Securitisation of Migration in Discourse and Practice

The case of Edirne, Turkey

Klara Lindvall
This study has been carried out within the framework of the Minor Field Study (MFS) Scholarship Programme funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA).

The MFS Scholarship Programme gives Swedish university students the opportunity to carry out fieldwork in low- and middle income countries, or more specifically in the countries included on the DAC List of ODA Recipients, in relation to their Bachelor’s or Master’s thesis.

Sida’s main purpose with the Scholarships is to stimulate the students’ interest in, as well as increasing their knowledge and understanding of development issues. The Minor Field Studies provide the students with practical experience of fieldwork in developing settings. A further aim of Sida is to strengthen the cooperation between Swedish university departments, institutes and organisations in these countries.
Abstract

The phenomenon of migration is a highly debated topic in international politics, rising in importance on the global agenda. This can be seen in the securitisation of migration policies of the EU, who has sought to restrict migration and sharpen border controls since mid-70s. In this process Turkey is of vital importance, considered one of the main ‘bridges’ for transit migration into the EU. Thus, the securitisation of migration in the EU has been influencing the Turkish migration management in the relation between the two. This thesis was conducted through nine weeks of fieldwork in Edirne, a city bordering the EU through Greece and Bulgaria. The aim is to look at how the process of securitisation is articulated in both discourse and practices among local migration practitioners. This has been done by unstructured interviews with local migration practitioners in Edirne. This thesis is following the framework of both Copenhagen and Paris School of securitisation, to locate how the process of securitisation is present in Edirne.

An outline of the main communication in the EU-Turkey relation, and the policy development of both, with regards to migration management, has been made. It concludes that the process of securitisation of migration is highly present in both discourses and practices of local migration practitioners in Edirne, and locates the process within the concepts of securitisation theory. It also shows tensions between adaption of the securitised agenda of the EU and the resistance expressed towards the EU’s migration policies.

Key words: securitisation theory, EU, Turkey, transit migration, Edirne
Words: 9996
Acknowledgements

First and foremost I would like to direct an utmost thank you to all my respondents in Edirne for their time and helpfulness, and for their efforts of sharing their knowledge with me. I would especially like to thank Nazan Kaçan for her incredible help and kindness, for taking care of me and helping me meet so many in Edirne. I would also like to thank the Governor of Edirne for giving me permission to visit the Detention Centre. There are so many who made my stay and research in Edirne, Istanbul and Ankara possible and highly enjoyable, and I deeply thank you all.

I would like to thank my supervisor Magdalena Bexell here at Lund University, for all her help. I would also like to thank other members of the staff at Lund University, where many have been very helpful with contacts and information before Turkey. I also want to thank the Swedish Development and Cooperation Agency for granting me the Minor Field Study scholarship.

Finally I am very thankful for all the support from my family and friends!
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DGMM</td>
<td>Directorate General of Migration Management, Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFIP</td>
<td>Law on Foreigners and International Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Detention Centre, Edirne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMA</td>
<td>Border Management Agency, Ankara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>Readmission Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPA</td>
<td>Instrument for Pre-Accession</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Table of contents

1 **Introduction** .................................................................................................................. 1  
   1.1 Background and Aim ................................................................................................. 1  
   1.2 Research Question ................................................................................................. 2  
   1.3 Previous Research and Significance ....................................................................... 2  
   1.4 Delimitations .......................................................................................................... 3  
   1.5 Outline of the Study ............................................................................................... 3  

2 **Methodology** ................................................................................................................ 5  
   2.1 Research Design .................................................................................................... 5  
      2.1.1 Selection of location ....................................................................................... 5  
   2.2 Collection of Material .......................................................................................... 6  
      2.2.1 Sampling .......................................................................................................... 6  
      2.2.2 Interviews ........................................................................................................ 7  
      2.2.3 Additional documents ..................................................................................... 7  
   2.3 Analysis of Material ............................................................................................. 8  
      2.3.1 Coding ............................................................................................................. 8  
   2.4 Reflections on Material ........................................................................................ 8  
      2.4.1 Ethical considerations and positionality ......................................................... 8  

3 **Theoretical Framework** ............................................................................................... 10  
   3.1 Securitisation Theory ............................................................................................ 10  
   3.2 Securitisation of Migration .................................................................................... 11  
      3.2.1 Transit migration and borders ....................................................................... 12  

4 **EU, Turkey and Migration** .......................................................................................... 13  
   4.1 Externalisation, Europeanisation and Securitisation: Policy Development in the EU ............................................................ 13  
   4.2 The EU-Turkey Relation ....................................................................................... 14  
   4.3 Transit Migration and Migration Management in Turkey ..................................... 15  
      4.3.1 Migration Management and Borders in Edirne ................................................. 16  

5 **Securitisation of Migration in Edirne** ........................................................................ 18  
   5.1 Politicisation .......................................................................................................... 18  
   5.2 Referent Objects and Threats ................................................................................. 19  
      5.2.1 Proposed Measures ......................................................................................... 20  
   5.3 The Relation Between the Audience and Securitising Actor ............................... 21  
   5.4 Practices of securitisation ...................................................................................... 24  
      5.4.1 Merging of internal and external security aspects ........................................... 24  

6 **Conclusion** .................................................................................................................... 26
7 References

7.1 Literature

7.2 Reports and Documents

7.3 Interviews

7.4 Documents from Fieldwork

8 Appendix

Appendix 1: Number of Illegal Migrants Apprehended on Turkish National Borders Between 1998 and 2014

Appendix 2: Number of Illegal Migrants Apprehended in the Edirne Border Area Between 2011 and 2014
1 Introduction

“Turkey is a bridge between some Middle East and Asian countries [...], where conflicts and unsustainability prevail, and the European Countries with high welfare and human rights standards at west. Turkey is the transit point for the migrants aiming to go to European Union (EU) countries for some reasons such as conflicts in the Middle East, particularly in neighbour countries, political and economic instabilities, mountainous and hard-to-control east borders, geographical structure of Aegean Sea and Mediterranean Coast eligible for illegal transit. Turkey has become an attraction place for regular and irregular migration, particularly due to its recently increasing economic and regional power. Given all these factors, migration deeply affects the economic, socio-cultural and demographic structure of Turkey, as well as its public order and security.” (Directorate General of Migration Management¹ 1, 2015)

1.1 Background and Aim

As the quote above reflects, migration is indeed a global phenomenon, rising in importance in international politics. In the European Union the focus is increasingly put on irregular migration, and how to prevent migrants from entering the Union in illegal² ways. This emphasis is placed heavily upon securing the external borders, showing a shift in regarding the issue of migration from a security perspective rather than a humanitarian one (Kirişci 2003). The project of creating a strong, common European framework of migration and border management has had implications far beyond the borders of the EU. It has also earned it the nickname of ‘Fortress Europe’.

In this context Turkey, holding the position as a Candidate Country since 1999 and considered a 'bridge' for transit migration to the EU, becomes central in the Unions concerns for migration flows. Argued throughout this thesis is that the securitisation of migration present in EU discourse has effects on the Turkish migration management system, both on a national and local level. The aim here is to see how this is visible, by focusing on the case of migration management in Edirne, a city bordering the EU through its land borders with Greece and Bulgaria.

The aim will not be to provide a comprehensive analysis of the macro-level of securitising influence of EU on Turkey, but this is a necessary background that will be accounted for through documents and previous research. Emphasis will be

¹ Which will further on be referred to as DGMM, go.gov.tr
² As well as legal.
put on the development of Turkish migration management, which before 2013 was highly fragmented in different institutions and legislative documents. This leads us to why an emphasis on local practitioners is so vital, which is what will be studied in the case of Edirne.

Following the framework of securitisation theory and thus regarding security threats as constructed through a discursive process, the securitising influence of the EU will be examined within the perception and description of migration management of local practitioners in Edirne. A combination of the Copenhagen and Paris School of securitisation will be used, to highlight the process within both discourse and practice.

1.2 Research Question

- How is the process of securitisation visible in the discourse on and practices of migration management among local migration practitioners in Edirne?

1.3 Previous Research and Significance

Both Waever and authors associated with the Copenhagen School (Waever et al 1998, Buzan et al 1993, Waever 2011) and with the Paris School (Bigo and Guild 2005, Bigo 2002, Bigo 2009, Geiger and Pécout 2010) have studied securitisation. A large body of works have discussed the effects on securitisation of migration within the EU, from the theoretical angles of both schools (Huysmans 2000, Léonard 2010, Benam 2011, Bigo, Carrera and Guild 2008, Watson 2009). These will be presented more thoroughly in section 4, and a discussion on the main trends in EU migration management will be presented.

The relationship between Turkey and the EU has been scrutinised within the fields of International Relations and Security Studies, as well as in more management and policy-oriented works. In particular it is the influence of the EU on Turkish migration policy that has been studied (Bürgin 2011, Cavlak 2013, Kirişci 2003, İçduygu 2011, Kaya 2009) and the conditionalities within the accession process (Erkut and Özen 2006, Emerson and Tucci 2004, Toğral 2012). Some of the main aspects of EU-Turkey and securitisation will also be outlined in section 4. Work that directly links Turkey and securitisation, both practices and discourse have also started to emerge, however it is still a relatively new field of research (Biehl 2009, Toğral 2012, Tolay 2012, Baysan 2013).

This brings us to the significance of this thesis. Within these wider academic debates and works on the EU, Turkey and securitisation, few have been made in a limited, local context. Only one recent study has been published on the topic of European influence over migration management in a local setting (Aras3 2013). A

\footnote{3 Which was conducted in Edirne and Izmir.}
study on the relation between Turkey and Greece concerned with similar topics has also been partly published, and will be published in its entirety later this year (Kaşlı 2014).

By using Edirne as location and combining the theoretical focus of both discourse and practice, new insights can be made in how the process of securitisation is shown and constructed in local migration management. Edirne is a highly specific setting and “still by far the undisputed hotspot for detections of illegal border crossings” (Frontex, 2013a), with its closeness to the EU border shaping the area. Analysing securitisation in this particular context accommodate deeper understanding of the levels of securitisation, communicated in a complex web of micro-macro networks in discourse and practice. Thus, this is a significant case to shed light on within the debate of securitisation of migration and international relations.

1.4 Delimitations

The current situation in Turkey with the Syrian crisis since 2011 is something that has not been emphasised in this paper. Though an important situation it does not hold conceptual relevance to this study, as the aim is not migration per se but the issues surrounding it. Describing the Syrian crisis would also requisite thorough reflections of Turkey-Syria relations, with special regards to the historic roots of the Ottoman Empire. This is not possible to outline in this thesis, neither is it relevant in EU-Turkey relations apart from Turkey’s role as a regional power. Equally important, my knowledge and experience is not enough for attempting to describe or access a vulnerable group such as Syrian transit migrants in Turkey. I neither had time nor resources to provide a fair account on the voices of migrants in a way that is not colonising their experiences (England 1994).

If space had been more available a deeper focus would have been put on the process of securitisation within the EU-Turkey communication. This is outlined in chapter 4, but is due to the scope and aim of this thesis highly limited. A deeper and more comprehensive focus would also have been put on the specificities of the Turkish context and its internal dynamics of securitisation of migration and development of migration management. As it is now the emphasis is put on this within the relation between EU and Turkey, not examining the independent dynamics of securitisation within Turkey.

The choice of not focusing this study further on the political economy of migration between EU and Turkey, with regards to transit migration, was also made. This is highly relevant for examining the root causes of the securitisation of migration within EU-Turkey dialogue, but is beyond the scope of this paper.

1.5 Outline of the Study
The following chapter will describe the methodology used in this fieldwork and following thesis, and provide reflections on the material and ethical considerations of the study. Chapter 3 will introduce the theoretical framework and the key concepts of this thesis. Chapter 4 will bring a review of EU-Turkey relations and the main developments of migration policy for both, in the light of the theoretical framework. Chapter 5 will present the material from Edirne, and the analysis of it from the key concepts of securitisation theory. In chapter 6, the main conclusions will be presented.
2 Methodology

2.1 Research Design

This thesis is based on a fieldwork conducted predominantly in Edirne, Turkey for nine weeks during January to March 2015. Some time was also spent in Istanbul and Ankara. The study is conducted as a qualitative, exploratory case study that looks at a well-documented theory to see how it applies in a new, different setting. The epistemological position is interpretivist, as described by Bryman (2012:280) as a feature for qualitative research where emphasis is put on context and process. The need to distinguish this as a case study comes from the elements of extremity underlining migration and –management in Edirne. While this thesis is concerned with a process that theoretically could be located among migration practitioners in another Turkish city or over a less location-specific spectra, it is the uniqueness of Edirne in its geographical location and context that constitute the unit of analysis (Bryman 2012:68). It is thus more of an ‘extreme case study’, however hard to locate among any set ‘types of case studies’ (Bryman 2012:70). It can also be defined as a critical case study, defined as “a case with strategic importance to the general problem” (Baškarada 2014:6).

It is important to highlight the constructivist approach used in this thesis, where the ontological position concludes that social phenomena and their meanings are accomplished by social actors (Bryman 2012:711). Theoretically there is an underlining consideration of discourse and security as constructed, rejecting the objectivist stands of an independent social world (Watson 2009:15). A slightly more deductive approach has been applied, as the aim throughout was to conduct the research within the framework of securitisation theory with indicators of securitisation developed prior to the fieldwork. However, a hypothesis was not developed prior, neither was the aim to confirm any ‘given’ reality. The study was conducted neither deductive nor inductive, but by using elements of both thus leaning towards the use of a hermeneutic approach. To conclude, this study is highly theory-driven, but also conducted with an explicit aim of letting the material speak for itself.

2.1.1 Selection of location

As described above Edirne has a unique relevance for a fieldwork, and the choice of it was initially made due to its geographical location as the closest Turkish city bordering Greece and Bulgaria and thus the EU. The city is also located about 10 km from the Greek construction of a land border fence, commonly regarded as a
symbol for ‘Fortress Europe’\(^4\) (Amnesty International 2014). Further, Edirne is repeatedly mentioned as a location of importance in NGO reports on migration and border issues in the EU (ibid, FIDH et al 2014, Pro Asyl 2013) but in my initial review on previous literature I found none made in the region. I was thus intrigued to conduct my study here, and to further specialise the focus on local migration and border management in this particular context.

2.2 Collection of Material

The main empirical material collected during the fieldwork was through unstructured interviews. Actively, the respondents were also asked for further material, and some PowerPoints explaining migration and border management in Edirne and Turkey was provided. Brief reviews of the main communications between EU and Turkey have been made, exemplifying the process of securitisation within the relation. These were chosen through comprehensive readings of previous research on the topics, which highlighted the relevant documents. The documents were not analysed further, except for brief readings following the coding-system explained below.

2.2.1 Sampling

Purposive sampling was used for this fieldwork, as is most common in qualitative research (Bryman 2012:418). Focusing on local migration practitioners, the initial aim was to contact as many as possible working with migration management in Edirne, and to complement that material with individuals working within civil society on migration matters. This developed as to include local politicians, realising their potential in commenting on the political situation.

As described in Bryman (2012:424) a mix of snowball sampling and opportunistic sampling was made. The focus was throughout to interview people of relevance in migration matters, which was realised both with direct contact of identified persons and by being introduced to such. I was lucky to gain access to a gatekeeper who made this study possible by her kindness and extraordinary social network in Edirne.

Thus, the sampling led to a number of fifteen interviews conducted, with local administration at the Edirne Detention Centre (DC), local politicians, members of civil society, a representative of the municipality and the Governor of Edirne. Two interviews were also conducted in Ankara, one with a national Turkish NGO\(^5\) and one with a representative of the Border Management Agency (BMA) at

\(^4\) This fence is also part of the reason (and at least a symbol) for the increased deaths of migrants at the Mediterranean Sea, since the increased border security in this land border region has led to a "displacement effect" of migrants, who instead attempt to cross to the EU over the sea (Frontex 2013a).

\(^5\) Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants.
the Ministry of Interior. These were made to complement and access further information on the situation for migrants and border management in Edirne.

Unfortunately, access to respondents involved in border management and more explicitly security related professions in Edirne (such as Police or Military), which would have been very rewarding for my sample, were not possible. I received a permission to conduct interviews with the administration at the DC from the Governor of Edirne, but he was not able to grant access to others, which are under the authority of Ankara.

2.2.2 Interviews

The interviews were conducted at separate, and in some cases multiple, occasions. At the DC, I was assigned a guide who spoke English to show me around and answer my questions while visiting. Multiple respondents with different roles at the DC was then interviewed, but their answers have been clouded to the category of ‘administration of the DC’, due to the differing nature of their response and some requests for exclusion of names. The interviews made at the DC with the present and former Director however, are regarded as separate.

Unstructured interviews were made, following a thematic interview guide developed in relation to the framework of securitisation theory, migration management and EU-Turkey relations. The initial aim was to conduct them as semi-structured, but that quickly changed when arriving to Edirne. Realising my limited knowledge and experience of the context, and the different positions my respondents held in migration management in Edirne, unstructured interviews was regarded as better as to avoid skewing the results from my own assumptions.

The main themes of the interviews were transit migration in Edirne and Turkey as a whole, relations with EU, perceived changes and effects of transit migration and EU policy, security, all focused on opinions and perceptions. Further inquiries were, with relevant people, made on practices and regional cooperation of migration management.

2.2.3 Additional documents

The BMA representative in Ankara and the Edirne DC provided me with additional documents on request. These documents were in the form of PowerPoints used as presentations at different meetings, where the three most significant were from a Frontex meeting, a bilateral Turkey-Greece meeting and a local Edirne-Greece monthly meeting. These are just fragments of the internal dialogue within the cooperation efforts, but are in this thesis regarded as significant in seeing how migration matters are presented within the security field of Turkish cooperation. They also contained valuable data that would not otherwise been accessed, due to the need of obtaining a formal research permission to access data from Ankara.
2.3 Analysis of Material

2.3.1 Coding

The interview guide used followed the initial objective of conducting semi-structured interviews, but was equally valid as a tool for guiding the main themes discussed when the interviews were conducted as unstructured. The initial, open coding followed these indicators of securitisation and emphasis was put on openly coding the themes of this thesis. The scale of ‘non-politicised–politicised–securitised’ that will be presented in chapter 3 was also used to grasp an initial sense of the material and its relation to securitisation. Things relating to practices and EU were also highlighted.

A second coding was then made to see how and where the material was relating to the concepts used in securitisation theory, and categorised as such. These categories included for example ‘referent objects’, ‘threats’, ‘audience-actor relation’, and are presented in chapter 5. This selective coding was developed from the compiled open-coded material, and the material was throughout placed under categories of respondents, such as ‘local politicians’, ‘civil society’ and ‘local administration’. This was due to the significance of the position the respondents held in the local migration management system.

2.4 Reflections on Material

By using material not only from interviews but official documents and previous research, I am confident with the validity of this material. The presented quotes and preceding analysis of material showed similar trends and expressions throughout, and the material presented reflects this.

Approximately half of the interviews were conducted in Turkish with a translator, and half in English. This of course has had implications for the material, and I have throughout been very careful with analysing and looking at the material. Further, recordings of the interviews were done, and the ones conducted in Turkish with translator were sent to a second translator who translated and transcribed them in their entirety. These measure, alongside with repeated clarifications made during the interviews, makes me confident that the language barrier has been crossed as smoothly as possible.

2.4.1 Ethical considerations and positionality

To return to the question of anonymity for my respondents, only one respondent requested anonymity. However, I have chosen to not include any names of

6 The coding scheme can be made available on request.
respondents in this thesis. The importance lies in their occupation and not their identity, and I have chosen to take this precaution since there is no relevance in their names. Some of my respondents are of course identifiable through their occupation, but I remain confident that they will not face any consequences, which was also discussed with all respondents.

My role as a European was visible in all contacts made during the fieldwork, opening a lot of doors and making me receive a lot of help, but it was also restraining. More information and locations were accessed due to my role as a young, European student, and I found my presence to be regarded positively. However, my role as such also occasionally added some distance between my respondents and I, where a slight reluctance to share and discuss negative aspects of Turkey and its migration management. These issues were part of what Sultana (2007) describes as people placing you in categories, something you have to negotiate with to form relationships with your respondents. In my own case I noticed my role as being complex, since I am a European but also a very young woman.

This leads us to the power relations present in this fieldwork. As I predominantly had contact with élites, the structures and my role were highly complex. The contact with élites was both due to the nature of this study, and also my inability to speak Turkish, where the élite (who can afford to study abroad for example) were the ones within my reach. This makes, as mentioned in Kapoor (2004) my research one-sided, however that has throughout the process been reflected upon to ameliorate. The aim has also been to represent a limited group within a specific context, which is clear throughout.

The use of language is an interesting and important part of analysing the power relations in field, where my ability to speak English were given plenty of attention in meetings with officials. Analysing this in its right context, namely the unequal power relations between and dominance of the Anglo-Saxon world throughout history, this is a significant factor in my research process. My English skills are giving me a position of power, and I was constantly aware of the power that is embedded in my language. As Sultana (2007) puts it, reflexivity is to reflect on how one is inserted in grids of power relations, which has been throughout this process.

By choosing to focus on the local migration practitioners, who de facto occupy a privileged position, I am aware that the picture of Edirne and migration I receive is filtered in the voices of élites. However, this thesis is an account of how migration politics and management works in Turkey, described by the ones in contact with it every day through their profession or passion. They are the actors who shape migration management, which is the aim to study in this thesis.
3 Theoretical Framework

3.1 Securitisation Theory

"To study securitisation is to study the power politics of a concept" is how the so-called Copenhagen School authors Buzan, De Wilde and Waever (1998:28) introduced the idea of analysing securitisation in discourse. Looking at securitisation as an intersubjective process allows for the identification of particular elements within that process to be analysed and understood, regarding the process as that of “constructing a shared understanding of what is considered and collectively responded to as a threat” (Peoples and Vaughan 2014).

The early development of securitisation theory was understood as the discursive construction of a security threat, which constitutes a speech act (Waever 2011). One assumption is premised; that the declaration of security itself creates a new order that shifts from the realm of ‘normal’ (Balzacq 2005). This speech act of securitisation is explained as when security “is not interesting in itself as a sign referring to something real; it is the utterance itself that is the act” (Buzan et al 1998:26).

The key concept within securitisation is the notion of a threat, which in turn is centred around survival (Buzan et al 1993:36). The distinguishing feature of securitisation is a specific rhetorical structure, which includes both survival and priority of action (Buzan et al 1998:25). Survival exists in relation to a referent object that is to be protected by any means. By a securitising move from a securitising actor the issue that is securitised can become an existential threat towards this referent object, in order to make the audience tolerate extraordinary measures that would not have been accepted otherwise (Waever 2011). The audience serves to provide legitimacy for the moves of the securitising actor (Watson 2009:20).

This discursive process of creating a security threat can be traced and identified by the concepts outlined above. These specific criteria rely on a few required conditions, especially in the relation between the securitising actor and the audience. The act of ‘speaking security’ has to be made by someone in authority, in the right context and according to certain pre-established conventions (Peoples and Vaughan 2014). There has to be a degree of acceptance between the securitising actor and the relevant audience, and a link should be established between the object being securitised and historical connotations of threats (ibid). In sum the process of securitisation can be defined as the ‘socially constructed notion of an issue as a security threat’ (Karyotis and Skleparis 2013). This process of securitisation ranges from ‘non-politicised–politicised–securitised’, explained in figure 1.
The idea of securitisation was expanded and elaborated by, among others, Bigo (2000) and the Paris School who moved the theory more in to the field of political sociology, drawing upon Bourdieu and his concepts of field⁷ (Peoples and Vaughan 2014). Here, securitisation is seen beyond the speech act, recognising that notions of threats also can be produced by daily routines and practices, and cooperation among security experts (Bigo 2006). The approach is actor-based, arguing that patterns of practices and networks at the micro-level can reveal different processes of securitisation than detected only from official discourse (Waever 2011).

The Paris School further emphasises how global insecurity and transnational networks of security experts creates a new arenas for securitisation that is expanding the dimensions of security (Bigo 2006). The focus lies on analysing the social construction of a threat by members of a community of security professionals (Bigo 2001). Merging of internal and external aspects of security, such as fusing and expanding the roles of police (internal) and military (external) are also parts of this process (Bigo 2000). This ‘blurring of lines’ is important for the construction of security issues in this theory, as it links the internal and external practices, creating a larger and more autonomous field of security practitioners, all concerned with ‘common’ enemies (Bigo 2000). The merging of internal and external aspects of security also serves to prioritise security, and define its importance as superior, creating further room for an expansion of a transnational security élite (Bigo 2006).

Further, the concept of security is elaborate by looking at insecurity and the politics of risk. Securitisation is seen as a way to manage and also create insecurity, and thereby creating an agenda of ‘risk management’ (Benam 2011).

3.2 Securitisation of Migration

---

⁷ The connection to Bourdieu will not be elaborated further, but the field is his theoretical concept of a particular arena where particular types of capital are differently valued (Bigo 2000).
In the context of migration, the process of securitisation covers different areas and sectors. Different subjects being securitised and different sectors where securitisation can take place mean that there is a range of possible referent objects, who can be articulated differently (Buzan et al 1998:45). This is however to be established in the following analysis. By securitising migration it is essentially the migrants themselves who are framed as a threat\(^8\), a threat that can be towards different kinds of referent objects. National culture and the societal sector are common, since the politics of identity tend to be articulated within the framework of nationality and entitlement to national resources (Peoples and Vaughan 2013). Migration is often also associated with crime and terrorism, which carries historical and widely accepted connotations of being a threat (Waever 2011).

As described by Bigo (2006) the budget allocated to security institutions can help establish to what degree a threat is accepted as real. Threat management linked to security and migration can be detected in how highly security and professionalised management is emphasised in the practices of bureaucracy and experts (ibid). Focus on intelligence and surveillance within migration management, commonly linked to crime or military operations rather than migration, also makes the process of securitisation visible (Benam 2011).

### 3.2.1 Transit migration and borders

In this theoretical framework the concept of transit migration needs to be introduced. It is considered as one of the most important topics in EU-Turkey relations (Kirişçi 2003) and a defining factor in the emphasis on irregular migration management from the EU’s side. In the context of EU and Turkey transit migration, especially irregular, is highly emphasised in their relation. This also brings forward the rationale of focusing on border security and management, which will run parallel to migration management in this thesis. Transit migration does not exist without the restrictions that surround, create and shape it (İçduygu 2005). Here border regimes grow in significance, and in the Edirne context there is relevance in keeping the focus at the restrictions creating flows of transit migration. Focusing on transit migrants also allows for a specific focus on the process of migration within and through Turkey, in relation to the EU. It also makes it possible to avoid a focus on particular migrant groups that constitute a research arena of themselves, such as Syrians in Turkey.

This also provides us an excellent bridge for moving on to the next chapter, which will review the relation between EU and Turkey, and their policy development in the field of migration and border management.

---

\(^8\) Bigo gives an excellent view on criminalisation of migration and the creation of a ‘ban-opticion’ as a structure that targets migrants as a group in a new form of governmentality, drawing on Foucault, in Bigo (2002).
4 EU, Turkey and Migration

This chapter will introduce and outline the background of EU, Turkey and migration that the process of securitisation in Edirne is located within. It will serve to briefly analyse the main communications in EU-Turkey dialogue and main changes in respective migration management. Some empirical material will also be presented in this chapter, to further contextualise and describe migration management in Edirne.

4.1 Externalisation, Europeanisation and Securitisation: Policy Development in the EU

The policy development of the EU contains important elements of three parallel conceptual processes, important for understanding the EU’s influence over Turkish migration management.

The Europeanisation of EU policies has played an important part in its securitisation of migration (Benam 2011), which is argued to have begun following the oil crisis of 1973. Here, the demand for labour migration decreased, and the Union sought to reform and restrict its migration policy (Cavlak 2013). The foundation for ‘Fortress Europe’ was laid with Council regulation 1612/68 which distinguishes the right to free movement between citizens of Member State and nationals of third countries (Bigo and Guild 2005:17). The process of creating a common European framework for migration policy accelerated in the 80s with the initiation of Schengen in 1985. This agreement framed migration as a subject for common and strict management among Member States, serving to distinguish the external and internal borders of the EU (Bigo 2009).

With the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 a Third Pillar of Justice and Home Affairs was introduced, in which migration became a subject of intergovernmental regulation within the EU (Huysmans 2000). In 1999 the Tampere Programme developed its internal security policies, which quickly became an issue of external border control (Léonard 2010), fusing the issue of migration with that of security (Bigo 2003). The following Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 made European migration matters supranational and brought the issues of immigration, asylum and border control under the formal competence of the European Commission (Huysmans 2000). This shift of sovereign ty in policy making to EU-level serves to distinguish a larger zone of ‘inside’, put in relation to a potentially dangerous ‘outside’ (Benam 2011).

---

9 i.e. the creation of a common, supranational legislative framework for the Member States (Benam 2011).
The Hague Programme of 2004 made the securitisation of migration in the Union’s discourse visible, by creating a common immigration policy of the EU in order to “control unwanted flows” (Aras 2013:240). The Stockholm Programme of 2010 further elaborated the security architecture of the EU, emphasising border surveillance, data sharing and cooperation among police, military and secret services (Kaunert and Léonard 2010). In the Stockholm Programme a section is called ‘Effective policies to combat illegal immigration’, exemplifying the emphasis on security in EU communication (European Council 2009:52). To conclude, many scholars argue that this creation of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has been driven by security focus, at the expense of the other two components (Kaunert and Léonard 2010).

In 2005 the EU established its border agency Frontex, with the explicit mission of working directly with cooperation and coordination efforts in third countries (Perowski 2012). Externalisation, or ‘outsourcing’ of migration and border policy is symptomatic with EU’s policy development of migration (Menjívar 2014). The EU has sought to externalise its migration policy and create a ‘remote-control’ based management framework, both with political pressure and agreements with third countries (Aras 2013:255).

This is where Europeanisation and securitisation goes even more hand in hand, creating new kinds of control mechanisms and externalising management to stop flows of migrants before reaching EU territory (Benam 2011). Placing the responsibilities of migration management further from the Union, with means as Readmission Agreements (RA) and financial assistance, creates this externalisation. The RA’s are made with third countries, valid for all Member States and created by the European Commission who was empowered in the Amsterdam Treaty. They mean that any Member State has the right to return a person who has entered its territory to their residence country or country of transit, who is obliged to accepted them if an RA is signed. This tool is commonly used together with incentives of visa facilitation and/or economic assistance (Kruse 2002).  

4.2 The EU-Turkey Relation

The EU-Turkey relation officially started in 1964 with the Ankara Agreement, but realised in 1999 at the Helsinki Summit where Turkey became a Candidate Country. Since, massive reforms have been made in order to align the country with the EU acquis (Baysan 2013). Noteworthy is that although the Chapter concerning migration and asylum under the Justice and Home Affairs is yet to be open, the reforms of Turkish migration policy have been shaped by EU pressure (Cavlak 2013). The EU Accession Partnership Documents for Turkey (APD) clearly outlined some of the most pressing issues of cooperation, and has continued to do so with annual Progress Reports. In the field of migration the

---

10 As in the recent signing of a Turkey-EU Readmission Agreement. In this case however, only a visa-dialogue was opened (European Commission 2013).
Turkish response to the APD was to establish a Task Force on Asylum, Migration and Border Management in 2003 to produce a number of documents concerned with strengthening its border and migration management (Kirişçi 2003). The National Action Plan on Asylum came in 2008, and had, similarly to the APD a special focus on irregular migration (Aras 2013: 178). Going through all projects and agreements is beyond the scope of this paper. Noteworthy however, is the discourse used in twinning projects with EU Member States and associates, as for example a project between 2012-2014 conducted together with UK and Norway described at the DGMM website as providing:

“Support to Turkey’s efforts in designing and implementing evidence based comprehensive policies for eliminating irregular migration related challenges has been provided. Furthermore, a comprehensive strategy in combat against irregular migration has been defined and a sustainable national action plan with a human rights perspective within a broader migration management framework based on this strategy has been created” (DGMM 2, 2015)

The emphasis is placed both on ‘combat against illegal migration’ and on the creation of an intelligence-driven migration management. The newly signed and not implemented Readmission Agreement between Turkey and EU is in the dialogue described as ‘efforts to combat irregular migration is a central part of the efforts to harmonize with the EU’ (İçduygu 2011).

This discourse is present in many examples of the dialogues and agreements between EU and Turkey, showing that a securitisation of the issue is highly present. The word ‘combat’ is a highly securitised word, as it encourages extreme measures and is clearly linked to the sector of military operations.

The RA mentioned above is also opening the dialogue on a visa-free regime between EU and Turkey, initiating a Roadmap emphasising cooperation in order to combat illegal immigration more effectively (European Commission, IP/13/1259, 2013). This agreement emphasises the role of Frontex providing assistance to Turkey in its missions, and enhance operational cooperation between the two. A Memorandum of Understanding (Frontex 2013b) between the two parties was set up in 2012, aimed to assist Turkey in following the Roadmap Toward Visa-Liberalisation11 and secure its border as part of the accession process. It also includes deployment of Frontex experts in Turkey and a more organised exchange of information and risk analysis (Sert 2013).

4.3 Transit Migration and Migration Management in Turkey

The nature of migration has changed rapidly in Turkey over the past years. From being considered predominantly as a country of departure and transit, it has

---

11 The document that was exchanged for the Readmission Agreement with EU. It contains very specific points to be followed in order to begin a visa-facilitation dialogue (European Commission 2013).
increasingly become a destination country as a stable regional power in its troubled neighbourhood (İçduyuğ 2005).

Before the Law no 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) of 2013 the legislation on Turkish migration management was highly fragmented with responsibilities scattered over a number of institutions following a variety of documents (Elitok 2013). The LFIP provided Turkey with its first comprehensive framework for how to manage and regulate both regular and irregular migration. It also introduces an entirely new administration, creating a civil authority for coordination of migration management (Kirişçi 2012). What before was loosely under the responsibility of the National Police Authority is now collected under the Directorate General of Migration Management under the Ministry of Interior. Compliance with the EU norms and regulations are reflected in the creation of the new framework (Tolay 2012). However its also important to note that although the development of the new law has been emphasised in EU-Turkey relations, there has also been an increasing domestic pressure and need to form a new kind of migration management (Elitok 2013, Kaya 2009, İçduyuğ 2013).

The new law do include outspoken emphasis on highly securitised measures to handle migration, such as formal establishment of a “Coordination Board for Combating Irregular Migration” that emphasises Turkey’s “fight against irregular migration” (LFIP 2013:60). The law also emphasises the use of intelligence gathering to “determine the routes for illegal entry in and exit from Turkey and develop counter measures” (PowerPoint 1).

4.3.1 Migration Management and Borders in Edirne

It is in the light from above that the significance of Edirne becomes clear. A picture of the number of migrants that pass through Edirne is possible to paint by looking at the numbers I did access. First, a graph on the number of apprehended migrants in total between the years 1998-2014 accessed in PowerPoint 2. Second, a graph on the number of irregular migrants apprehended in Edirne between 2012 and 2014 was provided in a PowerPoint received from the Edirne Detention Centre (PowerPoint 1). These can be found in their entirety in Appendix 1 and 2.

From them, a quick calculation shows that in 2012 37 % of the total number of apprehended migrants in Turkey was indeed apprehended in Edirne, 41 % in 2013 and 42 % in 2014. Suffice to say is that the region of Edirne accounts for a significant share of irregular migration flows in Turkey, and the apprehension in the Edirne area implies transit migration due to its closeness to the European border.

With the numbers and nature of transit migration in Edirne established, the migration management in the region needs to be briefly outlined. Edirne is under the new administration of the LFIP a Provincial Directorate, and the base for that administration is located at the Edirne Detention Centre (LFIP 2013:57). The DC is however not new, and has been functioning previously under the authority of the Foreigners Police (Interview 1a, DC). The DC is responsible for migration management and coordination between police, Jandarma and the army with
regards to apprehensions at the borders. They are also responsible for processing and interviewing migrants and applications, as well as gathering data (ibid). The DC also administers and implements the regional agreements made with Greece and Bulgaria, such as the Readmission Protocol of 2001 with Greece (Interview 1b, DC). Border security is still the responsibility of the army, who follow their own legislation, separated from the general framework of migration management within the ministry (Interview 1b, DC). The army are responsible for border apprehensions of migrants, who are then taken to the DC for processing (Interview 1a, DC).

Within the light of all this described above the conclusion that can be made is that EU indeed is influencing Turkey to embrace the securitisation discourse and practice in its migration management. This is done not only by emphasising ‘stricter’ migration management in the dialogue with Turkey, but also by a number of tools directed at border security and migration management. This is done both within the official discourse between the two and through the dynamics of international cooperation and practices by experts.

The next chapter will present an analysis of the micro-level where this process is played out; among local migration practitioners in the border city of Edirne.
5 Securitisation of Migration in Edirne

In this chapter the case of Edirne and the empirical material gathered will be presented and outlined in relation to the aspects of the process of securitisation and how it is shown in Edirne. The scale of ‘non-politicalised–politicised–securitised’ is also, as explained earlier, used to distinguish different levels of the process of securitisation. Some of the material that will be presented here also concerns Turkey in general and is not confined to Edirne, and will be stated here due to its value as indicative of the general situation. To briefly summarise, following the Copenhagen School discursive process of securitisation, what is looked at is the move where a securitising actor for an audience formulates an issue as a threat towards a valued referent object whose survival depends on the measures proposed towards the threat. Further, following the Paris School, practices of securitisation are looked at, with focus on internal mechanisms of migration practitioners, merging of internal and external aspects of security, regional, professionalised cooperation efforts.

5.1 Politicisation

Indicators of politicisation are present throughout the material, with the topic of migration expressed as recently occurring on the political arena and in debates. All three local politicians interviewed described migration as a ‘potential threat’ and a situation that had to be managed, however there was no mentions of strategies or political plans doing so, even when asked explicitly. This can be seen as a sign of the very recent politicisation of migration in Turkey, as it has not yet risen on the agenda of the political parties enough to be subject of any concrete measures. It is also a sign of how the process of migration management, and securitisation of it, is driven by the professionalised security bureaucracy (Bigo 2006). This also mirrors the very top-down political structure of Turkey, where power is highly centralised in Ankara.

“For example in the EU every political party has a section for migration. Here, we don’t have any. Before the Syrians they were invisible (...) Now the discourse has been around other, not humanitarian, things.” (Interview 14, ASAM)

12 Internal is here defined as issues of concern within the country on a national level, where external means what is concerned with issues from outside of the national borders.
In Edirne there is also a very notable lack of organisations and activists concerned with migration. There are a few, interviewed in this study, but none of the big Turkish migration NGOs is present in the area. A representative of the Edirne Bar Association, who concluded that migration issues and legal representation of migrants in Edirne had been non-existent until recently, described this. He explains that when he graduated in Istanbul and returned to Edirne “more than 10 lawyers were representing human smugglers in court, but there was only one who represented migrants” (Interview 11).

5.2 Referent Objects and Threats

Migration is throughout the material described as an emerging or already existing threat, with different degrees of outspokenness. This suggests that the audience my respondents represent is highly responsive to the process of securitisation. Throughout migration is described as a problem, or looming threat, as by two different interviewees of the administration at the DC expressed:

“It will become a problem, we can’t send back the Syrians. 90 % of the wants to stay in Turkey (...) In Edirne it’s a problem that so many pass through” (Interview 1a, DC)

“These foreigners will cause economic, social and political problems” (Interview 4, Director of DC)

There are different kinds of referent objects presented, where migration is described as a threat towards the Turkish culture, economy and social order. The predominant fear is for the economy, both by migrants taking jobs and the Turkish expenses on migrants. This emphasis on the economic cost of migration and management was stressed throughout, especially the financial burden Turkey experienced, and fears of migrants disrupting the economy.

“They are being harmful and the government is spending money on them. The medical bills cost more now because of the Syrians” (Interview 13)

Many also mentioned increasing tensions between migrants and Turkish nationals, and expressed fears that this would lead to conflicts. This was also expressed implicitly in concerns over how ‘local people’ reacted towards migration, and that activities of migrants led to fears among this local population. These statements clearly correspond to how the process of securitisation is present, as they explicitly make the link between a perceived threat of migrants and a referent object; Turkish nationals and community. A representative at the Municipality of Edirne made this link of identity, or more importantly a perceived lack of such, and security very clear by stating:
"Thousands of people without IDs. These people are putting society in a very dangerous situation (…) Security is the main effect [of transit migrants in Edirne]” (Interview 12)

One of the sharpest statements came from a local politician. Although he was more outspoken about the issue than any other interviewee, similar reasoning of cultural clashes and bad influence from migrants were expressed in other interviews.

"The national culture of the country is being defiled by immigrants (...) The immigrants in Turkey has adaptation problems in the cultural context. Prostitution and begging have increased. If we don’t take measures as a government, there will be prostitution, begging and theft in cities where there wasn’t before” (Interview 6, CHP)

Some respondents accused migrants for bringing diseases and being harmful, stealing and not pay rent (Interview 14, Interview 7). Similar descriptions of how migrants were perceived was mentioned:

“Syrians and refugees are regarded as disturbing elements, destroying culture etc” (Interview 10)

An interesting aspect was how this articulation of a threat towards the national culture was only present when it came to migrants, and no fears that the EU Accession Process would lead to any similar. Some material even presented migrants as a threat to the EU-Turkey relation itself. The governor of Edirne explicitly made a link that was present in other material too, that migration was harming the country’s international relations:

“Turkey is not happy about border crossings. It disturbs relations between countries.” (Interview 4, Governor of Edirne)

5.2.1 Proposed Measures

What kind of measures needed was not very commonly mentioned as a topic in the interviews, but kept reoccurring in the PowerPoints. In the communication between EU and Turkey, measures are commonly spoken about as described in section 4, and the views within the material indicates that a similar discourse of 'something has to be done’ is present in this case. Some drastic measures were proposed in interviews:
“If the number of Syrians continue to increase, we won’t be able to stand it and we will have to seal our borders”
(Interview 8, MHP)

Following the process of securitisation and identifying whether or not an issue is treated within the range of normal politics or calls for extraordinary measures (Waever 2011), the material gathered suggest that migration is increasingly considered a situation within the extraordinary. It is outlined as a potential or actual threat, and commonly described as a problem without any given solution and with unforeseen consequences for the future.

Following Bigo’s (2006) reasoning on how budget allocations to security institutions can help reveal how widely accepted a threat is, material found in a PowerPoint from a Frontex Meeting describing plans to enhance border security in Turkey shows high priority on security. It also explicitly prioritises investments in border security;

“[The] Turkish Government has allocated significant amounts of budget especially for the land borders recently and performed huge investments (...) Projected total cost of the system is above 100 million Euros.” (PowerPoint 3)

5.3 The Relation Between the Audience and Securitising Actor

This section will describe and discuss tensions and compliance in the relation between my respondents and EU or Turkey. To conduct a successful securitisation the relation between the securitising actor and the audience needs to be of the kind that the audience accepts the securitising move, i.e. some sort of authority needs to be present (Buzan et al 1998:25).

To briefly summarise the use of actor and audience relationship in this section, two main relations are focused on. The first is the less clear and more indirect, but highly relevant, of EU and Edirne. The other is the main feature in the material concerning the relation between Turkey and my sample in Edirne, to further discuss the different ways securitisation is present.

“We are doing our homework, which was given from the EU, we are doing our best. But we feel like we have confidence, that we don’t need, we don’t have to any more. But still, we are doing our homework. [We’re] frustrated with the EU. We’re tired of their attitude” (Interview 7, AKP)
This ambivalent quote captures how my respondents most commonly described the relationship with EU. It further shows how the process of securitisation is located within practices and that the relation between EU as an audience is highly flawed by distrust and a fatigue with EU conditionality. The administration of the DC expressed a similar view, where the following quote describes this awareness of EU agenda and compliance in practice but slight resistance in discourse. When asked of the aims of regional cooperation, especially the monthly local meetings with Greece conducted since 2011, the response given was:

"The main aim of the cooperation is border security, at least from the Greek side. The secondary aim is to reduce the number of migrants." (Interview 1b, DC)

The ambiguity of showing understanding towards the EU behaviour in the quote below is through the way the respondent puts the threat of migration toward Turkey in relation to the EU’s migration management. It places the emphasis on the contrast between the humanist acceptance of Turkey and the protectionist view of the EU:

"...if we accept all migrants passing through Turkey, then the number of refugees in our country will be equal to that of Bulgaria or Greece. And it will make us a poor country. Europe doesn’t want to take this responsibility, because they consider their own economy and social and cultural structure..." (Interview 5, EDAK)

Similarly, other respondents expressed negativity with regards to migration management in EU-Turkey relation. This tension in describing both EU and migrants as a problem shows the ambiguity of the securitisation process within this context of Edirne. As showed earlier migration and migrants are described as threats towards different aspects of Turkey, but responses also show an awareness and problematisation of this in relation to the EU:

“They told us to open our borders and they assured us that they would help us in every way. But now, no one helps us. We are trying to deal with this problem on our own (...) European border policy is planned according to Europe’s own interests. They always do what’s best for them. If it suits them, they say they will open their borders and everyone will be able to move freely. If it doesn’t suit them, they build walls and wire fences along the borders.” (Interview 8, MHP)

“Immigration occurs because of the immigrants who wants to go to Europe. If there wasn’t a Europe, there would be no such thing as migration. Since Turkey is a bridge to Europe,
the immigration problem in our country can not be solved easily." (Interview 6, CHP)

Among representatives from civil society both Frontex and the EU was sharply criticised for both treating migrants very badly and for pushing the responsibility to Turkey. “EU is using Turkey as its warehouse” (Interview 10) was an opinion expressed in different form. Very harsh criticism was expressed towards Frontex and its practices on the border.

“...the situation got worse for immigrants. Because Frontex began to use violence on them. Before Frontex the Greek officers were not nice to migrants either. But now the situation is worse than ever [...] they are being killed by Frontex officers” (Interview 9)

“Frontex is the dirty hands of Europe. They have weapons and they kill people” (Interview 10)

At a visit to the DC I encountered a military officer who had just brought in three new migrants, apprehended at the border. He was notably upset, and said:

“They hurt them, they push them back, they send their dogs at them. [...] What is this Europe? They do like this and they don’t let us in to the EU? We are the only one who care for them [the migrants].” (Interview 1b, DC)

These quotes show the tension in the relation between EU and Edirne. The practices of the EU are very present in this area, and they are condemned to a large extent. Similar to the quote above, this was expressed by many respondents, where the practices of the EU was put in relation to how the EU did not allow for Turkey to join them.

When conducting interviews at the Detention Centre and later on with the Border Agency in Ankara, a very interesting discrepancy was detected. While the official material, confirmed and elaborated in interview with IBM representative in Ankara, describes implemented and extensive cooperation with EU and Frontex, and articulate EU influence over policy in the harmonisation, the same view was not shared by DC administration in Edirne, who on the contrary expressed Turkish independence in developing border and migration management.

This discrepancy will, in the light of what is described in the next section, suggest what Bigo 2000) mentions – that the dynamics of securitisation are present among the practices of the security and migration management in Edirne, without particular regards to the official agenda. While many in my sample
articulate a resistance towards the official discourse of securitisation, the practices and how they are described\textsuperscript{13} suggests securitisation.

5.4 Practices of securitisation

In Edirne the process of securitisation is highly visible within the transnational and national practices conducted from the Edirne DC. The interviews conducted at the DC became more informative and less ‘perception-oriented’ than the others, since the respondents were so firmly put in their professional role at their workplace. This provided excellent material on how the internal and regional management of migration works, and although far from ‘mapping the practices and processes within in detail’ as put forward by Bigo (2009), gave a fragment of how the practices of securitisation looks in Edirne.

Some of the practices described at the DC show significant securitisation, such as the emphasis of coordination of border management and detection through surveillance in cooperation with Greece and Bulgaria, administered at the Edirne DC. The local meetings conducted with Greece every month, where the emphasis is on “exchange of data, cases and statistics” (Interview 1a, DC), show this extension of security networks (Bigo 2006), and transnational security management.

Increased emphasis on intelligence and data gathering, which highly indicates securitisation of practices, and expansion of the security field\textsuperscript{14} was mentioned in the interviews as a shift of focus in Turkish migration management. The administration of the DC emphasised this in their daily work, describing that their interviews conducted with migrants also involved collection of “what rotes they are taking, purposes, if legal what border gates, [if they used] smugglers” (Interview 1a, DC). This was also framed in relation to the EU, where the BMA representative mentioned that “[the instalment of] RABIT teams\textsuperscript{15} made communication to increase between Turkey and Greece [with] information flows, cameras etc” (Interview 15).

5.4.1 Merging of internal and external security aspects

The creation of DGMM as a civil authority in the new LFIP is very interesting within the framework of the Paris School discussion of expansion of the security field (Bigo 2006). A presentation on the new administration retrieved concludes this emphasis on a securitised view of cooperative, transnational efforts:

\textsuperscript{13} Here especially among the interviews conducted with the administration of the DC.

\textsuperscript{14} By emphasising intelligence and surveillance gathering in migration management, a clear framing of migration as an exceptional security threat, comparable to transnational crime or other related topics, occur (Léonard 2010).

\textsuperscript{15} RABIT teams are small, specialised intervention teams employed by Frontex at the border between Greece and Turkey before the Operation Poseidon began in 2009 (Frontex 2013a)
"Migration, especially irregular migration is becoming a global threat day by day […] Irregular migration can only be controlled by international cooperation and common action” (PowerPoint 2)

The interview with IBM in Ankara also made this merging visible. According to him, the different institutions working with border management are coordinated by the Governorship, which plays a big role in management of the borders according to the new law (Interview 15). Similarly, the former Director of the DC expressed hopes of a new authority dealing with the borders that would be tied to the DGMM (Interview 3). The reforms in Turkish migration management may suggest that a merging of internal and external security is indeed underway, enlarging the capacity of the country to manage this sort of created insecurity (Bigo 2000).

Further, the practices described at the DC such as how they are responsible for daily communication between Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey in border detections, with a “daily hotline” between the three (Interview 1a, DC), emphasise a similar securitisation. This hotline is used for detecting migrants in the respective border zones, i.e. before they are able to cross to the territory of the EU (ibid). These practices highly suggest that although the responsibilities of external and external security management is still officially separated they are beginning to merge, especially in relation to the practices conducted in cooperation with the EU.

---

16 From bilateral meeting between Turkey and Greece.
6 Conclusion

This thesis has aimed at answering the question of how the process of securitisation of migration is visible in practices and discourses of local migration practitioners in Edirne. It has done so by locating empirical material from Edirne in the framework of securitisation theory. The attempt has been to somewhat map and delineate the different levels and concepts where securitisation is present. This has led us to interesting results, revealing a complex picture of influence, and resistance expressed towards it. There is a clear process of securitising influence from the EU to Turkey on a national level, which is adhered in the national legislation, and thus creates the basis for daily practices at the Edirne Detention Centre. These practices then form their own dynamics, and by the outline above the process of securitisation seems to be present in the way the organisations responsibilities are presented. The merging of internal and external aspects of security also suggest that this process is well underway, which would be interesting to further study when then law has been more implemented.

The expressed relation with the EU is really interesting, as it shows high degrees of both compliance and resistance in adhering the discourse of securitisation of migration. This is expressed at the local level, in contradiction to the national Turkish level that seems to be more directed towards harmonising the EU acquis in its entirety. However, there are some areas of dispute in the official communication, with similar areas articulated in my sample, such as fears of becoming the EU’s ‘dumping ground’.

The discourse of securitisation, describing migration as a threat towards different referent objects, is however highly present among my sample, suggesting that the process of securitisation exists within the context of fears toward national identity, but only with regards to migration and migrants. In relation to the EU no such fears are expressed; hence the securitisation is indeed directed to migrants and not to national security. The tension between a present discursive process of securitisation of migration, and an outspoken resistance towards the EU’s such is interesting.

Here we can conclude that the process of securitisation in Edirne is highly influenced by the EU, where the closeness of Edirne to the EU borders may explain the higher degree of resistance towards its practices.

To conclude the securitisation of migration in Edirne is a highly complex process, with influence of the EU shaping practices and discourse, and an articulated resistance in Edirne towards the Union. These are very interesting aspects to discuss further, as the issue of migration continues to characterise the relation between EU and Turkey.
7 References

7.1 Literature

Aras, N. Ela Gökalp. “A Multi-level and Multi-sited Analysis of the European Union’s Immigration and Asylum Policy Concerning Irregular Migration and its Implications for Turkey: Edirne and Izmir as two Major Gateway Cities.” Diss. Middle East Technical University, (2013).


Benam, Çiğdem H. "Emergence of a 'Big Brother' in Europe: border control and securitization of migration". Insight Turkey (Ankara) 13.3 (2011).


Emerson, Michael, and Nathalie Tocci. "Turkey as a Bridgehead and Spearhead: Integrating EU and Turkish Foreign Policy. CEPS EU-Turkey Working Papers No. 1, 1 August 2004." (2004): 35.
İçduyuğ, Ahmet. “The Irregular Migration Corridor between the EU and Turkey: Is It Possible to Block It with a Readmission Agreement?” EU-US Immigration Systems 2011/14 (San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies European University Institute, (2011), 12–13, 15
Kaya, Ibrahim. "Reform in Turkish Asylum Law: adopting the EU acquis?." Migration Policy Centre; [CARIM-South]; CARIM Research Report; (2009): 16
Kirişci, Kemal. "Border management and EU-Turkish relations: convergence or deadlock", European University Institute, 2007.
Schaub, Max, Humanitarian problems relating to migration in the Turkish-Greek border region; The crucial role of civil society organisations, Centre on Migration Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford (2013)
7.2 Reports and Documents


7.3 Interviews

Interview 1a: Edirne Detention Centre 2015-02-12
Interview 1b: Edirne Detention Centre 2015-02-20
Interview 2: Director of Edirne Detention Centre 2015-02-26
Interview 3: Former Director of Edirne Detention Centre 2015-02-26
Interview 4: The Governor of Edirne 2015-01-12
Interview 5: EDAK, a voluntary emergency assistance organisation, Edirne, 2015-02-22
Interview 6: CHP, Cemhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party) leader, Edirne, 2015-02-23
Interview 7: AKP, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) youth branch leader, Edirne, 2015-01-27
Interview 8: MHP, Milliyetçi Harkeret Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party) leader, Edirne, 2015-02-20
Interview 9: Lawyer, Edirne, 2015-02-13
Interview 10: Local activist, Edirne, 2015-02-23
Interview 11: Bar Association representative, Edirne, 2015-03-01
Interview 12: Municipality representative, Edirne 2015-03-05
Interview 13: Translator, Edirne, 2015-03-11
Interview 14: Association for Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants, Ankara, 2015-03-16
Interview 15: Border Management Agency representative, Ankara 2015-03-17

7.4 Documents from Fieldwork

PowerPoint 1: Edirne Detention Centre, presentation from monthly, local Turkey-Greece meetings, 2015-02-18, accessed 2015-02-20
PowerPoint 2: Presentation at the 10th Bi-lateral Experts Meeting between Turkey and Greece, Ankara, 2015-01-13,14, accessed 2015-03-17
PowerPoint 3: Border Management Agency, Meeting with Frontex, 2013-05-14, accessed 2015-03-17

Image: Lindvall, Klara, 2015, View from the Edirne Detention Centre, [Front page photograph]
Appendix 1: Number of Illegal Migrants Apprehended on Turkish National Borders Between 1998 and 2014

Retrieved from PowerPoint 2
Appendix 2: Number of Illegal Migrants Apprehended in the Edirne Border Area Between 2011 and 2014

THE NUMBER OF IRREGULAR MIGRANTS APPREHENDED BETWEEN 2012-2015 (18 Feb)

Retrieved from PowerPoint 1