Instrumental Securitization

An Investigation of Contemporary Indo-Pakistani Hydro-Political Dynamics

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Abstract
The Indo-Pakistan rivalry has lasted for more than seven decades, experienced four major wars, countless armed skirmishes and extensive cross-border communal violence, resulting in more than one million casualties, and enormous amounts of resources diverted towards security. The disputed Kashmir region is often cited as the main reason for the persistence of the conflict. However, due to environmental stress and population increase, the influence of water-politics, as either a source of conflict- or cooperation, are gaining more analytical attention. Unquestionably, South-Asian policy-makers are increasingly linking environmental problems with national security; thereby inevitably militarize the contextual discourses. As recent research show, elements of Indian and Pakistani political elites alike have vested interests in maintaining the hostile relationship, a relationship which diverts responsibilities in domestic (mis)management while also consolidating political power by preserving existing threat perceptions. How does this manifest in on-going water disputes? Securitization Theory argues that by discursively framing or ‘securitizing’ specific issues, policy makers gain political momentum through the popular acceptance of implementing extraordinary means, which consequently removes institutional checks and balances while diverting attention away from domestic problems. This thesis aimed to explain these processes - and the underlying motivating dynamics - in one contemporary water conflict: the Indo-Pakistani Baglihar Dam dispute.

Key Words: India-Pakistan, International Relations, Security, Hydro-Politics, Securitization Theory

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## CONTENTS

1. **INTRODUCTION**  
   1.1 Forewords – The 'Enduring Rivals of South-Asia'  
   1.2 Research Question  
   1.3 Environmental Stress and South-Asian Securitization  
      *The Increasing Securitization of Indo-Pakistani Hydro-Politics*  
   1.4 Motivation  
      *The Refrain from Traditional Theories*  
      *Importance of Research*  
      *Why Actors Securitize*  
   1.5 Ethical Considerations  
   1.6 OUTLINE OF THESIS  

2. **THEORIES AND CONCEPTS**  
   2.1 Social Constructivism in the Indo-Pakistani Context  
   2.2 Copenhagen School and Securitization Theory  
      *The Securitizing Move*  
      *Sectors and Security Complexes*  
      *Critiques and Elaborations*  
   2.3 The Hydrological Security Complex  
      *Hydro-Hegemony and Lower-Riparian Anxiety*  
   2.4 Methodology  
      *Applying Discourse Analysis*  
      *Data*  
      *Empirical Delimitations*  
      *Applying Case Studies*  
      *Choice of Care – Why the Baghbar Issue*  

3. **ANALYSIS: SECURITIZATION ON THE INDUS RIVER**  
   3.1 Introduction  
   3.2 The Initial Stage – Hydro-Hegemony and Lower-Riparian Fears  
      *Pakistani Speech Acts and Practices*  
      *Indian Speech Acts and Practices*  
      *Summarization: Dynamics of the Hydrological Security Complex at Display*  
   3.3 Third-Party Involvement and Linkages to Kashmir  
   3.4 Post-Settlement – A Conflict Less Solved  

4. **CONCLUSIONS**  
   4.1 The Call for De-Securitization  

5. **BIBLIOGRAPHY**  
   5.1 Illustrations
List of Illustrations

Box 1 The Partition of India 2
Box 2 Water Index 5
Box 3 Public Opinions in India 11
Box 4 Public Opinions in Pakistan 12
Box 5 Broadening and Deepening Security 16
Box 6 Epistemological Considerations 19
Box 7 Case-example, India 20
Box 8 Case-example, Pakistan 20
Box 9 Merging Constructivism and (neo)Realism 23

Figure 1 Spectrum of Securitization 17
Figure 2 Sectors in Securitization Theory 18

Map 1 South Asia 1
Map 2 Global Water Scarcity 4
Map 3 Indus Water Basin 6
Map 4 Baglihar Dam 29
Map 5 Kishangaga Dam 49

Table 1 Analytical Framework 25
Table 2 Data Used in Study 27
Table 3 Overall Securitization of Water 32
Table 4 Official Objections of Baglihar 32
Table 5 Securitizing Moves, Initial Stage 38
Table 6 Securitization in J&K 43

Poll 1 Opinion of Current State of Country 11
Poll 2 Influence on Pakistani State Affairs 12
Poll 3 Greatest Threat to Pakistan 12

List of Abbreviations

CS Copenhagen School
IR International Relations
HSC Hydropolitical Security Complex
IWT Indus Water Treaty
J&K Jammu and Kashmir
NSA Non-State Actor
NWP National Water Policy

NE Neutral Expert
MP Member of Parliament
PM Prime Minister
PT Practice Theory
RSC Regional Security Complex
SC Security Complex
ST Securitization Theory
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Forewords – The ’Enduring Rivals of South-Asia’

In any research, the initial task is to position the study so that readers understand the specific ‘points of concern’ (Evans et al. 2014: 61). Therefore, the following section will set the stage by highlighting key elements of the Indo-Pakistani conflict, while briefly explaining the concept of hydro-politics and the seemingly increasing securitization of South-Asian water-disputes.

The seven decade long conflict between India and Pakistan, often understood as an ‘enduring rivalry’ within International Relations (IR) scholarship, has experienced four major wars and countless armed skirmishes (Misra, 2010: 9-12; Paul, 2005: 3-5; Pardesi & Ganguly, 2007: 131). It is frequently described as one of the most violent and persistent conflicts of our time (Khan, 2005: 160), in which the oppositional national identities of secular India and Muslim Pakistan are generally viewed as pivotal for maintaining the conflict (Nasr, 2005: 178; Tadjabaksh, 2011: 10, 24-25).

These oppositional dynamics manifest in various disputes, all emanating from the mistrust, animosity and overall existential fear of one-another, thus tainting relations since Partition in 1947 (Hasan, 2005: 74; 1

Map 1: South-Asia

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1 For an extensive explanation of the ‘enduring rivalries concept’, see Geller, 1993.
Cohen, 2013: 18; Mir, 2014: 110). The concept of ‘enduring rivalries’ as formulated by Geller (1993) and further developed by Paul⁵ (2005, 2006; see also Alam et al. 2011: 22-23) adequately explains the persistence of the conflict: In Geller’s article, multiple conceptual definitions of inter-state rivalries are summarized. The historical record of the Indo-Pakistani rivalry adequately fits these definitions, having “…experienced all these manifestations of confrontation” (Misra, 2010: 12). The persistent rivalry was an outcome of both deliberate actions and short-sighted failures to make comprises by the respective leaders of changing India, emerging Pakistan, and parting Britain⁴. Together, these actors were at least partly responsible in the “…creation of a communal discourse of Hindu–Muslim relations characterized by difference [and] antagonism” (Brass, 2003: 76) which emerged during the bloody Partition in 1947 (see Box 1).

The most noticeable factors maintaining the rivalry are the territorial aspects and the conflicting- or contrasting religious/national identities inherent within the two states (Paul, 2006: 610). Cohen (2013) explains that the conflict predominantly revolves around three connected geostrategic issues – Kashmir, the Siachen Glacier and water (2013: 33). The majority of scholarship has emphasized Kashmir as the “…chief source of conflict in the several wars fought between India and Pakistan” (Chari, 2003: 2; see also Tadjbakhsh, 2011, 3; Nasr, 2005: 179 Hasan, 2005: 74) while proving a constant obstruction to lasting peace⁵ (McLeod, 2008: 3; Pardesi & Ganguly, 2007: 135-136). Nonetheless, these three issues cannot be strategically separated, nor can their national-symbolic

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5 Enduring rivalries can be understood as conflicts “…between two or more states that last more than two decades with several militarized inter-state disputes punctuating the relationship in between [with a] persistent, fundamental, and long term incompatibility of goals between two states” (Paul, 2005: 3-4) which consequentially produce an almost existential animosity forcing parties to often view relations as zero-sum, while the conflict becomes further entrenched – or embedded (Paul, 2006: 602).

⁴ For an account of the political developments and the growing dissolution of the Indian Muslimsm within colonial India, see Kothari, 2009: 65-70. For a related analysis of the transformation of a discourse from demanded inclusiveness to outright separatism from India, see Nasr, 2005: 179-182.

⁵ The Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir has proven a continuous site for armed engagement (Malis, 2014) on which “…Cross-LoC fire has unfortunately become a barometer of India-Pakistan relations” (Bukhari, 2014).

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Box 1: The Partition of India

A Majority of experts recognize the Partition in 1947 as the main cause for the current animosity between India and Pakistan, arguing that the very foundation of the rivalry is located in the “…alternative visions of the Indian and Pakistani states” (Pardesi & Ganguly, 2007: 135). The petition for a separate Muslim state originated chiefly from divisive colonial policies and a growing discontent with the Hindu community, mainly caused by electoral frustrations leading to fears of Muslim misrepresentation. Thus, instead of opting for separate electorates within an Indian state, demands for separate Muslim state were made (Kothari, 2009: 65-70).
meaning be detached from one-another. While Kashmir unquestionably is essential for the rivalry, just as armed confrontations on the Siachen glacier have severely impeded overall relations, the attention of this thesis is on the last geostrategic issue: hydro-politics and its exploitation by certain elite actors in Indo-Pakistani security relations (Mustafa, 2007; Hazarika & Mehta, 2014: 20-23).

1.2 Research Question

According to Buzan et al. (1998) the essential quality of security is the framing of existential issues as of imperative political priority (1998: 26). Hence, the researcher’s task is not to determine the characteristics and importance of an ‘objective’ threat, but rather to “...understand the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat” (Ibid. 26 [emphasis added]; see also Buzan & Wæver 2003: 71). This thesis will describe the dynamics of such practices, while stressing the instrumental value in ‘constructing security’. This will be accomplished by highlighting underlying motivations for securitizing certain issues, while emphasizing the utility in this practice i.e. why actors attempt this process. As will be revealed, this research agenda directly translates into contemporary Indo-Pakistani scholarship by Bisht (2011), Tadjabaksh (2011) and Pervez (2013), researchers who all argue that underlying political and self-serving interests unquestionably influence securitizing actors in both countries. However, within their research, only scant attention to hydro-politics is given. This is where the thesis is situated by conducting a limited case study. In studying discourses and practices revolving one specific hydrological conflict, the decade long dispute over the Indian Baglihar Dam, this thesis asks:

What were the securitizing elements within the Baglihar dispute, and what do these reveal about the larger dynamics driving the South-Asian Hydro-political Security Complex?

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6 For instance, the Siachen Glacier feeds the vital Indus River, thus making it a geo-strategic water-issue, all the while it holds symbolic significance as it lies within the disputed region of Kashmir (Khan, 2012).
7 For a geo-strategic- and symbolic analysis, and an overview of the costs in resources and lives, see Misra, 2010: 107-137; Khan, 2012.
8 Hydro-politics can be understood as the outcome of increasing academic attention on the potential violent outcome of international water-disputes, and relates to “...the ability of geopolitical institutions to manage shared water resources in a politically sustainable manner” (Wolf, 2007: 12).
1.3 Environmental Stress and South-Asian Securitization

Within hydro-political research, especially *internationally* shared river basins are gaining more attention, excelling as a notable sub-discipline within IR theory (Hogan, 2005: 2; Wirsing, 2011: 39; Stetter et al. 2011: 441-442; Burgess et al. 2013: 1). Its relevancy is evident: 148 states possess areas within international river basins, covering 46% of Earth’s land surface (UN-Water 2014a; UN Water 2014b). Moreover, 40% of the global population lives nearby these basins (UN Water, 2008). Among many of the 250 internationally shared river basins conflicts are indeed intensifying, primarily driven by the decrease of freshwater availability and population increase (Hazarika & Mehta, 2014: 20).

Hence, the peaceful maintenance of internationally shared rivers is unmistakably of highest importance. Furthermore, water will only gain more significance in the future as environmental pressures increase, especially on the Southern Hemisphere, mainly due to over-population and urbanization, industrialization and climate change (Pai, 2008: 2-3; Jaitly, 2009: 18-19; John, 2011: 6). Map 2 displays the water-stress level globally as of 2012, highlighting the global North/South disparity.

*Map 2: Global Water Scarcity*
Hydrological theory contends that shared water-basins can cause much tension between states, and that especially pressures from gradual decline in water quality- and quantity potentially instigate a ‘spill-over effect’ into the international arena (Wolf, 2007: 19; Wolf, et al. 2005: 81). Nevertheless, water can also play a crucial part in normalizing relations between hostile states if looming water-scarcity is framed as a bilateral threat, instead of a zero-sum scenario (Ibid. 85; Homer-Dixon 1994; Gleick 1999; Price et al. 2014: vii-x.).

Particular South-Asia is increasingly experiencing the effects from environmental stress, elevating especially the concept of ‘water-scarcity’ (see Box 2) to a national security concern (UNESCO, 2011: 35-37, 87-83). India and Pakistan alike are facing extreme rates of population growth, wide-spread poverty and fast-declining food production coupled with a rising demand of water for domestic, agricultural and industrial uses, thus “…moving inexorably towards chronic water scarcity” (Wirsing, 2011: 42; see also John, 2011: 2). According to the Mckinsey Report (2009), the per capital water availability in India has plummeted from 5,000 m3 per year in 1947, to less than 2,000 m3 per year in 1997, and is projected to drop below 1.500 in 2025 (2009: 6, 12, 19, 45). Moreover, instigated by population growth and growing domestic consumption, the demand of water will increase to almost 1.5 trillion m3. India’s current water supply is 740 billion m3 (Ibid. 10).

Water-scarcity is similarly increasing in Pakistan (Wirsing, 2011: 42; Mashru, 2014) with shortages projected to increase by 23.51% in 2025 (Khalid et al. 2014: 268). Although receiving water from three different basins, the Indus Basin emanating from the Indian borders is of highest importance, providing water for 77% of the population (Bakshi & Trivedi, 2011: 3). As Alam et al. (2011) explain, the enormous Pakistani level of dependence on the Indus has “…historically influenced the threat perspective” (2011: 23). Moreover, as Pakistan is undeniably more dependent on the Basin than India. Recently, a considerable

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Box 2: Water Index

The influence by water resources to vulnerability is linked to the quantity and variation of water, and the pressures from these variables are referred to as ‘scarcity’ and ‘variation’. The water scarcity parameter is expressed in terms of annual per capita water resources available compared to the commonly agreed minimum level of per capita water resources required which is 1,700m3 pr. person (Babel & Wahid, 2008: 4; Hazarika & Mehta, 2014: 26-27). Thus an area is designated ‘water-stressed’ when annual supplies drop below 1.700m3 per person, ‘water scarce’ below 1.000 m3, and ‘absolute scarcity’ when available water is lower than 500m3 (UN.org 2014).

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8 Chellaney (2013) explains that Asia “…faces water challenges more weighty than developing economies elsewhere put together” (2013: 47; see also Chellaney, 2012: 142-143; IBWG, 2013: 20). For an account of the contemporary and prospective effects of climate change, over-population and intensified industrialization, see Babel & Wahid, 2008.
amount of scholars have argued that water-scarcity will increasingly become a “…key driver of tension and conflict within societies and states” (IDSA, 2010: 19). For instance, John (2011) explains that water will only play a more critical part in maintaining peace and stability in the region in the coming decades by “…dominating internal and external policies” (2011: 1). As such, the discourses on especially international shared waters are becoming increasingly securitized\(^{10}\), thus “…making water appear to be a source of tension, and potentially of conflict” (Price \textit{et al.} 2014: 92; see also, R. Singh, 2008: 7-8). This is certainly the case for India and Pakistan, being the region’s most water-poor nations already while demands only rise due to the aforementioned environmental pressures\(^{11}\) (Khalid, 2014: 259-260). As one recent report foresees, Indian hydro-politics with Pakistan will become dominated by political and strategic considerations because water increasingly will become instrumental as “…a tool of bargain [thus] trade-off will assume predominance because the political stakes are high \textit{vis-à-vis} Pakistan” (IDSA, 2010: 29). Similar contentions have been made by a range of scholars regarding Pakistani hydrological attitudes towards India (e.g. Bisht, 2011; Tadkabaksh, 2011; R. Singh, 2011; Burgess \textit{et al.} 2013).

Since Partition India and Pakistan have indeed since Partition experienced water-related conflicts, in which the shared Indus River Basin (see Map 3) is the primary site of contention (Khalid \textit{et al.} 2014: 264). Being of vital importance for both countries, the rapid decline of the Indus’ available water\(^ {12}\) press populations and decision-makers alike, while contributing to overall inter-state tensions (Wirsing, 2011: 49; Bagla, 2010: 142-143; Mashru, R. 2014. On the relation between water-scarcity and increasing conflict, see Wolf, A.T. \textit{et al.} 2005: 81; Hazarika, O.B. & Mehta, S. 2014: 27.


\(^{11}\) India and Pakistan are in fact among the most vulnerable nations globally in terms of future climate-related impacts (Hill, 2003: 29, 2013: 244; see also, John, 2011: 2; Wirsing, 2011: 41-42; Chellaney, 2012: 145, 154; 2013: 55-56).

\(^{12}\) All though the basin holds available water resources of 286.93 billion m\(^3\), the basin’s population of 300 million makes the annual per capita water availability of only 1.329 m\(^3\) (IBWG, 2013: 13-14), which is significant lower than regions’ other shared basins (Babel & Wahid 2008: 14).
1226; Sinha et al. 2012: 735). The Indus is indeed stressed to the point that water removals far exceed natural rates of renewal, thus facing ‘basin closure’ (IBWG, 2013: 16). Recalling the water-scarcity-conflict nexus (Wolf, 2007: 19) while factoring in the dynamics of the Indo-Pakistani enduring rivalry, armed conflicts regarding access to and use of water seems highly likely. Indeed this was noted in 2009 by numerous United Nations bodies, which warned that water had evolved into the most prominent driver for tensions between the two countries, hence “…the world [could] be perilously close to its first water war” (Hazari, & Mehta, 2014: 27).

Without doubt, South-Asian hydrological disputes are increasing, partly influenced by a recent virtual explosion in Indian hydrological infrastructure on the Indus (Bhatt, 2011; Jayaram, 2013). These actions have placed the Indus Water Treaty (IWT), signed between the two countries in 1960 under significant stress (Khalid, 2014: 265-266R; Singh, 2008: 10). Successful in smoothing post-Partition water-related tensions, the treaty has often been referred to as the hallmark within water-negotiations for its durability and effectiveness (Babel & Wahid 2008: 20; Barrett, 1994: 33; Bakshi & Trivedi, 2011: 8-9; Kakahel, 2014: 43-44). However, because the IWT divided the rivers between the countries, instead of institutionalizing co-ownership, it “…discarded the norms protecting the downstream country” (Wirsing and Jasparro, 2006: 3). This decision has been vital for developing a ‘lower-riparian anxiety-complex’, in which Pakistan perceives all actions by India as potentially threatening (Tadjabaksh, 2011: 10-11; Sinha et al. 2012: 742-743).

**The Increasing Securitization of Indo-Pakistani Hydro-Politics**

National security is increasingly being linked to the management of the declining Indus Basin, which leads to a ‘securitization’ of overall Indo-Pakistani hydrological relations (Veilleux et al. 2014: 8; Alam et al. 2011: 5). Securitization denotes the process of framing specific issues as ‘existential threatening’ to a given ‘referent object’, consequently infusing the matter with priority and urgency, thereby legitimizing the implementation of extraordinary security-policies (Buzan et al. 1998; 25-26). Hence, securitization often amplify geo-strategic security dynamics thereby furthering the possibility of conflict, especially in basins facing closure (R. Singh, 2008: 8; IDSA, 2010: 19; Turton, 2003: 76).

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13 Basin closure is the hydrological term for a basin in which all available water has been distributed to production, leaving no more left to be allocated (Turton, 2003: 8, 33).

14 The treaty remained operational during the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars, the Kargil conflict in 2001 as well as the political crisis in the wake of the 2001 Delhi parliament- and the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks (Sinha et al. 2012: 735; see also Kraska, 2009: 515).
Indeed, a recent CIA report warned that Indo-Pakistani hydrological conflicts would only increase due to water-scarcity (Economist, 2011). Similarly, another report argued that the aggregate effects of water-scarcity on associated sectors (e.g. food and energy) would become key in future national security policies (ICA, 2012: iii). Arguably, future South-Asian conflicts will be greatly affected by the “…shift in the way a nation views freshwater” (Veilleux et al. 2014: 10). Hydro-securitizing severely influences perceptions of water itself, which is arguably influential in the increasing discontent with existing institutional arrangements. In turn, this has caused a growing criticism of the IWT by Indian and Pakistani political actors alike, most rigorously by the latter due to a virtual explosion in Indian hydrological constructions (Hill, 2013: 251; Bhutta, 2011; Jayaram, 2013). As a consequence of increased securitization, policy makers invariably view hydrological disputes as ‘zero-sum’ instead of seeking mutual favorable solutions (Leather, 2001:131; Olmstead, 2014). Definitely, this manifests when water recurrently is situated within a militaristic/national security discourse.

1.4 Motivation

In the following, I will briefly explain my motivations for writing this thesis, emphasizing the theoretical refrain from traditional IR theories while stressing the importance of this particular study i.e. the saliency in explaining securitizing dynamics within a South-Asian hydro-political context. In addition, I will discuss the theoretical- and empirical motivations driving actors to pursue the accepted securitization of water itself.

The Refrain from Traditional Theories

In order to explain the increasing South-Asian hydrological securitization, Realism and Liberalism, the traditional theories of IR arguably prove deficient. Indeed, many scholars point to the explanatory shortcomings of both theories in a South-Asian context, as they fail to assign importance to the contextual identity- and socially constructed dynamics and mutual constitution of subjects and objects (Shafique, 2011; Pervez, 2013). Similarly, an emerging trend within hydro-politics views water not only as a physical commodity, but emphasizes its socially constructed character (Mustafa, 2007; Stetter et al. 2011; Burgess et al. 2013).

In this thesis, I adopt the analytical framework of traditional Securitization Theory (ST) bolstered with recent theoretical elaborations, some which have been applied to an Asian setting. Thus, I align myself with
both strains of critiques: Those pointing out the analytical inadequacies of traditional IR theories (Checkel, 1998: 324; Pervez, 2013: 19, 72) and those arguing that hydrological analyses necessitate the inclusion of socio-political meanings and wider contexts (Stetter et al. 2011: 442; Burgess et al. 2013: 2). In order to explain these ‘wider contexts’, traditional ST theory misses out by exclusively focusing on speech acts (Wæver, 1995: 55; Buzan et al. 1998: 36). Therefore, inspired by contemporary scholarship (Curley & Herrington, 2011; Jones, 2011; Balzacq, 2011) I argue for the saliency in analyzing ‘practices of security’ as well as speech acts.

**Importance of Research**

In theory, ‘enduring rivals’ are eight times more likely to engage in military engagement, compared to states involved in isolated disputes (Misra, 2010: 10). Peacefully ending the Indo-Pakistani rivalry is evidently critical given its volatile nature, while factoring in the potential for nuclear escalation15. As explained, hydro-politics are increasingly playing an important role in South-Asia, fueling conflicts while obstructing potential cooperation (Hazarika & Mehta, 2014: 20-23). I assume that the securitization of water contributes to the maintenance of antagonistic identities, which evidently is the agenda of certain securitizing actors (Pervez, 2013: 2, 45). Moreover, I contend that these actors recognize the instrumental value of securitization as a ‘political tool’, or a “…decisionist imposition of will” (Gad & Petersen, 2011: 318) capable of politically integrate- or harmonize a society by collectively constructing an existential threat embodied by an enemy (Huysmans, 1998: 577). Relating this to hydro-political theory, Gleick (1993) indeed argues that water has rarely been the primary cause of conflict, but should be viewed as a “…function of the relationships among social, political, and economic factors” (1993: 92).

But is more security not a positive thing? Not according to the ST’s founders, which problematize the often uncritically conceptualization of security as a preferred state, or a ‘universal good’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 4). This conceptualization is indeed problematic as security in Buzan et al’s (1998) own words are a “…stabilization of conflictual and threatening relations, often through emergency mobilization of the state [thus] a secure relationship still contains serious conflicts” (1998: 4; see also, Wæver, 1995: 212-213). Consequently, security should generally be understood as negative - a failure to politically manage conflicts,

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15 The nuclear acquisition of both countries in 1998 have been crucial for the persistence of the conflict (Misra, 2010: 16; Chari, 2003: 23; Khan, 2005: 160; Pardesi, & Ganguly, 2007: 131). Moreover, since 2000 the South-Asian nuclear arms-race has only become more intense (Krepon 2015).
while the ‘de-securitization’ of issues should always be sought (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). De-securitization is the process of withdrawing issues from the securitized level where policies “…demonize differences and reduces the sources of security problems to ‘evildoers’” (Grayson, 2003: 341) and instead reintroduces “…a matter into a standard politicized level [thus preventing] risks to society and abuse of authority” (Emmers, 2013: 137). Theoretically, this process allows actors to refrain from the likely armed solutions to problems actually requiring various non-military responses (De Brito, 2012: 5-6).

Pervez (2013) argues that the animosity and current security dilemma between India and Pakistan are created by the ruling classes of both countries, which have vested interests in maintaining this relationship (2013: 2, 44-45). The security dilemma can briefly be understood as a situation in which “…the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others” (Glaser, 1997: 174). Perceptions are pivotal, as it is the very security initiatives undertaken by state A which is perceived as threatening to state B, thus leading the latter to react, consequently forcing similar reactions with the former (Pervez, 2013: 2; Glaser, 1997: 174). This self-reinforcing process has amply also been called the ‘spiral-model’ (Glaser, 1997: 171), a process undeniably in the interests of certain elements of the Indian and Pakistani elites alike to maintain (Bisht, 2011: 15-16; Pervez, 2013: 44).

In Pakistan, the security establishment has long dominated policymaking16, clearly obstructing attempts at peacemaking with India (Tadjabaksh, 2011: 20). In India, hawkish elements of the political elite, notably from the nationalistic Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have similarly impeded “…meaningful dialogue with Pakistan” (Ibid. 20). As concrete examples, Pervez (2013) mentions the army in Pakistan (often the primary actor in state politics), which maintains power by projecting India as a threat (2013: 2; Aqil, 2014: 256). In India, examples are drawn from Hindu fundamentalist parties (e.g. the BJP), which by adopting an anti-Muslim/Pakistani discourse have experienced electoral success in 1996, 1997 and from 1998-2004 respectively (Pervez, 2013: 2; see also Kinnvall, 2002; Kinnvall & Svensson 2010).

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16 For a detailed description of the Pakistani security establishment, consisting of top military commanders, intelligence community leaders and elite bureaucrats, see Tadjabaksh, 2011: 21.
Why Actors Securitize

By successfully securitizing an issue, actors gain acceptance for implementing extraordinary measures, e.g. increased secrecy, limiting former inviolable rights, or diverting resources towards a specific issue (Buzan et al. 1998: 24). Thus discursive threat-constructions become ‘instrumentalized’ (Huysmans, 1998: 26) which invariably directs attention away from domestic (mis)management and related inequalities, and towards political projects intended to serve some groups more than others (Emmers, 2013: 136-137; Wæver 1995: 221). Moreover, while further empowering the state by reducing democratic emancipation (Buzan et al. 1998: 29; Wæver, 2000: 2) enemy constructions are often (re)produced, thereby keeping civil society ‘prisoners of their own fear’ (Grayson, 2003: 339) consequently breeding even more (in)security (Aradau, 2001: 2). As Grayson (2003) explains, securitization is indeed a tempting strategy for policy makers, enabling them to deal with “…the manifestations of highly complex problems by simplistically shifting all blame/responsibility/guilt to another group/element/factor that is then seen to embody ‘threats’ that must be eliminated” (2003: 339) while they themselves gain additional power and authority.

Hydrological securitization thus becomes instrumental in maintaining existing- or amassing greater political support (Emmers, 2013: 135-136). This is unquestionably taking place in South-Asia (R. Singh, 2008: 8; Sinha, 2014: 60) where one recent regional study found that politicians blaming domestic water woes on neighboring countries are common practice (Price et al. 2014: 100; see also Bisht, 2011: 15-16). While environmental securitizing can potentially infuse issues with much-needed urgency (Buzan et al. 1998: 23-25) there is a clear risk that the issue itself will “…become vulnerable to political vested interests [while] solutions could be manipulated within the political context” (IDSA, 2010: 19; see also Wæver, 1995: 22; 2012, 53).

Box 3: Public Opinions in India

A pew poll, conducted prior to the Indian general election 2014 found widespread popular dissatisfaction with the current state of the nation, especially concerning the declining economy, waning infrastructure and the level of state corruption, which all has led to a general delusion with the political establishment (Pewglobal, 2014a). Hence, the increasing securitization of water, the virtual explosion in hydrological infrastructure and the intensified usage of pro-Hindu/anti-Muslim discourses could all be understood as attempts to divert attention away from these domestic issues.

Poll 1: Opinion of Current State of the Country

- Don’t know: 1%
- Satisfied: 29%
- Dissatisfied: 70%
In India and Pakistan, the abysmal condition of state institutions, rule of law, high corruption/low accountability (Barthwal-Datta, 2012: 3, 35-38; Burki, 2012) leads to popular discontent with current policy-makers if not effectively diverted towards more perceived pressing issues (see Boxes 3 and 4 respectively).

Thus, I contend that similar dynamics are taking place in both countries, where “…corruption scandals and unstable governments serve as a backdrop to ethnic and religious political tension” (Buzan, 2002: 7). Moreover, the security complex between the countries is equally about perceptions of one-another and about internal politico-military relations (Ibid. 7). This manifests when certain issues are securitized – with potential detrimental inter-state relational effects.

Thus, my research agenda is to analyze the processes of Indo-Pakistani hydrological securitization, while shedding light on some of the underlying reasons motivating actors. This is certainly a novel undertaking, as ST argues that political elites can simultaneously assert power- and gain additional political maneuverability through the successful securitization of issues (Emmers, 2013: 136). Moreover, as hydro-political theory contends, the

**Box 4: Public Opinions in Pakistan**

According to a 2013 Pew poll, 91% of respondents were dissatisfied with the current state of Pakistan while 81% thought the national economic conditions were bad (Pewglobal, 2013; Pewglobal 2014b). As the following polls indicate, there is however a great confidence in the military establishment, while India is continuously seen as the biggest threat to the country. These sentiments fits with the findings of e.g. Bisht (2011), Tadjabaksh (2011) and Pervez (2013) which all argue that securitizing India works to divert attention away from domestic discontent while the military elites especially benefit from maintaining the threatening image of India.

**Poll 2: Influence on Pakistani State Affairs**

- Religious Leaders: 64% Good, 20% Bad
- Media: 68% Good, 16% Bad
- Military: 87% Good, 8% Bad

**Poll 3: Greatest Threat to Pakistan**

- India: 2009: 70%, 2010: 60%, 2011: 50%, 2012: 40%, 2013: 30%
- Taliban: 2009: 10%, 2010: 20%, 2011: 30%, 2012: 40%, 2013: 50%
mutual threat of water-scarcity could serve as a means for cooperation instead of conflict (IBWG, 2013: 49-50; Miner, *et al.* 2009: 207). Thus, it is of vital importance to further the understanding of hydro-political securitization between India and Pakistan in order to gain a better understanding of the obstructions to ending the enduring South-Asian rivalry.

### 1.5 Ethical Considerations

This study has been carried out in accordance with the ethical guidelines as formulated by the Swedish Research Council, entailing a range of ethical principles to be followed regarding data collection and interviews (Vetenskapsrådet, 2002). In terms of the latter, these requirements have not been relevant for my study as I refrain from conducting interviews myself. Nor do I undertake field studies, but solely limit myself to an investigation of discourses and practices, in which data is collected by conducting a holistic textual analysis of relevant empirical- and theoretical data. In regards to data collection, references are given whenever required, and quotes are either correctly cited or typographically represented whenever altered to fit the actual thesis text.

### 1.6 Outline of Thesis

The thesis is divided into three main parts;

The *first section* explains theories and concepts used, taking point of departure in a constructivist epistemology while presenting the various theoretical assumptions and concepts utilized, contextualized to the empirical focus. Moreover, I briefly explain ST while highlighting its various criticisms. An elaboration of the theory will then be synthesized into a bolstered analytical framework, derived primarily from the collective works of Buzan *et al.* (1998) John (2011), Balzacq (2011) and Curley and Herrington (2011).

The *second section* entails the methodological considerations and choices. Here I emphasize the inherent choice of conducting a discourse analysis when utilizing ST, while elaborating on choice of data, limitations, and the chosen case study.

The *third section* covers the actual analysis. Here I apply the theoretical framework to the Baglihar case-study, highlighting the political instrumental value of securitization. Subsequently, I will draw conclusions and discuss the prospective future for Indio-Pakistani hydro-diplomatic relations in a changing (political) climate, yet again emphasizing the imperative need for de-securitization.
2. THEORIES AND CONCEPTS

2.1 Social Constructivism in the Indo-Pakistani Context

Constructivism is best understood in contrast to the two traditionally dominant theories of IR (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism. These theories emphasize material capabilities (Wendt, 1995: 71-72; Checkel, 1998: 326) while contending that state’s are primarily driven by ‘structural power’ and national interests (Adler, 1997: 322; Agius, 2013: 88; Jackson & Sorensen, 2007: 60-61, 98-100). In contrast, constructivism views the interests of states as “…discursively structured by inter-subjective rules, norms and institutions” (Reus-Smit 2002: 488). Interaction is not merely influenced by material factors, but equally by ‘inter-subjective’ understandings, denoting the commonly shared ideas which produce both interests and identities of individuals, collectives and states (Chekel, 1998: 325-326; Wendt, 1998: 71-72; Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001: 392-393). Moreover, constructivists emphasize the ‘mutual constitution’ of the material world and social agents (Agius, 2013: 95-96). According to Wendt (1998), the international state structure is not universally given, but continuously (re)shaped by the actions and practices of actors driven by identities and interest (1998: 71-72; see also Reus-Smit, 2002: 490). Likewise, Adler (1997) explains that the “…material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction [which] depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world” (1997: 322 [emphasis added]). Constructivists therefore do acknowledge the presence of a material world, but argue that “…agents and structures are mutually constituted in ways that explain why the political world is so and not otherwise” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001: 393). Conclusively, the constructivist critique of mainstream IR theories is based on them missing “…the content and sources of state interests and the social fabric of world politics” (Checkel, 1998: 324).

Supported by research of e.g. Kinnvall & Svensson (2010), Bisht (2011), Tadjabaksh (2011) Pervez (2013) and Aqil (2014), I argue that the elite (re)produced Indo-Pakistani enmity has led to the current security dilemma. Constructivists define such dilemma as “…a social structure composed of intersubjective understandings in which states are so distrustful that they make worst-case assumptions about each other’s intentions, and as a result define their interests in self-help terms” (Wendt, 1998: 73). Resembling Pervez (2013), I believe that “[t]here is something more to the relationship of both states than the usual explanation based only on the material capabilities…” (2013: 2) thereby necessitating an inclusion of such

Especially the notion of collective identities is highly relevant for this thesis. Encompassing the ‘self’ while ‘spilling’ into others, the collective identities of India and Pakistan respectively are enforcing the inherent enmity and fear of one another (Pervez, 2013: 24-25; Nasr, 2005: 178-179). Indeed as Pervez (2013) explains, these two countries “…have shaped identities in relation to the other since independence, i.e. in the two nation theory in the founding of the states and when their independence started off with a war” (2013: 34). As mentioned, studies have found that nationalism, religion and utilizing the perceived threat from the ‘other’ have all been instrumental for Hindu fundamentalist elites to attract individual identities by offering ‘ontological safety’ within a collective identity (Kinnvall, 2002: 94-95; Kinnvall & Svensson, 2010: 282-283), just as certain Pakistani elites exploit the exaggerated image of India as a national threat (Bisht, 2011: 5-6; Tadjabaksh, 2011: 21-22). Therefore, there is arguably a clear connection between identities and interests, or as Wendt (1998) himself explains “[w]ithout interests identities have no motivational force, without identities interests have no direction” (1999: 231).

Conclusively, the Indo-Pakistani rivalry can be understood as (re)produced by a ‘culture of mutually shared expectations, ideas and norms’, emanating from the oppositional identities constructed by elites with interests in maintaining the animosity. By refraining from (neo)realist/liberalist explanations of the conflict, the constructivist approach enables me to unveil the deeper sociological/identity-related elements. Indeed, Buzan et al. (1998) note that the Indi-Pakistani conflict cannot be explained solemnly in structural terms, but rests on the “…incompatible principles on which politics and identity [are] linked in the two countries” (1998: 133). The previous research mentioned all support this contention (e.g. Kinnvall, 2002; Kinnval & Svensson, 2010; Bisht, 2011; Sinha et al. 2012; Pervez, 2013; Khalid et al. 2014; Price et al. 2014; Aquil, 2014). Behnke (2006) adequately summarizes these dynamics, explaining that “[i]nclusion and community can only be had at the price of exclusion and adversity” (2006: 65).
2.2 Copenhagen School and Securitization Theory

Hydro-politics is increasingly being situated in the language of security, which once invoked, can have detrimental societal effects (Turton, 2003: 75; Wæver, 1995: 213). Acknowledging this assumption, I argue for the saliency in Securitization Theory as an analytical framework for investigating the political aspects of South-Asian hydro-politics. Following the Cold-War a wide range of new conceptualizations of- and theoretical approaches to security emerged simultaneously. In refraining from traditional (neo)realist or liberal understandings, they all argued for a simultaneous ‘broadening’ and ‘deepening’ of the conceptual apparatus (see Box 5). Among these theories, especially the Copenhagen School’s (CS) Securitization Theory gained huge scholarly attention, and has been applied to a wide range of empirical studies (Aradau, 2004: 388-389; Emmers, 2007: 110-111; Jones, 2011: 404).

As explained, constructivists contend that objects are not universally given, but instead infused with characteristics and meaning through intersubjective interaction. ST adopts this assumption, thereby viewing security-problems as discursively constructed by framing certain issues as existential threatening to a specific referent object (Buzan et al. 1998: 25-26). Wæver (1995), one of the CS’s founders, explains that security can be understood as a speech act, not referring to anything more ‘real’ (1995: 55). Theoretically, by articulating security, actors ‘frame’ issues with such priority and urgency that implementations of extraordinary measures to secure survival are potentially legitimized (Buzan et al. 1998: 26; Munster, 2004: 6). As mentioned, everything can in theory be constructed as a security issue by the securitizing speech act, which if successful, moves an issue from ‘politicization’ to ‘securitization’ (Emmers, 2013: 134; see also Figure 1).

Box 5: Broadening and Deepening Security
Following the inability of traditional IR theories to explain the abrupt end of the Cold War (Buzan et al. 1998: 2-3; Jackson & Sørensen, 2007: 162-163), the core concept of security is now generally accepted to be both ‘broadened’ and ‘deepened’, thereby acknowledging the wide range of new threats in contrast to solely emphasizing state/military actions (Collins, 2013: 2; Jones, 2011: 404). Security analyses now include multiple issues, e.g. poverty, poor governance, trans-national crime, piracy, climate change and resource scarcity (Dalby, 1997: 3; Barthwal-Datta, 2012: 4). Moreover, beside the traditional focus on state-survival, various other ‘referents’ to be secured have been included, e.g. the economy, society and the environment (Buzan et al. 1998: 7-8; Mutimer, 2007: 60-61; Emmers, 2013: 110; Collins, 2013: 6-7).
**The Securitizing Move**

The process presented in Figure 1 is primarily determined by the ‘securitizing actor’ and ‘referent object(s)’. Buzan *et al.* (1998) define the former as an “…actor who securitizes issues by declaring something, a referent object, existentially threatened” (1998: 36). The referent object is the vulnerable element, framed by the securitizing actor as endangered by the threat (Ibid. 40; Emmers, 2013: 134-135). Moreover, audience acceptance is pivotal for successful securitization as orders equally rests on popular coercion and consent. Therefore securitizations move can never be crudely imposed, but needs to be argued for (Buzan *et al.* 1998: 25). ST formulates a number of *facilitating conditions* for successful securitization, divided into the internal, or linguistic/grammatical dimension\(^\text{17}\), and the external, contextual and social counterpart (Ibid. 31-33; Wæver, 2000: 9; Emmers, 2013: 134-135). Within the internal dimension, the securitizing actor must adhere to the ‘grammar of security’, for instance by narrating a “…plot that includes existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out” (Buzan *et al.* 1998: 33). In the latter dimension, the position of the speech actor is emphasized, since the relationship “…among subjects is not equal or symmetrical […] the possibility for successful securitization will vary dramatically with the position held by the actor (Ibid. 31). As such, ST includes the social capital of the securitizing actor, denoting the level of authority perceived by the audience addressed (Ibid. 33). In addition, the embedded characteristics of the threat influence securitizing moves, as potential threats will be easier accepted if they are “…generally held to be threatening – be they tanks, hostile sentiments or polluted waters” (Ibid. 33).

\(^{17}\) That is, to follow the ‘rules of the acts’ in an Austian speech-theoretical sense (Buzan *et al.* 1998: 32).
Sectors and Security Complexes

By broadening and widening security multiple new levels open up for analysis. Correspondingly, if post-Cold War security analyses are to be fruitful, researchers must refrain from viewing the state as the only referent object (Buzan et al. 1998: 7-8). Therefore, ST formulates the concept of sectors - characterized by the particular security relationships inherent (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: Herring, 2013: 46-47). Figure 2 displays the various sectors, relationships and typical threats.

Hydro-political disputes will logically often be situated within or deriving from the environmental sector. Buzan et al. (1998) note that especially this sector is complicated because of the many issues spilling into various other sectors, e.g. migration problems produced by water-scarcity affecting the societal sector, or war-related environmental damage and violence spilling into the military or political sector (1998: 74-75, 89; Turton, A. 2003: 116; Barnett, 2013: 191, 194). Importantly, the referent objects of the environmental sector are traditionally easily identifiable and greatly valued by the public, thus linking security to everyday life/public awareness plays a significant role in the successful transformation of issues (Aradau, 2004: 400).

Finally, Buzan et al. (1998) formulate the concept ‘Security Complexes’ (SC) as an analytical lens in which to apply the theory (1998: 201; Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 43-44). The SC, similar to the security dilemma,
Box 6: Epistemological Consideration

In conducting a securitization analysis, I invariably assume that actors and structure are mutually constitutive (Buzan et al. 1998: 3031, 204-205.; Agius, 2013: 88.; Emmers, 2013: 135). Thus, the concept of ‘inter-subjectivism’ plays a vital role, denoting that “…identities, interests and behavior of political agents are socially constructed by collective meaning, interpretations and assumptions about the world” (Adler, 1997: 324).

By taking point of departure in the epistemological assumptions inherent in constructivism, I adopt an interpretative approach to the discursive- and material aspects of the analysis, in which I attempt to understand the process of constructing intersubjective meaning through discursive acts.

Involves states which perceive every action by one another as a direct threat to their own security. Or in ST terminology: “[A] set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization or both, are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from each other” (1998: 201; see also Buzan & Wæver 2003: 44-45).

Since threats are linked to geographical proximity (Buzan et al. 1998: 57) Buzan & Wæver (2003) argue that “[s]imple physical adjacency tends to generate more security interaction among neighbors than among states located in different areas” (2003: 45), consequentially leading states to often perceive neighbors in a security complex as more threatening than rivalries located far away. As such, conceptual regional attention is added, thereby shifting analysis from the global level to a limited geographical area in which “…the extremes of national and global security interplay, and where most of the action occurs” (Ibid. 43). Certainly, the concept of ‘Regional Security Complexes’ (RSC) is beneficial in identifying dynamics between riparian neighbors, especially increasing securitization produced by pending basin closure (Turton, 2003: 76).

Critiques and Elaborations

While ST has been extensively applied, and is readily adopted in this thesis, it is not without analytical shortfalls: Key critiques involve the heavy emphasis on speech acts while ignoring other forms of expression (Hansen, 2000; Bigo, 2002; Balzacq, 2005), inherent Eurocentrism (Jones, 2011) and the simplistic conceptualization of audiences (Curley & Herrington, 2011; Miumachi, 2013). Moreover, meta-theoretical criticism based on researchers’ involvement in (re)producing security issues themselves have been formulated (e.g. Huysmans, 1998: 126). While agreeing with the above criticisms, a detailed discussion is not the aim of this thesis. Thus, I will mainly elaborate on research by Jones (2011), Balzacq (2011) and

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18 For an account of the traditional defensive realist understanding of the security dilemma, see Glaser, 2013: 16.
Curley and Herrington (2011) which all argue for including ‘security as practice’ within any securitization analysis. Moreover, adopting their analytical foci necessitate an elaboration on Practice Theory (PT) itself.

While traditional ST describes how something becomes securitized; “…it does not explain why one issue is selected over another or why it is governed (or not) in a particular way” (Jones, 2011: 409 [emphases added]). Thus, ST can merely be characterized as a “…problem-solving theory” (Barthwal-Datta, 2012: 4) which by both accepting ‘a given world’, and ‘merely’ aiming to fix particular problems, actually invariably reproduces present structures (Mutimer, 2013: 63). In contrast, some scholars refrain from accepting the “…prevailing social and political organizational structures as given frameworks for action” (Barthwal-Datta, 2012: 12), but instead investigate how these structures initially came to be, thereby revealing the interests of actors within (Cox, 1981: 128-129). This requires “…connecting security policies to specific domestic interests [while] considering how social, economic, and political forces constrain or enable particular security policies” (Jones, 2011: 409).

**Box 7: Case-Example, India**

Despite all evidence of the pending threat, the issue of depleting ground-water in India is still not politically securitized (Upadhaya, 2014: 36). Environmental securitization primarily revolves international river disputes which must be seen in the context of the country’s mismanagement of ground-water resources produced by “[l]ack of good governance and widespread corruption…” (Ibid. 39). Moreover, the abysmal state of urban infrastructures, combined with intense population growth have placed severe impediments on water quantity/quality, waste management etc. but the issue is generally ignored at both federal and state level as necessary reforms would likely be politically unpopular (Miklian & Kolás, 2014: 3)

Arguably, hydrological securitization is attempted to divert attention way from the above mentioned problems.

**Box 8: Case-Example, Pakistan**

A recent study found that in Pakistan, flammable discourses and linkages of water-scarcity to India severely increased during Winter when water availability was significant lower, while the “…negativity towards India reduce[d] in the Summer months (Alam et al. 2011: 67-68). While noting various reasons for this disparity, the study nevertheless emphasized the instrumental value of securitization (specifically in scapegoating India), contending it would be “…naive to assume that political opportunism […] and an attempt to deflect attention from poor governance and infrastructure do not play a significant role” (Ibid. 2011: 68).

Similarly, Balzack (2011) contends that securitization is better conceptualized as an instrumental or strategic process “…that occurs within, and as part of, a configuration of circumstances, including the context…” (2011: 2; see also Gad & Petersen, 2011: 318). Or as Jones (2011) explains, research should emphasize: “…how securitization advances particular agendas by suspending the normal rules of politics” (2011: 409).
In Asia, the state is not necessarily a unitary actor, but policies can instead be influenced by several “…wider contestations over state-building and other internal power struggles between competing social groups and elites” (Curley & Herrington 2011: 146). Hence, by only applying a fixed state-centric approach, the researcher “…is unable to account for why some issues are securitized over others because it neglects political contestation and the social and economic contexts of policy formation” (Jones, 2011: 407). The empirical examples presented in Boxes 7 and 8 on the preceding page support my contention that Indian and Pakistani elites alike partly practice securitization due to their ‘vested interests’ in maintaining the security dilemma.

As explained elsewhere, a brief elaboration on my adoption of Practice Theory is in order as well. This field is indeed quite expansive, entailing multiple theoretical assumptions, approaches and foci, thus it is impossible to formulate one coherent or unified theory, but only “…a body of highly divisive writings by thinkers who adopt a loosely defined ‘practice approach’” (Postill, 2010: 4). Hence, while the theory can be applied from “…the most mundane aspects of everyday life to highly structured activities in institutional settings” (Rouse, 2007: 499), I limit myself to briefly elaborate my utilization of a ‘wholist’ approach by explaining its relevancy in a South-Asian context. This is achieved by employing the ‘event-analytical’ approach, inspired by the research of particularly Commuri (2009).

A key debate within PT has regarded the restraints on the individual agency by larger social structures (Postill, 2010: 5). Wholists argue that individual actions indeed rely upon social and cultural contexts, therefore one simply cannot understand such practices as e.g. voting, exchanging money or implementing security-measures without “…reference to supra-individual settings” (Rouse, 2007: 505). However, recalling the constructivist concept of mutual social constitution, I stress the appropriateness of what Ortner (1984) then characterized as modern versions of PT, which all argue that “…society is a system, that the system is powerfully constraining, and yet that the system can be made and unmade through human action and interaction” (1984: 159). Moreover, by assuming that social practices are driven by identity, I argue for the relevancy in combining discourse analysis with an investigation of events – interpreted as ‘practices’. Event analysis can indeed be supportive, because although discourses shed light on the dynamics driving practices, the actual events allow researchers to assess these practices and connect the two. Indeed, Commuri (2009) adequately utilizes this method when investigating the role of Indo-
Pakistan national narratives in shaping foreign policy *vis-à-vis* one another. Hence I contend that “...juxtaposing discourses (expressions of national identity) and events (observable aspects of action)” (Commuri, 2009: 162) enables me to understand how larger social structures, or ‘supra individual settings’, influence decision-making on the individual level. In other words, in this thesis, practices are understood as individual- or collective actions (re)producing hydro-securitization, all motivated by the political gains to be reaped from the outcome. By practicing ‘strategic selectivity’, denoting states systematically favoring the interests of the dominant forces, existing structures of power and dominance are revealed. And unveiling these structures is indeed “…impossible without exploring their relationship to the strategies and interests of important societal groups” (Jones, 2011: 424-425).

Thus, traditional ST is arguably flawed by ignoring motivations behind securitization. Moreover, the state-centric approach miss Non-State Actors’ (NSAs) influence on policy-makers - especially in an Asian context. As mentioned, there the political apparatus is often *not* a unitary actor (Curley & Herrington 2011: 146), but is instead influenced by various social forces which through different “…interests, ideologies, and strategies […] relate differently to potential security issues, and thus potentially […] push for divergent responses (Jones, 2011: 425). By only looking at state-led security-responses, traditional ST undeniably miss NSAs’ impact on processes of securitization, something which many scholars argue are pivotal in raising security concerns (Jones, 2011: 405, 409; Curley & Herington 2011: 145-146; Barthwal-Datta, 2012: 5). For instance, the role of experts, or a ‘knowledge elite’ imbued with institutionalized competences constructing reality within a particular defined context, indeed deserve attention (Evers & Gerke, 2005: 3; Gooch & Stålnacke, 2010: 4). While claiming to provide objective information, they are in fact themselves far from value free, as their opinions and agendas are produced within a world of paradigms19 (Ibid. 4). Hence, I argue for the relevancy of including such actors in the subsequent analysis.

While elaborating on various criticisms, I still contend that ST is an adequate theoretical departure as the theory emphasizes ‘top leaders’, ‘states’, ‘threatened elites’ and ‘audiences’ with agenda making power (Booth, 2007: 164-166). This analytical scope is indeed fitting since I hypothesize that elite actors with significant discursive power are (re)producing the antagonistic relationship between India and Pakistan.

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19 For instance, there is evidence that water research focusing on conflict may be more easily published (Katz, 2012: 12).
Indeed, Barhwal-Datta (2012) contends that ST “…is best-suited to the pursuits of those who wish to understand how state-led security policy is negotiated by state elites” (2012: 8 [emphasis added]).

Therefore, while the meaning of security can be contested among various social groups consequently reflecting competing interests of power (Jones, 2011: 410), I still contend that focusing on elite actors’ speech acts, while including security practices as evidence of securitization, is one analytical adequate approach. Moreover, the hydrological foci only makes the subsequent securitization analysis more relevant. Certainly, the convergence of material objects and constructed meanings inherent in ST (see Box 9) are suitable for understanding Indo-Pakistani hydrological-relations - relations in which a recent PRIRO paper found that “…a mix of linked ideas seem to shape the securitization agenda for rivers in the region [by] connections between objective notions of scarcity, absolute leaps in population numbers and perceived geo-strategic requirements” (PRIRO, 2011: 11 [emphasis added]).

### Box 9: Merging Constructivism and (neo)Realism

Securitization Theory blends (neo)realist notions of material threats with the constructivist understanding of mutual constitution (Jones, 2011: 408). According to Buzan et al. (1998), security issues are “…constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat” (1998: 25) thus denoting the assumption that securitization indeed is “…socially constructed [and] part of a discursive, socially constituted intersubjective realm” (ibid. 31) in which ‘objects’ “…only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded” (Wendt, 1998: 73).

#### 2.3 The Hydrological Security Complex

In the ensuing section, the concept of a ‘Hydrological Security Complex’ (HSC) will be described. By emphasizing the concept's inherent dynamics of hydro-hegemonic practices and lower-riparian complexes, this part explains how India and Pakistan respectively are situated, thereby influencing processes of securitization in markedly diverse ways.

Unquestionably, the linkages between water, food, and energy have become a key component in South-Asian security relations (IDSA 2010: 20), relations which can be analyzed as a HSC, thereby enabling multiple levels of inquiry on riparian state dynamics (Turton, 2003: 85; Sinha, 2014: 60). This particular complex manifests when two or more states in a traditional SC are both ‘owners’ and ‘users’ of shared rivers, while beginning to perceive these rivers as a critical national security concern (Schulz, 1995: 97).
Certainly, HSCs are analytically appropriate for the subsequent analysis. For instance, Buzan et al. (1998) themselves argue the presence of environmentally related SCs, noting for instance Indo-Pakistani hydrological-disputes, in which “…security interdependence involves the issue of dams, reduced water flow, salinization, and hydroelectricity (1998: 88).

**Hydro-Hegemony and Lower-Riparian Anxiety**

To further explain the South-Asian HSC, the hydro-hegemonic position of India and lower-riparian Pakistan will be briefly addressed: A hydro-hegemon is the ‘strongest' state in an asymmetrical riparian relationship, which through its superior position utilizes a wide range of coercive strategies in order to create a situation of unequal distribution and control of shared resources (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: 437-438, 446-450). Motivated by the hydraulic mission, denoting the manifestation of a given hydrological approach/ideology, the hydro-hegemon ordinarily seeks to mobilize water and improve the security of supply (Turton, 2003: 1, 71).

The low-order riparian is close to the estuary of the River - a vulnerable position as both quality- and quantity of water are determined by the upstream riparian, over which the former often has no control, thereby fixating the lower-riparian in a situation of permanent fear (Turton, 2003: 13; Hazarika & Mehta, 2014: 24-25). Undeniably, Pakistani officials perceive Indian constructions of dams as giving the latter “…a measure of control [which] they simply cannot accept” (Iyer, 2013: 9; see also Sinha, 2006: 606-607) as it expands India’s strategic options30 (Ibid. 9; see also Bisht, 2011: 5-6). As previously argued, this anxiety or ‘existential fear’ (Pervez, 2013: 25) is indeed constructed i.e. ‘dramatized’ or “…exaggerated for political purposes” (Iyer, 2013: 9; see also Buzan et al. 1998: 26; Sinha, et al. 2012: 742). One recurring example is linking domestic water-scarcity to India, thereby deflecting popular dissatisfaction (Bisht, 2011; R. Singh, 2008). As India is facing their own internal problems, “…being outpaced by poorer countries on many indicators of human development” (Miklian & Kolás 2014: 1) similar motivations for the South-Asian HSC’s hegemon can be assumed.

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30 This could be deprivation of water or instigate a regional flooding (IDSA, 2010: 37).
Thus, current Indo-Pakistani hydrological-dynamics can be understood as a mutual process of securitization, partly influenced by their respective positions in the HSC. As Turton (2003) notes, “…securitization moves are linked to the broader patterns of amity and enmity that exist between the riparian states, so each international river basin is somewhat unique and specific (Turton, A. 2003: 95; [emphasis added]). This is no less true for the South-Asian HSC, in which notions of the Hindu/Muslim divide and the Kashmir-dispute directly spill into the highly militarized water-discourse, consequently enforcing dynamics in which every move by one actor invariably is perceived as threatening by the other.

Table 1 synthesizes the theoretical section into one analytical framework:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Climate change, water-scarcity</td>
<td>India (dams), water-scarcity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referent Object</th>
<th>Nation, environment, economy, development</th>
<th>Nation, public, environment, economy, development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor(s)</th>
<th>Elites (policy makers, ‘experts’)</th>
<th>Elites (policy makers, military, ‘experts’)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Audience</td>
<td>Policy makers, public</td>
<td>Policy makers, public, international community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Hydro-hegemon: seeks legitimation through hydraulic mission, securitization being instrumental in maintaining animosity while diverting attention from domestic (mis)management</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lower-riparian: influenced by an ‘anxiety complex’, consolidates power through scapegoating, securitization being instrumental in maintaining animosity while diverting attention from domestic (mis)management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Practice</th>
<th>Hydrological power-project construction justified by a developmental discourse, practicing secrecy, pursuing bi-lateral negotiations, attempting ‘imposed ‘political’ solutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obstructs Indian attempts at constructing dams justified through a legal, treaty-based discourse, links domestic water-scarcity to Indian hydro-projects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1: Analytical Framework*
2.4 Methodology

Any sound IR analysis necessitates a sound methodology and “…systematically structured or codified [way] to test theories” (Sprinz & Nahmia, 2004: 1). Applying discourse analysis – an integral part of any securitization analysis - is one way of achieving this. In the following section I discuss the thesis’ methodological choices, emphasizing the application of discourse analysis and the various methodological/theoretical considerations inherent.

Applying Discourse Analysis

Buzan et al. (1998) explain that “[t]he way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations” (1998: 25). As explained, securitization is constituted by the very speech act hence securitization analysis can be understood as a particular type of discourse analysis (Ibid. 26-27, 177-179). Discourses are certain representations of the social world which involve practices such as speech, writings, images and gestures, all utilized by social actors to produce and interpret meaning (Torfing, 2005: 7; Fairclough, 2007: 26-28; Potter, 2004: 202). Discourses shape perceptions, which thereby construct a certain ‘reality’ (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001: 394; Fierke & Jørgensen, 2001: 4-5). Indeed, Buzan et al. (1998) themselves argue for the saliency of this approach if the researcher “…believe[s] discourse has structures that are sufficiently rigid to shape policy lines” (1998: 177). Moreover, by emphasizing narratives, shared history and metaphorical usages, discourse analysis is particular effective when including the socio-political and historical context (Hajer 2005: 300) - something I consequently do.

Discourses can be an intangible concept to grasp. It has been characterized as a specific analytical method, a methodology in itself and a particular (meta)theoretical and analytical understanding of social life (Wertz et al. 2011: 4, 205). Moreover, the wide range of different discourse analyses entail various epistemological and ontological assumptions, which consequently make it a ‘non-specific term’ (Wood & Kroger, 2000: 18). Hence, as both method and theory, discourse analysis can be confounding. Fortunately, as the securitizing argument itself is ‘powerful’, it is often visibly deployed in the discourses surrounding the issue investigated (Buzan et al. 1998: 177). Since it is against the very logic of the securitizing move to stay hidden, the researcher should expect actors to attempt securitizing moves whenever “…a debate is sufficiently important […] thus, one does not need to read everything, particular not obscure text” (Ibid. 177). As such, with the above theoretical assumptions in mind, I will utilize discourse analysis as a method
to reveal securitizing moves by relevant actors, focusing on key debates revolving the disputed areas investigated.

Data

Studying speeches, statements and comments regarding my case-study is required for the following analysis. Moreover, as the theoretical framework is expanded by emphasizing security practices, I also include a wide range of empirical research on Indo-Pakistani hydrological disputes. Consequently, data will be drawn from second-hand sources, such as academic books and journals, surveys and reports from think-tanks and organizations as well as official governmental documents. I also include popular media (newspapers and online magazines) as these have been instrumental for elites in constructing specific self-serving perceptions by communicating with civilian society and stakeholders alike (Alam et al. 2011: 48). Thus, the main type of sources used consists of what Yin (2003) terms as ‘documentation’ – one of six sources of evidence “…likely to be relevant to every case study” (2003: 85). Table 2 displays the various sources and their purpose.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Data</th>
<th>Use in Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Academic Books and Journals</strong></td>
<td>Obtain required theoretical knowledge (e.g. hydro-politics, Securitization Theory).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>News Articles</strong></td>
<td>Obtain required empirical knowledge and data for analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reports from NGOs, Think-Tanks, etc.</strong></td>
<td>Obtain data for analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Official Documents</strong></td>
<td>Obtain data for analysis - primarily securitizing moves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Surveys</strong></td>
<td>Obtain insights on popular opinions from relevant collectives and identify statements from relevant actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interviews (2nd sources)</strong></td>
<td>Primarily gathered online from official governmental- and media sites. Relevant for retrieving statements from relevant actors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2: Data Used in Study*

**Empirical Delimitations**

Due to certain limitations, it is futile to attempt an extensive analysis concerning overall Indo-Pakistani hydrological securitization and the motivating ‘hidden’ factors. Therefore, I delimit myself to one single case-study - the conflict regarding the Indian Baglihar hydro-electric project. The dispute intensified
around the new millennium and was formally concluded in 2008. As such, a fairly chronologic analysis which covers approximately a decade of hydrological conflict is undertaken.

**Applying Case Studies**

Case study research is the investigation of an issue examined through one or multiple cases, within a limited setting or context (Creswell 2007: 73). In seeking to identify- and explain securitizing moves, the choice of conducting a limited case study is indeed sound, as this method is highly adept in identifying and assessing the indicators most adequate representing the theoretical concept the researcher intends to measure (Bennet, 2004: 34). Moreover, this approach entails a number of advantages for the interpretive researcher, such as the contextualization and operationalization of qualitative variables, and, with the support of sound theory, the identification of causality in highly complex relations (Kacowicz, 2004: 108).

**Choice of Case – Why the Baglihar Issue**

The choice investigating the Baglihar case is based on four assumptions, all made following a close investigation of literature regarding contemporary Indo-Pakistani hydrological disputes, which aggregated justify the saliency in the chosen case;

*First, As the Baglihar case was referred to international arbitration, it entails at least elements of securitizing dynamics, thus evidently marking the “…failure to deal with issues as normal politics” (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). Second, the dispute involved a significant higher level of tension compared to previous Indo-Pakistani hydro-political conflicts, thereby standing out as the most divisive hydro-electric project, consequently severely impacting future hydrological relations (Bisht, 2011: 3). Third, Pakistan’s intensified hydrological securitization began simultaneously with the rapid decline in the country’s economy relative to India’s (Alam et al. 2011: 23). Thus, a causal relationship between water-scarcity, increasing overall hydrological securitization, and the particular intensity of the Baglihar-dispute can be assumed Fourth, as Baglihar is located in the disputed Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), additional dynamics fueled by nationalism and irredentist claims seep into the political discourses (Saideman, 2005: 202-203; Bisht, 2011: 5) Indeed, the Baglihar project is general understood by commentators as being “…motivated by India’s geostrategic concerns vis-à-vis Pakistan” (Price et al. 2014. 67). Moreover, many scholars highlight the linkage between Pakistan’s territorial claim on the region and its vital need for securing water- while fearing Indian control of the Indus (Burgess et al. 2013: 15; R. Singh, 2008).
3. ANALYSIS: SECURITIZATION ON THE INDUS RIVER

In this section, I analyze securitizing dynamics within the Baglihar dispute. The analysis is two-fold, simultaneously investigating securitizing discourses and practices by India and Pakistan, while also explaining the underlying motives driving these dynamics within the South-Asian HSC. Accordingly, much attention to the individual positions of hydro-hegemonic India and lower-riparian Pakistan will be given. The analytical saliency of this approach has been argued for in the prior section.

3.1. Introduction

Unquestionably, the decade long Baglihar dispute became a turning point in Indo-Pakistani hydrological relations (Bisht, 2011; Alam et al. 2011; Price et al. 2014). Constructions were initiated in 1999 and the dam stood complete in 2008 - following years of constant accusations and counter-claims, partly driven by the effects of increasing securitization and the related ulterior political motives (R. Singh, 2008: 8; Sinha, 2010: 483). Though the inclusion of a neutral arbiter led to an official settlement in 2008, this only produced further Pakistani frustration and overall dissatisfaction with the IWT, thereby paving the way for the increased securitization of future hydrological conflicts (Hill, 2013: 253; Wirsing & Jasparro, 2006: 2). Map 4 displays the location of Baglihar Dam, set within the disputed region of J&K.

![Map 4: Baglihar Dam](image-url)
Water-security has indeed long been on the Indian national agenda (Alam et al. 2011: 5): At the 2004 Independence Day, Prime Minister (PM) Singh told a massive crowd that “[w]e need to ensure the equitable use of scarce water resources” (IDSA, 2010: 21[emphasis added]). Moreover, he also linked water to national security: “…water is a national resource, and we have to take an integrated view of our country’s water resources…” (Sinha, 2005: 319 [emphasis added]). This view was reiterated three years later when Singh urged “…states to look upon water as a national asset…” (Singh, 2007). In addition, the PM stressed the dangers of climate change, highlighting the importance of India accommodating to the dire environmental outlook (Hindustan Times, 2007a). Previously, the official 2002 National Water Policy (NWP) had already framed water as a national concern, referring to water as “…a prime natural resource, a basic human need and a precious national asset” (NWP, 2002: 1 [emphasis added]). A decade later, the subsequent NWP (2012) stressed the urgency and importance of the water-issue: “A scarce natural resource, water is fundamental to life, livelihood, food security and sustainable development” (2012: 1[emphasis added]).

The ‘grammar of security’ is evident in the above securitizing moves as water is presented as a ‘scarce’ resource. Thereby it is infused with priority and urgency, thus requiring extraordinary measures to be dealt with (Buzan et al. 1998: 26; Munster, 2004: 6). Equally important, labeling water as a ‘national’ issue frames its preservation as a matter concerning all Indian, while explicitly situating responsibility within the state-apparatus. Moreover, it consolidates audiences through the notion of being ‘one nationality’, all the while “…diverting attention away from class and caste struggle[s]” (Kinnvall & Svensson, 2010: 277). Consequently, ‘facilitating conditions’ of securitization are indeed strengthened through inter-subjective audience acceptance (Huysmans, 1998: 577). Finally, as securitization are attempted by actors with considerable social capital, the likelihood of audience acceptance arguably increases (Buzan et al. 1998: 31, 33).

Likewise elite-level securitizing moves can be observed in Pakistan, most notably by former President Zardari who in a 2009 Washington Post article said: “The water crisis in Pakistan is directly linked to relations with India. Resolution could prevent an environmental catastrophe in South-Asia, but failure to do so could fuel the fires of discontent that lead to extremism and terrorism” (IDSA, 2010: 37). As mentioned, Pakistani elites have a long practice of linking domestic environmental problems to security issues with India (Bisht, 2011; Tadjabaksh, 2011; Aqil, 2014) - especially by connecting water-scarcity to the
increase of Indian hydro-power projects (Alam et al. 2011: 5). In Pakistan, the consumption of water is heavily directed towards agriculture, which as of 2008 stood for 94% of the total water withdrawal and contributed to 24% of the country’s GDP (Ibid: 3; Khalid, 2014: 263). According to Bakshi & Trivedi (2011) this trend is unlikely to change, as the sector employs approximately 50% of the country’s population, while providing for 60-70% of its exports (2011: 6). Therefore, water for Pakistan is undeniably a matter of life and death – a fact repeatedly mentioned while linking its increasing scarcity to Indian hydro-practices. Indeed, this is a common trait within the environmental sector, in which aggregate perceptions of dangers often ‘distort’ the distinctions between natural and human threats, thereby making environmental security a matter with tangible, or human, ‘enemies’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 81). Furthermore, the securitizing language constructs notions of belonging to the ‘in-group’, while clearly defining the ‘out-group’ who is understood as existentially threatening to the existing social order (Aradau, 2004: 396; Kinnvall & Svensson, 2010: 276-277). Similarly, the language of security entails considerable integrative power by creating political cohesiveness through the construction of existential threats (Huysmans, 2002: 44). In framing water as a national concern, arguably PM Singh attempted to create such notions of belonging by exploiting the existential fear emanating from water scarcity, thus reaping the benefits of the ‘integrative effects’ of securitization. President Zadari’s securitizing move likewise adequately fits into Huysmans’ account of the internal political cohesiveness produced by constructing external threats.

Unquestionably, the South-Asian enmity has seeped into water policies as India’s hydro-hegemonic, actions toward Pakistan have become “…entirely driven by the ‘perception’ of the importance of certain issues” (Price, et al. 2014: 68). Often linked to matters of national security, these actions are partly responsible for the increasing securitization of the water discourse (IDSA 2010: 20). Moreover, this produces additional animosity and anxiety in Pakistan, highlighting the dynamics of the HSC, consequently impeding potential for hydro-political cooperation (Price et al. 2014: 67, 70).

In other words, water is constructed as an existential threat, therefore requiring action beyond the level of normal politics (Wæver, 1995: 221). This consequently gives a political momentum, essential for the implementation of extraordinary measures (Buzan et al. 1998: 25; Emmers, 2013: 135-136). Certainly this ‘securitization of water’ is taking place in South-Asia, which must be viewed in the wider context of the ‘enduring rivalry’ – a relationship some political actors have clear motivations in maintaining, thereby fostering a climate of “…noncooperation on all issues” (Pervez, M. 2013: 3).
Table 3 summarizes the overall hydro-securitization between India and Pakistan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors and facilitating conditions</th>
<th>Prime Minister, official government policies; high social capital with likelihood of audience acceptance</th>
<th>President, high social capital with likelihood of audience acceptance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Existential threat</td>
<td>Water-scarcity</td>
<td>Water-scarcity (linked to) India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referent object</td>
<td>Nation, population</td>
<td>Environment, nation, population</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Overall Securitization of Water

3.2. The Initial Stage – Hydro-Hegemony and Lower-Riparian Fears

The intensified South-Asian environmental securitization unquestionably fostered a climate of zero-sum perceptions (Olmstead, 2014; Price et al. 2014: 67). This is clearly visible in the Baglihar dispute, the first Indo-Pakistani hydrological conflict not solved through bilateral negotiations (Sinha et al. 2012: 744; Briscoe, 2013). Moreover, I contend Baglihar displays the dynamics of the HSC, as the efforts to improve (water)security by India unquestionably increased Pakistani perceptions of insecurity. Consequently, this placed the former robust IWT under significant pressure, while adding to overall bilateral tensions (Buzan et al. 1998: 201; Turton, 2003: 76; Sinha et al. 2012: 741; Briscoe, 2013).

As an analysis of the IWT’s institutional performance is not the aim of this thesis, I refrain from a detailed explanation of the official objections- and counter claims regarding the dispute. Suffice to say, official Pakistani objections regarded practical design specifications of the dam (Bakshi & Trivedi, 2011: 19; see also Table 4) in which especially the height of spillways and level of intake were emphasized, as the planned level were perceived to enable India to block the water flow (Sinha, 2006: 606-607; Salman, 2008: 109).

Whereas Pakistan pursued a political/legally strategy based on the adherence of the IWT’s provisions, India characterized the matter a simple technical dispute based on different

Table 4: Official Objections of Baglihar (Derived from Bakshi & Trivedi, 2011: 19)
interpretations of the treaty’s practical requirements (Dar, 2011-2012: 12). Nevertheless, political driven hidden agendas were undeniably equally influencing Indian and Pakistani attitudes, likely fostered in part by the increased South-Asian hydro-political securitization (Turton, 2003; R. Singh, 2008).

While Pakistan was informed about the Baglihar project in 1991 (which they immediately contested), actual construction was kept secret until 2001 (Hazariaka & Mehta, 2014: 32; Refseth, 2013: 33). Article VII[2] of the IWT states that both signatories are required to inform one-another of hydrological plans which could “…cause interference with the waters of any of the Rivers and which, in its opinion, would affect the other Party materially” (Indus Waters Treaty, 1960: 15). However, since India claimed that the project did not interfere with Pakistani water-flows, it did not feel obliged to inform the latter (Salman, 2008: 109). Thus, influenced by insecurity stemming partly from its lower-riparian anxiety, the Pakistani objections was arguably fuelled by the level of secrecy displayed by India - a common hegemonic securitizing move within the HSC (Tadjabaksh, 2011: 10-11; Turton, 2003: 52, 90). Certainly India’s hydraulic mission could be characterized as an attempt to ensure ‘security of supply’ by constructing hydrological infrastructure (Turton, 2003: 91), situated within a dynamic context where “…knowledge is seen as power and is consequently securitized by being classified as secret” (Ibid. 92). Indeed, the practice of withholding data is a common indicator of increased water securitization, strategically applied by the hegemon within the HSC (Buzan et al. 1998: 90; Turton, 2003: 93). Accordingly, Pakistan has frequently accused India of only providing low-quality and incomplete data (Bagla, 2010: 1227; Khalid et al. 2014: 271).

Certainly, when water becomes securitized it is raised to a national security concern (Buzan et al. 1998: 24-25; Emmers, 2013: 135-136) which explains why “[t]he Indian government protects [water-flow data] like a state secret” (Bagla, 2010: 1227). The fact that secrecy indicates increasing hydro-political securitization (Buzan et al. 1998: 90) was evident by the following actions of India and Pakistan: Driven by (in)security, Pakistan feared that Baglihar would give India control of vital water supplies, therefore demanded to inspect the Baglihar construction site (BBC, 2005; Briscoe, 2010a; Sinha, 2006: 607). In turn, India categorically refused this request by declaring that construction were within the IWT’s provisions, thereby clearly illustrating the need for secrecy (Wirsing & Jasparro, 2006: 4; Salman, 2008: 109; Dar, 2011-2012: 9). Following three years of intense negotiations, a team of Pakistani scientists were finally allowed to visit the dam, which then was well under construction (Mohanty & Khan, 2005: 3156-3157; Sinha, 2006: 608).
**Pakistani Speech Acts and Practices**

As a recent regional study finds, India’s long practice of pure ‘hard power’ strategies has fostered a lasting image of a regional hegemon, creating “…a deep seated mistrust towards India’s intentions among its smaller neighbors” (Alam et al. 2011: 19). This mistrust is clearly visible in Pakistani elite-discourses: For instance, the Secretary of Water & Power stated that once Baglihar was completed “…India can easily withhold [water] during shortage and release it during excess [which is] the precise opposite of what the lower riparian state would want” (Sahai, 2006). Moreover, referring to Baglihar, *Dawn* (2005a) quoted an anonyms top-official for saying that “Pakistan will use all possible options to stop India from completing the project”. Such statements display the evident Pakistani fear of Indian control of shared waters, arguably perceived (or at least framed) as ‘existential threatening’.

The general view in Islamabad was that India was aiming to “…wantonly exacerbat[e] the country's dire water shortages [while] choking its agricultural production and ruining livelihoods” (Manadhana, 2012). Moreover, Pakistani water-expert Gazdar argued that Baglihar threatened the country’s water supply which was “…clearly critical to the economic prosperity and political stability of Pakistan” (Gazdar, 2005). Regionally discontent was also voiced: The PM of Pakistani-controlled J&K asked whether “…Pakistan [is] going to stay put and wait until India diverts the river? Pakistan would be devastated” (Daily Times, 2003). He also hinted that Indian hydro-manipulation could cause an armed response: “Many people say that in the future wars may be fought over water. You cannot ignore that because the whole economy of Pakistan is centered around the water that flows from Kashmir” (Ibid.). Previously, the PM had already linked water-disputes to economic security by stating that “[t]he Pakistani economy is dependent on agriculture and hence on water, and therefore on Kashmir” (Sehboi, 2005). Moreover, by linking the dispute regionally to Kashmir, one could assume that the PM sought to gain increased support from the Pakistani center

Pakistani securitizing moves are indeed visible, manifesting as policy makers linked Baghlihar to the actual survival of Pakistan, mainly by situating water within the economic-environmental-security nexus (Khan, 2013: 213). Moreover, elites exploited the embedded South-Asian animosity by stressing the strategic risks of Indian water control (Bisht, 2011: 5). As mentioned, the usual referent object of the environmental

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21 The linkage between Kashmir and the Baglihar dam will be revisited further on.
sector is easily identifiable and of great popular value (Aradau, 2004: 400). Hence, linking Baglihar to environmental decline and economic degradation was a rational choice considering these ‘facilitating conditions’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 31-33).

By framing water scarcity as an existential threat, actors potentially gain political momentum, removes checks and balances while diverting attention away from domestic inequalities (Wæver, 1995: 221; 2012: 53; Buzan et al. 1998: 23-25; Emmers, 2013: 135-136). This explains why Pakistani elites increasingly situate water-politics in a militarized security-discourse which potentially could be “…detrimental to the prospect of a cooperative relationship between India and Pakistan” (Bisht, 2013: 15-16). Consequently, responsibility of domestic environmental (mis)management is diverted by politically situating water-woes “…in the language of security vis-à-vis India, the upper riparian state” (Sinha, et al. 2012: 742; see also Alam et al. 2011: 28)\(^\text{22}\). Indeed, Pervez (2013) finds via an investigation of elite-speeches, that the enduring rivalry is “…deliberately created by the elites [which] encourage the formation of a security dilemma between India and Pakistan […] due to both states’ ruling elites’ vested interests (2013: 44). Applying the theoretical framework of ST to the empirical data as described in the above section, unquestionably reveals motives for Pakistani securitization of the Baglihar dispute.

**Indian Speech Acts and Practices**

According to Balzacq (2011), securitization is not only limited to discourses, but is also present in non-discursive means, thereby offering an alternate analytical framework involving practices and contexts alike (2011: 2-3). As previously explained, this approach is highly appropriate for this analysis, as Indian discourses do not reveal many significant attempts of traditional discursive securitization. Nevertheless, Indian security-practices do expose securitizing dynamics within the HSC: As securitization is never a static process (Balzacq, 2005: 172), such attempts are unveiled only by exploring Indian security-practices, while also including the wider environmental-political-security context (Jones, 2011: 409; Balzacq, 2011: 2; Curley & Herrington, 2011: 142-143, 147-149). Although acknowledging the prominence of ST, Balsacq (2011) still contends that while “…discursive practices are important in explaining how some security problems originate, many develop with little if any discursive design” (2011: 1), thereby necessitating an analytical

\(^{22}\) Moreover, the Pakistani army has consolidated its power through the notion of acting as a bulwark against the Indian threat (Aqil, 2014: 256; Tadjabaksh, 2011: 21-22; Nasr, 2005: 186).
inclusion of contexts and practices. In the following section, an emphasis on Indian hydrological practices, as evidence of securitizing moves, will be emphasized.

While continuously linking Baglihar to Kashmiri developmental needs, India remained steadfast that constructions were within the IWT’s provisions (Ford, 2006; Sinha, 2006: 606-607). For instance, N. Singh, the Indian External Affairs Minister said that “[w]e cannot agree because the project is important for the economic well-being of the people of J&K” (Government of India, 2005). Generally, India found Pakistani objections ‘absurd’ as pointed out by one anonymous official (Wirsing & Jasparro, 2006: 6). Singh reiterated this view, stating that “…Pakistan's fears that Baglihar will give India the capability to either flood their country or to withhold water are completely misplaced” (Government of India, 2005). Evidently, policy makers did not explicitly frame water-issues with Pakistan as an existential threat. However, because the hydro-hegemon often utilizes its advantageous geographical (and material) position in bilateral negotiations, it is not dependent on traditional securitizing speech acts (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: 445, 447, 450). Thus, I contend that the Indian hydraulic mission can be characterized as an observable practice- or chain of ‘events’ (Commuri, 2009: 162), understood as an elite securitizing move, infused with iconic and symbolic power and discursively linked to national, political, social and economic wellbeing (PRIO, 2011: 2; Sinha, 2014: 58). The practice of constructing hydro-power projects in J&K surely influenced the regional conflict, which was only intensified by India’s justifying actions (Alam et al. 2011: 18): By imposing its will on the lesser riparian, discursively justified through a developmental discourse, India only fuelled the HSC. Indeed, the linkages between water-security and national development are one effective way to justify security practices as they produce “…increased centralized control of the rivers, enforced secrecy measures, selective data gathering and a tendency to design statistics for diplomatic maneuvers […] limiting citizen ‘publics’ from access while simultaneously empowering […] official experts and institutional expertise” (PRIO, 2011: 11). These outcomes translate directly into the aforementioned vested interests of elites as described by Pervez (2013).

By securitizing water, politicians can frame the inter-subjective attitudes “…around any water-related issue to fit other political interests” (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: 448). For instance, the abysmal state of urban infrastructures combined with intense population growth, have severely affected water quantity/quality, waste management etc., but the issue is mostly ignored at both federal- and state level, as necessary reforms would likely be costly hence political unpopular (Miklian & Kolås, 2014: 3; see also Box 3 and 7).
Therefore I contend that the hydraulic mission, accepted by the public through securitization, possibly sought to directly link state building activities to water, thereby legitimizing Indian elites themselves while diverting attention away from domestic (mis)management (PRIO 2011: 2, 10-12). Undeniably, the utilization of securitization is one effective ‘hegemonic compliance-producing-mechanism’ in which state elites promote “…a project to a national-security concern [which] equates criticism to treason, thus silencing critical voices in the bureaucracy and maintaining a form of hegemonic thought control” (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: 448).

These attempts at ‘hegemonic control’ are certainly happening on the Indus, partly motivated by the various environmental pressures previously mentioned (Alam et al. 2011: 119; IBWG, 2013: 16). Moreover, India’s hydraulic mission is arguably driven by the government’s pursuit “…for ‘iconic and symbolic projects’ involving large-scale irrigation schemes and large dams” (PRIO, 2011: 2). Traditionally understood as a symbol of modernization and development (Veileux et al. 2014: 7), the production of hydraulic infrastructure legitimizes the state through declared efforts towards domestic improvement, which in India manifest in the construction of large-scale dams (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: 444; see also Bhuta, 2011; Jayaram, 2013). Indeed, in their respective research on Indian security politics, Miklian and Kolás (2014) explain that the process of building dams and barrages has long been a sign of state-efficiency (2014: 8), just as Sinha (2014) notes that a stable supply of water, linked to the political, social and economic wellbeing is now a “…common national security refrain” (2014: 58).

**Summarization: Dynamics of the Hydrological Security Complex at Display**

Evidently, Pakistani elites simultaneously scapegoated India while framing it a potential threat, thereby diverting popular attention away from domestic inequalities (Bisht, 2013: 15-16; Tadjabaksh, 2011: 21-22). As the theory holds, environmental securitization indeed often spills into other sectors by assigning responsibility of domestic ecological stress to a tangible object, generally already negatively perceived (Buzan et al. 1998: 84). Regarding the facilitating conditions, by linking water-scarcity to security-relations with India, securitization was furthermore undeniably more easily accepted (Sinha et al. 2012: 742). Moreover, I contend that the inherent importance of security politics, and the popular value of the environmental/economic referent object, also assisted this process (Soroos, 1994: 321). As Indian security-practices were repeatedly perceived/framed as endangering Pakistan, the HSC’s dynamics can definitely be
observed. Therefore I conclude, similar to Pervez’s (2013) findings, that the current (hydrological) security dilemma is (re)produced by Indian and Pakistani elites motivated by the instrumental political value of securitization (2013: 44-45; see also Bisht, 2011; Tadjabaksh, 2011: Burgess et al. 2013).

As argued, the securitizing dynamics of the HSC are clearly visible in the Baglihar dispute: The increased securitization of water led hydro-hegemonic India to ensure water-resources through dam constructions (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: 444) and lower-riparian Pakistan to object to all such attempts (IDSA, 2010: 39). Resulting in zero-sum perceptions, framing water as a national concern in addition (partly) diverted attention away from domestic issues (Bisht, 2011, 5-6-, 15-16; Miklian & Kolås, 2014; 3). This conclusion fits well into Turton’s (2003) contention that insecurity indeed often grows with prospects of basin closure within the HSC - fuelled by the wider political context thereby consequently paving way for increased securitization, which in turn influences future political decision-making (2003: 8, 69, 95). Table 5 summarizes the securitizing moves of both countries in the initial stage of the dispute:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Existential Threat</td>
<td>Water-scarcity</td>
<td>Baglihar dam, India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referent Object</td>
<td>Nation, economy-development</td>
<td>Nation, economy, environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectors</td>
<td>Economic, Environmental</td>
<td>Political, Military, Economic, Environmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practices</td>
<td>Proactive: Resource capture strategy (extensive construction of hydrological infrastructure), withholding data - ‘protecting knowledge’, attempting to avoid 3rd party intervention</td>
<td>Reactive: Opposition through legal provisions of the IWT – presumably partly driven by lower-riparian fears, attempting to include 3rd party intervention</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Securitizing Moves, Initial Stage

3.3. Third-Party Involvement and Linkages to Kashmir

In accordance with official policies, India repeatedly attempted only bilateral solutions to the Baglihar dispute (NWP, 2002: 12). However, following a high-level meeting in Islamabad in 2003, this strategy finally came to an end as Pakistan remained firm that they would only resume bilateral talks following the immediate stop of the Baglihar construction (Reddy, 2003; Dawn, 2005a). This ultimatum was promptly refused by India, leading Pakistan to subject the matter to third-party arbitration as stipulated within Article
IX[2A] of the IWT (Dawn, 2005a; Indus Water Treaty, 1960: 18). In January 2005 Pakistan officially requested a Neutral Expert (NE), resulting in the appointment of Swiss engineer Lafitte. For the first time, the riparian neighbors were unable to bilaterally solve hydrological disputes, thereby revealing the impeding effects of increased water-securitization within the South-Asian HSC (Sinha et al. 2012: 741; Burgess et al. 2013: 13). As repeatedly mentioned, the rivalry is continuously (re)produced by elite security discourses and practices partly motivated by personal political interests (Pervez, 2013: 44). Hence, I contend that the inherent dynamics of the HSC hindered possible bilateral cooperation, visible in the pursuit of zero-sum solutions and ultimatums. As will be revealed in the follow section, especially Kashmir proved an irreconcilable issue between India and Pakistan, severely affecting hydrological relations.

As explained, the conflicting positions regarding Kashmir remain the most encumbering issue in the Indo-Pakistani enduring rivalry (Saideman, 2005: 202-203; Cohen, 2013: 33). Indeed, the disputed region was the main driver in all 11 major conflicts between the two states (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 631). Moreover, as the Indus passes through the region, Kashmiri disputes have also taken a hydro-strategic turn (Ahmad, 2009). According to research, water is certainly discursively utilized by Pakistan for a “…larger political objective, that of Kashmir” (Burgess et al. 2013: 15; see also, R. Singh, 2008: 10, 15). For instance, Waslekar (2005) connects declining Pakistani water-availability to growing Kashmiri insurgency activities (2005: 57). Moreover, many commentators view the region’s water-resources as a motivation for the 2001 Kargil War (Swain, 2004; Waslekar, 2005; Baid, 2005). For India, hydrological control of J&K is equally about military advantage and securing domestic energy resources (Zawahri, 2009: 5; Wirsing & Jasparro, 2006: 5-6).

Hence, Kashmir undeniably remains key in Indian-Pakistani hydrological disputes (Dar, 2010-2011: 2; Sinha, 2010: 483), in which Baglihar moreover played an influential part. Furthermore, the Kashmiri population also deserves analytical attention, as Baglihar proved a doubled-edged sword by simultaneously promising to fulfill regional electrical needs, but consequently also severely impeding agricultural development (Alam et al. 2011: 15; Gilani, 2005: 46). Therefore, regional ambivalence towards the hydro-project permitted “…exploitation by those pursuing a strategy of ‘securitizing’ the Indus water discourse” (Alam et al. 2011: 15).

Since Pakistani General Musharraf rose to power in 2004, the irredentist claim to Kashmir transformed from integrating the Muslim majority within the region with Pakistan, to securing vital water resources
from the Indus (Waslekar, 2005; Bisht, 2011: 2, 7). Moreover, by emphasizing water Pakistani elites attempted to increase waning domestic and international attention towards the region, just as linking J&K to domestic water-scarcity motivated insurgents serving Pakistani interests by maintaining instability and insecurity (IDSA, 2010: 38). This strategy was highlighted by water-expert Dr. Ejaz in *Daily Times*: “[U]nless Pakistan is assured on the supply of water, it will never abandon the proxies that can keep India on its toes by destabilizing Kashmir” (Gupta, 2010), adding that “…Kashmir may not be as important as the water issue” (Ibid.). Furthermore, the President of the Pakistani Muslim League was quoted in *Dawn* (2008a) describing Kashmir itself as the lifeline for the country, while saying that Baglihar had severely reduced the water flow to Pakistan. In addition, he stressed the declining water situation in the Northern Punjab province, thereby linking Baglihar to domestic water-scarcity all the while emphasizing the importance of Kashmir (Ibid.). Members of the Regional Assembly attempted similar securitizing attempts, passing a resolution denying Indian trade transit prior to any resolution to both Kashmir and water allocation issues (IDSA, 2010: 37). Moreover, one member was quoted for saying that India would remain ‘an enemy’ until both the Kashmir dispute and water issues were resolved, thereby yet again connecting the two issues (Dawn, 2010).

I contend that by linking domestic water-scarcity to Baglihar, environmental responsibility was shifted from Pakistan to India, while constructing the issue as an ‘existential threat’ thereby requiring extraordinary security-responses beyond normal politics (Wæver, 1995: 221; 2012: 53; Buzan *et al.* 1998: 23-25; see also Figure 1). As explained, Pakistani elites thus gained ‘political momentum’ by removing checks and balances, while diverting attention away from domestic inequalities (Emmers, 2013: 135-136). Indeed, Bisht (2011) explains how “[I]nlinking Kashmir to water suits the interests of political parties in as much as it helps divert debate away from inequitable land holdings, water scarcity, poor water policies and provincial conflicts on water rights” (2011: 10).

Therefore, these practices indeed make sense, as observers have explained how especially corruption and “…administrative inefficiencies in Pakistan’s water sector have hampered water aid and water development in the country and stunted growth considerably” (Bakshi & Trivedi, 2011: 10). Hence, inspired by Practice Theory- and event analysis, it is by combining the expressions of national identity with actual observable events or aspects of action, I can contend that the larger social structures in Pakistan influence individual political decision-making (Rouse, 2007: 505; Commuri, 2009: 162). Moreover, I argue that connecting
domestic water-scarcity to Baglihar, while linking this to the larger Kashmir dispute, was an overt elite securitizing attempt poised to rekindle fading Pakistani public interest in the region. By successfully linking and securitizing Pakistani water-woes to Indian hydro-logical constructions and J&K, elites attempted to transform the liberation struggle “…from a Jihadist element to an existential issue by inciting passions” (Tadjabaksh: 2011: 10). If successful, popular attention would in theory be directed away from domestic mismanagements, especially in the Northern provinces (Chandran, 2010; Bisht, 2011: 9, 13). Indeed, as noted by Bakshi and Trivedi (2011), obtaining vital water resources from J&K would “… provide much needed water for irrigation to Punjab and Sindh and alleviate tensions between these two provinces” (2011: 5). Thus, Pakistani motivations for securitizing the water-scarcity-Baglihar-Kashmir nexus are unveiled. These findings correspond with especially Pervez’s (2013) conclusion regarding South-Asian elites’ vested interests in maintaining the security dilemma/HSC.

Similar to Indian practices in the initial stages, Kashmir-linkages are less visible in the military/political sectors, but rather situated within an economic/development discourse. This was achieved mainly by emphasizing the prospective prosperity for the Kashmiris. For instance, in referring to Baglihar PM Singh argued that “[E]lectricity is crucial for the development of industry and the project will give a push to the industrialization of Kashmir” (GK News, 2008). However, as one Indian think-tank report argued, rather than for the development of J&K, India’s Kashmir policy was, and still is, purely geo-strategic driven23 (R. Singh, 2008: 16).

Moreover, economic incentives of private actors and regional state-governments possibly influenced central policy-making as well (Alam et al. 2011: 16). While justified by meeting domestic developmental needs, hydrological power-projects have often been criticized by local actors and experts for the disparity “…between claims and actual results/impacts on the ground (PRIO, 2011: 7). This can partly be contributed the ‘merchandising of water’, which denotes the fact that in South-Asia (and especially India) huge transnational water companies have increasingly gained influence – or control – of water resources. This consequently infuse hydro-politics with enormous sums, potentially resulting in widespread corruption (R. Singh, 2008: 19; Dar, 2011-2012: 21-23; see also Box 3). Still, India unquestionably needed

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23 For instance, the report explains that earlier hydrological power projects, equally justified through a domestic developmental discourse, actually held no benefits for local populations (R. Singh, 2008: 16.).
to appease the Kashmiri population in order to secure the region’s resources. For instance, Baglihar was vital for meeting India’s rising electricity needs - a recurring source of domestic discontent (Zawahri, 2009: 13). Other economic motives were probably influencing decision-making as well, e.g. expansion of tourism (Mushtaq, 2010). This particular endeavor certainly necessitates regional appeasement, something which Baglihar arguably was meant to instigate by meeting Kashmiri developmental needs.

In summing up, albeit overtly motivated by economic incentives, Kashmir is still high on the Indian national security-agenda (Zawahri, 2009: 5). However, as the undisputed hegemon, India continuously to enjoy the status quo within the region (Paul, 2005: 10), which explains why only few explicit securitizing moves within the military/national sectors are visible in discourses involving Kashmir. India instead repeatedly situated Baglihar within the economic sector, emphasizing the developmental benefits for the Kashmiri population (IDSA, 2010: 38). For instance, the Indian Extern Affairs Minister denied to concede to Pakistani objections as “…the project [was] important for the economic well-being of the people of J&K” (Government of India, 2005). Moreover, during the dam’s inauguration, PM Singh said that the “…effort has been to build the socio-economic infrastructure of the state to make Jammu and Kashmir realize its economic potential” (M. Singh, 2008). Furthermore, he assured that India would “…honor all our commitments to the State [and] that the special identity of this state and its people is kept intact” (Ibid. 2008). Arguably, India’s resource capture strategy was situated within a legitimizing discourse of ensuring economic well-being for the Kashmiris – which, as explained above, has not always held true. Finally, Singh noted that special care had been taken to ensure that Pakistani concerns were addressed (The News, 2008). However, discontent did manifest from both “…Pakistani objections and nitpicking under the ambit of the treaty” (IDSA, 2010: 38) and from Kashmiri elites themselves, disaffected with the IWT in general and the Baglihar project in particular (Misra, 2010: 184).

Already in 1999, J&K’s Finance Minister had referred to the IWT as ‘a nightmare’ while saying that “…the State of J&K needs to be compensated for the sacrifice it has to make in the national interest” (Pioneer, 2000). Moreover, in April 2002 the J&K Legislative Assembly demanded the IWT’s review on the grounds of unequal water-distribution (Dawn, 2002). This position was continuously reiterated: For instance, the head of J&K Council for Human Rights argued that the IWT had obstructed the region’s economic development (Gilani, 2010). Likewise, many local experts contended that the IWT had “…added to the
economic woes of the people of upstream Jammu and Kashmir State by depriving them of the legitimate right to full usage of Jhelum, Chenab and Indus waters…” (Warikoo, 2005).

Clearly there were differing views on who actually reaped the benefits from Baglihar: While India attempted to frame the issue as meeting regional demands of environmental scarcity, Pakistan feared the increased control of water-headways in J&K (R. Singh, 2008: 15; Dar, 2011-2012: 9). Moreover, the Kashmiris themselves emphasized the unequal distribution of resources from Baglihar, which they perceived having legitimate priority-rights to (Gilani, 2010). These views explain the various manifestations of securitizing attempts, which I contend are furthermore influenced by the various positions within the HSC, i.e. hydro-hegemon, lower-riparian and native population respectively. Yet again, I reiterate how such dynamics only become apparent by adopting a contextual understanding of the security practices driven simultaneously by the wider supra-national settings and inter-subjective identity-based perceptions (Balzacq, 2005, 2011; Rouse, 2007; Commuri, 2009; Jones, 2011; Curley & Herrington, 2011). Moreover, it clearly depicts how negotiations take a zero-sum character fostered by the increasing securitization of hydro-politics. Table 6 summarizes the securitizing dynamics of the HSC in the Kashmir context:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Kashmiris</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Existential Threat</td>
<td>Political elites</td>
<td>India, water scarcity, Baglihar Dam</td>
<td>India, Pakistan, unequal resource allocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referent Object</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Nation, population, environment</td>
<td>Region, development, environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectors</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Military, Environmental</td>
<td>Environmental, Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practice</td>
<td>Resource Capture Strategy, justified through a developmental discourse</td>
<td>Objections, based primarily on the IWT’s provisions and domestic environmental pressures produced by Baglihar</td>
<td>Objections, based primarily on unequal distribution and priority rights to hydrological benefits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 6: Securitization in J&K*
3.4. Post-Settlement – A Conflict Less Solved

Following numerous visits to Baglihar, the NE presented his decision in 2007 (Sinha et al. 2012: 741). This can briefly be summarized as a general compromise which left both parties officially satisfied24 (Salman, 2008: 115; Bakshi & Trivedi, 2011: 19). However, in a subsequent press briefing the Pakistani Minister for Water and Power reiterated Pakistani concerns of the height of Baglihar’s spillway gates, saying that the “…government is fully committed to protect Pakistan’s national interest and is examining further course of action” (Times of India, 2007; see also Mohanty & Khan, 2005: 3156). Although officially settled, the Baglihar dispute was evidently not resolved.

At the inaugural ceremony in October 2008, PM Singh yet again linked Baglihar to the economic sector by emphasizing the developmental benefits for J&K (GK News, 2008). Moreover, the PM said that by “…taking up this (Baglihar) project [India has] given due consideration to the genuine concern of the neighboring country [having] vowed to completely abide by this important treaty” (Ibid.). Singh also emphasized the mutual duty of common development, and was quoted for extending “…an invitation to Pakistan, to join us in this regard” (Ibid.). These statements clearly reflect Indian hegemonic practices, in which securitizing moves of constructing dams are discursively justified. By linking the Baglihar dam to development, while explicitly stating that constructions were within the IWT’s provisions, India arguably imposed its will on Pakistan through ‘legitimate political means’. Indeed, utilizing legal interpretations are a common hydro-hegemonic practice deployed to “…justify hegemonic control over water resources in contested international river basins” (Turton, 2003: 42; see also Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: 442). Moreover, while officially emphasizing cooperation, the hegemon distorts the negative effects of asymmetrical power relationships, which is “…evident in structural inequalities, the lack of control over decisions and an inequitable allocation of the resource or its benefits” (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: 440).

Nevertheless, I contend that the securitization of water led Pakistani officials to unremittingly view Baglihar as an existential threat, hence the explanation why they abstained from conforming- or accepting further Indian hydrological practices. Combining the wider contexts i.e. the political domestic climate of Pakistan with an understanding of the potential benefits of successful hydrological securitization and

24 For a detailed overview of the NE’s decision, and a fuller explanation of Pakistan’s technical objections to the Baglihar Dam, see Khattak, 2008. For a similar comprehensive analysis of the dispute itself and the resolution process, see Salman, 2008.
scapegoating, allows me to formulate reasonable conclusions as to why Pakistani elites refused to accept the Baglihar dispute settled. In contrast, Indian policy-makers viewed the conflict as over (Khattak, 2008: 97-98). Moreover, experts argued that Pakistani objections were strictly politically driven which reflected the country’s “…propensity to resort to horror scenarios and grandstanding [while] suggesting political more than genuine water issues as the real motivating factor” (Verghese, 2010). Or as Sinha (2010) contended, whereas “…India [had] been sincere in following the terms of the treaty, as the Baglihar case indicates [the] propaganda machinery in Pakistan continues to work overtime” (2010: 484).

Immediately following the inauguration, Pakistani officials voiced complaints that the filling of Baglihar did not adhere to the IWT. The Pakistani Indus Commissioner pointed to the reduced Pakistani water-intake, which had “…created a drought-like situation in vast stretches” (Hussain, 2008). More forcefully, President Zardari warned that “…Pakistan would be paying a very high price for India’s move to block Pakistan’s water supply from the Chenab River” (Subramanian, 2008). Demanding compensation for the reduced water flow, Zadari also hinted that the Baglihar-dispute could significantly impact overall Indo-Pakistani relations (Ibid. 2008). During this tense post-settlement period, India chose to fill the dam without warning in August 2008 (Hazarika & Mehta, 2008: 27). This practice was perceived by Pakistan as a clear violation of the IWT, thereby re-fuelling the fear and anxiety of Pakistani officials concerned with the military-strategic utility of Baglihar (Dawn, 2008b; Briscoe, 2010a; Bagla, 2012: 1227). For instance, as the filling had adversely effects on the farmers in Pakistani Punjab, Indian actions played straight into perceptions of lower-riparian vulnerabilities (Briscoe, 2010a; Hazarika & Mehta, 2014: 26). Moreover, as India kept the filling secret, it illustrates the securitization of hydro-politics through classification of hydrological data and especially practices (Turton, 2003: 52; R. Singh, 2008: 16).

Indeed, as Turton (2003) explains, in declining river basins, data and knowledge become ‘focal points of conflict’, fostering conditions where “…knowledge is power, and it is wielded like a weapon to achieve and maintain hegemonic control” (2003: 70). Certainly, a shared concern by India’s neighbors have been that the country “…maintains utmost secrecy about any facts/figures/data regarding trans-boundary water” (R. Singh, 2008: 16). These criticisms are continuously paralleled by many experts, all calling for more transparent Indian practice regarding river-flood data at their dams (e.g. Briscoe, 2010b: 32).
Indian post-settlement hydro-practices were unmistakably visibly securitized by Pakistani elites. Moreover, these moves were clearly intensified by explicitly hinting at armed escalation: For instance, *Dawn* quoted the former Pakistani Foreign Minister in January 2010 for saying that if “…India continues to deny Pakistan its due share, it can lead to a war between the two countries” (IDSA, 2010: 37[emphasis added]).

Similar linkages between water and war was made by the influential Pakistani Chief Editor Nizami, who warned that the Indian hydrological projects would turn Pakistan into “…a desert within the next 10 to 15 years” (Dawn, 2010). Moreover, he added that the country should either “…show upright posture or otherwise prepare for a nuclear war” (Nation, 2009). Members of the Punjab Assembly were particularly verbal in criticizing the Baglihar filling, accusing India of ‘water terrorism’ (Bisht, 2011: 11). One member was quoted in the *Daily Times* for saying that “[e]xperts foresee war over the water issue in the future and any war in this region would be no less than a nuclear war” (IDSA, 2010: 37-38). Meanwhile, in Pakistan’s National Assembly, the government was urged by several MPs to impress on India not to use the Pakistani ‘share of water’ (Arpi, 2010: 113).

Notably, these intensified securitizing moves all occurred following President Zardari’s Washington Post article (mentioned earlier), in which he stated that “…[t]he water crisis in Pakistan is directly linked to relations with India” (Zardari, 2009). Hence, I contend that the President’s securitizing move marked a new beginning in the water discourse *vis-a-vis* India. Similarly, Bisht (2011) concludes that the president’s discursive practices “…can perhaps be called the curtain raiser to the existing water discourse in Pakistan that seems to be directed towards India” (Bisht, 2011: 2). Related to my theoretical framework, Zadari’s securitization of water can therefore be deemed successful, as the characteristics of water as ‘existential threatened’ by India was now inter-subjectively accepted by the general audience. The rather undisputed nature of Pakistani hydrological securitization supports this argument. Moreover, the explicit, and apparent unproblematic referrals to (nuclear)war highlight the dynamics of successful securitization, in which the implementation of extraordinary (counter)measures are popular (Buzan et al. 1998: 25-26). Moreover, recalling the political momentum gained by successful securitization (Emmers, 2013: 135-136), I argue that the intensification of hydrological securitization helped to further divert domestic discontent – all in the interests of certain parts of the political elites (see e.g. Box 4 and 8).

Inspired by the geographical-positional assumptions of HSC theory, I contend that lower-riparian Pakistan was partly driven by fear of India’s commitment to strengthen its own position on the Indus (IDSA, 2010:
This consequentially led elites to object any potential Indian hydrological constructions (Bakshi & Trivedi, 2011: 22; Sinha, 2010: 484-485).

In contrast, Indian securitization can be interpreted as a hydro-hegemonic resource capture strategy, simultaneously aiming to fully exploit the Indus potential, while achieving political momentum through national development projects (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006: 444; PRIO, 2011: 2). Conclusively, both India and Pakistan were driven by the increasing securitization of water within the HSC, in which their respective positions also influenced discourses and practices alike. Common for both nations were the invariable linkage of water-scarcity to national security, while Pakistan moreover repeatedly connected domestic water-woes to Indian hydro-practices.

Linking resource-scarcity and environmental problems with security is never innocent, because the particular referent objects are almost always recognizable and pivotal for audiences (Wæver, 1995: 55; Aradau, 2004: 400). Therefore, this practice may yield unintended effects, as the inherent importance of security politics often bolsters nationalism or ‘undemocratic tendencies of secrecy’, while centralizing power and exclude competing political groups from decision-making procedures (Soroos, 1993: 321; Wæver, 1995: 221). Arguably, the ‘constructed’ enmity between India and Pakistan, deeply rooted and inter-subjectively reinforced, further facilitated securitization (Pervez, 2013: 3,26; Buzan, 2002: 21-22). Indeed, as the intersubjective process is a foundation of ST (Buzan et al. 1998: 19; Balzacq 2005: 177) identity logically plays a prominent part by shaping intersubjective understandings, perceptions, interests and behavior (Agius, 2007: 9; Wendt, 1998: 73). This explains the political instrumental use of securitizing Indian hydrological practices- whether the threat was perceived ‘real’ or not.

Regardless of the actual hydrological effects, the 2008 Baglihar filling was securitized by Pakistani actors in general – arguably motivated by gaining/maintaining political power and diverting attention away from domestic mismanagement. As I contend, the identities of both India and Pakistan are continuously shaped by the elite discourses which are “…ultimately linked to [their] security practices” (Pervez, 2013: 24). And as the above analysis has shown, increasingly these security practices links easily identifiable and valued referent objects to larger patterns of national security, thereby further fuelling regional enmity, which indeed are in the interests of certain elements of the political elites in India and Pakistan alike.
4. CONCLUSIONS

In this final part, I address the thesis’ research question, that is, explain what the actual securitizing elements within the Baglihar dispute were, and what these elements reveal about the larger dynamics driving the South-Asian HSC. Moreover, I suggests venues for further research, emphasizing the imperative need for de-securitizing the Indo-Pakistani enduring rivalry.

The Baglihar dispute was a turning point in Indo-Pakistani hydrological relations. Although avoiding armed escalation (partly due to the institutional setting and third-party intervention) it clearly exposed the IWT’s weakness vis-à-vis opportunistic actors by “…being overshadowed by political considerations” (Sinha et al. 2012: 744). Moreover, based on my theoretical assumptions and data investigated, I contend that Baglihar exemplifies the overall consequences of increased water-securitization in the South-Asian HSC (Turton, 2003:69-73; R. Singh, 2008: 7-8). As reiterated throughout this thesis, the successful securitization of specific issues liberate policy-makers from traditional political responsibilities, thereby certainly making the strategy seem appealing for self-serving political elites (Buzan et al. 1998: 24; Emmers, 2013: 136-137). Problematically, securitization likely produces unfavorable societal effects e.g. creating antagonistic perceptions of ‘the other’ while fostering a climate of zero-sum negotiations, which aggregated move “…people and policy makers to choose irrational responses that may lead to deepening of contests and conflicts” (Alam et al. 2011: 40).

Hence, within ST analysis, hydrological disputes should be given considerable more attention, as especially the environmental sector “…provides a lens that enables us to highlight root causes of existential threats that become manifest in other sectors…” (Buzan et al. 1998: 84). These securitizing dynamics were certainly present in the Baglihar dispute, especially concerning referent objects dearly held and easily identifiable by civil-societies (Aradau, 2004: 400). This finding corresponds with contemporary South-Asian research, which argue that in the region “[w]ater is a flammable issue that can easily be used by […] state actors as well for purposes of political positioning, to fuel hatred and conflict, phenomena witnessed around the world and in the region” (Alam et al. 2011: 40). The increasing securitization of water in South-Asia can be understood from several perspectives: As mentioned, many observers regard Pakistani securitization of India’s hydro-projects as a means to diminish domestic discontent while justifying increased militarization. Indeed, Bisht (2011) explains that “[s]elling a national security issue to the
domestic public has been considered as one of the main factors in strengthening the national power of the country” (Bisht, 2011: 15). While indicating the effects of increasing environmental vulnerability (Tadjabaksh, 2011: 10), I nevertheless argue that Pakistani discursive practices can be understood as a function of the likely opportunities gained by successful securitization. Given the costs of addressing various domestic issues, linking water to India can be appealing while playing “…an influential role in shaping the contours of Pakistan’s foreign policy objectives vis-a-vis India” (Bisht, 2011: 13). Similar domestic water woes are taking place in India, where civil strife and corruption also fuel national discontent (Buzan, B. 2002: 7; Miklian & Kolås. 2014: 1, 4). Thus, the hegemonic resource capture strategy, inherent with the likely state-legitimizing outcome, can equally be understood as motivation for Indian hydro-securitization (PRIO, 2011: 2). Moreover, the rapid expansion of dams holds clear economic incentives for certain stake-holders, additionally explaining such observable Indian hydro-practices (R. Singh, 2008, Dar, 2011-2012). Hence, it is reasonable to argue that while India and Pakistan might have different motives for hydro-securitization, which explains the fluctuation in actual practices, the instrumental value of securitization itself is unquestionably recognized by actors within both countries. Therefore it is problematic that the increasing securitization, both hypothetically and empirically proven, only produces additional fear and hatred, consequently making stable peace in South-Asia seem as illusive as ever. In other words, the elite (re)produced HSC does not seem to diminish due to prospects of basin closure. (Tadjabaksh, 2011; Bisht, 2011; Pervez, 2013). In contrary, Indian-Pakistani hydrological conflicts seem only to increase, as even before the Baglihar settlement Pakistan launched objections towards yet another project – the Kishangaga dam (Hindustan Times, 2007b).

Map 5: Kishangaga Dam
Pakistan, yet again arguably driven by lower-riparian anxiety, securitized the matter thereby dragging India into a “…protracted dispute involving neutral experts and arbitration” (IDSA, 2010: 36). In turn, India similarly framed the hydro-power project as a pivotal national project. This was emphasized by the Minister of State for Power: “[Kishangaga is] …of strategic importance to India… we have to move heaven and earth to ensure the earliest commissioning of the project”. Equivalent to the Baglihar-dispute, India again justified the hydrological mission through a developmental-national security discourse (IDSA, 2010: 42). Similarly, Pakistan once more linked domestic water-problems to Indian hydrological infrastructure while stressing their military-strategic features (Hindustan Times, 2007b; Khan, 2013: 15-16; Pakistan Defense, 2014). Hence, it would seem the dynamics described in the Baglihar-dispute yet again are in effect, clearly illustrating the impeding effects of increased hydro-securitization and the enormous undertaking towards a normalization of relations.

4.1. The Call for De-Securitization

As a consequence of basin closure, insecurity invariably increases. This is only fuelled by the wider political context within the HSC, which in turn influence future political decision-making, consequently breeding even more securitization (Turton, 2003: 8, 69, 95). Hydro-hegemonic theory holds that the resource capture strategy indeed entails constructions of large hydro-projects, which functions as a state-legitimizing venture (PRI, 2011: 2). The Baglihar- and Kishanganga projects are part of India’s resource capture strategy, which consequently forced an immediate reaction by Pakistan fearing increased Indian control of the declining Indus water resources (BBC, 2005; Masood, 2012). These dynamics clearly portray the dynamics within the on-going HSCs.

Under these current conditions of inherent national insecurity, Indian and Pakistani elites alike arguably assume the worst case scenario, thereby influencing future security-practices. According to SC theory, these security practices are then understood as potential threatening to the counter-part, thereby forcing the adoption of increased security-related measures themselves. In a South-Asian hydrological setting, these dynamics escalate “…into a spiral of insecurity like the cold war era with hydraulic infrastructure replacing nuclear weapons” (Alam et al. 2011: 37). As one possible solution, I argue for greater scholarly emphasis on the means and possibilities for de-securitizing the South-Asian HSC.
As explained, de-securitization denotes the withdrawal of specific issues out of ‘emergency mode’ and back into the politicized level where formal bargaining processes and political accountability are in effect (Buzan et al. 1998:4) This transformation is indeed called for, as hydro-securitization produces several unintended consequences, e.g. elevating water development projects to an undeniable level while rapidly escalating conflict potential with probable zero-sum outcomes (Leather, 2001:131; Turton, 2003: 113). But how is this process undertaken? As Turton (2003) finds, insecurity does often arise from the prospect of water-scarcity (2003: 242). However, this can be transformed by changing “…collective perceptions of the dispute, by de-securitizing the issue via voicing alternative discourses through various institutional settings” (Ibid. 242-243). Indeed, Barrett (1994) wrote that effective regimes assisting in the successful cooperation of international water resource management are critical, as water-scarcity without proper management can be a trigger for international riparian conflict (1994: 8).

The logic of de-securitization certainly lends itself to inter-state relations, potentially transforming conflict to cooperation (Emmers, 2013: 137). For instance, by studying the de-securitization process in Turkey, Aras and Polat (2008) argue that “…formerly securitized and dramatized issues have begun to be perceived as normal political issues […] policymaking process is now emancipated from ideational barriers, while the flexibility of foreign policy […] has increased substantially” (2008: 511)25. In order for the same to happen in South-Asia, I argue that emerging issues of cooperation must be prevented from becoming securitized. If actors involved allow environmental matters to be elevated above the level of negotiated politics, then compromises indeed will be that more difficult to reach as “…any concession will be painted as possibly undermining national security” (Olmstead, 2014).

Therefore, inspired by the referred scholarship which all call for increased attention on securitizing actors undermining attempts at peace, I argue that a bottom-up de-securitizing process is one possibly way towards stable peace. This approach presumes that mid- and low-level actors would converge and challenge dominating views, thereby transforming the hegemonic discourses and consequently the inter-subjective beliefs. How this is actually undertaken in practice is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, unveiling the obstacles to such process is one step of the way. This study, in its limited time and space, was meant as a contribution towards this important endeavor.

25 For a similar argument in the Israel-Palestinian context, in which a de-securitization process, instigated by sub-level actors’ counter-hegemonic discourses, challenged the dominating securitization of water thereby opening up for the possibility of a normalization of relations, see Frölich, 2010.
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5.1. **Maps and Polls**

Map 1: *South-Asia*. Available at:

http://www.nature.com/nnrneurol/journal/v10/n3/fig_tab/nnrneurol.2014.13_F1.html

Map 2: *Global Water Scarcity*. Available at:

http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Global_vattenstress.jpg

Map 3: *Indus Water Basin*. Available at:


Map 4: *Baglihar Dam*. Available at:


Map 5: *Kishangaga Dam*. Available at:


Poll 1: *Opinion of Current State of the Country*. Available at:

http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/03/31/indians-reflect-on-their-country-the-world/

Poll 2: *Influence on Pakistani State Affairs*. Available at:


Poll 3: *Greatest Threat to Pakistan*. Available at:

http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/07/on-eve-of-elections-a-dismal-public-mood-in-pakistan/