Revisiting, Reconciling and Recasting the Generalised Biopolitical Border

Seeking a Reconciled Multiperspectival Methodology for the Analysis of Concrete Textual Materials in the (Re)production of Sovereign Borders

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Abstract

This thesis is essentially a project in theory- and method-building. It engages the strengths of Vaughan-Williams’ alternative border imaginary under the name of the generalised biopolitical border (GBB) in accounting for the complexity of border phenomena in contemporary global politics. However, it identifies two major shortcomings related to Vaughan-Williams’ application of the GBB to various empirical analyses: 1) he does not provide a clearly elaborated methodology for its implementation in analysis; and 2) he demonstrates an insensitivity to language and concrete textual materials more specifically in the (re)production of sovereign borders. The intention is to work with the GBB and alleviate these shortcomings. To do so, the GBB is critically reconciled on the basis of its roots in Agamben theory with Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory at both the theoretical and conceptual level. This reconciled apparatus is thereafter translated into a coherent multiperspectival methodological approach for analysing concrete textual material in the (re)production of sovereign borders. The applicability of the approach is then illustrated in the context of Frontex discourse on border control whereafter its value-added benefits and limitations are discussed. The central argument is that this multiperspectival approach provides the GBB with a more comprehensive analytical register.

**Keywords:** Agamben, generalised biopolitical border, Laclau and Mouffe, methodology, Vaughan-Williams

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Chapter 1. Introduction

This thesis is situated among ongoing inquiries and debates within the academic field of International Relations (IR) and related disciplines concerning the concept of the border of the state.1 As such, it relates to calls by scholars from diverse academic disciplines and backgrounds for new and improved ways of conceiving and analysing borders today. From this position, it seeks to critically engage, build upon and recast Vaughan-Williams’ concept of the generalised biopolitical border (GBB). More specially, it attempts to do so by critically developing a reconciled, multiperspectival, value-added methodological framework for the analysis of sovereign borders today that marries the analytical register of the GBB with a discourse analytical approach based on Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory.2 In this way, this thesis relates to the growing body of poststructuralist scholarship in IR and related disciplines, which, exceeding a simple project of metatheoretical critique, have come to form a flourishing, provocative, promising research programme that warrants further discussion, reflection, refinement and development.

1.1. Radicalising the Concept of the Border

1.1.1. The Conventional Concept of the Border

Normally when we think about the border of the state, what comes to mind is a picture of global politics epitomised by Mercator’s map, on which territorial borders neatly divide sovereign political entities according to their respective geographical coordinates within the international political system.3 From this perspective “the border” is a stringent, fixed demarcation at the state’s geographical outer-edge marking the limits of the state’s sovereign power: “a thin line on a map that marks the ending of one sovereign territory and the beginning of another.”4 This view corresponds with what Agnew calls the “territorial trap” of the “modern geopolitical imagination” according to which sovereign power is assumed to be coterminous with the territorial limits of the state.5 For Vaughan-Williams, “there is little doubt that this imaginary, underpinned by the concept of
The concept of the border of the state has functioned and continues to function as “lodestar” in theories and practices of global politics: 1) it conditions, as diagnosed by Walker, the predominant spatiotemporal inside/outside model in international politics according to which political life is divided into two ostensibly distinct spheres of history, law, politics, order, security and progress “inside” and eternal anarchy, violence and insecurity “outside”; 2) it shapes traditional understandings of global security relations according to two respective series of affinities between “inside,” friend, safe, normal and secure, on the one hand, and “outside,” enemy, violence, exception and insecure, on the other; 3) it configures the confluence of people within a specific territory together with naturalising narratives of a shared history, nationality, identity, language, culture, and so on, constructing understandings of who “I” am, “we” are, who and where the “other” or “enemy” is, where our loyalties should rest and how we should act; 4) it organises, indeed forms the very condition of possibility for both domestic and international juridico-political systems; and 5) on the basis of these inside/outside and domestic/international distinctions, it problematically compartmentalises the division of labour and silofication between scholars of “domestic” politics and scholars of “international” politics.

1.1.2. Problematising the Conventional Concept of the Border

Vaughan-Williams’ problematisation of the conventional concept of the border of the state according to the modern geopolitical imagination is largely inspired by Balibar. In contrast to the unproblematised assumptions of the concept of the border in mainstream IR sketched above, Balibar points towards how borders do not necessarily conform to where the modern geopolitical imagination says they should be: “borders are vacillating....[T]hey are no longer at the border, an institutional site that can be materialized on the ground and inscribed on the map, where one sovereignty ends and another beings....[B]orders are no longer on the shores of politics, but...within...the political itself.” In other words, borders are not fixed at the territorial outer-edges of states, but are diffused and (re)produced
across various levels of social life. Such points resonate with Vaughan-Williams assertion that “different types of borders inevitably fold into one another: the notion of maintaining sharp, contiguous distinctions between anything is impossible and inevitably breaks down.” The significance of the ideational, historical and political stakes at play in Balibar’s seemingly paradoxical claim is difficult to overemphasise in terms of the challenge it poses to traditional coordinates of the modern geopolitical imagination. Indeed, for Vaughan-Williams, “[t]he notion that both the nature and location of borders have undergone some sort of transformation requires a *quantum leap* in the way we think about bordering practices and their effects.”

If Balibar’s pointed arguments regarding the borders of contemporary political life are to be taken seriously, then the well-worn and totalising debate in contemporary global politics concerning the relative “absence” or “presence” of state borders today, often coupled with claims concerning the nature and scope of globalisation, appears to be rather misdirected. It is blind to “dynamics in political practices that challenge the very imaginary within which those claims about ‘presence’ or ‘absence’ are able to make any sense at all.” In this way it obscures “precisely the possibility that the concept of the border of the state has undergone transformation in contemporary political life” and is “playing out in different and often unexpected ways at a multiplicity of sites in contemporary political life.” Moreover, it derogates from questions concerning how people experience border differently according to different subject positions.

Vaughan-Williams argues that, if a minimal definition of “the border” in law and practice is a place where the movement of people, services, and goods are controlled, contemporary bordering practices reflect that the concept of the border of the state is experiencing spatiotemporal transformations of “seismic proportions.” Borders are increasingly complex, differentiated and dispersed, “evermore electronic, invisible, and mobile.” With respect to recognising and addressing such phenomena, conventional border theory within IR related disciplines appears to be lagging behind; there is thus the risk of a growing gap between what many scholars identify as the increasing complexity and
differentiation of borders in global politics and the continuing, relative simplistic treatment of borders in IR. On this basis, critical scholars have called for the development of alternative ways of conceptualising “the border” in contemporary political life that are more capable of accounting for the complexities of contemporary border phenomena than the modern geopolitical imagination.

1.1.3. The GBB
Vaughan-Williams’ concept of the GBB represents an important and instrumental intellectual effort towards responding to critical voices calling for a concept of the border and the development of alternative border imaginaries and a more “pluralised and radicalised view of what and where borders are in contemporary political life” better suited to our conditions and the complexities of contemporary border phenomena. The argument is not that traditional border sites are obsolete or that these have not themselves been significantly transformed in certain ways. Nor is the argument that the horizon and logics of the modern geopolitical imagination no longer hold any sway in global politics. Rather, it is that a view to borders that is limited to this imagination cannot adequately account for numerous, complex border phenomena unfolding today. Vaughan-Williams thus offers the GBB as an alternative border imaginary that recasts the concept of the border of the state in a provocative, important and significantly different way.

In formulating his concept of the GBB, Vaughan-Williams draws significantly upon literature outside IR and related disciplines. He primarily invokes the poststructuralist thought of Agamben to access what he contends are largely untapped intellectual resources for rethinking “the border” in IR. As concerns this attempt, Vaughan-Williams argues that “the move from a geopolitical to a biopolitical horizon of thinking, initially inspired by Foucault and then taken in new and provocative directions by Agamben, opens up crucial lines of enquiry.” He draws heavily on Agamben’s theory of the relation between politics, life and sovereign power and, in particular, his overall thesis of “the camp” as the generalised space of the exception according to which sovereign power abandons certain forms of life to produce the bare life upon which it depends. Vaughan-Williams recasts Agamben’s central thesis within the register
of the GBB so that “the border” is reread in terms of the generalised sovereign
decision on the exception that can effectively happen anywhere across a global
biopolitical terrain. This introduces alternative framings of issues concerning,
among other things, juridico-political order, citizenship, subjectivity, identity and
security. Thus thinking in terms of the GBB stimulates new, plural, radical and
provocative implications and ways for how we conceptualise, identify and
interrogate “what and where borders are in global politics” which might otherwise
remain in obscurity.

1.2. Problematising the Current Register of the GBB
The GBB can be understood in two ways: 1) as concept or imaginary resulting
from Vaughan-Williams’ engagement in theory-building related to the concept of
the border in IR; and 2) as an analytical register or framework, insomuch as he
applies it to the analysis of empirical border phenomena. It is primarily in
accordance with this second reading that the following problematisation of
Vaughan-Williams’ provisions for the current analytical register of the GBB
proceeds. This thesis identifies two crucial shortcomings related to Vaughan-
Williams’ development and application of the current analytical register of the
GBB in and as concerns the capacity to comprehensively identify, analyse and
understand the (re)production of sovereign borders: 1) no clearly elaborated
methodology is provided for the GBB’s application to the empirical analysis of
the (re)production of sovereign borders; and 2) its focus on bordering practices
detracts from a detailed appreciation for and understanding of the role of language
and concrete textual materials in particular in the (re)production of sovereign
borders. These shortcomings will now be problematised in turn and are revisited in
Section 2.2.2.

1.2.1. The Absence of Methodology
Although Vaughan-Williams’ primary concern is theory-building, he does engage
the implications of Derrida’s thoughts on deconstruction with respect to
conditioning the limits of what the GBB can and cannot do. One can reasonably
deduced from this engagement and Vaughan-Williams’ approach to analysis that
he has a Derrida- or deconstruction-inspired methodology in mind when thinking and applying the GBB to analyses of the (re)production of sovereign borders in various contexts. However, he never provides the reader with any such methodology. The GBB first appeared in his published work nearly a decade ago, and he has still not presented a clearly elaborated methodology that can be used to guide its application in analysis. This tendency is arguably symptomatic of a common failure in poststructuralist scholarship to provide methodologies related to the analyses they perform.\(^{30}\)

The consequence of failing or refusing to provide methodologies, establish and argue research principles and design, conduct systematic analyses and assess substantive empirical analyses warrants problematisation.\(^{31}\) The common refusal within poststructuralist scholarship to conform with conventional, mainstream scientistic approaches to social science should not entail the almost total omission from debate of issues of research and method. Despite the importance of remaining critical of scientistic approaches to social sciences, translating one’s theoretical foundations into a clearly-elaborated methodological framework can only contribute to analytical rigour and precision.\(^{32}\)

 Vaughan-Williams’ failure to present a methodology relative to the analytical register of the GBB is problematic in at least four ways: 1) it makes it difficult for the GBB to be critiqued on its own terms as such terms are not made clear; 2) it leaves the GBB more vulnerable to critique or even outright dismissal; 3) it encourages under-theorisation and under-analysis concerning – among other things but with respect to this thesis – the role of language in relation to the (re)production of sovereign borders; and 4) because it makes it more difficult to identify, analyse and understand the (re)production of sovereign borders according to the analytical register of the GBB, it presents an exceedingly difficult and unnecessary challenge to subsequent studies seeking to follow the analytical logics of the GBB whose conclusions they might seek to test and/or further explore – thus hampering potentially useful dialogue among scholars.\(^{33}\)
1.2.2. The Under-theorisation and Under-analysis of Language

The GBB lacks a rigorous and comprehensive appreciation for the role of language and concrete textual materials more specifically in the (re)production of sovereign borders. Vaughan-Williams’ theorisation and analyses with respect to the GBB are decidedly practice-centred, illustrated by his focus on bordering practices – in the behavioural sense – in specific empirical contexts. His analyses do not take into account the context-specific and comprehensive textual frameworks (re)articulating and contesting the structural relations (re)productive of the meanings and subjectivities that are so crucially important to the (re)production of sovereign borders. As such, incorporating the role of language (at the level of concrete textual material) more meaningfully in the analysis of the (re)production of sovereign borders also provides a better understanding of some of the key elements of the GBB. Thus, pursuing this line of inquiry in greater depth can also provide a more comprehensive understanding of the (re)production of sovereign borders with regards to the sovereign bordering practices upon which Vaughan-Williams focuses. The basic point here, then, is that the role of language in the (re)production of sovereign borders remains under-theorised and under-analysed within Vaughan-Williams’ work with the GBB. The preceding points are returned to in Section 2.2.2. of this thesis following an illustration of Vaughan-Williams’ application of the GBB to analyses of Frontex bordering practices related to extraterritorial border control.

1.2.3. Perspectivising the Problems

As a consequence of these shortcomings, our capacity to systematically, accurately and effectively identify, analyse and understand the (re)production of sovereign borders according to the analytical register of the GBB remains rather partial. This is problematic since it restricts our capacity to resist sovereign borders in accordance with, for example, Edkins and Pin-Fat’s demand that all borders upon which sovereign power relies be resisted and rejected, or Agamben’s suggestion that seek to think and inhabit the indistinction and undecidability produced between borders and distinctions produce. If we cannot accurately, effectively and comprehensively identify these borders and distinctions, how can
we accurately, effectively and comprehensively resist, reject or inhabit them? There is thus a need for more methodological approaches to the problem of the (re)production of sovereign borders and for comprehensive interrogations of their (re)production according to all systems of signification, not just practices.

Vaughan-Williams’ work in relation to the GBB is ongoing and he may very well already be working on addressing or planning to address the shortcomings identified above. If this is the case, then not only would the critical engagement with the identification of these problems by this thesis appear all the more justifiable, but all the more timely as well in terms of its contribution, discussed further below, towards addressing these shortcomings.

1.3. Research Questions
These thoughts and observations lead to the following research questions:

1) How might a readily available set of theoretical and methodological resources be reconciled with the GBB in order to resolve the two shortcomings identified with its development and applications by Vaughan-Williams’ so far?

2) How might this reconciliation be translated into the development of a methodology for applying the GBB in analysis, and more specifically within the context of analysing concrete textual materials in the (re)production of sovereign borders?

3) What might some of the benefits and limitations be to such a methodology and form of analysis with respect to the GBB?

1.4. Objectives, Contribution and Thesis Statement
Vaughan-Williams’ GBB provides a robust biopolitical register for grasping the complexity and diversity of border phenomena today, especially as concerns sovereign borders. However, due to the two shortcomings identified above, this thesis argues that the GBB requires further development and refining. The overall motivation and objective of this thesis is to address and relieve the two shortcomings identified above while working with and preserving the strengths of the current analytical register of the GBB. The aim is to build into the framework of the GBB the methodological possibility to be developed here and the
corresponding capacity to analyse concrete textual material in the (re)production of sovereign borders.

In order to do this, the thesis seeks to reconcile the GBB on the basis of its Agambean underpinnings with Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory at both the theoretical and conceptual level. Discourse theory has been identified as holding the promise to alleviating both shortcomings identified by this thesis. The intention is to perform this reconciliation critically with a view to identifying potential points of discord and concord between Agamben and discourse theory and without undermining either theory in the process. In this sense, the objective is not only to produce a critically reconciled theoretical and conceptual apparatus with regards to the (re)production of sovereign borders, but a coherent one. As noted above, Vaughan-Williams’ move is to recast the concept of the border and frame the GBB analogously to Agamben’s definition of the operation and limit of sovereign power in relation to the exception or abandonment of certain categories of life. Similarly, the basic move in the context of this thesis’ reconciliation is to recast Agamben’s definition of the operation of sovereign power, and thus the GBB as well, in terms of discourse theory’s definition of hegemonic articulation so that the former definition is reread as an analogous but more context- and problem-specific rendition of the latter.

The attempt then follows to develop a multiperspectival methodological approach for analysing concrete textual materials in the (re)production of sovereign borders by conditioning and instrumentalising the reconciled theoretical and conceptual apparatus. In particular, resources for developing this methodology are sought after in the context of numerous methodological possibilities discussed in relation to Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory and employed by numerous scholars in practical discourse analysis. Lastly, the attempt is made to illustrate the applicability of this multiperspectival methodology to analysis in the context of the possibility that concrete textual material from Frontex discourse on border control might be (re)productive of sovereign borders.
The objectives and contributions help underscore the thesis statement guiding this project: when incorporated into the register of the GBB, the reconciled, coherent multiperspectival methodology for analysing concrete textual material in the (re)production of sovereign borders suggested by this thesis provides value-added elements to that register according to which such (re)production can be more comprehensively identified, analysed, understood and possibly resisted.

1.5. Map of the Thesis
Chapter 2 of this thesis presents a reading of Agamben’s theory of the relation between politics, life and sovereign power, concentrating on: 1) his “correction” or “completion” of Foucault’s diagnosis of the relation between disciplinary power of biopolitics; 2) his central concept of “bare life;” 3) his overall thesis on “the camp” as the generalised space of the sovereign exception; and 4) addressing certain ethico-political implications of Agamben’s thought. The chapter then presents Vaughan-Williams’ concept of the GBB which is inextricably grounded in Agamben’s theory and provides an illustration of his application of this concept in the specific analytical context of Frontex practices in extraterritorial border control.

Chapter 3 introduces Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, addressing why this theory was selected for reconciliation with the GBB, and provides a reading of the theory’s basic premises, arguments and key concepts.

Chapter 4 engages in the attempt to critically reconcile the GBB on the basis of its Agambean underpinnings with discourse theory at the theoretical and conceptual level. On this basis a coherent multiperspectival methodology for the analysis of concrete textual material in the (re)production of sovereign borders is developed. Finally, the chapter offers an illustration of how this methodology might be applied in practical analysis, drawing once again on the specific empirical context of Frontex border control.

Chapter 5 discusses the value-added benefits of the proposed multiperspectival methodology. It also discusses the specific benefits the
additional capacity to analyse systematically and in detail the role of concrete textual materials in the (re)production of sovereign borders offers relative to the current analytical register of the GBB. Subsequently, the limitations of this thesis’ attempt to reconcile the GBB with discourse theory and of its treatment of the scope of methodological possibilities deriving from this reconciliation are addressed. It also recognises and discusses the limits of any approach to analysis conditioned upon the relation between deconstruction and the metaphysical structures upon which Western thought depends.

Notes

1 Observe that all quotes within this thesis, unless otherwise noted, accord with the original emphasis, spelling and grammar of the works cited.


The modern political subject, according to Butler, is conceived in parallel with the modern sovereign state as an essentially bordered entity, “distinct, recognizable, delineated,...differentiated” and autonomous before the law. Discourses of rights and responsibilities consequently presuppose the category of the subject in contemporary politics to constitute an individual with a clearly defined status: a citizen. Butler, Judith. Precarious Life: the Powers of Mourning and Violence.


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16 For Vaughan-Williams, this paucity can be identified in at least two ways: 1) as concerns the rather narrow lexicon of concepts, metaphors, and grammars on hand for discussing the possibility of empirical changes in the character of the “border,” and 2) in that most of the theoretical literature generated in IR and related disciplines continues to hinge upon an unreflected ontological and epistemological conceits tied to the concept of the border of the state according to the modern geopolitical imagination. Vaughan-Williams, Nick. “The generalised bio-political border? Re-conceptualising the limits of sovereign power.” *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 35. Issue 4 (2009): pp. 729, 732, 749.


19 Ibid. p. 9.

20 Ibid. p. 9; see also: pp. 77-82, 97-98.

21 Ibid. p. 166.

22 Ibid. p. 6.


Chapter 2. The Theoretical Foundations and Concept of the GBB

2.1. Agamben: Politics, Life and Sovereign Power

This section and respective subsections trace Vaughan-Williams’ distinctive reading of Agamben’s diagnosis of the relation between politics, life and sovereign power. This reading is instrumental in two crucial ways: 1) in terms of unpacking the Agambean theoretical underpinnings of Vaughan-Williams’ concept of the GBB; and 2) with respect to laying the theoretical groundwork for reconciling the GBB on the basis the Agambean theory informing it with Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory.\(^\text{37}\)

Agamben has engaged for over two decades now in various critiques the dominant treatment of the relation between politics and life in political philosophy.\(^\text{38}\) He argues that this treatment has been primarily fashioned by the thought of Aristotle. At the core of Aristotle’s notion of the state is the distinction between “natural life” and the “good life” of the \textit{polis}.\(^\text{39}\) According to this understanding, in order to fulfil one’s potential as a human being, one must be a member of the state or \textit{polis}, for it is only here that the “good life” can be achieved. Agamben claims that this distinction reflects the way in which the Greeks had no single word for “life.” Rather, they employed two terms in its place: \textit{zoē} (the simple biological fact of life) and \textit{bios} (political or qualified life in the \textit{polis}).\(^\text{40}\) Agamben observes that Aristotle’s opposition between the \textit{zoē} and \textit{bios} and his distinction between private and public spheres by which “simple natural life \textit{[zoē]} is excluded from the \textit{polis} in the strict sense, and remains confined – as merely reproductive life – to the sphere of the \textit{oikos [home]},” has had an influential and enduring impact within the political tradition of the West.\(^\text{41}\)

Yet, Agamben further notes that the relationship between \textit{zoē} and \textit{bios}, despite its vital importance as “the fundamental categorical pair of Western politics,” has generally been presupposed rather than problematised within Western political thought.\(^\text{42}\) Agamben observes one crucial exception to this, however, represented by the work of Foucault.\(^\text{43}\)
2.1.1. “Correcting” or “Completing” Foucault’s Power Thesis

Foucault describes the transition from politics to biopolitics according to the process by which biological life (zoē) came to be included towards the end of the eighteenth century within the calculations and techniques of the governmentality of the state. Foucault claims that, whereas the Aristotelian man’s life could be clearly distinguished between biological life and the “good” political life, biopolitics puts the idea of natural life itself in doubt: “modern man is an animal whose politics calls his existence as a living being into question.” In other words, for Foucault, the bio-historical entry of zoē into bios in the polis constituted an essential shift in the relationship between life and politics where the biological fact of life is no longer excluded from political “projections and calculations” but resides at the centre of modern politics as their principal object and end.

Agamben seeks to problematise and radicalise what Foucault identifies as the “political ‘double bind’” formed by the intersection of: 1) disciplinary power (centripetal, enclosing, individualising anatomo-politics) emergent between the end of the sixteenth and the eighteenth century and technologies of the self by which subjectivisation processes “bring the individual to bind himself to his own identity and consciousness and, at the same time, to an external power,” and, on the other hand, biopower (centrifugal, objective totalising biopower/biopolitics); and 2) the political techniques by “which the State assumes and integrates the care of the natural life of individuals into its very center” and totalising them in terms of the population they form. Agamben takes the qualification of this “double bind” to constitute a “blind spot” or “vanishing point” in Foucault’s thought, a point that these two perspectival lines of inquiry “converge toward without reaching”: “where, in the body of power, is the zone of indistinction (or, at least, the point of intersection) at which techniques of individualization and totalizing procedures converge?” For Agamben, this point of intersection is precisely sovereign power.

Departing from this problematique, Agamben seeks to establish a second basic point by further problematising Foucault’s historicity according to which
zoē came to rest at the heart of modern politics. While Foucault reads the transition from politics to biopolitics as a historical shift involving the entry of zoē into the polis, Agamben argues that the “Foucauldian thesis will...have to be corrected or, at least, completed” because such a fundamental historical shift has not in fact occurred. Rather, for Agamben, the political realm is originally biopolitical; the inclusion of zoē in the political realm “constitutes the original – if concealed – nucleus of sovereign power....[T]he production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power. In this sense, biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception.” According to Agamben’s reading, while the basic metaphysical conception and structure of politics in the West has always been biopolitical, the idea of a historical shift from politics to biopolitics stems from the fact that relation between biological life and politics has become increasingly visible in the context of contemporary sovereign practices. That is, it is a question of distinguishing between originary structural relations and the intensification of these relations in modern history.

For Agamben, the originary biopolitical character of politics is identifiable in Aristotle’s definition of the polis in terms of the exclusion of zoē from bios. According to Agamben, however, the exclusion of zoē in this context is not strictly “exclusive” because, through its exclusion, zoē remains in a relation with bios. In other words, zoē is subject to what Agamben calls an “inclusive exclusion” relative to bios. Zoē is included in bios by way of its very exception from it in a relation of exception: “the extreme form of relation by which something is included solely through its exclusion.” In order to explain what he means by the paradoxical formulation “inclusive exclusion,” Agamben introduces Nancy’s spatio-ontological concept of the “ban.” A relation of exception or inclusive exclusion is a relation of the ban. According to this concept, if someone is banned from a community, s/he nevertheless continues to have a relation with that community. It is precisely because s/he has been banned from and in relation to that community that a relationship persists between them. In this context, Agamben states that s/he “who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather abandoned by it, that is,
exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable." Agamben identifies such indistinctions as basically biopolitical and reflecting the basic logic and operation of sovereign power and the structures it produces. The figure or form of life of the banned person thus complicates the straightforward distinction between inclusion and exclusion: the excluded person is included on the very basis of their exclusion. As such, a strict determination of inclusion and exclusion is undecidable: it is impossible to decide in absolute terms whether life subject to the relation of ban is strictly “inside” or “outside.”

2.1.2. Bare Life
Agamben argues that the operation of sovereign power relies on the ability to decide whether certain forms of life are worthy of living and of juridico-political qualification. This decision or sovereign dividing practice thus entails the decision concerning “the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant [i.e. zoē].” A consequence of the decision is the production, according to the perspective of sovereign power, of a new category of “life devoid of value” an expendable and exceptional form of life Agamben calls bare life. The sovereign abandonment of life from the juridico-political institutions citizens normally enjoy produces this life as bare life. However, it is precisely bare life that forms the condition of possibility for sovereign power to operate and (re)iterate those categories it includes: i.e. bios, nomos, rule etc. In this way, the “inclusion” of bios is constructed against the “exclusion” and abandonment of zoē, which is thus produced as bare life in the ban. Agamben argues that the abandonment of life by sovereign power thus constitutes the “fundamental biopolitical structure of modernity” and that the “original political relation is the ban (the state of exception as zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exclusion and inclusion)....[O]nly bare life is authentically political,” and its production constitutes the originary activity of sovereign power....[B]are life...is, from the point of view of sovereignty, the originary political element.”

Notwithstanding the centrality of the concept of bare life to Agamben’s work, it nonetheless remains a rather enigmatic and contentious concept. Even its
English translation from Italian is debated. Moreover, many scholars employing Agamben’s thought refer to bare life as if it were interchangeable with zoē (simple biological and/or private life). Upon an alternative reading, however, bare life can also be conceptualised as a form of life produced immanently by the logic and operation of sovereign power in a zone of indistinction between zoē and bios, physis and nomos, inside and outside, and so on. On this reading, bare life is not the same thing as zoē. Indeed, it is neither what the Greeks referred to as natural zoē nor political bios, although each nevertheless forms a crucial part of the equation or indistinction according to which bare life is produced. This latter reading is arguably more faithful to Agamben’s argument and it is the one followed here. For Agamben, bare life is: “Neither political bios nor natural zoē..., [bare] life is the zone of indistinction in which zoē and bios constitute each other in including and excluding each other [in]...a threshold of indistinction and [continuous transition]...between animal and man, physis and nomos, exclusion and inclusion.”

Thus read, bare life is constitutively and inextricably tied to the zone of indistinction from which ostensibly distinct categories such as zoē/bios can be drawn. It is in this sense an indistinct and undecidable form of life produced according to the drawing of binary oppositions whose sides are mutually exclusive and constitutive of one another. Because it undecidably permeates both zoē and bios and is constituted by these categories in a zone of irreducible indistinction, it is precisely neither zoē nor bios; it cannot be reduced to either. This understanding of the difference between bare life and zoē also highlights how bare life does not exist prior to or outside the abandonment of life by sovereign power. It is not something we are born with or, as in Butler’s reading, “life conceived as biological minimum...a condition to which we are all reducible.” Bare life describes a form of life that is constructed by sovereign power for sovereign power relative to sovereign subjectivisation processes structured according to the exception or ban: “Bare life is a product of the machine and not something that pre-exists it.” Once the concept of bare life is distinguished from zoē, then, far from an essentialising, totalising, universal conception of subjectivity, it can be
interpreted as a form of life whose identity is perpetually in doubt, uncertain, partial, constitutively split, indistinct, non-complete and lacking. Indeed, Agamben usefully demonstrates how it is exactly upon such continuous uncertainty and the cultivation thereof yielding the potentiality for differentiating forms of life in many different ways that the continued operation of sovereign power depends. Bare life is a form of life that is conducive to sovereign power and the sovereign decision because it is banned from the juridico-political order – and not simply or strictly excluded outside – while being simultaneously subject to the operation of that power. As such it forms a limit concept in which the relational borders on the nonrelational. Understanding this relation between \( \text{zo} \) and bios and analogous categorisations according to the relation of exception or ban in contemporary political life means that any clear-cut binary opposition between them becomes ultimately undecidable: “Living in the state of exception that has now become the rule has meant...this: our private biological body has become indistinguishable from our body politic.” Thus read, bare life is a form of life immanently produced by sovereign power in a juridico-political zone of indistinction between the bios/zo, licit/illicit, law/anomie, value/nonvalue, and so on, in which such distinctions are ultimately incommunicable, unintelligible and mute, but which is conducive to exceptional practices characteristic to sovereign power and upon which sovereign power nevertheless constantly decides.

This “zone of irreducible indistinction” is exactly that upon which sovereign power depends in order to produce and continue its own operation. The sovereign decision regularly (re)produces the zone of indistinction through which nature is originally excepted in law or, in other words, through which zo is originally excepted in bios. In so doing, it also refers immediately to the population of politically qualified People, to “the bare life of the citizen, the new biopolitical body of humanity.” What Agamben ultimately strives to demonstrate is that the biopolitical “production of bare life...insofar as it operates in an inclusive exclusion as the referent of the sovereign decision...is the originary [albeit hidden] activity of sovereign power” and the “the hidden foundation on which the entire political system rest[s].” On the basis of the above, we can understand bare life
as “a form of subjectivity whose borders are always rendered undecidable by sovereign power; it is a form of subjectivity whose identity is always in question.” As such, it is a form of subjectivity whose occupancy of a zone of indistinction, whose undecidable topological structure Agamben illustrates according to the Möbius strip (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Möbius strip

2.1.3. The Generalised Exception
Agamben’s *Homo Sacer* ends with the provocative conclusion that “[e]very attempt to rethink the political space of the West must begin with the clear awareness that we no longer know anything of the classical distinction between *zoê* and *bios*, between private life and political existence, between man as simple living being at home in the house and man’s political existence in the city.” This section aims to investigate this conclusion in more detail.

As noted earlier, Agamben’s approach to sovereign power is highly indebted to Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty, especially as concerns the decision on the exception and the paradoxical sovereign relation between exception and rule. Schmitt defines the sovereign as “he who decides on the exception.” This decision declares that a state of emergency exists and temporarily suspends the juridical order *in toto* to allow for “unlimited authority” to achieve whatever deemed necessary to resolve the emergency. However, Agamben also draws on Benjamin’s critique of Schmitt in an effort to shift the concept of the exception away from the question of temporary emergency provisions and towards a more fundamental, relational and permanent role within the Western, sovereignty-based political paradigm. By “laying bare the irreducible link uniting violence and law,”
physis and nomos or exception and rule, Agamben argues, Benjamin’s engagement with Schmitt “proves the necessary and, even today, indispensable premise of every inquiry into sovereignty.”85 According to Benjamin, “[t]he tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of exception’ in which we live is the rule. We must attain to a concept of history that accords with this fact.”86 As such, it is not so much the case as in Schmitt that “the rule lives off the exception alone,” but that the exception and the rule coincide with, mutually constitute and subvert each other.87 Agamben thus concludes that the undecidability between rule and exception formulated by Benjamin “puts Schmitt’s theory in check” insomuch as the sovereign decision is no longer capable of performing the specific task Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty assigned it according to the maintenance of paradoxical distinctions between exception and rule/law.88 Rather, “[w]hen the exception becomes the rule, the machine can no longer function...[T]he rule, which now coincides with what it lives by, devours itself.”89

Benjamin’s critique, while not outright rejecting Schmitt’s theory, illuminates how the Third Reich thrived on blurring distinctions between rule and exception, law and fact, politics and nature, law and violence, order and anomie, and so on.90 Under the Third Reich, the state of exception ceased to be referred to as “an external and provisional state of factual danger and [came]...to be confused with juridical rule itself” and was politically internalised and made permanent according to what has been called a “state of willed exception.”91 Accordingly, the sovereign does not limit “himself...to deciding on the exception on the basis of recognizing a given factual situation (danger to public safety): laying bare the inner structure of the ban that characterizes his power, he...de facto produces the situation as a consequence of his decision on the exception.”92 On this basis, Agamben undertakes to reconfigure the operation of sovereign power in terms of the production of zones of indistinction: “[t]he essential point...is that a threshold of undecidability is produced at which factum and ius fade into each other,” become one and the same, and “[e]very fiction of a nexus between violence and law disappears.”93 Agamben thus argues that willed production of permanent and
sometimes implicit states of emergency “has become one of the essential practices of contemporary states, including so-called democratic ones.”

2.1.4. The Camp as the Generalised, Normal Space of the Exception

Agamben observes that what is at stake in Schmitt’s understanding of the sovereign exception is thus the production and definition of the particular space conditioning the possibility and validity of the sovereign territorial juridico-political order (nomos). This operation, he argues, involves not simply a “taking of land,” but primarily a “‘taking of the outside,’ an exception.” Sovereign borders, conventionally comprehended in terms of delimiting sovereign border at the territorial outer-edge of the modern state, can thus be reread as exceptional spaces or zones of indistinction: “an undecidable zone of anomie excluded from the ‘normal’ juridical-political space of the state but nevertheless an integral part of that space.” For Agamben, however, the “outside” of the sovereign nomos does not represent a delimited or fixed space beyond geographical outer-edge of the nomos. Rather, as with the topology of the Möbius strip it weaves inside and constitutes the juridico-political order itself. Agamben argues that the excepted or abandoned constitutive outside of the sovereign nomos therefore signifies the generalised state of exception that contingently unites life and law in the sovereign spatial order because there is no fundamental or essential relationship between them. Thinking the spatiality or topology of the exception/ban and constitutive outside entails rethinking the conventional concept of the border of the state in terms of its capacity to strictly delimit inside/outside and so on. Indeed, Agamben’s thought requires us to reconceptualise and relocate the constitutive outside of the sovereign nomos in substantially more generalised terms.

Agamben refers to the emergence of concentration camps in the late nineteenth-early twentieth century, traditionally linked with the state of exception and martial law, to demonstrate how simple distinctions between zoē/bios, natural fact/law, outside/inside, exception/rule, and so on, ultimately do not hold under our biopolitical conditions: “biopolitics lies in the fact that the biological given is as such immediately political, and the political is as such immediately the
bio logical given.” Agamben understands the spatial arrangement of the camp as fundamentally paradoxical: “[T]he camp is a piece of land placed outside the normal juridical order,” yet it is nevertheless “not simply an external space.” That which the camp excepts is included through its very exception, understood in terms of an inclusive exclusion blurring conventional borders, distinctions and spatialisations. Yet it is nevertheless from this same undecidable terrain or zone of indistinction that sovereign power must determine such borders and distinctions and produce bare life. The camp represents a space in which the state of exception is given a permanent spatialisation through which sovereign power orders according to a dislocating-localisation.

Insomuch as law appears virtually “suspended” in the camp and arbitrary or exceptional decisions on life’s status become the rule, producing all life therein as bare life, Agamben claims that the camp signifies “the most absolute biopolitical space that has ever been realized.” For Agamben, the camp constitutes an exceptional space of “pure potentiality” in which everything is “truly possible,” “a hybrid of law and fact in which the two terms have become indistinguishable.”

Thus, in the camp, questions of fact/nature/illicit and questions of law/order/licit are no longer distinguishable or intelligible in the space of the camp. Life in the camp thus moves “in a zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit, [zoē and bios,] in which the very concepts of subjective right and juridical protection no longer...[makes] any sense.” For Agamben, “the camp is the very paradigm of political space at the point which politics becomes biopolitics and homo sacer becomes...virtually...indistinguishable from the citizen.” The camp thus represents the regularised and spatially generalised biopolitical cipher of the perennial sovereign decision on the exception/abandonment of life producing the bare life as the “exteriority” or constitutive outside sovereign power requires to define and animate the nomos and bios therein. In this sense, the biopolitical body of life in the camp has a “twofold appearance as...life unworthy of being lived and as full life.” In the camp, as the generalised space of the exception, every sovereign decision on the juridico-political status of life as qualified, legitimate, “full of value” and
“authentically human,” appears necessarily, tacitly or explicitly to designate a correlating, contrasting form of life defined as disqualified, illegitimate, devoid of value and non-human. Furthermore, on the background of Benjamin’s critique of Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty and the relation between exception and rule, “as the state of exception is less anomalous and more a permanent characteristic,” Agamben argues that we all potentially run the risk of being produced as and becoming bare life: “we are all virtually homines sacri [bare life].” For Agamben, the camp is not “a historical fact and an anomaly belonging to the past,” but rather “the hidden matrix and nomos of the political space in which we...live;” the fundamental yet “hidden regulator of the inscription of life in the [juridico-political] order.” Thus the camp, as the wilfully, normally and generalised spatialisation (localisation) of the exception (dislocation/unlocalisable) in which bare life is cultivated in a zone of indistinction between bios and zoē” is thus itself a structure. It shares the topological structure of the exception or ban which Agamben sees as consubstantial with Western politics; the “hidden foundation on which the entire political system” rests, the camp is the contemporary manifestation of “the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West.” Thus, although there may be relatively few archetypal camps today, the biopolitical structural logics and relations upon which such spaces hinge can also be identified within spaces conventionally conceived as the state’s “normal” “inside.”

The production of bare life in the exceptional space and zones of indistinction of the camp is arguably most evident in contemporary camps developed specifically to serve that function, such as Guantánamo, the Bagram US Airbase, the Sodexho-run migrant detention centre outside Heathrow, UK, and the CIA’s European “black sites.” Exceptional practices that produce bare life by blurring zoē/bios, law/nonlaw, inside/outside, and so on, have become routine and normal in these spaces. However, Agamben also highlights that, inasmuch as the exception has become increasingly prominent and generalised in our time and ultimately coincides with the rule, so too has the production of zones of indistinction and bare life in global politics. In other words, although the space
of the exception was once limited to the fixed, bordered spatial coordinates of camps like those just listed, Agamben implies that it has become both increasingly generalised and normalised in contemporary political life. In this sense, the distinction or threshold drawn by sovereign power according to the exception/ban between zoē/bios, licit/illicit, inclusion/exclusion, and so on, “no longer appears today as a stable border dividing two clearly distinct zones.” In this context, Agamben argues that the borders the sovereign exception draws “are moving borders because they are biopolitical borders, and the fact that today a vast process is under way in which what is at stake is precisely the redefinition of these borders indicates that the exercise of sovereign power now passes through them more than ever.” Moreover, Agamben understands the sovereign decision on the exception producing bare life in capillary and socially diffused; it has entered “into an ever more intimate symbiosis” with whole series of entities and subject-agents in various contexts so that potentially anyone can act as a relay and agent of sovereign power in the zones of indistinction of the generalised space of the camp: “[t]he camp, which is now securely lodged within the city’s [or state’s] interior, is the new biopolitical nomos of the planet.”

The above represents Agamben’s central thesis, on the basis of which he argues that it is the structure of the ban and the camp “that we must learn to recognize in all its metamorphoses...in the political relations and public spaces in which we still live...[W]e must confess that the camp is virtually present whenever and wherever such a structure is effectively produced, regardless of what crimes might unfold there or its particular characteristics and topography.” From this perspective, examples of how the structure of the camp permeates everyday life, especially within the governmentality paradigm of a post-9/11 security environment and the global “War on Terror,” are manifold: in the zones d’attentes of French international airports in which non-citizen asylum-seekers are detained for up to four days before a judicial authority must intervene; in London’s Stockwell Station where, while heading to the London underground train, Jean Charles de Menezes, an electrician, was shot repeatedly in the head by plainclothes police who suspected him of planning an imminent act of terrorism;
or on the streets of Copenhagen in 2009 when police, apparently testing the applicability of the Danish Hooligan Law, pre-emptively detained hundreds of COP15 protesters and climate change activists.\textsuperscript{123} For Agamben, each of these cases represents an instance in which a seemingly mundane, innocuous space actually delimits the space of the camp “in which the normal order is \textit{de facto} suspended and in which whether or not [rights are violated or] atrocities are committed depends not on law but on the [discretion and/or] civility and ethical sense of the police [or others] who temporarily act as sovereign.”\textsuperscript{124}

\textbf{2.2. Vaughan-Williams’ Concept of the GBB: Rethinking the Limits of Sovereign Power}

Vaughan-Williams argues that Agamben’s thesis produces stimulating avenues of inquiry for alternative ways of understanding the politics of space and bordering practices which problematise a reading of “the border” restricted to the modern geopolitical imaginary. He contends that Agamben’s central argument – that the camp is the “hidden matrix and \textit{nomos} of the political space in which we live” – demands we reconsider, if “the border” represents the limit of sovereign power, “what and where borders in contemporary political life might be.”\textsuperscript{125} Rather than thinking the limits of sovereign power as spatially fixed at the state’s territorial outer-edge, Agamben reconceptualises those limits according to a sovereign decision and dividing practice between politically qualified life, on the one hand, and excluded, expendable forms of life, on the other.\textsuperscript{126} Agamben’s idea of the “originary spatialization” of sovereign power refers exactly to “this dividing practice, one that can effectively happen anywhere (including traditional border sites at the outer-edges of sovereign territory as well as throughout social space).”\textsuperscript{127} On this reading, the “the border” is recast according to the generalised sovereign decision on the exception or abandonment of life. Vaughan-Williams reads this decision in terms of a performative production and securing of the sovereign community’s juridico-political borders. This performance defines the politically qualified life of the citizen/\textit{bios} against bare life “excluded,” excepted or abandoned from sovereign community, thereby seeking to produce and secure
individual and collective identities in terms of “self” and “us” formed against “other” and “them.”

Furthermore, while the conventional concept of the border according to the modern geopolitical imagination invokes an inert, unalterable juridico-political structure, Agamben exposes this structure not only as ultimately undecidable and indistinct, but as a performed, contingent, biopolitical narrative: a perennial process of (re)articulation/(re)definition that perpetually (re)produces bare life according to the abandonment of certain forms of life from sovereign communitarian juridico-political space. This border performance, moreover, is tied to the bodies of individuals and groups it seeks to control and exclude. In contrast to bodies simply confronting predetermined borders as if they were eternal territorial entities, the situation becomes one in which borders become as mobile as the bodies through they are constantly (re)inscribed so that these bodies can be “risk assessed, categorized, and then treated” as either bona fide/bogus or safe/threat. This border performance not only functions to risk assess and categorise life, however, but to condition categories of life and subjectivities in contradistinction with one another, so that “bona fide” identities are conditioned upon the abandonment of the “bogus” ones thereby produced and treated as bare life.

Recognising that Agamben does not employ this concept himself, Vaughan-Williams’ basic move is to translate Agamben’s central thesis regarding the logic and operation of sovereign power according to the generalised space of the exception in the camp into an alternative border imaginary, the GBB. Drawing on Weizman’s metaphor of the “archipelago” of global spaces and states of exception in which law or parts thereof are “severely undermined or annulled,” he ties the GBB to the idea of a “global archipelago of zones of indistinction in which sovereign power produces the bare life it needs to sustain itself and notion of sovereign community.” Employing the GBB uncouples an analysis of sovereign power from the territorial limits of the state and enables the recontextualisation of such analysis according to a generalised, “global biopolitical terrain that spans ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ space.” The register
of the GBB concentrates on the production of zones of indistinction and thus underscores how bordering practices are significantly more socially-diffused than the modern geopolitical imagination presupposes. As such, Vaughan-Williams tenders the GBB as a response to critical voices calling for the development of alternative border imaginaries than the modern geopolitical imagination conditioned according a conventional inside/outside logic, such as those intimated in the introduction to this thesis. The GBB not only resonates, for example, with Balibar’s claim that borders do not simply lie at the limits or “on the shores of politics,” “where one sovereignty ends and another beings,” but “within...the political itself.” It also understands the diffusion of the (re)production of sovereign borders to be generalised across a global biopolitical topography.

It is here argued that Vaughan-Williams’ GBB provides a provocative and instrumental analytical register for identifying, analysing and understanding the complexity of border phenomena today. However, this thesis takes issue with two shortcomings it has identified within the current analytical framework of the GBB: 1) the lack of a clearly elaborated general method or specific methodology according to which the register of the GBB might be applied in the analysis of the (re)production of sovereign borders; and 2) the lack of attention paid to the role of language and concrete textual materials more specifically in such (re)production. We will return to a discussion of these two shortcomings following an illustration of how Vaughan-Williams applies the GBB to the specific context of Frontex extraterritorial bordering practices in the next section.

2.2.1. The Politics of the GBB: Vaughan-Williams’ Analysis of Frontex Extraterritorial Border Control

The following presentation of Vaughan-Williams’ treatment of Frontex extraterritorial border control practices in the Mediterranean region provides a composite figuration of a number of analyses he has offered in relation to this area of empirical phenomena. It also provides more updated information on the status of Frontex border control operations and a brief reading of the complex relationship between sovereignty, territory and law in the maritime and extraterritorial context. This analysis serves the purpose of: 1) illustrating an
2.2.1.1. Frontex
The EU passed a regulation in 2004 to further its Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy and establish Frontex under the EU’s Third Pillar, Justice and Home Affairs. Frontex can thus be read against the background of the perceived need to provide compensatory measures for the removal of certain border controls between Member States bound by the Schengen acquis and to achieve greater effectiveness in controlling the EU’s external borders than existing Member State control systems could individually provide. Frontex is a decentralised EU agency with a complex institutional and operational structure. It has financial, administrative and legal autonomy and the primary aim of promoting a pan-European model of IBM and security by coordinating and facilitating the implementation of common standards relating to the management of EU external borders.

2.2.1.2. JO Nautilus, Push-Backs, and Recent Developments
Italy signed a “Friendship Pact” with Libya in August 2008 providing, among other things, for the “off-shoring and out-sourcing of Italy’s borders to Libya.” In accordance with this bilateral agreement, Italy executed a “push-back” policy of forcing migrants’ and migrant vessels’ return to Libyan shores. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports, for instance, that the Italian Navy towed some 80 migrant vessels in May 2009 into international waters and, without any screening or attempt to identify potential refugees, forcibly returned these interdicted migrants to Tripoli where they were then arrested by Libyan authorities. This incident was followed by another in June 2009 which directly implicated Frontex in these “push-back” practices. In this incident, a German Puma helicopter participating in Frontex JO Nautilus IV, hosted by Italy, interdicted a migrant vessel carrying 75
passengers around 30 nautical miles south of Lampedusa Island. The vessel was barred from sailing further until an Italian coast guard vessel arrived and forcibly transferred passengers without screening to a Libyan patrol boat which took reportedly handed them over to a Libyan military unit in Tripoli.145 Tempering its view in humanitarian concerns, Frontex presented this incident and the overall “push-back” policy favourably, indicating that it had had a positive impact on reducing irregular migration also in terms of saving lives because fewer migrants were chancing the journey.146 The fear for loss of migrants’ lives at sea is not unfounded; UNITED reports on the basis of documented incidents since the beginning of January 2000 that more than 17,000 irregular migrants and refugee have died at sea while attempting to reach and enter the EU.147 However, Frontex expressed ignorance on the question of whether the protection rights and other human rights of those forcibly returned were being violated in Libya, highlighting the point made by HRW, that Frontex’s position on these practices displays the “flawed proposition that a potential humanitarian benefit (preventing the loss of life at sea) trumps a human right (the right to leave and the right to seek asylum).”148

The ECtHR ruled in the Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy case in February 2012 that this “push-back” policy violated the international legal principle of non-refoulement enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention and Article 3 of the ECHR on the prohibition of torture.149 In the context of EU human rights law, the principle of non-refoulement guarantees protections to every person, not only refugees and asylum-seekers, prohibiting expulsion, refoulement or “push-back” to any country where the person risks suffering torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, including the death penalty.150 Accordingly, “migrants have the right not to be forcibly returned to places where their lives and freedom are potentially threatened.”151 The Hirsi ruling establishes the extraterritorial applicability of the ECHR, confirming the general consensus in international human rights that jurisdiction and corresponding rights, freedoms and responsibilities for both states and persons affected by the actions of those states are activated when state authorities effectively exert direct control and produce
effects “whether performed within or outside national boundaries.”\textsuperscript{152} Ambiguities remain, however, with regards to establishing a clear legal consensus on when Member States’ jurisdictions and legal responsibilities are triggered in relation to extraterritorial activities and interventions.\textsuperscript{153}

Recent interest in Frontex extraterritorial activities centre on JO Triton, hosted by Italy. This operation originally sought to fill part of the gap left in migration control following the termination of the previous and much more substantial deployment of Italian resources in that country’s Mare Nostrum operation. Mare Nostrum operated between October 2013 and November 2014 when Triton relieved it and covered a vast area of sea between Italy’s coastal waters and those of Libya and Tunisia, resulting in the “rescue” of over 140,000 migrants and refugees.\textsuperscript{154} Triton’s operational area originally extended to just 30 nautical miles from the Italian coast.\textsuperscript{155} However, the loss of over 1,000 migrant and refugee lives in the spring of 2015 in a series of catastrophic events of migrant vessels sinking at sea led to the extraordinary expansion of Triton’s operational budget and area of proactive patrolling as well as a more explicit authorisation for proactive search and rescue, even though this is technically neither an EU nor Frontex mandate.\textsuperscript{156} It is not as of yet entirely clear what this expanded mandate for JO Triton entails for the rights of migrants and refugees.

\subsection*{2.1.1.3. Analysing Frontex Bordering Practices: Rethinking Borders according to the GBB}
Vaughan-Williams uses the case of Frontex off-shore bordering practices to illustrate the need to rethink what and where borders are in contemporary global politics. Frontex “off-shore” border control practices signify the attempt to detect, deter and pre-empt the movement of “risky” migrants, refugees and other subjects \textit{before} they venture to journey to EU Member States.\textsuperscript{157} This is indicative of the point that EU borders are not simply an inactive frontier fixed at the spatial limits of Member States’ sovereign territory, but that they are evermore mobile and diffused through land, sea, air and cyberspace across a global terrain. The ability to delimit in any strict sense the “inside” and “outside” of the EU according to the conventional logics of the modern geopolitical imagination is therefore
The concern is with how borders are “vacillating” and do not simply represent passive territorial markers of sovereign jurisdiction – “it is precise through border performances that sovereign authorities can be seen as (re)produced across social space.” Vaughan-Williams posits that it is more intelligible to think in terms of Frontex bordering practices, representing the dynamism and spatio-temporal “‘thickness’ of ‘the border’ otherwise belied by the static metaphors of ‘lines’, ‘limits’, and ‘walls’.” He argues, moreover, that off-shore bordering practices in the EU context not only involve thwarting the movements of people, goods and services, but assert the need to balance “security” and “freedom;” a process governing the “filtration of ‘risky’ subjects from ‘bona fide’ travellers in order that the latter might enjoy faster, more efficient, and comfortable ‘customer experiences.’” As such, these bordering practices are also inherently ordering practices concerned with questions and processes of inclusion and exclusion in political space and correlate constructions of meaning and identity.

Vaughan-Williams applies the analytical register of the GBB to the problem of the (re)production of sovereign borders in the context of Frontex bordering practices. He therefore reads these practices according to Agamben’s diagnosis of the operation of sovereign power producing bare life in the generalised space of the exception in the camp. In this sense, Frontex’s activities can be seen as performatively (re)producing and securing the borders of the EU as a political community according to the sovereign decision to except and produce some life as bare life; thus, “the politically qualified life of the ‘European citizen’ is defined against the bare life of the ‘non-European’ migrant.” Vaughan-Williams argues that the activity of the GBB in the context of Frontex bordering practices can be understood as an attempt “to territorialize European space, albeit at sites often far removed from EU Member States’ territory, via the categorization of some life as bare, illegitimate, and risky, against which the legitimate, secure, and protected life of the citizen-traveller is (re)produced.” Aspects of Frontex extraterritorial border control practices are also seen as unfolding in an exceptional space in which zones of indistinction between categories of law can be realised and the
juridico-political status of persons whose movements are pre-empted “upstream” or who are intercepted, interdicted or rescued at sea are put in doubt and effectively made undecidable. Furthermore, the spatiotemporal mobility of the (re)production of sovereign borders by Frontex bordering practices also underscores the continuous (re)iterative (re)inscription of sovereign borders “through mobile bodies that can be risk assessed, categorized, and then treated as either ‘trusted travellers’ or ‘bare life’.“164 Crucially, Vaughan-Williams concludes his analysis of Frontex bordering practices with the reminder that these practices are only ever attempts at (re)producing and securing the EU and its Member States as sovereign political communities, “and while the model of off-shore [border] security operates according to a totalizing vision of sovereign space, it inevitably encounters resistance.”165

2.2.2. Reiterating the Shortcomings of the GBB

One of the central questions Vaughan-Williams seeks to address in developing the GBB relates to potential methodological insights that might apposite to the task of developing an alternative border imaginary better able to account for the complexities of borders in contemporary political life.166 He allocates a substantial portion of his book Border Politics in the attempt to address this question, appealing to Derrida’s insights on deconstruction.167 While framing the GBB in deconstruction-inspired terms, he nevertheless stops short of presenting a clearly elaborated methodology guiding his application of the GBB to analysis for the reader. As Vaughan-Williams himself observes, deconstruction is not a theory, a method, or a practice applicable to specific empirical cases.168 Although one might develop a methodology inspired by deconstruction, it is not one itself. The drawbacks of this lack have already been covered in the problematisation section of this thesis’ introduction, and we will not revisit them here.

The illustration of Vaughan-Williams’ application of the GBB to an analysis of bordering practices above demonstrate an appreciation, albeit a superficial one, for the role of language in the (re)production of sovereign borders. The argument, then, is not that he completely ignores the inherent implication of language in the
tern of (re)production of sovereign borders, just that he does not engage the problem in any methodological, comprehensive, textually-focused or precise way. Vaughan-Williams’ focus on sovereign bordering practices, implicitly deprioritises this aspect in favour of detailed interrogations of the practical dimensions. His analysis of Frontex sovereign bordering practices repeatedly identify contradistinctive categories of life identified as such according to the sovereign decision on the exception and abandonment of life through the (re)production of sovereign borders: risky/bona fide; politically qualified life/bare life; European citizen/non-European migrant; trusted traveller/bare life; bare/secure; illegitimate/legitimate; and risky/protected life of the citizen-traveller.169

However, he only provides for these categories outside of their specific textual contexts. It is the articulation and (re)production of the categories and corresponding spatial, identity and meaning orders that the operation of sovereign power through the (re)production of sovereign power hinges upon. The question remains though as to where this language and these categories come from? Who is articulating them more specifically, how, where and in what contexts? How might such language and categories find concrete expression in textual materials of various political actors and throughout everyday social life? How might these texts relate to other texts in terms of their framing, other articulations they draw upon and reproduce, and still other texts that might contest them? What might these questions mean for our ability to identify, analyse, and understand the (re)production of sovereign borders and to potentially resist them?

This thesis advocates the value of engaging the role of language in terms of concrete textual materials in the (re)production of sovereign borders as this role arguably plays a major part in constructing the intelligibility frameworks according to which the sovereign bordering practices can be understood and communicated. Therefore, a more methodological and in-depth interrogation of concrete textual materials in the (re)production of sovereign borders is arguably not only apposite to providing a more comprehensive understanding of such (re)production in this dimension of social life, but also in terms of understanding the sovereign bordering practices currently prioritised by the analytical register of
the GBB. As noted in the introduction, the adequate provision of such an analysis is unfortunately beyond its scope. However, it will nevertheless attempt not only to illustrate what this kind of analysis might look like in practice and have to offer to an understanding of the (re)production of sovereign borders, but to clearly provide a methodological framework that can inform such analysis as well.

In order to do this, the following two chapters will attempt to critically reconcile the GBB on the basis of its grounding in Agamben theory with Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory and to develop on this basis a coherent multiperspectival methodology for the analysis of concrete textual materials in the (re)production of sovereign borders. The aim then is to recast the GBB in order to exact an analytical framework that can supplement the current strengths of the GBB by enabling the analysis of concrete textual materials in the (re)production of sovereign borders in contemporary global politics according to its register. In so doing, it is here argued that the two shortcomings identified by this thesis with respect to Vaughan-Williams’ development and application of the GBB to date can be largely alleviated.

Notes

42 Ibid. pp. 7-8.


Simultaneously, while Agamben contests Foucault’s historicity, he appears at other times to support the implication of this shift within the context of marking a major development in the progressively intensifying march of biopolitics within the historical paradigm of the West according to which sovereign power increasingly tends to (re)produce zones of indistinction between categories traditionally assumed to be clearly distinct and separate (e.g. private/public, inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion, nature/right-law etc.). Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. pp. 3-8, 11, 122, 139-140; Vaughan-Williams, Nick. Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign Power. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009. pp. 97-98.


Similarly, while Agamben contests Foucault’s historicity, he appears at other times to support the implication of this shift within the context of marking a major development in the progressively intensifying march of biopolitics within the historical paradigm of the West according to which sovereign power increasingly tends to (re)produce zones of indistinction between categories traditionally assumed to be clearly distinct and separate (e.g. private/public, inside/outside, inclusion/exclusion, nature/right-law etc.). Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. pp. 3-8, 11, 122, 139-140; Vaughan-Williams, Nick. Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign Power. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009. pp. 97-98.


Ibid. pp. 28-29.

Ibid. pp. 137, 139-140.

Ibid. p. 139.

Ibid. pp. 71-86, 137-139, see also: pp. 8, 10, 22, 87-115, 159.


the realm of the divine. For Agamben, the figure of
discourse, see Foucault's analysis of the idea of war or the exception as that which perpetually underpins and constitutes
“There exists no norm that is applicable to chaos.” Schmitt, Carl. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of
92 Agamben, Giorgio. State of Exception. Trans. Kevin Attell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005, p. 58; Also, on this issue, see Foucault’s analysis of the idea of war or the exception as that which perceptually underpins and constitutes

Agamben illustrates the point to which exception and rule had become so indistinct under the Third Reich by recalling the Nazis’ declaration under Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution of the indefinite suspension of constitutionally guaranteed personal freedoms in accordance with the “Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of the People and State of 28 February 1933.” He argues that this decree did not simply follow the well-established and consolidated common practice of declaring states of emergency characteristic of previous governments between 1919 and 1933, but rather contained a significant difference insomuch as its text made no mention of the expressions “state of exception,” “state of emergency” or “state of necessity.” For Agamben, however, it nevertheless undoubtedly amounted to a declaration of a state of exception which moreover remained de facto in force until the Third Reich’s fall twelve years later. Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. p. 168 (emphasis added).


Ibid. pp. 139, 142; What the camps so definitively reveal to us is the extreme space in which sovereign power conditions the possibility for inscribing the value and “full life” of *bios* or the citizen-subject in political community in correlation to the nonvalue and emptiness of “life unworthy of being lived.” What concerns Agamben here is not simply the advent of an explicit juridical category of life devoid of value, but the sovereign decision of a threshold beyond which the juridico-political status of life is excepted and undecidable, like the life of *homo sacer* or bare life, and can thus be killed without the commission of a homicide. Ibid. pp. 139, 142, 153, 177-179.


120 Ibid. p. 164.

121 Ibid. pp. 175-176 (emphasis added). In this context, Agamben also claims that: “When our age tried to grant the unlocalizable [the exception of bare life in a zone of indistinction] a permanent and visible localization, the result was the concentration camp.” Ibid. ibd. p. 20, see also pp. 24-27, 38, 174-176.

122 Ibid. pp. 11, 174-175.


125 Ibid. p. 166.


It is also helpful to note that, while focusing on the theme of extraterritorial or off-shore bordering practices by Frontex, the analysis here also draws on elements of Frontex bordering practices more generally.


158 Ibid.


Ibid. p. 196.

Ibid. p. 195.

Ibid. p. 196.


Ibid. pp. 145-158.


Chapter 3. Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory

3.1. Justification and Introduction

Laclau and Mouffe’s analyses of discourse according to their discourse theory are limited to the abstract level of discourse. Moreover, they do not provide any method for discourse analysis in relation to their theory. Nevertheless, there are a number of reasons discourse theory has been selected for the purpose of reconciliation with the GBB on the basis of its Agamben roots. Firstly, because of its poststructuralist commitments to the structural undecidability and its central concern for the subject, subjectivisation and identity, discourse theory is deemed amenable to reconciliation with Agamben and, by proxy, the GBB. Furthermore, its concern for the production and effects of limits and political frontiers also identified it as a promising choice for reconciliation with Agamben and the GBB. Additionally, because of its broad focus, discourse theory is when done critically – especially amenable to being combined with the specific perspectives of other poststructuralist social theories into multiperspectival approaches to discourse analysis. Lastly, simply because Laclau and Mouffe do not offer a method for discourse analysis does not mean that potential methodologies cannot be identified, developed and applied on the basis of their discourse theory. This point is illustrated by many scholars with respect to how general methodological guidelines based on discourse theory might be identified and tailored to meet the particular demands of engaging in context-specific, problem-driven research project. Indeed, discourse theory provides a robust theoretical and conceptual apparatus for approaching discourse analysis that is amenable to the development of corresponding methodologies.

It is argued here that a critical, coherent, reconciliation of the GBB on the basis of its Agamben underpinnings with Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory holds the promise of developing a powerful, multiperspectival methodological framework for the analysis of concrete textual materials in the (re)production of sovereign borders. The attempt to do so, however, demands respecting what Jørgensen and Phillips describe as an irreducibly “complete package” formed between discourse theory and corresponding method. The attempt to reconcile
discourse theory with the GBB on the basis of its Agambean roots in the following chapter must be done critically and respect the basic premises of discourse theory and Agambean theory. These issues are discussed further in the next chapter. The reading of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory provided here to lay the groundwork for the attempt to critically reconcile it with Agambean theory in the following chapter at the theoretical and conceptual level and the possibility of translating this into a multiperspectival methodology for the analysis of concrete textual materials in the (re)production of sovereign borders. This reading is primarily informed by Laclau and Mouffe’s collective works, *Hegemony and Social Strategy* and *Post-Marxism without Apologies*, as well as subsequent work by Laclau alone and in combination with others, as well as a number of secondary sources.175

3.2. Central Premises, Arguments and Concepts
The reading of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory offered here concentrates on establishing an understanding of its central premises and concepts that can be employed in the attempt to both reconcile discourse theory with Agamben and translate this reconciliation into a multiperspectival approach for the analysis of concrete textual materials in the (re)production of sovereign borders in the following chapter. It does not provide a comprehensive reading of all of its central arguments and concepts. Readers are directed to *Appendix A* of this thesis for a more detailed presentation of discourse theory’s conceptual framework than the scope of the present reading permits.176

Discourse theory adopts an anti-essentialist ontology which denies the existence of any objective transcendental signified/centre (e.g. Reason, God, Nature, Class) that might be referred to and can determine and ultimately fix every other meaning and identity within a secure and totalising structure.177 Discourse theory seeks to address what the abandonment of the idea of a transcendental signified/centre entails, importing Derrida’s argument that the impossibility a transcendental signified and the ultimate undecidability of social structures “extends the domain and the play of signification infinitely.”178 The
consequence of this, however, is not complete chaos and flux, but the contingent, socio-political determination of meanings and identities within a relational system and structure temporarily and partially fixed by empty signifiers.

Discourse theory’s anti-foundationalist premise is closely related to that of anti-essentialism. This presupposition does not reject the idea that the world exists but more specifically that there exists an independent, authentic “Truth” outside of or unmediated by language/discourse and the ultimate undecidability and contingency of its structures. Discourse theory therefore rejects the possibility of making any prior distinction between the discursive and the non-discursive/extra-discursive: discourse is “fully constitutive of our world.”

Objects exist, but only becoming meaningfully through language or discourse.

On this note, Laclau and Mouffe argue that discursive “articulation, as fixation/dislocation of a system of differences, cannot consist of purely written, spoken or visual signification; but must instead pierce the entire material density of the multifarious institutions, rituals and practices through which a discursive formation is structured.” Thus, discourse theory attends not only to discourses in terms of speech and writing, practical behaviour, and the production of meaning and identity, but socio-material objects as well. All of these form part of complex sign and signification systems and contribute to the discursive production of diverse aspects of social life. According to this premise, discourse theory views “truth” as contingent, local and ultimately undecidable and, therefore, pliable and mutable between discursive contexts and “regimes of truth.”

The basic premises sketched above condition discourse theory’s main arguments. The first refers to the claim that every form of social life unfold upon the historically contingency and particular terrain of discourses, provisionally defined as “relational systems of signification.” Everything we think and signify in writing, speech and practice, for example, is governed by a relatively objectified/sedimented discourse that is perennially affected and transformed by what we think and signify. A “discourse” can be conceptualised at the abstract level in terms of representing a relational system of signifying
concatenations that interimbricate the semantic, pragmatic and material aspects of social life. Laclau and Mouffe state:

“[W]e...call articulation any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice. The structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice, we will call discourse. The differential positions, insofar as they appear articulated within a discourse, we will call moments. By contrast, we will call element any difference that is not...articulated [by that discourse].”\footnote{186}

Discourse can thus be understood as the structured product of the articulatory practice of fixing meaning/identity within a particular context. Articulation is a “discursive practice which does not have a plane of constitution prior to, or outside, the dispersion of the articulated elements.”\footnote{187} In other words, it is a practice made from an undecidable terrain and according to which the articulation of elements is contingent. Laclau and Mouffe situated the surplus of meaning that an articulation and discourse excludes in an undecidable terrain (the field of discursivity) made up of contingent, alternative articulations of other discourses. The moments of discourse refer to the contingent fixations of meaning/identity established in discourse by articulation and which relate according to their mutually differential positions; the meaning/identity of each is constructed according to that all the others which it is not.\footnote{188} This understanding oversimplifies the production and fixation of meaning/identity in discourse, however. More specifically, meaning/identity can be constructed in discourse according to (logics of) difference or equivalence. The logic of difference prevails within certain discursive contexts, whereas the logic of equivalence prevails in others. Generally speaking, the construction of meaning/identity is mediated through the articulation of both difference and equivalence (see Figures 2 and 3). With respect to its anti-essentialist premise, discourse theory argues that the absence of every transcendental signified/centre means that total discursive
closure according to which it would constitute pure presence is impossible. In order to think and represent structure, however, a provisional centre must be established within it. In this capacity, empty signifiers function in order to partially fix discursive moments. Although the particular representation of an empty signifier in a specific discursive context is contingent, the general function of empty signifiers is necessary for the possibility of establishing fixity of meaning/identity/space in a discourse – it functions to form a structural centre that collects, binds, and stabilises differential moments in a chain of equivalence. Because each moment in this chain expresses a “sameness” with respect to the empty signifier, the differential positions of moments in a discourse can thereby be united as if they formed a united totality. Equivalence therefore creates a second meaning to difference, which, though derived from the first, ambiguates and subverts it: “the differences cancel one other out insofar as they are used to express something identical underlying them all.” Moreover, in order to accommodate and assimilate the meanings and identities of all other terms in the discourse’s system of differences, the empty signifier must itself be emptied of any content/meaning/identity. Thus, an “empty signifier is, strictly speaking, a signifier without a signified.” It thereby loses its character as a fixed discursive moment and assumes the floating quality of an element – that is, it assumes character of a floating signifier that different discourses articulate differently and in competing ways. These arguments suggest attending discourses in relation to their capacity to (re)construct and fix meaning/identity and their ultimate failure to provide a complete, closed, uniform space of representation with respect to the undecidability of the social world.

Figure 2. Difference (logic of)
Discourse theory’s second line of argument concerns the point that discourse is formed in and by hegemonic (discursive) struggles. Due to the ultimate undecidability of the social world, discourse is basically a product of socially diffuse, contingent, political articulations/decisions resulting from an array of “decentred strategic actions undertaken by political agents aiming to forge a hegemonic discourse.”

As meaning can never be fixed once and for all, openings for social struggles over representations and definitions of society and identity are continually (re)produced and with ensuing social consequences: “Different discourses – each of them representing particular ways of talking about and understanding the social world – are engaged in a constant struggle with one other to achieve hegemony, that is, to fix the meanings of language in their own way.”

Different discourses thus strive to achieve cognitive and ethico-political dominance through the articulation of meaning/identity. Hegemony, then, can provisionally be understood as the dominance of one particular perspective.

As noted above, a discourse is formed through articulation. A hegemonic discourse, more specifically, is formed by articulations that successfully provide subjects with a convincing, stable intelligibility framework positing particular ontological and epistemological conceits according to which history and the world can be understood. This entails an element of ideological totalisation which always form part of hegemonic articulatory practices that organise and unify discursive space around a specific series of empty signifiers. Ideology here does not refer to a distortion of “reality” according to which the true essence and cause of social life might be revealed. Rather, it “is the representational, metaphorical and precarious closure that stabilizes meaning within specific contexts.”

Once
an empty signifier/myth (e.g. liberal democracy) can successfully (albeit partially and temporarily) domesticate and neutralise contingency and undecidability and assimilate a vast number and diversity of social demands, then it can be conceptualised as having been transformed to a collective social imaginary (ideology). A social imaginary functions as a totalising ontological and epistemological horizon, objectivity or “absolute limit which structures a field of intelligibility;” in short, a metanarrative we tell ourselves to make sense of our world, ourselves and others, and in order to make our acts meaningful. On the one hand, empty signifiers/myths, social imaginaries or ideologies distort the ultimate undecidability of the social world and the contingency of all meaning/identity, yet, on the other hand, “this distortion is inevitable because it establishes a necessary horizon for our acts.” As such, they are intimately linked to the political dimension in all social identities/identifications because they condition socio-political space, our individual and group identities, as well as what the consequences of these identities are, such as how we should act. The making of objectifying, naturalising and universalising myths and imaginaries is a crucial aspect of the hegemonic thrust towards ideological totalisation.

The third central argument states that the hegemonic articulation of meaning/identity is intimately tied to the construction of antagonism(s) according to the exclusion of a threatening exteriority or “otherness” (see Figures 4 and 5). The exclusion of this outside/other functions simultaneously to both: 1) stabilise the discursive system of differences by enabling it to appear in a chain of equivalence organised around an empty signifiers and; 2) to prevent its final suture. That is, the antagonism functions at once as the condition of possibility for the chain of equivalence to appear as if it were a fixed, complete, closed, totality and the condition of impossibility for that “totality” to realise itself as such. This argument relates to the establishment of a discursive system’s limits and unity. Discourse theory holds that limits and unity cannot be constructed by referring to some inner-essence or presence within that supposed unity; the objectivity or “structurality” of the structure...cannot find the source of these connections within itself.” Rather, something else beyond the discourse’s system of
differences must be identified in order to define its limits. Crucially, this difference cannot simply be different with respect to the others in the system of differences in the same fashion all the other moments differ from one another.\textsuperscript{206} If it were, it would simply be just another, positively included difference within the discursive system. Rather, this difference must be \textit{radically different} from all the others in order for them to appear as if they constitute an objective, unified whole.\textsuperscript{207} This entails the contingent establishment of a constitutive outside/other which shares nothing in common with the given discursive system. This constitutive outside/other corresponds to the name of an antagonism.\textsuperscript{208} Antagonism entails the \textit{exclusion} of a set of meanings/identities articulated as part of a chain of equivalence underscoring their “identicalness.”\textsuperscript{209} The expansion of the chain of equivalence in the position of the antagonism to incorporate still more meanings/identities crystallises the understanding that these excluded elements share but one thing between them: they are \textit{threatening} to the discursive system.\textsuperscript{210} Antagonism thus entails the production of a “threatening exteriority” or “otherness” that establishes radically irreducible incommensurability with respect to the system of differences “included” by the discourse, thus forming its unity and limits. The practice of articulating and fixing antagonistic “others” functions to stabilise the discursive system and its chain(s) of equivalence, although crucially, the determination of a constitutive antagonism is contingent. In this sense, “antagonisms are not \textit{objective} relations, but relations which reveal the \textit{limits} of all objectivity.”\textsuperscript{211} The presentation of a radical negativity menaces and problematises the discursive system and precludes it from becoming an objective, complete, closed totality.\textsuperscript{212} Limits between the discursive space of the “totality” and the constitutive outside/other/antagonism are \textit{political frontiers} that frequently conjure essentialised figurations of us/them, friend/enemy, and so on. The border dividing “inside-friendly-safe” from “outside-enemy-threat,” however, is not immutably fixed. Rather, for discourse theory, the discursive struggle concerning social division and inclusion in and exclusion from hegemonic discursive space forms the heart of politics and include efforts to have lines drawn more
inclusively so that antagonistic identities can cohabitate the same discursive space.²¹³

Figure 4: Hegemonic articulation of a constitutive outside/other/antagonism

Figure 5: Concrete example of hegemonic articulation of antagonism

The fourth and final argument that this reading of discourse theory will address claims that dislocation of hegemonic discursive order – its radical destabilisation, failure and crisis resulting from the emergence of phenomena that it cannot account for, domesticate, assimilate or represent – means that the subject always appears as a constitutive split subject that desires and might seek to reconstitute a whole identity through subjectivisation processes.²¹⁵ This assertion
is inspired by an understanding of the subject according to Lacanian psychoanalysis. It thus contests the Althusserian understanding of the subject as reduced to a collection of subject positions pinned to the subject and into which it is passively interpellated or hailed by the discourses in which it is situated. Rather, by importing Lacan, discourse theory aims to assign the subject with political agency and subjectivity to explain why subjects desire to construct their identities within particular discourses and subject positions. The recurring dislocations of the “discursive system,” Torfing explains, “mean that the subject cannot be conceived in terms of a collection of structurally given positions.” The discursive structure’s dislocation precludes it from exhaustively deciding the subject’s identity. The subject is inside the structure, but possesses neither a full nor a full lack of structural identity. It is indeed constituted by this lack as a failed identity – it is a subject of the lack. Structural dislocation exposes the subject to the experience of the limit of social order and sees that the subject appears as a split subject, traumatised by its lack of completeness. This limit-experience is tantamount to an identity-crisis for the subject, though crucially does not provide a window of access to some “other” of discourse or “something beyond differences, simply because...there is no beyond.” The subjectivity might then either dissolve or seek to regain the illusion of a complete identity through by identifying with the assurances of completeness and ontological security proffered by different hegemonic projects. It is the desire for fullness in discourse/Other/language that catalyses subjectivisation, although discourse can never actually realise the subject in fullness. Thus, as Foucault observes, the subject’s limit-experience in a dislocated discursive space is not necessarily solely a traumatic experience for it yields an increased space of subjective freedom offering new possibilities for subjects to reconstruct themselves, their understanding of themselves, the world and what can be done. Conversely, insomuch as subjects identify with their systems and orders of meaning and intelligibility, discourses are generally understood as structures that “limit the subject’s agency in terms of the “scope for action and possibilities for innovation.” The split subject might simultaneously identify with numerous
different things in relation to which hegemonic struggles will need to afford ways of articulating and fixing those different loci of identification into a reasonably coherent discursive order. Antagonism has an important function in the endeavour to unify differing loci of identification insomuch as establishing an antagonism facilitates the projection and externalisation of blame for the split subject’s failure/lack onto a radical outside/other/enemy that it then vilifies or demonises as that which prevents it from becoming whole. The projection of the subject’s failure onto an antagonistic other tends to stimulate political action motivated by an illusionary promise: “that the elimination of the other will remove the subject’s...lack.”

Discourse theory can be characterised by the overall claim that structures are undecidable and that everything about how we structure and articulate social life is contingent and, therefore, mutable. However, social life tends towards sedimentation and stability in hegemonic discourses that are successful in their articulations and provision of ontological security for the identities constructed therein.

Notes


171 The reasons then for not engaging in the task of trying to extrapolate a methodology for analysing the (re)production of sovereign borders in concrete textual materials directly from Agamben theory or the register of the GBB are twofold: 1) methodological possibilities for discourse analysis based on discourse theory are already well-illustrated and readily available; and 2) any attempt to extrapolate a similarly capable methodology directly from Agamben or the GBB would most likely simply reproduce the methodological possibilities already offered in relation to discourse theory.


This position resonates with Derrida’s axiomatic claim that “there is nothing outside the text,” which he later refined to state, and arguably much less controversially, “there is nothing outside context. Contrary to common misinterpretation, this


197 Laclau observes that while such signs are empty signifiers and have a floating character, their floating character “is not a purely contingent and circumstantial one, because without it political argument would be impossible and political life would be a dialogue between the deaf, in which we would only have incommensurable propositions.” Importantly, although the specificity of the content is contingent, the role the content plays in filling the gap and symbolising a totality is the condition of possibility for a systematic of signification. Laclau, Ernesto. Emancipation(s). London: Verso, 2007 [1996]. p. 95), see also pp. 44-46, 59-61, 63, 86, 92-93, 95, 102); See further: Laclau, Ernesto. “Ideology and post-Marxism.” Journal of Political Ideologies, Vol. 11. Issue 2 (2006): p. 114; Laclau, Ernesto and Lilian Zac. “Minding the Gap: The Subject of Politics.” The Making of Political Identities. Ed. Ernesto Laclau. London: Verso, 1994. pp. 15-17, 21-23, 35-36.


202 The dotted line between the space of articulation and the articulated signifiers/moments (S, S^2) illustrates how the trace of the undecidable terrain of the articulatory practice is inscribed within each of the moments, dislocating and subverting them in undecidability and contingency.
The dotted line between the space of articulation and the articulated empty signifier and signifiers/moments (S, S') illustrates how the trace of the undecidable terrain of the articulatory practice is inscribed within each of the moments, dislocating and subverting them in undecidability and contingency. The solid line between the position of the empty signifier and all the others illustrates the equivalence or “sameness” of all the moments with respect to the empty signifier.


Laclau, Ernesto. Emancipation(s). London: Verso, 2007 [1996], p. 52; Laclau, Ernesto and Lilian Zac. “Minding the Gap: The Subject of Politics.” The Making of Political Identities. Ed. Ernesto Laclau. London: Verso, 1994, p. 30; For Derrida, every structure/system/meaning/identity “requires a synthesis in which the completely other is announced as such – without any simplicity, any identity, any resemblance or continuity – within what is not it.” In this way, every effort is made in the interest of stabilising the structure/system/meaning/identity to present every outside as straightforward exteriority in order to emphasise the purity and fullness of the structure/system/meaning/identity for it is incapable of protecting or defending itself, “except through expelling the other, and especially its own other, throwing it outside and below.” The “excluded” other “threatens the desire” for the self “from the closest proximity,” breaching it “from within and from the very beginning;” identity or difference “cannot be thought without the trace” of the other inside the self. Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997 [1974]. pp. 34, 39, 47, 56-57.


Bud, p. 16.


Thus, the primary condition for the subversion of the objectivity of a totality and the preclusion of its closure is that the specificity of each moment in the system of differences to be dissolved, cancelling itself as such by entering into a chain of equivalence with all the others and that the equivalence be counterposed by a radical, threatening, antagonistic outside/other that negates it. Laclau, Ernesto. Emancipation(s). London: Verso, 2007 [1996], p. 38.

214 The dotted line represents both the limits – that is, political frontier – between the discursive “totality” and the antagonism and the undecidability/contingency of their distinction, the limits/frontiers traced between/within them, and the undecidability/contingency of the hegemonic articulation of this antagonistic structural relation.


221 Ibid. p. 126.


227 Ibid. pp. 54-57.
Chapter 4. A Reconciled Multiperspectival Methodology

4.1. Reconciling Discourse Theory with the Agambean Underpinnings of the GBB

The present attempt to critically reconcile the GBB on the basis of its Agambean underpinnings with discourse theory represents the first major step in the crux of this thesis: the development of a coherent multiperspectival methodological framework for the study of the (re)production of sovereign borders in concrete textual materials.²²⁹ The aim reflects a dual concern for: 1) preserving the analytical strengths of the GBB, especially with respect to its basis in Agambean theory; and 2) respecting the irreducible link between theory and method in discourse analysis, constituting what Jørgensen and Phillips call a “complete package.”²³⁰ With regard to the first concern, if Agamben’s theory of the relation between politics, life and sovereign power cannot be coherently preserved in the process of combining and reconciling it with discourse theory, then we would also lose sight of precisely that upon which the analytical register of the GBB is based. In relation to the latter concern, discourse analysis cannot be intelligibly divorced from the theoretical and methodological principles informing it: “In discourse analysis, theory and method are intertwined and researchers must accept the basic philosophical premises in order to use discourse analysis as their method of empirical study.”²³¹ Considering the force and depth of its poststructural commitments, this is especially true when it comes to the application of a methodology drawing on Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory in analysis. The GBB and its Agambean underpinnings must therefore be shown to align at a basic level with the premises of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory if these bodies of theory are to be critically and coherently reconciled at the theoretical level and thereafter translated into the development of a multiperspectival methodological approach to the analysis of concrete textual material in the (re)production of sovereign borders.

In order to meet the requirements outlined above, the potential points of theoretical discord and agreement between Agambean theory and discourse theory will first be addressed. The need in the present context to proceed critically in
relation to the possibility for reconciling Agamben and discourse theory is all the more relevant because Laclau himself presents a rather strong critique of Agamben’s thought. This critique therefore presents us with a useful framework according to which we can address possible point of divergence and irreconcilability between Agamben and discourse theory.

4.1.1. Discord: Laclau’s Critique

Laclau forwards three primary complaints with Agamben’s diagnosis of the relation between politics, life and sovereign power. His first criticism derives from his reading of Agamben’s understanding of the ban. The problem with Agamben’s treatment of the structure of the sovereign ban, he claims, is that the articulation of dimensions through which he thinks it exhausts the system of possibilities that such a structure opens.\textsuperscript{232} Laclau argues that Agamben’s understanding of the ban is essentialising, totalising and absolutist in that it reduces the possibilities of the relation of the ban to one alone: bare life.\textsuperscript{233} If all abandoned life “outside” the system of differences constituting the juridico-political order is to be reduced to and conceived as bare life, Laclau argues, then two extra presuppositions must be added: 1) “sheer separatedness [nonrelation],” and 2) “radical indefension” of the “outsider.”\textsuperscript{234} He categorically rejects these presuppositions, asserting that the category of bare life does not exhaust all situations of being outside the law. Rather, it refers specifically to “the fact of being outside the law of the city.”\textsuperscript{235} The point Laclau seeks to underline here is that Agamben’s thesis of the relation between sovereign power and bare life, despite recognising violence as the limit of sovereign power, overwhelmingly forwards a totalising understanding of sovereign power that is blind to the contingency of this relation and denies any possibility for resistance.\textsuperscript{236} Thus, Laclau argues that Agamben’s understanding of bare life’s abandonment by sovereign power “amounts to a radical elimination of the political: a sovereign power which reduces the social bond to bare life....When a supreme will...is not confronted by anything, politics necessarily disappears.”\textsuperscript{237}

Laclau’s second criticism concerns Agamben’s concept of bare life. He reads Agamben as suggesting that a strict distinction between \textit{zooē} and \textit{bios}
actually once held true in Western political life – that is, that the distinction was not only a metaphysical distinction but one that was objectively observable in reality. Agamben forwards a strict separation between life as exclusively zoē (natural life) and life as exclusively bios (political life), he argues. In contrast, Laclau emphasises that “those who have bios obviously have zoē [‘biological – or bare – life’] as well,” and as such the two cannot be assumed to have ever been truly distinct or capable of separation to begin with: “zoē is primarily an abstraction.” Reading zoē as bare life, Laclau asserts that for Agamben’s thesis to hold, “he would have to prove that, in some circumstances, bare life [i.e. zoē] ceases to be an abstraction and becomes a concrete referent.” He basically understands Agamben’s category of bare life to be reductionist, oversimplifying and undifferentiating. Contra Agamben’s figuration of all abandoned life as bare life/zoē, Laclau argues that all lives subject to the ban “can be entirely political...because they...are capable of engaging in antagonistic social practices. They have, in that sense, their own law, and their conflict with the law of the city is a conflict between laws, not between law and bare life.” Thus, while he reads Agamben as equating the two, Laclau argues that abandoned life is not pure zoē. Insomuch as abandoned life is capable of articulating its own antagonisms, laws and politics, is displaces the relation and “logic of exclusion to something which clearly exceeds the notion of ‘bare life.’”

Laclau’s third complaint concerns Agamben’s claim that the camp is the “fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West” and, as the permanent space of the generalised exception, forms the new regulator of the inscription of life in the sovereign nomos. This claim, Laclau charges, constitutes “a naïve teleologism, in which potentiality,” and thus politics, “appears as entirely subordinated to a pre-given actuality.” The three problems addressed above combine, Laclau argues, “to divert Agamben’s attention from really relevant question, which is the system of structural possibilities that each new situation opens” in relation to the ultimate undecidability and contingency of every articulation and particular structural relationship. He complains that Agamben’s approach is not only insensitive to structural diversity, but is totalising and essentialising: insomuch as
it assumes that “origin has a secret determining priority over what follows from it,” it ultimately represents a “sheer teleology.” In conclusion, Laclau addresses Agamben’s idea of a “politics freed from every ban.” For Laclau, a politics beyond every ban or distinction entails not only the “myth of a fully reconciled society,” but simply, “to be beyond politics.” This apolitical myth is what directs Agamben’s discourse, he argues, causing him to disregard the full scope of our socio-structural and political possibilities and to uniformly compound them in an unrelenting “advance towards a totalitarian society” and “the concentration camp as their secret destiny.” In contrast, Laclau asserts that he seeks to identify countercurrents and resistances he believes Agamben’s “essentialist unification” and absolutist conceptualisation of sovereign power prohibit. On this basis and with respect to the criticisms he forwards discussed above, Laclau ends his critique of Agamben with the damning accusation: “Political nihilism is his ultimate message.”

If Laclau’s critique and the reading of Agamben upon which it is based is accepted, then the possibility of reconciling Agamben with discourse theory would seem rather pessimistic. Indeed, Laclau’s critique casts their respective theoretical positions as if they represent utterly incommensurable polar opposites. Laclau’s various complaints resonate strongly with different critiques of Agamben’s thought levied by numerous scholars. These familiar criticisms relate to readings of Agamben’s work as implying an oversimplifying, undifferentiating, essentialising, totalising, teleological, pessimistic and apolitical relation between politics, life, subjectivity and sovereign power. These readings, however, more accurately apply to the vision, logic and operation of sovereign power that Agamben diagnoses than what Agamben himself understands the structural relation it articulates to imply.

Once this thesis’ alternative reading of Agamben’s thought is adopted, however, Laclau’s critique can be brought into relief. The problem with Laclau’s first criticism is that it basically conflates sovereign power’s essentialising, totalising, absolutist vision, logic and operation with Agamben’s diagnosis of these. In this sense, the presuppositions that Laclau assigns to
Agamben’s understanding of life subject to the ban according to which such life is simply outside all law – “sheer separatedness” and “radical indefension” – should be assigned instead to the perspective of sovereign power with respect to the immanent attempt to abandon life and establish strict borders and distinctions in relation to its order. It is the immanent production of bare life by sovereign power for sovereign power according to its presupposition of these characteristics in relation to bare life that makes bare life amenable its sway. The conditions the presuppositions describe, therefore, are not objective, absolute or exhaustive conditions of life in the sovereign ban. Should Agamben claim otherwise, not only would this constitute a grave historical inaccuracy with respect to the many instances in which life abandoned by sovereign power has resisted sovereign power. It would also undermine Agamben’s critical project in terms of his suggestion for renewed, innovative ethico-political thought and praxis connected to form-of-life. Moreover, Agamben clearly indicates on a number of occasions that abandoned, bare life is not without any relation to the communitarian juridico-political order. Rather, it constitutes a limit relation with sovereign power and this order: bare life “is not...an extrapoli-tical...fact...without any relation to law and the city....The relation of exception is a relation of ban. He who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather abandoned by it...on the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable.” Thus read, abandoned life or bare life is not strictly outside the sovereign communitarian juridico-political order – a matter nonrelation/nonlaw/zœ̆ rather than relation/law/bios – but ultimately undecidable and unintelligible. It is this set of conditions that enables sovereign power to attempt to engage in exceptional practices in relation to life abandoned in the space of the camp. “Attempt” is the operative word, because sovereign power precisely does not have a monopoly on how subjects construct their subjectivities, be these those sovereign “includes” in or “excludes” from the juridico-political order. Laclau thus fails to distinguish between the perspective of the essentialising, totalising, absolutist logic and operation of sovereign power in relation to life subject to the sovereign ban and Agamben’s appreciation for the
ultimate undecidability and contingency of the structures, orders, distinctions, meanings and identities articulated by sovereign power and corresponding possibilities for ethico-political thought and praxis, including resistance and subversion.

Laclau’s second criticism reflects an understandable concern that Agamben’s perspective and analysis are totalising and unappreciative of the complex issues at stake. At the centre of such criticism is the idea that Agamben’s concept of bare life is reductionist and homogenising, and therefore too simplistic and essentialising to account for the full complexity of the production of differentiated subjectivities. The force of this criticism is mostly neutralised if this thesis’ reading of bare life is adopted, which distinguishes bare life from rather than reducing it to zoē: “If bare life is treated as precisely an indistinct form of subjectivity that is produced immanently by sovereign power for sovereign power then the true undecidability of the figure of homo sacer is brought into relief.” Doing so permits a differentiated approach to subjectivisation processes because it neither determinately fixes bare life as zoē, for example, nor as something that exists before or outside the biopolitical logic and operation of sovereign power. When thus reformulated, bare life can be read as “a form of subjectivity whose borders are always already rendered undecidable by sovereign power” – a subjectivity whose identity is perennially lacking, split, indistinct, insecure and in doubt, though often in substantially different ways and with different consequences.

Having now addressed Laclau’s first two major criticisms of Agamben, his third and forceful conclusions are more easily alleviated. Laclau reads Agamben’s diagnosis of the historical development of the biopolitical logic and operation of sovereign power culminating in the camp as the generalised space of the exception as naïvely constituting a dual ontological and teleological determinism. Overall, Laclau argues that Agamben’s essentialising and totalising logic ignores the actual scope of structural possibilities available in the world, including struggle and resistance. Once again, however, the criticisms Laclau forwards only make sense if one confuses Agamben’s reading of the logic
and operation of sovereign power with Agamben’s own logic and operation. It is when Agamben offers his own view on the relationship between sovereign power and bare life that he stresses both the undecidability and contingency within the relationship between politics, life and sovereign power and possibilities for subject agency and resistance. The principal problem with failing to differentiate between Agamben’s logic and that of sovereign power is that it obscures crucial aspects of his thought. If Laclau’s reading is accepted, then Agamben’s thoughts on form-of-life as a form of resistance that can render the (de)subjectivisation machine of sovereign power inoperable would either have to be ignored or seen as utterly unintelligible. By way of addressing the closing accusations of Laclau’s critique, according to this thesis’ reading, Agamben’s suggestion for resistance in terms of form-of-life does not amount to his suggestion that a “fully reconciled society” is possible or even desirable. Rather, he suggests that form-of-life can function as an everyday critical ethico-political thought and practice of resistance and subversion targeting the essentialising and totalising vision, logic and operation of sovereign power in order to problematise, resist and, when possible, subverted. The point is not that we can move beyond all borders, abandonments and distinctions, but that we begin to think and act in ways that challenge them and, insomuch as it relies upon them, resist sovereign power. In contrast to Laclau’s reading, that forwarded here underscores Agamben’s overall thesis regarding the ultimate contingency and undecidability – and thus mutability and subvertibility – of the structures, meanings and identities articulated by sovereign power and of sovereign power itself. This, in turn, helps bring into focus the possibilities Agamben sees for ethico-political though and praxis that can contest and even subvert the logic and operation of sovereign power. When the reading of Agamben forwarded by this thesis is adopted, not only is Laclau’s critique brought into relief, but the possibility for identifying multiple points of alignment between Agamben and discourse theory is opened up.
4.1.2. Concord: Shared Poststructuralist Premises and Arguments

The identification of points of alignment between discourse theory and Agambean theory proceed here according to the understanding that Agamben’s diagnosis of the relation between politics, life and sovereign power represents an analogous but more local, context- and problem-specific example of discourse theory’s understanding of the relation between politics, subjectivity/identity and hegemony. With this premise in place, we can now proceed with the identification of points of convergence between discourse theory and Agamben according to certain shared poststructuralist premises and areas of argumentation. The identification of these convergences is rather schematic on account of the limits of this thesis and the fact that certain points of alignment have already been intimated by bringing Laclau’s critique of Agamben into relief.

Discourse theory’s anti-essentialist and anti-foundationalist premises are evidenced in Agamben’s thought according to his appreciation for the ultimate undecidability and indistinction of classical political categories and ostensible distinctions more generally. Laclau even acknowledges this shared concern for *critical structural explanation* in terms of undecidability.\(^{269}\) This, in turn, highlights these theories’ alignment with regards to the negative, differential construction of structure/meaning/identity according to the decision on the exclusion/exception/antagonism of an outside/other from an undecidable terrain of abstraction *between* possible distinctions.\(^{270}\) This common understanding also reflects an appreciation for the contingency of any decision/articulation precisely because these are made upon this undecidable terrain. Thus, both are concerned with challenging the knowledge, meanings and identities we take for granted as well as how their production is influenced by and influences social processes and social action. This shared understanding ties into yet another: insomuch as the subject constructs its identity in accordance with a particular regime of truth, these regimes limit the freedom or agency of the subject in terms of how it should (not) act, what it should (not) articulate and, indeed, what constitutes an intelligible articulation in the first place.\(^{271}\)
Moreover, Agamben shares discourse theory’s concern for the performative (re)production of limits, borders or political frontiers in accordance with articulating distinctions and thereby excluding certain meanings/identities from inclusion in socio-political space. Each also recognises that the exclusion/exception of the constitutive outside/other is what constructs the limits of any social order and provides the condition of possibility for determinate entities to provisionally appear as if they constituted strictly bordered totality. Similarly, each acknowledge that this constitutive outside/other is simultaneously also the condition of impossibility for those determinate entities to constitute objective totalities. In connection to these limits, both discourse theory and Agamben recognise the constitutive importance of determining an excluded outside or other. In discourse theory, this relates to the articulation of an antagonism. In Agambean theory, this relates to the sovereign decision on the exception or abandonment of life. As already intimated, they both recognise the indistinction in and subversion of structure/space/meaning/identity that this constitutive negativity/outside/other/antagonism implies. Moreover, they both acknowledge the primacy of (re)producing this framework in conventional Western politics. Agamben’s recognition of this primacy is clearly evidenced throughout his treatment of the relation between politics, life and sovereign power with respect to the exception/ban of life. For discourse theory, the production of structural frameworks for the ordering of discursive socio-political space according the effects of limits/borders/frontiers – “the constitution of the very identities which will have to confront one another antagonistically” – is “the first of political problems.” Both discourse theory and Agamben demonstrate a commitment to understanding the subject in terms of being constitutively split and lacking in relation to a constitutive outside/other/antagonism and the Other in terms of the metaphysical language/discourse structures of Western thought. This leads to the last point of convergence between discourse theory and Agamben identified here by this thesis – further interrogation would surely render more. Discourse theory and Agamben converge on the argument that the subject’s limit-experience, its experience of contingency and undecidability in a
dislocated zone of indistinction, does not involve the possibility of accessing a space before or beyond the structures and differences of language. Laclau and Mouffe flat-out deny the possibility of this “beyond:” “there is no beyond.”\textsuperscript{275} In contrast, Agamben’s suggestion for a renewal of categories based on novel forms of ethico-political thought and praxis entails \textit{thinking} the possibility of this somewhere “beyond” or between differences, though he also implies its ultimate impossibility: “Where, after all, would this somewhere be?”\textsuperscript{276} Together with those above, these last points reflect basically shared theoretical commitments to an anti-essentialist ontology and an anti-foundationalist epistemology.

4.1.3. Conceptual Complementarity: Reconciling Key Concepts
Laclau suggests in his critique of Agamben that “sovereignty,” understood in the present context as sovereign power, “should be conceived as hegemony.”\textsuperscript{277} Having brought Laclau’s critique into relief and identified shared poststructuralist premises between Agamben and discourse theory above, Laclau’s argument here can be read as containing the cipher according to which the analogous correspondence or complementarity between certain respective key concepts of these theories can be developed. Insomuch as, on the one hand, sovereign power is linked to virtually every other aspect of Agamben’s theory of the relation between it, politics and life and, on the other hand, hegemony is tied to virtually every other aspect of discourse theory, we can instrumentalise Laclau’s equation of sovereign power and hegemony in order to match and potentially merge other key concepts from these respective theories. Employing Laclau’s claim that sovereign power is hegemony, this thesis argues that it is instructive to refine this claim in terms of understanding sovereign power as a particular form of hegemony, and its operation a specific form of hegemonic operation. In similar fashion to Vaughan-Williams’ recasting of Agamben’s central thesis into the alternative border imaginary of the GBB, this thesis fuses these with and reconceptualises them in terms of discourse theory’s understanding of the hegemonic articulation of an antagonism constitutive of political borders. Thus, the basic move by this thesis is to: 1) analogously merge discourse theory’s more general conceptualisation of the hegemonic articulation of antagonism with the
problem-specific context of Agamben’s thesis of the sovereign decision on the exception/abandonment of life upon which Vaughan-Williams bases the GBB; and 2) to think all of these as respective but reconcilable renditions of the (re)production of political borders (compare Figure 6 with Figures 4 and 5).

A detailed reading of the complementarity between specific concepts and areas of thought in discourse theory and specific concepts and dimensions of Agamben’s theory of the relation between politics, life and sovereign power is beyond the scope of this thesis. The task then is for future inquiry to interrogate the possibilities of developing and refining this theoretical and conceptual reconciliation further. For now, the intention is to provide an introduction to the possibility for reconciling discourse theory and Agambean theory at the conceptual level so that this might be instrumentalised in the development of multiperspectival methodologies for the analysis of the (re)production of sovereign borders in concrete textual analysis.

*Figure 6* below illustrates the structural relationship formed according to the sovereign decision on the exception or abandonment of life which has been recast as an analogous and more context- and problem-specific of discourse theory’s understanding of the structural relationship formed according to the hegemonic articulation of an antagonism.

*Figure 6. Sovereign decision on the exception/abandonment of life analogous to hegemonic articulation of an antagonism*
4.2. Developing a Multiperspectival Methodology for Analysing Concrete Textual Material in the (Re)production of Sovereign Borders

In the present context we are concerned with the possibility of methodologically analysing concrete textual materials in the (re)production of sovereign borders according to the reconciled, multiperspectival theoretical and conceptual apparatus established by the previous sections. The idea is to condition and instrumentalise the critical reconciliation performed in these sections, especially at the conceptual level, in order to extrapolate from it particular methodological tools that might be applied to context-specific analyses of concrete textual material in the (re)production of sovereign borders.

As observed previously, Laclau and Mouffe do not provide a method for discourse analysis based on their theory of discourse. It is nevertheless possible to identify on the basis of their theoretical and conceptual apparatus what some general methodological possibilities for discourse analyses employing their theory might be. However, while the presentation of clearly elaborated methodologies in poststructural discourse analysis is important, it is neither possible nor desirable to seek to provide a universal, “all-purpose” method approach that can be applied to analyse every discursive context. Rather, methodologies drawing on discourse theory must be tailored to the specific discursive contexts and problems upon which concrete analyses focus. The development and illustration of a coherent multiperspectival methodology for analysing concrete textual material in the (re)production of sovereign borders on the basis of the critical reconciliation of the GBB via its Agamben roots with discourse theory here will therefore focus on the particular context and problem it seeks to address. In other words, it is geared towards addressing the particular problem of interrogating the role of concrete textual material in the (re)production of sovereign borders within particular discursive contexts and is informed by the general methodological possibilities of discourse theory elucidated by, among others, Howarth, Jørgensen and Phillips and Torfing. The objective is to: 1) develop a multiperspectival methodology for approaching analysis of concrete textual material in the
(re)production of sovereign borders; 2) illustrate how this methodology might be applied in a practical analysis of specific textual materials within the context of Frontex discourse on border control; and 3) discuss what might be gained and learned from doing so, as well as what certain limitations to this multiperspectival methodological approach might be in the following chapter.

### 4.2.1. Methodologically Conditioning and Instrumentalising the Reconciled Theoretical and Conceptual Apparatus

A useful starting point in seeking to develop the desired multiperspectival methodology is to make a basic stipulation. This stipulation should be used to guide the development and application of methodologies based on the multiperspectival approach suggested here for the analysis of concrete textual material in the reproduction of sovereign borders. This involves conditioning the ability to conclude that the textual material being analysed demonstrates the (re)production of sovereign borders according to the multiperspectival understanding of sovereign power established by this thesis.

Discourse theory conditions its definition of hegemony, as in hegemonic practice, upon two aspects of discourse. The first condition is that hegemonic articulation operates according the construction of an antagonistic discursive field and corresponding chains of equivalence and frontier effects. The second condition is that the articulation the frontier effects resulting from the articulation of the antagonism related chains of equivalence in terms of inclusion and exclusion in discursive communitarian space be contested therefore unstable. Thus, “the two conditions of a hegemonic articulation are the presence of antagonistic forces and the instability of the frontiers which separate them.”

The conditioning of hegemony upon antagonisms, chains of equivalence and the instability of its frontier effects due to the contestation of its articulations underscores the point that hegemony is formed through and sustained in perennial conditions of discursive struggle, contestation and resistance, necessitating its constant redefinition of meaning and identity in its articulations. In order to speak of the (re)production of sovereign borders in the specific concrete textual material
being analysed and with respect to its intertextual relations, therefore, it must be shown that the text establishes chains of equivalence in relation to inclusion and exclusion in discursive space and according to the articulation of antagonism(s). Corollarily, analysis of the textual material’s intertextual relations must establish the contestation of these articulations, also because these demonstrate the instability of the frontier effects and the correlative system of differences established within the text.

According to this thesis, the operation of sovereign power in terms of the (re)production of bare life through excepting or abandoning certain categories of life from sovereign space and the correlate conditioning of life “included” in that space is seen as analogous to the definition of hegemony above. In this sense, the understanding of the (re)production of sovereign borders and their inevitable contestation according to the register of the GBB is understood to be analogous to the (re)production of frontier effects through hegemonic articulation. Read in this way, the (re)production of bare life according to the sovereign exception/ban and the tracing of limits/borders between ostensibly distinct categories of life in order to constitute the nomos and bios therein corresponds to the hegemonic articulation of antagonisms and the (re)production of political frontiers conditioning chains of equivalence in the process of (re)structuring hegemonic discursive space.

Lastly, as understood by this thesis, the explicit articulatory production of zones of indistinction is a feature of sovereign power and is increasingly prominent in the operation of sovereign power under contemporary biopolitical conditions. Analysis might look to identify such explicit dislocatory articulations of classical political categories into zones of indistinction in concrete textual materials. However, the production of zones of indistinction and the undecidability they entail is implicit in every articulation of ostensibly determinate structure or meaning/identity. As such, the explicit production of zones of indistinction in the text being analysed does not here form part of the basic requirement for being able to conclude that the text is (re)productive of sovereign borders. On the other hand, however, this thesis argues that in order to be able to speak of the (re)production of sovereign borders in textual material in
the strict sense, the articulation of the sovereign decision on the exception/ban (antagonism(s) in discourse theoretical terms) must be explicit rather than simply implied by the articulation of a chain of equivalence “included” within sovereign-discursive space. It is the direct attempt to (re)produce sovereign borders through concrete textual materials and not the indirect implication of these borders – such as only making reference to a “positively” “included” chain of equivalence in discursive space – that is the immediate concern of the multiperspectival methodology offered here. In sum, the conditioning here of the possibility to conclude that the textual material under analysis (re)produces sovereign borders means that analysis must demonstrate the text’s articulation of equivalence, an explicit antagonism and the contestation of such articulation and the frontier/border effects it seeks to (re)establish.

In addition to this stipulation, it is instructive to provide a guiding hypothesis with respect to the specific discourse and textual material in question, such as: “The selected concrete textual material and intertextual relations of X discourse is (re)productive of sovereign borders.” Using the stipulation and hypothesis above as a framework and guide, some of the multiperspectival methodological possibilities for research and analysis yielded by this thesis’ reconciliation of the GBB on the basis its Agambean roots with discourse theory can now be explored.

An initial problem with respect to the present multiperspectival methodology for analysing text in the (re)production of sovereign borders concerns the question of how to delimit analysis. The goal in developing the present multiperspectival methodology for analysing the (re)production of sovereign borders concerns addressing the role of concrete textual materials in this (re)production. It is therefore necessary to delimit analytical scope to a strategically selected number of articulated concrete text materials from discourses within a broader discursive formation; obviously this entails the need to identify these “through an initial survey of relevant texts, including existing research on the topic.” Focusing on discourse at the specific level of its articulations in concrete textual materials helps highlight the distinction between
discourse and articulation: “the discourse is the more abstract fixation of meaning, and articulation is the specific action that draws on or transforms the discourse.”

It is in accordance with the latter then, that we can potentially identify the (re)production of sovereign borders through concrete textual materials.

As a part of the strategic selection of texts, the researcher will need to consider how the concrete textual materials analysis focuses upon relate intertextually with other texts. This is relevant in terms of understanding what other discourses/articulations might contextually frame these materials, that they might draw upon and reproduce or alter, or that might contest and alter them. As such, addressing intertextual relations to other texts not only provides a more comprehensive picture of the primary textual material for analysis. It also helps satisfy the stipulation elaborated above in terms of identifying counter-discourses that contest the articulation of meaning and identity in this textual material and thus its (re)production of frontier effects. In order to identify such intertextual relations, it is instrumental to identify empty signifiers within the textual material selected for analysis because it is precisely the context-specific articulations of these signifiers that are most often contested by alternative articulations. One can then more easily identify what alternative articulations the textual material in question positively and negatively relates to intertextually.

The identification of empty signifiers in the text is also instrumental in terms of being able to determine how these work to construct the antagonistic terrain upon which we have conditioned the multiperspectival definition of sovereign power and thus the (re)production of sovereign borders above. It is precisely around these signifiers that articulations establish chains of equivalence in relation to those meanings and identities it “includes” in the “totality” of discursive space and those it “excludes” or abandons in the position of antagonisms. Identifying empty signifiers in the text and the organisation of meanings and identities through them is therefore a crucial step towards being able to determine whether or not the concrete textual material under analysis is (re)productive of sovereign borders.
The task of the analyst is thus to try to identify an “identical something” around which meaning and identity is organised in the textual material to form a chain of equivalence. From here, the analyst should look to identify the explicit articulation of an antagonism within the text. One can then seek to determine in relation to this “included” the chain of equivalence established through an empty signifier the antagonistic chain of equivalence “excluded” from and “threatening” it. As noted above, the analyst should also seek to determine according to these structural relations how the text being analysed relates intertextually with other articulations/discourses. It should do so, moreover, with particular regard to fulfilling the multiperspectival definition of sovereign power and the (re)production of sovereign borders according to which the text being analysed must be shown to be contested.

In seeking to advocate the merits of the overall multiperspectival methodological approach suggested here, it is instructive to illustrate a delimited, context-specific and sensitive approach to the analysis of concrete textual material in the (re)production of sovereign borders. In order to do so, the overall multiperspectival methodological approach will be illustrated according to its tailoring to the analysis of concrete textual materials in Frontex discourse on border control and the possibility that these function to (re)produce sovereign borders.\textsuperscript{288}

4.2.2. Illustrating this Multiperspectival Methodological Approach for Analysing Concrete Textual Material in the (Re)production of Sovereign Borders
4.2.2.1. The Concrete Textual Dimension of Frontex Discourse on Border Control
A detailed examination of Frontex remains beyond the scope of this thesis, as does a more exhaustive examination of the concrete textual dimension of its discourse on border control according to the present illustration of the suggested multiperspectival methodological framework in a specific analytical context. With respect to the limits of this thesis and for the simple purpose of providing an illustration rather than a full-blown analysis of the role of concrete textual materials of Frontex discourse on border control in the (re)production of
sovereign borders, only one text has been selected: a feature story produced by
Frontex and published on its website under the title Smarter, Faster, Safer? This
concrete textual material is taken as constituting part of Frontex discourse on
border control.

In seeking illustrate the applicability of the multiperspectival methodology
developed above, the broader context of EU discourse on security and migration
was identified as largely constitutive of the discursive formation within which
Frontex discourse and specific articulations on border control is situated and upon
which these draw. A number of counter-discourses were also identified by the
initial survey conducted by this thesis, although only one such counter-discourse
will briefly addressed here.

4.2.2.2. Context and Intertextual Relations: EU Discourse on Security and
Migration
The EU security environment has since the 2003 European Security Strategy
(ESS) been framed according to threats and challenges in the context of 1) the
removal of internal border controls in the Schengen area and 2) globalisation.289
This framing was confirmed in the EU’s 2010 Internal Security Strategy (ISS).290
In response to the perceived threats and challenges globalisation entails, the ESS
and ISS declare the old security model of self-defence based largely on pre- and
Cold War concerns over the threat of invasion as obsolete. The globalisation
context of “increasingly open borders” demands proactive approaches to EU
security by combating threats beyond EU territory “in which the internal and
external aspects of security are indissolubly linked....With the new threats, the
first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic....This
implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs.”291 The notions that
internal and external security are inextricability linked and that “threat prevention
cannot start too early” are central aspects in both the 2003 ESS and 2010 ISS, as
well as in other policy documents.292 In response to such beliefs, the EU has
adopted a “global security” paradigm intended to be adaptable to both the needs
of EU citizens and the “challenges of the dynamic and global twenty-first
century.”293
Irregular migration has featured prominently as a “threat” on the EU global security paradigm’s radar, especially as it is seen to be interrelated with other perceived threats, such as terrorism, human trafficking, other forms of serious and organised crime, and cybercrime. Migration control, and irregular migration in particular, now appears “firmly at the top of the European Union’s political agenda.” Within this context the EU has prioritised strategies to control the movement of “risky” subjects before they reach the EU’s territorial borders: “any action to counter irregular migratory flows should take place as close as possible to the irregular migrants concerned, the EU should promote actions in, and support actions of, countries of origin and transit.” In this way the EU aims to fulfil “the need for more efficient management of migration flows at all stages and to tackle illegal immigration at its source.”

4.2.2.3. Frontex Concrete Textual Materials on Border Control: (Re)producing Sovereign Borders?
The concrete textual material appearing in Smarter, Faster, Safer? articulates the empty signifier “smart borders” “border management” around which it organises an “included” chain of equivalence and an “excluded” or abandoned chain of equivalence in the position of an antagonism. The empty signifier “smart borders” is also linked to the “threat” posed by “the number of external border crossings exceeding 700 million each year and expected to keep rising.” “Smart borders” is articulated in relation to the application of “new technologies and intelligence-led targeting to separate the vast majority of bona fide travellers from the small number of transgressors, be they irregular migrants, cross-border criminal groups or suspected threats to European security.” This clearly demonstrates the function of this empty signifier in relation to establishing a positive chain of equivalence organised around and “included” within it and a corresponding abandoned chain of equivalence. The first chain consists of “new technologies,” “intelligence-led targeting,” “bona fide travellers” and “European security.” This chain combines with other meanings and identities in the text to form a broader chain including “Eurosur,” “pre-vetted regular border-crossers,” “business travellers” and “EU’s citizens.” Notably, the text excludes from this
particular chain of equivalence the additional empty signifiers around which EU communitarian juridico-political space is often articulated elsewhere, namely “freedom” and “justice.” In fact, in relation the “smart borders” empty signifier, the textual material explicitly articulates a zone of indistinction between the classical political categories “security” and “freedom,” expressing the need to strike “a balance between security and freedom at the EU’s external borders” as if these were mutually opposed categories according to which one should be defined against the other.299 The explicit blurring of these categories into a zone of indistinction combines with the articulation of the other moments in the “included” chain of equivalence to generate an understanding that this equivalence primarily relates to “security,” not “freedom” or “justice,” which is totally absent from the text. The implication is the production of the bare life of the “bona fide travellers” in terms of this identity’s or category of life’s exclusive inclusion in EU communitarian juridico-political (discursive) space. Arguably, this is even more the case with respect to the conditioning of this identity against the second, antagonistic chain of equivalence. This chain is formed according to “transgressors,” “irregular migrants,” “cross-border criminal groups” and “suspected threats.” It represents those categories of life abandoned by the articulation of the textual material, whose “threatening” identities are inclusively excluded and thereby produced as the bare life against which “EU citizens,” “bona fide travellers” and “EU security,” for example, are constructed and secured. Only following this antagonistic chain does the text condition the potential benefits “smart borders” might have on their “experience” of “freedom” as it is balanced against “security:” “for most travellers...[‘smart borders’]...will be noticeable in the form of faster and more efficient border crossings, particularly at airports.”300

On the basis of this concrete textual analysis, we can identify certain aspects of the text which contribute towards the possibility of concluding that this text is (re)productive of sovereign borders. It articulates an empty signifier, “smart borders” around which a chain of equivalence is organised to link a number of “identical” meanings and identities and in relation to which an abandoned,
antagonistic chain of equivalence is established. As such, the text signifies the production of bare life excepted from the discursive space it articulates. Moreover, it also articulates those categories of life “included” in that discursive space as bare life in accordance with the explicit production of a zone of indistinction between classical political categories: “freedom” and “security.” Therefore, the illustration here of an analysis of concrete textual material of Frontex discourse on border control has partially fulfilled the stipulated conditioning of the ability to conclude that the text is (re)productive of sovereign borders.

However, as the stipulation makes clear, in order to make this conclusion on the double conditioning of the multiperspectival understanding of sovereign power employed by this methodological approach, we must also identify antagonistic counter-discourses that contest and destabilise the frontier effects produced by the text analysed above. Only then can we coherently conclude that these frontier effects refer to the (re)production of sovereign borders according to the multiperspectival methodological approach developed by this thesis.

4.2.2.4. Context and Intertextual Relations: Counter-Discourses of Resistance
Numerous counter-discourses to Frontex discourse on border control can be identified through their articulation by diverse actors, such as Amnesty International, the Fortress Europe blog, HRW, Migreurop, UNITED, Watch the Med and other human rights-interested organisations, groups and individuals concerned with the agency’s operations and especially the impacts these have on migrants’ and refugees’ lives. The interrogation here of intertextual counter-discourses of resistance in relation to the (re)production of sovereign borders through concrete textual materials of Frontex discourse on border control concentrates on what this thesis sees as constituting an instance of basic contestation and effective resistance to this (re)production. More specifically, the counter-discourse is articulated by the No Borders UK network.

This network of groups and individuals are engaged in a counter-discourse against borders and immigration controls to “create a world without borders.”302 The network is primarily anarchist-based and anti-capitalist but articulates a
vision of a more cosmopolitan world in which “no one is prevented from moving because of where...[they] were born, or because of race, class or economic resources, or because of any other barrier imposed on us by capitalist elites and their governments and police.” It argues that “[b]orders are used to divide and rule us, for example to set ‘citizens’ competing against ‘illegal workers, and to impose the law of the market.”

In this way, it contests the borders Frontex and others seek to (re)produces and seeks to breakdown distinctions, privileges and hierarchies between all categories of life, insisting that “a world without borders must also mean a world without states.”

In this way, the network not only contests the articulations of the concrete textual material analysed above but, reflecting Edkins and Pin-Fat’s arguments on effective resistance of sovereign power, more generally reject the borders and distinctions upon which the logic and operation of sovereign power in the abstract sense depend.

On the basis of having identified this counter-discourse evidencing the instability of the border/frontier effects of the concrete textual material treated above and together with that treatment’s partial fulfilment of the multiperspectival stipulation at work, we can thereby conclude that this concrete textual material of Frontex discourse on border control is (re)productive of sovereign borders.

**Notes**


231 Ibid. p. 4.


concentration camps as “the most absolute biopolitical space that has ever been realised – a space in which power confronts nothing other than pure biological life without any mediation,” detainees in Guantánamo and the over-comatose. However, because Agamben arguably states these things in relation to the logic and operation of sovereign power itself – that is, with respect to the immanent attempt to produce of bare life in zones of indistinction by sovereign power and for sovereign power – it is unlikely that Agamben would claim that life in the camps was or is entirely without possibilities for resistance. This claim would not only seem to undermine Agamben’s critical project of resistance and ethico-political thought and practice in relation to sovereign power and the space of the camp, but would also simply be historically inaccurate. Agamben, Giorgio. Means without End: Notes on Politics. Trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009, p. 41; Agamben, Giorgio. State of Exception. Trans. Kevin Attell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. pp. 3-4; Raulff, Ulrich. “An Interview with Giorgio Agamben – A Life, A Work of Art Without an Author: The State of Exception, the Administration of Disorder and Private Life,” German Law Journal, Vol. 5, No. 5 (2004): pp. 609-614; see also: Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. pp. 154ff.


259 This reading of bare life as zoé also seems to inform elements of Laclau first criticism: namely, the reading and presuppositions of life on the receiving end of the ban as implying a form of life that is simply outside the communitarian order, entirely solitary and lacking in any form of political identity, utterly defenceless relative to sovereign power. Ibid. pp. 17-18.


261 Ibid. p. 19.


265 Ibid. pp. 11-12; for more references to Agamben’s teleology, see: pp. 17, 20-22.


272 More specifically, these readings entail: 1) that the concept of bare life is differentiated from zoé and understood in term of virtuality and becoming; 2) that the figure of form-of-life aligns with Foucault’s understanding of resistance as desubjectivation and self-bricolage and being-in-(im)potentiality with respect to the thought and experience of the limit, in contrast to an objective Being of pure presence beyond every ban; 3) that Agamben’s understanding of a new politics of ethico-political thought and praxis tied to form-of-life – as a remnant, interval or lack within an uncertain terrain or zone of indistinction and between the classical political categories of sovereign biopoliticies – hinges upon the possibility of limits, border and distinctions, not transcending them absolutely; and 4) that Agamben’s logic is distinguished from his diagnosis of the essentialising, totalising vision, logic and operation of sovereign power.


272 Ibid. p. 22.


274 Agamben’s point, however, it is argued here, is not the denial of the discourse theoretical claim that “social division is inherent in the possibility of politics, and...the very possibility of a democratic politics.” Rather, it is that this presupposition be subjectively challenged in accordance with limit-experiences that confronts subjects with undecidability and contingency and can function to contest and even render inoperative sovereign power. That is, the idea and acceptance of social division as inherent and necessary to politics needs itself to be reactivated or politicised according to new modes of ethico-political thought and praxis, Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. Trans. Winston Moore and Paul Cammack. London: Verso, 1985. p. xiv.

Agamben addresses this limiting of the subject’s scope of possibilities in the specific context of (de)subjectivisation processes related to sovereign power, whereas discourse theory does so in relation to discourses more generally.


The points of convergence identified here and the possibility that others might be identified represent promising new avenues for theoretical, empirical and methodological inquiry in social science.
Chapter 5. Discussion

5.1. Value-Added Approach
5.1.1. Multiperspectival Methodological Benefits

The presentation of a clearly elaborated methodology guiding one’s analysis enables more balanced debate according to a research study’s own terms. It also facilitates further theory-building and methodological development and refinement while allowing researchers to more easily follow with and build-upon analyses of concrete textual material in the same discursive context, others that closely relate to it, or other contexts entirely in which the (re)production of sovereign borders unfolds. More specifically, insomuch as this thesis has managed to coherently integrate the suggested multiperspectival methodology into the register of the GBB, there are a number of benefits it offers this register for analysing the (re)production of sovereign borders.

Firstly, the multiperspectival methodological approach tendered here does not presuppose the operation of sovereign power or the (re)production of bare life in zones of indistinction in the concrete textual materials to which it might be applied. Rather, it clearly conditions the possibility for the researcher to conclude that the selected text(s) are (re)productive of sovereign borders. The implication is not that this should lead to “confirmation bias” in the research analysis – that is, the tendency to pay greater credence to data that supports one’s theoretical model and adhere to one’s theoretical conceits rather than looking for data which might undermine them. Rather, the recognition of “false positives” through the research process and in analysis according to the researcher’s adherence to the condition of the stipulation put down by the multiperspectival methodology for concluding that the text analysed is (re)productive of sovereign borders and openness to the disproval of one’s research hypothesis provides a greater degree of transparency and rigour to this style of scholarship.

Secondly, the multiperspectival methodological approach advocated here emphasises the intertextual dimension of the (re)production of sovereign borders and requires a more comprehensive approach to textual analysis in term of what other discursive articulations and texts that under analysis might draw upon,
reproduce or be contested by. It requires contextualising analysis and recognising the broader set of relations involved in the (re)production of sovereign borders than those that might be immediately present in the primary textual material being analysed.

Lastly, the multiperspectival stipulation requiring counter-discourses of resistance to be identified in order to qualify the results of analysis as demonstrating the (re)production of sovereign borders helps underscore Vaughan-Williams’ observation of the contested and contingent character of every attempt to realise this (re)production.306

5.1.2. Benefits of Concrete Textual Analysis: A More Comprehensive Register for the GBB
This thesis has critically reconciled the GBB with discourse theory and translated this reconciliation into a coherent multiperspectival methodological for analysing concrete textual material in the (re)production of sovereign borders. Notably, its illustration of the multiperspectival methodological approach applied to the analysis of concrete textual material in the (re)production of sovereign borders within the context of Frontex discourse on border control is an obvious one. That being said, the illustration the thesis provides should not detract from the point that analyses of concrete textual materials can be more sensitive to the (re)production of sovereign borders in everyday articulations concerning religion, integration, criminality, unemployment etc. As such, the approach provides an additional means for approaching the (re)production of sovereign borders in terms of the diffused, generalised character of this (re)production permeating everyday social life and global politics. In this way it gives further credence to Vaughan-Williams’ claim that the (re)production of borders at different levels of socio-political life “inevitably fold into one another.”307 It can be said to provide a methodologically-guided means by which we can identify, compared to the rather spectacular examples Vaughan-Williams provides through his analyses of various empirical contexts according to the GBB, the (re)production of sovereign borders in “cases no less extreme and still more familiar.”308 Moreover, adopting a detailed approach to analysing the (re)production of sovereign borders in concrete
textual materials based on the suggested multiperspectival methodology enables the appreciation the more intricate textual relations involved in this (re)production than Vaughan-Williams’ decontextualised treatments of categories like “bona fide” and “risky” appreciate.

To be clear, the intention of this thesis in suggesting the multiperspectival methodology and form of analysis it suggests is certainly not to displace or discard the GBB. Rather, the intention has been to merge the current strengths of the GBB with the analytical possibilities proffered by the multiperspectival methodology tendered here and its appreciation for detailed analyses of concrete textual material. In doing this, the argument is that the GBB is provided with a more comprehensive analytical register that can coherently address problems of both the sovereign bordering practices upon which it has been focused to date and/or sovereign bordering in concrete textual materials and, ergo, language more generally as well. The implication is that analyses of practices and texts in the (re)production of sovereign borders can be undertaken within individual research projects or can complement and supplement each other between respective research projects. Thereby, a more comprehensive understanding of the (re)production of sovereign borders according to different dimensions of social life and different contexts can be established. Crucially, this can lead to an appreciation for how practices, language and textual material more specifically interlock in mutually contingent fashion in the (re)production of sovereign borders. Thus, overall, the incorporation of the multiperspectival methodological approach into the current register of the GBB offers that analytical apparatus an enhanced capacity to more precisely and comprehensively identify, analyse, understand and thereby potentially resist the (re)production of sovereign borders in everyday life and contemporary global politics more generally.

The implications of the suggested multiperspectival approach to studying the (re)production of sovereign borders and the possibilities for developing both more detailed and comprehensive understandings of this (re)production through the analysis of both practices and textual materials in it lead to one last consideration to be made here. For discourse theory, every aspect of the social is
constituted in discourse and can be interrogated according to discourse analytical tools. This appreciation has been imported into the analytical register of the GBB by reconciling it at the theoretical level with discourse theory. The implication then is that, besides the possibility for incorporating interrogations of both sovereign bordering practices and texts into research projects or establishing supplementarity between respective projects focusing on either within specific contexts according to the framework of the GBB, complimentary methodologies for addressing other dimensions of discourse might be developed as well. Such multiperspectival methodologies based on the critical reconciliation performed by this thesis or its further development might seek to focus on addressing questions of the role of (de)subjectivisation and socio-material objects in the (re)production of sovereign borders. More specifically, this could entail approaching the study of the (re)production of sovereign borders according to the multiperspectival analytical register of the GBB advocated here in terms of what we might call “sovereign bordering discourse.” The further pursuit of this line of inquiry, however, is beyond this scope of this thesis.

5.2. Limitations
This thesis is limited in a number of ways and leaves a number of avenues for potential thought and research unaddressed. For instance, the possibility for reconciling the GBB on the basis of its roots in Agambenian theory with discourse theory at both theoretical and conceptual levels warrants further interrogation. Considering alternative possibilities for how this reconciliation may or not be performed and identifying further points of converge and discord would prove instrumental. This is not only to the case when it comes to debating, developing and refining the multiperspectival methodology developed herein, but as concerns possibilities for developing multiperspectival methodologies for the analysis of the (re)production of sovereign borders in relation to other dimensions of discourse. Further investigation into the potential for reconciling these bodies of theory at the conceptual level might also prove fruitful and provocative both in terms of theory, analysis and ethico-political thought and praxis, such as the
potential implications of exploring the possibility for form-of-life, as read by this thesis, to approach and compliment Laclau’s concept of subjective hybridity and/or Mouffe’s notion of agonism.  

The greatest gap left by this thesis is arguably left by the inability to adequately conduct and provide a comprehensive analysis of concrete textual materials in the (re)production of sovereign borders in one or a number of empirical contexts. More work is needed in this area in order to test and try the application of the suggested multiperspectival methodology according to specific problems and contexts that might relate to the (re)production of sovereign borders.

Notes


310 The potential for developing various, problem-driven multiperspectival methodological approaches to the analysis of different discursive dimensions involved in the (re)production of sovereign border in specific context points to what this thesis considers to be a promising avenue for further thought and research in terms of both theory-building and methodological development and refinement.

Chapter 6. Conclusion

Ultimately this thesis represents a work-in-progress. The multiperspectival methodological guidelines and specific illustration of how these might be tailored to and implemented in specific problem-driven areas of analysis it offers are nascent and tentative, in need of debate, further development and refinement. Indeed, multiple potential avenues for further though and research emerging from this thesis remain open.

Nevertheless, it is the hope here that these “loose ends” will be taken up and interrogated. Already, the argument goes here, this thesis has made a valuable contribution to the analytical register of the GBB by critically reconciling it with discourse theory and translating this reconciled theoretical and conceptual apparatus into a coherent multiperspectival methodology for the analysis of concrete textual material in the (re)production of sovereign borders. In so doing, it has also contributed towards the development of a more comprehensive register for the GBB and indicating possibilities for thinking the (re)production of sovereign borders according to a more general approach to this (re)production in terms of sovereign bordering discourse. It thereby offers not only a means for enhancing our capacity to more precisely and comprehensively identify, analyse and understand the (re)production of sovereign borders in different dimensions of social life, but a more refined instrument according to which they might effectively be resisted.
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Appendix A: Glossary of Terms in Discourse Theory

Table 1 below presents a glossary of terms related to Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory. The list of terms included exceeds those addressed by this thesis above. The intention is to offer the reader in a succinct manner a more comprehensive conceptual framework related to discourse theory than the limits of this thesis would otherwise permit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Apparatus</th>
<th>Concepts</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analytical Approach</td>
<td>Discourse Analysis based on Deconstruction of Hegemonic Discursive Structures</td>
<td>Deconstruction is a Derridean notion referring to the constant destabilisation of the metaphorical language structures of any given context in Western thought due to the undecidability traced by the movement of play of undecidables (e.g. difference) between the constitutively negative construction of ostensibly distinct categories whose meanings/identities are always-already deferred and differed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactivation/re/politicisation</td>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>A discourse is a contingent relational, structured “totality” of signifying sequences that together constitute a more or less coherent framework for what can be said and done.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discursive formation (order of discourse)</td>
<td>Discourse</td>
<td>A discursive formation, understood in terms of the concept “order of discourse” in Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis, is the result of the articulation of a variety of discourses into a relatively unified whole through hegemonic practices (e.g. sovereignty, liberal democracy, human rights etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sign</td>
<td>Sign</td>
<td>The conjoning of a signifier and signified in a unit signifying meaning/identity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signified</td>
<td>Signified</td>
<td>The concept/thought/content conveyed by a certain signifier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elements</td>
<td>Elements</td>
<td>Signifiers whose meanings are multiple and have not yet been fixed in a discourse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articulation</td>
<td>Articulation</td>
<td>A practice establishing a structural relation among elements/signifiers in such a way that their meaning/identity is changed/redefined as a consequence of the articulatory practice. It is a practice proceeding from and conditioned upon an undecidable terrain of indistinction between all structural possibilities but which nevertheless seeks to fix elements into moments (meanings/identities) of a discourse order/chain of signification. This practice can never succeed at establishing any final fixation of structure/meaning/identity because it is conditioned by undecidability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moments</td>
<td>Moments</td>
<td>Elements whose meaning/identity has been partially fixed through articulation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closure</td>
<td>Closure</td>
<td>The apparent fixity of a signifier’s meaning/identity within a discourse.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutive outside/other</td>
<td>Constitutive outside/other</td>
<td>The constitutive outside/other is a discursive exteriority/negativity excluded in the process of representing a discourse’s structure as if it were a strictly distinct, fixed, sutured totality (synonymous with the role of an antaognism). This negativity cannot be domesticated and simply related to the moments and...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field of discursivity/the discursive:</td>
<td>The irreducible surplus, contingency and undecidability of meaning/identity a discourse excludes according to its partial (can never be total or absolute) fixation of meaning/identity. An undesirable terrain of all contingent semantic/articulatory potentiality. A discourse is always constituted in relation to a field of discursivity it excludes. The field of discursivity simultaneously harbours the condition of possibility for discourse as well as condition of impossibility in terms of its contestation, decentredness, dislocation and subversion.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Floating signifiers</strong></td>
<td>Signifiers which are particularly open to and are overflowed by their alternative forms of articulation between different discourses. They are also particularly prone to form nodal points in different discourses.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Empty signifiers (nodal points, master signifiers, myths, points de capiton)</strong></td>
<td>Privileged signifiers within discourses around which other moments are ordered in chains of equivalence according to a logic of equivalence. They are the key signifiers in the discursive socio-political organisation of structure, meaning and identity. Generally, nodal points organise discourses (e.g. &quot;liberal democracy&quot;), master signifiers organise identity (e.g. &quot;citizen&quot;), and myths organise a socio-political space (e.g. &quot;the EU&quot; or &quot;society&quot;) and interrelate in the process of doing so. Because meaning and identity is only ever established negatively, for differences included within a discursive order to appear as if they form a structural unity totality, they must refer to a central signifier within their structure that is not simply one more difference within the greater system of differences. Rather this signifier must empty itself of any precise content and take the position of a nodal point or empty signifier. It is thus a signifier without a signified. It is so overcoded by the sliding of the signifiers (meanings/identities) in the system of differences under it in the process of structuration as to be itself indistinct, undecidable and unintelligible. Moreover, in the role of a structure's centre according to which the structuration moments (meanings/identities) occurs, the nodal point/empty signifier/myth escapes structuration, decentring, dislocating, destabilising, disordering and subverting it in relation to a constitutive negativity/inside/other while simultaneously acting to represent structure as if it were centred, organised, stable, closed totality. Nevertheless, these key signifiers are necessary concepts according to the structural logic of Western metaphysics. They form for us a necessary horizon for thinking and signifying structure/meaning/identity. In terms of general function, therefore, they are not strictly contingent. We cannot think or communicate the world, socio-political life, structure or meaning/identity without them. The particular forms they assume through specific articulatory practices, however, is contingent.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Decentring of structure</strong></td>
<td>Recognising that the unintelligibility of the idea of a structure without a centre, decentring nevertheless involves not only the rejection of the idea of a fixed centre organising structure/meaning/identity, but that the centre itself is paradoxically/indistinctly/undecidably both inside and outside the structure and escapes/denies the process of structuration. Its decentring relative to an &quot;outside&quot; thereby has a destabilising and disordering affect on the very structure it is meant to stabilise and order. Decentring of structure also concerns the construction of a variety of centres (i.e. nodal points/empty signifiers) that partially fix the meanings/identities within the open-ended structurations of discourse.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Lack</strong></td>
<td>Lack is a name for the inevitable failure of every structure/meaning/identity to form a full, complete, closed, objective totality. Lack does not suggest the possibility of an objective presence or transcendental signified according to which the structure/meaning/subject can become a pure or whole. Rather, it refers to the idea that every structure/meaning/identity always-already fails to constitute a fully structured objectivity/presence/transcendental signified/Being.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Contingency</strong></td>
<td>A given relation/structure/identity/meaning is possible but not necessary. Because of the fundamental undecidability of every structure, no single discourse can totally exhaust the full range of structural possibilities through its articulation of structural relations productive of meaning and identity fixations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>Articulation of and subjectivisation corresponding to subject positions in discursive structures which are always split and incomplete, but whose structurality is necessary for the socio-political life</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interpellation</td>
<td>The discursive hailing of subjects into particular subject positions/subjectivities. Ideology interpellates subjects by addressing them in a way that constructs them in particular discursive subject positions according to particular ascriptions of meaning/identity, e.g. women, (honest, law-abiding, tax-paying) citizens, unemployed, delinquents, foreigner, Muslim.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subject (of the lack)</td>
<td>Importing Lacan, the subject is defined as the lack or failed construction which emerges when the subject traumatically experiences its incompleteness and contingency in dislocation and undecidability and consequently seeks to establish a sense of wholeness of being though an extimate relation with the o/Other in discourse/language. The subject is the lack, its very incompleteness, and can only desire to establish itself as a concrete subjectivity/objectivity in and through acts of subjectivation in relation(s) to the o/Other, discourse/language</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subject positions</td>
<td>The different positions according to which subjects are interpellated in discourse to construct their subjectivities.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Popular subject positions</td>
<td>Subject positions constituted on the basis of a popular antagonism dividing socio-political space into two antagonistic camps.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic subject positions</td>
<td>Subject positions referring to a clearly delimited antagonism which does not simply divide socio-political space into two antagonistic camps.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Decentring of the subject</td>
<td>There is no subject of pure Being or presence taking the form of a wholly self-present/referential singularity or transcendental signified. The identity of every subject is differentially (i.e. negatively) constituted in relation to what it is not, not according to what it is. The subject is therefore perennially incomplete, yet the desire for fullness of Being or pure presence, however, is what motivates the subject to engage in subjectivisation processes in relation to the subject positions and meaning structures of different discourses.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Split subject</td>
<td>The split subject is constitutively split between the presence/being is presupposed to represent and the negativity/other/outside – all that it is not – that simultaneously forms its condition of possibility to appear as if it were a totality and condition of impossibility, because it constitutively splits and thus decentres, dislocates and subverts that “totality.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ideological Fantasy</td>
<td>An illusion on the part of subjects (subject positions/subjectivities) within a discourse articulated by a discourse which enables people to think and act as if the totalising and reductive forms of ideology are important and true.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>The organisation of social life in a particular way with regards to structure, meaning and identity and which excludes other possible arrangements. Politics basically entails the articulatory practice</td>
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<tr>
<td>Difference (Logic of)</td>
<td>A way of relating discursive moments in and through their mutual differences, like the structural nexus of interconnected and differentially-related individual knots of a fishing net subject to the movement of play of undecidables (e.g. différance) between them. The logic of difference operates to construct a relational “totality” but does not refer to a negativity or antagonism according to which the mutual differences moments in this “totality” would be displaced into an empty signifier/nodal point.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equivalence (Logic of)</td>
<td>The logic of equivalence constructs a chain of equivalence in terms of equivalential meanings/identities between moments that are seen as signifying a certain sameness or unifying concept/signified. This logic constructs the chain of equivalence according to one or more empty signifiers/nodal points under which the mutual differences established by a logic of difference can be assimilated/united in relation to a constitutive outside/other. This is especially the logic employed by a hegemonic operation in relation to representing its order as a united totality through nodal points/empty signifiers and their relation to antagonisms.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Antagonism</td>
<td>An antagonism functions as a unifying force on a discourse’s order. Antagonism results from the hegemonic exclusion of one or more discursive elements from its system of differences the chain of equivalence that establishes between them. This exclusion forms an exteriority and threatening negativity (e.g. outside/other) primarily in relation to the nodal point(s)/empty signifier(s) established by the logic of equivalence in a hegemonic discourse.</td>
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or deciding on distinctions and limits, especially as concerns the articulation of antagonisms, from an ultimately indistinct zone of structural undecidability. Politics is thus intimately bound to hegemonic discursive struggle. and thus, in turn all the meanings and identities organised around and make equivalent to it. When an antagonism involves the exclusion of more than one discursive element, the differential character of these excluded, antagonistic elements is collapsed by the hegemonic discourse through their articulation in an opposing chain of equivalence. This antagonistic chain of equivalence expresses a certain “sameness” from the perspective of the logic and operation of the hegemonic discourse, although the only thing the equivalential antagonistic elements share between them is the negativity and threat they represent to the hegemonic discourse in question. Numerous antagonisms may function in relation to a given discourse and they may be reciprocated by chains of equivalence formed according to this antagonistic position. Importantly, hegemony and politics is conditioned upon the multiplicity and reciprocity of antagonisms across socio-political life. In order to speak of a hegemonic operation, this operation must articulate an antagonism in relation to which it orders meaning/identity in a chain of equivalence related to structuring/dividing socio-political space.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Popular antagonism</th>
<th>A form of antagonism that tends to divide socio-political space into two antagonistic camps, producing popular rather than democratic subjectivities.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Frontier</td>
<td>Articulation of a limit/threshold/border in the organisation of socio-political space (e.g. country, territory, province, community, city etc.) and the inclusion and exclusion meaning and identity in relation to these frontiers and the space(s) they define. A constitutive limit will always be antagonistic. Although they are imagined as such by the identities constructed and secured in relation to them, limits or frontiers do not represent dividing lines between objectively appearing totalities. Rather, these limits must be understood as inscribed within and thus splitting, decentring, dislocating and subverting the “distinct totality” in relation to which it is established. In this sense, both the limit and the exterior/other it excludes are constitutively more interior to than the “inside” of the “totality” than that “inside” itself.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hegemony</td>
<td>The achievement of cognitive and ethico-political dominance in socio-political life through the expansion and objectification of a discourse that partially fixes meaning/identity around nodal points/empty signifiers. Because it only emerges upon the antagonistic terrain of discursive struggle/politics, hegemony entails more than a passive consensus and legitimacy with respect to the structural relations articulates. It concerns the extension and objectification/naturalisation upon an antagonistic, undecidable discursive terrain of a particular discursive horizon or intelligibility framework for ways of perceiving, understanding and acting in the world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegemonic practices</td>
<td>Attempts to articulate a discourse which can bring about cognitive and ethico-political dominance. Hegemonic practices of articulation that unify discursive space around a specific set of nodal points/myths always involve an element of ideological totalisation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hegemonic project</td>
<td>The logic and operation of a political project that strives for hegemony and includes a particular vision of the world demanding corresponding ways of organising, viewing, understanding and acting within socio-political life.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hegemonic agent</td>
<td>An individual/group political agency struggling for hegemony.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ideology (social imaginary)</td>
<td>The product of a relatively limited capacity of the semantic horizon of a myth/nodal point/empty signifier to provide for the occultation of structural undecidability, contingency and dislocation transformed into a totalising, reductive and absolutist aspect of discourse and through hegemonic interventions and entailing the constitutive non-recognition of the undecidability, contingency, decentredness, dislocation, instability and subversion of every discursively constructed structure, meaning and identity. The ostensibly decidable/decided discursive forms are merely partially fixed meanings that are always overflowed and destabilised by undecidability, contingency and a constitutive negativity/outside/other/antagonism. This ideological aspect of hegemonic discourse constructs its undecidable, contingent discursive structures/iUniformity identities within a totalising horizon couched within universalist pretensions (e.g. state, nation, population, citizenship, liberal democracy, security, freedom, law, peace, progress).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Objectivation/sedimentation/hegemonic closure</td>
<td>Structural relations of a discourse becoming seemingly natural, objective and uncontested and thereby taken-for-granted through the sedimentation of hegemonic intervention so that the act(s) of their political, undecidable, contingent structuration is occulted. Hegemonic discourses tend to draw upon and (re)produce readily-available, powerful frames of intelligibility (myths, nodal points, ideologies, imaginaries) that can circumscribe or overcode recognising of possible forms of dissent/resistance to the structural order.</td>
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| Dislocation | This concept should be understood two related, but different ways. In the one sense, dislocation refers to the perennial indistinction, undecidability and
dislocation of every discursive structure due to its relation through a centre to a negativity (outside/other) it excludes yet must nevertheless constitutively incorporate within this very centre. Structure is thus always-already dislocated and subverted with respect its negative construction. In the second sense, dislocation should be understood as referring to analogous situation to Gramsci’s “organic crises.” A situation of this type represents radical destabilisation of a discourse and its order of meaning/identity resulting from the emergence of phenomena that it cannot account for, domesticate, assimilate or represent. Dislocation in this sense entails subjectivities formed within that discourse’s semantic horizon experience the disorder of that discourse and the undecidability and contingency conditioning its order and thus these same subjectivities. This experience describes what Foucault and Nietzsche refer to as desubjectivation and limit-experience, although this inevitably leads to resubjectivation in a discourse capable of restoring order.