dismal as many rely on fish as a source of their livelihood. As these companies are showing little concern for communities despite the clashes that have taken place, the chances of them responding to the adverse environmental effects of mining appear grim.

To conclude, it appears that Malawi is in dire need to strengthen their institutions and hold mining companies accountable in order to turn the notion of the ‘resource curse’ into a ‘resource blessing.’ Despite these mining companies being predominantly Western, they appear to be unfamiliar with the concept of CSR and far away from achieving a ‘social license to operate.’ Rather, it appears that Malawi’s lack of mineral extraction expertise and weak government capacity is working in their favor. While it is difficult to see how the adverse effects associated with mining are impacting Malawi on a national level, the evidence lies in Malawi’s local mining communities. I am hopeful that this research has proven the importance of studying the resource curse at a micro level; and that it can contribute to the creation of more socially and environmentally responsible policies in relation to natural resource extraction. Further research is encouraged.
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**Images**


**Interview List**

Interview 1: Success Sikwese, CFJ. Interview 21 January 2015, Lilongwe

Interview 2: Gibson Nyirenda, Ministry of Mines. Interview 23 January 2015, Lilongwe

Interview 3: Esther Masika, NCA. Interview 2 February 2015, Lilongwe

Interview 4: Kaulungo Simwaka, CCJP. Interview 5 February 2015, Lilongwe

Interview 5: Jimmy Kainja, Political analyst and professor at the University of Malawi. Interview 15 February 2015

Interview 6: Sydney Mwakaswaya, CCJP. Interview 20 February 2015, Karonga

Interview 7: Louis Nkhata, CCJP. Interview 20 February 2015, Karonga
Interview 8: 8 Mwabulambo coal mine community members. Group interview 24 February 2015, Karonga

Interview 9: Towera Mtambo, Kayelekera community member. Interview 25 February 2015, Karonga

Interview 10: Maskin Gondwe, Ex Paladin employee. Interview 25 February 2015, Karonga

Interview 11: Senior Chief of Karonga. Interview 25 February 2015, Karonga

**Meetings List**

Meeting 1: CSOs, Members of Parliament, media. Capital Hotel meeting 5 February 2015, Lilongwe

Meeting 2: CSOs, mining community members, media, local authorities, Bruno Chareyron (CRIIRAD), Karonga meeting 25 February 2015, Karonga

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