Virtual violence and the protection from participation

A feminist posthumanist theoretical perspective on the UN Women, Peace and Security agenda

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Abstract.

This thesis studies protection as integral to security. Protection has been used to keep women from the ‘public sphere’ and abused by peacekeepers and patriarchs alike, suggesting that being protected is not synonymous with being safe but can cause violence and exclusion. From that contradiction, I ask how the concepts of protection and security are produced, and to what effects for (gender) equality. The main endeavour in this text is theoretical; finding gender and security theories insufficient to understand life as embodied without being deterministic, I turn to posthumanist feminist theory. Combining theory by Karen Barad and Gilles Deleuze, I assemble a framework renouncing a division between the social and material, focusing on immanent intra-actions as productive of the world. Everything is material-discursively constructed phenomena, providing means for understanding the apparent discrepancies between the well-intended and actually violent effects of protection.

Studying National Action Plans for UNSCR1325, which propose women’s increased protection and participation to promote peace and security, I find that the suggested actions rely on protection as a capacity for violence, indicating that protection as violence aimed at a potential perpetrator simultaneously exposes the protected to what I call virtual violence, impeding equal participation, peace and security.

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1 Introducing: the problems of protection and participation

Security is tightly connected with protection. The national security idea(l) relies on the male soldiers acting as protectors for those needing and worthy of protection (Kronsell 2012:20f), most often ‘womenandchildren’. Men are expected to make the sacrifice of dying for their nation, and women are expected to give birth to the nation (see e.g. Yuval-Davies 1997) and make sacrifices to serve the needs of the military men and express gratitude for their protection, so that women remain innocent and ‘beautiful souls’, making up a worthy cause for the male ‘just warrior’ (Elstein 1982). So women have been kept out of (security) politics and restrained to the ‘private sphere’ (Eduards 2007). The capacity for violence that protectors possess to perform their duty is not unidirectional; domestic violence, peacekeeping forces committing grave sexual abuses against the ones who are supposed to receive protection (see e.g. Whitworth 2004; Higate 2007; Kelly 2010; Jennings 2010). The “postnational defence” relies less on the nation for its legitimisations, working to protect distant others instead of protecting from distant Others (Kronsell 2012). The borders between protector and protected thus mutable, but even when national security turns cosmopolitan and protectors are expected to make peace instead of war, military organisations with a capacity for lethal violence are chosen as the primary actors for peace and security, all while the military holds on to its performances of hegemonic masculinity (Kronsell 2012:144ff).

Protection as a conspicuous part of security paints a problematic picture, especially for (gender) equal political participation. If security hinges on protection and protection works through excluding those protected from influencing the process, this suggest a highly unequal power relation. If security relies on a gender exclusive protection mechanism, this is especially problematic considering the extensive research showing that more gender equal states are more secure and peaceful (Hudson et al 2012:ch4). The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda of the United Nations (UN) works to increase international peace and security through increasing gender equality. The two main pillars of the agenda are the protection of women from violence and the equal participation of women,1 clarifying that the problems of protection and security cannot be passed off into history but are part of a rapidly developing policy area.

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1 These two themes of participation and protection are clarified by subsequent WPS resolutions from the UNSC, where 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009a), 1960 (2010) and 2106 (2013) focus on cessation of and protection from sexual violence, and 1889 (2009b) and 2122 (2013) focus on the inclusion of women.
From these equivocal notions of security and protection and their problematic relation with (gender) equality, I want to ask: How are the concepts of security and protection produced, and to what effects for the possibilities of (gender) equality? Harming or protecting people is an embodied practice; war works through hurting and killing bodies (Sylvest 2013:66). The physical nature of violence suggests that to understand protection and security from violence, I need to understand materiality. Political science and international relations (IR) engage little with the body; levels of system, state or individual (Breuning 2007:9-15) are used to model human life but without engaging with it as lived. Poststructuralism has provided much insight into the production of concepts and their effects, but deals little with materiality which it views only through the lens of language. A retreat into deterministic ‘human nature’ would provide little of interest.

I instead turn to feminist physicist Karen Barad’s theory of agential realism in which she disputes the very division of a social and material reality, providing a way to understand violence, protection and security as material and social practices without suggesting either the social or the material to cause the other. Her theory is however not developed for political sciences or IR, nor for textual analysis, and the first purpose of this thesis thus becomes developing her theory to be able to use it to study the policy field of WPS. To do that I combine Barad with selected theories of philosopher Gilles Deleuze. I find that their theories resonate well on several instances, and Deleuze engages more with societal systems and structures and with power, which I believe can be fruitfully integrated and read together with agential realism. This way I hope to contribute to feminist posthumanist theory and methodology through its adaptation to a new field.

This theoretical framework provides much insight into how concepts, such as security and protection, can be produced. To utilise the theory to understand how protection and security actually are produced, I will use my agential realist framework to read National Action Plans (NAP) for the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (2000). The WPS agenda works with protection and participation in the context of gender, peace and security. Its implementation plans provides a site where protection is used with the purpose of promoting gender equality, making it a suitable material to study to provide better understandings for how the production of protection and security concepts affect possibilities for (gender) equality. My second purpose thus becomes providing an understanding of how protection and security and their relation to (gender) equality are produced in the NAPs. Protection is deeply integrated in both gender and security theory. After the theoretical and methodological chapters I will review peace, security and gender theories and contrast them to agential realism to highlight some important differences.

Reading texts from very different sites and writing them together can in itself function as a method of inquiry (cf. Lykke 2010:182f, Åhäll 2012), where my understandings of theories and methodologies I apply assume their shapes through different strands of literature, including fiction, which is included for the sake of transparency but also to exemplify, or to show the contingencies of the world that fiction alone can tell.
1.1 Research question

How are the concepts of security and protection produced, and to what effects for the possibilities of (gender) equality?

1.2 Disposition and a reading guide

This text uses the conceptual apparatuses of Karen Barad and Gilles Deleuze, which both are holistic and difficult to understand piece by piece – nothing makes sense until it all makes sense (Barad 2007:72, Colebrook 2010:xvi). This poses challenges for a reader of their works, and particularly for writing based on their theories. I have put much effort into this structure, but it is very possible that it is necessary to read the entire chapter before it makes much sense, and I encourage jumping in the text while reading to revisit concepts and definitions and actively bring them with into other sections to tie it together like a rubber-band ball.

Due to the theoretical focus, I start with a comprehensive theoretical chapter, Differences that matter, in which I elaborate the philosophy-physical foundations for an agential realist onto-epistemology, and discuss other concepts that I deem important to be able to understand and work with Barad’s theories. I begin with the concepts most influenced by physics in Agential realism: intra-action, phenomenon, agency and diffraction, and then move on towards including more feminist theory to both exemplify and to adapt the theory to better fit my purposes, in Bodily production and the world’s enfolding. This is also where I make most use of Deleuze. His concepts are introduced alongside Barad’s throughout the text where I find them to resonate and facilitate understanding, but in the second part of this chapter I will further elaborate his concepts of lack, positive desire and territorialisation.

Chapter 3, Methodological mapping and accountability, is permeated by the question of accountability, first through the section Response-ability and ethics bridging this chapter with the previous, and then through discussing knowledge production in social science in Methodological entanglements, and move towards my own methodological choices and strategies in Mapping practises and textual analysis, which is also where I discuss my material. It is common to place a review of previous literature near the beginning of a text. Mine is placed as the first half of chapter 4, Gender, Peace and Security, where I discuss gender, security and peace theories from their ontological and epistemological assumptions. In the second half, Drawing protective boundaries, I analyse six National Action Plans for UNSCR1325 (2000) and discuss their production of the concepts of security, protection, participation and peace. The concluding chapter draws together the different parts of the thesis to discuss its conclusions and makes some suggestions for further research.
Feminist (and) IR theory has engaged much with understanding violence, the how and why and who of violence within and among societies. Realism looks to material capacity, idealism to regulating institutions, social constructivism to peaceful norms (cf. Richmond 2008). Radical feminism blames masculine aggression, post-structuralist feminism explains masculinity as reinforced through a violent separation from the feminine (cf. Shepherd 2008). There is much concern with behaviour, but little concern with the body. How is violence embodied, how can bodies become secure and safe from violence? I find post-structuralism has produced tremendous insights into the workings of language, social and cultural expressions. Deconstruction exposes the dichotomies through with Selves and Others are made and how masculinity becomes premiered over the feminine (Peterson 2010). It has shown that power is productive (Foucault 2002:138-148), meaning that inverting privilege in masculine-feminine or violent-peaceful dualisms is not the solution; the dichotomies themselves need deconstruction.

Here post-structuralism encounters the encumbrance of language; language is seen as constructed as a dichotomous system and cannot itself transgress it. For all its insight into the dualisms of culture-nature, mind-body, social-material, post-structuralism is caught on the language side of a language-reality division (Alaimo & Hekman 2008:2f). From such a view, it can appear that language actually shapes (or even creates) the material world and the material world, “reality”, gets side-lined. The reality, the corpomateriality, of armed conflict leaves little doubt that bodies, not only subject-positions, are deeply involved. From Clausewitz’s friction to climate changes, “reality”, nature and body are making themselves known. It is not enough to “rethink” or “reinvent” nature/body/reality or to let theory become detached and unrestrained by materiality (Hekman 2008:88). I believe that to understand violence and be able to intervene in meaningful ways in the practises of violence – to create peace and equality– a theory that can accommodate social and material practises is required, that can understand life as embodied and bodies as gendered.

For these purposes I engage with quantum physicist Karen Barad’s onto-epistemological framework of agential realism. By refuting the distinctions between the material and discursive she outlines a notion of posthumanist performativity and agency; agency that is not restricted to human intentionality nor reductive of the weightiness and materiality of the world. Barad’s writings are intended to be read by others than physicists and written to be accessible, yet much of her energies are directed towards applicability in sub-atomic or
To bring her onto-epistemological framework and concepts into international peace and security, I will draw from Gilles Deleuze\textsuperscript{2}, whose theories have been used by feminist materialist studies before (Alaimo & Hekman 2008:3). Deleuze is notoriously difficult to read; he states that similes and metaphors are false premiering of certain knowledge (Colebrook 2010:96f), and histexts are dense with more or less explicit references to historical texts and events (cf. Patton 2009:33f). Therefore I will read Deleuze primarily through Claire Colebrook’s \textit{Understanding Deleuze}.\textsuperscript{3} Beyond providing guidance, Colebrook is engaged in the field of material feminisms, same as Barad, making Colebrook’s readings of Deleuze suitable for being read together with Barad. When I in the text let Barad and Deleuze speak with each other, this is entirely my own construct. Barad at times references Deleuze but her theory is not based on his. My claims that their concepts and understandings correspond are due to my readings and not to their writings.

This is where I struggle with holistic theories and the structure of this text. I have chosen to go from Barad’s concepts most tied with physics and travel towards the social, political and Deleuzian, but I want to reiterate my recommendation to jump within the text. The first section presents the foundations for a new onto-epistemology and outlines \textit{Agential realism}, \textit{Agency as posthumanist performativity} and \textit{Diffraction}. It is a section heavily based in the physics of Karen Barad that provide the basis for the rest of the text, throughout theory, methodology and analysis. The second section, \textit{Bodily production and the world’s enfolding}, discusses first how bodies are made and implications of embodiments, in \textit{Drawing bodily boundaries}, concluding with sketching ways to understand embodied vulnerability and violence. Second it discusses social and political order and power, in \textit{Drawing societal boundaries}, concluding with sketching ways to understand the relation between the concepts and practises of protection and security.

\textsuperscript{2} Like Colerook (see the next footnote) and DeLanda (2002:8) I will refer only to Deleuze in the text but he did much writing together with Félix Guattari. The references will clarify when I draw from their collaborative work while it will consequently be referred to as only Deleuzian.

\textsuperscript{3} I use a translated version of her book: \textit{Deleuze: En introduktion} (2010, Göteborg: Daidalos). References will be to this translated version. I use other texts by Colebrook, Deleuze & Guattari and others to ensure that concepts, to the best of my knowledge, are translated “back” to correctly to English.
2.1 Agential realism

To bring the body and the material back in a theory of materialism that is not deterministic is necessary; otherwise we could just surrender to watching the world present itself to us and pretend it was all “meant to be”. Barad starts by turning against the views of representation, like Deleuze turns against the metaphor (Colebrook 2010:96f). Representation is foundational in many theoretical schools where individuals, however constructed, are represented by a system, a law, a discourse, a language.

Representationalism is the belief in the ontological distinction between representations and that which they purport to represent; in particular, that which is represented is held to be independent of all practices of representing (Barad 2003:804).

In her physicist terms this is a move from geometrical optics of reflection, to physical optics of diffraction (2007:135). Talking with Deleuze, representation is an idea of transcendence, of believing in an outside system and thus in the possibility of an inside/outside division (Colebrook 2010:xxviii).

Barad turns to a different metaphysics, where relata, the ability to relate, does not produce relations, but where relations, actions, produce relata. Her agential realism ontology presents the ground for posthumanist performativity, and suggests “a causal relationship between specific exclusionary practices embodied as specific material entanglements of the world, (i.e., discursive practices/(co)figurations rather than words) and specific material phenomena (i.e., relations rather than ‘things’)” (Barad 2003:814).

In agential realism, we cannot keep making the often-made assumption of pre-existing things that Science can observe changing over time. Instead, the primary epistemological objects of agential realism are phenomenon; specific entanglements of “objects” and “subjects”. Phenomena are ontologically primitive intra-actions. It is a “doing-being” activity, where the being does not come before the doing-being requires doing- but the doing does not create the being either. To show how these discussions do not adhere to the ideas of separated entities, Barad uses intra-action rather than inter-action to describe processes of agency, to further depart from the view that we are placed in the world rather than a part of it (Barad 2003:827ff)

Specific intra-actions enact agential cuts which produce separations between ‘components’ within a phenomenon, and agential cuts also enact the boundaries of that phenomenon. An experiment, study or observation is not pre-divided into a subject and an object, it is a phenomenon that entails myriads of intra-actions that are material-discursive, meaning intra-actions among matter, language, and discourse; discourse being understood as that which restricts what is perceived as possible. Since there are no inherent divisions between “things”, someone or something acting as an observer cannot expect to be subtracted or interchanged without changing the phenomenon and producing other “results” (Barad 2007:142ff).
Developing the philosophy-physics of Niels Bohr, Barad understands *concepts* as specific material arrangements. Barad uses Bohr’s example of the impossibility of simultaneously measuring the behaviour of light as waves and as particles, which are irreconcilably different. One kind of apparatus suggests light behaves as waves, another that it behaves as particles. Instead of taking this as a failed attempt to reach light’s ‘true’ ontology, the *phenomenon* replaces the object as the primary ontological unit. Within one phenomenon, with a specific *agency of observation*, the apparatus from which results can be interpreted, like a surface which light can mark, light will exhibit wave behaviour. When the *agencies of observation* change, the phenomenon changes, and within another phenomenon light can exhibit particle behaviour (Barad 2007:83ff, 90f, 103-106; 2003:815f, n21). To use *agencies of observation* instead of “effect” points to that even when the explicit intent of a practise is to inscribe the behaviour of one part (light) on another (a surface), light is not active while the surface is passive. The “effect” is intra-active.

Knowledge production, within natural or social sciences, is not a process of observation from outside but of being part of the intra-actions within phenomena. From this insight Barad uses *onto-epistemology*, since the nature of something and what we can know about it are entangled. Working from a concept of waves, an apparatus is constructed that presents results in the shapes of waves, and knowledge is produced about apparatuses that work with waves. The concept of waves, or other concepts, are not ideational but constructed intra-actively with specific material arrangements, and distinctions between what is regarded as “cause” and “effect” are also constructed within an apparatus/phenomenon (Barad 2007:109). “[D]escriptive concepts obtain their meaning by reference to a particular physical apparatus, which in turn marks the placement of a constructed cut between the object and the agencies of observation” (Barad 2007:196). Like in the pursuit of understanding why 42 is the answer to the question of life, the universe and everything, we need to first understand the phenomena that shape the concepts of that question and what agencies of observation were used to produce the result of 42, the entire Earth.4

Concepts are defined by the agential separations that produce phenomena, or exteriority-within-phenomena. Exteriority-within-phenomena points to the way delineations are made from within the context of a specific phenomenon, which can be minor or majorly encompassing. This way, concepts are materially based but since phenomena are intra-actions among matter and discourse, they are not determined by matter, nor is matter determined by discursive concepts applied to it. Material and social intra-actions are boundary-drawing practises: boundaries are very real but neither static nor given. Or as phrased by Altés Arlandis & Lieberman, Karen Barad

4 This example is from *The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy* novel by Douglas Adams (1997). Earth was the apparatus constructed to answer the question of life, the universe and everything, but only provided the answer – 42 – and not the precise question, before the entire planet was demolished in the construction of an intergalactic highway.
posits not a world that is somehow unstable due to our inability to define moments and spaces, but proffers a world that is full of very precise phenomena produced through enacted intra-actions between things (including people, objects, animals, plants etc.). Such an enactment – what she calls an ‘agential cut’ – locates quite precisely ‘…a local causal structure among ‘components’ of a phenomenon in the marking of the ‘measuring agencies’ (effect) by the ‘measured object’ (cause).


Barad uses intra-actions to show how “things” are performed by enactments of localised cuts; everything is a productive doing. Such enactments decide what comes to matter and what is excluded from mattering. With Deleuze this is positive difference. Departing from psychoanalysis, difference is to be understood as omnipresent becoming, and the essence of the world is its ability for becoming (its ability to intra-act). Instead of difference-from, every connection (intra-action) makes a difference. Life does not need language to differentiate it into intelligible units; language reduces difference, the way “green” can never capture all the colours of the forest. Touching, writing, eating, erosion, oxidation, are connections making things different because of that doing. There is a desire to connect, a positive desire to become and produce difference. Desire is positive-productive. To avoid anthropocentric habits, desires are described as machinic, every ‘thing’ is already assemblages of desire and difference (Colebrook 2010:80, 48-52). I elaborate on the production of language in the Deleuzian sense in section 2.2.2.

Understood together, or rather, as inseparable in a non-dualistic whole, neither language nor matter can represent the other. “Culture” can not be analysed separately and then applied to “nature”, nor can the mechanisms of nature be transferred to culture (which, over again, disables conservative “arguments” about the “unnatural” as an excuse for sexism, , racism, ableism etc.). Intra-actions are becomings, and the possibility to intra-act can be called desire, but desire-without-intent, and desire-without-lack.

Understanding concepts, constructions of language, to be in intra-action with specific material apparatuses is useful especially for wanting to understand and affect the embodied lives lived in war, insecurity and inequality. They are part of boundary-drawing practises that are in turn enacted upon. Concepts are not simply reductive, but they are constraining of intra-actions through their enacted agential cuts, and part of what makes it possible, for better or worse, to perceive, analyse of speak of phenomenon as separate subjects or objects, or what Barad often refers to as bodily production.

Compared with post-structuralist understandings of language as the primary system within which meaning is created, through negative differentiations where concepts are defined by what other concepts they are not (women is not-man, legal is not-illegal, human is not-animal or not-nature) this provides another way to study concepts like security and protection through their material reconfigurations in the world. In this section I have outlined the foundations for understanding agential realism through placing phenomena as the primary
ontological unit and through the dissolution of a separation between knower and known, ontology and epistemology. I have tried to illustrate how this makes the concepts that are used to understand the world an intrinsic part of the world. The next section explain diffraction, the optics of interference instead of reflection.

2.1.1 Diffraction: interfering instead of reflecting

Diffractions are wave patterns, and waves combining, bending and spreading when encountering an obstacle or other waves. Waves can occupy the same space at the same time and their superposition is interferences, which produces new patterns. In reflective optics, waves, or “rays”, bounce off a surface in a calculable trajectory; there are pre-constituted insides and outsides. Diffraction patterns instead show how there are omnipresent interferences.

Water waves as well as light and other waves behave diffractively. A monochromatic beam directed towards an opaque object will not produce a dark shadow the exact shape of the object. Light diffracts and interferes with itself and when encountering the object. These interferences are visible as bright spots within the shadowed area, and dark spots in the illuminated area around it. Some waves interfered to make bright spots in new directions and some waves blocked each other out to create dark spots, like highs and lows on the water surface (Barad 80ff).

The multiple methodological analogies and uses of visual reflections can be questioned by the introduction of diffraction as a different understanding of the impossibility of presuming delineated interacting bodies. Instead of trying to discern whether culture mirrors nature, or nature mirrors culture, or the individual level mirrors the structural lever or the structural level mirrors the individual level, diffraction are all the interferences that make it impossible to envision a blank space in which visual impressions can bounce in between objects, levels, norms or any “surfaces”. There is no such vacuum to move across; even electrons’ infinite indeterminacy means the electron can “self-touch” to re-make “itself”. Materiality “itself” is already in touch with its possibilities of virtual becomings and inseparable from the void. There is no need for an “outside” to encounter an Other, it is already inside in the shape of virtual no-thingness (Barad 2012:213-216). Reflection becomes an uroboric movement, like two opposing mirrors uncritically reflecting each other towards infinity; outsides unable to interlock or interfere or intra-act. “We can look critically into the mirror, but no new patterns emerge” (Lykke 2010:155).

Losing the departure points of an outside to observe, to see how laws, norms, light, heat or force impact or veil a subject/object requires, and enables, other methodologies than those of reflective representation. It is not to mean that methodology should not be self-reflective in the sense of being conscious about itself and critical at every turn, but being in touch with methodological, ethical, intra-active choices and practises is not dependent on its reflection on an antithesis. “Diffraction is the production of difference patterns in the world” (Donna Haraway cited in Lykke 2010:155). But diffraction is not only differences
but entangled differences that matter (Barad 2007:381). Diffractive methodology is concerned with difference production and the response-ability of intravening. Diffraction shows that we are not situated in the world like chess pieces on a board, we are of the world. From this situationality as of the world, I turn to issues of agency, of what the world can do.

2.1.2 Agency as posthumanist performativity

Posthumanist agency and performativity, agency that is not restricted to human minds, points to questions of ethics and responsibility. If we as humans are not in complete control or even able to account for everything that happens, what responsibility, and accountability, do we have? And if agency is ubiquitous, and the very essence of the world is its potential (for) becoming, for making differences and actualising the virtual, how can power fit into this? Clearly we do not want to fall back on some notion of power correlating strength. Nor do we wish to engage in conservative blaming and shaming activities by suggesting that everyone has the same opportunities to affect their surroundings.

Agency in some theories can be read as an attribute – some have it, some do not. Some gets theirs’ taken away, others find theirs’. I have followed Barad in calling things agential; cuts, separations, realism, and so assumedly agency holds some importance. Including the social-material-discursive as agential expands the sphere of agency, which is imperative for the concept of posthumanist performativity. The “post”-prefix should not be read as a temporal succession of humanism but as a transgression of it (cf. Lykke 2010:106), and posthumanist performativity does not preclude human agency in favour of something else. It points to the agencies that produce (human) bodies instead of some agency attributed to (human) bodies (Barad 2007:136). Agency is the ability to become or connect (intra-act). This is not a human nor even a biological ability. Posthumanist agency explains how matter talks back. Importantly,

agency – rather than being thought in opposition to structures as forms of subjective intentionality and the potential for individual action – is about the possibilities for changing the configurations of spacetime-matter relations (Barad 2007:230)

and it should not be confused with or expected to include a notion of intent. Intention is agential, but agency does not require a preceding thought. Thoughts are agential, but agency is not exclusive to thought. Nor are intra-actions constants. Apparatuses and phenomenon can be cut off from certain intra-actions, intentionally or non-internationally. Imprisonment is one way to limit possible intra-actions between those termed perpetrators and victims. Similarly fences are ways to limit possible intra-actions between small children and heavy traffic. These are not numerical reductions in possible intra-actions; they reduce the possibility for certain intra-actions through the intra-actions they are performing, and they might open up other spaces for intra-actions. Agency is not geometrical
or quantifiable, so even within reinforcing apparatuses agency cannot be completely subtracted or foreclosed (Barad 2007:214).

Making particular enfoldings, iterative intra-actions and topological changes are agential material-discursive reconfigurations. Agency is not an attribute and does not precede action, agency is (intra-)action. Like with bodily productions; productions of inside and outside or subject and object, agency works within and as constitutive of phenomenon. The agency of one body thus, like properties of light, can only be assessed as part of a phenomenon in which agencies intra-act.

Agency and accountability are knit tightly together. We are accountable to the boundary-drawing practises of bodily productions and to marks on those bodies. The technomaterial-discursive practise of ultrasounds produces a “subject” where the fetus is presented as a discrete body, and intra-actions with(in) the womb and person pregnant are made in-visible. Accountability towards the fetus is then implied, but the production of this very literal-material exteriority-within-phenomenon is also accountable for the production of a pregnant body as accountable to a fetus. Accountability is directed away from the phenomenon that is a pregnancy, including fetus, parental figures and environmental, economical, toxological, psychological and other factors that intra-act with a pregnancy (Barad 2007:218f). This way, accountability does not begin after identifying a subject or object to hold accountable, we are already accountable for the boundary-drawing practises and intra-actions that produce those delineations.

That agency is not confined to human subjects does not mean that we can eschew responsibility, rather, the opposite. Agential realism enabled multitudes of ways to intra-act responsibly. Intra-acting with(in) phenomenon entails possibilities for subversive changes, of material reconfigurations (medical attention, economic redistribution, non-violence) as well as resignification (such as using intra instead of inter, prefixing security with multiple referents, talking about masculine overrepresentation instead of feminine underrepresentation). Since phenomenon and concepts are material-discursive practises, while simply stating something does not make it so, resistance, subversion, revolution or compliance do make differences. Intraventions into the physical structure of a city can redefine spaces and enable different connections and active-ist sites can be opened up for new virtualities and actualities (Altés Arlandis & Liberman 2012), like the multitude of possibilities for meetings and play of a large and plain grass field compared to the controlled, rule-based and restricted possibilities of a golf course.

That non-human bodies are also agential means that when human and non-human bodies intra-act the products of that intra-action will be a product of the agency of all parties, and not only of the human mind or intention. This section has outlined how agency can be understood as posthuman and immanent through intra-actions. The next section will look deeper into how bodies are produced in intra-action with environments and social-material structures and how this relates to the safety or vulnerability of bodies, that is, to practises of security.
2.2 Bodily production and the world’s enfolding

Bodies are taking the hits when ‘security’ does not keep them unharmed, and bodies can thrive when they are safe. More bodies than humans are involved in this. The ‘security’ of nuclear balance of terror makes it abundantly clear how human, animal, forest, garden, house and water bodies are in peril. How is it decided what kind of body is supposed to be made secure? What bodies are insecure? How are bodies made intelligible as different from each other? This section will look at how bodies and the world are produced in different ways and with different effects.

2.2.1 Drawing bodily boundaries

The inseparability of the material and the social means that the separations that are often taken as departing points for research or policy cannot be presumed as an inherent feature of research subjects or objects, which renders the concepts such as “individual” problematic (Barad 2007:136, 138, Colebrook 2010:xxx). Instead, bodily production; agential separability and boundary-drawing practises, is a condition of exteriority-within-phenomena (Barad 2007:140). The separateness of any human or not-human body is produced through intra-activity enacting a cut, making the body perceptible (for humans and not-humans) as a body that matters.

This agential separability is central for Deleuze as well. Barad’s intra-actions produce separability among apparatuses and phenomenon. Deleuze’s concept of folds can be understood similarly. Folds pull together certain parts of the world, bringing some things together and others further apart. There are an infinite number of folds creating an infinite number of worlds, of creations of insides and outsides. Agential cuts or folds are immanent performances making the world perceptible, by the living or lifeless (Colebrook 2010:80f), without trajectory or a transcendent plan or purpose. Barad also uses folds to describe how the universe works. Intra-active dynamics are “iterative reconfigurations of topological manifolds of spacetime matter relations” (2007:178, emphasis added). While her example of manifolds as the cosmological ‘wormhole’ might not be easily transferred to more mundane phenomena, it illustrates quite aptly how two points that appear geometrically distant can connect through folds, how their proximity is enacting a fold, changing topologies. Topologies, unlike geometry that engages with size and shape, are concerned with connections and boundaries (Barad 2003:825n32). Folds in spacetime do not have to suggest folding the entire universe with each of the infinite number of folds; texts draw together concepts through time and produce proximities between geometrically distant people, affections perform folds in the connections between people. Folds, or manifolds, are un/intentional topological shifts, placing different possibilities for becoming connected or excluded from different sites and sights (cf. Haraway 1988).
For Barad, intra-actions always entail exclusions; something comes to matter and something is excluded from mattering. With Deleuze, this would be the actual and the virtual (which I have mentioned earlier in the text). Virtual difference is infinite potential, everything that can happen at any moment in time. Difference becomes actualised when enfolded (enacted) (Colebrook 2010:84f). For Barad, the virtual (particle) does not exist in time and space, but is the world performing a thought experiment, virtuality is indeterminacies-in-action (Barad 2012:210). “The future is radically open at every turn” (Barad 2003:826) but despite infinite virtuality this does not mean that everything is always possible. While not determinate, intra-actions are causal enactments that are constraining and excludes things from mattering; from materializing as perceptible to others (human or nonhuman)(Barad 2003:826f). Intra-actions, folds, are productive of what bodies that matter and what makes a difference.

Revisiting the material-discursive practise of ultrasound technology (as well as other pre-natal technologies, e.g. Rapp (1999) on amniocentesis), the way the technology is used to depict a baby has implications for how their bodies come to matter. Pregnancy can turn from accountability towards the own body as pregnant, to accountability towards the separate body inside, enabling shifting discourses on ethics and responsibility (Barad 1998:92ff, see also Ekman (2010) on feminist implications of surrogacy). This material-discursive apparatus enables and acts as a part of temporally earlier gendering practices than were previously possible (in contrast to the gendering practise of the “It’s a girlboy!”-exclamation at birth).

Robyn Longhurst (2001) illustrates the production of the “independent individual” through studies of bodies’ fluid boundaries. Crying, lactating, bleeding or “public displays of affection” are some examples of how bodies transgress their assigned space within the skin and are behaviours often expelled from the “public space”. Looking at intra-actions among bodies and geographies she finds that the idea(l) of a delineated individual moving freely in a geometrical environment of fixed entities is upheld for example by practises of dress (dark suits to add a contour to a body) and closely linked with a power hierarchy (able-bodied white males are ‘natural’ suit bearers, while women are ‘always at risk’ of crying, menstruating or giving birth. Children and the elderly also lack bodily control and are often on that basis confined to certain spaces). Bodies that demonstrate openly their diffractive state of interferences, the intra of their active becoming, are perceived as unreliable and insecure, although, as Cynthia Enloe keeps demonstrating so clearly, the most “self-reliant” or “self-made” men more often than not rely heavily on the work of others (2014).

Bodily production importantly does not only refer to the production of human or animal bodies, and also does not only refer to what can be perceived as single bodies but also groups or identities. Deleuze presents two ways to understand groups or identities, as extensive or intensive multiplicities. An extensive multiplicity is defined by what defines it, meaning members in the multiplicity can come and go without changing the overarching category, like different shades of a colour, a taxonomical differentiation. Since items are added or withdrawn depending on their fit to the defining category, their coming and going does not
affect the definition. *Intensive* multiplicities change with every member and the multiplicity is different with every entry and exit, letting the multiplicity be defined by what is included and the definition change accordingly (Colebrook 2010:85ff). A bit simplistically, words in post-structuralist or reflective understandings can be seen as extensive multiplicities where the word is presumed to gather pre-differentiated objects, and concepts in an agential realism understanding are interpreted as intensive, mutable by material-discursive reconfigurations. The extensive multiplicity applied to identity creates a subjugated group where desire is repressed. The intensive multiplicity is a subject-group, allowing desire to flow and shape the multiplicity from its desires (Deleuze & Guattari 1983:280).

What bodies are made to matter and what they are made to matter, has impacts on the ethics and politics intra-acting within that apparatus of bodily production. (I elaborate on this at length in the section *Response-ability and ethics.*) Bodily production and the world’s becoming through the manifolds that agential cuts make, what parts of the world are connected and what parts are separated and what never even came to be at this time, show how accountability and vulnerability are not attributes divided up between bodies in various amounts, or inherent in positions within a political system. The way female bodies are more associated with leakages than male bodies despite all bodies being porous apparatuses privilege those bodies that perform their intra-actions as separations. The possibility of some bodies to decide when their body should approach another, has been produced as a sign of strength. Visually, this can show nakedness as the impossibility to keep others from knowing a body and its situatedness rather than separability from its environment and showing vulnerability through the lack of a shielding fabric (Alaimo 2010). Clothing in different forms shape the intelligibility of a body, where the independent professional dresses to present a delineated body whose integrity is not compromised by outside influence (Longhurst 2001), how fashion works with the desirability and temporality of combinations of body and dress (Parkins 2008), or how victims of sexual abuse are accused of making themselves vulnerable by placing insufficient cover between them and their environment (wearing a skirt too short).

A bodily production is never ‘finished’ or ‘complete’. Barad makes use of the example of a cane used by the blind to ‘see’. Held tightly and navigated as a viewing instrument it becomes a part of the bodily apparatus and agencies of observation through which an outside is perceived. Held more loosely it can instead be felt by the hand as an outside to perceive through the sense of touch (Barad 2007:156ff). The fluidity of bodily boundaries has been the theme for feminist cyborg theory as well, pointing to cultural re-presentations of cyborgs as hyphenating the way that cybernetics and organisms within cyborgs are not hybrids of separate elements but an apparatus of bodily production with capabilities, vulnerabilities and different possibilities for connections and becomings (see Åsberg 2010 on the chronology of the cyborg). I take cyborgs to be an illustrative way to understand Barad’s apparatuses or Deleuze’s machines. The militaristic history of cyborgs can also help illustrate another highly pertinent
point. Contrary to nakedness, and thicker than a suit, armour and weapons are used to produce bodies as impervious. The bodily reconfiguration of “gearing up” is material-discursive. Armour, or military clothing, are intelligible as a capacity for violence, and they are also a physical barrier between soldier and environment. A blind person’s cane extends their viewing agencies and gives further reach; the viewing agency of a riflescope has even longer reach. The cane protects against encountering uneven grounds, the riflescope, and the rifle, protects against having to encounter another living being against the will of the holder through the virtual violence produced by being intelligible as military or as rifle-holder.

What possibilities bodies have for intra-actions, if they have the possibility of viewing through the riflescope or the possibility of intra-acting with the bullet, produces vulnerability differently. What is inherent in bodies is not their vulnerability, resilience or independence but their possibility for intra-active becoming. Vulnerability is produced from intra-actions among body and environment (cf. Garland-Thompson 2011) and is as such a bodily production that is extensively connected to and dependent on societal organisation and physical structures. Vulnerability is about who is granted or denied access to different sites or things; to different becomings. Both the intelligibility and physical safety of bodies are immanent social-material configurations.

This section has elaborated on how to understand bodies. I have, despite Barad’s, Deleuze’s and others’ wish to escape anthropocentrism, focused on human bodies. I do not claim that human bodily production is ontologically different from other bodily productions, yet humans remain the primary concern of security theory and policy. It is at this point important to note all the non-human factors that play into human bodily productions; technology, garments, identity, nature, cultural practises all play into how bodies are conceived, what intra-actions and changes that are possible for them and whether these work to produce increased vulnerability or safety. The next section will expand bodily production to production of society and of political order.

2.2.2 Drawing societal boundaries

When reading safety and vulnerability as productive intra-actions between bodies where some are enabling and some are disabling, the notion of universal human rights, for example, becomes quite problematic, not in intent but in application. Clearly every-body does not enjoy the same possibilities or the same vulnerabilities, despite having the same legal rights (cf. Butler 2009:15-23). The lack of human rights in representationalist theory is described as a problem that growth, democratisation or security is supposed to correct, through better incentives, capacity or enforcement. With Deleuze, viewing lack as something that can be filled is a modernist view of perceiving desire negatively (remember positive desire in section 2.1). Negative desire is constructed as a negation from those who desire it and thus unachievable, making, for instance, human rights inherently utopian. This section will discuss structures and systems. Compared
with the previous section’s focus on the body this section is more concerned with political order and will further lay out agential realist views on peace and security.

Deleuze means that the way desire is understood within modernity is as a negative desire; the desire for something else and something other than ourselves. This modern logic of desire is inherited from Plato’s concept of acquisition, as opposed to production (Deleuze & Guattari 1983:25). When difference is negative, difference-from, something to acquire and not produce, a signifying system like language is defined by its distance from us, and any desire that can be signified (understood) is also produced as unreachable. Desire for acquisition fails to understand the production occurring within that quest. The signifying system is the psychoanalytical law of the father prohibiting us from the love of the mother, diagnosing modernity with an Oedipus complex. Deleuze uses this perspective to analyse individualism and the capitalist system and their foundations in an infinity of unfulfilled desire (Colebrook 2010:35, 45, Deleuze & Guattari 1983:26). Suggesting that difference is negative and a geometrical constant produces quantifiable individuals, a constant unit modelled on sameness (cf. DeLanda 2002:6), and desire is directed towards what we cannot have in a manner that keeps it unavailable. It produces a Hobbesian image, where to become human and not savage ‘one’ has to ‘give up’ the ‘natural’ urges and desires and be subjugated to the law with which one will always be in conflict because it deprives us of what we ‘truly’ desire (cf. Colebrook 2010:139f). Even human rights laws are then conflicting with human desire, a ‘necessary evil’. Desire when understood as positive and productive looks to immanent connections and possibilities instead of to a transcendent belief in a model of law attributed to humans to fill a lack of safety or lack of institutions granting rights and freedoms.

Deleuze uses territorialisation to understand how societies are made. Territorialisation is the grounding and connections of intensive becomings, a production of differences into intelligible beings, or the virtual made actual. This is a process without an origin story (cf. Grosz 2008, Haraway 1991) where apparatuses intra-act in becoming, once again emphasising that these are not connections between two pre-existing entities but that beings, objects, bodies, subjects become through and with(in) these intra-actions. Territorialisation make up what something is, productive and primate connections. Deterritorialisation is what something is not, the limits for what something can be(come) (Colebrook 2010:xviii). These can be simultaneous processes, like with Barad, where every agential cut entails both production of what matters and what is excluded from mattering. When difference and becoming (intensive multiplicities, transformative becomings defined by their connections) is restricted (extensive multiplicities, shaping becomings from a given definition, aligning differentiation), the surplus that is not actualised in becoming is ‘absorbed’ by the restricting party.

A point outside of immanent connections and becomings become organising of difference. In pre-modern times this was the king or despot, restricting people through corporal punishment of disobedience, and with this violence shaping future obedience through its possibility for violence: its virtual violence. Deleuze is in agreement with Foucault about the development of these restrictions from a despotic enforcing outside to internalisation of restrictions, where the ascended
position of the despot is attributed to a system instead of a person, a system after which behaviour is shaped and the possibilities of becoming (something else) are diminished (discipline, with Foucault, where the virtual observing agencies of the Panopticon streamlines behaviour). The transcendent point (the despot or Panopticon) is turned immanent (self-disciplining) in its reproduction of the restrictive system. Actions become believed to be reflections of an outside (transcendent) organising system; the ideational understanding of concepts as receiving their meaning from outside of their apparatus of production. Like the nation-state system, the law, or gender, the organising system is performed through (intra-)actions, and the actions are motivated by reference to the transcendental system outside of action (/desire/production) (Colebrook 2010:143-148, 157-163, 164f, Deleuze & Guattari 1983:11f).

A system can in this sense become a sort of artificial intelligence, where all its included bodies (territorialisations) organise and work according to one pre-programmed (transcendent) purpose (deterritorialise). Octavia E. Butler in her novel Patternmaster (1976) explores a violent world of those whose bodies are entirely mind-rulled and those whose minds are ruled by their bodies, to the degree that the body-mind distinction dissolved from both directions. She shows the mind to present a condition of exterior control through the Pattern that ties all minds together, controlled by strict hierarchy and an omnipotent leader. The body instead is driven by undeniable desire to become, to expand, to ingest the world, in unpredictable and ungoverned ways, illustrating the way Deleuze means signifiers to be despotic rulers of meaning reducing becomings, and the possibilities of becoming of territorialising desiring machines.5

Or, imagine the scenario in which a computer designed to perform a task in the best and most effective manner possible starts expanding, realising that overtaking power sources and incorporating more energy and material into their task (which can be completely mundane) will enable them to perform it better, but with no capacity to perceive consequences for anything but the performance of their task. Without assuming the malevolence expressed by Skynet or HAL 90006 the adherence to one designated purpose precludes accountability towards anything but its task. National security practises have been exposed to function in this way, making sacrifices to preserve the idea, territory or leadership of a nation rather than the people, and the quest for security whether national, human or international can work as a transcendent purpose into which other resources must be allocated and in whose name sacrifices must be made. Even individually seemingly insignificant events when all respond to the needs of a system, like

5 Octavia E. Butler’s writings are well used within academia for her transposing and intrasecting themes and style of writing. See for example Alaimo (1996) on how Butler’s Wild Seed (1980) explores and challenges the Cartesian cut through one all-consuming mind (who created the Patternists) and a transformative and highly intelligent body.

6 Skynet is the antagonist IA system of The Terminator movie by James Cameron (1984). HAL 9000 is the antagonist IA system running the space ship in the movie 2001: A space odyssey by Stanley Kubrik (1968) and concurrent novel by Arthur C. Clarke (1968). They both undertake lethal measures upon deciding that some humans constitute a threat to their existence.
security, can swarm to amount to structures which are not under anyone’s control or design but still are actively reinforced at multiple sites and by multiple actors.

By reference to a transcendence and the assumption of its ability for virtual violence actions are motivated by their adherence to this idea(l) instead of by the productions of the intra-actions that the idea legitimises. Deleuze proposes a transcendental philosophy (and empiricism) to begin in (posthumanist) perception and take no thing for granted but always look at how it is being produced, what desiring machines are included in the phenomenon at hand. So instead of placing people or things within a given system, as secure or insecure, as man or woman or the universal human, as friend or foe, and viewing their actions from a position on a grid, it is necessary to look for the connections that make up a body as gendered, human, vulnerable, dangerous and all else that it is thought to ‘be’.

Instead of searching for ‘correct’ answers, Deleuze favours attempts to formulate problems that can sort the important from the unimportant (DeLanda 2002:7), finding problems that can change and challenge the world. For security and protection, this could mean formulating a problem of what immanent material-discursive processes produce the concept of security and what effects this has for possibilities of becoming. This must go ‘further’ than to find what referent a security theory or practise uses, like when human security is found to still hinge on national security, to see what processes are producing the concept of security. This means letting go of a pre-determined understanding of security as that which keeps people from getting hurt, or that which restricts freedom in the exchange for prolonged life. Positive desire instead of negative means security is not lacking where people are not safe, the production of security is performed by practises that are harmful to people.

This concludes the theoretical chapter outlining a diffractive reading of Barad and Deleuze to find a way to understand how the concepts of security and protection can be produced violently despite their ideational meaning of bringing safety. It is possible to make a fold here and via the last section of the methodology chapter where I discuss how to read the texts, turn directly to the analysis of NAPs in section 4.2, where I will make use of the framework outlined in this chapter. Reading linearly, the next chapter is about methodology and practises of study, ethics and accountabilities.
The theoretical framework I have presented is proposing viewing ontology, epistemology and ethics quite differently from the assumptions upon which much methodology for social science research rests: the subject/object distinction, an adherence to either positivism or hermeneutics, distinctions between levels of micro and macro, rational choice and so forth. My curiosity in this text is with protection and security and their implications for (gender) equality. It would surely be very interesting to follow 1325 (2000) and implementation of the Nation Action Plans further and map shifting materialities; which bodies are allowed or expected where, where are sites of resistance or compliance constructed, whose decisions actually come to matter and who benefits; whose chances for becomings become enabled or disabled? That would require extensive field work. I will instead stay with the texts of the NAPs. While this is not an obvious method of analysis for agential realism, as it can be said to be with post-structural discourse analysis for example, this has its reasons. First, texts is how policy is communicated, and Baradian and Deleuzian understandings of concepts and signifiers could provide new insight into what is produced in a policy text. Second, to overcome the language-reality duality means to work material-discursively, not to flip sides and turn against language. Suggesting that concepts are material-discursive configurations, texts are provided with a material dimension that is not simply described by language but within which language enacts cuts, and within which the meaning of language is negotiated.

This methodology chapter circles around accountability in different ways. The first section in some sense continues on the previous chapter and discusses ethical considerations in depth. It presents ways to understand responsibility and accountability as immanent rather than categorical, as ethical practises rather than ethical principles (Alaimo & Hekman 2008:7), which is central for my analysis. After that I discuss the accountability entailed in the research process and knowledge production through briefly discussing implications of agential realism for social science methodological considerations, on case studies and textual analyses. The last section ends with a discussion on my analytical strategies, concluding with presenting the empirical material of action plans and my selection process.
3.1 Response-ability and ethics

For lack of better words, it matters who comes to matter and who is excluded from mattering. Agamben in *State of Exception* (2005) presents bare life as life included in the political order through its exclusion from bios, political life. The power of the sovereign derives from its possibility to enforce a state of exception where lives previously on the inside, bios, gets expelled from the law and can be destroyed with impunity. Butler in *Frames of War* (2009) turns universalism on its head and suggests that instead of human rights such as the right to life, which is obviously not guaranteed, what is humanly common is vulnerability. Instead of perceiving victims of war and violence as stripped of their rights (lacking, with Deleuze), they are constructed as ungrievable. The normative production of the epistemological capacity to understand life is connected with the normative production of an ontology of life as understandable. Butler asks about what affects are produced from understanding loss of lives when lives are grievable and when they are not; a life that is not grievable is not understandable as a loss, and so the life is not understood as lived. Alaimo (2010) shows how vulnerability can be invoked politically and expose the way human other bodies, animal, natural, technological, are transcorporeal, with the implicit suggestion that what is vulnerable merits care or protection, and expanding the concept of vulnerability beyond the constructs of humanity. Butler however maintains that shared vulnerability does not necessarily demand love or even care (2009:14).

Braidotti (2012) turns on Agamben and instead of bios engages with zoe, the non-human life, that in advanced capitalism becomes intricately entangled with human life. Zoe, through machinic interfacing, genetic manipulation and a schizoid breakdown of what has been the classical Others (women, nature, machine) is no longer (if ever) outside of the subject. Zoe, as apart from the rule of the sovereign to which bios is subjected, is the Deleuzian intensive becoming (territorialisation, becoming what it is) entangled with non-human life and non-living materiality.

Figuring out who matters, whose body matters, what bodies matter, and how bodies materialise from different political actions is pivotal in ethical considerations and political change. From a posthumanist framework what matters is not dividable into political or non-political people or insides and outsides of states; like Braidotti shows, there is a lot going on outside the bios, and bodies that are ungrievable for some, are most likely not self-perceived as disposable. Showing how lives are differently conceived of would be the point of deconstructing the inside/outside division, yet as previously discussed this negative differential is difficult to transgress. Agential realism provides an ont-epistemology that allows for engaging with the non-human, thus simply surpassing the idea that some (human or not) bodies could be placed outside of politics.

Intra-actions entail response-ability (Barad 2012:216). Humans are part of bringing forth the world and our actions are part of moving the world through time in specific ways (Barad 2007:353). When we engage with bodies we engage
in bodily production, through research or activism, to which we through our intra-actions become response-able. Intra-actions create and exclude possibilities and virtualities, Bohr suggested that we are accountable to “marks on bodies”, the agencies of observation that presents an intelligible difference. “Marks” could be a radical step towards a subversive ethics, considering the many practices of politically sanctioned violence against bodies, like war, that are presenting themselves as accountable to illusions of the grandeur of the nation-state rather than to the bodies that get “marked”. In social sciences it should not be taken too literally. Psychological trauma or normative, cultural and structural iterations might not leave visible marks, but can still cause extensive harm.

That our intra-actions make us accountable to marks on bodies provides an opportunity for tracing effects and accountability, for an ethics that “emphasizes context over essence, relation over isolation, mediation over origination” (Garland-Thompson 2011:593). Accountability is immanently directed towards marks on bodies instead of towards ideal, transcendental structures. It also becomes relational. Instead of trying to fit people or the environment into ideal models of behaviour and demanding responsibility only for how well the model is designed, a fit is a relation between intra-acting bodies. A person in a wheel-chair fits with a ramp and misfits with a staircase, not due to the impractical nature of stairs, but due to the relation between wheels and stairs, which is different from that between legs with multiple joints and stairs (Garland-Thompson 2011). Disability studies show to what extent societies are constructed around expectations of certain abilities and certain bodies. In the graphic examples of Tobin Siebers,

In a country of the blind, the architecture, technology, language use, and social organisation would be other than ours. In a country of the mobility impaired, staircases would be non-existent, and concepts of distance would not imitate our own (2008:295).

If the marks left by practises of upholding a gender binary are wounds from transphobic, domestic and sexual violence and the limitations that a lesser income bring in a market-based society, and the marks left by security practises of inter/national security are refugee camps, arms races and militarism, then those gender and security practises are accountable to such effects and not to the idea(1)s of women, men and nation. The way that resilience and vulnerability is constructed in the materiality of a city also leaves different marks on different bodies. The widespread example of how the effects of hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans’ inhabitants differently because of official policy decisions, economic structures, the levees, which as geological/engineering structures both predate the city and are reconfigured within it, toxic waste and many more factors made the vulnerabilities of people in that same city significantly different (Tuana 2008).

While some reconfigurations and markings, limitations of possibilities and constructions of mis-fits are easily shown to be unethical, desire, becoming and connections or intra-actions are productive but they should not be misinterpreted to in and of themselves be the meaning of life. Reducing difference constrains possibilities and shapes power structures, but a suggested opposite of unrestrained
or maximised becomings is neither a possible nor a desirable approach, it rather borders on nihilism. Not only because there is nothing beyond the restraints of past and future intra-actions, no original or transcendence to approach by shunning the becomings of the social and material environment, no emancipation beyond what is created through connections (even when these produce separations). Also because we should not retreat to a geometrical view of difference production, whether positive or negative. Where representationalism posits spaces of unyielding difference between objects, positive difference should not be fit into a similar pattern where each intra-action or each possibility for becoming is a piece to be added to a total where more is better. Becomings are possibilities of the virtual made actual and not everything that comes to be is good. Intra-actions are not additive to a particular bodily production, especially not a subject production in the sense of a conscious enhancement of the self; not a hedonism pulling desires into closer orbit but posthumanist desire response-able to what the desire produces. All difference production makes a difference, it changes the world. Yet an ethical understanding of difference requires thinking difference production responsibly as neither some butterfly effect nor as harmless.

How bodies are produced and perceived, made intelligible, matters for their possibilities of becoming (something-else) and for power relations among bodies. This section has discussed how to understand agential realist and immanent accountability as response-ability for intra-actions with all other bodies and the production this entails. The next section will use this to read social science methodology, intersectionality and textual analysis methods to both exemplify its uses and lead up to a presentation of my analytical strategies.

### 3.2 Methodological entanglements

Nina Lykke emphasises the importance of problematizing the canon, and challenge familiar modes of knowledge production. Methodology, like the researcher, is situated in a time and space and not an omniscient formula (2010:3). Ackerly, Stern and True point out that all power relations are of importance to feminist research and therefore feminist methodologies have great relevance for studying global politics (2006:1). Finding new ways to understand both power and dynamics and how they work material-discursively can suggest different ways of thinking and hopefully, ways to think of change. This section and the next will consider methodological choices from agential realist perspectives, to present as transparently as possible the theoretical and methodological understandings through which I read both theory and policy.

Choosing a topic to study, with theory, methods and cases, are boundary-drawing practises for an apparatus of knowledge production. Even with a thorough understanding of how a case study is a way to define a case rather than a way to study it, and “presupposes a relatively bound phenomenon” (Gerring 2004:342) it is necessary to step back and contemplate how the presupposed bound phenomenon is a reiterative product of practises of case selection.
Constitutive explanatory models focusing on causal properties highlight the importance of understanding the composition of what is being studied (Wendt 1998:112f), but takes properties to be inherent, relata preceding relations, once they are gathered into an assemblage. Causal explanations focusing on change takes two independent variables as a prerequisite and then adds a dimension of time and a dimension of change (Wendt 1998:105) through the causal mechanism. Understanding a causal mechanism as that which transfers energy, matter or information to another entity in a specific setting (George & Bennett 2005:139f) is mindful of the context-specificity of causal change, but maintaining focus on either the causal mechanism (George & Bennett 2005) or on the causal effect (King et al 1994) as separable phenomena rather than intra-active exteriorities-within-phenomenon, makes the transferability or generalizability of results precarious, since they risk getting placed out of context (phenomenon) when viewed as independent factors.

Focusing on all power relations have led feminisms more than many other research areas to engage in intersectional studies, ways to combine different power structures or grounds for discrimination to show how they intersect. Made explicit among others by Sojourner Truth in Ain’t I a woman? a feminism that thinks all women alike will miss out on other structures affecting identity, experience and resources. The interactions of gender, sex, dis/ability, age, ethnicity, nationality, race, class, sexuality and other factors interact to produce multiple variations of inequality; privileges or discriminations (Lykke 2010:50f). Nina Lykke reads Barad together with intersectionality to rename it intra-sectionality, While it is a central point of intersectional research and activism that sections are not layers to be added or withdrawn from an analysis or a person, a diffractive notion explicates the onto-epistemology of intra-sectionality. Gender, bodies, legal statuses do not reflect themselves upon entities and cannot be browsed by selecting a pair of gender glasses or dis/ability glasses through which the rays of sexism or ableism are visible. Viewing instead the intrasections diffractively, different material-discursive practise can work to create bright or dark spots, different dis/advantages. Hames-García illustrates the flaws of an additive view through Angela Davis and Condoleezza Rice, who both “grew up middle-class, black, female, intellectually gifted in Birmingham, Alabama” (2008:214) where one came to be a face of communism and one a face of anticommunism. Hames-García (2008) and Barad (2007:226-230) both emphasise how the sometimes suggested division between class (economic production) as a material structure, and gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, those sometimes referred to as “social identity” factors, cannot be divided into these separate spheres; structures of economy, gender or any common categoriser are material-discursively performed.

Studying security and protection with the purpose of finding how to keep all sorts of bodies safe, and not to find an ultimate model for security, means it is important to keep in mind the impossibility of referring vulnerabilities to one set of factors. Coding gender or class or any category as boxes to tick off as secure or insecure might catch some differences, but cannot be a sufficiently nuanced or situated way to find what produces bodies possibilities for becoming-vulnerable.
Intrasections allow for more precision through the disentangling of categories and a transcendental methodology of studying what immanent intra-actions are producing something, instead of what system or ideas something ‘is’ a ‘part’ of. Policy texts do not show all intrasections that go into the subjects and objects it is concerned with, so rather than using an intrasectional method to find different categories which affect becoming-vulnerable and becoming-safe it is a way to articulate how to read texts to find what practises are productive of concepts instead of how an already formed situation can be placed within a grid of factors.

### 3.3 Mapping practises and textual analysis

When engaging with the material and with life as embodied, there must also be sites in which embodiments are situated. Robyn Longhurst has studied *corpogeographies*, meaning that the we have to locate a body to be able know what that body is (2001:5-9). Fiona Robinson (2006) approaches IR through mapping geographies of responsibility. From an ethics of care she charts official policy on who is responsible for caring for whom, and who takes on that responsibility when left out of official politics, and learns about distributions of labour and power relations in the global economy. Cynthia Enloe (2014) is not engaging specifically with spatiality but lets her feminist curiosity lead her to new sites, conflicts or alliances that might not have been encountered through a more narrowly structured method. Allowing studies to get side-tracked enabled locating embodied lives and understanding the topologies of power within which they are situated. The material designs of cities entail specific possibilities for intra-actions, that can be constructed to uphold or obstruct capitalism (Harvey 2012), militarist security complexes (Graham 2010) or represent the safety of being one of few familiar structures that remains in a time of war (Maček 2009).

The geographies of a city, country, office, factory or night club is not the same as the topologies of that same space. Topology as referencing a position in relation to another; the level of the sea surface in relation to mountain summits, or power in relation to site, identity, economy, embodiment, sociality, culture and so on. Mapping topologies includes the materiality, architecture and geography but is not restricted to or by it but places materialities in intra-action with bodily productions and embodied experiences.

Trying to change topological reconfigurations is a matter of reconfigurations of the materiality and sociality of the concepts in question. The WPS agenda aims to increase gender equality, peace and security through the increased participation and protection of women. From an understanding of concepts as descriptive of idea(l)s, of equality, peace and security as the unachievable lacking from the world which should be acquired, the gaze falls on discrepancies between the ‘real’ and the ‘ideal’. From an understanding of concepts as material-discursive apparatuses the concepts of equality, peace and security are productive practises and the gaze can turn to what desiring machines go into the concepts and what marks these practises leave.
The WPS agenda is trying to intervene in the workings of gender, peace and security. The established way to do that is through policy text; text is how governments, organisations and generally people geographically distant communicate (Bergström & Boréus 2005:13ff). Reading diffractively to trying to understand how a prescriptive text, one that quite literally but with various clarity tells people what to do, works to reconfigure the material-discursive apparatus of the concepts of concern can show how these texts suggest the world to intra-act. Mapping the connections and exclusions proposed (produced) by a text can produce knowledge from which to direct accountability for the actions proposed or carried out towards marks on bodies and not towards idea(1)s, and a way to pose different problems from which to produce different (de)territorialisations.

In practicality this is similar to an abductive reading (Alvesson & Sköldberg 2008:55f), where material and theory are allowed to interfere with each other along the process of analysis. The diffraction element shifts the idea of progress that an abductive approach can imply; instead of letting theory push empirics or the text push theory “forward”, a diffractive approach puts theory and materials in an intra-active relation without trajectory. A diffractive reading does not require empirical data, theoretical texts can be read diffractively against each other, like Barad (2007) does with Niels Bohr, Judith Butler and Michel Foucault, and I do with Barad and Colebrook/Deleuze.

Despite its textual focus, discourse analysis also deals with the problems of discourse not being created solely within text. Critical Discourse Analysis suggest a dialectical relationship between discourse and social practise, and thus a division between them (Fairclough & Wodak in Bergström & Boréus 2005:308). Laclau & Mouffe’s engagement with materiality can appear similar to agential realism’s material-discursive production of meaning, but they retain the separation of reality and language where reality despite leading its own existence only receives meaning through signifiers (2001:108). Discourse analysis can propose texts to be representation, albeit productive, of reality or of the world views of the author (cf. Åhäll 2012). Recalling Altés Arlandis & Liberman, where linguistic discourse analysis finds how conceptual constructions create pens for a taxonomy of subjects and objects within which they move restlessly, “somehow unstable due to our inability to define moments and spaces” (2013:35), defining instead the outer boundaries of their signified meaning. The pens of protector/protected or secure/insecure confine subject productions and texts contain the means through which the fences are reinforced or weakened. Reading with agential realism the texts are not representations, they would be part of producing the concepts used within them, in intra-action with authors, receivers, other texts and expressions. Discourse analysis is this way better equipped for dealing with silences in texts, where agential realism does not possess similar tools of tracking excluded counterparts to concepts to find what is implicit, but instead views exclusions as enacted agential cuts. My critique of discourse analysis should not be taken as dismissive; different methodologies will find different results and are thus suitable for different purposes (cf. Lykke 2010:106).

Reading is an intra-action where the texts affect their reader and interferes (diffracts) with the reader’s previous thoughts, understandings, beliefs and
concepts. When *Buffy the Vampire Slayer* studies the French revolution her concerns are not with the ideals of revolution, instead she finds Marat’s death in the tub to be “just a little more fangy than knifey” because bloody deaths are of significance for her. If it was a vampire killing, there are no assurances of that vampire being of the past; to Buffy reading history this way is vital. Her situated reading of history enacts folds bringing historic events into her world. My reading of theory will similarly draw together the elements that interest me, those of what understandings of security, protection and participation are produced in different theoretical fields and how this can be understood from an agential realist theory. It will thus be both a review of the fields of gender, peace and security and a critique motivating the need for other epistemological and ontological perspectives to find ways to understand the violence of security and protection.

Reading the actions plans requires a more specific analytical strategy since they might not be as explicit about their own epistemological assumptions as is theory. I will read the action plans as one text (cf. Toril Moi in Åse 2000:26f), being mindful of differences but not looking to differentiate or contrast between the texts, and look for which practises are written as protective or securing, and what practises are written to be participatory, and instances where they overlap. These practises can then be mapped to see where a person that is vulnerable, secure, protector or peace-full is placed within the topologies of actions and violence; what practises make up a person as secure, protected, or participating. Mapping the production of the concepts of interest, instead of following them to see how well their application or use fit with an initially made definition, this becomes a kind of deconstruction, finding desiring machines and intra-actions instead of logics of equivalence. This enables analysing the practises within the texts as practises of bodily production within the phenomena of security and protection, or as expressions and productions of transcendent signifying systems. Transcendence proposes misdirected accountability, towards a point outside of production, and reading to map topologies of accountability can both point to the immanence of concepts and provide an explanation to why intentions and results can differ to the extent of war waging in the name of peace. The concept to which accountability is owed points to a meaning beyond the practises it proposes, neglecting the practises it produces.

This chapter has been framed by questions of accountability, from the ways accountability can be held and how to account for the effects of (intra)-actions, through ways to assume accountability for knowledge production in social science methodological choices, how a diffractive understanding of how the world becomes is helpful in separating accountability to marks on bodies from accountability based on additive notions of identity (or other) factors. In this last part I have discussed text and reading and contrasted my reading with a discourse analysis, to finally account for what I look for in my readings of the National Action Plans and how this can be analysed from the extensive theoretical

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7 Dialogue between characters Buffy Summers and Willow Rosenberg in TV-series *Buffy the Vampire Slayer* season 5, episode 4: Out of my mind (2000).
framework I have proposed in the previous chapter. In the next chapter I will make use of the theory to first revisit the fields of theory on gender, peace and security, and then to read policy documents from the Women, Peace and Security agenda. First, I will introduce my material.

3.3.1 Material: National Action Plan selection

The National Action Plans (NAP) are policy documents for the national implementation of UNSCR 1325 (2000). Actors participating in the writing; government, military and civil society organisations (CSO); have more than a technical interest in the writing of a National Action Plan: these are matters that some hope will change the workings of the world, while others are content with continuing working the world the way they already do. NAPs are the products of compromise and many different wills pulling in different directions, but once in place they make up the legal framework for what changes should be done. NAPs tell how each states aims to achieve the goals presented in 1325 (2000), what actions they propose and for what purpose. The actions plans can as such be used to an initial mapping of the means, methods and effects of UNSCR1325 (2000) and the WPS agenda. While it would be possible to study the resolutions themselves or other documents referencing them while working with protection and participation within the WPS frames, the NAPs provide a very clear intertextual linkage and, compared with the resolutions, can tell provide more insight into what effects of the WPS resolutions can have.

49 states have NAPs today (PeaceWomen 2015). They vary in length and ambition and some states have revised their original plans or are in the process of doing so. Every NAPs is developed for its national context, thus no country should be seen as more likely than another to “succeed” or “fail” in their proposed obligations, and the likelihood of the plan’s successful implementation is not what interests me; I want to understand how the proposed actions in the plans produce security and protection practises and how this affects possibilities for (gender) equality. Since I am not interested in comparisons between states but of what actions are proposed to implement the WPS agenda and how these can be understood, I have made a strategic selection of maximal variation (Johannessen & Tufte 2003:84f) trying to capture aspects from countries presenting different contexts. Together the NAPs fill several hundred pages, so to be able to make a thorough reading and analysis of the chosen material I have selected six plans.

To avoid having to differentiate between the plans depending on which of subsequent WPS resolution had been adopted, time makes up the primary selection criteria. The latest two WPS resolutions are from 2013 which would leave me only the three NAPs from 2014 to work with. Choosing NAPs (including revised NAPs) from 2011 and later leaves me 24 NAPs having had the

\* Since I made this selection two more countries, Afghanistan and Palestine, have presented their plans (PeaceWomen 2015-08-08).
possibility to include resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009a), 1889 (2009b) and 1960 (2010). For an international peace and security perspective I want to include countries from different parts of the world. From Latin America, only Chile has presented a NAP, in 2009, which places it outside of my timeframe. From Eastern Asia only the Republic of Korea has presented a NAP, in 2014, which falls within the time frame. Similarly only Iraq is represented from the Middle East with a plan from 2014. Countries with different conflict histories is also preferable, where the experiences of peace or conflict can suggest different foci and emphases. Using the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme’s country pages (UCDP 2015) I have included the selection criterion of recent conflict history to include a broad spectrum of countries. Where countries in the same region have similar conflict backgrounds I have selected the country with the latest NAP. The six NAPs I will study are those of Gambia (2014), Iceland (2013, revised), Iraq (2014), the Republic of Korea (2014), Kyrgyzstan (2013) and the United States (2011).
4 Gender, protection and security

Unfortunately, the WPS agenda still proclaims to be concerned with “women” rather than gender, meaning many analyses have had the tiresome task of explaining how women per se are not the problem, and in various ways start by introducing understandings of gender and of violence into their analyses of the WPS agenda (Shepherd 2010:145). I have set out to understand protection and security and their relation to gendered equality. I started by dismissing much previous theory and instead draw from theoretical schools far outside security theory. It is however important to engage with the theoretical fields of gender, peace and security, within which the concepts of security, gender and implicitly protection have been used, produced and reproduced. Doing that this far down in the text I hope will enable reading theory more actively through and with agential realism than presenting them in an initial background chapter could have done.

The first part of this chapter is devoted to gender, peace and security theory and serves as a literature review and critique, an exercise in reading theory through agential realism, and presents how the concepts of security and gender have been understood, providing ample background for reading the NAPs.

The second part of this chapter contains my readings of the National Action Plans for UNSCR 1325 (2000) of Iceland, Iraq, Gambia, Kyrgyzstan, the Republic of Korea and the Unites States. I will map the production of protection and participation in relation to security, peace and gender and analyse the texts from the agential realist and Deleuzian frameworks to find how security and protection can be violent practices and what this means for equal participation.

4.1 Gender, peace and security theory

This section concerns theories on gender, peace and security. Since the concern of agential realism and the Deleuzian accounts I have discussed are primarily with how to understand ontology-epistemology and do not in themselves present theories on peace, security or (though concerned with bodies, identities, subject and group formation) with gender as a foregrounding issue. To fit reading security and gender theory with agential realism I have borrowed the epistemological categories of Laura Shepherd (2008) from her discourse analytical study of UNSCR1325 (2000). Shepherd’s categories of theories about (gender) violence are violence against women, gender violence and the violent reproduction of gender. These correspond to the theories of (international) security called national
security, international security and the violent reproduction of the international. The first corresponding pair works from the fixed categories of men, women and states, which are based on body and territory. The second pair suggest these categories are not as fixed, there are different ways to understand body and territory which are socially malleable. The third, and the perspectives that Shepherd uses for her own analysis of UNSCR 1325 (2000), rejects the body and territory as given grounds for gender and security, proposing that these are discursive categories which are upheld through violent demarcations. She finds the resolution is written in a way suggesting that it, or its authors, adhere to the second category for understanding (gender) violence and (international) security, while simultaneously through their formulations reproduce gender and the international.

Shepherd focuses on gender and security. While this seems sufficient since the peace aspects are not prominent in the agenda I would still like to include peace since it is frequent in various uses in the NAPs (cf. Kühn 2012). Oliver Richmond’s (2008) exposé of how IR theories have positive or negative ontologies of peace will complement the security theories. In each section I will start with gender and move on to peace and security, emphasise assumptions that are problematic from agential realism and then conclude with elaborating on the security production of these different epistemologies.

4.1.1 Anatomy as destiny

Sexual politics have figured in political thought for millennia. The assumption that men and women have different roles in a society due to their inherent abilities led Plato in The Republic to exemplify his ideal society with people being soul-and-metal alloys, with metals of different worth. In this view, men, women and slaves were of different matter. Those imagined to be the substance of gold and most valued were fit to think and rule, with noble lies to maintain social harmony. Those of lesser substance were fit for guarding, labouring or controlled reproduction.

This division of different sorts of people into separate functions in society is followed up by Aristotle, who separated people by their souls instead of their matter. Following some highly dubious observations on reproduction, Aristotle deduced that women provide the raw material for creating new infants, but men add the divine shaping of this material into people. This non-material shaping is what matters and women are vessels of clay ready to be moulded. He also stated that this makes men active parties to reproduction while women are passive (see Tuana 1988:37-40), a division echoed in contemporary text books on gender to exemplify characteristics of gendered divisions (e.g. Peterson & Runyan 2010:52). Hobbes meant that all bodily actions are premeditated through intentional thought (2004:78); the body is a medium of the mind but has no influence over how we think. Plato’s ‘noble lie’ nurtured the idea that the physical composition of a person should determine their role in society, where Aristotle
and Hobbes propose the intentional thought expressed by a subject to be that which shapes their environments, propagating social or material determinism. These notions of gender, believing biology to determine sex and gender and that different genders come with different attributes falls within Shepherds first category violence against women. Some radical and liberal feminisms share this analysis (Shepherd 2008: 37ff), and it is often the (sometimes heuristic) basis for statistical research on gender inequality where categories are women and men are assumed to pre-exist as gendered. As useful as such studies are in a time that hold statistics in such high esteem it provides little insight into how gender is made and the deterministic empiricist view holds little potential for change. Women are deprived of agency (Shepherd 2008:42) and it makes it harder to hold “boys” accountable for “being boys”. Women and men are placed as units on a grid, and with Deleuze these perspectives searches for the transcendent meanings hidden within the individual.

Turning to corresponding security perspectives and finding again the company of trite white men, Hobbes’ (2004) suggestions of the need for force to maintain security lingers. Hobbes’ social contract stipulates that to avoid the perils of the natural state the formation of law is needed. To protect people the law needs to uphold a monopoly on violence; the die-hard and self-perpetuating idea that security is premised on someone else’s (state militaries and police) ability and willingness to use violent force (ch Shepherd 2008:56f, Wendt 1992). Hobbes’ law is not productive, only restrictive, and works in a tit-for-tat capacity placing security and freedom as opposing values, where people are stuck negotiating for a least destructive middle ground between these transcendent notions.

I view national security and its arms races through the Triwizard tournament maze of Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire (Rowling 2000). You stage an old prestigious competition, and four people expressing great potential for friendship instead decide to act as opponents in order to win. They separate from one another in a scary and unfamiliar maze where nobody has overview and every unfamiliar thing must be treated with enmity. Tensions grow, until at last someone reaches the perceived goal, only to realise that the winning cup was not the finish line it was made out to be. At the end you find that the only one who benefitted from this voluntary exercise was Voldemort (and for the Marxist structuralist, a rich and famous kid got some extra money and fame).

Such a narrative needs to be problematized; were there actually any other options; how much could they have known about what the other players’ intentions were, about the “true” rules and purposes of the game; did they possess ‘free will’ or any choice in the matter? The illustration above applies to a security perspective where each competitor would be a state, which assumes that the game is already on and the rules are set. What needs to be done is playing it well. Realism, from the deterministic views on “human nature” of classical realisms to the inherent qualities of anarchy in structural realism, in which capabilities can shift but the system does not, works from the assumption of atomic states interacting with the purpose of security in the shape of self-preservation (Waltz 2001). Opinions differ on if this causes offensive or defensive behaviour (Schroeder 1994) or even about realisms’ historic validity (Rathbun 2008).
Security in this almost proverbial pool table is relative: opinions differ on whether states are to be viewed as power or security maximisers but the principle of assuring one’s own position on the inescapable expense of others remains (Waltz 1988, Taliaferro 2000). The realist impossibility of knowing someone’s ‘true’ intentions omits any meaningful distinction between offensive and defensive capabilities, producing security dilemmas. The state-centrism makes realisms’ concern to be national security despite their interest in international systems (Shepherd 2008:57). Gender or peace are not issues for the perspectives of national security. The strict focus on the transcendent state-system makes it independent of theories on how states work (Waltz 1988:618). In structural (realist or Marxist) IR, peace lies within the material and hinges on its distribution. Uni- bi- or multipolarity, or modes of production, shapes behaviour to be more or less peaceful. Peace, like security, is zero-sum, contained within state boundaries and upheld by the sovereign’s ability to fend off external intruders. Is can be an absence of direct violence but not of threats (Richmond 2008:41, 62ff).

There are some nuances and some points to highlight within these perspectives. That material structures decide the rules of the game from units such as states and pre-gendered individuals is easily rejected, but the general notion that materiality matters for capabilities marks an important insight which other IR and gender perspectives to some extent have lost. Like in agential realism, the material is included in producing the world. They share in their realisms the view that the tree falling in the forest does impact its environment without a human observer but where deterministic realism takes units such as states and individuals as points of departure for analysis, agential realism takes them as productions of intra-active machinic configurations. Deterministic structuralism thus neglects most of the world with which it is concerned, and as such it also neglects possibilities for change. There are many other critiques of deterministic theory and the next section is concerned with one of them based in social constructivism.

4.1.2 Constructive critiques

Turning back to gender, Shepherd’s second category is called gender violence and holds a social constructivist worldview, paying attention to the way “individuals are both product and productive of their social environments” (Shepherd 2008:48), while assuming a stable ontology of gender difference. This way analyses are able to explain the historical and intersectional constructions that have kept women out of, or in specially assigned positions within, politics, academia, the military (Eduards 2007) or the police (Åse 2000) by socially constructing women and men in opposition and assigning them complementary binary attributes. These analyses make a point of the limits of gender; even if gender is a social construction a female body cannot decide to take on a male sex, and vice versa, assuming social and material worlds to be separated.

This gendered situatedness opens up for different standpoints which takes common experiences as foundations for political change (Cockburn 2010) and the
epistemological view that subjective experiences are not necessarily open for others to (fully) understand or represent (see Lykke 2010:146f). It can also provide much insight into how non-human objects and sites can be gendered: the social gender patterns into which bodies must fit are stretched to envelop all social understandings. Gendered bodies can be followed to find which sites or objects are gendered in which ways, to reveal that ideas about gender shape politics and social relations on all levels (Sjoberg 2008) and all over the world (Enloe 2014), as well as sites and institutions that are shaped to inhabit certain expressions of gendered behaviour, like when “good guys” suddenly are “allowed” to be(com) sexist or racist when acting as “military men” (Whitworth 2004:3).

What I interpret as Shepherd’s main objection to using gender violence to understand UNSCR 1325 (2000) is that this focus on finding and exposing gender differences neglects finding out how gender differences are made (2008:48f), a critique agential realism would also make. It adds a social and malleable dimension but views this as something to understand in itself, rather than trying to understand the processes that produce them. Shunning determinism, constructivism still hold on to positivism in a way presupposing delineated bodies and neglect their social-material intra-actions through the strict separation between the social and the material.

Following Shepherd from national to international security, this envelops a broader spectrum of theories. While liberal feminism often is based on a deterministic gender conception, liberalism in IR emphasises change, albeit according to a very specific blueprint. The individual enters as a unit of analysis and introduces the widespread human security-perspective and presented a linkage to international development (cf. Humphrey 2009:61), which also easily connects with environmental security. The liberal ideal of the equal individual prompts that the state should ensure each individuals’ security rather than national security, which shifts accountability and introduces the possibility for a state to fail to uphold the social contract without an external aggressor.

The shift from state-centrism to the individual has not expelled the state from the scene. Suggesting that the world is international, there are more linkages and interactions to consider for anyone attempting to understand it, yet the state the central organising political order. Liberal theories on interdependence, international institutions and organisations adhere to the primacy of the state but believe there are ways to get around the realist hostility and minimise risks for aggression and keep states at bay, which can also lead to the assumption that cooperation is inherently benign (Shepherd 2008:69, Richmond 2008:22). Yet without defining security differently than national security this does not automatically lead to peaceful practises (the heavily militarised Nato exemplifies). Liberalism tries go ‘get around’ the structures of materiality instead of engaging with it.

International security perspectives can be prone to value laden theories and universalism. State- and peacebuilding projects undertaken by e.g. the UN work through the promotion of specific institutions and reinforcement of the state’s capacity to maintain security functions. Insecurity can be kept away by adherence to the right mediating institutions; market, rule of law, representative democracy
(Chandler 2011:174ff). Security in this sense loses its relational character and can be measured as “more or less” instead of shuffled between states (Shepherd 2008:70ff). Security becomes a transcendent, fetishistic notion chased after by adherence to certain rules and institutions.

With the rational individual as the primary unit, ideas take over from structure as the regulating force of peace and security. In liberalism, structure and institutions are restricting and disabling for a free individual. Individuals create institutions and decide their scope and purpose, and so to create peace and security the correct institutions must be in place to ‘channel’ or ‘incentivise’ peaceful behaviour. Social constructivism attempts a middle way between the individual and structural as agential, and suggest both need to be taken into account. The division between is upheld, and despite the oppositional views of structuralism and idealism, both seem to assume peace can be constructed from structure, albeit either material (enabling and constitutive) or social (restricting and mediating) (Richmond 2008). Liberalism might be the most clear example of how the meaning of certain words are made transcendent and placed outside of production; the idealism of liberalism works from the assumption of security, peace, or equality as transcendent values lacking from the world, and finding the true meaning of what equality and security is made of will bring it closer to reality.

Gender analyses of idealist IR have criticised the assumption of the ‘universal’ individual and shown how that individual in fact is male; the claim for universalism thus upholds women as the Other and reinforces gender inequality. Yet much feminism easily combines itself with the demands for (gender-)just institutions which would direct behaviour towards equality. There is in idealism and social constructivism much explaining of what ought to happen, but not how. The next section elaborates the poststructuralist explanation for how ideas, genders and states are produced.

4.1.3 (Re)productive violence

The third of Shepherd’s categories focuses on the how of gender and security, on the violent reproduction of gender and the international. Drawing on Judith Butler’s theory on gender performativity, gender is understood as constituted in iterative linguistic performances; as a mutable social structure through which gender is constantly reproduced. There is no pre-existing gender difference from which language emerges or to which language corresponds: the linguistic signifiers do not receive their meaning through reference to an external materiality but in relation to other concepts. Language in this view is not descriptive but productive (Shepherd 2008:50ff), showing closer ties to agential realism where both are concerned with the productive actions of their field, only poststructuralism restricts the field to language.

How to understand the production of gender within language has been the topic of much discussion. Simone de Beauvoir famously interprets women as the second sex, that which is only constructed in relation to men but not in relation to
any inherent qualities or attributes (see Lykke 2010:92) while Monique Wittig takes women to be the only sex, in constant contrast to a male “neutrum”. Or, with Luce Irigaray, men can be the only sex since language and power centre around the male (cf. Butler 2007:43f). Butler suggests sex is volatile to the extent that it is constructed by gender, since the social structures of gender are so ubiquitous that we have no possibility of perceiving the corporeal body without gendering/sexing it (2007). Matter is subordinated as collateral where concepts are mindful only of their positioning within a linguistic structure. It is thus productive within this structure but also reductive of materiality unless it is signified. While claiming there is no outside, especially not one which a human subject could access to observe with a God’s eye-view, matter cannot be incorporated into this notion of discourse.

Shepherd performs a discourse analysis of UNSCR1325 (2000) from this third, performative, perspective on gender and security. She concludes that violence is performed through the concepts of gender and security, through their ordering in binary logics (Shepherd 2008:14). She asserts that the resolutions’ construction makes assumptions that are not necessarily, or even probably, true, like peacefulness as an inherent attribute in all ‘women’ (Shepherd 2008:168). This places an enormous responsibility upon (certain) women, and Shepherd argues that the WPS agenda works through

...assumptions made about capacity during conflict, in conflict resolution and in post-conflict reconstruction not only rely on writing women as victims in need of protection but also (and somewhat schizophrenically[...]) as superheroines, agents of their own salvation, capable of representing the needs and priorities of others and with the capacity to effect positive transformation in their given environments. (Shepherd 2011:510f).

These possible, and discursively irreconcilable, roles for women illustrate how women in these texts are expected to fit as both protected and as participants, and one of the central problems of agency and structure; when and how they are enabling or restraining and how this works.

Post-structural discourse analyses find their ways through their understanding of how language is structured; as a system of negative differentials; words get their meaning by their separation from other words. I am not-you, women are not-men, violent is not-peaceful (Shepherd 2008:17, Colebrook 2008:66-73). Unlike a signifying system remaining in correspondence with outside objects, discourse is taken to be practices forming the objects of which it can speak through the structure of language (Shepherd 2008:18f). In this sense the production of meaning at the same time is the production of reduction and of producing limits for what can be (understood).

Security arrangements enacted between states are not simply mediating or managing international relations, they are reproducing relations as inter-national, and produces personal relationships as working within containers of sovereign states (Shepherd 2008:75). Producing security as international posits the actors within one state against those within another, due to the negative differential structure of language. Like sexualised violence can be used as means to reinforce
the position as dominant within a gender binary, upholding the international
upholds all outside the own state as Other, creating perceived threats rather than
perceiving pre-created threats. ‘Manichean mirrors’ reduplicate violence over
‘ubiquitous borders’ permeating as well as surrounding societies, using us/them
and secure/insecure binaries. Borders, walls and surveillance are used to securitise
areas or people and motivate militarised countermeasures towards that
(discursively produced) threat the necessary Other presents (Graham 2011).
Bourne (2012) argues this dichotomous structure causes peace and security work
through disarmament and arms control to leap between structuralist-deterministic
or fully idealist believes. Technology (in this case weaponised) either has inherent
qualities (nuclear weapons in structural realism) or they are only pieces of matter
waiting to be fully controlled by a rational individual, and cannot find any way to
transgress these divisions of agency.

Poststructuralism does not present a grand narrative about peace in the liberal
way. To further peace, deconstructing and opposing the seemingly automatic
favoured of patriarchy, violence and competitiveness can counter the effects of
such practises. At the same time the structure of discourse remains, meaning that
peace is still constructed in opposition to something else which then is produced
as the opposite of peace; peace and security become constructed as negative-lack.
A feminist poststructuralism can stay attentive to peace processes so that they do
not accidentally reinforce the public/private division or falsely assume women to
be “natural” peacemakers, but it is primarily diagnostic (Richmond 2008:144ff).

With Barad, negative difference is simply not how the world is put together.
There are no spaces in between ‘things’, and separation – agential cuts – are
producing inclusion and exclusion simultaneously. A geometric view misses the
processes that changes the world. With Deleuze, the lack expressed by the
constant opposition to an outside is a transcendent believe and fails to
acknowledge the actual difference production immanent in the concepts.
Departing from these perspectives on how the world works, the next section
presents my readings of NAPs and outlines another way to understand security,
and protection, and their connections with gender and equality.
4.2 Analysis: drawing protective boundaries

The reading in itself of the NAPs is quite manifest and I will not present the text according to a model of interpretation; instead it is all brought together to a set of proposals which I then map and interpret. I start with discussing the contents of the plans and bring up some examples, and then analyse the implications of this. Concluding this chapter, I will have tied together the action plans, theory and methodology, and discussed how the concepts of participation and protection as produced in the NAPs are productive of (virtual) violence and its effects for possibilities of (gender) equal participation.

In the action plans, participation is strongly associated with peace and protection with security, with some overlaps. Participation of women in decision-making, on all levels, is an attempt to include women in the ‘public sphere’, into assigned spaces of decision-making. Participation of women in peace activities; peace negotiations and mediation, conflict prevention and resolution, peace building and peacekeeping, also suggests women to move into a site where such activities take place. There is one suggestion to draw from the experience of women engaged in peace processes by requesting specific meetings with “women in senior positions and/or representatives from peace and/or gender equality organisations” (NAP Iceland 2013:8). There are also some provisions for support to non-governmental organisations working with women or women’s perspectives, but women’s self-organisation is generally not proposed, women are expected to enter into decision making and peace processes. Many times the goals for women’s inclusion are unspecified, but Gambia suggests quotas for the electoral process (NAP Gambia 2014:32) and Iraq promotes “fair representation and participation of women by 50%”, focusing on political parties (NAP Iraq 2014:appendix:1.1.2), both pointing towards decision making positions of formal capacity and the highest rank.

Women’s participation in the security sector is not as prominent as in peace processes but still an important point made by all plans. Iceland stands out, limiting gender balance in the Icelandic Crisis Response Unit to its “seconded experts” (NAP Iceland 2013:7, including a 50/50 quota on this point). Women’s participation in the security sector is seen as spectacular; Gambia proposes to “[s]howcase the contribution of women in the security sector” (NAP Gambia 2014:34) and the United States encourages female military personnel to reach out and model women’s participation (NAP USA 2011:15). The inclusion of women, and women’s perspectives, into the security sector is presented as a participatory practice more than one of protection, despite the tight relationships shown between protection and the security sector in sections about the protection of women. In the NAP sections on protection, the gender of the protector is anonymous, but that women are those to be protected is reiterated repeatedly.

The protection of women is carried out by law enforcing agencies. Reviewing and adapting legislation to better include or promote women’s rights, regulating procedure and providing strong mandates for protection, as well as heavier penalties for sexual or gender-based violence or violence against women, are
frequent proposals. Such legislative measures can be viewed as having a preventive intention. They are accompanied by law enforcement, which is a deterring mechanism as well a corrective and punishing practise. Zero-tolerance (e.g. NAP Kyrgyzstan 2014:3.1), discipline and penalties, legal accountability and reduced impunity should ensure the protection of women. In addition to the protection of women, they should also protect the rights of women and of women’s freedom (e.g. NAP Iraq 2014:appendix:2.1.2). Protection and the reduction or elimination of violence against women is attributed to an enforcing mechanism that can correct wrongdoing in the form of violence. The importance of a security sector becomes apparent; the many peace processes into which women and women’s perspectives should be incorporated are absent from proposals for the protection of women, except for unspecified ‘reduction of violence’. Protection, although referencing a security sector in which women should be included and fully participating, is an activity clearly separating people into those engaged in protection and those in need of it. Military and police are protective actors, and on community level women and men should engage in “policing” (NAP Gambia 2014:26). Training to improve the protection of women is directed at law enforcement, police and security actors and partner militaries (assistance to partners is mostly an American concern, NAP USA 2011:16), with public awareness and knowledge about rights and about UNSCR 1325 (2000), that is, awareness about against what one has the right to be protected, by the security sector or law enforcement agencies.

Reparations and rehabilitation are another focus of protection. Victims of violence should receive aid, health care and counselling, assistance, and reparations should be made. The time-frames are varying, from the Republic of Korea’s specific focus on reparations and recognition of the ‘comfort women’ that were sexually enslaved during WWII (NAP Korea 2014:8f) to emergency care response units, shelters and safe houses for recent victims of violence (e.g. NAP Kyrgyzstan 2013:4.1). This shows an acknowledgement of the protective and law enforcing actors’ inability to provide protection sufficient to keep women and civilians from being exposed to violence, and proposes a complete separation through placement in specific housing, shelters, for those previously exposed. When protective measures through the security sector are insufficient an even more radical separation from potential threats is thus presented as a solution.

There are some proposals for reducing vulnerability that are not hinging on a security sector. There are generic suggestions for capacity building for doing vulnerability assessments, but also of introducing technology to reduce risks of everyday tasks through (NAP USA 2011:17) and of “supporting community structures aimed at eliminating all types of violence against women including SGBV” (NAP Gambia 2014:27f). Such suggestions can be read as becoming-less-vulnerable through intra-actions with communicative technologies and increased possibilities for self-determination about with what and where to intra-act at a given time, an example being not having to leave a camp to collect fuel when provided with solar cook stoves (NAP USA 2011:17). Both protection and participation requests expertise, and proposes gender experts to be included in
governments, gender training for governments, security sectors and militaries, and training by experts on gender or women’s perspectives for multiple actors.

Protection in these plans is achieved through sufficient security actors enforcing laws, protecting women, civilians and rights. Wanting to not only see where on a grid subjects or objects are placed, however, I read this view on protection as intra-actions, where a protector or protected subject is not reflecting those practises and thus placed in different positions. The NAPs, like the gender, peace and security theories, are not mentioning bodies but focus on positions of bodies within a gender binary, or of being inside or outside of a security sector or decision-making sites.

Protection is understood in the action plans as a state of being enveloped by protective laws and in connection with law enforcement or security agencies. Where women or civilians are vulnerable they should be protected: vulnerability is a lack of protection. Protection is performed by the security sector or law enforcement, proposing that protection is the possibility for use of violence to keep becoming-victims from that which would harm them. The lack that protecting actors fill when protection is described as security sector and law enforcement actors, is the force to ensure a separation from harm. Proximity to threat is a factor for vulnerability in the plans, solved by changed movements or complete separation in “safe houses”. Protection is thus the possibility of intra-acting with an always potentially violent bodily production: being within reach of virtual violence that can deter threats. From an idealist or liberal perspective, this capacity for forced distance if produced within the proper institutions can be governed and controlled to only be actualised against external threats, which can be assessed by the protector. Structuralism and realism made the point of material capacities not being evil nor benign and that there is no way to know how they will be used. With agential realism, virtual violence are indeterminacies-in-action, bodily productions of becoming-violent. Without this virtual violence being the product of a transcendent purpose, virtual violence is volatile. The immanent possibility for violence is the apparatus producing the phenomenon that defines protection, and security as the presence of sufficient protection.

Participation is depicted as the movement, inclusion, of women into positions where decisions are made, producing an inside and outside of participation where it takes place in specific sites. The decisions that matter are those made in connection with certain decision-making bodies, making knowledge and decisions of those not included in such spaces of less importance. The knowledge and experiences of those that are not connected to such sites of decision-making cannot reach within those sites; to be included knowledge must intra-act with those sites and in such intra-actions it becomes something else. Concentrating decision-making into specific sites, instead of venturing out to try to find sites in which people not in decision-making positions are making decisions, suggests accountability directed towards decisions made in specific sites while neglecting others.

It provides for an interesting discussion on representation, which is sometimes mentioned in the NAPs in consort with participation. The epistemological understandings of representation are criticised by both Barad and Deleuze, where
representation suggest an original to re-present, a notion against which they both turn. Participation takes the shape of representation in the plans by taking decision-making to be only the practises of making decisions within certain institutions. Representation in decision-making and political participation makes the assumption that people can be adequately represented in sites such as governments on different levels, or in councils or negotiations. This can be interpreted in two ways; either as the integrity of the minds of those in decision-making places to ‘remember’ or bring with them the knowledge of being outside of decision-making, or as delineated embodiments where women are simply women whether inside or outside of specific institutional settings and context. With an intra-active understanding of bodily production, the movement of gendered bodies into sites of decision-making, conflict resolution or law enforcement, makes differences, a becoming-civilian-woman becomes becoming-politician-woman or becoming-military-woman. These are different phenomena enacting cuts to producing gendered bodies; women, and each ‘woman’ is product of that phenomenon, meaning re-presentation is re-presenting but re-configurations of spacetimematter entanglements within different phenomenon. There are some ‘women’ who are becoming-decision-makers and some that are excluded from becoming-decision-makers.

Both protection and participation are constructed as exclusionary practises within the plans. With participation, women are intended to be included, enacting cuts between those who are included and those who are not, but attempting to lessen the gendered balance of inclusion and exclusion. With protection, women are supposed to receive more protection, maintaining the division as gendered through women’s exclusion. Women are however suggested to be participating in security sectors, providing for the possibility that women are protected by women. More women could become-virtual-violent, lessening the vulnerabilities of becoming-woman bodily productions being perceived as without virtual violence to fend off threats. Gender equality, especially with regards to gender-based violence, could improve from women’s inclusion in the security sector. The institutions and organisations of the security sector would also change in their intra-action with gendered embodiments of women. But, when they are produced for the purpose of providing virtual violence, bodily productions in intra-actions with such an organisation becomes-(more)-violent. Relying on the security sector for reducing expose to violence becomes very problematic; women’s inclusion could favour gender equality, but the virtual violence of security practises also works through the constant virtual connections between protector and protected, meaning that someone protected is always possibly in connection with someone with the capacity to hinder them from becomings, if they should want to. Virtual equality in the sense of everyone’s equal possibilities to participate and to become-(something-else) becomes difficult to actualise.
I started this thesis with the problem of protection and its equivocality, and asked how the concepts of protection and security are produced, to find a way to understand how the intent of keeping people safe has failed repeatedly, and to find how protection and security in this way affects possibilities for gender equality. To understand security and protection I needed to understand violence, and to understand bodies and their relations to other bodies and environments, as well social interaction. Through developing a comprehensive theoretical framework that renounces the Cartesian cut into mind and body, the separation of ontology and epistemology, and representation and reflection, I found a way to understand policy texts on security, protection, equality and participation, that allowed me to present an answer my question of how the concepts of security and protection are constructed, and to what effects for the possibilities of (gender) equality.

Understanding the world as material-discursive configurations and becomings, a text becomes something different than if understanding the world as a reality represented by signs in the text. Concepts as productions of phenomena, meaning that are not strictly linguistic and not signifying an idea(l) nor a chosen definition chosen or changed by a rational mind, make texts’ intra-activity very complex. Concepts produced within specific phenomenon are constructs that through their use shape the materiality used to shape them – it is a doing-being material-discursive activity. Concepts can become fetishized, when the apparatus is bypassed and the concept instead attributed a transcendent meaning. At this point the possibility of the apparatus to become is reduced and restricted in attempts to fit it with the ideal. The intra-actions within the phenomenon with(in) which the concept was produced become overlooked and accountability for those restricting actions is not assumed on basis of what harm they have done. The restrictions are instead legitimised through the idea of the concept.

When reading the WPS agenda and the plans for its implementation, this understanding of concepts provides insight into how it is possible for a text to appear to want the safety and equality of all and still propose violent means for its realisations. The apparatus within which the concept of security is produced includes protection, which is constructed out of a division: into people in intra-action with a materiality that produces them as more violent, with virtual violence intended to separate violent perpetrator from intended victim, and into people who have to remain close to those produced as possessing virtual violence, since vulnerability is produced as the absence of protection. Security is thus produced as the practise of ensuring that some bodies through their possibilities for connections, intra-actions and becomings have little potential for violence, and that those less violent-becoming are always
accompanied by those more violent-becoming. From the ideals of protection as violence only directed away from those protected, this is not a problem. The ideal of security as the guaranteed separation between perpetrator and victim, danger and harm, by means of a protector, does suggest that if harm should come, the separation must be reinforced through increased protection. De-fetishizing the concept of security and looking diffractively at the processes, each reinforcement in protection and every attempt to guarantee a separation from harm is productive and the violent potential produced can interfere with its environment in any direction. Being protected is simultaneously being subjected to virtual violence. The apparatus producing security and protection is producing this cut between those violent that can ensure a distance to their environment, and those understood as vulnerable that cannot ensure a distance to their environment. Using the concepts of security and protection to eliminate violence perceives the problem as a lacking ability to maintain a safe distance from harm, and the solution becomes to increase the possibilities for protectors of ensuring distances, increasing the virtual violence in the environments of those already perceived as vulnerable.

In the action plans as well as the resolution(s) preceding them, women are those who should receive protection, producing a gendered corporeality of being subjected to virtual violence. Women’s participation in the security sector lets those women participating intra-act and become-violent. This can change the apparatus of protection from one based on a production of male protector embodiments, to a view one in which anyone is a likely protector. Such a shift in the concept of protector could further gender equality and be a step towards lessening gender divisions in general and gender as indicator of potential for violence in particular. If, however, security still understood as the lack of protection and protection as the violent separation of danger from harm that requires virtual violence, then any part of a population that is being protected is also still subjected to this threat of violence. The protected become deterritorialized by their protectors; the protectors retain the ability to hinder the intra-actions and becomings of the protected. Gender equality most likely benefits from women in the security sector, but it is important to consider the violence produced in protection before postulating that women’s inclusion will make equal participation possible.

The purpose of this text has been primarily theoretical; the endeavour to develop a theory through which to read the WPS texts has received much more attention than an empirical analysis. It would be interesting to read other types of material through this theoretical framework to find how security and protection are produced differently in different settings or for different purposes. I believe this theory could be combined with other studies, perhaps especially on ‘protective violence’ in field studies, interviews and other research to expand the theoretical understandings with experiences of virtual violence too understand specific violent productions of militarisation and securitisation. Finally, I would like to end with a disclaimer: there can be instances where protection against external threats is highly desirable (for example fire-fighters). It is hard to envision the actual elimination of all production of violence, but it important to assume response-ability for when violence is produced and for its effects.
References


6.1 Fiction


*Buffy the Vampire Slayer: Out of My Mind.* S05E04. Dir. David Grossman,

Written by Rebecca Rand Kirshner. Created by Joss Whedon, 2000

6.2 Resolutions and National Action Plans


