The Demand for Lobbying in the European Union

A Comparative Study On The European Commission’s and The European Parliament’s Institutional Demands For Lobbying Input

Aida Ida Uhac
Abstract

Lobbying in the European Union (EU) is a highly discussed and disputed phenomena. The main focus on lobbying in the EU is concerned with how and why lobbyists interact with institutional actors, rather than exploring both sides of the occurrence. The aim of this thesis is to explore and compare whether the European Commission and the European Parliament have different demands for lobbying input. The institutional demands is explored through a structured focused comparison, which is built on six interviews including two Swedish Members of the European Parliament (MEP), one assistant to a Swedish MEP, two employees from the Trade Cabinet in the European Commission, one employee from the Transparency Unit at the Secretariat General European Commission and textual material including two speeches held by the Energy Commissioner as well as a seminar regarding MEPs views on lobbying in Brussels. This thesis applies parts of the theoretical framework ”Theory of access” as the dependent variable, were the established type of institutional demands are incorporated. In order to explain the dependent variable, this thesis have added the independent variable of Interdependence. Moreover, it compares the Commission’s and the Parliament’s demands for lobbying input as well as its interdependence to lobbyism respectively. It further conclude that as the Commission and the Parliament is devoted to different constituencies and have different objectives over political considerations, it affects both their type and scope of demands for lobbying input.

Keywords: Institutional demands, Lobbying, European Commission, European Parliament, European Union

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# Table Of Contents

1. Introduction........................................................................................................... 6  
   1.1 Research problem & motivation................................................................. 7  
   1.2 Research question & aim........................................................................... 9  
   1.3 Contributions............................................................................................. 9  
   1.4 Lobbying definition.................................................................................... 10  

2. Previous Research & Theory.............................................................................. 12  
   2.1 Previous Research...................................................................................... 12  
   2.2 Theoretical framework............................................................................... 15  
   2.3 Dependent variable - Bouwen’s Access Goods.......................................... 16  
      2.3.1 The Theory of Access......................................................................... 16  
   2.4 Independent variable - Interdependence................................................... 19  

3. Measuring the Demands for Lobbying Input..................................................... 23  
   3.1 Research design.......................................................................................... 23  
   3.2 Method, data collection & type of analysis............................................... 24  

4. Empirics & Analysis.......................................................................................... 29  
   4.1 The type of demands.................................................................................. 30  
      4.1.1 The European Commission.............................................................. 30  
      4.1.2 The European Parliament............................................................... 39  
      4.1.3 Analytical comparison of demands............................................... 44  
   4.2 The degree of interdependence................................................................. 45  
      4.2.1 The European Commission.............................................................. 46  
      4.2.2 The European Parliament............................................................... 54  
      4.2.3 Analytical comparison on the degree of interdependence.............. 58  
   4.3 The linkage between the Dependent variable and the Independent variable... 60  

5. Conclusion......................................................................................................... 62  

6. Bibliography..................................................................................................... 65  

Appendix I: Interview guide questions................................................................. 70
List Of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>EK</td>
<td>Expert knowledge</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>The European Union</td>
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<td>IDEI</td>
<td>Information about the Domestic Encompassing Interest</td>
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<td>IEEI</td>
<td>Information about the European Encompassing Interest</td>
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<td>MEP</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty of the European Union</td>
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1 Introduction

Lobbying has been present in Brussels since the emergence of the European Union (EU). Networking and interest representation\(^1\) in the EU are decisive for the private sector and civil society all across Europe when it comes to acquiring information and representing interests. Lobbying is an equally important factor for the EU institutions as it contributes to effective political communication (Hague & Harrop 2010: 239). The increasingly comprehensive lobbying that we are witnessing today took off in the 1980-90s. It is claimed that there is a clear link between the increasingly intense lobbying activities which blossomed considerably during the 90’s and the increasingly centralized regulatory function that shifted from member states to the EU institutions’ (Tallberg et al. 2011: 25; Coen 2007: 3). Another reason that is often cited in the literature regarding the increased lobbying in the EU, is the introduction of qualified majority voting on the single market issues (Naurin 2001: 14, 49, 81; Coen 2007: 3). As the EU institutions’ competences increased, it created the need for an information flow from the private sector’s insights into current policy areas affecting the industry. The EU institutions’ enhanced need for input contributed to an openness of the European Commission and the European Parliament, which meant that lobbyists had the opportunity to affect and influence each stage of the policy process (Coen 2007: 3). During this time, the lobbyist input to the EU's institutions has been described as a major contributing factor of relevant and necessary information for the development of EU public policy source of legitimacy to policy-makers (Coen 2007: 3). Lobbying is well established in western politics and both politicians as well as political scientists recognize the benefits and legitimate roles of public and private stakeholders interacting in the policy process (Greenwood & Thomas 1998: 487-488; Coen 2007: 3). Due to the increasing amount of lobbyists in Brussels, the European Commission and the European Parliament have jointly introduced a European Transparency Initiative\(^2\) and Codes of Conduct in order to manage

\(^1\) This thesis uses the terms lobbying and interest representation interchangeably.

\(^2\) The European Commission and the European Parliament have merged in a joint European Transparency Register in 2011 on the basis of an Inter-Institutional Agreement. The Transparency Register is a voluntary system where any interest representation seeking to directly or indirectly influence the EU decision-making process should register (Marko et al. 2014).
the lobbyists’ access (Coen 2007: 4). However, it is argued that these attempts to regulate lobbyists’ access to the institutions, have resulted in a competitive elite pluralist surrounding, meaning that access to decision-makers is restrictive and more competitive (Coen 2007: 4). It is commonly acknowledged that the Commission is in need of policy-relevant information and has due to its understaffing regular external consultation processes within all sectorial policy areas (Richardson 2006: 248-249). According to Article 11 in The Treaty of the European Union (TEU), the Commission is obligated to exchange views with stakeholders when drafting proposals for legislation (Zibold 2013: 3). Due to the Commission’s technical and regulatory functions, it is in need of expert- and technical information which lobbyists willingly supply (Chalmers 2013: 477). It has been argued that:

The informational nature of lobbying is particularly important in the EU, since the different decision-making institutions in the EU actively generate a huge demand for policy relevant information. All of the decision-making bodies in the EU are deeply affected by the conditions of informational asymmetry and rely on lobbyists for a steady supply of policy-relevant information (Chalmers 2011: 475).

It is further identified that the three main EU institutions, i.e., the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, are in need of information for the legislative process (Bouwen 2002a: 8).

1.1 Research problem & motivation

The driving factor for wanting to conduct a study on lobbying in the EU is that there seems to be a difference in the societal perception and the substantial functions of lobbying in relation to the EU institutions. Furthermore, there is much focus on explaining one aspect of the matter, mainly why and how lobbyists interact with decision-makers (supply side), rather than viewing the phenomena of lobbying from both sides as a part of a political system built upon information sharing. There is a theoretical gap in asking the questions why and how the institutional actors (demand-side) interact with lobbyists. A study that explores what motivates the EU institutions to interact with lobbyists (demand side) can contribute to the intelligibility of how the interaction between the actors look.
The research problem of this study is motivated by the absence of information on the "receiving side" or "demand side" of lobbying. Lobbying is something that occurs on a daily basis in communities globally, yet we know very little about how the larger context functions as a whole. We know very much about how lobbyists operate, nevertheless very little about what the institutional actors’ role in the phenomenon of lobbying is. Simply stated, lobbying comprises at least two parties, namely the one or more that lobby, and one or more that is lobbied. The mainstream rendering of lobbying is portrayed as a single sided occurrence, with lobbyists constantly projecting to the other party who eagerly receives what is given. However, lobbying can be seen as a phenomenon of exchange that benefits both parties. So, what is the institutional gain of this relationship and what are the different demands for input? The EU is a system whose structure is constructed in a way that requires external input in order to maintain functionality. However, both in social science and in society, lobbying is regarded as not desirable and related to undemocratic issues. The debate encompassing lobbying is continuously revolving around how lobbyists’ are forcing themselves on public authorities, exerting influence over politicians, officials and policy proposals, its negative affect on public interests and how it is a cause of issues regarding democratic deficit and the legitimacy of the EU (Naurin 2001: 49, 89; Foeurope.org 2013: 1; Tallberg et al. 2011: 77). The overall image, suggesting that lobbying is a profound problem in our society does not correlate with the facts of the regular contact that occurs between the parties. The dichotomy of arguments surrounding the discourse on lobbying in the EU makes it difficult to foresee how the two non-overlapping parts actually are interrelated and functioning in daily practice. The importance of information is a recognized factor to why lobbyists’ and the EU institutions interact. As mentioned above, the Commission is obliged to interact with stakeholders when initiating legislation in order to be well informed and to prevent undesirable outcomes. The choice of comparing the European Commission’s and the European Parliament’s needs and demands for lobby input with excluding the Council of Ministers is based on the consideration that the Commission and the Parliament have agreed upon a joint Transparency register. Therefore, their basis for interacting with lobbyists’ is harmonized and established on a joint structure based on equal starting points.
1.2 Research question & aim

Accordingly, the research questions are as follows:

What are the European Commission’s and the European Parliament’s different demands for lobbying input? How can it be discerned, and Why does it differ?

With these research questions as a guideline, the aim of this thesis is to explore and compare whether the Commission and the Parliament have different needs and demands for lobbying input. It will do so through a structured focused comparison, which is built on six interviews including two Swedish Members of the European Parliament (MEP), one assistant to a Swedish MEP, two employees from the Trade Cabinet of the European Commission, one employee from the Transparency Unit at the Secretariat General European Commission and textual material including two speeches held by the Energy Commissioner as well as a seminar regarding MEPs views on lobbying in Brussels. With the mentioned sources as a basis, this thesis will examine and compare whether the Commission’s and the Parliament’s demands for lobbyist input differ.

1.3 Contributions

This study aims to contribute with findings to help fill the theoretical gap of knowledge regarding the demand-side of lobbying in the EU. From a scientific perspective, the study can be motivated by arguing that the majority of previous research focuses on the supply side of lobbying (among many see, Chalmers 2011, 2013; Balosin 2009; Eising 2007; Klüver 2012). It often portrays lobbying as having a negative impact on democracy and as an infiltrator in the corridors of power that possesses excessive influence. Since the discourse revolving around lobbying is mainly supply side focused and concerned with how they influence the democratic system, there are clear motives to conduct a study that focuses on what and why the Commission and the Parliament types of demand. From an empirical perspective, it is of value to conduct a study that highlights the institutional demands for lobbying in order to
increase the overall picture of lobbyism role in the multi-level system of governance that the EU encompasses. The thesis' aims to contribute with information and knowledge regarding why and how institutional actors from the Commission and the Parliament need and desire to interact with lobbyists.

1.4 Lobbying definition

The meaning of the concept lobbying is highly disputed. The comprehensive uncertainty on what the term lobbying actually means is evident for those who desire to study the field is acquainted by. Due to the high uncertainty of what this term means, includes and actually stands for, this section will present a few ideas around the concept to demonstrate the most common definitions of the term, but also to highlight how the variation can be depicted.

The political scientists Baumgartner and Leech made a literature review on lobbying and stated that the “word 'lobbying' has seldom been used the same way twice by those studying the topic” (Baumgartner and Leech 1998: 33). Chalmers identifies eleven different types of interest group representation in the EU, which are; professional associations, companies, law firms, public affairs consultancies, chambers of commerce, academic organizations, trade unions, Non-Governmental Organization’s (NGO) and associations of NGO’s, representatives of religions, churches and communities of conviction, think-thanks and public authorities like regions cities and municipalities (Chalmers 2011: 473). Chalmers defines interests groups as ”any group that seeks to influence the policy-making process but does not seek to be elected” (Chalmers 2011: 476). Balosin defines a lobbyist as ”persons that are neither government officials nor politicians within the European Parliament or Commission, who try to influence the decision-making processes in the EU” (Balosin 2009: 1181). She argues for a broad definition that is not excluding those who are not working as professional lobbyists but who are nevertheless active lobbyists, i.e., members of think-thanks etc (Balosin 2009: 1181). The term 'Professional lobbyists’ is referring to those who are working full-time for clients, i.e., consultants and lawyers.

In a library briefing of the European Parliament, it is stated that the Council of Europe recognizes lobbying as "a concerted effort to influence policy formulation and decision-
making with a view to obtaining some designated result from government authorities and
elected representatives” (Zibold 2013: 1). This could be interpreted in a wider sense as well as
in a more restrictive sense. In a wider sense, this definition on the term “lobbying” could refer
to public actions such as demonstrations as well as public affairs activities carried out by
consultancies, think-thanks, advocacy groups, lawyers etc (Zibold 2013: 1). However, in a
more restrictive way, the term “lobbying” is then referring to the protection of the corporate
lobbying’s economic interests based on a national or global arena (Zibold 2013: 1). The
Parliament is communicating a concern regarding the fact that a precise definition of
lobbying is non-existing (Zibold 2013: 1). Due to the variating range of very narrow to very
wide understandings of what lobbying professions include, there is a lack of consensus
regarding what the term “lobbying” in fact means (OECD 2012: 22; Zibold 2013: 1). This
thesis will utilize all the above-mentioned definitions as the basis for this thesis understanding
on the concept of lobbying. This choice was made in order to avoid the risk of excluding, but
rather in order to broadly include.
2 Previous Research & Theory

2.1 Previous Research

Lobbying is often associated with both corruption as well as being a recognized supplier of information. The most frequent research problem in previous research focuses on answering questions similar to: 'How much influence do interest groups have over politics in the EU?', 'Are some interest groups more influential than others?', or 'What resources and strategic approaches provide the best conditions for influence in the EU?'. These perspectives have the aim to explain the functions and activities of lobbying and the process of influencing decision-makers. This implies that the main focus is on how lobbyists are working, developing strategies and collecting as well as projecting information in order to be able to participate in the policy process and influence decision-makers in various policy areas. Research on what the demand side of the interaction between lobbyists and policy-makers comprises, is much less explored. A strong focus on what lobbyists supply role in the political system resembles is interesting and important to enhance our understanding of how the dynamic between interest representation and public sector looks and operates in our society. The section on previous research will therefore be organized by three different research approaches, namely the general negative outlook on lobbying, the dominating supply side research and finally the positive supply side outlook on lobbying.

Previous research that perceives lobbying as a problem related to democratic matters have raised perspectives such as the Weberian notion of power: "The opportunity to impose one’s will in a social relationship, even against resistance, without consideration to what opportunity rests on" (Chalmers 2011: 474). Robert Dahl's interpretation has a pluralistic view on power and clarifies Weber's notion of power further: "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do" (Dahl 1957: 203). There is also the perception of influence as the power over outcomes, meaning that lobbying is exerting power when the policy outcome is close to their ideal points (Dür & Bièvre 2007: 3). Previous research in line with these perspectives also suggest that various lobbying interests
are not evenly represented (Tallberg et al. 2011: 25; Klüver 2012: 494; Chalmers 2011: 473; Eising 2007: 390; Naurin 2001: 88). Previous research on lobbying in the EU has described the EU system as both a pluralistic and corporatist (Tallberg et al. 2011: 27). The EU as a pluralistic system is characterized by an openness in the political institutions, where there is a wide range of lobbying interests which compete to be able to represent the same kind of interests (Tallberg et al. 2011: 26-27). The EU as a corporatist system is in contrast to a pluralistic system, only selectively open to a hand full of interests which alone represent their interests (Tallberg et al. 2011: 26-27). Several approaches to lobbying tend to raise the elite pluralism argument regarding lobbying in the EU, which implies that certain lobbying interests have privileged access to the policy-making process whereas others are systematically excluded (Chalmers 2011: 473; Tallberg et al. 2011: 25).

The theoretical use of the elite pluralism approach as an explanation on how lobbying in the EU is functioning, often highlights the perspective of lobbyists participation in the EU policy making as restricted to a limited number of policy actors, which makes the process of whom to include very competitive (Naurin 2001: 29; Coen 1997). This approach is nourished by arguments stating that it is due to the EU’s multi-level system with strong elements of power-sharing between the institutions, which have contributed to its pluralistic characteristics (Tallberg et al. 2011: 91-92). Others have highlighted the institutionalized relationships between certain lobbyists and the EU institutions, such as the EU social dialogue, and therefore stresses the EU system to be more corporatist (Falkner 1998: 187-188). Categorizations of lobbyists as framers, argue that the majority of the lobbyists’ time is spent on convincing stakeholders that a certain issue should be seen in a separate matter (Baumgartner 2007: 485). This implies that lobbyists’ attempt to diffuse the various possible dimensions of directions that public authorities could take due to their own interests, in order for the procedure of policy to be in line with their aim (Baumgartner 2007: 485, 486). There are arguments stating that the lobbying profession and the actual word “lobbying” has a negative connotation due to the mass-media’s great myths of lobbying which reads as follows; ”The legislator is dominated by the lobbyist, money is the key of lobbying, industry destroys NGOs, corruption increases because of lobbyism” (Balosin 2009: 1181).

This perspective focuses on characterizing and improving the understanding of how lobbyists are working towards political objectives and what the underlying intentions for
contact politicians are. There is moreover a strong focus of emphasizing under which conditions that lobbyists have more or less influence in the policy process (Naurin 2001: 90-92). Broadly speaking, it is concerned with increasing the understanding of how lobbyists operate in the light of influencing public policies, how it can be depicted from various supply-side perspectives and what the purpose of lobbying is. It is concerned with how lobbyists assemble and process information, but also how they pursue the actual representation of interests (Chalmers 2011). These are usually based on case studies and conducted in a very detailed manner. It is argued that the currency of lobbying in the EU is information (Chalmers 2011: 471, 475; Chalmers 2013). Information as a form of currency shapes lobbyists organizational culture, their behavior and their daily work, since any adjustment to the needs of policymakers can benefit them in the final stage of the process, i.e., information sets the tone of how lobbyists interact with EU decision-makers (Chalmers 2013: 39). While decision-makers receive vital information needed for policy-making, the lobbyists’ returned favor is a legitimate access to the EU’s institutions and the policy making process with the chance of being listened to (Chalmers 2013: 39). The lobbyists supply decision-makers with needed information in return for legitimate access to the policy making process. Access can be seen as a function of the informational needs of decision-makers (Chalmers 2013: 40). This further means that lobbyists that share information with those decision-makers who value it the most, can also gain more influence through increased access. Balosin argues that the success of EU lobbying is due to the EU being a consensus oriented governance that strives for a coherent long-term policy development (Balosin 2009: 1180). She further argues that there is a weakness of the EU’s institutional system as a multi-level governance and to its existing political parties, which makes the access of private interest uncomplicated and effective to take part in and influence the policy process (Balosin 2009: 1180). This implies that lobbying interests possess a significant and unique role in the policy-making process, since the EU is increasingly in need of information on complex issues requiring expertise knowledge, which lobbyists can provide (Balosin 2009: 1180). Due to the easy access, lobbyists can highlight their interests while providing the EU decision-makers with desired technical information, meaning that the relationship is based on a win-win deal, since the lobbyists get to raise their interests and the EU institutions receives the information needed without having to work for it (Balosin 2009: 1180).
Positive supply side views on lobbying argue that lobbying is concerned with the exchange of information between lobbyists and understaffed decision-makers (Chalmers 2011: 474), and that the EU decision-makers and officials would not function without lobbyists, since it would be hard for the institutions to conduct public business without lobbyists (OECD 2012: 27). Lobbyists represent interests and can be viewed as an important function in a democratic governance, since it provides the EU decision-makers with policy-relevant information and expertise on any given matter, which secures procedures and processes for further development (OECD 2012: 27). Bouwen argues that the degree to which some lobbyists can participate in the policy process and the degree to which they have gained access to the institutions is dependent on their ability to provide the decision-makers with policy relevant information (Bouwen 2004: 341). Lobbyists fulfill a function that usually goes unnoticed. While lobbyists supply decision-makers with scientific data or public opinions, they are also informing their employers or clients regarding the actions of governmental authorities, which is consequential in regard to holding decision-makers accountable and oblige to effectuate compliance with the law (OECD 2012: 27).

2.2 Theoretical framework

The research field of lobbying in the EU has been and can be theorized through a variation of perspectives and theories, depending on which approach and level of analysis one wishes to achieve. The diversity of theoretical approaches highlight various actors' role, function and the interaction in progress between the actors involved. Furthermore, the choice of theory is decisive for what the study concentrates on, and what is regarded as important to convey in the study. There are a number of well-developed theories and perspectives that will not be addressed in this thesis as these will not act as a means to highlight the desired, i.e., what the Commission and the Parliaments demands for lobbying input are. The theoretical framework of this thesis which will assist to further explore and explain the Commission’s and the Parliament's demands for lobbying input is the "Theory of access". Parts of this theoretical framework will function as the dependent variable. It will be explained through the independent variable which the author of this thesis has added in order to build on the theory of access. The independent variable is the degree of interdependence. This will further be
analyzed through interviews and textual material, in order to compare the units of analysis, i.e., the Commission and the Parliament.

2.3 Dependent variable - Bouwen’s Access Goods

This thesis has its starting point in examining the dependent variable, which is different types of institutional demands for lobbying input. The focus of this thesis is therefore on the various institutional demands for lobbying input and will thus not be problematize further into how these demands for input are fulfilled, since that is beyond the scope of this thesis. The theoretical framework of ”Theory of Access” has determined and identified three types of access goods, i.e., institutional demands that vary between the Commission and the Parliament. These institutional demands will be incorporated as this thesis dependent variable and will function as the base of established institutional demands. They will be measured, but also further explained, since the identified demands are linked to the specific case of the legislative process in the EU.

2.3.1 The Theory of Access

Pieter Bouwen has extended the range of exchange theories with his addition of ”Theory of access”. The theory of access, also called the logic of access, is developed in order to explain and increase the understanding of the interaction and exchange that occur between lobbying actors and the actors within the three main EU institutions, i.e., the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers (Bouwen 2002, 2004). It provides a theoretical framework to measure the degree of access that lobbying representation has to the EU institutions in terms of a theory of the supply and demand of access goods (Bouwen 2004: 340). Access goods is referring to information that is vital in the EU policy-making process (Bouwen 2004: 337). According to this theory, lobbyists are obliged to supply the EU institutions with certain goods in return for legitimate access to the EU agenda setting and policy-making process (Bouwen 2004: 337). For lobbyists to gain access to the policy-making process, it has to provide the ”access goods” (information) demanded by the institution in which they want to play a part (Bouwen 2002: 369). Bouwen’s
theoretical framework is developed and conducted in order to answer the question; "What determines the degree of access of lobbyists to the European institutions?" (Bouwen 2002a). Bouwen argues that these access goods are a vital part of understanding the exchange relation between lobbyists and the EU institutions (Bouwen 2002a: 9). Bouwen is concerned with different organizational forms of lobbying in regard to their degree of access to the three main EU institutions. Bouwen’s research has much focus on the supply side of lobbying which is not of interest in this thesis. However, he address and has determined three institutional demands for lobbying input. The theoretical framework has identified variables of institutional demands which lobbyists supply, in order to further understand the interaction between lobbying and public actors. This thesis does not intend to include Bouwen’s supply variable explaining the lobbyist degree of access, since the aim is to further explain as well as compare the Commission and the Parliament institutional demands. However, Bouwen’s results regarding the institutional demands will be incorporated in this thesis dependent variable in order to further explore what the Commission and the Parliament demands for lobbying input are, as well as explain why they differ. Bouwen’s research and theoretical framework is concerned with EU legislative lobbying (2002a), which implies that the determined factors of institutional demands are set in relation to the legislative process. Three access goods are identified, and concern three different kinds of information that the EU institutions\(^3\) demand from lobbying stakeholders in relation to the legislative process. Bouwen’s identified access goods which in this thesis will be used as the basis for this thesis dependent variable, i.e., type of demands are as follows:

**Expert Knowledge (EK)**

This access good concerns the expertise and technical know-how needed from lobbyists in order to understand the potential policy outcomes. This kind of information is important for the development of effective EU legislation in a various policy areas (Bouwen, 2002a: 8). According to Bouwen, this kind of information is mainly demanded by the Commission, due to its supranational status and its central position in the EU legislative process as well as its understaffing, it is in great need of expertise knowledge (Bouwen 2002a: 14-15).

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\(^3\) The demands of the Council of Ministers is excluded, since it is not an object of research that will be examined in this thesis.
**Information about the European Encompassing Interest (IEEI)**

This access good concerns the information needed from lobbyists about the European encompassing interest. The European encompassing interests concerns the interests of various sectors in the European economic arena, i.e., the internal market (Bouwen 2002a: 8). According to Bouwen, this type of information is also important for the Commission, in order to push Member States to accept policies beyond intergovernmental and to be able to act as a promoter of European interests, it needs to know what the common European interests are (Bouwen 2002a: 14-15). Bouwen further argues that this type of information is also important for the Parliament, since it has to evaluate the Commission’s legislative proposals from a European perspective (Bouwen 2002a: 14). This type of input provides the Parliament with information about the interests of European stakeholders (Bouwen 2002a: 14).

**Information about the Domestic Encompassing Interest (IDEI)**

This access good is the information about the domestic encompassing interest needed from lobbyists. The domestic encompassing interests can be defined as the needs and interests of various sectors in the domestic market (Bouwen 2002a: 8). According to Bouwen, this information is vital for MEPs since they are elected at national level and need to know the preferences of their voters in order to increase their chances for re-election (Bouwen 2002a: 14).

These three institutional demands will function as operationalizations of the dependent variable, meaning that these factors will act as the basis for comparing the Commission’s and the Parliament’s various demands for lobbying input. This thesis will use Bouwen’s determined factors of institutional demands as a basis for measuring whether there are other institutional demands which have not been addressed. Since Bouwen’s discoveries on various institutional demands are directly linked to the legislative process, there is given space to further investigate whether there are other demands which are not the same as those linked to the legislative process.
2.4 Independent variable - Interdependence

In order to build on Bouwen’s theory this thesis will add another variable, the independent variable of interdependence. Since Bouwen’s theory of access mainly focuses on the supply side of lobbying, this thesis will build on Bouwen’s theory in order to explain the dependent variable. The assumption is that different factors of interdependence can demonstrate higher or lower demands for lobbying input and therefore answer the research questions of how the demands can be discerned, and why it differs. In order to answer these research questions, the independent variable will include three indicators of interdependency which the author of this thesis has determined to be: mutual exchange, resource dependence and organizational structure. Bouwen has determined that there are institutional demands as well as a variation within these, however the author of this thesis desire to find out why this is the case and whether there are other institutional demands which has not been addressed. Bouwen’s identified differences have created incentives for further examining why the scope of institutional demands for lobbying input differs. The dependent variables of institutional demands as well as the scope of demands will be explained by the degree of interdependency, which intends to help explain why there is a difference of demands between the Commission and the Parliament as well as why there is a difference in high or low degrees of demands. The degree of interdependence, will be able to say more about how the use of lobbyism can look different. It is intended to demonstrate that in cases where the various indicators of interdependence are met, it will have an impact on how much demands are requested and to what extent they are necessary. This will be further examined by testing a hypothesis which the author of this thesis have developed in order to link the independent and dependent variable; The higher the degree of interdependence between lobbyists and EU decision-makers/officials, the more institutional demands for lobbying input.

The three indicators for interdependence that will function as the operationalization in order to indicate a higher or lower degree of interdependence during interview sessions includes the following.

**Mutual exchange**

This indicator means that the interacting actors exchange services, information or other things on a frequent basis. This will be measured by asking the interviewees of the frequency
that they meet with lobbyists through both informal and formal forums in order to exchange goods which one actor has and the other one needs. When there is a frequent contact characterized by exchanging goods, it is argued that the relationship is a mutual exchange. Frequent contact requires three times a week. The regular contact can facilitate the demand of input easier as the availability increases. This indicator will be measured by examining and ask how often the interviewees meet with lobbyists, in what form they meet, i.e., informal/formal and whether the purpose of frequent meetings are to exchange goods.

Resource dependence

This indicator implies that institutional actors are dependent on the resources which lobbyists possesses. This may for example mean that institutional actors need lobbyists resources in order to have enough basis to be able to legislate, to have the necessary information regarding current issues, in order to improve the business within the European internal market and the access to markets outside the EU, etc. Resource dependency is assumed to imply that the scope of demands increases. This indicator will be measured by asking how often goods are demanded and how important these are in relation to how it affects their ability to carry out the work as well as how vital the requested resources are for the functioning of their work duties.

Organizational Structure

The author of this thesis argues that organizational structure can function as an indicator of interdependence. By examining whether the institutional actors’ working structure is constructed in a way that makes them dependent on lobbying input, one can see whether this affect higher or lower degrees on type of demands. It may for example be that as the EU’s areas of competence increase, the need to be informed increases to a greater extent, which leads to more type of demands. This can also be linked to the fact that the Commission is a relatively small and understaffed institution in relation to what its expected to perform and is therefore in need of input. It could also be linked to MEPs membership in various parliamentarian committees, which might affect their scope of demanded input. Organizational structure as an indicator of interdependence will be measured by asking interviewees to explain why the lobbying input is demanded in relation to their work tasks.
It is argued that in order to understand the activities of lobbying in the EU, one has to discern the relationship between lobbyists and decision-makers as an exchange relation between two interdependent actors (Bouwen 2002a: 7). Bouwen highlights the EU institutions enthusiasm to interact with lobbyist as a response of needing to have close contact in order to fulfill their institutional work (ibid). The exchange theories developed by sociologists in the 60s, argued that the interaction between private and public actors could be understood as a sequence of inter-organizational exchanges (ibid). The understanding of lobbyists and public actors interaction as a mutual exchange is also found in resource dependency theories. These approaches stress the importance of an understanding that organizations need to exchange resources (ibid). Resource dependency focuses on the interdependency between the interacting organizations and suggests that organizations cannot be self-reliant since they require resources from their surroundings and therefore need to interact with those who possesses the resources that are needed (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 258). Pfeffer and Salancik argue that "interdependence is important to an organization because of the impact it has on the ability of the organization to achieve its desired outcomes" (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 41). Furthermore, it is argued that the decisive importance of a resource needed by an organization, lies in the comprehensiveness to which the organization requires the specific resource to be able to fulfill its duties (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 46–47). In relation to the EU policy process, lobbyists and decision-makers become interdependent for the reason that they need resources from each other in order to function (Bouwen 2002a: 7). The activities of organizations such as the EU will always involve exchanges with other actors. It might involve monetary or physical resources, information or social legitimacy. Since organizations are not independent or self-sufficient, they depend on the external actors to provide relevant resources and support (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 43).

This thesis argues that the degree and types of demands, can be explained and discerned by the level of interdependency between the lobbyists and the Commission and Parliament respectively. The form of exchange between lobbyists and the Commission and the Parliament can determine the degree of how much demands there is. It is assumed that the higher the degree of interdependence, the more institutional demands for lobbying input. The degree of interdependence can also help to explain the type of demands by explaining how the use of lobbying can look differently. The level of interdependency will be measured through conducting interviews with two MEPs, one assistant to a Swedish MEP, as well as
three employees from the Commission, where the answers will act as empirics of institutional demands and their interdependence to lobbying stakeholders. Bouwen’s variables of EK, IEEI and IDEI\(^4\) will act as determined types of demands of the Commission and the Parliament. The conducted interviews and textual material will function as the empirics to the dependent variable, “Type of Demands” which will be categorized by the Commission and the Parliament respectively, as well as the interviewees degree of interdependence and how this affect their demands which also will be categorized by the Commission and the Parliament respectively.

\(^4\) EK - Expert Knowledge
IEEI - Information on the European Encompassing Interest
IDEI - Information on the Domestic Encompassing Interest
3 Measuring The Demands For Lobbying Input

3.1 Research Design

Up until now, this thesis has presented its aim and motivation, the previous research within the field as well as the theoretical framework of this thesis. This chapter will focus on the methodology of this thesis as well as the build up for the coming analysis of empirics. As this thesis main objective is to further explain and compare whether the Commission and the Parliament demands for lobbying input varies in different aspects, the analysis will be characterized by comparative method. The main feature of this thesis is that it is based on qualitative aspects which is suitable since the purpose of the study is to compare, depict and describe the essential of a particular social phenomenon and how it is constituted in depth. The qualitative characteristics will be the basis for how this study regard and focuses on open versatile empiricism. The research process is inductive, meaning that it is the observations and the collected material which will form the basis for being able to present explanations and reasoning about the research aim (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 115-116). Qualitative method will be used for the purpose to describe, explain and interpret the research problem, which further will be compared and analyzed. In qualitative studies it is assumed that reality can be perceived in many different ways which implies that there is no absolute and objective truth (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 19-20). The qualitative method is also used in exploratory research, i.e., when you know very little in advance of the phenomenon or issue, which is in line with this thesis starting point and research objective (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 193). The purpose of this qualitative study is to get as broad and accurate a description as possible of the Commission’s and the Parliament’s needs and demands of lobbying input.
3.2 Method, data collection & type of analysis

In order to detect the Commission’s and the Parliament’s various kinds of institutional demands for lobbying input, this thesis method will be a structured focused comparison, which is built on six interviews including two Swedish MEPs, one assistant to a Swedish MEP, two employees from the Trade Cabinet of the Commission, one employee from the Transparency Unit at the Secretariat General European Commission and textual material including two speeches held by the Energy Commissioner as well as a seminar regarding MEPs views on lobbying in Brussels. The thesis units’ of analysis is the Commission and the Parliament. These units will be examined in order to operationalize the variables. The Commission and the Parliament will be the objectives under examination in order to identify the linkage between the dependent and the independent variable. The units of analysis is the study objectives that will help discover empirical findings which will cover insights from both the dependent and the independent variable.

An interview requests was sent out to a total of thirty persons, including 10 Swedish MEPs, one former assistant to a former swedish MEP which the author of this thesis was referred to, seven Commissioners and twelve members of two Commissioners teams. The selection of MEPs is based on a recommendation given through a conversation the author had with Europe Direct, who urged her to contact Swedish MEPs because they are generally susceptible to set up interviews. The selection from the Commission is based on the fields which in they work. By reading much on lobbying in general and on specific case studies, it is noticeable that certain fields such as, environment, agriculture, trade and energy is more likely to accommodate with lobbying interests since their course of action affects lobbying stakeholders vastly. It is thus more likely to have greater opportunity to depict different demands for input within these areas. Therefore the Commissioners within the areas of trade, energy, climate action and energy, agriculture and rural development and health and food safety were asked to participate in interviews. The twelve officials from the two Commissioners teams were selected on the basis of availability. Many Commissioners team information does not refer to any further contact information, but rather to one email address or to one phone number, which is covering the whole Cabinet. The twelve selected team members which had available contact information are working within the teams for Trade
Commissioner Mrs Cecilia Malmström (Sweden) and Agriculture and rural development Commissioner Mr Phil Hogan (United Kingdom).

The selected interviewees were kindly asked to choose to participate through either a telephone interview, Skype interview or to answer and submit the interview questions via email. The interview consists of thirteen questions. There are pros and cons of using different types of interview methods. The advantage of carrying out the interviews through telephone or Skype is that it function as a conversation, which allows the opportunity to address further questions, issues etc. The cons of carrying out interviews through email lies in the fact that misunderstandings of concepts or questions may occur easily than in conversational interviews. The different types of interview options were included in hope of raising the participation rate and in order for the interviewees to be able to choose the interview option which suited them the best. The response rate of the requested interviews have been perceived as somewhat low as only six out of thirty persons participated.

The Interviewees

The interviewees consist of three employees from the Commission, two Swedish MEPs and one assistant to a Swedish MEP. The first interview from the Commission was conducted with Mrs Jolana Mungengová that operates as policy assistant to Trade Commissioner Mrs Cecilia Malmström. The second interview from the Commission was conducted with Mr Miguel Ceballos Barón which operates as Deputy Head of Cabinet under Trade Commissioner Mrs Cecilia Malmström’s office. The third interview from the Commission was conducted with Mr Martin Ohridski who is a Policy Officer at the Transparency Unit at the Secretariat General in the European Commission. Mr Ohridski works with the management of the joint Transparency register which is managed together with colleges from the European Parliament and with wider transparency issues related to the Commission. All the interviewees from the Commission were conducted via telephone. Mr Lars Adaktusson is a Swedish Christian Democrat in the parliamentarian group of European Peoples’ Party. The interview with Mr Adaktusson was conducted by email, which turned out to provide somewhat shorter, but direct and clear answers to the questions asked. Mrs Malin Björk is a Swedish politician in the Left party and a Member in the parliamentarian Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left. This interview was also conducted through email. However, unlike the email interview with Mr Adaktusson, this interview provided
longer and more detailed answers to the questions asked. The third interview from the Parliament was conducted by email with Mrs Dalia Lahdo who works as an accredited parliamentary assistant to Mrs Bodil Ceballos who is a Swedish politician in the Green party and a Member of the Parliamentarian Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance.

The selection of interviewees and its various positions within the Commission and the Parliament are assumed to detect different types of demands for lobbying input. As the Commission and the Parliament functions differ, it is possible that their type of demands for input also differ. The Commission is devoted to represent the general European interest and are divided into specific policy departments, which possibly means that the interviewees from the Commission has specific needs depending on which Cabinet or DG they are positioned in. The Parliament, on the other hand, is intended to represent the people, i.e., the civil society in the EU. However, as they are elected at national level, they have an obligation to pursue the issues that exist with their national political party which citizens voted as important. This means that MEPs are active and engaged in parliamentary committees that drive development in areas that pleases their own and the national party's agendas. This means that the interviewed from the Parliament may have different demands for lobbying input depending on which party they represent and what committees they are members of. The answers to this thesis research questions will naturally be affected by the fact that the interviewed from the Parliament are either Swedish politician or representative of a Swedish politician, and that two of the interviewees from the Commission are colleagues within the trade cabinet and that the third interviewee from the Commission is working within the Transparency Unit. A wider variety of MEPs from different countries, as well as a wider selection of employees from the Commission’s various departments would have contributed with a larger scope of empirical data on institutional demands for lobbying input.

As the six interviews were conducted using different methods, there is a discrepancy of whether the interviewees had the opportunity to develop their responses. As the interviewees who participated through a telephone interview had the opportunity to question the meaning of certain enquiries or to develop the questions further through discussion, there were not any obstacles in the implementation of this method. However, those who participated in an interview by answering the questions in writing through email, did not to the same extent, have the opportunity to get further clarity of the questions asked, which presupposes that the
questions are clear and easy to understand. Examples of uncertainties regarding the clarity of the questions stems from peoples’ perception and interpretation of concepts, such as: lobbyist, institutional demands and interdependency in various ways. The notion of demands, can certainly be interpreted in different ways. Within academia one could for example, associate this in relation to theory-based relations of supply and demand as opposed to those who are active in the EU institutions, which could possibly link this to presuming on others assets. In order to overcome the possibility of misunderstandings, a definition of lobbying and institutional demands was provided in the questionnaire. The aforementioned difficulties with email interviews were not an issue during the conducted email interviews.

*Textual Material for Analysis*

The text material that will be analyzed combined with the three interviews from the Commission, are two speeches held by Energy Commissioner Mr Maroš Šefčovič. Due to Commissioner Mr Šefčovič former position as responsible of Inter-institutional Relations and Administration, he frequently held speeches and made statements regarding the conditions of lobbying in the EU. Mr Šefčovič was kindly asked to participate in an interview, but could unfortunately not participate due to lack of time. Therefore, two of his former speech will be included as analytical materials. The two speeches held by Mr Šefčovič were on the topic of lobbying in relation to the Commission, and will be analyzed in order to capture arguments and reasoning concerning the institutional demands and their interdependence on lobbying input in the Commission. The speeches which will be addressed were held in November 2011 at a Transparency Register Conference organized by the British Chamber of Commerce, and in June 2014 at the General Assembly of European Centre for Public Affairs 2.0 (EPCA 2.0) in Maastricht University, to talk young professionals about lobbying and transparency. The text material that will be analyzed combined with the three interviews from the Parliament, is a seminar on lobbying which was organized by the Committee on Constitutional Affairs in October 2007. The seminar intended to address MEPs considerations of Brussels lobbyists. This seminar was organized in relation to a consideration on lobbying that the Parliament had to deliberate over throughout the autumn of 2007 (European Parliament 2007a). These textual material was chosen because it address matters which are of importance in this thesis and can assist in further depicting the institutional demands and their differences. The text material on the Commission are more open for interpretation, whilst the text material from the Parliament is easier to comprehend as it comprises direct statements from MEPs.
Content Analysis

When analyzing collected text materials from the Commission and the Parliament as well as the interviews, content analysis will be used. Content analysis will function as a tool when drawing conclusions about the content of different types of communication, such as speech, press message, internal briefings or interviews (Esaiasson et al. 2012: 210). The purpose of using this method is to discern and interpret how the selected interviewees argue and reasoning on their demands and relation to lobbyists. This means that the material will be analyzed and interpreted depending on the materials comprehensiveness, in order to gain the arguments, reasoning and underlying content of the texts and interview material. This approach has limitations that should be considered in relation to the final results of the analyzed materials. The major limitation lies in the credibility of the interpretations and discernment produced in the analysis. However, it is a method that will be used in order to detect relevant elements in the material that form the foundation for this thesis empirics.

Limitations

Some of this thesis limitations have been raised under headings concerned. The main limitation of this thesis is the small number of interviews and due to small response rate only six were collected. Due to the open-ended questions in the interviews, they were still able to provide a lot of information about the research question of this thesis. Furthermore, interviews were complimented with textual material of two speeches and one seminar. The limitation makes it difficult to generalize on institutional demands for lobbying input. However, the conducted interviews have brought important information about institutional needs and demands for lobbying input and is sufficient to be able to draw relevant conclusions from the interview responses in this unexplored area.
4 Empirics & Analysis

This chapter will be divided into three parts. The first two parts will analyze and compare the collected material in order to answer the questions:

- What are the European Commission and the European Parliament’s different demands for lobbying input?
- How can it be discerned?
- Why does it differ?

In the first section of this chapter, the analysis will be based on the thesis’ dependent variable, i.e., type of demand. The empirical data on the Commission's and the Parliament's various demands and needs for lobbying input, will be presented and analyzed respectively and finally compared. The initial part for both the Commission and the Parliament will begin with presenting the empirical data on types of demands connected to the theoretical framework. Thereafter, other types of institutional demands which have not been addressed in the theoretical framework but rather through the interviews, as well as other insights that have been addressed through the interviews will be presented and analyzed.

The second part of this chapter will be starting from the independent variable, i.e., the degree of interdependence. The empirical material will function as the basis to be able to depict whether there is a link between the degree of interdependence and higher or lower degree of institutional demands, i.e., answering the research questions of “How it can be discerned, and why does it differ”. This part will be structured through the three indicators of interdependence which is mutual exchange, resource dependence and organizational structure. The hypothesis linking the thesis dependent and independent variable together that will be tested is:

The higher the degree of interdependence between lobbyists and EU decision-makers/officials, the more institutional demands for lobbying input.
The third and last part of this chapter will discuss the linkage between the dependent variable, i.e., type of demands and the independent variable, i.e., the degree of interdependence through the empirical results.

4.1 The type of demands

The research to further explore the European Commission’s and the European Parliament’s demands and needs for lobbyists input, has started from the dependent variable, which contain three established institutional demands for lobbying input. The three identified types of demand is Expert Knowledge (EK), Information about the European Encompassing Interest (IEEI) and Information about the Domestic Encompassing Interest (IDEI). According to the incorporated demands in the dependent variable, there is a difference between the Commission and the Parliament. This section will present and analyze this thesis empirical material in order to further evolve on what the institutional demands of the Commission and the Parliament are, and why they differ respectively.

4.1.1 The European Commission

According to Bouwen’s findings, the three different types of demands are not equally important for the Commission and the Parliament. This have also become apparent through the empirical material from the Commission. Therefore, the type of demand concerning Information about the Domestic Encompassing Interest (IDEI) will not be addressed in the empirical part of the Commission’s demands for lobbying input since this type of demand regarding domestic issues is not of relevance for the Commission, as its constituency is the European Union as a whole. Therefore, this part will start by addressing the demands for expert knowledge, information about the European encompassing interest (IEEI) and finally other empirical findings which has not been addressed within the theoretical framework but rather through empirical material.
Expert Knowledge (EK)

All the interviewees from the Commission stated to have a great need for expert knowledge (Interview 1, 4, 6: 2015). However, while everyone stated that they have a need for expert knowledge, there were differences regarding the demands for lobbying input. Two out of three interviewees from the Commission stated that they are in great need of expert knowledge and demand this from lobbying stakeholders who are experts in the fields of interest, while one of the interviewees stated that the greatly needed expertise is not demanded from lobbyists but rather received from the Commissions own expert groups and other institutional actors.

The two employees from the Commission who stated that there is a great need and a constant demand for lobbying input referred to their demands as a necessity in order to fulfill and meet their responsibilities as Commission employees. The expertise is greatly needed by the Commission employees in order to access the technical know-how from those who daily practice within the filed of interest, but also in order to understand how the Commissions policy outcomes potentially affect various stakeholders (Interview 1, 4, 6: 2015). The Commission’s demands for expert knowledge differs widely since the demands for input depends on which Department, Cabinet or DG of the Commission one is positioned in (Interview 4, 6: 2015). In other words, the institutional demand for EK is specific for each policy field within the Commission, meaning that the Trade Cabinets types demands for lobbying input varies vastly from for example the Energy Cabinets types of demands. Mr Ohridski explained that the European Commission, in particular, has always been very open to outside input and proactively seeking input to its policy making (Interview 6: 2015). The reason for this is according to Mr Ohridski, that the Commission is a relatively small institution that does not have all the expertise that is required in-house and in order to produce good laws (Interview 6: 2015). Therefore, they need to hear from the experts in the various policy fields e.g. internal market, transport, fisheries, environment etc (Interview 6: 2015). In other words, it is stated that the Commission does not have the technical expertise which is required to independently form policies, and that they therefore need lobbying input in order to know the impact of the policy making on the ground (Interview 6: 2015). In line with this is Mr Ceballos Barón, who argues that the field of world trade is very complex, and if they do not demand and receive lobbyist input, they would not have the information on
what is happening (Interview 4: 2015). Furthermore, if they do not receive input, they would not have new information on what and how to take action (Interview 4: 2015).

There is no other way to learn that there is a problem until the industry, the business, the associations, the lobbyists come and raise our attention. Most of the barriers that we face in trade and investment, we only discover when the industry and associations informs us...We need information. We have delegation in third countries that can gather information, but I mean the people who are in the front line, is the companies and they know what is going on (Interview 4: 2015).

It emerges that the Commission is very open towards lobbying stakeholders and are in a constant listening mode and that the majority of employees within the Commission frequently demand input regarding issues on specific policy areas concerning their departments working field (Interview 4, 6: 2015). The interview responses from the Commission showed great variation regarding the specific demands requested. The reason for the varying types of demands is because the input which is requested is specifically linked to the policy areas in which the employees work (Interview 1, 4, 6: 2015). Another variation that becomes apparent is that the required expertise is used for different purposes. Mr. Ohridski specifies that the demanded input from lobbying stakeholders is used for legislative purposes (Interview 6: 2015).

The purpose of lobbying input is concerned with legislative matters as well as policy implementation, but also the work that comes after the implementation of a policy or legislation. I am in need of lobbying input throughout the whole legislative process, but the input is especially important early in the drafting stage of legislation (Interview 6: 2015).

The demanded input is concerned with expertise data, statistics, good practices from lobbying stakeholders as well as their opinions on specific or general issues concerning the Commission (Interview 6: 2015).

There is a constant hunger for evidence based analysis, so the Commission indicates what it is looking for and ask lobbying stakeholders - will this work, and if so, why? (Interview 6: 2015).

Mr Ohridski’s demands for expertise is in line with how Bouwen defines the Commission’s needs of lobbyists expertise knowledge in order to fulfill its role as the main legislator of the EU. The responses from Mr Ohridski and Mr Ceballos Barón are in line with the theoretical type of demand which states that the Commission is in need of expert knowledge in order to pursue development of effective EU legislation in a various policy areas
However, the difference regarding the employees within the Trade Cabinet is that the expertise is not demanded in order to legislate as suggested in the theoretical framework, but rather to facilitate and develop beneficial trade prospects for European stakeholders (Interview 4: 2015). As mentioned by Mr Ohridski, the demand for expertise is vital for the simple reason that the Commission does not have all the in-house expertise needed to produce effective legislation, which is in line with the theoretical assumption of the Commission being understaffed and therefore in great need of lobbying input (Interview 6: 2015, Bouwen 2002a: 14-15).

Mrs Mungengová presents a different side regarding the Commission’s demand for lobbying expert knowledge and argues that there are no such demands (Interview 1: 2015).

The Commissions first source of expertise is its own groups, which is very qualified personal working in various DG’s. In addition to that, we get information from our 28 member states who have regulatory agencies, ministries, and again plenty of competent personal over there, so this is our first source of information and expertise. Then of course as I said we are constantly being approached by lobbying stakeholders of various kinds with their position papers, but the fact that they approach us does not necessarily mean that this is what the Commission is end up doing ultimately (Interview 1: 2015).

Mrs Mungengová argues that the Commission’s expert groups that are the first and main source expertise (Interview 1: 2015). Therefore the Commission looks at facts, raw data and listen to other members of the European Commission in other DG’s, MEPs, Members of Council, the Auditor institution, but also to the civil society (Interview 1: 2015). In contrast to this, Mr Ohridski stated that the Commission is seeking input through many different channels, for example expert groups (Interview 6: 2015). However, he says that the majority of the existing expert groups within the Commission consist of lobbyists’ as they have expertise knowledge and practical experience in specific areas that are of interest to the Commission (Interview 6: 2015). Mr Ceballos Barón was asked whether issues concerning trade matters normally are raised through the expert groups of the Commission or straight to individual employees. He sounded somewhat inquiring and replied that the trade Cabinet does not have any expert groups and that the experts in the field are the businesses themselves or the representative associations (Interview 4: 2015). Thus, the interview responses from the Commission showed great variation regarding the specific demands requested. The reason for the varying types of demands is because the requested expertise is specifically linked to which policy areas the employees are working in. Another variation that becomes apparent is that
the required expertise is used for different purposes. For example, Mr. Ohridski specifies that
the requested input from lobbyists are used for legislative purposes which is in line with how
Bouwen defines the Commission’s needs of lobbyists EK, whilst Mr Ceballos Barón demands
for EK is for non-legislative matters.

Information about the European Encompassing Interest (IEEI)

All interviews from the Commission showed a clear need for information on the
European encompassing interest (Interview 1, 4, 6: 2015). Regardless of which department
and within which policy area the interviewees are engaged in, it became evident that the
information which is demanded is used to promote the common needs and interests of
various sectors within the EU as a whole (Interview 1, 4, 6: 2015). This became evident as the
Commission has the whole of the EU and its citizens as its constituency. In order to satisfy the
European interests, Mrs Mungengová argues as follows:

…. we try to define the European interest based on core European values that are assigned in our Treaty.
And this is also the reason why we don't lean to individual or particular constituencies to see here or there,
because our constituencies is all European people. We have a European interest and represent the Union as a
whole (Interview 1: 2015).

It is further argued that the Commission also listens to the business community, but that
the role of the Commission is strictly to then derive the European interest out of all the
information and present something which will be coherent enough to then secure majority
approval in the co-decision process (Interview 1: 2015).

Therefore I can't really say that because this or that big business company issues a statement that this is
going to be the guiding source of information for us. It is just one of the many. One of the many of Avalanche
of information that we get. You need broad coalitions, which end up representing a variety of European
interests (Interview 1: 2015).

The interview responses from the Commission showed that the only constituency and
interest of the Commission are the whole of the EU and its citizens (Interview 1, 4, 6: 2015).
As the Commission’s role is to represent the whole of the EU and its citizens, it implies that it
is in need of facts and input from all types of European interests.
Other findings

One of the interview responses suggests that the Commission’s demand for lobbying input is minimal and virtually non-existing. This interview response does not correlate with the other interview responses from the Commission and is somewhat unexpected. However, it raises an interesting point of view which shows a different view on the Commission’s need for exchange relations with lobbying stakeholders.

One of the initial interview questions asked the respondents what kind of lobbyists they are mostly in contact with and why. Following this question, the eleven different types of lobbying interests which were identified by Chalmers were stated as alternatives (Chalmers 2011: 473).

There have been few objections to Chalmers definition of which actors that are identified as lobbyists. However, during the interview with Mrs Mungengová, it was stressed that she makes a clear distinction between institutional and non-institutional stakeholders (Interview 1: 2015). Institutional stakeholders are referring to actors that represent other European institutions or national institutions, for example, MEPs or persons from the Council, representatives of regions as well as representatives from various Committees (Interview 1: 2015). Furthermore, in order to ensure proper checks and balances in a democratic system, the Commission is obliged to make itself available and to be accountable towards other institutional stakeholders (Interview 1: 2015).

The institutional actors are not considered as lobbyists, because it is just normal democracy and all the others, we are not contacting them, this is something I wanted to stress, it is not us who pick up the phone or send emails to them and ask for input, it is rather them knocking on our doors, sending emails, calling us wanting to meet and to give their perspective on things (Interview 1: 2015).

This statement is very interesting considering how the academic literature perceives lobbying as well as who is included as preforming such representation, i.e., the kind of representation that occurs from institutional actors such as local municipal bodies to the Commission, are not considered as activities which fall under the concept of lobbying. Furthermore, it is clearly stated that no public actors deemed to be acting in lobbying spirit, since they belong in the realm of Inter-European relations. This is interesting in relation to the fact that, for example, the City of Malmö, among many others, has a representative resident in Brussels, whose purpose is to lobby for the city of Malmö in itself and for enforcing and fulfilling the desired

5 See Appendix I
interests at EU level. This perspective indicates that lobbying should be understood as something that strictly takes place between private and public actors. Strong representation of interests among the public sector are considered part of internal relationships and may even be considered to fall under normalized negotiations. In regard to non-institutional stakeholders, it is clarified that they are divided into three sub-groupings which is, business stakeholders, NGO stakeholders and self employed people (Interview 1: 2015).

In order to manage that flow of demands, the Commission has also set up a social civic dialog, were four times a year we meet with more than 200 NGO type organizations present, were some are umbrella organizations, so one is present, but they represent maybe 40 others and this interaction with civil society is also a very important part of how we interact with civil society, how we take on board their views, how we are also accountable to them on what we do and this is always web stream, i.e., public (Interview 1:2015).

Here it is stated that there are no demands from this part of the Commission, but rather that the identified non-institutional stakeholders have created a flow of demands, i.e., the lobbying stakeholders demand or are in need of interacting with the Commission, not vice versa. When asked whether there is a need of input from lobbyists, i.e., requests of goods for trade negotiations etc, Mrs Mungengová answers;

We do not even ask ourselves the question of whether we need it, We get it!… Honestly, we don't demand input, we get it! We don't need to ask for it, it just flows on a daily basis in to our emails and so forward… (Interview 1: 2015).

It is further explained that as the Commission receives a great amount of information, they have to process it, since they are asked to react to it.

… I would not say that we would not be able to propose policy issues or view legislative proposals without this kind of input, but its just a part of the normal reality and democratic society where people have views, people are allowed to create organizations, to represent their views…I don't think we where ever in a situation where we would be short of information on the position of one of these actors (Interview 1: 2015).

Moreover, Mrs Mungengová argues that the most natural thing which lobbyists do if they have a position, is to write it down and then send it to the Commission, the Council and the Parliament (Interview 1: 2015). However, it is explained that the Trade Cabinet receive requests of meetings just to raise concerns even before lobbyists have a coherent position paper (Interview 1: 2015).
So I would really not say that we are the demanders here that need to ask positions. As soon as they have a view on something, or even before they have managed to comprehensively written it down, as soon as they actually have a concern, they will say we are concerned about this and this… could you please schedule a meeting with us. So the flow is really from them to us with respect to any concerns and ideas (Interview 1: 2015).

This can be interpreted as a) meaning that they have demands but don't need to ask for it, or b) it means that the current system of supply and demand is so ingrained that it is considered natural to receive the resources that is required without considering how it would look if the flow of information would not happen to the extent that it is described. Perhaps it is so that the present structure within the Commission which comprises enormous inflows of information is being perceived as a work of organizing inflows, where the value of the concrete needed information decreases.

Mrs Mungengová often repeats that not only the Trade Cabinet, but also the Commission as a whole, does not demand and ask for input. This is very interesting and begs the question whether the responses, on occasions were pre-formulated in order to demonstrate the Commission's strength and independence. One would expect that there is a comprehensive review and consultation with stakeholders during the negotiations on the trade agreement between the EU and the USA, which is why it is unlikely that they don't need input. Thus, it implies that they might not ask for it, but they do need it. A close cooperation with trade companies and associations appears to be needed in order to be in agreement with stakeholders to anticipate European trading stakeholders with the best possible terms. Many aspects of Mrs Mungengová’s interview responses are not personal but emerges to be more generally represented for the Commission. There is a lack of clarity in why Mrs Mungengová considers the Commission relationship with lobbyists to be single-sided, i.e., lobbying actors demanding the Commission’s attention. It is not in line with any of the other interview responses or the theoretical framework and seams to be formally compressed. It is said that the main source of expertise that the Commission uses is their own expert groups and they do not ask for input, they simply receive it. At the same time it appears by the other interviewees from the Commission that their own expert groups mainly comprises of lobbyists’ who are experts in each policy areas. One might assume that the need to obtain input from those which will be affected by the decisions to be made is fundamental within the EU system of governance. It seems that the institutional need for input may not be self-noticed or even reflected upon as the current situation of information flow is described as an avalanche of information.
As we don't ask for anything specifically, we get what we get, so if they come with just information that they have from their sources, then we get that. If they come with coherent position papers, eventually a study that they have commissioned or any other outside evidence that we can use and also verify, then we will get that (Interview 1: 2015).

This response goes against Bouwen’s theory and is inconsistent with the idea of understanding lobbying as a phenomenon that occurs in terms of an exchange between the actors involved as well as with the other interview responses from the Commission. In order to understand the content of lobbying, Bouwen stresses the significance of discerning the relationship between lobbyists and EU decision-makers/officials as an exchange relationship between two interdependent actors (Bouwen 2002a: 7). Bouwen highlights the EU institutions enthusiasm to interact with lobbyists as a response of needing to have close contact with those possessing required goods, in order to fulfill their institutional work (Bouwen 2002a: 7).

Mrs Mungengová follows the Cabinets relations with civil society and explains that there are two type of lobbyists (Interview 1: 2015). It is further stated that there are those lobbyists who concentrate more on solutions and framing, meaning that they will criticize one thing, but at the same time they will reach out to the Commission with some concrete solutions or at least ideas on how things eventually could be solved (Interview 1: 2015). Then there are lobbyist who make the case of only criticizing, and highlighting that there is a problem with policies in various areas, however they don't make the next step as contributing to the solution (Interview 1: 2015). It is further stated that, the more concrete the solution lobbyists can provide, the better for the Commission because it makes it easier for them to consider whether the presented may be something to look into, something to consider or not (Interview 1: 2015).

One of the general messenger that I always leave to civil society is: If you have identified a problem in an area, please try to also think about how you think the problem should be solved. Because even if you don't come up with the perfect solution, if you come up with at least something for us to consider, it actually eases the way (Interview 1: 2015).

Mrs Mungengová argues that if lobbyists only criticize without providing any ideas on how they would like to see the issue improve, the Commission will have to come up with a solution that possibly could provide a just as dissatisfying outcome (Interview 1: 2015).
As with many things surrounding lobbying, there is a dichotomy between the interview responses from the Commission employees. Two out of three interviewees are in line with the theoretical framework’s suggestions concerning the Commission’s demands for lobbying input. The majority of the responses have shown that the Commission employees have a great demand for lobbying input regarding both expert knowledge and information about the European encompassing interests (Interview 1, 4, 6: 2015). In addition to this, it has also emerged that the Commission’s demands for lobbying input is not purely connected to legislative matters. Mr Ceballos Barón explained that the Trade cabinets work is not connected to legislation, with exception of legal acts in trade policy which is very exceptional (Interview 4: 2015). It is further stated that as the Trade cabinet differs from other departments that defines legislation and that they are continuously in negotiations of international trade agreements listening to lobbying stakeholders (Interview 4: 2015). Mr Ceballos Barón further explains that, in the international trade relations to the rest of the world, they are in constant regular contact with business, stakeholders, lobbyists, consumers, governments in the EU, outside the EU, in the Parliament etc (Interview 4: 2015).

4.1.2 The European Parliament

The interviewees from the Parliament have generated great input regarding parliamentarian demands for lobbyism and also shown that there is a great difference between the type of demands that is requested. All of the interviewees have a great need for demand lobbying input. However, the type of demands are depended on the individual MEPs personal interests as politicians as well as the specific needs for which Committees they are engaged in (Interview 2, 3, 5, 6: 2015). In opposition to the theoretical framework which suggest that the Parliament is concerned with IDIE as well as IEEI in order to evaluate the Commission’s legislative proposals from a European perspective (Bouwen 2002a: 8, 14), the empirics from the Parliament show that there is a need for all the three type of demands included in the dependent variable, including expert knowledge (Interview 2, 3, 5: 2015). In other words, all of the variables on type of demands will be included in this section on the Parliament. The section will begin with addressing the demands connected to the theoretical framework and thereafter address other findings which have become evident through the empirical material.
Expert Knowledge (EK)

According to the theoretical framework, this access good is only demanded by the Commission. It is argued that the Parliament’s legislative role does not require much EK, since the Commission at that time of the process already drafted the details on often technical proposals (Bouwen 2002a: 14). However, the empirical material on the Parliament show that there is a demand for expertise input from lobbyists (Interview 2, 3, 5: 2015). The interviewee demands for EK is much needed in order to fulfill their work and duties within the parliamentarian Committees (Interview 2, 3, 5: 2015). The specific demands for EK is different for each interviewee from the Parliament as they all represent different political parties and are engaged in diverse Committees. The expertise knowledge which is demanded is also important for the Parliament in order to assess the legislative proposals which comes from the Commission.

Mr Adaktusson demand EK from mainly NGOs concerning foreign affairs and human rights as these matters are of main concern for his parliamentarian work (Interview 2: 2015). Furthermore, EK is demanded on transport related businesses and organizations issues due to his position as substitute in the transport Committee (Interview 2: 2015). One out of many examples of when Mr Adaktusson had a great result due to lobbyists’ EK input was concerning a transport directive, were the original proposals’ section on wages was very discriminatory for Sweden and Finland and this issue was raised though industry representatives (Interview 2: 2015). Mrs Björk stated that her parliamentarian work require EK from trade unions, feminist groups, environmental groups, gender equality movements as well as movements working for citizens’ rights such as migrant organizations and asylum seekers solidarity committees (Interview 3: 2015). These lobbying stakeholders and their input is vital for Mrs Björk as they assist her with EK and groundwork in her position as a member of the Equality Committee (FEMM) and the Citizen Rights Committee (LIBE) (Interview 3: 2015). The gained input provides Mrs Björk with new information and knowledge which is important and useful in her parliamentarian work as well as for her national party ideology (Interview 3: 2015). The demanded EK varies in form and can be information, reports and stakeholders agenda (Interview 3: 2015).

I need input from democratic popular movements in my work in the parliament. As an MEP representing a Left Party it is of utmost importance to have a dialogue with important social and popular movements, since it
is only through an alliance between progressive movements outside the parliament and progressive democratically elected parliamentarians that we strengthen citizens’ rights and reach progressive reforms….I am interested to listen to their views on specific issues (Interview 3: 2015).

Mrs Lahdo stated to have a great need for specific information concerning stakeholders interests regarding the Committee work under which she works (Interview 5: 2015). Therefore, the type of demands that are of interest are concerned with EK on mapping positions on specific topics and policies for each Committee which she engages in (Interview 5: 2015).

For the Parliament it is important to get input from civil society and consider all aspects/effects of legislative proposals (Interview 5: 2015).

Mrs Lahdo stated that the majority of the demanded EK is used for legislative purposes and used as a foundation for being able to understand lobbying stakeholders interests before parliamentarian amendments are tabled (Interview 5: 2015).

Information about the European Encompassing Interest (IEEI)

The parliamentarian demands for lobbying input is stated to be important both in legislative matters as for non legislative purposes (Interview 2, 3, 5: 2015). The interview responses from the Parliament indicate that there are interests concerning the IEEI. The information on IEEI is demanded and needed from lobbying stakeholders in order to evaluate the Commission legislative proposals from a European perspective (Interview 2, 5: 2015). This type of input provides the Parliament with information about interests of European stakeholders, which is also beneficial depending on which Committees one is involved in (Interview 2, 3: 2015).

Information about the Domestic Encompassing Interest (IDEI)

It emerges clearly that the interviewees from the Parliament’s demands for lobbying input are linked to their political agendas (Interview 2, 3, 5: 2015). As they are elected at national level and also the only directly elected institution, they are expected to represent the issues that they promised while campaigning. This implies that much of the demands which is requested are linked to the issues and ideologies prioritized by their national party and its supporters, i.e., the people who voted them to the Parliament. It is therefore a matter of course that the MEPs are demanding input concerning IDEI. The requested information is
vital for the MEPs since they need to know the preferences of their voters in order to increase their chances for re-election.

All the interviewees from both the Commission and the Parliament were asked whether they consider the two institutions to have different needs and demands for lobbying input, and what the differences might be.

... not only when it comes to lobbyists input, but needs when it comes to information in general. Parliamentarians, of course, are members that have been elected to the parliament directly, by a constituency in the member states. And these constituencies normally have some interest and the parliamentarians are suppose to represent these interests (Interview 1: 2015).

It is further argued that the Parliament normally have to follow its constituencies interests in order to be re-elected and that MEPs therefore have a need for input from their constituencies for reinsurance of representing those that have elected them to the Parliament (Interview 1:2015). In other words, MEPs agendas and the input they are seeking are driven by the interest of their political party at national level as well as the interests of which Committees they engage in.

There are other objectives over political considerations between the Commission and the Parliament. MEPs are often driven by their constituency, so if there is a particular concern of a constituency of one MEP or a group of MEPs, they may propose new legislation to the Commission or try to seek some change in the current regulation. The origin is different, as the MEPs are often driven by constituency and in our case, the constituency is the whole of all business in general (Interview 4: 2015).

It is argued that MEPs interact from a perspective based on their domestic interests from their constituencies and that MEPs get their legitimacy from direct democracy since they are the only ones within the EU that is directly elected (Interview 6: 2015).

They say that they are close to the public and that they speak for the citizens, however, they have been elected with an agenda, meaning that they have to represent the interests of their country or their local constituency. They are not civil servants, they are politicians who are elected and accountable to their own constituency which is the one that can re-elect them if they consider that the MEPs have defended their interests in Brussels and Strasbourg effectively (Interview 6: 2015).

The empirical findings on the MEPs type of demands are consistent with Bouwen’s findings on the Parliament’s demands for lobbying input, with one exception. It becomes evident that the Parliament require IDIE of its constituency and IEEI in order to mobilize
their interests and increase its chances for re-election (Interview 1, 3, 4, 5, 6: 2015). However, the interviewees also demand EK, which is a contribution to the theoretical framework.

Other findings

Similar to Mrs Mungengová, Mrs Björk did not agree with this thesis use of Chalmers definition on the notion lobbyist and disapprove of referring to those she interacts with as lobbyists (Interview 3: 2015). Mrs Björk has a clear idea about what those she meets with are, in relation to what a definition of a "lobbyist in Brussels" includes (Interview 3: 2015).

… first of all I would like clarify the word “lobbyist”. The majority of lobbyists in Brussels are very well paid men representing big corporations and banks. Their only goal is to protect the interests of this corporation/bank. In short: to protect their profits. These lobbyists are active vis à vis the EU-commission and the EU-parliament…..There is obviously a huge distinction from the lobbyists protecting corporate interests/profits and civil society (Interview 3: 2015).

This is a very strong description of what lobbying is perceived as. It is furthermore not in line with any of this thesis' defining remarks on the meaning of the concept lobbying. This interpretation on the context of lobbying is neither coherent with the European Parliament’s definition on lobbying as ”a concentrated effort to influence policy formulation and decision-making with a view to obtain some designated results from government authorities and elected representatives” (Zibold 2013: 1), which furthermore confirms the European Parliament’s concern regarding the non-existing consensus on what the lobbying profession includes. Mrs Björk further argues that there are stakeholder representatives which are called “lobbyists” within the EU-system, who represent important popular and democratic movements (Interview 3: 2015). Mrs Björk stated that she obviously meet with representatives of public authorities, regions and municipalities as well as members of parliaments (Interview 3: 2015). However, the most important factor is that the lobbyists she interacts with are representing democratic values, and that their goal is to defend certain values such as social rights, social justice, gender equality, workers’ rights, health and environmental standards (Interview 3: 2015).

As clearly indicated through the interviewee responses, there is a need and demand for lobbying input in order to achieve the desired outcomes of their parliamentarian agendas (Interview 2, 3, 5: 2015). The interviewee responses from the Parliament are of great value and clearly indicate that there are institutional demand for lobbying input regarding EK,
IEEI, IDEI and information on how the EU future decisions will affect the course of various lobbying stakeholders, new knowledge, mapping positions and stakeholders views on options on course of action (Interview 1, 2, 3, 5, 6: 2015).

4.1.3 Analytical comparison of demands

A noticeable difference between the interviewees is the perception of what lobbyist input means. Some differentiate between institutional and non-institutional lobbying stakeholders, others categorize lobbying stakeholders along specific areas of interest, while others accepted Chalmers eleven identified actors as lobbyists. Evidently, this contributes to that the interviewees from the Commission and the Parliament, experience their demands and need for input in different ways.

The analysis shows that the Parliament demand for lobbying input are different from the ones that the Commission needs. The Parliament’s members have to take into account national interests in order to satisfy the constituents who elected them to represent and drive certain issues at European level. This is vital for MEPs to demand in order to know the preferences of their voters and increase their chances for re-election. This kind of input is not of importance for the Commission. As the Commission’s constituency and its interest is the whole of Europe, it has no need for information on particular domestic issues. This was especially stressed by Mr Ceballos Barón who stated that the Trade Cabinet serves European firms, business, exporting and importing interests and consumers who want to benefit from open trade and having access to getting cheaper products. In other words, they serve the European trading interests in order to keep the European market open for consumers and business. The Commission is in need of knowledge of the European interests to be able to act as a promoter of European interests. As clearly stated by Mr Ceballos, the Trade Cabinet has great demand for expertise knowledge from the business stakeholders which knows what current issues of trade there is. They welcome the know-how from lobbying stakeholders in order to take an appropriate course of action. It is important to mention is that some of the demands for lobbyists’ input from both the Commission and the Parliament are not linked to the legislative process alone, which differs from Bouwen’s identified institutional demands.
There appears to be a difference in the scope of input that is needed and demanded between the Commission and the Parliament. It becomes clear that the Parliament demands more input in a variety of fields and are interested in expert input as well as general information, while the Commission employees are interested the specific policy areas in which they work and consult widely within the specific sectors (Interview 2, 3, 4, 6: 2015).

Parliament has more use for expertise since the Commission is more specialized in different topics while members of the European Parliament need to have knowledge in all topics. But the earlier in the political process that the input is made – the better (Interview 2: 2015).

As the Commission holds the pen first, it is evident that they need to interact more intensively when proposing and drafting legislation. The Parliament is in a position where they are mainly making amendments which puts the Commission and the Parliament in different positions when demanding lobbying input for legislative purposes. This affect the type of demands which are required. The Commission has a European Public interest and are divided into specialized policy areas of EU competence. Due to the Commissions setting, every department of policy area has to consult widely with relevant stakeholders, while as the Parliament has personal interests as politicians as well as interests varying due to which Committees they are engaged in, which means that their scope on type of demands can differ widely.

4.2 The degree of interdependence

In the process to depict whether the interviewees as well as the textual material demonstrates a higher or lower degree of interdependence, the overall impression as well as the specific indicators played a role. The material regarding how frequently requests occur, the types of demands and how the discourse of the interviewees and their relationship with lobbyists is described, are important factors to consider in the analysis regarding the degree of interdependence. The specific factors which served as indicators of interdependence are: mutual exchange, resource dependency and organizational structure. With these factors as a
base, this thesis has been able to discern whether the empirical material demonstrates high or low degree of interdependence to lobbying.

4.2.1 The European Commission

Mutual exchange

The empirical material from the Commission shows a great need to maintain exchange relations with lobbying stakeholders in order to pursue enhanced policy-making (Interview 4, 6: 2015). Two out of three interviewees from the Commission stated that they actively seek to interact with relevant lobbying stakeholders in order to exchange vital goods (Interview 4, 6: 2015). The third interviewee stated that regardless of the institutional will of interacting is there or not, there is a constant contact, in which the Commission is compelled to respond to the inquiries of the requested exchange relations (Interview 1: 2015).

The Commission seeks input and does this in many different ways, formally, informally, directly, and indirectly. Formally through public consultation by Green papers, by specific EU funded projects or by events. But also informally by discussions with interests group representatives. In other setting one might receive input through expert groups, were many of the existing ones within the Commission are lobbyists. And you need in fact both expert input as well as wide consultations in order to receive input. There is a need and practical reason for demanding lobbying input (Interview 6: 2015).

Mr Ohridski is in contact with lobbyists frequently, meaning three or more times a week. He is in contact with all of the eleven identified lobbying actors as the spectrum of interests covering the transparency register is wide and of inclusive nature (Interview 6: 2015). However, there is a more intense contact with the professional consultancies, trade associations, NGOs and lately local authorities due to particular issues (Interview 6: 2015). Mr Ceballos Barón stated that the Trade Cabinet are in constant contact with business, stakeholders, lobbyists, but also consumers, governments in the EU, outside the EU, in the Parliament in order to exchange needed goods (Interview 4: 2015). The Commission's need to have a close relation of exchanging goods with lobbyists are a substantial part of how they receive what is needed to carry out their work. When asking whether the relation to lobbying stakeholders and the received input is important to their work, it became evident that is it crucial.
Yes, absolutely! There is simply no other way to do it, you can not work behind closed doors and design policies without hearing from all sides that will be affected by your policies. You need to be informed about all the pros and cons and the ones that are unsure, and after this you take decisions, and you form the evidence based on decision. This is not possible if you do not hear all sides. Lobbying input contribute to a solid ground for policy-making. The whole quality of law making is enhanced through the various stages of consultation and input (Interview 6: 2015).

It was further stated that there is a strong sense of interdependence to lobbyism.

Yes, if interdependence means that the policy makers need the lobbyists in order to understand the impact of what they are designing, vis a vis the lobbyists need the policy-makers in order to make sure that regulations and legislation works on the ground. It is a mutual exchange since the institutional actors need to know what is going on in order to form policies, and the lobbyists need to voice their opinions and concerns to the policy-makers (Interview 6: 2015).

Resource dependence

The empirical material indicate that there is a dependency on the resources that lobbying stakeholders possesses (Interview 4, 6: 2015). The resources which are requested are specific for each policy sector in the Commission (Interview 1, 4, 6: 2015). Mr Ceballos Barón stress the fact that they collect a large amount of information by listen and interacting with a lot of lobbying stakeholders (Interview 4: 2015). It is further stated that as their work is not about drafting regulation, they are not like other departments that defines legislation on, e.g., migration or taxation. Therefore, they are continuously in negotiations of international agreements, listening to and exchanging vital resources with various stakeholders: "we are in constant contact with business, consumers, third countries etc" (Interview 4: 2015). Mr Ceballos illustrates an example of how it could look on a daily basis and states that:

Usually lobby companies, industry associations, farmers associations raise a problem that they are facing, which in turn leads to us taking action (Interview 4: 2015).

In other words, there is a great need for the resources that lobbying stakeholders possesses in order to know how to facilitate beneficial trade for European stakeholders. Either the Trade Cabinet has an agreement in place and use the channels of the agreement, or there is no agreement and then they use the channels to try to eliminate or ease these barriers and facilitate trade (Interview 4: 2015).
We talk to all stakeholders on issues regarding that… We are in a lot of contact with lobbyists in the sense of industry associations that are involved in trade, and today everybody is involved in trade (Interview 4: 2015).

Mr Ceballos stated that the lobbying input which is demanded and received are an important and vital part of his work.

Lobbyists are our stakeholders, because we work for firms, business, exporting and importing but also for those consumers who want to benefit from open trade and having access to getting cheaper products. So we have to keep the market of Europe open for consumers and business (Interview 4: 2015).

It is further argued that the Trade Cabinet is not aware of problems until lobbyists inform them about the problem (Interview 4: 2015). This indicates that there would be a considerable lack of opportunities on how to promote European trade without lobbying input and the resources which they provide. He stresses the importance of discussing with the business industry, for the simple reason that they are the ones who know exactly how it works.

We have cases everyday where lobbyists input and information is vital for our knowing. They inform us, and we take action (Interview 4: 2015).

Mr Ohridski which was a part of setting up the transparency register stated that the process of outlining the register would not have been possible without the resources of lobbying stakeholders (Interview 6: 2015).

What information should we ask for, what should be the different headings of disclosure and also in developing the guideline around the disclosure regime - We consulted externally, and we were discussing with many stakeholders on each of the various six sections. When we had the first draft of guidelines, we asked them what they thought and they came back with feedback and tactical suggestions for amendments. We demand certain kind of information such as cost revenues, address, policies they work on etc. As it is not we who fill in the register, it is the registrants, it has to make sense to them, practically, but also in terms of what we are asking from them, there is no point to be overly bureaucratic or to ask for something that does not make sense to them. The building of the transparency register is an example of how lobbying resources helped us to shape what I think is now a good compromise of a public disclosure regime (Interview 6: 2015).

The interviewees showed that the demanded resources are of great importance for the functioning of their work as well as their ability to implement it effectively (Interview 4, 6: 2015). The resources which are demanded differs depending on which of the various policy sectors within the Commission are in need. There is a frequent demand for lobbying resources which indicate a relation of resource dependence (Interview 4, 6: 2015).
Organizational Structure

The interview material emphasizes that the organizational structure of the Commission makes them more dependent on lobbying input (Interview 3, 4, 6: 2015). It is stated that the definite need for lobbying input is nothing new within the Commission (Interview 6: 2015). This has been the case since the institutions was established, however, the institutional demands for lobbying input has been intensified over the years due to the EU’s growth in areas of competence (Interview 4, 6: 2015). The current organizational structure which has formed the great need for lobbying input intensfied after the Single European Act and after the Lisbon Treaty due to the extension of the ordinary legislative procedure to more areas (Interview 6: 2015). This means that, as the competences and the legislative outreach of the EU has increased, it has created a great demand for a large scope of competences and representatives that could assist building a solid ground for the outcome of European legislation (Interview 6: 2015). As the Commission holds the pen first, they need to interact more intensively when proposing and drafting legislation (Interview 6: 2015). The expectations on the Commission to be well informed but also to possess solid expertise while producing legislation is great and have led to the Commission being obliged to widely consult with stakeholders before, during and after legislation.

Art 11 states that the Commission should consult widely, not the other institutions. Why? Because it is the institutions who work for the general interest of the Union (Interview 6: 2015).

The empirical material from the Commission strongly indicates that it does not have the resources to independently produce legislation (Interview 4, 6: 2015). It is stated that the Commission is a relatively small institution which in relation to its areas of competence are understaffed and does not have all the in-house competences needed to be able to cover legislation in all the EU areas of competence (Interview 6: 2015). It is further stated that the Commission’s need for lobbying input is very sector oriented due to the specific areas of competences within each DG and Cabinet (Interview 6: 2015). In other words, the organizational structure of the Commission is organized in a matter that makes them more dependent on lobbying input (Interview 6: 2015).

Each DG and sector within the Commission is responsible for specific policy development, meaning that each sector has their own lobbyists that are of certain interest in regard to their work in progress (Interview 6: 2015).
This implies that the Commission’s division of policy sector oriented departments desire specific knowledge and know-how techniques for each policy field, which is virtually impossible to obtain in-house due to the very detailed areas of knowledge expected to be covered as well as the fact that the Commission is understaffed in relation to its work load. These features indicate that the current organizational structure is built in such a way that makes the Commission dependent on external inputs in order to carry out what is intended.

There is a need and practical reason for demanding input (Interview 6: 2015).

The speeches held by Commissioner Mr Šefčovič depict that the organizational structure of the Commission has create interdependence between the Commission's work and lobbyists, as it needs to involve external actors for enhanced functionality. The speech starts with stressing that the aim of the Transparency Register is not to impose stigmatization of partner stakeholders to be named and shamed, but rather the opposite (europa.eu 2011). The aim is to demonstrate to the public, that the registered organizations are committed to ethical standards, and that the EU policy-making is fed by various contributors which legitimately share their viewpoints (europa.eu 2011). He further states that the aim is to make the policy-making process transparent and within an ethical framework which is expected by the institutions and the citizens of EU. This statement can be interpreted as raising the importance of the current lobbying efforts in the EU as a great part of the policy-making process which needs to become as transparent to the public as the work of the institutions are expected to be, i.e., it is a contributing factor which is needed in the institutions and therefor has to be more public in order to be legitimate. The majority of the speech can be understood as the Transparency Register’s aim is to legitimate and improve lobbyists reputation in order for the EU institutions to be able to exchange goods with them and demand their resources as they wish, without being questioned. The speech ends with an announcement of two new features that will be added into the system. The first feature is presented as follows:

Not only will registered entities receive an alarm each time the Commission launches a public consultation in their field of interest, but they will also receive the roadmaps made public every year, along with the Work Program of the Commission (europa.eu 2011).
The second feature to be added is concerned with: "...the opening of an additional module on-line which will make it possible for registered entities to use the Register web interface to introduce their request for the accreditation of their representatives and their fast-track access to the Parliament’s buildings" (europa.eu 2011). These upcoming additions insinuate that there is a desire to achieve further integration with lobbying stakeholders by making it easier for lobbyists to participate by increasing the availability of information, needs and demands. In other words, the availability for institutional actors and lobbying stakeholders to maintain mutual exchange relations eases with the additions of the transparency register.

Mr Šefčovič stressed the importance of a close cooperation of responsibility between the Commission and the coming Public affairs professionals. The speech was held ten days after the European Parliament elections last year and was dedicated to discuss the direction in which the Commission and the lobbying community of Brussels collectively should take to act more effectively in addressing the European citizens concerns and how to do so while moving forward in a positive spirit (neurope.eu 2014). In order to achieve a more effective way of addressing the citizens concerns, Mr Šefčovič stated there is a need to communicate with a clearer message.

This means that we have to build support and coalitions. Member States, Parliamentarians, but also stakeholders cannot stand by and leave the communication job to the Commission whereas everyone else focuses on criticizing ...it seems clear to me that we still need to work on transparency. Now, I believe that the Commission is one of the most transparent organisations in the world, with a commitment to wide consultation, open law-making and high quality impact assessments that are second to none. (neurope.eu 2014).

The focus is on transparency and the image on how lobbying in relation to the Commission is perceived by the media and citizens in general. He further states that the image that the media presents of the Commission's relation with lobbyists is as far from the reality as possible and that external influence and pressure is a regular occurrence which has been present since the emergence of the EU (neurope.eu 2014). However, he clearly points out that the image is tangibly present and need action to transformed for the better.

They see the Commission's commitment – in fact, its obligation under the Treaties – to consult widely on legislative proposals as opening the process up to undue influence. This is the perception of lobbying in Brussels – as widely reported in the EU media over the last few months – and it is undoubtedly a difficult image to dispel" (neurope.eu 2014).
The issues are concerned with the media which claims that there are as many lobbyists in Brussels as there is staff in the Commission (approx. 30 000), and that these shady actors influence up to 75% of EU legislation (neurope.eu 2014). He argues that with these figures, it is obvious that citizens might be disillusioned with the legitimacy of the EU. However, he states that this is of course far from the case in reality (neurope.eu 2014). It is further stated that the constant interaction between the Commission officials and lobby groups does not mean that the Commission is under bribery to represent their interests (neurope.eu 2014).

And yet, meetings between officials and stakeholders on a wide range of policy areas, and representing every side of the argument, take place on a daily basis in Brussels. How else can the Commission – as the main proposer of legislation – ensure that it does intelligently and effectively, in a balanced way that tries to take into account all points of view? Would critics prefer that the Commission remained entirely aloof, taking decisions that could affect millions of Europeans, without bothering to ask about the potential repercussions? (neurope.eu 2014).

The content of the speech is very relevant in the sense that the overall thread is perceived as a matter of confirming his own and/or the internal views on lobbying and lobbyists as part of the EU machinery. It is often clarified that as a Commissioner or an employee of the Commission, it is an obligation to consult widely with stakeholders such as citizens, national parliaments, NGOs and with the industry as part of the legislative proposal procedure (neurope.eu 2014). The speech ends with a positive encouragement to the young public affairs professionals in the audience.

…I count on you, as the next generation of lobbyists, to be at the forefront of showing that you too are committed to acting openly and proactively. As the new generation of EU lobbyists, will be part of that battle – ensuring the reputation of your industry does not suffer by making contributions to the development of future EU policies, alongside the myriad of other stakeholders involved in that process…..I am sure I can count on your support in this shared endeavour (neurope.eu 2014).

This is consistent with the statements made by both Mr Ohridski and Mr Ceballos Barón who argues that the lobbying input which they demand and receive are of much importance for the functioning of their work (Interview 4, 6: 2015).

We are always in a listening mode for input and they are a very good source of information. We cant replace the kind of resources that we get from business (Interview 4: 2015).
The interdependence between institutional actors and lobbying stakeholders can be connected to the regulation concerning transparency which is being implemented more intensively within the EU. Regulation of lobbying made in the EU, USA, Canada and the UK has, according to Naurin, a common basis for the initiative. The background to the regulations have very little to do with serious attempts to stop lobbying influence over policy, but is more about a kind of symbolic politics (Naurin 2001). The proposals to introduce increasing regulations in relation to lobbying is thus about politicians' attempts to demonstrate decisiveness. Lobbyists are regarded with distrust by the public, and the media describes lobbying as a shady and undemocratic phenomenon. This image motivates politicians' actions to regulate more, which in the public eye can be perceived as driving attempts to strengthen democracy (ibid). However, there are arguments suggesting that the democratic beliefs, that formed the basis for the regulating decisions, have been highly unclear in terms of achievement (ibid). Greenwood and Thomas argue that these kind of regulations have no impact on lobbyists' ability to impact and participate in politics: "Lobby regulation is never likely to restructure interest intermediation" (Greenwood & Thomas 1998: 498). The European Parliament has stated that "Widespread lobbying in the EU institutions has led to criticism regarding the transparency and accountability of the EU's decision-making process" (Mańko et al. 2014: 2). This statement is in line with both Naurin, Greenwood and Thomas arguments of using regulations as a symbolic tool for politics. Organizations which lack a functioning structure for coordinating activities among social components can experience their interdependency to others as a problem which causes uncertainties or unpredictability of outcomes (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 42-43). Organizations who perceive that they are facing uncertainty, tend to handle the situation by restructuring their exchange relationships. When trying to resolve their uncertainties regarding outcomes, organizations tend to increase their interdependence in relation to behavior, meaning that they inter-structure their behaviors in ways predictable for each other (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 43). The most ordinary solution for organizations to deal with issues of interdependence and uncertainty entails increasing coordination (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 42-43). Furthermore, it also leads to increasing the mutual control over each others’ activities, i.e., intensifying the behavioral interdependence of the social actors (ibid). The degree of interdependency between actors can change over time as organizations become more or less self-reliant (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 43).
The activities of organizations such as the EU will always involve exchanges with other actors. Since organizations are not independent or self-sufficient, they depend on the external actors to provide relevant resources and support (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 43). The lobbying actors which provide organizations with what their diverse needs are, will in return require certain actions (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978: 44), which is in line with Bouwen's supply and demand approach to the relationship between private and public actors.

The interview responses from the Commission indicate and confirm the hypothesis concerning the link between interdependency and the degree of demanded input. Through the interview, it becomes clear that the interviewee which represented the view that there is non-interdependence between herself and lobbyists, also had no demands for lobbying input (Interview 1: 2015). Hence, the interviewee communicated a low degree of interdependence towards lobbyists which corresponds to a low or according to the interviewee, a non-existing degree of demand (Interview 1: 2015). However, the interview material from Mr Ceballos Barón and Mr Ohridski shows a diverse side of the Commission, were there is a constant demand for lobbying input as well as a high degree of interdependence, since it is stated that they could not fulfill their duties if there were no input (Interview 4, 6: 2015). One side of the trade Cabinet indicate that parts of the Commission has no need or demand for lobbying input as they are fully equipped internally, while the other interview from the trade Cabinet as well as Mr Ohridski from the Transparency unit indicates that there is a great demand for frequent interaction with lobbyists in order to ensure steady input which is highly needed.

4.2.2 The European Parliament

Mutual exchange

The empirical material on the Parliament indicate that having a close and frequent contact with lobbying stakeholders are a key aspect for many MEPs. All the interviewees from the Parliament stated that they meet with lobbyists frequently in order to exchange goods or to interact in order to be updated on current news (Interview 2, 3, 5: 2015). Mr Adaktusson meets with lobbyists frequently and says that he often is in need of input and demand certain information regarding the fields in which he is engaged in as a politician and as a member of
Mr Adaktusson is in contact with all of the eleven identified kinds of lobbyists regarding different topics (Interview 2: 2015). He considers the gained input as valuable, considering lobbyists' knowledge on certain issues (Interview 2: 2015).

If politicians make laws that affect civil society, businesses and jobs we should listen to them before making decisions that affect them (Interview 2: 2015).

Mrs Björk is also in frequent contact with lobbying stakeholders (Interview 3: 2015). The close involvement requires that she has a frequent dialogue and contact with NGOs and their representatives to be able to keep up with their activities in Committees and to be updated on information she needs (Interview 3: 2015). The organizations and lobbyists that Mrs Björk meets with, have solid knowledge on specific issues and reports on the parliament’s agenda which is of great need for her parliamentarian work (Interview 3: 2015). Mrs Lahdo is in line with the MEPs and are in frequent contact with a variety of lobbying stakeholders including especially professional associations, public affairs consultancies, academic organizations, NGOs and associations of NGOs (Interview 5: 2015). The interviewees from the Parliament demonstrates a close and frequent cooperation with lobbying stakeholders characterized by mutual exchange (Interview 2, 3, 5: 2015). The interviewees regular contact with lobbyists facilitate the requested demands for input easier as the availability increases.

Resource dependence

The relationship between MEPs and lobbying stakeholders are an elementary and important part of their everyday work as politicians as well as for their work in the parliamentarian Committees (Interview 2, 3, 5: 2015). The empirics show that goods which lobbying stakeholders possesses are often demanded and that these goods are very important for the MEPs ability to carry out their parliamentary agendas (Interview 2, 3, 5: 2015).

Lobbyists are a substantial part of the European Parliament's work. I believe that lobbying is an essential part of the parliamentary process. Policy formulation would be weak without their contributions…. Lobbyists provide useful information (and MEPs are) smart enough to realise that the information they get is subjective, Alexander Stubb, former member of the EPP-ED Group, Finland, now Foreign Minister (European Parliament 2007a).

Lobbying, taken for itself, is something positive. We (MEPs) welcome everybody that can contribute something, said Committee Chairman, German Socialist Jo Leinen (European Parliament 2007).
The Finnish Prime Minister and former member of the EPP-ED Group Alexander Stubb, drafted a report on lobbying in the EU institutions, with the intention to highlight the decision-making process in Brussels (European Parliament 2007a). The main point of the report is stressing the importance of improving their work with lobbyists in order to enjoy legitimacy and exchange resources (European Parliament 2007a). Mrs Lahdo stated that her frequent contact with lobbying stakeholders are important in order to facilitate the resources which she needs (Interview 5: 2015).

Lobbying input brings a valuable insight to proposals consequences in reality, since it brings valuable expertise and information (Interview 5: 2015).

Mrs Björk considers the Commission’s need for lobbying resources to be overly dependent (Interview 3: 2015). However, regarding her own demands for lobbying resources, she emphasizes the importance of interest representation input as well as their resources and refers to a specific moment when she was visiting Sicily during the Lampedusa disaster. During this time, she met representatives of humanitarian organizations as well as Italian organizations, from whom she gained a lot of knowledge and learned facts and practicalities on the effects of the EU asylum policies and effects of the EU’s Frontex structures (Interview 3: 2015).

These facts and the knowledge I gained from them has been very important in my work in the Citizen Rights Committee (LIBE), for the human rights of asylum seekers (Interview 3: 2015).

**Organizational Structure**

The Parliament’s organizational structure seems to play a role in their dependence on lobbying stakeholders. As politicians and representatives of the European citizens, they are expected to have a close relation to civil society, to be well informed regarding issues that the Commission proposes as the Parliament with the Council jointly are finalizing most legislation, but also to follow their political agendas and the priorities which it comes with. Their political ideology are important in relation to their specific demands since, for example, liberals often promotes business and industry development, which imply that they will have increased contact with such representatives. Likewise, politicians to the left tend to have strong ties to NGOs to advocate certain issues and in the same line, ecologists tends have close contact with environmental movements, etc. In other word, the Parliament working structure
is built in a matter which makes them dependent on having a close relation to lobbying
stakeholders which can assist them in specific policy issues.

Mr Adaktusson stated that he considers lobbyists as ordinary people that live and
operate in a world that the politicians decide upon (Interview 2: 2015). As regards to whether
Mr Adaktusson would say that there is an interdependence between politicians, officials and
lobbyist:

…. it’s a symbiosis. We need their information and they should have all the right to inform us (Interview
2: 2015).

This statement is very straightforward, and the author of this paper understands this
implicitly as him viewing the relationship with lobbyists as an interaction between two
different actors living in close association, to the advantage of both, i.e., actors with a strong
correlation of interdependency.

*Other findings*

When asking the interviewees whether the Parliament and the Commission are
interdependent to lobbying stakeholders in different ways, Mrs Björk had a strong view on
this matter. Mrs Björk depicts the differences of the Parliament and the Commissions
interdependence to lobbying stakeholders to be vast in regard to how much consideration is
given to lobbyist input (Interview 3: 2015). She argues that the Commission gives priority to
the corporate lobbyists, which in turn affects their interdependence with theses actors
(Interview 3: 2015).

The Commission has several members who themselves are coming from top positions in corporations,
banks and lobbyism, so the links in between the two are also on a direct personal level. In the parliament there is
also a huge corporate lobby influence, but it depends on the MEPs political background and their independence
(Interview 3: 2015).

Mrs Björk distrust’s the Commission on whether their relations with various interests is
to the benefit for the European public interest. This paper does not address whether the
different institutional demands are performed in accordance with democratic values or not,
but it is an interesting impression that possibly could answer to why there are variations and
whether political position and ideology affect the attitude towards the interaction with various
lobbying stakeholders. In contrast to how Mrs Björk depicts the Commission's problematic relationship with lobbyists, there are other MEPs expressing their concern over parliamentarians dependence on lobbyists.

On the other hand Luxembourg Green Claude Turmes sees the "huge dependence on lobby advice [as] a weakness." He said it would be better if MEPs had larger staffs to gather independent information (European Parliament 2007).

Mrs Björk further develops on what the considerations of the major differences between the Commission and the Parliament are and gives an example of how she reasons:

The most important difference is that corporate lobbyist are given priority by the EU-Commission, take the TTIP-negotiations as an example out of the Commissions 560 meetings with external representatives in 2012 – 2013 (DG Trade not counted) 92% were with corporation lobbyists, only 4% with representatives of civil society and 4% with experts from universities and authorities. (Interview 3: 2015).

The author assumes that she implies that the interdependence between the Commission and corporate lobbyism is a major problem of the EU (Interview 3: 2015).

The interviewees from the Parliament confirms that there is a demand for lobbying input to such a degree that meetings and requesting input occur frequently. The interviewees from the Parliament indicate relations to lobbying stakeholders as characterized by mutual exchange, resource dependency and that the organizational structure of how they work reflects a high degree of interdependence. This is therefore also in accordance with this thesis’ hypothesis, which imply that there is a correlation between the degree of interdependence and the amount and type of demands. The hypothesis aimed to test whether a high degree of interdependence leads to more demands, which is confirmed in this case.

4.2.3 Analytical comparison on the degree of Interdependence

The degree of interdependence has been used as the independent variable in order to measure the dependent variable of types of demand, and has proven to give great results in terms of empirical outcomes. The empirical material confirmed that the majority of
Interviewees relation to lobbyists is characterized by interdependence. There is one non-confirming empirical source in the empirical material, which is the interview with Mrs Mungengová. It suggested that there is no demand for lobbying input and no sense of interdependence. However, the confirming empirics showed that in the cases where frequent contact with lobbyists occur, there is more demand and need for lobbying input, i.e., the higher the degree of interdependence between lobbyists and institutional actors, the more demand for lobbying input. These cases also confirmed that the organizational structure plays a large role in the type of demands as well as how often it is required.

During Mr Ceballos Barón's interview it became clear that the structure of the trade Cabinet is organized in such a manner that it makes them dependent on lobbyists’ input and their resources in order to be able to facilitate European trade. They are therefore in constant contact with lobbying stakeholders to exchange resources. The gained resources are described as of great importance and irreplaceable (Interview 4: 2015). In the speeches held by Mr Šefčovič, a need for closer cooperation between the Commission and the lobbying community of Brussels is depicted. The speeches further indicate that there is a desire to build stronger support and coalitions between the Commission and lobbyists in order to collectively work on the development of EU policies (neurope.eu 2014). Mr Ohridski stated that there is simply no other way to work than to include lobbying stakeholders in the process and that their input is frequently demanded as ”there is a need and practical reason for demanding lobbying input” (Interview 6: 2015). Mrs Björk’s frequent contact and demand for lobbying resources is viewed as a vital part of her parliamentarian work in various committees. The relationship with lobbyists interests are described to be of utmost importance since these alliance allows the political policy fields of interest to progress (Interview 3: 2015). Mr Adaktusson described the relationship to lobbyists as a symbiosis. There is a constant need for external resources in a variety of policy fields and the importance of exchanging information and views are described as a vital part for the functioning of the daily work (Interview 3: 2015). Mrs Lahdo confirms that the demand for lobbying input brings vital insights, expertise and information and that the relationship with lobbying stakeholders is very beneficial for the parties (Interview 5: 2015).

It is possible to conclude that a there is a significant relation of mutual exchange and resource dependency between the institutional actors and lobbying stakeholders (Interview 2,
3, 4, 5, 6: 2015). It has also become evident that the organizational structure of the Commission and the Parliament plays a part in explaining their interdependence to lobbyism. The Commission is a relatively small institution which in relation to its areas of competence are understaffed and do not have all the in-house competences needed to be able to cover legislation in all the EU areas of competence. This implies that the Commission's division of policy sector oriented departments desire specific knowledge and know-how techniques for each policy field, which is virtually impossible to obtain in-house due to the very detailed areas of knowledge expected to be covered as well as the fact that the Commission is understaffed in relation to its work load. These features indicate that the current organizational structure is built in such a way that makes the Commission dependent on lobbying input in order to carry out what is intended. The Parliaments organizational structure play a role in their interdependence towards lobbying stakeholders as their engagement in various parliamentarian committees as well as their part in finalizing the Commission's proposals and their agendas as politicians create a large and diverse scope of demand for input from lobbying stakeholders which can assist them in various aspects of their duties.

4.3 The linkage between the Dependent variable and the Independent variable

Based on the interviewees' contributions concerning the Commission and the Parliament's various demands for input, it can be concluded that the degree of interdependence could explain why the level of demands differ. The empirical material indicate that the level of interdependence between the Commission and the Parliament to lobbying stakeholders are similar; however, the scope of policy fields which needs to be covered are larger within the Parliament as they cover many policies depending on their political agendas the variety of Committees, as oppose to the Commission which is specialized and require a large amount of input regarding the specific field which in they work. It emerges clearly that Parliament has a great need of lobbying resources as they are involved in a variety of issues and policy areas simultaneously. Unlike the Commission, which is specialized in each area of EU policies, the Parliament needs resources regarding a wide variety of areas. The scope of matters to be covered by the parliamentarians in the
committees they are members of, and the information required to be able to propose amendments to the Commission's legislative proposals are generally larger than those that the Commission demands. However, the actual frequency of demands appears to be similar between the Commission and the Parliament. It is the scope of fields of demanded input which differs. All of the interviewees which confirmed the indicators of interdependence, i.e., mutual exchange, resource dependence and were the organizational structure makes institutional actors dependent on lobbying input, there where a high degree of demanded input. In other words, the empirical material show that as the indicators for Interdependence have been met, it correlates with more frequent demands, which help explain why the demands are higher or lower as well as how their type of demands can be discerned through their relations of interdependence. The hypothesis aimed to test whether; The higher the degree of interdependence between lobbyists and EU decision-makers/officials, the more institutional demands for lobbying input. The empirical analysis have shown that there is a linkage between the dependent and the independent variable and confirmed this thesis hypothesis. The degree of interdependence has assisted in answering the questions of how the demands can be discerned, and why they differ, by showing that the interviewees who met the indicators for interdependence, also frequently demanded input, meaning that the empirics showed a linkage between a relation of interdependence and increasing demands for lobbying input.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators for Interdependence</th>
<th>Degree of Interdependence</th>
<th>Type of Demands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mutual exchange</td>
<td>The interviewees which stated that they have a frequent contact with lobbying stakeholders also stated that they —&gt;</td>
<td>Frequently demand lobbying input, meaning increased type of demands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource dependence</td>
<td>The interviewees which stated that they are in frequent need of resources which lobbyists possesses, also showed that —&gt;</td>
<td>Their scope of demands are larger and stretches across various aspects of their work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational structure</td>
<td>The interviewees which showed that the demanded lobbying input is important or vital for fulfilling working duties, also showed that —&gt;</td>
<td>Their type of demands which are requested are vital for their functioning and for the efficiency of developing EU policies (legislative or non-legislative)</td>
</tr>
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</table>
5 Conclusion

The contextual meaning of the term lobbying is highly disputed and is often associated with both corruption as well as being a recognized supplier of information. The comprehensive focus on how lobbyists are operating towards the EU institutions, motivated for conducting a study which focuses on the opposite, i.e., on what the Commission’s and the Parliament’s demands for lobbying input are. The research problem of this thesis is based on the apparent discrepancy between the societal perception and the substantial functions of lobbying in relation to the EU institutions. In order to understand the phenomenon of lobbying, a thorough understanding of what the interacting actors’ roles are is needed. This thesis has aimed to fill out parts of the theoretical gap regarding how the demand side of lobbying can look, by asking the questions “What are the European Commission’s and the European Parliament’s different demands for lobbying input? How can it be discerned, and why does it differ?” The research question has been answered by comparing the Commission and the Parliament demands for lobbying input through six interviews and text materials on the basis of the theoretical framework. It has highlighted various institutional demands for lobbying input and tested whether the degree of interdependence impact the scope of input that is requested. Within the theoretical framework, Bouwen has established a scheme of supply and demand in regard to the EU legislative process, in order to investigate various lobbyists’ access to the policy process. This thesis desired to develop Bouwen’s variables of institutional demands and decided that the established institutional demands would function as the thesis dependent variable. In order to explain the dependent variable, this thesis added an independent variable, i.e., interdependence, which has proven useful to explain the how the dependent variable can be discerned and why it differs.

As demonstrated in the analysis, one can see a difference in demands for lobbying input between the Commission and the Parliament. The Commission and the Parliament are devoted to different constituencies, which makes their objectives over political considerations diverse. This affect their demands for lobbying input vastly. As the Commission is concerned with the encompassing European interests, and is divided into policy oriented departments,
the demands are specific for each office, DG and Cabinet since it requires specific input on particular policy fields that they work with. The interview with Mr Ceballos Barón from the Trade Cabinet, showed that there is a constant demand for lobbying input in order to know how current international trade obstacles affect European interests and in order to remove trade and investment barriers for European stakeholders and facilitate beneficial trade. The need for input is very specific for trade and investment related matters and serves to benefit all European stakeholders affected in this field. According to the interviewees from the Trade Cabinet, the demands for lobbying input is not for legislative purposes, which is an addition to the dependent variable were all the types of demands were directly connected to the legislative procedure. In line with this are the MEPs demands for lobbying input, which is multifaceted and not purely connected to the legislative process, but rather to their positions as substitute in various committees.

The interviewees from the Parliament have shown that their demands for lobbying input is more diverse in comparison to the demands of the Commission. The MEPs demands range across a variety of policy fields depending on which national party they represent, which Committees they are a member of and what their personal interests as politicians are. It is of utmost importance that the MEPs are actively involved in issues that their constituency expect them to be involved in, in order to increase their chances for being re-elected.

Five out of six interviewees who met the indicators for interdependence seem to have a similar relation to lobbyism. They all stated to frequently meet and interact with lobbyists in order to exchange or receive resources which is of great importance for their work. However, the main difference lies in the use of the input. The Parliament’s organizational structure makes their scope of policy fields to cover larger than the employees in the Commission, which means that they use the received input for a wider amount of working areas, while the Commission’s input is used for the specific policy area in which they work. The hypothesis aimed to test whether the higher the degree of interdependence between lobbyists and EU decision-makers/officials, the more institutional demands for lobbying input. The analysis has shown that there is a linkage between the dependent and the independent variable and confirmed this thesis hypothesis.
A clear conclusion that can be demonstrated on the basis of what the empirical material demonstrated, is that the term lobbying continues to be very diffuse and is understood in different ways. It remains a phenomenon that individuals, even within the same office, perceive and relate to very differentially. Furthermore, it becomes apparent that the different demands for lobbying input is at a personal level and needs to be thoroughly mapped in various areas in order to make a generalization in broader terms possible.

With the analysis as a basis, the conclusions of the various demands for lobbying input can be said to be significant and of great importance in relation to the EU institutions' daily work and functionality. The ramification of lobbying is better understood when viewed as an important part of the information based system of EU governance. It is a knowledge-bank which distributes policy-relevant information and expertise on any given matter among the EU institutions, securing institutional procedures for further development. This thesis has shown that there is a diversity of institutional demands for lobbying input within the EU and that there is a sense of interdependence between actors in the EU institutions and lobbyists. It has further offered an insight into what the Commission’s and the Parliament’s demands for lobbyists input can look like, how it can be depicted and why there is a difference between the respective institutions.

Knowledge of the different institutional needs and demands for lobbying input should be investigated further. The incomplete state of knowledge in this research field encourages the continuation of empirical studies on the EU’s institutional demands for lobbying input. A more in-depth study of institutional demands for lobbying input within the Commission’s different departments and an equivalent mapping of an extensive amount of MEPs demands for lobbyist input would provide a solid base for the two institutions demands.
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6) Martin Ohridski, Policy Officer at the Transparency Unit at the Secretariat General European Commission (Joint Transparency Register Secretariat), Phone Interview 27.32 minutes, 2015-06-18.
Appendix I: Interview Guide

Questions

1) How often are you in contact with lobbyists?
   - Never, Rarely, Often, Frequently, More than 3 times per week?

2) What kind of lobbyist are you most in contact with and Why?
   - Professional associations, companies, law firms, public affairs consultancies, chambers of commerce, academic organizations, trade unions, NGO’s and associations of NGO’s, representatives of religions, churches and communities of conviction, think-thanks and public authorities like regions, cities and municipalities?

3) Do you need input from lobbyists?
   Yes; Why and When?
   No; Why not?

4) How often do you need/demand input from lobbyists?
   - Never, Rarely, Often, Frequently, More than 3 times per week?

5) What kind of goods is it you ask for? (information needs, mapping positions on particular topics/policies, exchange of services, information to support legislation etc?)

6) Would you say that the Commission and the Parliament have different needs when it comes to lobbyist input?
   - What differences are there according to your experience?
   - Is the lobbyist input used/facilitated for different purposes? Examples?

7) Do you think lobbying input is important in relation to your work?
   - What is it that is important that you gain?
   What is lobbyists contributing, according to you? Examples?

8) Would you say that there is an interdependency between politicians/officials and lobbyists?
   Yes; How and why?
   No; Why not?

9) Do you have an example from a personal experience where external input in the form of...?...was required?