Promotion of Democracy

A Comparison Between UN Special Political Mission in Libya and Peacekeeping in Mali

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Abstract

In this thesis, I have conducted a descriptive, comparative study to highlight the differences between the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali and the special political mission (SPM) in Libya, with regards to the promotion of democratic development and direct support to facilitate such development. My study will show that even though the ambitions and the nature of the support is almost identical, the UN expectations are set too high. Even though they see the difficulties in (re)establishing peace and democracy in states ridden by conflict, they often rely on the “good will” of actors involved, be it transitional government, political parties or armed groups. Though this study might not generate a result that can be used to generalize within the field of study - mostly since cases are often unique - it can further our understanding of UN mentality regarding the ambitions, hopes and expectations of UN peace mission strategies. Originally created to uphold peace and security, the UN have perhaps gotten lost in the idea that peace and democracy has to be created side by side, therefore undermining their original ambition.

Key words: Libya, Mali, Peacekeeping, Special Political Missions, United Nations
Words: 10625
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1 Introduction and Research Question

Ever since the establishment of the United Nations (UN), the organization’s prime objective has been to promote and uphold peace and security around the globe. In addition to the UN’s ambition to create a peaceful world, they are also unwavering in their support of democratic governance and development. When the UN Charter was drafted in 1945, democracy was not a prioritized issue for the UN. However, today the UN presents itself as a force of democracy, claiming that…

“… the UN as an institution has done more to support and strengthen democracy around the world than any other global organization -- from fostering good governance to monitoring elections, from supporting civil society to strengthening democratic institutions and accountability…”1.

Today, the UN have dozens of active missions around the globe, whose goals are to facilitate peace and democracy. 16 of these are so called peacekeeping missions, which aim to restore and keep peace, while trying to restore, uphold or otherwise facilitate security, human rights and the rule of law2. One of the most recent of these missions is the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which was established on April 25th 2013, through United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 21003. Through this mission, the UN seek to “… assist the transitional authorities of Mali to implement swiftly the transitional road map towards the full restoration of constitutional order, democratic governance and national unity in Mali”4.

During late 2010 and early 2011, civil unrest spread along the North African region. Starting in Tunisia, the so called Arab Spring spread through the region, reaching Libya in February 2011, where massive demonstrations were held, most notably in the city of Benghazi5. The escalating violence caught the attention of the UN, and following a UN sanctioned intervention6 in early 2011, led by NATO forces, the regime fell and Muamar al-Gaddafi, who had been in power for 42 years, was killed by rebels.

4 Ibid. p. 7
5 “Violent Protests rock Libyan city of Benghazi”, France24, 2011-02-16
6 Through resolution 1973, adopted by the UNSC on March 17th, 2011
In September 2011, roughly a month before NATO withdrew their forces, the UNSC adopted resolution 2009, which called for the establishment of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)\(^7\); a so called *special political mission*. Through the mandate of UNSMIL, the UN seek (among other things) to facilitate a transition to democracy and build government capacity\(^8\).

In this thesis, I will conduct a descriptive, comparative analysis of the two missions currently implemented in Mali and Libya. The aim is to identify any differences between the different mission types (peacekeeping, and special political mission), when it comes to the UN support of the establishment of democratic governance. My research question is as follows:

*What is the difference between the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali and the special political mission in Libya, when supporting the establishment of democratic governance?*

This thesis will consist of a total of four chapters, excluding this introduction, which is the first one. In the following chapter, I will present my theoretical framework. I will make a summary of some research that have been done within the field of UN peacebuilding and peacekeeping, as well as a brief explanation of the term *special political mission* and what is included in the term *democratic governance*.

The third chapter will be focusing on methodology and the material that will be central when conducting my research. I will make an overview of my chosen material, why it is relevant and how I will use it.

The fourth chapter, which will be split into two parts, one for the UNSMIL mission and one for the MINUSMA mission, is the central part of my analysis. These sub-chapters will present an overview of what measures are being taken to support, or otherwise promote, democratic governance in the two countries. In the fifth, and last, chapter, I will present my conclusions about how the two different UN strategies have been implemented in relation to the (re-)establishment of democratic governance.

2 Theory and Terminology

2.1 Participatory Democracy

Since the main focus of my analysis is the inclusion of citizens in the democratic process, I have chosen to tie my empirical analysis to the democratic theory within participatory democracy. In the context of this thesis, I will make a short summary of both the normative grounds on which participatory democracy rests, as well as a more empirical, semantic overview, as to put it in the context of UN policy.

In the field of normative democratic theory, the normative basics of participatory democracy is fairly simple; the value and legitimacy of the state rests on public support and participation. Simply put, the moral foundation is that higher participation in the democratic process also results in higher state legitimacy, given that those involved in the process are not being coerced, as consent and freedom of choice is critical in a participatory democracy. Perhaps the simplest, albeit unsatisfactory, way to measure participation is to look at voter turnout. However, going more deeply, we could also look at participation in ways of engagement in “political life”. Therefore, the simple (and minimalistic) method to look at participation to look at voter turnout will not be enough, and it is important to note that inclusion is not only to be measured in how many votes are being cast, but should include an analysis of the general engagement in the political process. Therefore, through my analysis, I will have to look at other indicators, such as participation in negotiations, consultations and the political discourse in general. Another important factor is transparency in the political process. The issue of transparency will be dealt with by looking at (for example) UN engagement in sharing information and education about the democratic process.

As my analysis will show, participation – and inclusion – is of central importance to the UN when shaping policies and strategies to promote and support democratic governance. The inclusion of women, minorities or otherwise marginalized groups is a main priority when the UN works to create a more democratic process.

9 Through violence or threat of violence, bribes, etc.
2.2 Consociational Theory

Although I do not have enough room for an exhaustive presentation of consociational theory and its critics, I will give a short summary of the basic principle, and put it into the context of my analysis. The idea of consociational democracy emerged in the 16th century, by philosopher Johannes Althusius, but was developed considerably during the 20th century, through the works of Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, Arthur Lewis and, most famously, Arend Lijphart. The idea have often been used when tackling ideas about how to manage states plagued by conflict, and the design involves inclusion and bargaining to achieve consensus, so that democracy does not break down into conflict between different communities. Although consociationalism can be seen as having a pessimistic notion of democracy, it has become a dominant theory for managing conflict in divided societies. It can be seen as a theory that promotes “inclusion through segregation”, since it promotes the idea of keeping different identities separated in communities where ethnic conflicts remains a threat to peace. Originally a theory in conflict with with the theory of constructivism, Lijphart later embraced a more constructivist view, resulting in the notion that, as Dixon puts it “...‘voluntary apartheid’ may not be necessary if identities can be reconstructed into less antagonistic forms and other measures taken to ameliorate conflict”. Those who embrace consociationalism also claims that it promotes the guarantee of minority rights. Even though consociationalism mainly deals with ethnic conflicts, I would argue that it could just as well fit in when studying intrastate conflict in general, since conflicts related to identity does not need to be ethnic.

In practice, consociationalism assumes a more realist perspective, where different groups come together, as they recognize the importance of cooperation. The theory also has the notion of mutual veto to enable power-sharing, and that minorities cannot be “run over” by majority groups, and that representation should be proportional for all groups. With regards to the more segregating characteristics, consociationalism promotes certain autonomy for different groups, so that they don’t have to share a “national morality” with regards to (for example) legislation.

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11 O’Leary, 2005, From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies, p. 3
12 Ibid. p. 11
14 Ibid. p. 312
15 O’Leary, 2005, From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies, p. 87ff
The purpose is to use a pragmatic approach, recognizing that some conflicts between different groups cannot be solved through integration, and that it is better to create a situation where groups might have separate identities, and yet have common goals with regards to peace and democracy.

For the UN in general, and the cases of Libya and Mali in particular, the idea has been to bring different groups to the negotiation table, and as will be evident by my analysis, both conflicts are plagued by continuous fighting between conflicting groups. While some consociationalist notions might not be seen as favorable among liberal peacekeepers and peacebuilders, the UN are no strangers to consociationalism design\textsuperscript{16}.

The existing ethnic conflicts in Libya and Mali, and the need for inclusion and mutual acceptance within these groups, makes a consociationalist approach fitting, even if some UN ideas (for example, the perceived importance of civil society) might put consociationalism under some scrutiny. Even so, the UN remains somewhat pragmatic, recognizing that (former) rivals need to negotiate with each other to achieve peace and stability. This is evident in both cases, especially in Mali, where armed groups have been invited to negotiations, even though they might have committed acts of violence during conflict. The need to create a consensus between conflicting groups is seen as an important tool in creating reconciliation in post-conflict societies.

2.3 A Brief History of Peacekeeping

Unlike today’s peacekeeping missions, the early missions were not characterized by military presence. Instead, the UN marked their presence by unarmed personnel tasked with observing and monitoring situations in regions plagued by conflict, or risking a relapse into conflict. The first peacekeeping mission, called United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), was established in 1948, through UNSC resolution 50. The initial objective was to bring an end to hostilities in Palestine, and to maintain cease-fire\textsuperscript{17}. The mission remains active to this day.

\textsuperscript{16} O’Leary, 2005, From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies, p. 18
\textsuperscript{17} United Nations, 1948, S/RES/50, p. 20
In 1960, the first large-scale peacekeeping mission, named United Nations Operation in the Congo (UNOC) was established. UNOC was active for four years, and involved extensive military presence. In 1961, escalating violence in the Congo resulted in another resolution (161), where the UN were urged to “take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo”. The UN also noted “the imperative necessity for the restoration of parliamentary institutions […] so that the will of the people should be reflected through the freely elected Parliament”.

When the Cold War was over, UN peacekeeping went into a new phase. The focus moved from inter-state conflict to intra-state conflict and civil wars. Between 1989 and 1994, the UNSC authorized 20 new peacekeeping operations around the world, including in Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador and Namibia. In the mid-1990’s, the missions established in former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Somalia were met with criticism, since the UN could not live up to their ambitions within these regions, and were considered failures, even by the UN themselves.

In the so called Brahimi report, which was released in August 2000, had the intention to “assess the shortcomings of the existing system and to make frank, specific and realistic recommendations for change”. During the following years, there were several reports with the aim to assess and reform peacekeeping strategies, including the “Peace operations 2010” reform strategy (2006), the so called Capstone Doctrine (2008) and A New Partnership Agenda - Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping (2009). It was also brought up during the 2005 world summit and other UN meetings, resulting in several resolutions dealing with the subject.

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20 Ibid
22 Ibid, p. 1
2.4 Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding – Same But Different?

In 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s policy statement *An Agenda for Peace* mainly used three different concepts: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. The first two of these concepts are fairly straight-forward, involving diplomatic interactions and the strife for agreements to prevent and create peace between two, or more, parties. The third concept, peacekeeping, required more engagement from the UN. The definition reads as follows:

“Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace”\(^\text{24}\).

Meanwhile, the term peacebuilding seem to refer to post-conflict strategy, taking over when peacekeeping end, to assure that conflict do not reemerge\(^\text{25}\). Despite this distinction between the terms, when engaging in peace studies, the terms peacekeeping and peacebuilding seem to have become increasingly intertwined. Whether you read it in UN policy documents, or within the theoretical research done within the field, it can be problematic to differentiate between the two.

Even though peacekeeping and peacebuilding are often treated as separate terms\(^\text{26}\) the UN recognizes that “the boundaries between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement have become increasingly blurred”\(^\text{27}\). In a document entitled *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, the UN provides a guide to what is included in the different types of peace operations.

In this document, peacekeeping is defined as “a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers”\(^\text{28}\). It is further stated that the strategies have evolved over the years, now encompassing the ambition “to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace”\(^\text{29}\).

\(^{24}\) Boutros-Ghali, 1992, *An Agenda for Peace*, II - Definitions
\(^{25}\) Ibid.
\(^{26}\) For example, the UN themselves have different web pages and offices for the two.
\(^{29}\) Ibid.
This is an accurate, albeit short, description of the MINUSMA mission in Mali. Turning to the term peacebuilding, however, the ambitions become vaguer:

“Peacebuilding is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that affect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions”30.

Note that there is no prerequisites regarding military presence or specific strategy implementation when it comes to what constitutes a peacebuilding mission. A figure presented in the document does not make the differences between the different missions any clearer:

Figure 1 Linkages and Grey Areas

As we can see, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacekeeping can all go hand in hand, and it is also stated that “experience has shown that they should be seen as mutually reinforcing”31. Indeed, as the peacekeeping missions evolved, the term “peace operations” would soon emerge, since the variation of the different missions became so extensive that they did not all fit the “traditional” notion of peacekeeping32. With this in mind, I will in this study use the term peace operation(s) when I write about both previous UN missions, as well as the missions in Libya and Mali.

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31 Ibid, p. 20
This term will encompass the entire spectrum of the different designs that the UN are using to promote, build and keep peace, even if the strategies may differ. However, I will still differentiate between the different missions and their strategies when discussing specific cases. The term \textit{peace operation} will simply be used as a generic term to describe UN ambitions to promote, create and uphold peace and, in extension, democracy.

2.5 The Ambiguity of “Special Political Mission”

Even though the concept behind special political missions (SPM’s) have been around since the very beginning of the UN, the term did not surface until the 1990’s. According to the UN, the role of political missions have been central to maintaining international peace and security. The term SPM is defined by the UN as “United Nations civilian missions that are deployed for a limited duration to support Member States in good offices, conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding”\textsuperscript{33}. Looking at this definition, the term does not in itself stand by itself, apart from other mission types, such as peacekeeping. It is a term that is generically used to describe almost any mission with UN presence. The definition also shows that the ambitions and aims of SPM’s can be identical to those of peacekeeping missions. The UN even states that SPM’s have become a “critical peacebuilding tool”\textsuperscript{34}.

Going back to the definitions of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and how they interact, the semantics becomes a bit confusing. The UN wants to define the terms differently, but points out that the distinction is blurred. In extension, SPM could be seen as a peacekeeping tool, despite the lack of military presence. Therefore, the term remains inconsistent, even more so since the UN have deployed peacekeeping missions and SPM’s side by side in the same country\textsuperscript{35}. Such “double deployment” does seem as an ambiguous concept, considering that the scope of a peacekeeping mandate can encompass all tools included in SPM’s.

Even though the nature of these missions can vary, the main purpose remains the same; resolve disputes, promote and support peace talks, and assist states in conducting national dialogues and political transitions, and facilitate sustainable peace\textsuperscript{36}. It is also seen as “an indispensable instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security”\textsuperscript{37}.

\textsuperscript{33} United Nations, 2013, A/68/223, p. 2
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid. p. 6
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid. p. 14
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid. p. 5, United Nations, 2014, A/69/325, p. 10
\textsuperscript{37} United Nations, 2013, A/68/223, p. 18
2.6 Democratic Governance

The term *democratic governance* has been around for decades, and encompasses many different aspects of what is generally considered the basics of democracy. These include (among other things) free and fair elections, inclusion in the political process and the rule of law. Due to the limited scope of this thesis, I have chosen to focus on free elections, and political inclusion. The analysis will deal with both these issues, but they will go hand in hand, and will not be analyzed by themselves. This is partly due to the limits of this thesis, but it is also permissible since political inclusion is central to the legitimacy of free elections, and by extension democratic governance. For example, if a free election has a voter turnout of 10 percent, the process is not as inclusive as an electoral process with a turnout of 85 percent.

In their policy document entitled *Democracy and the United Nations*, the UN presents their view on democracy, how they promote it and how it should be shaped. In this document, it is presented that “UN electoral assistance has been a crucial part and successful component in [...] establishing and deepening democratic governance”\(^{38}\). Within the field of elections, this is often done by offering support when a state seek develop sustainable electoral capacity, where inclusion is of central importance, especially among women and other underrepresented groups\(^{39}\).

For the purpose of this study, I have chosen to focus on two main issues connected to the UN notion of democratic governance, namely inclusion and participation, that is 1) granting people the *possibility* to take part of the political process and 2) increasing the *willingness* for the population to participate in the process. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is generally responsible for the work towards democratic governance, and I will use indicators that are related to the aforementioned phenomena\(^{41}\):

- Support of the creation and/or development of electoral bodies.
- Coordination of electoral assistance, as to optimize the inclusion of citizens in the electoral process.

\(^{39}\) Ibid. p. 2  
\(^{41}\) [http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/focus_areas/focus_electoral.html](http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/focus_areas/focus_electoral.html), accessed 2016-05-13
Promoting the participation of women, minorities and other marginalized groups, in the political process.

As evident by these objectives, the ideas of free elections and political inclusiveness go hand in hand. Therefore, it will be these subjects that will be used in my analysis. Of course, since the time frame is limited, some points might be hard to bring into the equation, perhaps most notably the second (establishing independent and permanent electoral management bodies). Thus, most focus will be on the active support of the UN promote 1) an electoral system based on free and fair elections and 2) inclusion of all citizens, both as individuals and as a collective, (for example, civil society groups) in the democratic process.

2.7 Previous Research

As UN peace missions have been implemented around the world, so have their critics been able to assess these missions. Séverine Autesserre has covered several of these missions in her book *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention*. Autesserre is using ethnographic approaches to critically assess different peace missions established by the UN through the years.

As one of her examples, she highlights the second peacekeeping mission in the Congo, named *United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (MONUC), which was active between 1999 and 2010, which was later renamed to the *United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (MONUSCO), which remains active to this day. 42

Autesserre points out that this mission indeed was a positive force able to reestablish the peace, which would not have been possible without UN presence. She also notes that the democratic election in 2006 would not have been possible without the UN mission in the country. Despite this, the mission is generally considered a failure, and even though Autesserre doesn’t dismiss the idea of peacekeeping, she does express criticism towards the inefficiency of UN peacekeeping missions. 43

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43 Autesserre, 2014, Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention, p. 8
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the differences between the different peace operations are all but clear, which is also reflected in *Peaceland*, and Autesserre notes that her research…

“… encompass members of other international, non-governmental, donor, or governmental agencies who had ‘peacebuilding,’ ‘peacekeeping,’ ‘conflict resolution’ (or an equivalent word) in their job titles or descriptions, or who worked on projects with an explicit conflict-resolution goal, even if their organizations’ main mandate was not explicitly related to peace”44.

In 2004, a decade before *Peaceland* was printed, Roland Paris, another front runner within peacebuilding studies, released his work *At Wars End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*. In his book, Paris points out that while specific missions have been covered within academia, there is a lack of criticism towards the theoretical and conceptual foundations of UN peace operations.

His work is focusing on missions that have been executed between 1989 and 1999, but also points out that there is already (in 2004) several new UN peace operations, mainly in Africa and the Middle-East45.

When turning to the results of peacebuilding missions, Paris notes that any would-be success of peace missions during the 1990’s are hard to measure. Simply looking at decrease of hostilities within the state, he argues that the missions could be seen as successes, since large-scale violence indeed have decreased where the operations were conducted. However, using the definitions used by the forbearers of peacebuilding, Kofi Annan and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, where success is to be measured through the sustainability of peace, the results are not as positive46.

In addition to Autesserre and Paris, there are many other scholars who have devoted their time to the subject, including Oliver Richmond, who have been engaged in shaping alternative approaches with regards to conflicts and the (re)constructions of peace47.

Some peace and conflict researches go further in their critique of UN peace missions than others. Kühn and Turner, for example, argues that some interventions with the ambition to build or promote peace doesn’t really have anything to do with peace, but are violent at its core.

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46 Ibid. p. 6
47 See; Richmond, 2008, *Peace in International Relations*
They criticize the western discourses about intervention, arguing that this discourse is to western-centric and does not take into consideration other perspectives that are not characterized by “typical” western values. Others, such as Madhav Joshi, argues that even though some UN peace missions have brought states closer to democracy, such missions have done little to ensure long lasting peace, as countries subject to UN promotion of democracy have fallen back into conflict.

We could also argue that UN peace missions are opportunistic, seeing that they are often deployed in non-democratic post-conflict states. Of course, the notion that interventions are neocolonial is not new, but these notions are often based on the nature of intervention itself, and not specifically those involving UN promotion of democracy. Promoting democracy while trying to create peace is perhaps more to establish the UN’s self-proclaimed role in advancing democracy, which might directly undermine peace; after all, peace is not something that can only be achieved through democracy. This could also explain why peace missions often fail; all states might not be ready for a western model of democracy.

There is also the issue of contingent sovereignty. In short, it is what the term implies, that sovereignty is not something absolute, but rather something that is only attributed to those being able to live up to certain standards. The emergence of responsibility to protect (R2P) illustrates this perfectly, where a state that fails to protect its own citizens also loses its sovereignty. This was a central argument when the UNSC legitimized the NATO led intervention in Libya. However, such a policy is in large very arbitrary, since it is not clear what constitutes a failure of protection.

There have also been numerous studies exploring peacebuilding and peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cyprus and South Africa, and Cambodia. The failures of peacekeeping strategies have put the concept in a situation where success is theoretical, while implementations are often seen as failures.

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50 Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of People, p. 27, 66ff
52 Kappler, 2014, Local agency and peacebuilding: EU and international engagement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cyprus and South Africa
3 Methodology

3.1 Laying the Foundations

As mentioned in the introduction, this is a descriptive, comparative analysis focused on the cases of the MINUSMA mission in Mali, and UNSMIL in Libya. In my study, I have chosen to use tools from the method of structured focused comparison, as presented by Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennet. It is structured in the sense that I pose a general question representing my research objective, and that this question guides a systematic comparison between my chosen cases.

The focus is the “zeroing in” on the research, to choose specific aspects of the cases that are to be examined\(^{54}\). Within theory development, a single case can provide answers that can fit many different theoretical traditions. Some cases could, for example, be studies to provide new knowledge within theories related to both institutionalism, foreign policy and international relations. Therefore, as part of this method, it is imperative to, as George & Bennet puts it, “identify the universe”, and identify a class and subclass of events, to focus on a specific phenomenon\(^{55}\). In this case, as I will illustrate below, the class is UN missions\(^ {56}\), and the subclasses consist of one peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) and one special political mission (USMIL).

\(^{54}\) George & Bennet, 2004, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, p. 67ff
\(^{55}\) Ibid. p. 69
\(^{56}\) Early on in this research, the class would probably have been defined as "UN intervention", but since the UNSMIL mission does not have the components to be defined as an intervention (at least not in a traditional sense), I have chosen "UN mission" to describe the general phenomenon instead.
It is also important to note that the validity of this research rests heavily on the definition of *democratic governance*. As George & Bennet points out, some variables are especially difficult to measure.

Conveniently enough, they use the term *democracy* as an example of this, saying that “a procedure that is ‘democratic’ in one cultural context might be profoundly undemocratic in another”\(^{57}\). Since different countries differ concerning (for example) institutional design, which is indeed the case with Mali and Libya, even the same issue to be analyzed can differ between the different cases\(^ {58}\).

In my case, this is solved by using UN definitions as a starting point, having a clear definition of my central variable *democratic governance* (see 2.4)

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\(^{57}\) George & Bennet, 2004, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, p. 19

Reaching any generalizable results will be difficult, since the nature of UN peace missions are heavily dependent on the circumstances surrounding the specific missions. Even though such circumstances often include at least a few common variables, such as a weak state, poor security, humanitarian issues, and corruption, there can rarely be a “one size fits all”-solution. The UN recognizes the difficulty in identifying underlying problems, and how different traditions (both political and cultural) and practices makes each case unique. Despite this, my hope is to provide some sort of insight into how today’s peace strategies are defined, motivated and carried out.

3.2 Material

The main sources of information will consist of various documents from the UN. As of now, the number of documents, and their categories, are as follows:

**Documents related to the situation in Libya**
- Twelve UNSC resolutions, dating between September 2011 and March 2016
- 48 UNSC meeting records, dating between November 2011 and March 2016
- Nine reports on UNSMIL, from the Secretary-General, dating between November 2011 and March 2016.
- 16 briefings from UN officials regarding the situation in Libya

**Documents related to the situation in Mali**
- Four UNSC resolutions, dating between December 2012 and June 2015.
- 13 UNSC meeting records, dating between January 2013 and April 2016
- 26 reports and statements by the President of the UNSC, dating between January 2013 and March 2016.
- Seven letters from the President of the UNSC to the Secretary-General, dating between January 2013 and October 2015.

In addition to these documents, there might be upcoming briefings, resolutions and reports related to these missions, in which case I will try to include as many as possible in my analysis. Furthermore, there are several official statements and media reports related to the conflicts in both states.

Counting the aforementioned documents, we can see that there are almost double as many documents related to Libya than Mali. However, since not all documents explicitly (or perhaps not even implicitly) touches upon the variables that I seek to analyze, several documents might not be of any relevance.
For example, several of the meeting records related to the issues in Libya consists of reports and statements from, and about, the International Criminal Court (ICC), which does not deal with the issues at hand. Therefore, I expect that the analysis itself will be more well-balanced when it comes to the quantity of information related to UNSMIL and MINUSMA.

The documents that will be analyzed will be used in two different ways:

1) To identify the *aims* of the missions, with regards to democratic governance. This will mainly be done by going through the aims as they are presented in resolutions, etc. Since the aims are often formulated on the basis of UN policy documents (such as the UN charter), this part of the analysis will also involve a review of such documents, especially with regards to what is central to my analysis; democratic governance.

2) To identify specific measures taken to work towards these aims. In this part of the analysis, the main focus will be on briefings and reports. This will be done in relation to the main indicators that I identified earlier (see. 2.1, 2.2 and 2.6).
4 Analysis

4.1 United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)

4.1.1 Background

After the NATO led military intervention in Libya, which started in early 2011, it did not take long before Muammar Gaddafi was ousted, and the intervening forces withdrew after about six months of military operations. United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) was established on September 16th, roughly a month before NATO withdrawal, through resolution 2009. The aims of this mission was, among other things, to establish a democratic and inclusive government.

4.1.2 Early Reports (November 2011 – March 2012)

One of the first UNSMIL reports was submitted by the Secretary-General in late November 2011. The Libyan officials welcomed the support of the UN, but remained adamant about their right to self-determination, beginning with the creation of a transitional government. The UN support had several priorities, one of them being the creation of a working, democratic electoral process. The ambitions was to create legislation that would allow such a process, which should be done within three months.

The UN also promoted the idea of a political consensus that would include “delimitation of electoral boundaries and seat allocation; election of individual candidates or party-based elections; voter and candidate eligibility; women and minority representation; and the establishment of a credible electoral management body.” The Secretary-General also shared his optimism regarding the creation of an inclusive, representative government, and his belief that the new leaders of Libya would build a society based on human rights.

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61 Ibid. p. 11f
On March 1st 2012, another report was submitted by the Secretary-General, assessing the situation, while calling for the extension of the UNSMIL mission by three months. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) initiated a program, involving 30 education instructors who would educate people about elections, democracy and “good governance”.

Further, the report contained passages regarding political inclusion in the electoral process, especially among women, youths and minorities. Being able to hold free and inclusive elections were seen as an important milestone towards the development of a legitimate, democratic government.

On March 14th, the UNSMIL mandate was extended by another twelve months, and the UNSC expressed concern about reports of sexual violence against women, serious flaws in the judicial system, and mistreatment of prisoners.

Two months later, Ian Martin once again briefed the UNSC on the situation in Libya. Several clashes between several rivaling armed groups had created some difficulty for the new Libyan government to stabilize the country. Reports about torture and arbitrary incarcerations also undermined the political development. Martin shared his worries with the Council, and noted that complications, together with the great expectations of the people of Libya, interfered with the interim political system. Furthermore, the plans for the June election were hampered by a short time for voter registration, and getting the people involved in the democratic process was problematic.

4.1.3 First Election and Constitutional Development (July 2012 – December 2013)

On July 7th, the first Libyan election took place. Even though Ian Martin was worried that previous conflicts would cause trouble with the election, the process was conducted without any major disturbances. Of the 2.8 million registered voters, about 1.7 million people voted, resulting in a voter turnout of 62 percent.

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63 Ibid. p. 12f
67 It should be noted, however, that the number of eligible voters (that is, including those who was not registered) is significantly higher than 2.8 million, which leaves us with a turnout that was de facto lower than the reported 62 percent.
He further reported that there was now new opportunities for the UN to conduct a dialogue with Libyan political actors regarding representation and the constitution-making process. The UN would also assist the Libyan authorities with the development of a more just and effective judicial system. On August 8th, the National Transitional Council (NTC) transferred power to the newly elected government, the General National Congress (GNC), consisting of 200 members.

During the transfer of authority, the UNDP proved technical assistance during this transition, and initiated induction training for the members of the GNC, in issues related to parliamentary functions. Jeffrey Feltman, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, also commended the transparency of the election process. The new Libyan government was, after some turbulence, formed on October 31st. Mustafa Abushagur, who was previously elected prime minister, stepped down on October 7th, after which Ali Zeidan was elected and formed a new cabinet.

On November 8th, Tarek Mitri, then special representative and head of UNSMIL informed the UNSC about their continued support of the democratic development in Libya. UNSMIL had offered the GNC’s Constitutional Committee support with regards to the constitutional process, mainly through technical and legal assistance, and consultation during the drafting of a constitution. However, UNSMIL had to allocate some of their resources between different cities, especially Benghazi and Bani Walid, where violent clashes between the military and former revolutionaries, which required support for those who got displaced as a result of the fighting.

During this time, the UNSMIL had also finalized their strategic framework for 2013-2014.

In January 2013, Tarek Mitri once again briefed the UNSC on the situation in Libya, pointing out that prime minister Zeidan had great support from both the GNC, political parties and the public in general. During the previous months, UNSMIL had provided technical support developing institutions and giving their support in the establishment of GNC’s internal structures. Furthermore, UNSMIL continued to promote an inclusive dialogue, as well as women’s rights and political participation.

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70 United Nations, 2012, “Briefing to the Security Council Mr. Tarek Mitri, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Libya”, p. 1f
71 United Nations, 2012, S/PV.9657, p. 3
72 Ibid. p. 5
73 United Nations, 2013, S/PV.6912, p. 2
Tarik submitted yet another report on the situation in Libya on March 14th. While he did commend the Libyan authorities on their work on constitutional development and their ambition to continue drafting democratic reforms, he expressed great concern regarding the security of the country. Weak state institutions and poor coordination continued to plague the Libyan people, as the fighting and proliferation of weapons remained an ever-present threat. In a resolution passed the same day, the UNSC again stressed the importance of equal participation in all parts of Libyan society, as well as “reaffirming that the United Nations should lead the coordination of the efforts of the international community in supporting […] the Libyan-led transition and institution-building process aimed at establishing a peaceful, democratic, independent and united Libya.” Furthermore, the mission was extended another twelve months, noting that the mission is an integrated political mission, where assistance was to be offered, but that national ownership remained a central, guiding principle and that UNSMIL was standing at Libya’s disposal.

On June 18th, Tarik Mitri re-visited the UNSC, briefing them on the development in Libya. The fighting between authorities and revolutionary groups did not seem to end, and the government had problems asserting their authority in the southern part of the country. Following the positive development of 2012, Mitri now saw a stagnation, pointing out that “the road to democracy” might not be as easy as it was back then. Despite the election in 2012, the Libyan state (and the people of Libya) was still presented with difficult challenges.

On September 16th, it was reported that UNSMIL’s wishes to improve the representation of women in the GNC, by having 16% allocated to female representatives were not met. Only six seats out of 60 were reserved for women, leaving it short by four seats.

Six seats were also reserved for cultural and ethnic minorities. Meanwhile, conflicts between different groups escalated, while it remained difficult to integrate revolutionaries in the society.

74 United Nations, 2013, S/PV.6934, p2ff
75 United Nations, 2013, S/RES/2095, p. 2
76 Ibid. p. 2f
77 United Nations, 2013, S/PV.6981, p. 4f
78 United Nations, 2013, S/PV.7031, p. 3
The Libyan people had come to develop certain skepticism and rejection towards the political process, undermining inclusiveness as promoted by the UN. Tarik Mitri stressed the importance of a more inclusive political dialogue, and that the nation was in need of a broader consensus regarding norms of government and rules of political actions. Despite this, Mitri reported that the ambition to create a national dialogue was shared by the GNC and the Libyan government.\textsuperscript{79}

In December, the frustration regarding the political process had increased among the Libyan population, resulting in mass demonstration around the country. The discontent was a result of the weak security provided by the authorities, as the conflict between different fractions, most notably those involving the Ansar Al-Sharia brigade. As a result of this, UNSMIL asked the Libyan authorities to strengthen the protection needed to provide the citizens with basic security.\textsuperscript{80}

Since the report in September, UNSMIL had also provided support in shaping a joint action plan, developed by National Women’s Network, with the purpose to empower women and increase their participation in the political process, with focus on the upcoming election. The voter registration had begun on December 1\textsuperscript{st}, even though the High National Election Commission (HNEC) had not yet set a definite date for the election.

4.1.4 Distrust and Escalating Violence (January 2014 – October 2014)

After the development towards democratic governance during the two previous years, 2014 started with political turmoil, with increased violence and the storming of the GNC, by protesters demanding its dissolution. Conflicts between the GNC and the government, who could not agree on election policies and the level of power that should be granted to a future president, left the political process at a standstill.\textsuperscript{81}

Tarik Mitri shared his frustration with the UNSC, pointing out that even though the UN is to remain neutral, he did what he could to deter threats and violence by trying to bring the different actors together for dialogue.

\textsuperscript{79} United Nations, 2013, S/PV.7031, p. 4
\textsuperscript{80} United Nations, 2013, S/PV.7075, p. 2
\textsuperscript{81} United Nations, 2014, S/PV.7130, p. 2f
With a new election closing in, UNSMIL reported that they “… provide direct support to the electoral process, providing technical advice through 25 advisers and experts drawn from UNSMIL, UNDP, UNOPS and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and procuring ballot papers and other electoral materials from international suppliers”\(^82\). During this time, UNSMIL also promoted transparency and public engagement, at the same time as they provided information and strategy sessions aimed towards women\(^83\).

Observations in Libya led to the conclusion that the skepticism towards the political process, as well as the distrust towards government, was steadily increasing in the country. A problem that caused a lot of worry within the UN, and it was feared that public discontent could further destabilize they region\(^84\). On February 20\(^{th}\), it was time to vote for the Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA). The voter turnout was staggeringly low, even compared with the 2012 GNC election. Only 46 % of the 1.1 million registered voters cast their vote, falling short with over one million people compared to two years earlier.

Many groups, especially in the southern part of Libya, boycotted the election, due to their demand for a more consensual decision-making process. In addition to these boycotts, several security issues also affected the voter turnout, and when the polling was done, 13 of the 60 seats empty\(^85\).

On March 14\(^{th}\), with the unanimous passing of resolution 2144, the UNSC underscored the importance of public participation, as well as the importance of credible electoral processes and a constitutional drafting process characterized by inclusion and transparency. The Council reaffirmed the importance of UNSMIL, and that they should lead international coordination, as well as promote a national political dialogue in Libya and improving government capacity. Furthermore the UNSMIL mandate was once again extended by twelve months\(^86\).

In June, Tarik Mitri reported to the UNSC that he would convene with some 50 representatives from different political groups in Libya, including political and tribal leaders, revolutionaries and civil society actors.

\(^{82}\) United Nations, 2014, S/2014/131, p. 6
\(^{83}\) Ibid.
\(^{84}\) Ibid. p. 16
\(^{85}\) United Nations, 2014, S/PV.7130, p. 3
This dialogue would be a way to bring different actors together, so that they could agree on principles on political interaction, and how to prioritize with regards to the transition period. However, this meeting had to be postponed, mostly due to increased conflict between different actors.

On June 25th, the Libyan people once again got the chance to vote, this time for a new 200-member council of representatives that was to replace the GNC. Compared to the 2012 GNC election, the voter turnout was very low, at 40 %, while the number of registered voters reached only 1.5 million, compared to the 2.8 million in 2012.

During the 7251st meeting within the UNSC, Mitri addressed several issues that were undermining the ambitions of UNSMIL. Even though there was a certain demand for UN assistance, previous security issues had forced some UN personnel to evacuate their quarters, which made it hard to fully act in accordance with the UNSMIL mandate. At the same time – as the previous election turnouts had shown – the skepticism towards the political elite remained.

In September, Tarik Mitri had been replaced as special representative and head of UNSMIL by Bernardino León. During his first report to the UNSC, León informed the Council that the Libyan authorities had been provided with advisers tasked with assisting in areas of electoral operations, external relations and public awareness. UNSMIL personnel also engaged with representatives from government, as well as holding capacity-building and training sessions for women.

87 United Nations, 2014, S/PV.7194, p. 4
89 Ibid.
91 United Nations, S/2014/653, p. 9
4.1.5 Deterioration and Struggle for Legitimacy (November 2014 – March 2016)

At the end of 2014, the security issues in Libya had grown even worse. The constant deterioration in Libya had now resulted in open conflict between two self-proclaimed governments fighting for power and legitimacy.\textsuperscript{92}

In a report presented February 13\textsuperscript{th}, 2015, the Secretary-General shared concerns about the national upheaval in Libya. He pointed out that “the poor quality of services provided to the population, particularly in the fields of security, health and education, has undermined public trust in the State”\textsuperscript{93}.

It was also pointed out that even though UNSMIL still gathered the support of Libyan stakeholders, the circumstances under which the UNSMIL mandate was given had changed, making it difficult for the UN to fully implementing their task to improve the capacity of national institutions. With this in mind, it was conceded that the size of UNSMIL had to decrease, while focusing on some key issues, such as promoting political agreements, human rights monitoring and coordination.\textsuperscript{94}

The political conflicts in Libya made it difficult for electoral actors to maintain impartiality and operating capacity. The security situation also prevented preparations for a constitutional referendum, and UNSMIL had to shift focus, organizing several events on electoral topics. Through their mandate, they also continued to provide technical assistance\textsuperscript{95}. Bernardino León shared with the UNSC that misinformation about the UN mission garnered some mistrust among certain groups, but assured the Council that he was clear with that “the role of the United Nations has been to facilitate talks without any impositions, while maintaining the outmost respect for Libyan ownership of the process”\textsuperscript{96}.

Through 2015, UNSMIL continued to promote an inclusive political dialogue between different groups, while facilitating discussion with women’s groups and civil society actors\textsuperscript{97}. However, the lack of security and general lawlessness, as well as an increase of terrorism activity, continued to plague the political process, and different armed groups abducted civilians based on their political opinions, making it even more difficult to conduct a proactive dialogue.\textsuperscript{98}

\textsuperscript{92} United Nations, S/PV.7306, p. 2
\textsuperscript{93} United Nations, 2015, S/2015/113, p. 2
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid. p. 5ff
\textsuperscript{95} United Nations, 2015, S/2015/144, p. 8
\textsuperscript{96} United Nations, 2015, S/PV.7398, p. 3
\textsuperscript{97} United Nations, S/2015/624, p. 2
\textsuperscript{98} United Nations. S/PV.7512, p. 3
However, the UN remained adamant in their support of a transition to democracy in Libya, and extended the mandate of UNSMIL until March, 2016\textsuperscript{99}. Entering 2016, the security issues remained the most serious threat to Libyan stability. Even though UNSMIL were able to conduct meetings with (for example) women, the situation made it next to impossible for UN electoral support teams to conduct their work.

Even so, the UN managed to provide HNEC with support, strengthening technical capacities and increasing knowledge and awareness on electoral issues among decision makers\textsuperscript{100}. UNSMIL also encountered difficulties with the authorities in Tripoli, who repeatedly denied access for UNSMIL representatives, at the same time as they infringed the political and civil liberties of the population\textsuperscript{101}.

On March 15\textsuperscript{th}, resolution 2273 was unanimously passed by the UNSC, resulting in the extension of the UNSMIL mandate until June 15\textsuperscript{th}, 2016\textsuperscript{102}. As of May 2016, the special representative and head of UNSMIL, now Martin Kobler, is yet to submit the latest report on the situation in Libya. If the past two years is any indication, the report will mainly deal with the severe security issues in the country. As it stands now, Libya does not have any official government, and the future of UNSMIL is unclear.

4.2 The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

4.2.1 Background

During the years leading up to the UN intervention in Mali, the country had been plagued by several structural problems, including weak institutions and ineffective governance. The crisis culminated with a coup d’\textsuperscript{état} in the beginning of 2012, when Mouvement national pour la libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), with the support of several armed groups, including Al-Qaida, initiated a military offensive against the Malian army. France quickly pledged their support to the government of Mali, supporting the Malian defense forces. This improved the security situation in the country, but threats still remained, undermining stable governance\textsuperscript{103}.

\textsuperscript{99} United Nations, S/RES/2238, p. 4
\textsuperscript{100} United Nations, 2016, S/2016/182, p. 7, p. 11
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid. p. 17
\textsuperscript{102} United Nations, 2016, S/RES/2273
4.2.2 From AFISMA to MINUSMA (December 2012 – April 2013)

With the passing of resolution 2085 in December 2012, the UNSC urged the authorities of Mali to honor a Framework agreement signed April 6th that same year. The Council pointed out the need to restore democratic governance, and the transitional roadmap included a development where inclusive political dialogue was paramount, and that free, fair and peaceful elections were to be held in April, 2013 or “as soon as technically possible”104. In the same resolution, the UNSC authorized the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), an international military support mission whose purpose was to assist the rebuilding of Mali security forces, and help authorities retake control over territory that was under the control of certain armed organizations105.

On a meeting in the UNSC on January 22nd, 2013, it was further established that the UN would back the Malian authorities during a transitional period, which would enable the re-establishment of democratic governance. In his address to the Council, Lionel Zinsou, representative of Benin, stated that…

“The prompt success of the military action under way will make it possible to launch the democratic process that will lead to free and transparent elections open to all Malians, from north to south, east to west, pursuant to resolution 2085”106.

In a report submitted from the Secretary-General on March 26th, summarized the development in Mali the previous three month. On January 29th, the parliament had unanimously adopted a “road map for transition”, where restoration of territorial integrity and the organization of a free and fair election was paramount. The UN worked closely with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to support such a transition. The UNDP elections project granted technical support, establishing a biometric voters’ register, production and distribution of identity cards, and establishment of polling stations108.

Though the fragmentation created in the aftermath of the coup d’état had a significantly negative effect on legitimacy and inclusion in the democratic process, the voter turnout in Mali had been consistently low for many years. In the previous parliamentary and presidential election held in 2007, the turnout was 32.19 % (for parliament), and 36.24 % (presidential)109. These low figures could not only be seen as an indicator to what resulted in a coup to begin with, but it also reflected the low public trust in the electoral process.

105 Ibid.
106 United Nations, S/PV.6905, p. 16
108 Ibid. p. 5f
Given this, the creation of a more credible and transparent electoral process, that would hold up to international standards, became a main priority\textsuperscript{110}. For the UN it would, aside from electoral assistance, be of central importance to support the Mali in the ambitions to “establish a political order that enjoys the consent of the governed on the basis of inclusive dialogue, political participation, accountable governance and safeguards for all communities”\textsuperscript{111}.

In the report, the UN was presented with two main options that would guide their future engagement in Mali:

1) A continuation of multidisciplinary support, to promote mediations, negotiations and dialogue, support the authorities with the electoral process, and promote human rights. Within this option, a future initiation of a peacekeeping mission was seen as a possible step.

2) A more “hands-on” approach, including the protection of civilians through “all necessary means”. These operations could be carried out solely by the UN, or with the support of Mali defense forces. This option would include the authorization of 11,200 troops and 1,440 police\textsuperscript{112}.

In this report, and during a meeting held by the UNSC on April 3\textsuperscript{rd}, it was established that it was the intention of the transitional government in Mali to hold free and fair elections on July 31\textsuperscript{st}. From March 10\textsuperscript{th} to March 16\textsuperscript{th}, the Secretary-General had deployed a mission in Mali to explore the possibility for a future peacekeeping mission. The conclusion of this mission was that Mali was in need of extensive international support to deal with the issues of security, political challenges and the humanitarian situation in the country\textsuperscript{113}.

On April 25\textsuperscript{th}, during the 6952\textsuperscript{nd} meeting of the UNSC, resolution 2100 was unanimously passed, which resulted in the initiation of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The previous operations in Mali, AFISMA and United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM), thus became incorporated in this new mandate\textsuperscript{114}. At the time the resolution was passed, it was also stated that the transitional authorities in Mali had the intent to hold a presidential election on July 7\textsuperscript{th}, and legislative elections on July 21\textsuperscript{st}, which was an intention supported by the UNSC\textsuperscript{115}.

\textsuperscript{110} United Nations, 2013, S/2013/189, p. 7f
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid. p. 12
\textsuperscript{112} United Nations, 2013, S/2013/189, p. 13ff
\textsuperscript{113} United Nations, 2013, S/PV.6944, 4ff
\textsuperscript{114} United Nations, 2013, S/RES/2100, p. 5
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid. p. 4
As for the support relating to the transitional roadmap, the mandate of MINUSMA included the following:

- Assist the authorities in implementing a transitional roadmap towards the restoration of democratic governance.

- To assist the transitional authorities of Mali to facilitate an inclusive national dialogue, and in promoting the participation of civil society, including women’s organizations.

- To support the organization and conduct of inclusive, free, fair and transparent presidential and legislative elections, in part through logistical and technical assistance.\textsuperscript{116}

4.2.3 New Elections (May 2013 – December 2014)

The first report on MINUSMA was submitted on June 10\textsuperscript{th}. The report consisted on several updates regarding both the humanitarian and political situation, as well as security issues. On May 27\textsuperscript{th}, the interim president had announced that presidential elections were to take place on July 28\textsuperscript{th}, which would possibly be followed up by a second round of voting on August 11\textsuperscript{th}.

Meanwhile, legislative elections were to be held in September. The UN (through UNDP), along with with the EU, Canada, Luxemburg and Sweden, helped fund these elections by contributing a total of 35 million dollars. In addition to financial support, the UN also provided technical assistance to create better circumstances for transparent and inclusive elections. Steps were also taken to engage more women in the voting process\textsuperscript{117}.

With elections closing in, the Mali government requested help from the UN. Support was given through deployment of electoral material that was distributed in the north. This included a national identity card, which would be necessary to cast a vote in the upcoming elections. The UN also provided continued support to facilitate the elections. Being able to include internally displaced persons (IDP) and refugees was one of the major challenges, and steps were taken to make sure that refugees could vote in neighboring countries, if needed.

The UNDP, as well as the Internal Organization for Migration, supported the government in this project. Meanwhile, MINUSMA also supported a national strategy to include more women in the electoral process\textsuperscript{118}.

\textsuperscript{116} United Nations, 2013, S/RES/2100, p. 7f
\textsuperscript{117} United Nations, 2013, S/2013/338, p. 3f
\textsuperscript{118} United Nations, 2013, S/PV.6985, p. 3f
It was not until the 1st of October that the second MINUSMA report was submitted. Since the first report, peaceful presidential elections were held as scheduled, on July 28th, and August 11th. Looking at voter turnout, the elections were a success compared to the previously held presidential election in 2007, landing at 45.78 % of the registered voters, compared to 46.24 % in 2007. However, logistical issues made it close to impossible to distribute voter cards among refugees in neighboring countries, which resulted in very low participation among these groups. Despite difficulties, MINUSMA succeeded in distributing 30 tons of electoral material, and offered a support staff of 220 individuals all over the country. According to both national and international observers, the elections were considered “free, transparent and credible”, even though there were some reports of voter intimidation in the first voting round.

On November 24th, the first round legislative elections were held in Mali. The voter turnout landed at 38.49 %, compared to 33 % in the 2007 election. In the second round, held on December 15th, gave a turnout of about 37 %. As with the presidential elections a few months earlier, some minor incidents were reported. Observers saw the elections as free and fair, and also noted some improvement in the electoral process since the presidential elections. During the electoral process, MINUSMA provided logistical support, having logistics assistants in every voting jurisdiction. The UNDP provided financial support, and supported an education awareness campaign through 62 civil society organizations.

During the electoral period, a special-representative of MINUSMA conducted several meetings with stakeholders in the country, including political parties, civil society groups and the women’s groups. These meetings were meant to facilitate as good conditions as possible to hold peaceful elections, and create an environment where mobilization of women and young voters could be improved. In addition to this support, MINUSMA also played a key role in electoral security.

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It should be noted, however, that looking at VAP (Voting age population) turnout, the numbers were noticeably lower than those of 2007, landing at 41.75 %, compared to 48.18 % 2007.

120 United Nations, 2013, “SRSG Albert Koenders congratulates Mali for the second round of the parliamentary elections”

121 United Nations, 2013, S/2013/582, p. 4

122 United Nations, S/2014/1, p. 2f

123 United Nations, 2013, S/2013/582, p. 4f
4.2.4 Further Support and a New Resolution (January 2014 – December 2014)

From January 31st to February 3rd, the UNSC deployed a short mission with the aim to promote and support further democratic development in Mali. This included consultations with the newly-elected and appointed officials. The UNSC once again stressed the particular importance of an inclusive dialogue with the northern parts of the country, so to facilitate stability and long-term peace. Even though the notion was that “any sustainable solution for northern Mali should be found by the Malian themselves”, the process was in need of international support, and the primary role of the UNSC should be to support the Malian authorities in such dialogue.

Under several agreements regarding more inclusive dialogue, people engaged in the civil society had some concerns regarding the design of these agreements. The dialogues often included armed groups, so that the government could reach compromises to disarm these groups, to further ease the process of national reconciliation. Civil society groups felt that the victims of the conflict should also be included in the dialogue, and that the armed groups should not be “rewarded” for their treatment of civilians.

As a result of these concerns, the Malian authorities committed themselves to invite civil society in a more inclusive dialogue.

In February and March, MINUSMA also promoted and supported workshops, with the aim to launch a more inclusive dialogue, which included consultations with civil society and “exploratory discussions”. MINUSMA also supported a two-day regional forum to discuss what the government could do to increase the participation of women in the political process.

The next report on MINUSMA was presented on June 9th, 2014. In May, the political process had been subject to disturbances due to armed clashes between Malian forces and several armed groups. This raised some questions about the durability of the agreements previously signed between the Malian government and several armed groups, and these conflicts could seriously undermine an inclusive dialogue.
On June 27th, the first resolution since the establishment of MINUSMA was passed. The resolution, given number 2164, consisted of a short summary of the last year (positive and negative aspects alike), and concluded with the extension of the MINUSMA mandate by one year (June 30th, 2015). Within the resolution, the UNSC also reaffirmed their ambition to promote and support Mali in negotiation processes, as well as inclusive and free local elections (through technical, logistical and security assistance)130.

4.2.5 Continued Reports and Further Mandate Extension (March January 2015 – April 2016)

A new report, covering the period from December 17th 2014 until March 18th 2015, reached the UNSC on March 27th. During this period, another round of dialogue had been initiated to produce another peace agreement, which was encouraged by MINUSMA. These dialogues covered several areas, both geographically and politically. MINUSMA once again organized workshops, both for politicians, women and youth organizations, to inform different actors about the political process that lead to the peace agreement.

The Malian government also managed, with the support of United Nations Integrated Electoral Team, to extend and upgrade the civil registers, which radically increased the number of individuals that would be able to take part in future elections.134. The report ended on a somewhat positive note, with hopes of a sustainable peace agreement that would end armed conflict, and start a reconciliation process. However, during the period covered in the report, hostilities still had not seized135.

In June, meetings were once again held in the UNSC, and one year after the previous resolution, another one was passed to further extend the MINUSMA mandate by one year. This extension also included the deployment of another 50 observers, as well as 1,440 police personnel. Further, MINUSMA were to “exercise good offices” to support dialogues with all stakeholders, to facilitate national conciliation and social cohesion. The resolution also called upon MINUSMA to improve its interaction with the civilian population, and support the Malian authorities to improve participation and representation among women136.

130 United Nations, 2014, S/RES/2164, p. 6f
134 United Nations, 2015, S/2015/219, p 1ff
135 Ibid. p. 15f
136 United Nations, 2015, S/RES/2227, p. 6ff
For the coming months, the work done by MINUSMA remained roughly the same, and there was substantial progress with regards to the signing of another peace and reconciliation agreement. On August 3rd, the government declared that local elections would be held on October 25th, and MINUSMA provided their support for preparations that were needed\textsuperscript{137}. However, the election came to be postponed, partly due to absence of local authorities in the north. MINUSMA continued to provide their support, providing logistical support to revise the electoral list\textsuperscript{138}.

Five months into 2016, MINUSMA remains one of UN’s most ambitious projects to date. The humanitarian situation is still urgent, and security issues remain. There are also reoccurring attacks carried out against UN personnel, but at a lower rate than before. MINUSMA continues to provide technical and logistical support, while being an active actor in deliberation processes. In the end of June, another resolution will most likely be passed, further extending the MINUSMA mandate by one year.

\textsuperscript{137} United Nations, 2015, S/2015/732, p. 3  
\textsuperscript{138} United Nations, 2015, S/2015/1030, p. 3
5 Conclusions

Putting the most obvious differences, such as the absence of military forces in Libya, aside, the ambitions have been largely the same. Promoting and supporting free, fair and inclusive elections have been a main priority in both Mali and Libya, as have technical and logistical support. The different mandates have also included extensive promotion and support of national dialogue and the inclusion of marginalized groups, such as ethnic minorities and women. There is no doubt that the UN have had high hopes for both missions.

One of the more interesting questions to ask is why a peacekeeping mission have not been launched in Libya. Two arguments have been made to explain the lack of such a mission; According to Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO’s Secretary General, pointed out that such a mission need the consent of the Libyan government\(^1\) and Russia’s representative on the UNSC, Vitaly Churkin, said that “there will not be a peacekeeping operation because there will not be either a ceasefire or the presence of two conflicting parties.”\(^2\) Consent is indeed one of the key principles of UN peacekeeping, but this could be questioned, since the NATO led intervention in Libya was authorized by the UNSC, which could be seen as an intervention by proxy. Furthermore, if the UN seeks to be consistent in their principle regarding consent, the UNSMIL mandate should come to a halt, since there is no legitimate or functioning government to offer such consent.

Churkin’s notion also implies that any efforts to bring different groups to the negotiation table would be hopeless, even though several armed groups have been included in negotiations in Mali. More importantly, in resolutions dated after 2014, most recently resolution 2278 (March, 2016), the UNSC have established that the crisis in Libya indeed poses a threat to international peace and security, leaving the possibility of intervention open, in accordance with the UN charter\(^3\)

Yet, plans for any sort of intervention, through a peacekeeping mandate or otherwise, have not yet surfaced. Considering the severe issues regarding lack of border security and proliferation of weapons, the Libyan crisis – with its proximity to the Middle East – does create problems outside its borders. Meanwhile, the main issues regarding Mali remains within the country, and often geographically limited even within the borders. Thus, it could be argued that UN, with its self-proclaimed role as a global force for peace, should have incentive to launch a peace mission in Libya. Of course, this would open up for extensive criticism, since an intervention without consent could be construed as neocolonial.

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\(^1\) Interfax, Military News Agency, 9/5/2011
\(^2\) Interfax, Military News Agency, 9/12/2011
\(^3\) Amstutz, 2008. International Ethics: concepts, theories and cases in global politics, p. 152f
The choice made to authorize an intervention, as the UNSC did in 2011, while not offering any exit strategy or extensive presence to uphold security, may have escalated the development that have no left the country without any legitimate government, and a plethora of armed groups struggling for power.

With regards to consociational approaches to peacekeeping and conflict-solution, botched negotiations and forced integration could perhaps be seen as an argument in favor of such a design. The cases of Libya and Mali might not provide us with any empirical data regarding consociational theory, but it does open up for exploratory research. If the ultimate goal is peace, security and inclusion in the democratic process, some compromises – even those in conflict with liberal democratic notions of integration and plurality – might be necessary to achieve such goals. This is perhaps mostly true for Libya, where several armed groups still engage in combat.
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