Civil Society Participation in Global Governance

A Road to Empowerment?

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Abstract

Whether it is global warming or financial crisis, more and more challenges we face today are increasingly of a global or transnational character. As global governance increasingly has been perceived as having a democratic deficit however, increased forms of participation by non-state actors in global governance processes has attracted scholarly attention. This study centres on what the conditions are for these practices to serve as potential entry-points for traditionally disempowered and marginalized social groups to influence global governance. Can they work in their favour?

Drawing on a neo-gramscian perspective operative questions are derived for examining established practices of civil society participation in three major institutions of global governance; the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Having relied on gathering documented information and secondary sources the study finds the conditions not to be favourable. The narrow scope and thresholds for marginalized groups to access these forms of participation arguably reinforces existing asymmetries. While some stakeholder practices are geared for greater responsiveness to the concerns of marginalized group, these are not without some key ambiguities.

Key words: Global governance, civil society, Gramsci, non-state actors, power
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# Table of contents

1 Introduction

   1.1 Aim of the study
   1.2 Outline of the thesis

2 Research field and theory

   2.1 Related research
   2.2 Theoretical points of departure

3 Method

   3.1 Delimitations and choices
   3.2 Operative questions

4 International organizations and civil society participation

   4.1 The World Bank
   4.1.1 Civil society participation
   4.2 The International Monetary Fund
   4.2.1 Civil society participation
   4.3 The World Trade Organization
   4.3.1 Civil society participation

5 Analysis

6 Conclusions and final remarks

7 References
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CAS    Country Assistance Strategy
CSO    Civil Society Organization
GATT   General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
IBRD   International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA    International Development Association
IMF    International Monetary Fund
IO     International Organization
IPE    International political Economy
LDCs   Least Developed Countries
NGO    Non-Governmental Organization
ODA    Official Development Assistance
PRSP   Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SAP    Structural Adjustment Program
TNA    Transnational Actor
UN     United Nations
WBG    World Bank Group
WTO    World Trade Organization

TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 1</td>
<td>Composite overview of civil society participation in WB</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2</td>
<td>Composite overview of civil society participation in IMF</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 3</td>
<td>Composite overview of civil society participation in WTO</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1 Introduction

From climate change to global financial crisis, more and more challenges facing us are global or transnational (Held 2009:542). Correspondingly they are increasingly determined by decision making processes at transnational levels. Yet there are no structures in place which conform to conventional democratic ideals (Steffek & Nanz 2008:1).

Those that do exist, commonly referred to as global governance institutions, such as the United Nations (UN), the World Bank (WB) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for example, often reflect power asymmetries which prevailed at the time of their inception (Held 2009:543). So for example, some states are permanent veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council, and in the financial institutions the votes are weighted by economic contribution and economic size of each member.

Arguably, asymmetries are not just limited to disparities between countries and regions. They can also reflect asymmetries between social forces mediated territorially through states. As trans-territorial challenges increase and political space expands beyond the Westphalian state (Fraser 2004), global governance processes marked by democratic deficit, effectively further disempowers marginalized groups vulnerable to effects of global challenges (Held 2009:544).

After all, they are the ones who traditionally have least opportunities to make themselves heard. Although they may differ vastly in many respects, structural lack of power, and of economic as well as social opportunities to exercise their reasoned agency are defining features of this vulnerability (Sen 1999:xii-31).

Scholars of global governance however have noticed more complex forms of governance taking shape over the last decades with increased participation of transnational actors (TNAs) (Tallberg & Jönsson, 2010:1, Tallberg 2010:60). This has led some to suggest civil society participation in global governance processes, for example through deliberation as ways of achieving increased democratization (Agné 2010:177-178, Näsström 2010:201-213, Scholte 2007, Steffek & Nanz 2008:5ff).

In my view, empirical as well as research trends thus prompts the question of what this might entail for marginalized groups and their voice in global governance. Can participatory practices work in their favor?
1.1 Aim of the study

The aim of the study is to account for established practices of civil society participation in global governance and assess the conditions for traditionally marginalized social groups to use these practices as an avenue to influence global governance. The specific questions raised are:

- What established practices of civil society engagement and participation are there in global governance institutions? And;

- What are the conditions for these practices to serve as potential entry-points for traditionally disempowered and marginalized social groups to influence global governance?

1.2 Outline of the thesis

In the next chapter (2) I outline the wider field of research, thereafter turning to define suitable theoretical points of departure. In chapter 3 I subsequently describe how I intend to pursue the aim of the study and answer the questions posed, along with defining delimitations and scope. Chapter 4 presents the three institutions of global governance the WB, IMF, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) which I focus on and the way in which each engages civil society. This is followed by analysis in Chapter 5, while the final chapter (6) presents conclusions and final remarks.
2 Research field and theory

2.1 Related research

Briefly looking at how some research has approached related themes, one noticeable focus has been on assessing degrees to which participation by Civil society organizations (CSOs) serve to democratize global governance (Steffek & Nanz, 2008, Scholte 2007). Steffek and Nanz (2008) for example, elaborate a normative model for how civil society participation can mitigate democratic deficits by drawing on theories of deliberative democracy.

The model envisages CSO participation contributing to democratization of global governance by acting as a transmission belt between international organizations (IOs) and citizens. One researcher, looking at a “most favorable case”, finds that responsiveness on the part of governments to CSO concerns was more evident in the initial phases of a policy process (Dany, 2008:53-70).

The overarching conclusions include noticing increased formalized participation by CSOs, in part as a response to criticism over lack of legitimacy. They also find transparency to be a criteria in which International Organizations perform well, while they see deficiencies regarding access to deliberation, responsiveness and inclusion (Kissling & Steffek 2008:208-238). They conclude by identifying that whether it is justifiable to see CSOs as transmitters of citizens concerns is a main concern for future research.

In Jönsson & Tallberg (2010) the focus is on levels, patterns, explanations and implications of participation by transnational actors in global governance. They outline that participation and access can span between: representation, collaboration, consultation, information sharing and no access (Tallberg & Jönsson 2010:4-8). A noticeable trend is TNAs involvement as policy experts, service providers, and compliance watchdogs (Tallberg 2010:45). A hypothesis derived from rational choice intuitionalism put forward is that these variations may be due to the benefits states and international institutions see in TNA involvement in different functions. Applied to the policy cycle, TNA involvement would by this account be more valued in an agenda setting phase, in relation to implementing programmatic services, and monitoring in an enforcement phase, while less so in a decision making phase. (Tallberg 2010: 50).
Testing such a hypothesis Steffek finds that external assistance is more sought after in technically complex issue areas, as highlighted in literature on epistemic communities (Steffek 2010:71). In contrast Steffek notes that states see little benefits in collaborating on issues of finance and security, central to state survival and where they tend to have more resources. This also ties in with Greens finding of limited increase in delegation of authority in areas where states incur a high sovereignty cost, and therefore less common in rule-making or decision-making (Green 2010:170-172).

Jönsson & Tallberg conclude that the growth of TNA participation varies along the suggested lines being highest in environment and human rights areas with finance and security at the other end of a continuum (Jönsson & Tallberg 2010:239-241).

Along with these lines of research, there have also been normative proposals for improvement (See for example Scholte 2007). Meanwhile, challenging conventional perceptions of global governance structures Slaughter (2004) shows how it is not just states and supranational structures but intersecting transnational vertical and horizontal government networks that make up global governance.

Whilst these are all fundamental research aspects of global governance providing crucial insights, the nature of the bodies of theories in commented research is reflective of the questions posed, either providing normative foundations or explanatory options for observed patterns. I however pose a different question. With this in mind, I now turn to outline suitable theoretical points of departure.

2.2 Theoretical points of departure

Useful perspectives highlighting power relations in international politics can be found in neo-gramscian approaches to international political economy (IPE). In these perspectives social orders are understood as based and grounded on the relationship of social forces, which suggests that changes in structures, are reflective of changes in the social relationships which underpin it (Cox 1993:64). This reflects a historical dialectic conceptualization, in which orders or structure can be seen as inherently having conflictive elements which in the social base can be manifested in the asymmetrical relationship between different social forces, in which some are subordinated and other dominant. Cox, for example, suggests that structural transformation can originate in these points of conflict (Cox 1995:35).

In line with this understanding, global governance could effectively be seen as modalities of management of a social order based on the configuration of asymmetrical social relationships. Even if referring to classes in the same sense as Gramsci would be less relevant in the current context seeing how the nature of social conflict have changed, it can still be valid if denoting the cleavages between
dominant and subordinate social groups which cut across societies today (Cox 1995:39).

In an IPE perspective along these lines, this stresses the fundamental importance of the linkages between the economic and political domains, as well as the linkages between the domestic and international domains (Stubbs & Underhill 2006:X, Krätke & Underhill 2005:32).

The centrality of the linkages in relation to power and influence in matters of transnational and global decision-making become evident if viewed as essentially matters of influence and power over social life and over the production and distribution of wealth. The nature of some transnational issues may be more clearly characterized by economic interests among various stakeholders than others; this could for example be the case of trade issues. Nevertheless, issues relating to climate change are also inextricably about material values and the production and distribution of wealth with competing assertions.

Given the intertwined nature of economic and political domains, just like the rules of the market economy, transnational and global issues of this kind, with its inherent conflicts among competing interests, are regulated through political resolution (Stubbs & Underhill 2006:5).

In addition, if the view that has been advanced here is of a reciprocal and dialectic relationship between actor and structure and between social base and structure, power and influence in political decision-making is always going to be dependent on the balance of social forces as conditioned by economic interests and social conflicts. The mutual nature of the relationship also means that the balance between social forces and the character of conflicts marking their relations are in turn shaped by the prevailing social order.

Turning to the significance of the linkages between the domestic and international domains, this can be appreciated more clearly if the international system is seen in terms of a state-society complex encompassing both the domestic and international levels of analysis within which the state has a central role of managing the constraints of both realms through domestic policy making and intergovernmental bargaining (Stubbs & Underhill 2006:6).

Levels of analysis can be useful for analytical purposes in denoting different institutional levels of organization, but remain artificial divisions. As such, a separate and exclusive focus on the international level of analysis is many times not enough for an appropriate appreciation regarding issues of international political economy (Stubbs & Underhill 2006:5).

This is stressed by Stubbs and Underhill who suggests considering “the international domain as reflecting the specific balance of social forces of the most
powerful states as this balance becomes projected into the international system” (Stubbs & Underhill 2006:6).

In his analysis, faced with failure of revolution in the west, Gramsci’s concern was for how consent was secured for capitalist exploitation to prevail (Lukes 2005:7). Centering on this issue several concepts evolved which prove useful for capturing salient features of discrete while still differentiated modalities of how social orders and structures are produced and reproduced or transformed by social forces through their relations at the social base of a given structure and its institutions.

In accordance with the historicist gramscian approach his concepts cannot be understood as abstracts separated from their applications (Cox 1993:50). This means that the context in which they were brought to bear has to be borne in mind; while at the same time they can nevertheless in an abductive approach, to the extent they prove useful, be considered in relation to other contexts.

In a gramscian view social order and structures of power rooted in a social base may either be hegemonic or not. The distinction being the extent to which power is based on consent (or coercion). A hegemonic order is one in which dominant forces gain the consent of subordinate groups for a given order by forming what is referred to as a historic bloc, in which they concede certain adjustments beneficial to subordinate forces and to some degree incorporate their interests in order to secure their consent (Cox 1993:51). The union of social forces which a historic bloc constitutes and which underpins a social order is therefore the basis of consent which produces and reproduces the hegemony of the dominant class through a nexus of institutions, social relations and ideas.

As originally conceived, attaining a hegemonic position historically involved concessions to subordinate classes in return for acquiescence in bourgeois leadership, which in Gramsci’s analysis ultimately cleared the way for forms of social democracy which preserved capitalism and yet also managed to make it more acceptable to workers and the petty bourgeois (Cox 1993:51).

However, even if the concept of power, and of hegemony as one form of power, as discussed here does not have to be exclusively associated with historically specific social classes but could be more widely considered for relations of dominance and subordination, it cannot be transposed to contexts in which power relations are addressed separate from their social basis (Cox 1993:52).

This perspective means that in terms of issues related to the international realm, in as much as they concern relations of power and social order, and in a sense world order, rather than suggesting an analytical framework narrowly focused on relations among states, it stresses the need to direct attention to the social basis (Cox 1993:52).
As applied to the international realm, the notion of hegemony requires a distinction to be made between it and other common usages which in this context are better referred to simply as dominance. Given this distinction it is also evident that there are also distinctions in periods marked by hegemony and those marked by mere dominance (Cox 1993:60).

For Cox, historically to become hegemonic, a state would have to found and protect a universally conceived world order in which those states within the hegemon’s sphere could find compatibility of interests without being exploited. By consequence, an order along these lines can hardly be understood in inter-state terms alone. Instead Cox argues it could be construed as presenting opportunities for the forces of civil society to operate at an international scale. Understood this way a hegemonic concept of world order is not only premised on regulating inter-state conflict but also on an understanding of a civil society with global reach in which a global mode of production links the social classes of various countries (Cox 1993:61).

In this respect world hegemony integrates economic and political, as well as social structures and is expressed in universal norms through institutions and mechanisms and the rules of behavior in favor of the dominant mode of production which these help establish, both for states and civil society forces acting on an international scale (Cox 1993:62).

This view thus gives further basis for seeing global governance and its institutions as modalities of management of social order. For Cox for example, international organizations not only serve to develop the norms and ideology of hegemony but are themselves products of hegemony, or at least require the support of the hegemonic state, and co-opt the elites from peripheral countries as well as absorb counter hegemonic ideas. In this respect Cox argues that they permit adjustments to be made by subordinated interests with a minimum of pain. Changes, he says, therefore only occur to the extent they are consistent with the interests of the hegemonic power (Cox 1993:62-63).

In this context, just as historically envisaged, Cox maintains that threats to hegemony in the international sphere mediated by international organizations are conditioned on the emergence of nascent counter hegemonic historic bloc.

In Gramsci’s view, conditions of hegemony had ample implications, including that because the hegemony of the bourgeoisie was firmly entrenched in civil society, the bourgeois did not need to run the state themselves, as long as those who did recognized the hegemonic structures of civil society as the limits of their political action (Cox 1993:51).

From this perception a broader view of the state under conditions of hegemony was derived based on that it was merely analytically useful to distinguish between the conventional elements of the state, such as the administrative, executive and
coercive apparatus of government, and civil society under circumstances where these were constrained by the hegemony of the dominant class of a social formation underpinned by civil society. The argument thus being that a meaningful definition of the state under these circumstances would have to include the underpinnings of political structures in civil society, which for Gramsci in concrete historical terms could include the church, the educational system, the press and all the institutions which helped create behaviors and expectations consistent with the hegemonic social order (Cox 1993:51).

The concept of these circumstances, in which distinguishing between civil society and the state is merely of analytical value, can for purposes of the context of this study be useful in pointing out that one variable in understanding the transformative potential of participatory features is the extent to which the civil society that actually participates in various forms of deliberative forums or arrangements can be described as constituted of counterpoint movements, or of groups who merely serve to reinforce the dominance of an elite citizenry in global governance, akin to the notion conveyed by Gramsci’s characterization of civil society under hegemony.

In other words, seen through the lenses of the gramscian perspective, it is pertinent to ask whether civil society participating in deliberative forums, reinforces the social order in which some sectors of society are excluded by being part and parcel of the civil society which in gramscian terms forms the basis of the social order, i.e. by representing the elite citizenry that is reflected in the very power asymmetries of the IO’s themselves.

Clearly there is a distinction to be made between the case under circumstances of hegemony and the context of the current problem. What is envisaged in the former, is that by virtue of hegemony the given social order is consented to and thereby entrenched in civil society, whereas the context discussed here merely suggests using the notion of a civil society potentially serving to reify an order to assess the transformative potential in civil society participation also by the extent to which the participants are reflective of the same power asymmetries as the formal structure.

This also serves to remind of previous arguments, that concepts borne out of Gramsci’s analysis cannot be seen as abstracts in general, but attains meaning in connection to specific contexts in relation to which its use can be assessed, and the concepts meaning developed (Cox 1993:50). The concepts that are currently being discussed are treated as heuristic tools for interpreting, explaining and describing the aspects of global governance of interest in this thesis. They are not used as precise molds within which reality either fits perfectly or not at all.

Other concepts which might also be helpful for understanding and assessing the transformative scope of democratic features in global governance are those of “passive revolution” and of “transformismo”. In gramscian analysis these
concepts refer to distinct modes in which dominant groups either make concessions which does not put the order itself into question or threaten the vital interests of the dominant classes, or strategies in which leaders of subordinate, potential counter-hegemonic forces are co-opted and the interests of other groups bound up with and tied into those of the dominant groups, so as to serve or be in line with their interests.

By assessing the degree to which practices with civil society involvement in global governance correspond to these modes of coping with challenges to the interests of dominant classes, it is then also possible to gain a further nuanced picture of whether deliberative and participative features can be considered to hold transformative potential. The thinking of course being that if participatory practices in global governance can be described in these terms, the transformative potential will be limited, and the features perhaps merely represent token concessions in return for renewed semblance of legitimacy for the institutions concerned. Conversely, if these characterizations are not accurate of emerging practices they may instead signify bargained concessions to a “double movement” type of reaction of substantial meaning.

In summary, the theoretical points of departure and the concepts presented here offer some heuristic tools for assessing if mechanisms of civil society participation is just “tinkering and reforms by elites” (Cox 1995:44), or if it represents a more profound space for change.

Arguably they would suggest looking at the following aspects:

A) The historical context of the emergence of the practices in each separate case in what is a historic approach to explanation,
B) The extent to which participating civil society serve as counterpoint to institutional power asymmetries or to reify them;
C) If by looking at the practices and their implementation they can be described in terms akin to the concept of “passive revolution”, and;
D) The extent to which the practices can be viewed as cases of “transformismo”.

Here a remark is warranted regarding aspect (A). As examining this aspect would require a historic study with another methodology, it will not form any explicit part of the study moving forward. For the other aspects a specific set of corresponding operative questions allowing for a fruitful approach in examining established participatory practices will be presented.
3 Method

The outlined perspective has framed the issue theoretically and offered concepts with which to address the question raised. Concretely the study will focus on three major international organizations which can reasonably be taken to constitute parts of global governance through their policy or regulatory role in important policy areas of development funding and cooperation, financial stability, as well as trade, impacting on the global economy as a whole. These organizations are the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

These will first be presented with brief comments on the conception, purpose organization as well as governance and management structures of each, including formal decision-making. Thereafter the established practices for civil society participation within each organization will be presented, thereby answering the first question I set out. By subsequently examining key facets of these practices, guided by theory driven operative questions which will be outlined shortly an analysis in line with the second question will be made.

The approach has not included gathering data through primary empirical observations. Instead, it has relied on extensive gathering of documented information on the established practices of the three institutions, given the aim of achieving a comprehensive view of the established practices with attention to coverage, as well as the sheer size of the organizations. The type of data gathered includes policy documents, guidelines, informational texts and factsheets, lists of participants at events, annual reports, thematic reports, and statistical figures. This has also been complemented by secondary data.

3.1 Delimitations and choices

Any conclusions will be limited in time and primarily to the organizations concerned. Moreover, lack of practical means of examining informal forms of engagements also sets limits. Aiming to include substantial practices to the extent possible I have included what I define as “established practices”, i.e. of some recurrence, and which are not so informal that they become very difficult to gather information on. This is different from “formal practices” in that it could be taken to mean only those set out in provisions or formal decisions by governing bodies.
Due to the complexity of the subject area and theory, owing to a multiplicity of aspects with large number of different types of variables and levels of analysis (Hettne 1995:13), as well as the difficulties in conducting empirical research into many of them within the confines of the thesis (not the least into non-state actor influence, See for example Karns & Mingst 2010:246-247), there has also been a compromise and trade-off between depth and breadth. It is nonetheless hoped that meaningful, if tentative, insights will be provided in an important subject-area.

The choice of the three organizations is intentional. Each contributes to upholding an arguably distinct contentious ideological order. The WB and the IMF came into conception at a specific point in time when the United States had decisive influence in international politics which it could use to serve its perceived interests (Karns & Mingst 2010:258). Each also has promoted policies which have produced clear dissent. In the case of the WB and IMF, conditionality associated with previous structural adjustment programs (SAPs), for example, have been highly criticized for having disproportional adverse effects on vulnerable and marginalized sectors of society, (See for example Stiglitz 2002, Karns & Mingst, 2010:400-401, 403-405) making them highly relevant in relation to the topic at hand.

While WTO promoted free-trade may be more contentious in terms of potential stakeholder effects and interest, a common view used to be that owing to power asymmetries among members and organizational structures and processes the playing field was tilted against least developed countries (LDCs) (De vylder et al. 2007, Sell 2005, Seth 2004). From a theoretical standpoint they are therefore viable candidates to fit the bill of a contended hegemonic order, to which the conceptual points of departure can be meaningfully applied. Including these three organizations in interrelated areas also allows for comparisons.

3.2 Operative questions

The key guiding theory driven operative questions by which established practices will be examined are:

1) What can happen under these premises? What is possible?
2) Who are they aimed at? Who do they cater to?
3) How do they take place?
4) What is the purpose and motive?
5) What is the scope and scale?
6) With what frequency?
7) What are the requirements to participate (formal and actual)?
8) Are there any links to policy- or decision-making?
9) Who might take part in these practices?
The set of questions connects to a central aspect of neo-gramscian approaches to international politics - who benefits from any given order? (Gill 1993:9).
4  International organizations and civil society participation

4.1  The World Bank

The World Bank was created at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) for post-war reconstruction and development. It has since expanded into a closely associated group of five institutions, the World Bank Group (WBG). The term World Bank (WB) however refers to IBRD and the International Development Association (IDA) created in 1960 (WB 2014, WB 2015a). These are the focus of the study.

Nowadays the WB is a development cooperative owned by 188 member countries where IBRD lends to governments of middle-income and creditworthy low-income countries, while IDA is the largest multilateral source of concessional funding. It’s headquartered in Washington, but has regional and country offices. Its main goal is to end extreme poverty and boost shared prosperity (WB 2014).

The WBs member countries are represented by a Board of Governors, the highest decision making body. One Governor is appointed by each country. The Board of Governors meets once a year with most day-to-day duties delegated to 25 Executive Directors making up the Board of Directors. Of these, the five largest shareholders appoint one each while the other members are represented by elected Executive Directors. Votes of member countries are weighted by shares and economic contribution. In order to become a member, a country must first join the IMF. The President is responsible for overall management and chairs the meetings of the Board of Executive Directors (WB 2015b, WB 2015c, IBRD 2012, IDA 1960).

4.1.1  Civil society participation

Civil society participation in the WB takes places in various forms, with various purposes at country level as well as at a global level. This is further detailed in what follows, while Table 1 shows a composite overview.

Information disclosure
Information disclosure is not a form of active engagement, or participation but arguably a prerequisite. The WB has a policy whereby it allows access to any information in its possession which are not included in a clear list of exceptions, such as correspondence from offices of its Executive Directors, personal information on staff, information on corporate administrative matters for example on expenses and procurements. The exceptions also include attorney-client privileged information and information provided by member countries or third parties in confidence, and deliberative information. Not all information is published on the internet but can be requested (WB 2015d).

**Outreach events**
The WB together with the IMF has an outreach event called Civil Society Program once in the spring and once in conjunction with the annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the organizations, typically in the autumn. These are mostly held in Washington D.C. where both organizations have their head offices. Once every three years the Governors meeting take place in another country, and so does the Civil Society Program held in conjunction with it. When held in conjunction with the meeting of the Board of Governors it is not necessarily on the same premises or even on overlapping dates. At the annual meeting in the spring of 2015, 531 CSO representatives attended. (WB 2015e, WB 2015f, WB 2015g).

The sessions are mostly organized by participating CSOs, although lately, the President of the WB and the Managing Director of the IMF has participated in one session at each hosted event and Executive Directors in one other session. In order to participate CSOs have to register well in advance. To promote greater diversity among CSOs from developed as well as developing countries the WB and the IMF has during the last years offered grants to facilitate participation by CSOs from developing countries. These are chosen by the IMF and WB based on consultation with local staff in country offices. For the spring meeting in 2015, 15 CSO leaders and think tanks from developing countries were sponsored, with an average of 35 being sponsored each year in the years 2010-2012 (WB 2015h, WB 2012b). The measure taken reflects the bias of participants often representing well established, organized CSOs based in developed countries. A cursory overview for example reveals that out of 531 participants in the spring meeting 2015, 464 were from developed countries, i.e. an overwhelming majority. Of these 328 were from the United States (WB 2015g).

These outreach events lack any direct link to policy or decision-making process and are intended to promote transparency and foster mutual understanding and trust, not necessarily agreement or changes in policies, according to the WB (WB 2015f).

**Consultations**
The WB states that any new policy development process, including proposed new policies or changes to regulation as well as Country Partnership Strategies, global
thematic studies, and programs include consultation with stakeholders (WB 2013).

On its webpage the WB also has what it calls a consultation hub with information on consultations that it hosts which may be country-specific, regional or global. It publishes information on locations of different consultative meetings. The scope and length varies depending on level and context. For global consultations the WB may set specific meetings but it is sometimes possible to contribute online. Of these some concern central policy, as for example was the case when it adopted its policy on information access, and as is the case with a current consultation on its policy concerning safeguard policy for safeguarding the environment and the poor and vulnerable in its investments projects. These consultations can occur in cycles and phases whereby the WB gathers contribution feeding into draft proposals which again can be put forward for consultation authorized by the Executive Directors on specific issues in the draft (WB 2015i).

The WB also has guidance and policy papers on stakeholder consultations in local investment operations. In these, the WB outline their role in obtaining the view of those who might be affected by development projects and their importance in ensuring that stakeholders concern are taken into account in decisions in which they typically do not have a say. The significance is considered to be greater in cases when people may be adversely affected. Moreover, they also serve to inform about changes which may affect them. Well conducted consultations in the view of the WB provide project affected people with a clear understanding of how they might be affected, changes that may result and meaningful ways to influence decision-making during project design and preparation. Additionally it also builds support for projects. Defining stakeholder representation is not considered necessary as long as views and opinions that are shared are relevant to the project. The need for guidance papers however, according to the WB, has arisen from non-compliance with Bank requirement on consultation and information disclosure recurring in investigations. It does however point out that the primary responsibilities for conducting consultations rest with the borrower, with the bank assigning itself a supervising role in ensuring that they are carried out (WB 2012, WB 2013). At the country level, CSOs were consulted on over 80 per cent of all WB Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) over the past years, encompassing 40 countries (WB 2015f).

**Collaboration and partnerships**

One form of civil society “participation” which sets the WB apart due its role in development field is when a CSO fulfills the role of a service provider or implementer. CSO involvement in Bank-financed projects in 2012 were at 82 percent, and the WB says it funds hundreds of CSOs each year directly through various mechanism, and thousand indirectly through government managed community driven development projects (WB 2015f).
The WB further states in its latest available report on civil society participation that it needs to find ways to increase CSO representation in governance structures “while taking into account civil society’s distinct institutional and representational role as a non-state actor” (WB 2012). In this respect, it has invited CSOs to serve as advisors or as full partners in governance structures of several funding mechanism (WB f, WB 2012:8).

**Stakeholder participation in PRSP and CAS processes**

A mediated form of civil society engagement is the one associated with governments processes of producing poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs). For recipients of official development assistance (ODA), this is required by the WB and the IMF as a formal mechanism tied to assistance from the institutions. It ties the policy conditionality’s of the institutions to governments own strategies in which a focus on poverty reduction is promoted and often become a reference point for other donors as well. Through this process, and by including stakeholder and civil society participation as part of the process it is intended to foster local stakeholder ownership. Of the 28 PRSPs the WB received in 2010-2012, according to the WB all reported some form of civil society participation. In the Country Strategy papers the bank itself prepares, civil society participation is reported in 82 percent during the same period (WB 2012b).

**Table 1. Composite overview of civil society participation in WB**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
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<th>Purpose</th>
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<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>No direct link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society policy forum</td>
<td>Twice a year</td>
<td>Registration and accreditation. Developed countries overrepresented</td>
<td>Foster trust and understanding</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>No direct link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation online</td>
<td>Recurring</td>
<td>Open to anyone</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>consideration in policy making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder consultations</td>
<td>Encouraged in all new projects</td>
<td>Adversely affected most important</td>
<td>Transparency/Fostering ownership</td>
<td>Country and project level</td>
<td>Consideration in project decision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect stakeholder consultation in PRSP process</td>
<td>Occurred in 100% of PRSPs 2010-2012 (latest data)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Fostering ownership</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaboration in implementation</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Project/country</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16
4.2 The International Monetary Fund

The conception of IMF, like the WB, dates back to the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, and like the WB is headquartered in Washington and has 188 members. It was envisaged as a framework for economic cooperation in light of the Great Depression of the 1930s. Its primary purpose is to ensure the stability of the international monetary system, i.e. exchange rates and payments. Its mandate was updated in 2012 and now includes all macroeconomic and financial sector issues relating to global financial stability (IMF 2015a).

The IMF fulfills its responsibilities in three different ways. Firstly, through a surveillance mechanism by which the IMF reviews country policies as well as regional and global financial developments, advising member countries on policy. Secondly, through financial assistance to its members by way of various, often short term, financial support mechanisms and lending instruments which are subject to different qualifying requirements (IMF 2015a). In close cooperation with the IMF member countries which have received financial assistant are required to design adjustment programs, with continued financial support conditioned on effective implementation. Thirdly, the IMF provides technical assistance and training to strengthen member countries capacity in designing policies (IMF 2015a).

The highest decision making body is the Board of Governors, with one Governor for every member, meeting once a year in conjunction with governors meeting of the WB. Voting power in the IMF was however designed to reflect relative positions of member countries in the global economy. Most of the powers are delegated to elected and appointed Executive Directors which make up the Executive Board, reflective of the governance structure of the WB, whereby five Executive Directors are directly appointed by the member countries holding the largest quotas. Chairman of the Executive Board and head of staff is a Managing Director appointed by the Executive Board (IMF 2015b).

4.2.1 Civil society participation

Some forms of civil society engagement by IMF reflect those of the WB as seen in Table 2. It also co-hosts the outreach events held in the spring and during the annual meeting of Governors of the institutions. Its managing director participates in the same session as the WBs President and the IMF co-funds grants for facilitating participation by CSO representatives from developing countries. The PRSP processes, when IMF is involved are likewise the same (WB 2015f, WB 2015g, WB 2015h, WB 2012b).

Just as the WB, the IMF also has an online portal for consultation where written comments can be submitted in relation to its policy and strategy papers following
set guidelines of specific question it seeks feedback on. Information is scarce on scope or frequency of this mechanism but of the consultations still posted online it has 2 for 2015, 3 from 2014, 3 from 2013, and 4 from 2012 (IMF 2015c, IMF 2015d).

What it does not seem to offer are local stakeholder or civil society consultations outside the PRSP framework. In its institutional language it does not make any references to stakeholders as the WB do either. The seminars and conferences it reports as being on the agenda on its website refer to intergovernmental meetings or with experts in the field (IMF 2015e).

### Table 2. Composite overview of civil society participation in IMF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Participants/ Requirements</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Links to policy and/or decision-making</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information disclosure</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>No direct link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society Program</td>
<td>Twice a year</td>
<td>Registration and accreditation. Developed countries overrepresented</td>
<td>Foster trust and understanding</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>No direct link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultation online</td>
<td>Recurring</td>
<td>Open to anyone</td>
<td>Consultative</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Consideration in policy making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect stakeholder consultation in PRSP process</td>
<td>Occurred in 100% of PRSPs 2010-2012 (latest data)</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>Fostering ownership</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 4.3 The World Trade Organization

The WTO consisting of 160 members and located in Geneva was created in 1995 but traces its origins to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Uruguay round of trade talks which began in 1986 and culminated in 1994. It is the only global trade regime within which global rules for trade are negotiated and monitored. Apart from negotiating trade agreements in various areas, member countries also review each other’s trade policies. The WTO also includes a dispute settlement mechanism (WTO 2015a, Seth 2004).
As opposed to the WB and the IMF, all members have one vote, but in practice decision are taken by consensus. Although previously a decision within the whole WTO used to be possible once the four biggest members including Canada, the European Union, the US and Japan had reached an agreement. The highest decision making body is the Ministerial Conference which meets at least once every two years. The day-to-day work is carried out in three bodies with different functions but consisting of all the members; the General Council, the Dispute Settlement Body, and the Trade Policy review board. For each broad area of trade there are three councils reporting to the general council and with subcommittees reporting under them. The secretariat headed by a director-general has a staff of around 677 responsible mainly for administrative and technical support (WTO 2015a, Seth 2004).

Agreements have rarely been reached in the formal settings but in discussions in smaller groups. As opposed to in the past, these meetings which can be called by chairs of meetings aimed at forging compromises have now reportedly become transparent, with regular reports back to the full membership (WTO 2015a).

4.3.1 Civil society participation

The various forms of contact between civil society and the WTO are shown in Table 3 and are commented on in what follows.

Institutional provisions for participation
The Marrakesh Agreement from 1995 establishing the WTO provisions for cooperation with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Under Article V.2 “The General Council may make appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with nongovernmental organizations concerned with matters related to those of the WTO.” In 1996, this was clarified by the General Council giving the Secretariat authority to establish direct contacts with NGOs. (WTO 2015b, WTO 2015c).

NGOs can also receive accreditation for briefings on WTO issues and accreditation badges valid for one year which allows access the WTO building for specific events or meetings without having to register. Currently the WTO reports 52 local NGO representatives as accredited (WTO 2015b).

Information disclosure
The WTO makes most of its documents available to the public as soon as they have been circulated, with a minority of restricted documents made available two months after they are derestricted. It currently has 150,000 documents available for download. A monthly electronic newsletter bulletin is also available (WTO 2015).

Public forum
The WTO hosts an annual Public forum for civil society, academia, business, government, parliamentarians and other institutions. Participation is subject to acquiring accreditation requiring that a concern with trade issues related with WTO can be shown. The WTO receives proposals for sessions of workshops and panel discussions to be led by participants but choses which, among the proposals it receives (WTO 2015b, WTO 2015d).

The forum itself has no direct links to any decision-making or policy processes and participants are reportedly to a significant degree representatives from think tanks and business associations (Vifell 2010:119).

**Registration of position papers**
NGOs can register position papers with the secretariat which compiles and circulates a monthly list to member governments (WTO 2015a). They do not seem to have any other link to policy- or decision-making processes however.

**Attendance at Ministerial Conferences**
NGOs can register for accreditation to attend WTOs Ministerial Conferences provisioned on satisfying criteria of concern with trade issues within the scope of WTO, although access is restricted to General Council meetings with restrictions on where they are allowed to be at the premises (WTO 2015e, Vifell 2010:117). Some have also detected asymmetries in participation between representatives from the North and South, as well as between business representatives and CSO (Steffek & Ehling 2008:104-106).

**Submission of amicus curiae briefs**
Third parties have been allowed to submit amicus curiae briefs in dispute settlement hearings. This is not explicitly provisioned for and there has been some ambiguity on the legal basis for it. The appellate body have gone against the panel – which first hears a case- however, and declared that it can accept or reject information it receives, whether it has been requested or not (Pandey 2013, Vifell 2010:120, Steffek & Ehling 20008:106-107).

**Attendance at dispute settlement hearings**
NGOs can attend the public hearings of some dispute settlement proceeding, but information to which and why only “some” is not readily accessible (WTO 2015b).
Table 3. Composite overview of civil society participation in WTO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Participants/ Requirements</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Links to policy and/or decision-making</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information disclosure</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>No direct link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public forum</td>
<td>Once a year</td>
<td>Registration and accreditation subject to approval as a concerned NGO</td>
<td>Foster dialogue and exchange of views</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>No direct link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registration of position papers</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Dissemination of information</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>No direct link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance at ministerial conference</td>
<td>Biennial</td>
<td>See “public forum”</td>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>No direct link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submission of amicus curiae brief in dispute settlement</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Admissible</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>No direct link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendance at dispute settlement hearings</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>No direct link</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Do the institutions of global governance being examined here form part of a management mode of a social order by and for dominant social classes? If so, what are the conditions for marginalized and disempowered sectors to use forms of civil society participation in global governance as entry points for social change?

Perhaps it is no coincide that IMF and the WB have mutual provisions allowing for attendance at each other’s decision making meetings, and that the IMFs by-laws explicitly allow for the WTO secretariat to send an observer (IBRD 2012, IMF 2012, IMF 2015f). Let us however turn to the second question which is the main concern.

From the perspective of the problem in focus the overall picture speaks to an important and recurring issue posed in the literature on non-state actors in global governance. Who do non-state actors in global governance actually represent? In assessing the democratizing potential of CSO participation this is often a concern, just like actual degrees of influence (See for example Steffek & Nanz, 2008, Kissling & Steffek 2008).

Addressing this within the context of this thesis inevitably at some point requires saying something on who traditionally disempowered and marginalized refers to. As initially stated however, a singular homogenous definition may be impossible, not necessarily desirable, but importantly, not ultimately needed for the problem at hand. It may be sufficient to speak of what the commonalities may be. These may for example include scarce monetary resources, low skills, low education, lack of access to information and infrastructure, poor social capital and so on. These characteristics may in turn be interrelated with exclusion from labor markets, from political life, as well as disconnection from capitals and major cities.

In examining the modes of participation and engagement and comparing them to who they are aimed at, who might be able to access them and effectively participate, does this include those marginalized and disempowered sectors of society? In my view the assessment would mostly be that they do not offer effective modes of participation for these sectors of society. On the contrary arguably, they reinforce existing power asymmetries between elites, and marginalized sectors.
Let’s start with those most unattainable forms of participation, first however a comment on transparency in global governance which often features in the literature. In relation to discussions at hand, important as it is for legitimacy, it merely constitutes a basic enabler in this context.

Now, let us look at something which the WB, IMF and WTO all share - an outreach event for civil society at a general level. These events are mostly hosted in Washington and Geneva. Although the WB and IMF have made grants for CSO representatives from developing countries to attend, there is a reported overrepresentation of representatives from developed countries. In the case of the WTO business association are as welcome as non-profit NGOs at these events and accreditation requires NGOs specifying the concern with trade matters in the realm of WTO agreements and negotiations. The same requirements are set out for attending WTOs Ministerial Conferences. None of the events are tied in with any policy or decision-making.

Key in examining these instances of participation is whether they even amount to being accessible for disempowered and excluded sectors of society, even if loosely organized through CSOs? Given the requirements, including technical proficiency to register for participation, acquire accreditation, and the resources to travel and stay in Washington or Geneva, it does not seem likely. Overrepresentation of well-funded CSOs and high degree of participation by business associations in WTOs events (Steffek & Ehling 2008) suggest they cater more to elites.

Moving on, WTO offers NGOs to register position papers on trade topics with their secretariat in Geneva which does not appear to have any further implication. The WB and IMF have a more purposeful mechanism of active policy consultation online. Since these arguably require some policy proficiency as well as online access for WB and IMF consultations, it is likewise more likely to cater to more professional and elite parties. While it certainly allows for civil society feedback the threshold is certainly lowest for elite sectors thereby potentially reinforcing asymmetries. A mechanism concerned with participation by broader and especially marginalized sectors of society would, I argue have to be more proactive and maybe even targeted. Likewise, important as the possibility for NGOs to submit amicus curiae briefs in WTO dispute settlement hearings may be, it stands to reason that the thresholds are high for marginalized sectors to make use of it.

What about when participation takes the form of a CSO in the role of implementer or service provider? In literature on non-state actor participation in global governance this is treated as strong incidence of participation (See for example Tallberg 2010), and institutionally it is. Likewise the WB, where this occurs, treats this as the form in which civil society reaches its strongest level of influence (WB 2012b).
However for the problem at hand it is problematic. Firstly, if we recall the operative questions used to assess forms of civil society participation which includes looking at the purpose and motive, in these cases the purpose is not to consult civil society, or to deliberate with it on its policies, the function is clearly to implement them. In and by itself it does not say anything about its implication for influencing policy at any overarching level, or even on country or project level. From the WB perspective it’s an explicit technique to foster what it calls “ownership”.

This is a strong but double-edged concept which will merit some additional discussion, it suggest ownership by having a say, but also by just being coopted into a structure where in fact having a say is ultimately conditioned. As implementer in relation to the WB it may be a way of some influence in design and provision. However at the same time it stands to reason that influence in a significant scale by fulfilling this role may only possible for civil society when it is highly organized, arguably professionalized in the role of implementer, with the adequate time-resources and skills. Arguably this would exclude large sectors of civil society which are neither highly organized nor have the necessary resources. Before anything more can be said however specific attention would have to be paid in studying these instances.

Returning to the term of ownership, this is a prominent driver in the mechanism of stakeholder participation used in the WB and IMF initiated PRSPs required of governments receiving development assistance by these organizations. In relation to the institutions it is an indirect form of civil society participation. By making governments responsible for owning the process of carrying out consultations with stakeholders, including civil society, it seeks to assure that the priorities are shaped and owned by the government, stakeholders and civil society, becoming a reference point for other donors (Lazarus 2008, Harman 2009). While it may seem a powerful instrument, the question is for whom? It has been criticized as a subtle form of control whereby these institutions can disassociate themselves from responsibility while at the same giving them the means of embedding similar type of policy conditionality’s as in previous structural adjustment programs which fell in disrepute.

Lazarus for example points to this, and also cites others which go so far as to consider them to be a mere act and highly donor driven with more emphasis on the process itself than actual inclusive participation focused on the priorities. Moreover they are also criticized for attempting to depoliticize issues in the concerned countries which are in fact intrinsically subject to political conflict and thereby undermine legitimate political processes (Lazarus 2008).

This can have wider implications tying in with the approach adopted by the WB of local stakeholder consultation in general. In light of the multiple forms of civil society participation practiced by the WB at different levels presented here, Harmans basic argument that using local modes of stakeholder consultation is
used by the WB to insulate it from any outside critique has severe implications (Harman 2009). While it is arguably important that consultations occur with stakeholders at local levels where it operates, it implies a severing of the links between the local and the global, and a compartmentalizing of issues. In essence, it can serve to disconnect local issues from broader strategic policy decisions and hide or condition political alternatives. The same goes for issue areas which obviously can be interrelated.

While the WB thus has a wider array of forms through which it engages with civil society than others, if used in this way it can clearly present a form of actually asserting control. If this were to be the case, looking at its forms of civil society participation, it can easily acquiesce to CSO engagement for elites during its summits in Washington, and consult local stakeholders elsewhere without them having any comprehensive impact.

Overall, what is noticeable is also the lack of civil society participation which could include broader and marginalized sectors of society. Given its local investments projects in the field of development the WB appears to have most presence through which it can interact with civil society. The problems that could arise if it compartmentalizes its contacts have been discussed, but for the IMF and the WTO one could envisage a thousand fold greater engagement. Both seem trapped in the perception, not only that they are accountable only to governments (IMF 2003) but also that they operate in affairs which are only a matter for governments.

As regards the WTO, its small secretariat actually does very little of and by itself as it is the governments who negotiate, arbitrate and makes decisions. Not surprisingly the view taken is that beyond transparency, civil society should lobby its respective governments (Van den Bossche 2008, Pandey 2013). While macro policy, the area of the IMF, normally is a function executed by governments, the IMF actively advises and has by way of conditionality’s both the mandate and the power to see these policies implemented. Governments who do turn to the IMF may do so also in lack of choice and alternative. Importantly, the people who do suffer the busts of the economy or austerity measures and cut backs on social and public spending are real individuals and households, typically the most vulnerable and marginalized (Friedmann 1992), not a government.

Nonetheless the IMFs institutional view is that while relations with civil society are important, the partner it is accountable to is the member country (IMF 2003). Thus, in one study Scholte for instance reports that even in cases where IMF has local staff and representatives in countries that could engage actively with local civil society this is simply not the case. Reportedly they many times fail to see what there could possibly be to talk about (Scholte 2012). Even while respecting the IMFs governance structure and its decision making process it is not beyond imagination that if nothing else, to improve and inform its policies and as a basis for decision it could take an interest in actually talking with broader sectors of
society, including those at the lower strata about the views they hold on the effects of the policies it recommends. This could even be done in collaboration with governments.

In as much as IMF policies include austerity measures in relation to for example public spending while it rightfully may raise questions regarding macroeconomic instability, these concerns have to be considered in light of overall objectives and weighted against the cost of an exaggerated focus on controlling inflation which might imply having to tolerate high rates of unemployment (Sen 1999:129,139,142). Moreover, while economic indicators may be important they do not necessarily say anything about actual disaggregated effects (See for example Friedmann 1992).

Notwithstanding possible critique, in contrast with the IMF, the WBs more diverse and substantial forms of engaging civil society seems to reflect that it genuinely sees a civil society which arguably includes marginalized sectors of society as its stakeholders. Even if in part due to its policy area.
6 Conclusions and final remarks

Many of the “strongest” forms of civil society participation which at first glance seem promising for traditionally disempowered groups as actually constituting a way of having an influence, such as for example through stakeholder and civil society participation associated with PRSPs, are ambiguous. This is also the case in the strongest form of participation i.e. as provider or implementer.

In the first case it is because of the risk of simple co-option whereby the policies of dominant social forces and ultimately social order remains intact, but subtly veiled through minor concessions. In relation to participation as implementer/provider it is due to the ambiguity of the purpose and actual capacity of others than CSOs with resources and organization to effectively take advantage of it.

In conclusion, this study has been in an immensely complex subject area in and by itself, with a potential for a multitude of levels of analysis and variables. The theoretical lens by which it has been critically examined similarly reflects this. In contrast the thesis operates within clear confines. It has thus been a clear compromise, extensive in neither depth nor aggregated quantities. Nevertheless, it presents a clear composite overview of civil society participation in global governance critically examined from the perspective of traditionally marginalized and disempowered groups, identifying a number of problems from this perspective for further detailed investigation. Both in terms of in-depth case analysis and in mapping links between community, local and global levels. In this sense this constitutes a preliminary contribution to that specific problem and to the wider subject area of non-state actors and global governance.

Additionally, it has not only pointed at ambiguities, but also at mechanisms clearly enforcing power asymmetries, such as for example the arguably very narrow scope of civil society participation if compared to what could be envisaged which lead to high thresholds for marginalized groups to access them. As to the conditions for marginalized sectors of society to use civil society participation as a vehicle for change – as it stands, the assessment is not favorable. In terms of actual impact on policies and decision-making the discussion from the perspective of marginalized social groups certainly seem premature. Considering the available forms of civil society participation in global governance examined here, this might also be the case even when it comes to assessing their representation in them.
As regards commenting on it in neo-gramscian terms, even if civil society participation has evolved, in part as a response to try and improve transparency and democratic credentials, the result could be described as Cox (1995:44) put it “tinkering by the elites”. Maybe transformative change is not forthcoming when the elite “tinkers”, but when actual changes occur in the social base.
7 References


Online sources:


