EU Security and Defence Cooperation

A case of balancing US influence?

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Abstract

This study shows the importance transatlantic relations to the development of the CSDP.

*Key words:* CSDP, transatlantic relations, EU, US
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1 Introduction

The security landscape in Europe since the end of the Cold War has been marked by the dominance of NATO as the sole credible structure for military security. This situation is now undergoing a transformation. (Whitman, 2004, p. 430)

This paper was written in the midst of Russian aggression towards Ukraine, after the Russian annexation of Crimea. Meanwhile, the EU actions taken and not taken in relation to the conflict have been debated in newspapers across Europe. EU member states cooperating on matters of security and defence within the European Union has been and remains a sensitive topic, for various reasons for different governments.

However, despite the sensitive nature of national security, the degree of EU cooperation on matters of security and defence has grown over the last two decades. The increase in degree of cooperation has also occurred despite the lack of a common military threat. So why have the EU member states chosen to intensify their cooperation on these sensitive matters?

This paper will analyse the expansion of EU cooperation on security and defence since the early 1990’s. The puzzle in this expansion of security and defence cooperation is why do states cooperate on matters of security and defence when they lack a common military threat?

To answer the question I follow the approach laid out by Maria Strömvik in her dissertation To Act as a Union – Explaining the development of the EU’s collective foreign policy, and apply it to the distinctly different but understudied policy area that is the CSDP. I am following Strömvik’s approach because of the explanatory value she shows it has for the development of the CFSP, the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Common Security and Defence Policy, CSDP, has been developed as a more specific policy arena within the CFSP. The area of policy is similar where the CFSP handles EU foreign policy, including matters of security. The CSDP is more specialized compared to the CFSP and solely handles matters of security and defence rather than more general foreign policy.

1.1 The Puzzle

There exists several theories on how states cooperate on matters of security and defence when they perceive they are faced with a common enemy (see Strömvik, 2005, p. 8). The theories illustrate how states as actors cooperate when faced with a common enemy; usually by forming an alliance (e.g. NATO, the Warzaw Pact). But why do states cooperate on matters of security and defence when the perception
of a shared military threat does not exist? The European cooperation on matters of defence and security has increased, especially since the beginning of the 1990s.

Strömvik points out (2005, p. 4) that it is a relatively easy task to identify why EU member states fail to act as one so often. With oft diverging interest, and in the case of CSDP, a veto right for all 27 participants for any decision made within that institution, it is not unsurprising that decisions are difficult to reach. What is more difficult, and an intriguing puzzle, is to explain why they sometimes do succeed (and increasingly so) to act collectively, especially regarding such sensitive questions as defence and security.

There is a gap in the research on state cooperation on security and defence, therefore the research question guiding this paper is:

**Why do sovereign states cooperate on matters of defence and security when they do not perceive a shared military threat?**

### 1.2 The case

EU member states have put significant resources into various attempts of a common European defence. The most recent result of those efforts is the Common Security and Defence Policy, CSDP (which prior to 2009 was known as the European Security and Defence Policy, ESDP). The predecessor to the CSDP, the ESDP, was created in 2003 out of the framework of the Western European Union, WEU. These three security and defence institutions are analysed in this paper as indicators of EU security and defence cooperation.

### 1.3 The hypothesis

The foundation of the hypothesis is that states are influence maximisers. When states choose to cooperate on matters of security and defence they do it to gain influence, but at the same time the states as separate actors lose autonomy. States choose to cooperate in order to gain influence in relation to the strongest actor in the international system. In this paper the strongest actor in the international system is considered to be the United States.

Since the case of this paper is the EU security and defence cooperation and the strongest actor in the international system is the US, the transatlantic relations are key to understanding the development of the institutionalized forms of EU security and defence cooperation. The hypothesis is that the political will of the EU member states to cooperate on matters of security and defence increases when they

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1 Denmark, the 28th EU member, has opted out of the Common Security and Defence Policy. See Bailes et al for an entire chapter on Denmark and the European Security and Defence Policy (2006, chapter 1).
collectively disagree with a US foreign policy. In other words, when the US performs a foreign policy (e.g. the invasion of Iraq) which all or some EU member states disagrees with, the political will among the EU member states to cooperate further increases. Note that the political will to cooperate increases, EU disagreement with US foreign policy does not directly translate into a deepened cooperation. The hypothesis is that any institutionalization of cooperation is done in order to gain influence in relation to the strongest actor in the international system. Maria Strömvik tested her more sophisticated version of this hypothesis on the adjacent policy arena, the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This paper thus tests the validity of a hypothesis that holds for an adjacent field of policy.

1.4 So what?

The theoretical literature on international security institutions is relatively sparse and leaves scholars wanting (see e.g. Menon, 2011, p. 85 and Berenskoetter, 2013 for a discussion on this). This opens up the field of research for contributions to the understanding of cooperation on matters of security to be made. My contribution, then, is a systematic study of a policy field which has been understudied theoretically (Menon, 2011, p. 85; Berenskoetter, 2013, p. 381 ff.).

The theory presented by Strömvik in her dissertation has so far been overlooked by researchers. Therefore the field of research benefits from the systematic study of it done in this paper.
2 Theory

The previous section introduced the paper and the purpose of writing it. This section explains the theory underpinning the hypothesis. The hypothesis has been briefly stated above and is below elaborated on. Following the elaboration of the hypothesis, the theory underpinning the hypothesis is explained and discussed with fundamental assumptions made explicit.

With the differences of the two institutional constructs CFSP and CSDP in mind, I have attempted to stay as close as possible to Strömvik’s assumptions in order to test her thesis more fairly. That said, Strömvik’s dissertation is a much more in-depth work of research and this paper will not be at par with it.

2.1 Hypothesis

The hypothesis in this paper is, as has been noted above, derived from Maria Strömvik’s dissertation To Act as a Union – Explaining the development of the EU’s collective foreign policy (2005). In her dissertation Strömvik analyses the evolvement of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, the CFSP. This paper instead analyses the Common Security and Defence Policy, the CSDP. The CSDP is a part of the CFSP framework. However, this does not mean that the CSDP and the CFSP have necessarily been created and evolved for the same reasons. In other words, explaining the development of the CFSP does not automatically explain the development of the CSDP.

In brevity, the hypothesis is that the EU member states are balancing influence relative to the strongest actor in the international system, which has been and remains to be the United States. The EU member states are attempting to balance US influence by cooperating. Cooperating does, however, infer autonomy losses for each member state in the field of cooperation. They manage to cooperate due to a perceived greater benefit than loss, in other words greater influence for the group as an actor is traded in for less autonomy for the states as actors. The key to the hypothesis is that cooperation is expected to intensify due to periods of common disagreement with US foreign policy, for this is when the political will of the EU member states increases.

The hypothesis is explained in more detail in the section directly below.

2.1.1 Balance-of-influence-hypothesis
Elaborating on the explanation above, Strömvik’s dissertation has the collective security and foreign policy of the EU (European Political Cooperation, EPC and CFSP) as the focal point of her research. Applying Strömvik’s hypothesis to the CSDP and its predecessors will not only be another test of her balance-of-influence hypothesis, but will help discern why states may choose to cooperate in matters regarding defence and security. The differences between the CFSP and the CSDP are not monumental, rather the CSDP can be thought of as a branch of the CFSP specialized to deal with matters of common EU defence and security issues. The relative closeness of the two constructs CFSP and CSDP means the analysis borrowed from Strömvik’s dissertation is relevant for this paper. What will be analysed more specifically are institutional changes to the cooperation, i.e. what is analysed are formal changes that are institutionalised.

Moving on to the hypothesis, Strömvik’s theory is that the level of cooperation between EU member states is a trade-off. An increased level of cooperation in foreign and security policy brings about an autonomy loss since it restrains the member states in various forms (i.e. a common EU position may undermine a specific member state’s intended position). At the same time as it is a cost, in the form of an autonomy loss, it is a benefit in that the common voice of the EU member states may have more of an impact than that of a single state. Do note that this hypothesis does not attempt to portray the US as a threat to which the EU member states are responding. Rather, the EU member states try to maximise their influence in international affairs by cooperating. Cooperation, then, is facilitated by US foreign policy that EU member states disagree with. Strömvik expands on this:

> It is not primarily A’s ability to influence B that should be seen to constitute the balancing behaviour, but rather A’s ability to influence events that B also wants to influence. Consequently, cooperation as a balancing strategy should be interpreted as an attempt to increase – in relation to the most influential actor – the collective ability to influence events and outcomes. (Strömvik, 2005, p. 49)

The hypothesis yields that cooperation will only happen if the perceived gains in influence are greater than the autonomy loss (Strömvik, 2005, p. 142 f). This is expected to lead to increased levels of cooperation during periods of disagreement with the most influential actor in the system. In other words, states lacking a perceived common threat or enemy are likely to cooperate in matters of security and defence when collectively disagreeing with the most influential actor in the system. This cooperation, then, is strengthening the position of the states and thus balances the influence of the cooperating states in relation to the most influential actor. It is fundamental to realize that this hypothesis does not give a strict causal relationship in the form of: ‘when there is disagreement, cooperation intensifies’. Rather, cooperation as a strategy for the EU member states becomes more of a viable option to increase their influence.

When EU member states disagree with a US foreign policy it is essential to not focus on finding increased institutional cooperation undertaken in order to tackle that specific “hot issue” over which the US and the EU disagree. Rather, the “hot
topic”, e.g. the invasion of Iraq, acts as a catalyst for increased cooperation to tackle future policies (Strömvik, 2005, p. 180).

The hypothesis builds on three fundamental assumptions (see Strömvik, 2005, pp. 145 f.). These key assumptions are;

1. States are influence-maximisers.
2. Decisions on cooperation are based on an analysis where autonomy loss is weighed against influence gains.
3. Cooperation on matters of security and defence is seen by states as one possible strategy for balancing (the influence-balancing behaviour is taken in relation to the most influential actor in the system, rather than the most threatening).

The three fundamental assumptions above are the most crucial ones for the hypothesis. They do, however build upon an additional set of three assumptions common to several theories regarding state cooperation.

*First*, states can be analysed “as if they are capable of making at least fairly conscious choices, and that the strategies chosen can, within limits, be seen as the result of rational calculations by their leaders” (Strömvik, 2005, p. 36). In other words, an assumption of a degree of rationality is assumed, Strömvik calls this “soft rationality” (ibid).

*Second*, “states are able to formulate preferences regarding preferred outcomes as well as regarding their preferred means of achieving these outcomes” (Strömvik, 2005, p. 37)

*Third*, states are “assumed to condition their behaviour on the expected behaviour of others” (Strömvik, 2005, p. 37).

The hypothesis paints a picture where disagreement fuels political will to cooperate. This raises the question if the opposite would hold true as well. If foreign policy of the most influential actor is in line with the preferences of the EU members, would the EU security cooperation decline over time as a result? Strömvik discusses this and concludes that the “perceived need to cooperate should be at a stand-still or perhaps even decrease” (2005, p. 143). However, Strömvik also points to the institutional development and writes that there seems to be a lock in effect of CFSP cooperation, that the increased levels of cooperation seem to be a flight of stairs rather than an oscillating curve, illustrating that new levels of cooperation become institutionalized (Strömvik, 2005, p. 180).

As part of the institutionalization of cooperation new aides to facilitate cooperation may be created so that the cooperation yields less friction. The cooperation becomes lubricated by a change in attitudes and removal of institutional hurdles, or by adding institutional aides (such as secretariats) (Strömvik, 2005, p. 181). Strömvik points out that institutional changes, such as creating a new agency to assist a policy area, may be important lubricants but that this is an under researched area (2005, p. 181). These ‘institutional lubricants’ are present throughout the evolution of the EU cooperation on security and defence. Therefore, they are mentioned when relevant in the data section. One example of such an institutional aide created to improve the cooperation is the European Defence Agency, EDA.
3 Method

The previous section explained the hypothesis and the theory underpinning it. This section of the paper will explain the choices made on how to answer the research question. The research question guiding this paper is:

*Why do sovereign states cooperate on matters of defence and security when they do not perceive a common military threat?*

3.1 Research design

In her dissertation (2005) Strömvik shows that EU member states increase foreign policy cooperation to balance US influence when disagreeing with US foreign policy. Strömvik tests this theory against empirical data in competition with other theories and finds that the theory holds and should be studied further. This paper utilizes Strömvik’s theory and applies it to the policy area of security and defence cooperation among the EU member states in order to answer the research question.

The following section explains the research design. The research design in this paper is thus based on Maria Strömvik’s research design presented in her dissertation *To Act as a Union – Explaining the development of the EU’s collective foreign policy*. Accordingly, this paper will be an observational study where the independent and dependent variables are observed. The variables will be observed over time in order to allow for causal claims—i.e. the hypothesis presented in this paper—to be tested and the research question to be answered. An important difference between the research design of this study and that of Strömvik is the time period. Strömvik’s analysis stretches from 1970 to 1999, and this study stretches from 1991 through 2014.

Periods of change to the European cooperation on security and defence are accordingly identified. Examples of such notable changes to the cooperation include; the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam (entered into force in 1999) which laid much of the groundwork for a common European defence policy, as well as the Berlin Plus agreement which institutionalized important parts of the security and defence relationship between EU and NATO, such as intelligence sharing and interoperable forces. Periods of change to European security and defence cooperation, such as these two indicate, will be identified and situated in global events, with a strong focus on the transatlantic relationship. By identifying periods of change to the security cooperation it becomes possible to situate them in a transatlantic context and discern whether or not the hypothesis holds. This is done
in the analysis section. Prior to the analysis section the indicators and the history of the transatlantic relations are presented in separate sections.

This paper will not cover the entire contemporary history of EU security and thus a selection has been made. Strömvik tackles this by choosing a timeframe—1970-1999—in which to analyse the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP. This paper will not analyse the same time period Strömvik analyses, as is mentioned above, simply because the more recent years—i.e. post-Cold War—are of more relevance to the development of the European defence and security cooperation.

I operationalize European security and defence cooperation as the WEU/ESDP/CSDP; more on this choice follows below. To capture the key changes to these constructs I thus analyse the timeframe 1991 through 2014. The study is thus focused on relatively recent developments. Important events that could be considered relevant may therefore be lacking. The reason for choosing this time period is that studying this period ensures that major institutional changes to the security cooperation are captured more in-depth. Furthermore, since 1991 the security and defence cooperation has indeed intensified, thus ensuring there has been an observable change in the dependent variable.

The identified periods of institutional change between 1991 and 2014 will help situate the cooperation—where the degree of cooperation will be compared to that of previous and subsequent periods. The degree of cooperation will thus be measured in relation to itself. This alleviates the problem of finding an accurate measurement of the degree of cooperation by instead comparing more in-depth descriptions of the cooperation with each other. A potential problem is, however, that the cooperation changes but whether or not the degree of cooperation has increased is difficult to interpret. To clarify my point, institutional change does not necessarily mean that the degree of cooperation has increased or decreased, but merely that it has changed. This issue will be dealt with by comparing analysts’ reports on European security and defence cooperation. Establishing if there is more or less cooperation relative another period in time will be necessary in order to vary it against EU disagreement with US policy.

When the periods of change have been identified the thesis is tested against the gathered data. The EU member states and the US are the relevant actors for this study, but an EU member state disagreeing unilaterally with the US outside of the EU framework is not necessarily relevant. However, if such a member state was placed in a context where the disagreement rallies the other EU member states to a common standpoint against the US, it would be relevant. This illustrates that each identified discrepancy between the US and the EU on foreign policy must be analysed carefully. An example of serious disagreement between the EU member states and the US over US foreign policy is the US decision to invade Iraq in 2003.

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2 Throughout the paper the security cooperation will be labelled as just that; cooperation. In other policy areas the relevant term is rather integration. The distinction between security cooperation and security integration is important since, again as compared to other EU policy areas, the institutionalization of the cooperation is intergovernmental, not supranational. For the interested reader, see the work of Seth G. Jones (2007) who discusses this distinction at more length.
A key point in Strömvik’s thesis is that disagreement between the EU member states as a group and the US over US foreign policy encourages further EU security cooperation. However, this does not mean that all of the member states necessarily disagree with the US policy (despite the necessity for consensus on every question handled within the CSDP). Rather, if the member states do cooperate despite different inclinations on a certain US policy, it shows the strategic nature of security and defence issues. Proving that there has been strict mutual disagreement over a certain policy is thus not necessary. The stance disagreement or agreement with US policy will be found through analysis of official government documents and statements as well as newspapers and other relevant publications. Expert publications will, however, be the main source utilized. The expert publication are written by both European and US scholars on transatlantic relations.

When attempting to identify the mechanism explaining the occurrence of an issue (i.e. the research question) and with the hypothesis of this paper (EU disagreement with US foreign policy fuels political will for defence and security cooperation) the importance and difficulty of determining causal relationships comes to the fore. Attempting to determine causality in social sciences is a contentious issue. In this paper, as is usually the case in social science, any causal relationship will be considered probabilistic. It will be established by considering temporal ordering and correlation while working with a plausible causal mechanism. In other words, is the disagreement happening at the approximately same time as the change in security cooperation; what happened first between the change and the disagreement? (see Strömberg 2005, p. 50).

### 3.2 Variables

This subsection explains the choice of dependent and independent variables, as well as further operationalizations.

The dependent variable is the degree of security and defence cooperation among the EU member states. The degree of cooperation will be relativized to itself in previous periods.

In order to be able to better track and measure the degree of EU defence and security cooperation it will in this paper be operationalized as three institutionalized forms of cooperation: the Western European Union (WEU), the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the current Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This approach is similar to that of Strömvik who analysed the EPC, European Political Cooperation, and subsequently the CFSP.

The term ‘security’ is ambiguous; it can entail various conditions and must be defined. Personal security, state security, food security, human security—they are all relevant add-ons depending on the focal point of the research. This paper utilizes the term ‘security’ liberally throughout the text, and the term consistently refers to state security. This is in line with Strömvik’s (2005) work.
When analysing the institutionalized cooperation the chosen indicators are treaties, declarations & strategies and military action undertaken within the frameworks (e.g. WEU/ESDP/CSDP military operations). The variables are presented over time in separate sections.

There are certainly shortfalls to defining European security cooperation as the three types of institutionalized cooperation that is the WEU, the ESDP and the CSDP—such as missing out on cooperation outside of those constructs. Institutions created to facilitate the Common Security and Defence Policy, CSDP, (such as the European Defence Agency, EDA) will be of interest to analyse, however.

Finally, the testable proposition of this paper is that when EU member states disagree with a US foreign policy, security cooperation among the EU members should intensify.

3.3 Data

In this paper the diplomatic history of EU-US relations is analysed, starting in 1991 and through 2014. This is the same approach Strömvik utilizes, but with a different time span. When describing the transatlantic relations over time I rely on secondary material in the form of books and articles written by scholars on the subject. The scholars are prominent in their field and are both Europeans and Americans. This alleviates concerns about biased or one-sided material. Furthermore, choosing a single case runs the risk of selection bias (see King et al., p. 128 ff.). Looking at multiple cases over an extended time period alleviates this issue and is done in this paper. Jones puts it in other words: “[t]his time-series approach should counter the criticism that scholarly work on European security cooperation is methodologically problematic because it is a single case.” (Jones, 2007, p. 14).

The treaties are handled in a similar fashion to the transatlantic relations; I mainly rely on secondary material for the political situation surrounding negotiations or other political action. First-hand material in the form of the treaties discussed are, however, utilized and referenced.

Data for the security and defence cooperation are found for the respective indicators. For military actions data from the CSDP Map and Kreutz data set are utilized. The CSDP Map has data from 2003 through 2014. This data exclusively includes missions performed within the ESDP/CSDP framework, meaning a selection of their data is not needed. The Kreutz data set stretches from 1991 through 2008 and includes all military actions of the EU members, all military action presented in the Kreutz data set are therefore not utilized in this paper. The data chosen from the Kreutz data set includes missions undertaken within the WEU framework and the ESDP framework. In short, only data on military missions undertaken within one of the three institutionalized forms of military cooperation (WEU/ESDP/CSDP) are considered for this paper.

The data on the various treaties are primarily first hand material, i.e. the official treaties. They are complemented with second hand material in the form of analyses. The same approach is used for declarations and strategies.
4 EU security and transatlantic relations

It is remarkable that European governments collectively have doubled the number of troops deployed abroad within the past decade, with so little national or Europe-wide debate on the implications of this development. (Giergerich & Wallace, 2004, p. 179)

The words of Giergerich and Wallace above serve well to introduce a discussion on EU security and defence cooperation. In the previous chapters the hypothesis was explained, discussed and situated in the broader literature. The method used to answer the research question was also presented. This section will go over the relevant information needed to evaluate the hypothesis. The analysis is kept in its own subsection in this chapter. The reason for separating the more descriptive sections and the analysis is to allow the reader to better assess the analysis. In other words, to alleviate concerns about intersubjectivity.

To recapitulate, I hypothesise that US foreign policy and transatlantic relations are key to understanding the evolvement of the European security and defence cooperation. Specifically, the disagreements and the disunity between the EU and the US over US foreign policy are crucial in inducing political will among the EU members to cooperate on matters of security and defence. In order to be able to evaluate this hypothesis this section therefore outlines the transatlantic relations over time. It also outlines important changes to the European security and defence cooperation.

In this section I start out by presenting the different indicators of cooperation (military actions, treaties, declarations & strategies) as well the history of the transatlantic relations. These are presented in separate subsections. After the sections covering the data are presented the analysis follows to tie the sections together. This chapter ends with a timeline which provides a more accessible overview.

The next section presents the different indicators over time. The section presenting the transatlantic history below is, out of necessity, a relatively brief one. The same, unfortunately, goes for the changes to European security and defence cooperation. I have identified what I believe are key changes to the cooperation and key events affecting the transatlantic relations. Below I present this first in text, then with the timeline mentioned above. The timeline has each key event plotted and illustrates the text graphically. It should be consulted to gain an overview of the text.

4.1 The indicators
This chapter will present the different indicators of changing levels of European security and defence cooperation. Whitman’s quote in the beginning of this chapter points to that the ‘security landscape’ of Europe is changing. In fact, the European security and defence cooperation has grown remarkably in the post-Cold War years (Jones, 2007, p. 181; Giegerich & Wallace, 2004). The following subsections will present the indicators of the changes utilized in this paper.

4.1.1 Treaties

In this section the treaties are presented chronologically. Not all years are included, however. Rather, it is a selection of the years and treaties deemed most relevant for the development of the EU security and defence cooperation.


In 1992 a crucial step was taken for increased EU integration across Europe; a document was drafted which laid the groundwork for the future of the European Union’s cooperation on matters of security and defence (Jones, 2007, p. 82 ff.). This document was the Maastricht Treaty and was signed in February 1992 and effective as of November 1993. It is a key document for the EU project and is more formally known as the Treaty on European Union, TEU3 (see EU legislation and glossary no. 1). This treaty defined the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as one out of the three pillars of the EU and importantly referred to a common defence policy for the EU (EUISS, no. 1; Treaty on European Union (article 24); EU legislation and glossary no. 2; Whitman, 2004, p. 434; EU legislation no. 1). The Treaty on European Union, TEU, was a step towards a harmonized EU foreign policy and was crucial in order to deepen the cooperation on security and defence. The TEU was crucial for deepened security cooperation since “issues of military security and defence were to be discussed in the confines of the EC for the first time” (Whitman, 2004, p. 432). Thus, the TEU not only showed the intentions of the Europeans powers to cooperate on these matters but also paved the way for such an institutional development.

Further developments to be made in the future for a more developed security and defence policy area were being prepared for with the help of the TEU. Under Title V, Provisions on a common foreign and security policy, the following is declared: “eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence”4. This was a significant step for the future development of the ESDP and the CSDP. Mentioning a common EU defence in the TEU was, however, a contentious issue, and needed to be somewhat distanced from the rest

4 Available at: http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/index_en.htm
of the political integration project. The distancing was achieved by adding article J.4.2: “The Union request the Western Union (WEU), which is integral part of the development of the Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The Council shall, in agreement with the institutions of the WEU, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.”

The Western European Union, WEU, which was mentioned in article J.4.2 was a European defence organization predating the ESDP. It “provided a ready-made mechanism for the member states to exploit” and was a complement to NATO, rather than a duplicate or rival (Whitman, 2004, p. 432 ff.). The influence of the WEU on international security and defence policy was, however, minimal (Schleich, 2014, p. 187). The nature of WEU as non-rival and complementary to NATO, alleviated transatlantic tension somewhat in regards to this nascent European defence project. Apart from being the ‘vehicle’ of European security and defence development, the WEU was also a “means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance – the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI)” (Whitman, 2004, p. 433). In other words, the European states managed to cooperate on security and defence policy. In doing so they strengthened the European member states’ standing within NATO (through the ESDI) as well as strengthened the EU’s capabilities in international security management, by utilizing the WEU as the security and defence institution of the EU.

A perceived advantage of utilizing the WEU as a defence and security institutional framework was that it was an intergovernmental rather than a supranational organization. The intergovernmental framework helped de-sensitize the issue for the member states on a national level by preserving national sovereignty on the issue of defence and security (Whitman, 2004, p. 432 ff.). This has been a recurring organizational structure in the developments, first of the ESDP and subsequently of the CSDP.

1994 – 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam, Continuation of separation between WEU and NATO

The progress made on the cooperation on security and defence was seen as slow, and “the incapability of the EU during the Balkan Wars showed the necessity to give the Union more means and instruments for action” (Schleich, 2014, p. 188). The unhappiness of some states with the capabilities of the WEU during the Balkan crisis fuelled the debate on a European common defence (Jones, 2007, p 87; Whitman, 2004, p. 435). The gap between the expectations and capabilities that was felt during the Balkan crisis opened up for the next step in the cooperation process and the desire to deepen the common EU defence using the WEU resulted in

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5This issue was especially sensitive for Ireland and Denmark. Denmark actually opted itself out of continued European security cooperation in the Maastricht Treaty (TEU) in 1992 (Whitman, 2004, p. 432 f.; Pedersen in Bailes et al., 2006, p. 37). For a thorough discussion on Denmark’s reasons for this ‘opt-out’, see Pedersen’s chapter, chapter 1, in Bailes et al (2006).
important passages in the Treaty of Amsterdam, ToA, drafted in June 1997 (Schleich, 2014, p. 188; Whitman, 2004, p. 435). The ToA amends the Treaty on European Union, TEU, and made significant changes regarding the future of European defence and security. ToA strengthens the commitment of the EU to military security and defence in several ways. Firstly, a key development was that the former ‘neutral’ states—Sweden, Finland, Austria and Ireland—now accepted the development of a military security and defence to be included in the ToA, and thus amend the Treaty of European Union. However, the “Finnish and Swedish governments in particular did feel some discomfiture at the existence of military security within the EU and were keen to promote crisis management as the most important practical task that the EU could undertake and it was their initiative to include the Petersberg tasks in the ToA” (Whitman, 2004, p. 435). This is an example of how the issue of a common security and defence policy can be framed, and new objectives added, to help the policy to fit the interest of all member states, realizing they face different security situations and domestic political realities. An example of such an operation was when, in 1998, the WEU was tasked by the EU to “undertake three activities: monitor the situation in Kosovo via the Satellite Centre; undertake action in assistance for mine clearing in Croatia; and study the feasibility of international police operations to assist the government in Albania and then to implement.” (Whitman, 2004, p. 434).

Returning to the Treaty of Amsterdam it was significant in several other ways as well. For one it included the creation of the position of the High Representative, HR, for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP. The first HR appointed was Javier Solana, who was a former Secretary General for NATO. Solana was also appointed Secretary General of the WEU at the same time, making Solana the head of both CFSP and WEU (today the HR heads the CFSP and the CSDP). The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in 1997 and came into force in 1999 and was, in essence, a compromise between member states wanting a deeper security cooperation and states who did not want any further development (Whitman, 2004, p. 435 f.). The new Treaty of Amsterdam was a part of making the EU militarily operational. Doing so the EU took one more step towards autonomy in the field of security and defence, without detaching from NATO, however (Schleich, 2014, p. 188).

2001 – The Treaty of Nice and EDA, strengthening the cooperation

The Treaty of Nice was signed in 2001 and entered into force in 2003. The treaty further strengthened the EU as an autonomous actor in the field of international security and defence (Jones, 2007; Wivel, 2005, p. 400 ff.; Whitman, 2004, p. 439).
Interestingly, a declaration attached to the treaty made it clear that the ratification of the Treaty of Nice was not a precondition for the ESDP to become operational. In other words, the creation of the ESDP could not be stopped by refusing to ratify the ToN (Whitman, 2004, p. 439 ff.). The declaration thus showed the importance placed on the security cooperation, and also helped put some distance between ratifying the ToN and the creation of the more sensitive issue of the ESDP.

In 2004, roughly a year after the ESDP became operational, the European Defence Agency was established. The purpose of establishing this agency was, *inter alia*, to strengthen the EU defence industry and improve EU’s defence capabilities (in other words, to improve the capabilities of the member states (EUISS, no. 2, p. 63)) as well as to help implement the ESDP/CSDP (see Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP10). This was another step towards strengthening the security cooperation in the long run by empowering the EU defence industry, thus ensuring the Europeans remain in greater control of their own future capabilities. It was also an ‘institutional lubricant’, helping make the institutional steps necessary to improve the ESDP/CSDP.

2007 – The Treaty of Lisbon enters into force and ESDP becomes CSDP

The Treaty of Lisbon, ToL, was agreed upon in 2007 and entered into force in 2009. The ToL introduced several developments to the ESDP. A visible change was relabelling the cooperation CSDP, Common Security and Defence Policy. This change was coupled with substantial changes. In general, the developments clarified “the EU’s ability to speak on international issues and give it more political weight and stability respecting NATO commitments.” (Sola, *in Laursen et al.*, 2009, p. 202). According to a prominent scholar on the CSDP, Anand Menon, a common observation among EU defence analysts was that the primary objective of the Treaty of Lisbon agreed upon in 2007 was to allow for the EU to be a more effective global actor (Menon, 2011, p. 75). “Of the 62 amendments it makes to its predecessors, the Treaty of Rome and the Maastricht Treaty, 25 apply to provisions on foreign and security policy. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) was not only given more space than the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) that preceded it; its remit was expanded to include joint disarmament operations, post-conflict stabilisation and, if these were not taxing enough of themselves, the ‘fight against terrorism’. ” (Menon, 2011, p. 75).

With the Treaty of Lisbon several important amendments were made to the TEU that more specifically strengthened the military cooperation of the EU member states. Above some general changes are mentioned. Here follows some more tangible examples. One such example of the strengthening of the defensive aspect of the CSDP was the inclusion of the ‘solidarity clause’. The ‘solidarity clause’

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(article 188 R) states that member states ‘shall act jointly if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member states”11. This clause, then, more explicitly shows the direction EU defence strategy is heading and where it is currently at. With the US wanting EU to take on a larger burden regarding the defence of Europe, this could be seen as a step in that direction (Nielsen, 2013; Fabbrini & Sicurelli, 2014).

The Treaty of Lisbon extended the role of the HR to include the role of the Vice-President of the Commission. The Treaty of Lisbon also expanded the responsibilities of the HR (EUISS, no. 2, p. 61).12 The European External Action Service, EEAS, is created to help the High Representative fulfil the mandate of the job (EUISS, no. 2, p. 61). “The creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2010 offered the opportunity to bring under the same roof the diverse policies, tools, staff and working cultures from the various EU institutions and member states dealing with or engaged in CSDP” (Balfour in Gross & Menon, 2013, p. 45). The main point of addressing this change is to illustrate the continued belief in the system by the EU members.

The following quote is an analysis by the EUISS on the importance and limitations of the Lisbon Treaty. The words of the EUISS end the section on treaties. The section following is on declarations and strategies.

. . . [I]nstitutional engineering can only achieve so much if political consensus on making the Union a strong, autonomous international actor in the field of security and defence is not forthcoming. From this standpoint, the reforms envisaged by the Lisbon Treaty are of particular importance. They create the institutional conditions for much more joined up policy-making at EU level, bridging the intergovernmental and the Community dimension as well as the national and the European levels of decision-making. That said, ultimately, institutional reform cannot provide a conclusive answer to a political question. (EUISS, no. 2, p. 65)

The Mutual Defence Clause states that “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.”

It further states that: “Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.” (TEU, article 42)

Quille points out that the text was written to please three categories of states; those “seeking a mutual defence commitment [...] seeking to protect their traditional neutral status [...] wanting to ensure that the article would not undermine NATO” (2008, p. 8).

The ToL effectively closed the WEU by adding the Mutual Assistance Clause. The WEU officially closed down in June 2011.

4.1.2 Declarations and strategies

1992 The Petersberg Declaration

In 1992 the Council of Ministers of the Western European Union Ministerial Council present the Petersberg Declaration which defines the ‘Petersberg tasks’. The Petersberg Declaration “have become the paradigm which have conditioned both the ambitions of the ESDP and also informed the force structure deemed appropriate for realizing the EU’s military security ambitions.” (Whitman, 2004, p. 434). The ‘Petersberg tasks’ can be defined as political goals. They were set up to be met over time with the creation of new institutions (Whitman, 2004, p. 433). The tasks were explicitly included in the Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty, TEU)—marking the political weight the tasks hold—and the WEU subsequently created institutions throughout the mid-1990s to meet the tasks (Whitman, 2004, p. 433). The ‘Petersberg Declaration’ and the political goals known as the ‘Petersberg tasks’ are crucial to the institutional development of the EU defence and security cooperation as they laid much of the groundwork for future developments, in part by creating new institutions.

1996 – 1999 Berlin Plus, Saint-Malo Declaration, Cologne and Helsinki

In 1994 a process was started to allow the WEU to use certain NATO assets and capabilities, especially through the Combined Joint Task Forces, CJTF. The CJTF is a “deployable multinational, multi-service formation generated and tailored for specific contingency operations. It could cover a wide range of potential tasks including humanitarian relief, peacekeeping or peace enforcement.” This development is important to highlight since it allowed for operations to be run by the WEU members without including the US. This development was therefore important in the further development of a European Security and Defence Identity,
ESDI (Whitman, 2004, p. 433 f.). The process of allowing WEU to use NATO assets made slow progress and it “was not until May 1997 that NATO’s Military Committee designated the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) as the principal point of contact between the NATO Strategic Commands and the WEU” (Whitman, 2004, p. 433 f.). Although a seemingly small step, this was, in fact, another step towards greater EU autonomy from the US in matters of international security.

The years 1996-1999 were marked by the continued separation between NATO and the EU member states. This “continuing separation between NATO and the EU was illustrated by the fact that the first ever formal meeting between the EU Presidency and the NATO Secretary-General only took place in December 1998.” (Whitman, 2004, p. 434).

In 1996 the NATO Berlin Council was held (see NATO no. 1). It was agreed at the ministerial meeting of the NATO council that the Western European Union (WEU) would see to the creation of a European ‘section’ within the NATO framework. This ‘section’ within the NATO framework was the development of the aforementioned ESDI, the European Security and Defence Identity.

Increasing the security cooperation was not without hiccups, even within the EU. The British were outspokenly reluctant to increase the EU cooperation on security and defence, and preferred an increased level of cooperation on EU defence within the NATO framework instead (e.g. through the ESDI). However, despite this outspoken reluctance an important understanding was reached in 1998 between the two European military powers France and the UK in the Franco-British summit in Saint Malo. In this summit common political ground was found between the two powers, and in fact it “was the first time that the EU’s two most significant military powers had agreed such a bilateral statement”, in effect “kick-start[ing] the development of what was to become the ESDP” (Whitman, 2004, p. 436). The summit at Saint Malo “famously calls for the European Union to develop ‘the capacity for autonomous action’” (Berenskoetter, 2013, p. 383; also, see the Saint-Malo Declaration) and set the course of action to taking the formal decision at the next European Council meeting in Cologne in 1999. The importance of the summit and the agreement between France and Britain should not be underestimated; it changed several European governments’ positions towards a European security and defence policy (Tiilikainen in Bailes et al., 2006, p. 57). Jones notes that the summit “added a common defence policy to the second pillar” (2007, p. 85).

At the meeting in Cologne, then, the ESDP was subsequently created. It was also decided that the role of the WEU (which had been separate from the EU but utilized as an instrument) was to be incorporated into the EU. This effectively closed the WEU. The Cologne European Council took the expected formal decision that the EU should be able to act autonomously in matters of defence when NATO decided not to (Wivel, 2005, p. 400; Jones, 2007, p. 181). It was also at this summit that Javier Solana was appointed to be the first High Representative (EUISS no. 2, pp. 13, 117; Whitman, 2004, p. 434 ff.). Within the ESDP framework the foundation for the EU Intelligence Center, EU SITCEN, is laid. This is another step
towards a more autonomous and capable EU within the field of international security, being able to rely less on American capabilities and more on European ones. The European Union Institute for International Security Studies notes that the “difference from 1999 onwards was that the EU was not a military alliance like the WEU (or NATO), but a political Union which brought much more broad diplomatic, political and economic weight to the table.” (EUISS no. 2, p. 128).

The Helsinki European Council, which took place in the other half of 1999, underscored the determination with which the Council sought to develop an autonomous capacity to act where NATO declined to act. The meeting resulted in an important goal, known as the ‘Helsinki Headline Goal’. This goal was, in short, to be able to muster the capacity necessary to achieve the ‘Petersberg tasks’ by 2003 (this was estimated to be in correspondence to 50,000-60,000 troops). This was not to be a ‘European army’, but rather a pool of national resources which the EU through ESDP may utilize (EUISS, no. 3, p. 90).


Improving the capacity of the EU to act autonomously has remained a contentious issue. For one, it strained the EU-NATO relationship. There were ongoing discussions between the EU and NATO on how to make sure the ESDP and NATO complemented each other, rather than duplicated one another. The culmination of the talks about the arrangements between the two organisations has come to be known as the ‘Berlin Plus agreement’ (the talks began in 1996). In the beginning the talks were held between NATO and the WEU in Berlin, hence the name (EUISS, no. 2, p. 128). When the ESDP effectively replaced the WEU following the Cologne summit in 1999, “it was only a matter of time before the EU would replace the WEU as the negotiator with NATO on the ‘Berlin Plus’ talks, and in January 2001 the EU and NATO initiated direct talks on Berlin Plus.” (EUISS, no. 2, p. 128). In 2002 the ‘Berlin Plus agreement’ is reached. The agreement is an agreement that the EU may use certain NATO capabilities where necessary for EU operations (Sola in Laursen et al., 2009, p. 201; Giegerich & Wallace, 2004, p. 163; Schleich, 2014, p. 188; EUISS, no. 3, p. 91). In 2003 the Berlin Plus agreement enters into force (Sola in Laursen et al., 2009, p. 201; Giegerich & Wallace, 2004, p. 163).

In 2003 the EU members agreed on the first European Security Strategy, the ESS (EUISS, no. 2, p. 24; Toje, 2010, p. 76). The ESS was drafted partly as a counterpart to the American National Security Strategy of 2002, and partly to be a foundation for future EU cooperation on security (Giergerich & Wallace, 2004, p. 167 f.). An important phrase in this strategic document is that the EU intended to “share in the responsibility for global security” (ESS 1, p. 1, emphasis added). An important aspect of the ESS is that it “reinforces the elements of combination of hard and soft power” (see Sola in Laursen et al., 2009, p. 202). This is a pointer that the EU is keen on having a multifaceted toolbox to be able to autonomously deal with problems.
The ESS document was a strategic framework important for the European Security and Defence Policy, ESDP (EUISS no. 2, p. 15). Or in the words of a scholar on the subject; “The ESS is important, as Sven Biscop and Jan Joel Andersson have argued, because it sums up the EU’s political project, its hopes and ambitions. Its significance lies not so much in what the document actually states as in what it is seen to represent.” (Toje, 2010, p. 76). In short, the document helped in framing the strategic direction the EU and the ESDP would follow.

In 2008 the European Council published a review of the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS); the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, RI-ESS, titled Providing Security in a Changing World. RI-ESS comments on the changes in EU strategic thinking and shortcomings since the publication of the ESS (Toje, 2010, p. 76 ff.). The review of the security strategy has a particular focus on the development of capabilities for the ESDP (EUISS, no. 2, p. 24 f.). The review of the security strategy was thus another step in the ongoing development of the security and defence cooperation.

Apart from the overarching security strategy and its revised edition mentioned above, more specific security strategies have been developed as well. One such important strategy was the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strategy and action plan. This framework document helped devise a regional approach to security and defence (EUISS, no. 2, p. 25 f., 148 ff.). It showed the EU’s continued commitment to being a global security actor.

2014 Selected EU Strategies

In 2014 two important strategies were adopted. Firstly, the EU Strategy on the Gulf of Guinea (EUSGG) which aims to achieve “peace, security and prosperity” in the region of the Gulf of Guinea. This is to be achieved through a multifaceted approach, in short through a combination of hard and soft power. It is to be done by partnering with the African Union, AU, and supporting its regional organisations, such as ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States). The aim is to help build stable institutions capable of handling the issues independently of the EU. The importance of this strategy lies in the EU members continuing to work through the CSDP. This may come to strengthen the cooperation, with the CSDP becoming a more normalized part of the EU membership.

The European Union Maritime Security Strategy is written to be in accordance with the ESS (EUMSS, p. 2) and the purpose of this strategy is to “secure the

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maritime security interests of the EU and its Member States against a plethora of risks and threats in the global maritime domain.” (EUMSS, p. 3). It is important to note the word ‘global’. This is a sign of intent to continue striving towards becoming more of a global actor.

The last EU strategy to be addressed here is the EU strategy for security and development in the Sahel (EUSSS) and it stretches over a 10 year perspective. It was implemented in 2011. A key perspective of the EU strategy is that security and development are inseparable in the Sahel region. Therefore, in order for the EU to help develop the region economically and politically, military capabilities are necessary. The overall goal is to reduce terrorist threats, limit international criminal networks operating in the region, as well as enhance the overall political stability and security.22

4.1.3 Military actions

This section notes the military actions but only briefly comments on them. The military actions are the EU member military actions taken over the time period 1991-2014 within WEU/ESDP/CSDP. To clarify, there have been additional military actions taken by EU member states. However, these actions have been made in other contexts than under the EU framework for cooperation. Examples include unilateral actions or NATO operations. Due to their character those actions are disregarded since this paper analyses institutionalized European security cooperation. The selection of operations below was made utilizing the data from Kreutz data set and the CSDP Operations Map by the EUISS.

**WEUDAM**

WEUDAM was a mine clearance operation to assist Croatia at Croatian request. The mission was funded by the EU, with nine military personnel and lasted between 1999 through late 2001. It was conducted within the WEU framework.23

**Operation Concordia**

After the Berlin-Plus agreement, the EU took over peacekeeping and stabilisation responsibilities in Macedonia from NATO—utilizing the newly operational ESDP—between March 2003 and November 2003.24

**Operation Artemis**

In June 2003 the EU sent 1,800 troops to Eastern Congo in a military operation called Operation Artemis, marking the first long-range EU military operation a

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23 [http://www.weu.int/History.htm](http://www.weu.int/History.htm), accessed 22/6 – 2015
success in September 2003. The operation was done per request from the UN Secretary-General of the UN.\textsuperscript{25} The mission of the operation was to stabilise a region in Eastern Congo, effectively buying time for a larger UN peacekeeping force which was being put together and deployed. Of specific importance for the ESDP was that this was the first autonomous EU military operation outside of Europe. It did not rely on NATO or other assistance (Giegerich & Wallace, 2004, p. 163 ff.; Hoebeke et al., 2007, p. 8; Whitman, 2006, p. 446 f.) and was a “high risk, high profile, politically important mission that set the stage for future ESDP developments, both in Africa and beyond” (Hoebeke et al., 2007, p. 8).

\textit{EUFOR Operation Althea} 
EUFOR Operation Althea began in 2004 (that is, roughly a year after the ESDP was operational). The EU force (or EUFOR) was authorized by the UN Security Council with the adoption of resolution 1575. It replaced NATO forces on the ground and initially consisted of 7000 troops. It is a mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and has three main missions:

- To provide capacity-building and training support to the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- To support BiH efforts to maintain the safe and secure environment in BiH
- To provide support to the overall EU comprehensive strategy for BiH.\textsuperscript{26}

The operation is conducted under the Berlin-Plus agreements. Thus, the EU through CSDP and NATO work closely. However, EU maintains control over the political and strategic aspects of the operation.\textsuperscript{27} The operation is a sign that the EU is trying to take a greater autonomous responsibility for European security management.

\textit{EUFOR DR Congo} 
EUFOR DR Congo was a military operation conducted to secure elections in DR Congo. The EU responded to a UN request in assembling a military force to secure the upcoming elections in DR Congo. Importantly, it deepened the relationship between the EU and the UN and thus gaining further international approval of the CSDP construct. There were, however, hiccups delaying the operation, such as distribution of costs and availability of troops. The mission started and concluded in 2006 (Hoebeke et al., 2007, p. 8).\textsuperscript{28}

\textit{EUFOR Tchad} 
EUFOR Tchad was a military operation that was launched in 2008 and ended in 2009. It involved 3700 troops and had as main objectives to facilitate delivery of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{25} \url{http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/artemis-drc/index_en.htm}, accessed 7/5 – 2015
  \item \textsuperscript{26} \url{http://www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15:eufor-fact-sheet&catid=185:about-eufor&Itemid=134}, accessed 4/5-2015
  \item \textsuperscript{27} \url{http://www.euforbih.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15:eufor-fact-sheet&catid=185:about-eufor&Itemid=134}, accessed 4/5-2015
  \item \textsuperscript{28} \url{http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eufor-rd-congo/index_en.htm}, accessed 5/5-2015
\end{itemize}
humanitarian aid, protect UN, EU and other humanitarian staff as well as protect civilians. In 2009 the UN took over the operation.

EUFOR Tchad further helped improve the UN-EU relations. The mission was the most multi-national EU operation in Africa to-date, with 23 member states being represented in some manner.29

**EUNAVFOR Somalia, Operation Atalanta**
Operation Atalanta became operational in 2008, and was as of the end of 2014 ongoing. The operation is based on several UN resolutions and aims to deter piracy, monitor fishing activities and protect vulnerable vessels. Its overarching goal is to improve maritime security and capacity in the region of the Horn of Africa, mainly along the coastline of Somalia. Its area of operations is vast and is a sign of the global presence of EU forces.30

**EUFOR Libya**
EUFOR Libya is the name of a never conducted military operation (which may still be conducted) in Libya if requested by the UN. The decision to intervene militarily if requested in Libya was reached in April 2011 but never acted upon.31 EU thus never intervened militarily in Libya through the CSDP. However, the UK and France intervened militarily and unilaterally in Libya within the NATO framework (Menon, 2011, p. 75).

The size and geographic location of the Libyan conflict did actually fit well for the design of the CSDP framework (Howorth, 2014, p. 405; Menon, 2011, p. 75). In fact, “the classic scenario for which the Common Security and Defence Policy had been planning was a medium intensity military intervention in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, either with access to NATO assets (Berlin Plus) or autonomously. The ‘fit’ between the Libyan case and the ideal-type CSDP mission cannot be overstated.” (Howorth, 2014, p. 405).

As a result, the EU’s inability to quickly and decisively act was, for some observers, seen as a crucial weakness of the security cooperation. It was a sign of intra-European divisions crippling the CSDP, according to some analysts (Nielsen, 2013, p. 98). Others went further and proclaimed the failure to act as the effective end of the CSDP (Menon, 2011, p. 76). The operation did, however, indicate that the CSDP was not a solid security organisation to count on.

**EUFOR RCA**
EUFOR RCA is a UN mandated EU peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic, or CAR. It was operational as of early 2014 and was at the end of 2014 still ongoing. The goal of the military operation is to stabilise a region called the Bangui area to allow for humanitarian aid and aims to hand over to ‘African partners’.32

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The EUFOR RCA is another show of EU’s intent of global impact and autonomous action.

4.2 The transatlantic relations

These events should serve as impulses toward increased cooperation by boosting the political will to attempt to exert European influence over international events. (Strömvik, 2005, p. 146)

In this section the transatlantic disunity between 1991 through 2014 is presented. Note that only the periods of discord are presented. As a result the transatlantic relationship may appear to be in a constant crisis. This has, of course, not been the case. Just as Strömvik notes in the quote above, the EU-US relations are considered impulses which spark EU willingness to cooperate. The analysis of the connection between EU-US relations and the development of the CSDP is however kept in the analysis section. This is done in order to allow for intersubjectivity.

This section starts out in the midst of a worsening of EU-US relations. The worsening of the transatlantic relations was mainly due to the Iran-Contras scandal which erupted in 1986. The scandal severely damaged the credibility of the US foreign policy in the eyes of the Europeans (Strömvik, 2005, p. 167).

The poor transatlantic relations may be considered the baseline against which the ongoing relations may be judged. The uncertainties following the end of the Cold War is a backdrop to consider when analysing decisions made.

1991-1995 Iran-Contras, Yugoslavia and a relationship adrift

The uncertainty following the end of the Cold War was tangible in Europe. A key worry for the Europeans at that time was the risk of a withdrawal of US troops from Europe. The US hegemonic position as security provider for the Europeans following WWII for the Europeans was not as much of a certainty following the end of the Cold War. The question if US protection of Europe would continue following the end of the Cold War was raised and discussed (Lundestad in Andrews (ed.), 2005, pp. 14—16; Calleo, 2008, p. 69). In fact, when the EC members were discussing “the introduction of issues of defence policy into the new Treaty on European Union [i.e. TEU, the Maastricht Treaty], the European capital cities received a letter, drawn up by the US State Department, warning against building up a European defence identity within the EU and containing implicit threats about force withdrawal from the US side.” (Strömvik, 2005, p. 169). This American response to European talks on creating an EU security organisation is indeed noteworthy.

During the uncertain times following the Cold War, a new war broke out in the former Yugoslavia. As the conflict intensified, the Europeans and the US disagreed on how to tackle the situation. This was especially noticeable between 1993 and 1995. Bill Clinton was the new president—preceded by George H. W. Bush—and with the new administration the conflict in the Balkans was framed as a conflict
with an aggressor and another state, Serbia and Bosnia. EU instead attempted to show that the conflict was more complex than the US official way of framing it (Strömvik, 2005, p. 171; Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 32 ff.).

With the two different interpretations of the conflict followed two different ways of tackling it. The separate policies for solving the conflict lead to serious disagreements between EU and the US. The US wanted a more hands-on approach which included limited airstrikes and a lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnian arms imports. This US policy, often called the ‘lift and strike’ policy did not receive any support from the EU. These disputes mainly took place in 1993 (Dumbrell, 2010, p. 270 ff.; Strömvik, 2005, p. 172).

In 1994 the US administration became less patient with the caution the European states displayed in their approach to the conflict. The US asserted a more unilateralist approach to the Yugoslavian crisis, and “conducted, through NATO, five air strikes against Serb positions in early 1994” (Dumbrell, 2010, p. 271). This more decisive approach followed the more consensus seeking approach pursued previously. The approach had been critiqued in the US that the US could and should act rather than seek to do everything together (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 33; Lundestad in Andrews (ed.), 2005, pp. 16 ff.). The situation following the end of the Cold War was unique and power relationships needed to be redefined. The Europeans wanted to act more autonomously but could not achieve what they wanted on their own yet. The US was still needed to ensure security (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 33; Lundestad in Andrews (ed.), 2005, pp. 13 ff.).

The different foreign policy approaches were tangible for the military force as well, with the Europeans perceiving the situation as being placed in more risky missions, adding to the political tension. This was linked to the different approaches to the situation in the Balkans, with the US favouring air attacks over occupation of the ground. The European forces lacked these air strike capabilities in comparison with the capabilities of the US. The European forces therefore mainly contributed to the ground forces instead, which was a better fit to the foreign policy approach of the European governments. With European forces placed on the ground, and doing the force protection missions, the Europeans felt the US placed them more directly at risk (Giergerich & Wallace, 2004, p. 166 ff.).

Returning to the crisis in the Balkans in 1994, the US threatened to no longer be a part of the arms embargo, and tensions between EU and the US were renewed. In 1995, after the US played an increasingly active role in the peace talks, the Dayton peace agreement was finally signed. This marked the temporary end to the transatlantic disputes and disagreements over the Balkans (Dumbrell, 2010, p. 270 ff.; Strömvik, 2005, p. 173). However, the more unilateralist approach by the US to the Balkans in 1994 was in 1995 followed by a more general unilateral foreign policy approach. One reason for the nascent unilateralism was that the US congress was dominated by Republicans (who, as a collective, favoured a less multilateral approach) (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 37; Dumbrell, 2010, p. 269). This change in the approach to foreign policy was presented in the US 1995 National Security Strategy, which is a key US foreign policy document. The 1995 National Security
Strategy stated that the US is “willing to act unilaterally when our national interests are most at stake” (NSS, 1995, p. 7). The EU instead preferred multilateral solutions (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005; Dumbrell, 2010). This difference in approach is a recurring theme of transatlantic tension.

1996-1999 Handling rogue states and the Iraq controversy

The transatlantic tensions that subsided somewhat following the Dayton peace agreement in 1995 arose again in 1996. The rising tension was mainly due to different approaches and policies on handling ‘rogue states’, where the US pursued a tougher, sanctions driven line and the Europeans promoted engagement in order to promote gradual political change (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 38 ff.).

This difference in approach to ‘rogue states’ became a source of serious tension when two American civilian aircraft were shot down outside of Havana, in international airspace. The Americans pushed through the Helms-Burton act in Congress, and Clinton signed the act in March as a response to the downing of the planes. The Helms-Burton act, a federal US law officially known as The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Act of 1996 (Libertad), was meant to tighten the sanctions already in place against Cuba and was an even tighter than before trade embargo. The main focus was on foreign investments (Smis, & Borght, 1999; CNN, no. 1; PBS, no. 1), and thus the act punished European companies doing business in Cuba (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 37). The Helms-Burton act was a piece of extraterritorial legislation, and its legality was disputed by the Europeans. In other words, a US bill was signed into law dictating foreign companies’ investments in Cuba (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 33; Strömvik, 2005, p. 175). The Act relied “on the U.S. position as the world’s most important participant in international economic markets to force foreign companies not to invest or trade with Cuba for fear of sacrificing their trade with the United States” (Smis, & Borght, 1999, p. 229).

Another similar source of transatlantic tension the very same year was how to handle Iran and Libya. The US signed a bill into law, the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (also known as the d’Amato Act, or ILSA), in the summer of 1996, a few months after the Helms-Burton act, aimed at regulating or blocking foreign investments in Libya and Iran, similar to the sanctions towards Cuba. Through the act the President of the US was required to impose sanctions toward any foreign company investing heavily in Iraq or Libya. This extraterritorial legislation was challenged by the Europeans who defied it by taking action within the World Trade Organisation, WTO (NYT, no. 1; Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 37; Smis & Borght, 1999, p. 231 ff.).

The unison EU response to these rather aggressive US foreign policy acts is noteworthy. Together they critiqued the legislation with consensus, and defied it, mainly through actions taken within WTO (Smis & Borght, 1999; Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 39; Strömvik, 2005, p. 174).
The tensions created as a result of the Helms-Burton and D’Amato Acts eased when a deal was made between the US and EU members in May 1998. The agreement of 1998 contained the establishment of a transatlantic partnership which would make political cooperation more effective, as well as “a package relating to the two Acts, by which the United States would limit the impact of certain provisions on European companies and citizens” (Smis, & Borght, 1999, p. 231). The EU, in return, agreed to not pursue any further action in the WTO against the Acts (Smis, & Borght, 1999, p. 231 ff.; Strømvik, p. 175). The Europeans disliked the unilateral approach of the US that the two Acts were testament to, and in the deal struck it was ensured that such future foreign policy actions using economic sanctions were not to be made (Smis, & Borght, 1999, p. 231 ff.).

In this time period, 1996-1999, there were simultaneously other sources straining the transatlantic relationship than the matter of the three ‘rogue states’ above. An important case is the Kosovo crisis that erupted with the Serbian expulsion of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians in 1998. On this issue the US and the EU disagreed on the best foreign policy approach in EU’s close own neighbourhood. The US wanted a much tougher response, again, than the EU was ready to back, and demonstrated a will to lead decisively. The US pursued its tougher policy line of use of force against the Belgrade regime but wanted international support for this policy approach, and eventually the US got the UN to pass Resolution 1199 “which declared the situation a “threat to international peace and security”” (as quoted in Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 35). This resolution, then, legitimized force against the Belgrade regime, and paved the way for NATO forces to act (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 36).

There were further issues straining the transatlantic relationship. The Iraq controversy erupted in 1996 with US missile strikes against ‘tactical targets’ in northern Iraq. The missile strikes were a response to Iraqi military intervening “in an intra-Kurdish dispute in the part of effectively autonomous northern Iraq that had been protected by U.S., U.K., and French air power since the 1991 Gulf war” (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 40). The US decision to strike with cruise missiles in northern Iraq not only affected the transatlantic relationship negatively, but also highlighted a serious divide among the Europeans who failed to rally behind a unified policy response. The military action by the US was denounced by France, but not by the UK and the transatlantic, and intra EU, divide on the Iraq policy was made apparent (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 40 f.). Some analysts note that this may be part of a US strategy to divide EU members to weaken the prospects of a united security cooperation (Jones, 2007, p. 180). Whether or not it was indeed strategy the result was the same. The divide was apparent and its dividing effects were available for all to see.

The change in US foreign policy stance from “assertive multilateralism to nascent unilateralism” (Dumbrell, 2010, p. 269) occurred throughout the 1990s, of which the foreign policy decisions above are testament to, and they were, at least in part, due to the growing relative power of the US. This growth in power worried
the Europeans adding to the tension in the transatlantic relations (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 37 f.).

The growth in power was noticeable within NATO, where the US started to exercise more assertive leadership in NATO. For example, President Clinton pushed for new US identified threats to be included in NATO’s missions, such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and the “development of European defense capabilities better equipped to deal with these new challenges” (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 34). To pursue this goal, the US administration called for a new ‘Strategic Concept’ in 1999 for NATO which would recognize these new types of missions. It also put forward a Defence Capabilities Initiative to integrate European and US forces more, allowing EU forces to be more rapidly deployable. This new agenda the US put forth was met with reluctance by many Europeans who were worried of the military might of the US. The Europeans also considered NATO and the use of force the wrong solution to these ‘new’ challenges. In fact, some were concerned that the US might abuse its military might, which was increasing. The Europeans instead preferred and insisted to work through the UN. The US, however “refused to make Security Council authorization an absolute requirement for military action” (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 35).

NATO and EU have intensified their cooperation (Schleich, 2014). This was institutionalized with the adoption of Berlin-Plus, and over time “[t]he inter-institutional cooperation has developed from parallel structures to more interwoven ones – from ‘interblocking’ to ‘interlocking institutions’.” (Schleich, 2014, p. 198). Despite increased cooperation their relationship is still described by some analysts as an unresolved puzzle, with the future purpose of the two organisations remaining unclear (see e.g. Howorth, 2014).

The years 1991-1999 were, in sum, a period of the US growing in power and military might, and a struggle of how to handle this new political reality, on both sides of the Atlantic. The failure to agree on how to handle Iraq had become a major divisive issue, in fact it had become one of the most divisive issues in the Atlantic alliance. There were several other divisive issues (e.g. over how to handle rogue states), and this increased frequency of transatlantic disagreements is a noteworthy feature of this period.

Additionally, the Europeans were wary of the growing might of the US, and the US wanted to be more autonomous from—less constricted by—her allies, but with a continued strong support from them. This lead to clashes over several foreign policy issues described in the section above.


In the years preceding the Clinton presidency president G. W. Bush led the American government. Bush seemingly had little patience with the EU, as compared with Clinton, and favoured force over trade and careful diplomacy in dealing with rogue states or dictators. This was at odds with how the EU preferred to deal the issues and tension was sparked following the new US agenda of
unilateralism (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 49). In fact, “[i]n the new team’s view, the Clinton administration had too often followed a model of diplomacy [. . .] that unwisely sought to achieve allied, and especially transatlantic, consensus before making important foreign policy decisions. That model, they believed, belonged to a bygone era.” (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 49). This mentality was connected to the increase in relative US power that started following the Cold War (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 49). This mentality is known as the “if you build it, they will come” doctrine. In short it meant that unilateral action by the US was followed by multilateral action (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 49 ff.). In other words, the US set the agenda, pursued their preferred foreign policy action and calculated that the EU would follow. This was provoking for the EU members.

In the midst of this new display of US power projection, the 9/11 attacks occurred. NATO’s article V was invoked, ensuring that EU members of NATO were prepared to meet this attack unified as an alliance together with the US. However, the US reaction to the 9/11 attacks was to lead unilaterally and not to be constricted by the alliance: “In Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s formulation, “the mission needs to define the coalition, and we ought not to think that a coalition should define the mission.” This, Europeans pointed out, was the very opposite of NATO’s founding principle. Former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana [. . .] responded that “the alliance should determine the mission and not vice versa,” and complained that NATO had “invoked its most sacred covenant” and yet was totally ignored by American war planners.” (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 61 f.). This was another show of the new unilateralism and another blow to the Europeans who felt ignored (Andrews in Andrews (ed.), 2009, pp. 256 ff.).

Following the 9/11 attacks, the US become intent on attacking Iraq in 2002. This worried the members of the EU members who continued to feel mistreated and under-appreciated. In the months leading up to the invasion, the US was in “something of a diplomatic war” with Germany and France (Strömvik, 2005, p. 197; do also see Andrews (ed.), 2009). In general, the American US foreign policy was considered simplistic by the Europeans (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 67; Nielsen, 2013, p. 85 ff.). In 2003 the US invaded Iraq, dividing the European governments, with Germany and France remaining in strong opposition to the invasion and the British in a strong alliance with the US (Lundestad in Andrews (ed.), 2005, p. 9).

The invasion of Iraq, the failure to find any weapons of mass destruction, and the problems that followed the invasion haunted the Bush administration and the transatlantic relations (Nielsen, 2013, p. 87).

In short, the already rather poor transatlantic relations deteriorated during the Bush presidency, and went from bad to worse, only to stabilise somewhat toward the later years of the Bush era (Fabbrini & Sicurelli, 2014, p. 41; Nielsen, 2013).

2009-2014: US multilateralism and ‘leading from behind’, the Obama years
The US position following the inauguration of the Obama administration was to encourage the Europeans to take a more prominent role when dealing with crises in the EU’s own backyard (Menon, 2011, p. 75). Obama also made a pledge to improve the transatlantic relations that had been damaged during the previous presidency. Obama was held in high esteem in the European capitals, and was famously awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009. The transatlantic relations had in short been boosted by the change of president and foreign policy approach (Nielsen, 2013, p. 83). The change of president in foreign policy approach has been interpreted as the Americans trying to ‘lead from behind’ (Howorth, 2014, p. 406). This is a distinctly different picture than the one depicted of the GWB-years above, which was more of a ‘we lead, they follow’-approach. The approach by the Obama administration suited the EU-US relations members significantly better with less straining as a result (Nielsen, 2013).

With the change in presidency from Bush to Obama the importance of ‘soft power’ (e.g. international law) was reintroduced as an important tool used to justify the use of ‘hard power’ (e.g. military operations). Diplomacy gained in relative importance for the US administration, with the State Department gaining in relative power vis-à-vis the Defence Department (Fabbri & Sicurelli, 2014, p. 43). Such major institutional changes in the US impacted the Europeans by increasingly including them in talks. Increasing the diplomatic efforts the US also decreased the risk of public confrontation with European allies. This removed strain from the transatlantic relationship.

Although the institutional change and foreign policy stance alleviated stress in the EU-US relations, major international scandals re-stressed the relations. Most notably the information that the US allegedly has spied on several European heads-of-state has again damaged the transatlantic relations.33

All-in-all, the transatlantic relations seem to have improved during the Obama presidency if one looks at the surface. Less public confrontation and clashes over foreign policy matters. However, Nielsen notes that “the relationship’s underlying health is not good and possibly worsening, as ‘drift’ continues and US attention shifts to other parts of the world.” (2013, p. 84). In sum, the state of the relationship is difficult to gauge and looking at what is portrayed out in public may not entail the true health of the relationship.

A brief summary of a relationship adrift

The transatlantic relations between 1991 and 2014 have been in constant flux. It is a special relationship that has been plagued by mistrust, scandals and difficulties to adjust to new political realities. Different strategies have been employed by different presidents, and up until 2001 the US approach can be summed up as

selectively multilateral. Over this time, however, the US’ ability to project power abroad grew, worrying the Europeans who became wary of this new political reality and what it may come to entail. With the election of GWB the selectively multilateral approach changed in 2001, and the years of 2001-2006 were signified by “unequivocal unilateralism” (Fabbrini & Sicurelli, 2014, p. 41; Nielsen, 2013). The Obama administration set the goal to mend the relations, but whether or not this has succeeded on any significant level is contested (Nielsen, 2013).

In sum, the ‘transatlantic drift’, or the tension in the relationship between the US and the EU, did not start with the Bush administration. Rather, it started during the Clinton presidency and during the subsequent presidencies has not been settled, although it seems to have improved, especially since the change of presidency from Bush to Obama. The change of presidency signified a transition to a more multilateral approach in dealing with foreign policy issues, but the health of the relationship is difficult to gauge and a continued transatlantic drift may be ongoing (Nielsen, 2013).
4.4 Timeline
5 Analysis and conclusions

The EU now generates commentary not over whether it is engaged in the use of force but rather over what are the most appropriate forms of military coercive capacity the EU should develop. EU-rose is now a putative military power. (Whitman in Smith (ed.), 2013, p. 44)

The quote from Whitman above, published in 2013, serves well to introduce this analysis. The CSDP has by other analysts been called redundant, ineffective, effectively dead, etcetera. The fact remains, however, that the CSDP is indeed alive and kicking and every subsequent mission it completes further knits the cooperation more tightly together.

In this section of the paper the analysis of the previous chapters—the chronology of the development of the European defence and security cooperation and the transatlantic relations—is presented. The analysis has been avoided in the previous chapters to allow the reader to assess the analysis more independently.

The severity of transatlantic disunity is considered in relation to other periods of disunity. This allows the possibility to point to moments in time where we would expect more or less political will to cooperate among EU member states on a common defence. When there is transatlantic disunity related to international security management we should, according to the theory, expect increased political will among EU members to cooperate on matters of security and defence. This political will is, of course, not observable per se. What is observed is instead the outcomes of this political will—i.e., policy decisions regarding European security cooperation. Political will does not translate directly to decisions, though. The decision making process in the CSDP is governed through consensus, meaning considerable political will is required to reach any decision on change. This means that what the theory predicts will happen (increased political will to cooperate (Strømvik, 2005, p. 146)) may happen without it being observable as too little political will may not lead to a decision; we do not get an observable outcome. This will be taken into account in the analysis.

The analysis will run into other problems. One is the temporal dimension. After how long of the eruption of transatlantic disunity should we expect an EU reaction leading to an increased security cooperation? This problem requires caution when thinking of making any causal claims. It will be tackled with careful and explicit reasoning.

In this section, the chapters are tied together to answer the research question that has guided this paper:

Why do sovereign states cooperate on matters of defence and security when they do not perceive a shared military threat?
In order to answer the research question some recollections of assumptions previously stated are necessary.

Firstly, states are assumed to be influence maximisers and thus only cooperate should they gain influence by doing so.

Secondly, in before cooperating states consider a trade-off where increased cooperation yields less autonomy for the state as an actor.

Thirdly, cooperation is considered a strategy for balancing undertaken in relation to the strongest actor in the international system, the US in this time period.

Fourthly, the political will to cooperate on matters of security and defence increases when the most influential actor in the system, the US, pursues a foreign policy action which the EU member states disagree with.

From the account given in this paper it is obvious that the institutionalized security cooperation has grown over time, that there has been an observable change to the dependent variable. Over time, the trend has been a more autonomous EU, perhaps especially so in the field of international security (see e.g. Calleo, 2008; Nielsen, 2013; Fabbrini & Sicurelli, 2014; Haastrup in Laursen (ed.), 2009, pp. 281 ff). To be more specific, each new iteration of the institutionalized security cooperation—WEU-ESDP-CSDP—has been another step in the direction of a more tightly integrated and capable security and defence cooperation belonging solely to the EU. This development has been underpinned by the various treaties amending the Treaty on the European Union (ToA, ToN, ToL). At the same time, the EU strategies have given the CSDP direction for future operations, with emphasis on the EU acting globally since the 2003 European Security Strategy. The strategies for different parts of Africa previously brought up are clear indicators of this continued direction. The EU is thus intent on acting globally as one with CSDP as a tool in the EU toolbox.

While the cooperation has grown in scope, the road has not been without obstacles. The obstacles to utilizing the CSDP are necessary to bring up as only when they are acknowledged is it possible to appreciate the difficulty facing the cooperation. When considering the CSDP it is crucial to keep in mind that it is a highly political cooperation concerning the sensitive issues of military and defence. In fact, according to Huff it has been a common perception in Brussels that the CSDP is seen as a political instrument and that this hampers the ability to employ the CSDP to tackle sensitive regions, such as the Eastern Neighbourhood (Huff, 2011, p. 5). This may be a part in explaining the inability of the EU to utilize the CSDP in previous conflicts, such as in Libya.

Another important point when discussing the CSDP’s ability to act is brought up by Menon, who claims that the key to understanding the inability of the EU to act within the CSDP framework is to acknowledge that the member states own the EU military policies. It is, according to Menon, to err to look at the failure on a narrow institutional level. Focusing on the institutional framework and its development risks hiding that very fact: member states own their own military policies (Menon, 2011, p. 76 f.). Therefore, success or failure of agreed upon policies depend on the political will demonstrated by the member states. Focusing on the institutions instead “encourages member states to blame the European-level
institutional structures for their own failings” (Menon, 2011, p. 77). This point is adjacent to one brought up by several other analysts; the re-occurring intra-European divisions on a number of issues (Nielsen, 2013, p. 97; Gordon & Shapiro, 2005; Jones, 2007). With differing national preferences comes difficulties to reach a consensus, and the political nature of the CSDP comes to the fore, bringing back the point made by Huff; it becomes difficult to react and utilize the CSDP in politically sensitive regions or conflicts. These points are, however, rather difficult to observe as the failure to reach a consensus means there is no action taken. Huff believes this has been the case, with several potential military operations being dismissed based on either the sensitive nature of the operation or that the will of the EU members is diverging.

All of these obstacles to utilizing the CSDP brought up above are necessary to recognise prior to explaining why the cooperation has developed despite them. By pointing out the difficulties the cooperation has encountered, and the basis for those difficulties, it becomes more of a puzzle that the cooperation was formed, and does in fact function and still continues to grow. The importance of the political will of the member states in overcoming the obstacles above to form the common security and defence project function can probably not be overstated. This brings the transatlantic relations to the fore as the potential catalyst for the security cooperation.

The time period analysed in this paper has shown what seems to be an interdependence between the EU security and defence cooperation and transatlantic relations. When the EU has pushed for an EU unique cooperation, the US has at times welcomed an EU taking greater responsibility for the security in Europe, and at times shrieked at the potential of an unfettered EU with capabilities and political will to act alone (consider the outdrawn talks to reach the Berlin Plus arrangements allowing NATO right of first pick, or the letter drawn up by the State Department sent to capitals in the early 1990s to try and stem talks of a European security organisation). It seems poor transatlantic relations fuels the cooperation, which may feed back into even worse transatlantic relations. Mentioning this, it would seem this means perpetually worsening relations. However, it must not be forgotten that nothing occurs in a vacuum—though it would make studying this relationship much easier. At the same time as the EU-US relations are ever changing, so are other international relations, as well as domestic political factors. These are not accounted for in this paper, making the ordeal of establishing any relationship between transatlanticism and the CSDP even more challenging.

What may be said with certainty is that transatlantic disagreements have been recurring over the entire time period analysed in this paper. The point of time from which this study started was 1991. The transatlantic relations will now be relativized against different points in time, with developments of the CSDP considered at the same time. Taking 1991 as the baseline, the transatlantic relations started out in a poor state. Recollecting the periods of transatlantic disunity they will henceforth be denoted by the US Presidents in office, matching the timeline. The first couple of years of this study were the last years of G. H. W. Bush’s presidency. The transatlantic relations had been severely shook by the Iran-Contrass scandal in the late 1980s, and the Helms-Burton and D’amato acts were to follow—
further placing the EU and US at odds with each other (Smis & Borght, 1999). The talks of creating a European defence organisation were already in swing following the end of the Cold War. Whether the discussions on creating an EU unique security organisation was due to the uncertainties that followed the end of the Cold War, or as a balancing strategy versus the US sparked by the poor relations, is difficult to say. It does seem to have at least been a hedging of European bets, a way to make sure that if the US were to leave the Europeans to fend for themselves in the future, there would be some sort of insurance. It should be noted, however, that with the Cold War in fresh memory, it was plain to see that the Europeans and the Americans did share common values and did stand on the same side, and this notion should not be underestimated (Gordon & Shapiro, 2005, p. 14; see e.g. Toje, 2010 for a discussion on the hedging behaviour). In sum, the years were marked by a clear unilateral US approach, challenging the EU member states, e.g. by imposing global trade regulations. The Europeans continued talks on joining the WEU and the EU, and the Maastricht Treaty is signed in 1992, adding the third pillar of a common foreign policy to the EU cooperation and referencing a common defence policy.

With the election of Clinton the transatlantic relations were immediately improved. The US were in an incredibly strong position following the Cold War and the EU member states were wary of the US dominance of international affairs. Clinton did however appeal to Europeans on a personal level and combined with Clinton’s more multilateral approach to international affairs the relations improved (Dumbrell, 2010; Gordon & Shapiro, 2005). Over time, however, the US wanted to push through foreign policy actions on their terms (e.g. in Kosovo), but clashed with the Europeans, thus making it difficult to maintain the multilateral approach. Clinton became more unilateral as time passed and his patience with the Europeans ran out. Clinton’s appeal with the Europeans faded as well and the relations worsened (Fabbrini & Sicurelli, 2014; Dumbrell, 2010; Gordon & Shapiro, 2005). The Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in 1997, and was a compromise between members who did not want a security cooperation and those who did. It was a part in making the EU militarily operational, and so was another crucial step towards greater cooperation in the field of security and defence (Schleich, 2014). The Europeans then took a major leap forward in the summit of Saint Malo in 1998 where France and the previously reluctant UK famously agreed that the EU should be able to take autonomous action, kick-starting what would become the ESDP (Berenskoetter, 2013). Schleich analysis is straightforward: “[t]he alliance of Great Britain and France in St. Malo lifted the process to a higher level, creating an actor ‘EU’ in security and defence policy during the second phase. It also partially de-blocked the transatlantic rift, quasi forcing the USA to accept ESDP and tying EU and NATO closer to each other.” (Schleich, 2014, p. 199). The case of Saint Malo and the signing of the ToA could well be a case of EU member states cooperating to balance US influence. With a US able to push the US approach in Kosovo, the EU members were probably wary of what the future could hold if US dominance continued unhindered. This case would need to be more heavily researched in this paper, however, in order to say that it was the case. The Clinton years were years of US dominance of international security, and with transatlantic relations that
improved, only to worsen yet again. The EU took major steps towards realizing an EU cooperation on security and defence.

Following Clinton’s presidency G. W. Bush was elected. Bush did not appeal to the Europeans and the transatlantic relations did not improve as a result. With the outspoken unilateral approach the relations actually worsened right off the bat with Bush as the new president (Nielsen, 2013; Fabbrini & Sicurelli, 2014; Dumbrell, 2010; Gordon & Shapiro, 2005). Bush did not have the favourable geopolitical starting conditions Clinton did, however. In fact, Clinton had left some ‘bad poison pills’ behind for Bush to deal with (Nielsen, 2013, p. 86). These ‘poison pills’ were unresolved issues left by Clinton for Bush to pick up, such as the failure to get the Kyoto protocol through the senate, another was withdrawing Clinton’s signature from the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court. Both the ICC and Kyoto protocol were important political issues for the EU, and so failing to meet expected obligations impacted the relations negatively (Nielsen, 2013). In 2001 the Treaty of Nice was signed, which formally created the European Defence Agency. This agency’s purpose was to improve the conditions for a strengthened European security and defence cooperation, such as improving European defence industries. This helped make the EU more autonomous in the field of security and so was another step towards the EU as an autonomous actor in the field of international security (Wivel, 2005; Whitman, 2004).

Still on his first year as president the 9/11 attacks happened. This rallied the Europeans to the Americans’ side as NATO’s article V was invoked, the Europeans were, however, more or less shrugged off by the US. In the wake of the attacks the US unilateral approach became even more noticeable and Bush pushed even harder for a regime overthrow in Iraq. The US also presented their National Security Strategy of 2002 which focused on ‘pre-emptive’ war, which meant preventive war (Nielsen, 2013, p. 87; also see the NSS 2002). In response to the NSS the Europeans presented an EU equivalent, the European Security Strategy, or the ESS. This emphasized the more global direction and role the EU intended to have in the years to come (Toje, 2010).

The US invasion of Iraq was at first blocked by the Europeans in the Security Council, meaning UN support for the invasion was off the table. These clashes over Iraq sparked lots of tension between the EU and the US, but also showed the disunity of the EU member states where some supported the US and some fiercely opposed. The final decision by the US to invade Iraq and failing to find the WMDs further aggravated the situation between the EU and the US, making 2003 the year the relations were at their worst so far of this time period (see e.g. Nielsen 2013; Fabbrini & Sicurelli, 2014; Ratti, 2014, pp. 371 ff.). Following the outdrawn conflict in Iraq, the Bush administration tentatively became more multilateral in its foreign policy approach in 2006 and the transatlantic relations improved. During the Bush era, the EU members launched five military operations, and signed the Treaty of Lisbon which gave significant room for the new CSDP, which further strengthened the cooperation (Menon, 2011). In 2009 president Obama took office. Obama’s appeal to the Europeans was unmistakable, and he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (Nielsen, 2013). Obama’s administration had a greater focus on multilateralism from the start, and the
transatlantic relations improved significantly. Obama also promoted an EU security approach, wanting the Europeans to take greater responsibility for European security (Menon, 2011; Howorth, 2013). Several European security strategies are presented, notably for several regions in Africa. This shows EU’s continued intent to be a global actor with international impact. One new military operation is launched.

The Obama years were signified by improved transatlantic relations. The later years these relations deteriorated, however, when the espionage scandals surfaced.

The transatlantic relations have thus not been poor for the entire time, they have varied. But the underlying health of the relationship seems to have been shaky at best with constant stress being applied to it. However, with values and history shared over the Atlantic the relationship remains strong and oftentimes amicable, though still unhealthy. Foundational trust between the EU and the US seems to be lacking, making future progress on the CSDP project likely, and thus further distancing the EU from US dominance through greater autonomy.

5.1.1 The future of the transatlantic relationship

EU’s relatively recent indecisive actions taken in regards to Libya within the CSDP framework (described above) were considered alarming to the US for several reasons. Firstly, the US was looking for the EU to shoulder a greater responsibility for security issues in the EU’s neighbourhood. Secondly, it was considered alarming for the sake of the security cooperation’s wellbeing (Menon, 2011, p. 76). The inability to do decisively act strengthened the view some US officials held of an EU wanting more autonomy but reluctant to pay the price for it. It was later acknowledged that “in spite of 12 years of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the European countries could not have succeeded without the US’ technical support and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)” (Nielsen, 2013, p. 98).

The US Secretary of Defence of the time, Robert Gates, gave words to US frustration over the European allies’ inability to act and overall contribution to the crisis in Libya. Gates said that ‘[f]uture U.S. political leaders, those for whom the Cold War was not the formative experience it was for me, may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost’ (as quoted in Nielsen, 2013, p. 98).

Considering the complex relationship between France and NATO may be crucial to understand why certain issues, e.g. the currently highly relevant EU Africa policy, are shaped in the manner they are (see e.g. Fabbrini & Sicurelli, 2014). France was a founding member of NATO and has since the early Cold War been a key contributor. France has viewed European defence and NATO as different projects, which is a different view than that of many other European partners (Ratti, 2014, p. 374). France re-entered NATO’s military structures in 2009. This decision to become a full partner again is politically and psychologically important not only for France but for its allies (Ratti, 2014, p. 375).
“Thus, when the French Government decided to include its Africa’s policy in the EU framework, it inevitably did so via the intergovernmental procedure of the CFSP. This might explain the EU’s decision to increase its ESDP operations to support its crisis management initiatives in Africa, thus adding political and military components to the otherwise economic/civilian core of the strategy of structural stability.” (Fabbrini & Sicurelli, 2014, p. 57)

The Africa policy is important to mention in this analysis for several reasons. Firstly, instability and ungoverned spaces in especially the northern parts of Africa pose potential security threats to the EU members. The EU intervention in Libya was an attempt to deal with this. The US have their own reasons, such as combating terrorism, to be present in the same regions. As long as the EU and the US have the same goals and similar strategies, it will likely be a successful co-venture. If the goals or strategies start to diverge, however, it is likely that further steps are taken to improve the CSDP.
6 Conclusions

Nobody is happy with the current situation. A feeling of European free-riding is getting more firmly entrenched on Capitol Hill. Europe is uncomfortable in the role of junior partner; it is not willing to follow any US lead, but cannot very credibly criticise US militarism while simultaneously banking on the security provided by said militarism. (Nielsen, 2013, p. 99)

A recurring point noticeable in the analysis. The states as actors own the CSDP actions and their own foreign policies. This is a case in point for the assumption by Strømvik that states are influence maximisers, and thus act to increase their influence when cooperating on matters of security and defence. Consider the Sahel region, which is important for France for various reasons. This region is also important for due to the security risk they pose as ungoverned space.

Consider the political fallout between the EU and the US. The institutional changes and the official documents on strategy presented by the EU signals that the EU is striving to become more autonomous and more global on issues of international security. Help from the US is still sought as a foundational security vent for the EU. But, in international affairs the EU is signalling its intent to become a more active and autonomous actor. A reminder of the ever changing political relationships and the never changing nature of politics; the importance of relative power and influence.

6.1 Conclusions on the CSDP

The EU military operations conducted within the WEU/ESDP/CSDP frameworks show the implications of the EU goal to be a more global actor (e.g. the European Security Strategy, ESS). The missions have grown considerably in size and the ‘theatre of operations’ has expanded from inside Europe to central countries and regions in Africa. The EU is indeed a global actor, although it still has endemic issues in need of resolve, and its efficiency as a security provider may be discussed. This issue boils down to that unanimous agreement is necessary for any CSDP operations, but there are several other issues plaguing the CSDP (Menon, 2011).

There have been issues with a gap in expectations and capabilities, i.e. that equipment has been lacking. The want in EU capabilities is not necessarily due to a lack of investments by the Europeans, however. In 2006 the EU member states together spent almost a quarter of the global defence spending. The EU members’ spending was the equivalent of 60% of the US defence budget. The EU thus spends considerable amounts on defence, but still finds themselves lacking in capabilities. The main issue is, however, that circa 70% of the land forces of EU member states are not able to operate outside of national territory. The forces instead need to be
able to handle increasingly expeditionary and multinational settings if the CSDP is to be able to handle the set goals (Menon, 2011, p. 80). This is necessary to have in mind as major obstacles still stand in way of an efficient CSDP.

The principle ‘costs lie where they fall’ is the principle guiding actions taken within the CSDP framework. This principle means that those states actually participating in an operation are the ones who will have to pay the costs (Menon, 2011, p. 83 ff.). It is worth mentioning that the UK and France together account for more than 40% of EU defence spending (Menon, 2011, p. 84). In order to become more efficient the cooperation has many obstacles still to overcome. Issues of funding, political will and intentions are all important.

Even when deployed, the forces run into trouble. On such problem is that the forces lack the means to work together seamlessly. Often times the different forces use different systems for communications, different types of combat vehicles (when they use the same vehicles they are often of different configuration which means spare parts aren’t interchangeable), etcetera (Menon, 2011, p. 81). The Treaty of Lisbon tries to tackle the capabilities deficit and the European Defence Agency (EDA) has since 2004 actively attempted to improve European defence capabilities by promoting armaments cooperation and creating a European arms market. Improving capabilities is not the only purpose, however. EDA is also a part of an EU strategy to become more self-sufficient, and thus less dependent on US arms (Menon, 2011, p. 81; Jones, 2007, pp. 159 ff.).

In short, the EU forces are relatively uncoordinated and far from streamlined, causing issues that need to be resolved for the CSDP to become a more stable security organisation. It thus seems a political solution is the necessary remedy, and not merely increased investments or similar quick fixes. Taking the political steps necessary towards improving the CSDP may be less visible, but still important in balancing US influence and improving EU autonomy. With greater EU military capabilities the EU becomes a stronger actor and ally which lessens the burden of securing Europe for the US. The US has asked for the EU to take a greater regional responsibility for security. However, in increasing its capabilities the EU also becomes a more autonomous international actor, able to act in its own interest—which may be at odds with the interests of the US. “CSDP was not designed with the purpose of pleasing the United States and it would be misleading to conclude that there is fruitful coordination, let alone cooperation, between the European Union and NATO. There is not, Berlin-Plus agreements and battlegroups notwithstanding.” (Berenskoetter, 2013, p. 384)

6.2 The next step

The analysis has shown the importance of continued studies of the CSDP and its connection to transatlantic relations in general, but perhaps also shown the importance of analysing the role of the major powers in Europe in the transatlantic relations and the development of the CSDP. It is essential to remember that actions taken within the CSDP construct, veto or approval, are not isolated from other
arenas, such as bilateral relations. Thus, these need to be taken into consideration at the same time. The next step for this study would be to test it against competing theories.

Howorth claims a possible solution to the relationship between the EU and the US is a merger between, or an integration of, NATO and the CSDP. A key element of this solution is that the EU takes on a larger responsibility for security issues in general, and specifically takes on the majority of the heavy duty security work in EU’s backyard (2014, p. 413). Different analysts come to different conclusions. What seems to be a unifying conclusion of CSDP analysts, however, is that the EU needs to be taking a larger share of the security issues in and around Europe. Nielsen’s words of wisdom will end this study:

The literature is almost unanimous in its recommendations for this bargain: Europe taking defence seriously again, ending its free-riding on the USA and becoming a real partner; the USA embracing other means of policy than the military ones, becoming a bit more appreciative of others’ efforts, and just a little less ‘exceptional’ in its way with international institutions. Solutions so deceptively simple have, however, eluded policy-makers for the past 20 years or more. (Nielsen, 2013, p. 103).
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