ACCIDENTAL CITIZENS: ETHEREALIZING SECURITIZED IDENTITIES OF SOMALIS IN KENYA; CONTESTING REPRESENTATION, IDENTITY AND BELONGING

Author: Shamsa Birik
Abstract

The Kenyan security apparatus has undergone immense transformations particularly after Kenya’s military incursion into Southern Somalia in 2011. The intervention dubbed ‘Operation Linda Nchi’ was an attempt to protect Kenya’s territorial sovereignty and create a buffer zone against the Somali linked Al-Shabab insurgency. At the time, the risk of Al-shabab was insignificant however following the operation, attacks on Kenya’s soil has escalated beyond control as a result of the growing influence of Al-Shabab. These events have seen growing visibilities of Somalis in Kenya and more attempts by the government to militarize and manage their identities. Fundamentally it has seen the resurfacing of the age old ‘Somali Question’ and contestations of ‘who belongs’ and ‘who is a threat’ within Kenya’s civic landscape. This paper traces the entry and confinement of the Somali identity within the security sphere. Adopting postcolonial framings, I will problematize how securitization as a modern State strategy is used in constructing, othering and managing certain identities. In its entirety the paper demonstrates two key aspects; the crisis of the postcolonial state as rendered in its pursuit for peace, secondly I will explore the multi-layered intersections of power, identity, citizenship and belonging of Kenyan Somalis and how its influenced by securitized framings. I rely on belonging and identity as conceptual tools to interrogate questions of difference, essentialism, inclusion and exclusion

Key words:

Securitization, Identity, Othering, Belonging, Postcolonial, Al-Shabab, Terrorism, Laclau & Mouffe, Discourse Theory, Hegemony, Ideology, Antagonism
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Abbreviations

IR – International Relations
CORD – Coalition for Reforms and Democracy
TJRC – The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya
WoT – War on terror
NIS – National Intelligence Service
NFD – Northern Frontier District
ODO – Outlying Districts Ordinance
SDO – Special Districts Ordinance
NPPPP – Northern Province Progressive People’s Party

Words: 19,700
Introduction

The space of ‘the political’ becomes important as it is where “articulation of grievances of identity is enabled or disabled, of the right not only to claim agency but to posses the right to politics and political expression” (Jabri, 2010:39). With the understanding that not every identity has access to a political space where articulation of the self is possible, we are forced to look at entities or actors that control means of enunciation. In this case I refer to the Kenyan State as a hegemonic structure and also as a discursive site of study. In my analysis of the intersections of security and identity I focus my attention on Somalis living Kenya regardless of their legal citizenship. My desire of focusing on Kenyan Somalis as a specific category lies in its futility. The blurring of lines of who is considered a Kenyan Somali citizen from Somali national or who is alternatively seen as a Somali refugee or categorized as Alshabab exposes the ambivalences inherent in what constitutes a “modern citizen” in postcolonial Kenya.

The frantic search for identity among Somalis in Kenya points out to wider failures of self-articulation. A “search for identity is a sign of uncertainty, unsafety and insecurity” (Donskis, 2011:10). While identity is a quest of ‘who an individual or a group is’ or ‘how they identify’, belonging is a temporal desire to be located outside the self. As an analytical tool the application of belonging is wider than simply categorical, as it denotes a process not simply of ‘being’ as in identity but also of ‘becoming’. Belonging as a concept entails struggles relating to inclusion and exclusion, access, social bonds as well as “forms of violence and subordination entailed in processes of boundary making” (Anthias, 2013:7). It invokes a need to be located in a place as well as in a discourse however this location should be viewed as provisional (see Anthias, 2010; Yuval-Davis, 2011; Antonsich, 2013; Broch-Due, 2005). Belonging or not belonging in this case is aimed towards broadening this intersectional analysis whilst exposing the complexities of identity formation. I also analyse politics of inclusion and
exclusion and the numerous ways securitization discourses frames Somalis as the ‘Other’

The invisibility of the Somali and the lack of subject positions assigned to it by the Kenyan state constitute the problem this paper seeks to address. According to Spivak ‘the problem is not that the subjects cannot speak but rather they are assigned no space from where to speak’ (Young, 1990:164). In my analysis of Somali identities in Kenya, I am referring to ‘subject positions’ as opposed to an autonomous Somali subject. I make reference to Laclau and Mouffe theory on identity formation that assumes not a fixed ‘Subject’ but ‘subject positions’ that is contingent and discursively constructed. Their theory asserts that it is ‘discourses that always designates positions for people to occupy as subjects’ (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2000:41). As a result, our identities and the subject cannot be assumed to be ‘sovereign’ nor a transparent representation of itself. The idea of ‘subject positions’ has discredited essentialism in the construction of identity as every subject position is seen as contingent, split, over determined and changeable operating in an open decentralized space. It is in this view that Laclau and Mouffe reject the belief in any center as a nodal point of society nor ‘Man’ as that nodal point for that which is human. My analysis neither views the current securitized representation of Somalis, their identities nor their desire to belong as objective given facts. Similarly I engage in decentering the State and its security apparatus from its privileged standpoints through disclosing its ambivalences and contingency. Disqualifying the necessity of any center as the locus of politics shifts the political space from that of a closed system to one that is open and accessible to all. There are no ‘privileged points rather a political practice is constructed from a number of dissimilar points’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001:87). It is within this premise that the idea of history or knowledge production for minority groups can be positioned and contested. The aim of my analysis is therefore not to uncover an objective reality of the Somali society in Kenya per se but rather to situate the formation of their current reality within discursive and political processes. I therefore focus on the construction process of their securitized
identities whilst beginning from a point of fragmentation that allows alternatives ways of being and articulation. Even though I engage in the painful process of exposing ugly histories of colonial and postcolonial contempt, I aspire to ‘soothe my writing not with narcotics but with language that replicates agency’ (Morrison, 1979). This agency becomes possible with the understanding that in politics no meaning, representation or discourses ever achieves ‘permanent fixity’. This “opens up the way for constant social struggles about definitions of society and identity” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2000:24). Therefore contesting the current confinement of Somali identities within securitized discourses becomes a possibility both in terms of theory and in practice.

**Research questions**

At the crux of this research lies a fundamental question;

> How is power in the form of security legitimized, performed, inscribed and how does it manifest itself on Somali identities in Kenya?

Sub questions:

A. Do securitization practices point out to a wider crisis of political identity of the postcolonial state?

B. How did the image of the Somali as the ‘Other’ become hegemonic?

C. How do Somali identities intersect with colonialism, the State and the War on Terror logic to discursively become securitized subjects?
CHAPTER 1

Theoretical Framework

In order to fully comprehend security paradoxes facing the Kenyan State today, theorizing the genealogy of security, its place in IR and most importantly its philosophical framings is fundamental. According to Wæver this undertaking is in itself a valuable part of researching securitization (Wæver, 1989:14). Security sensibilities as pegged on a hegemonic Western Newtonian framework have shaped the postcolonial imagination on what ‘order’ should look like. As this paper will further demonstrate seeking a framework that can capture these postcolonial dilemmas of a case like Kenya is crucial.

Body security

Modern Newtonian International Relations (IR) is founded on 16th century enlightenment worldview (Kavalski, 2012). Its philosophy and knowledge base stems from Newton’s laws of motion and gravitation. Newtons’ principles of motion and inertia mean the world is predictable whereby “bodies move in straight lines at uniform speed unless acted on by a force” (Chalmers, 1998:100). On this basis Newton confidently proclaimed ‘the world is like a mechanistic clock’ (Snobelen, 2012). According to Newtonian science within this worldview humans could now be understood in mechanistic terms. Hobbes used Newtons’ understanding and appraised humans as ‘mechanisms’ comparable to the most technically advanced mechanical device of its day, the watch. Thus like a watch Hobbes, defined all the parts of the human mechanism body comprising inner mechanisms of ‘springs’ and ‘wheels’ (Hobbes, 1998:7). For Hobbes understanding the parts in mechanistic terms identified how parts of the human body function to create human motion. This mechanistic understanding of humans suggests the human body operates according to clockwork (Schmitt, 1996). Hobbes writes, the artificial man is like a mechanistic clock, he parallels man’s movement to a clock's 'engine' whereby the organ muscles are like “springs and wheels” (Ibid). Further he notes for “what is the heart, but a spring and the nerves,
giving motion to the whole body”? (Ibid). Hobbes laid out the sovereign as the symbol of this new power that controls our desires, our bodies, our freedoms and natural passions. He notes “the sovereignty is an artificial soul that gives life and motion to the whole body” (Ibid:7). The ‘sovereign’ is the Leviathan (the watchmaker) that is the ‘commonwealth’ or the ‘counsellors’ basically an ‘assembly of men’. The ‘counselors’ represent the mind of this body politic, they are the “memory by whom all things needful for it to know, are suggested unto it” (Ibid). To control humans as mechanisms required experts in understanding human mechanistic function (just like the watchmaker is an expert in how a watch functions). In this way a government could be established whereby this mechanistic understanding could be applied to legitimise authority, and modern state power (Tickner, 1992). The purpose of government is a central authority that is a mechanism designed to command power over the corporeal body to exert full control over the human body. According to this Hobbesian metaphor therefore being a political actor and politics is to be a person who is in control over vast numbers of mechanisms. It is a function of few individuals (the watchmakers) who were perceived to be rational men conscious enough of human savagery and who have appreciation for civil liberties. It therefore becomes apparent that modern power was conceived in a practical material way. Arendt argues that Hobbes used these features of man to “fit the needs of the Leviathan” in its attempts at establishing this structure of material power (Arendt, 1958:140). The Newtonian mechanistic framework establishes the definition of human beings and how they should be governed and this framework underpins all of conventional IR thinking today (Kavalski, 2012).

A multitude of men, are made one person, when they are by one man, or one person, represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of that multitude in particular. For it is the unity of the representor, not the unity of the represented, that maketh the person one (Hobbes, 1998:109)

The above phrase explains the nature of this material power in the form of a social contract to which men willfully subject themselves to avoid ‘state of war’. However this material power lacks a body politic from which individuals can
actively contest or politically articulate themselves. It’s laws are silent and its command is not authoritative rather ‘we’ authorize its powers. In Foucault’s readings he demonstrates how ‘biopower’ substituted this political order. The aim of this institution is for “the defense and peace of them all” from which men protect themselves from the evils of other men (Bennett, 2004:84). Therefore to question its command is to question ourselves since the sovereign is not a corporeal entity but an ‘assembly of men’. It follows that “nothing the sovereign does can wrong any of his subjects, nor ought any of them to accuse him of injustice” (Ibid:83). So even though every man is an institution not all men have ‘sovereign powers’ blatantly meaning not every one is a political actor. The sovereign is viewed as a ‘social totality’ whose main goal is to ensure maximum security and an utopian unity. This maximum security requires borders and walls to establish and maintain ‘order’. Its subjects are understood as ‘inert’ ‘fixed’ objects subject to control by a government (the watchmaker). This security logic is built out of fear of anarchy, confrontation and uncertainty which are natural elements of human relations. The Hobbesian orderly framework despises ‘strangers’, ‘travellers, ‘migrants’, ‘nomads’ basically humans “without a fixed abode” (see Ringmar, 2016:6). Hobbes imagination of power and its model of governance becomes a major dilemma when exerting control over peoples who simply do not fit within this mechanistic paradigm.

So my argument is that ‘body security’\(^1\) is a subcutaneous form of control espoused by IR and is underpinned by Hobbesian model of governance which in turn is based on Newtonian understanding of physics. Its problem lies in its attempt to govern every human being on the planet which in itself is a self-licking ice cream cone. This model (despite being a ‘universal’ one) does not work well with bodies of peoples who do not move according to Newtonian assumptions on movement. Movement defines people such as the nomadic and they owe their movement not from an external governing institution that coerces movement through force but internally. The State underpinned by a Newtonian appraisal of

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\(^1\) Body security is my own concept of security that I derived from the ‘complexity paradigm’ (see
humans as mechanisms may have worked well in Europe however it has struggled to exert authority over humans who are not easily contained by a centralised governing authority. Perhaps a central reason for this limitation lies in the states’ limited definition of body movement. Newton’s theory of gravity identified a mechanistic prediction of movement which was related directly to the invocation of force (Onuf, 1997). Among nomadic people, movement is prior to use of force, it is a way of life, they are not easily subject to fixed centralised control. Similarly this orderly framework is beginning to loose significance due to globalization which has made territoriality to loose significance. We are all becoming uprooted, globalization has brought down walls and borders, how is the sovereign to govern globe-trotters, migrants, travellers, diaspora groups who are all outside of ‘home’. The cracks of this framework are beginning to appear even here in Europe with the arrivals of migrants (the Other) who is confronting the walls of modernity. No longer can we be protected from strangers, globalization makes the world borderless, stateless so we have to learn to accept the Other with all their differences, ambivalences, contradictions and all the insecurities they pose to our own ‘stable’ identities. The desire for this Hobbesian security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference--that which is not us, not certain, not predictable (Der derian, 1998:7). “Efforts to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear” (Ibid). The idea that “order is man-made and good and chaos is natural and evil” is a negation of ‘the political’ and contingency of life (Der derian, 1998:5). “Politics is largely still created and imagined within this epistemic frame, which is that of mechanism” (Pikalo, 2008:46). The political institutions that govern us are Newtonian institutions and have not changed much in terms of the basic principles that underpin them. To first of all contemplate that much of our political theories and institutions are set on non-political foundations is only a first step towards understanding the history of our present.

**Securitization theories**

In contemporary times critical literature within the field of security studies has
emanated largely from the ‘Copenhagen School’ (Buzan; Weaver), the ‘Aberystwyth School’ (Booth; Wyn Jones) and the Paris School of security studies (Bigo). However a wide array of important literature lies outside of these institutionalized platforms (see Der derian 1998; Campbell 1998; Burke 2002; Dillon, 1996; Connolly, 2004; Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004). For the purpose of this thesis I will highlight the first two (Aberystwyth and Copenhagen) as they are more widely used.

I. The Aberystwyth School
Synonymously referred as the ‘Welsh School’, it draws much of its vision from the Frankfurt Critical Theory School and its key thinkers the likes of Horkheimer, Adorno, Habermas et.al. Its most prominent theorists, Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones recognize security as ‘emancipation of individuals from threats’. Booth argues “security is equivalent to freedom from life-determining threats, and therefore space to make choices” (Booth, 2007:102). He envisions a “community of communities, where war is practically unthinkable, and in which global issues are pursued as collectively as possible” (Ibid:427). Similar to Hobbes, Booth adopts a utopian ideal in which a ‘universal security’ and ‘universal emancipation’ is possible. Even though he challenges the dominance of State centric realism in IR, he succumbs to Kantian individualism. He normatively views individuals (rational beings) as the referent objects that need to be secured from State driven insecurity. His Hobbesian understanding of power as the ‘exercise of one’s will over others’ denote to elimination of those dangers posed by ‘others’ for the achievement of emancipatory freedom. The belief that an ‘emancipatory order’ emerges once the gap between rationality and irrationality is closed denotes to the triumph of universalism at the expense of particularism (Laclau, 1996:24). Considering that political identities or discourses are constituted through the encounter of universalism and particularism this conceptualization negates engaging with ‘the political’ in its entirety.
The two entities are relational and can only acquire stable identities through a social construction process. For this ‘emancipated identity’ is not constituted apriori rather it has to engage in power to fully hegemonize its particularism into a universalism. Laclau argues that the universal is an ‘empty signifier’ therefore it can only “emerge out of the particular” (Ibid:15). This confrontation between these two equivalent relations to give the ‘universal’ meaning and saturate it with its particularism is what power and politics is about. However Booth’s emancipatory politics presupposes apriori constituted ‘universal order’ that is logically non-contradictory which he tries to hegemonize thus disqualifying the necessity of politics. Booth notes that emancipation is a way of verifying “whether particular claims to knowledge should be taken seriously” (Booth, 2007:112). To demonstrate his claims he gives the example of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) as a “practice that is entirely incompatible with freedom” (Ibid). Further claiming that those who practice it lack the “reason and the capacity to use their own understanding as they come from highly traditionalist cultures” (ibid:113). If freedom is to do what we ought to do shouldn’t the choice whether to eliminate this practice or not come from the communities themselves? According to Booth the universal is justified to impose its ideals on the particular cultures as they have the capacity to understand ‘true freedom’. Here Booth’s universality “implicitly distinguishes between illegitimate violence and legitimate violence and forgets the latter for the sake of eliminating the former” (Bahceci, 2015). The Hobbesian impasse becomes evident in Booth’s normative securitizing move. His refusal to engage with the contradictions of power, succumbs to intolerance with difference of which an artificial emancipatory order becomes necessary. His idea of a common humanity can only be achieved through hegemonic practices that eliminate any group that contradicts this vision.

II. The Copenhagen School
The Copenhagen School defines security as a ‘speech act’ of which an issue
becomes securitized through utterances. The speech acts is therefore viewed as the ‘securitization move’ that is often articulated as legitimate for the purpose of gaining consent of an ‘audience’. An issue is raised to the security threshold once it is determined that it poses ‘existential threat’ and decision is arrived at democratically. Once an issue has been articulated as posing a threat, it moves outside the realm of ‘normal politics’ (democratic norms) to ‘special politics’. In this case the securitizing actor can respond with actions that are considered outside the norm of a democracy. Security is henceforth understood as an intersubjective process achieved through ‘successful’ articulation. Copenhagen School therefore recognizes the role of language and power in articulating a particular reality. However this framing of security has been criticized for its Eurocentric emphasis on liberal democracies. How to analyse securitization for quasi-democracy like Kenya? Where often than not the securitizing move is not achieved through a decision making process? To address the applicability of the ‘Wæverian model’ to postcolonial and non-western states, Vuori introduces useful conceptual and analytical tools. Within the Copenhagen securitization theory he puts emphasis on the ‘logic of illocutionary’ or the speech acts and provides a broader analysis. He argues that in postcolonial settings context becomes important thus trivial to distinguish ‘normal politics’ from ‘special politics’ (Vuori, 2008). Similarly Laclau and Mouffe reject the separation of security and politics as they view the two as discursively constituted within the same social order. In a case like Kenya where there is weak opposition, the political processes is not transparent and a powerful army it is difficult to draw the line between “who securitizes what” or the success of a securitizing move (Ibid:70) As it will be identified in my paper, there are two major securitizing actors; the State and al-shabab therefore there can be numerous securitizing actors depending on the context. Since a securitizing move is discursive it is important to highlight how the ‘logic of legitimization’ works. Majority of securitization analysis recognize this ‘audience’ as citizens of a particular country however Vuori notes that they could be the ‘political authority’ in non-democratic regimes (Ibid:72). He argues that the audience cannot be predetermined rather it is dependent on the context
and history alternatively the audience is temporal and not static. The audience therefore is dependent on the purpose of the securitizing acts. In my case acts of “securitization serves as ‘system maintenance’ in reproducing understandings of the self and other” in the construction of ‘unified’ national identity (Ibid). Even though I highlight that its often the ‘political authority’ that engages as the securitizing actor and the audience due to the opaqueness of Kenya’s democratic processes its important to mention Somalis as audiences. My paper will highlight how the audience is temporally located and determined by the context for example Somalis assume different articulatory roles across time. Following Wiberg’s analysis of how ‘apathy can translate into legitimacy’ I will demonstrate three ‘audience subjectivities’ in which Somalis are located. Firstly during the ‘Shifta period’ Somalis were in ‘active resistance’ towards securitization practices, during the Wagalla massacre they were in ‘general apathy’ and now in the ‘War against Terror’ Somalis are articulating themselves ‘passively active’. I will further explore these different articulations under the ‘logic of legitimization’ later on in the analysis. As I have demonstrated there is no strict dichotomy between the ‘securitizing actor’ and the ‘audience’ rather these two relations are historically and contextually ‘contingent’ to the speech acts. The Copenhagen School despite its many strengths, remains weak in addressing inclusion and exclusion binaries or in prescribing ways securitized identities can hegemonically contest these framings. To strengthen my analysis, I will use Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory as it is more adapted to addressing my case study. I will hereby use the concepts of ‘articulation’ to address the gap between ‘securitizing actor’ and the ‘audience’ and to point out how speech acts are discursively articulated. I will also introduce their concept of ‘hegemony’ to a theory of securitization to demonstrate how a speech act becomes ‘successful’. As I will further analyze much of the securitizing moves have not been achieved through ‘democratic decision making’ but rather from hegemonic practices. I will use the concept of ‘antagonism’ to point out to precariousness by which the state is assumed to be the securitizing actor. The concept of antagonism is important as it will highlight a normative agenda by which Somalis can contest their securitized identities. Therefore my
analysis will encompass both discourse analyses in the form of speech acts and
securitization theory in the form of securitizations practices both conventional acts
and non conventional (contingent to historical time).

CHAPTER 2

Methodology

Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse Theory

My methodological approach is drawn from Laclau and Mouffe’s Discourse
Theory. The methodology will be based principally from their seminal work
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985). I will also rely on some of the
subsequent works they have since published including (Laclau 1996; Laclau and
Mouffe 2001; Mouffe 1994; Mouffe 2005; Mouffe 2013). In addition to the
numerous interpretations and commentaries of their work found in (Jørgensen and
methodological framework with postcolonial theory (Hall 2013; Bhabha 1994) in
an attempt to link my theoretical framework with the methodological approach.

Analytical concepts

The social field of Discourse

Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe refer to discourse as “partial fixation of
meanings around a nodal point” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002:26). A nodal point
is the ‘site of meanings’ where other signs acquire their meaning and are
positioned. In my case the nodal point can be understood as ‘security’, the ‘state’,
‘order’, ‘territoriality’ or ‘national unity’, ‘national identity’. There is no limit to
the number of nodal points constituted in a discourse, this is because a discourse
bears no ‘fixity’. The different signs struggle to inscribe their meanings to the
nodal point(s) and exclude all the other meanings. Therefore all the meanings that
is included is the ‘discourse’ and all that is excluded is referred to as the ‘field of
discursivity’ (Ibid:27). Laclau and Mouffe argue against the permanence of any
discourse, ‘fixity’, ‘totality’ or a ‘closure’ of meanings. This is because the social field is ‘contingent’ meaning it’s a fluid, undecidable, and uncertain. Any fixity by the signs on the nodal point (s) can be understood as a ‘partial fixation’. Its “unity of meaning is constantly in danger of being disrupted by other ways of fixing the meaning of the signs” (Ibid:27). ‘Nodal point’ is also synonymous to a ‘floating signifier’ or an ‘empty sign’ as its meaning depends on the forms of articulation ascribed to it. This ‘empty space’ is perceived as the discursive centre of any discourse where ‘partial fixity’ is exercised by ascribing meaning to the ‘empty sign’. In my analysis I identify the nodal points of; ‘national unity’, ‘national identity’ ‘territoriality’ and ‘order’, which are ‘symbols of power’ representing the Newtonian IR. The ‘floating signifier’ is the ‘empty sign’ that shows the contingency of the meanings constructed in the ‘nodal points’. In my paper I endeavour to show the contingency of these concepts as there is a different way of interpreting or constructing these meanings depending with the context. In his book the ‘Location of Culture’ Homi Bhabha formulates a space similar to this ‘empty space’ that he refers as the ‘third space’ or the ‘hybrid space’. I will revert to his concept of hybridity later.

To be able to understand how the concept of ‘contingency’ operates I will explain ‘elements’ and ‘moments’ as introduced by Laclau and Mouffe:

We call **articulation** any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of articularatory practise. The structured totality resulting from the articularatory practise, we will call **discourse**. The differential positions, insofar as they appear articulated within a discourse, we will call **moments**. By contrast, we will call **element** any difference that is not discursively articulated (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985:105)

Articulation can best be understood as a ‘social practice’ or a ‘struggle’. ‘Moments’ and ‘elements’ are differential signs that are relationally constituted which denote to “fluctuations in the meaning of the signs”. Moments are the ‘partially fixed signs’ on a nodal point while ‘elements’ are the signs located in the ‘field of discursivity’ whose meanings are excluded by the discourse. Perhaps
it is interesting to ask why it is not possible to have all the signs articulated and placed in a discourse? The reason for this is ‘power’. A discourse can best be understood as ‘power’ it is a ‘reduction of possibilities’ (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002:27). Laclau and Mouffe point out an articulatory practice seeks to either establish ‘closure’ or it seeks it ‘transition’ from the elements to the moments both of these moves are never fully permanent.

There is always room for struggles over what the structure should look like, what discourses should prevail, and how meaning should be ascribed to the individual signs (Ibid:29)

Their theory allows us to understand discourse not only in strict linguistic terms (statements or language) but to view it as ‘power’ or ‘truth’ or ‘reality’ ‘identities’ or a ‘knowledge regime’ (Ibid). In my research I will be analysing ‘identity formation’ therefore I will be exploring the link between power and identity. The process of discourse formation can be used to explain identity inclusion and exclusion by just substituting articulation of discourse with articulation of identity. I will describe the constitution of identities in the section below since its ‘actors’ who participate in the struggle of discourse.

Subject, Identity formation and collective identity

The category of Subject

Laclau and Mouffe refute the idea of the Subject as sovereign, unitary or essentialized identities. In a re-reading of Marxism they present their critique of the subject the ‘working class’. In classical Marxism this subject was considered the preferred agent that was to bring social change through revolution. The logic was that there existed an ‘essential reality’ and that all interests and identities were class related. This thinking obliterated specificities of history and identities resulting to the theory becoming one of mere historical essentialism. The authors extend their critique to the subject of feminism with its abstract category of the ‘Woman. As Mohanty posits that homogenous representations of ‘Women’ as a category resulted in the privileging of a particular group as the norm or preferred agent for bringing social change. In this case Western feminists self-
representation as opposed to their representation of women in the Third World was what produced the image of the ‘average Third World woman’ (Ibid:22). The authors refute the empiricism in the construction of ‘stable identities’ or ‘essentialized identities’ that are ‘unitary’ and ‘homogenous’. Instead they substitute the category of ‘subject’ with ‘subject positions’ that they view as ‘contingent’ ‘fragmented’ and discursively constructed (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014:101; Jørgensen and Phillips, 2002). This conception allows a subject to possess several identities as in my case I portray Somali identities as subject positions as opposed to an essentialized subject. The Somali identity does not come preformed rather it is produced through power and only emerges by relating it to other subject positions. The ‘construction of subject positions and hence identities is a battlefield where different constellations of elements struggle to prevail’ (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2000:47). The demise of Marxist orthodoxy may have left ‘theory with a sense that everything is now in flux’, but it has also brought about the important realization of the intricacies between knowledge and power as articulated by writers such as Said and Foucault (Young, 1990). At the core of these debates two major issues emerge; one is the question of ‘representation’ as well as the incorporation of the ‘Other’ and the introduction of ‘contingency’ to political and social relations.

**Identity formation and collective identity**

Just like an individual, the group does not come preformed rather its constituted through representation in a discourse. A group or a collective identity often constitute itself then represents itself through a ‘myth’. A myth is understood as a “distorted representation of reality” in that ‘national unity’ as an abstract category is not a totality but rather a constructed myth (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2000:39) A nodal point such as ‘national unity’ is not a stable entity but rather it is a myth used to contrast one group from another. For example in my paper I identify not only ‘national unity’ a myth but I also not how ‘anti-colonial identities’ was constructed as a myth to contrast between the ‘colonialists’ from the ‘Africans’ during the Pan Africanism era. Collective identities are constructed when
differential positions connect their struggles to form a collective identity through a ‘chain of equivalence’ in order to gain power over representation or hegemony. The ‘logic of difference’ on the other hand can be regarded as counter-representation that frustrates the ‘represented identity’

**Logic of Antagonism and Hegemony**

Even though identities are differentially constituted, it is not necessary that this relationship will be antagonistic, often times it is recognized as mutual coexistence. However “antagonisms emerge where identities collide” or where there is a negation of ‘otherness’ (Ibid:48). The authors argue that “any position in a system of differences, insofar as it is negated, can become the locus of an antagonism” (Laclau and Mouffe, 200:131). Antagonism should therefore be seen as a (positive) function that allows different discourses or identities to struggle over meanings. This is because when there is no struggle over meanings a partial discourse can become fixed and gains dominance in a manner that its contingency is forgotten. Such a discourse is viewed as ‘objective truth’ or a ‘hegemonic relation’ and the fixation can be viewed as the achievement of ‘hegemony’. However there exists no necessity or permanence of any hegemonic order due to the presence of other discourses and also social antagonisms. Hegemony itself becomes the possibility for pluralist politics, as power (hegemony) belongs to no particular group due to its contingency. Therefore in identity formation, the relation between the ‘empty signifier’ and the field of discursivity is crisscrossed by antagonism due to existence of ‘otherness’. Antagonism is a political function that makes permanent fixations between the two impossible.

**Method**

**Research Design: Case Study approach**

The case study was the most suitable research design due to my focus on ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions and a general explanatory approach. Yin defines case study as a type of empirical inquiry that “investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context and addresses a situation in which the boundaries
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 1993:59). Case study provides an in-depth understanding of phenomena due to its detailed investigation and ability for contextualized analysis. In my case I focus on multiple-case design as opposed to a single-case design as I am analysing two cases that is Somali identities during the: Somali secessionism movement (1948-1968) and ‘Operation Linda Nchi’ (2011-to date). The choice of cases is largely determined by the data and the context so I focussed on these two cases due to their similarities from which I intend to draw parallels. The first case was chosen as it marks the beginning of a discursive relationship between the Kenyan state and Somali identities and the subsequent securitization practices. The second case is a continuation of securitization but in a different historical epoch: that of War on terror (WoT). The two cases are “considered to be variants within the same methodological framework” and not necessarily as comparative, however I do make comparison ‘within’ the cases (Ibid:53). To provide a deeper analysis of the historical and discursive context I conducted in-depth interviews among seven participants in order to improve the validity of my findings. The participants were mostly key academics, journalists, human right activists and security analysts who are involved in the NFD either through research or activism. I relied on both snowball sampling as well as convenience sampling since I was fully aware of the context and had substantial contacts.

**Research material**

For the first case I rely on mainly on interviews, parliamentary proceedings, newspaper articles, which I complement with secondary data. In the second case I focus on the Kenya Security Law (2014), I also triangulated my findings with interviews, newspaper articles and parliamentary proceedings. For the second case I used Lene Hansen’s securitization model that focus on identity construction. Hansen formulates three intertextual models which can be used in interpreting the research material. I will focus primarily on the first (model 1) which is based on official discourse derived from (speeches, political debates, interviews, articles,
and books, as well as other relevant texts (Hansen, 2006:53). I will utilize this approach together with speech acts which constitute the securitization discourse.

In my analysis constitutes the identification of ‘basic discourses’ that are centred around the representation of Somali identities within the “shifta period” and the current “Operation Linda Nchi”. According to Hansen “events might be located at different times but related by issue” and the selection of a particular case depends on its importance (Hansen, 2006:71). Since identities are discursively constructed, a historical genealogy is useful in revealing avenues for contesting hegemonic articulations (Ibid). The aim of this historical and conceptual analysis is therefore to offer a trajectory of how the Somali identity was historically and discursively located within the security frame. The historical discourses that emerged during these two distinct events fundamentally construct contemporary debates on securitization of Somalis in Kenya. Basic discourses will therefore be identified to trace the ‘dominant’ and ‘marginal’ discourses of two periods using mostly secondary sources, interviews and official government speech acts.

For both cases I use discourse theory which is considered both a theory and a method which further provides my research with a multiperspectival analysis. Discourse analysis is considered “not just a method for data analysis, but a theoretical and methodological whole – a complete package” (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2000:4). It addresses philosophical (ontological and epistemological) assumptions, which in my research I use postcolonial and post structural framework which is considered interpretivist and often times qualitative. Discourse also formulates the theoretical model which I use throughout the paper, thirdly it offers “methodological guidelines for how to approach a research” and lastly “specific techniques for analysis” (Ibid). Therefore “theory and method are intertwined” throughout the paper (Ibid).
CHAPTER 3

Discursive Context of the Northern Frontier District (NFD)

In Kenya, the securitization of territorial spaces occupied by Somalis was undertaken simultaneously with the policing of the Somali body throughout history. The politicization of the Somali identity in Kenya within the security sphere discloses representation of the Somali identity through which they are excluded as the ‘Other’ specifically by the State as a hegemonic power. The Somali occupies and is located in a position of precarity and disposability due to their minority status as ethnicized, racialized, Muslims constituting about 5% of the Kenyan population. As securitising means ‘Othering’, the hegemonic practices of the ‘political authority’ has accentuated their Othering and exclusion. To fully analyse how the Somali becomes a securitized subject it becomes paramount to understand how power produces their subject positions as the ‘other’ and places them within security framings. Both Eastleigh, a historically Somali urban area and the Northern Frontier District (NFD), a Somali inhabited area have been the sites of systemic state violence. The securitization of the northern frontier as a territory has been ongoing for decades. The region was placed under curfew numerous times with the longest one lasting for 27 years. Eastleigh on the other hand is a residential area whose majority of its inhabitants are Somali refugees have been subjected to continuous curfews, illegal arrests and deportations as well as extortion and cases of rape of women by Kenyan military personnel. The focus on this research is however on the NFD, a region which has endured large-scale atrocities dating as far back as colonial time. It has been a discursive center of colonial violence, state sponsored atrocities, repressive laws, heavy militarization and state neglect. The Truth Justice Reconciliation Report (TJRC) is perhaps the only legal commission ever established to investigate and record the historical injustices endured in the NFD. Among the atrocities it documented were the; ‘Shifta war’, Wagalla massacre, Garissa Massacre and the Malka Mari massacre (see, TJRC, 2013). Ann Stoler’s description of colonies as “laboratories of modernity” is descriptive of this region as it bears all the hallmarks of modernity.
and its exigencies (1995:15). NFD became a laboratory of colonial practices of control, then in postcolonial experiments of statehood and now it’s a major site for development agencies on ‘civilizing missions’. In recent times the region has been a target in Kenya’s fight against ‘War on Terror’. The following sections begins with the conceptual history of the ‘Somali secessionism’, I will then analyse the multiple ‘basic discourses’ that emerge that construct Somali identities within a larger securitization discourse. This analytical perspective is useful in understanding how ‘otherness’ and ‘difference’ is demarcated in the Kenyan political context.

**CASE 1: Somali Secessionism (1948-1968)**

In most of Africa, statehood was imposed through an arbitrary assemblage of “accidental aggregates of peoples and tribes” (Lewis, 2004). This colonial legacy has perhaps been the greatest obstacle in constituting a harmonious pluralist democracy (Ibid). Following the colonial partitions, Somali territories were divided among four colonial powers; Britain (NFD & Somaliland), Ethiopia (Ogaden), Italy (South Somalia) and French (present day Djibouti). Despite the territorial partitions, all Somalis in the different frontiers continued to identify themselves as ‘one people’ based on kinship ties. Their sense of identity was based on an “awareness of common culture and language that preceded the development of modern nationalism” (Ibid:493). This form of cultural nationalism mutated to a ‘political’ one with the introduction of ‘modern nationalism’. For the Somalis the shift in nationalism was from “nation to state rather than—as mostly elsewhere in Africa—from state to nation” (Ibid). Somalis under British jurisdiction in the NFD numerously agitated the colonial government for unification with ‘Greater Somalia’ as early as 1948. After the end of colonial rule in 1962, “Kenyan” Somalis expressed an overwhelming support to be included to the Somali republic and this was due to dissatisfaction with repressive colonial policies. Following the findings of the NFD Commission report, the British colonial government concluded that the region should be joined to the independent Somali republic. However the newly formed Kenyan government
under Jomo Kenyatta overruled the request marking the beginning of a stringent relationship. Somalis not only rejected pledging loyalty to the new government, they also boycotted the elections and refused to participate in the nationwide celebrations for independence (Ibid). Somali secessionism was seen as posing an ominous threat to Kenya’s territorial sovereignty and also undermining its Pan-Africanism ideology of territorial unity. Diplomatic failures by the Somali government to unite NFD to Greater Somalia, Somalis in the NFD resorted to armed resistance, revolting against the Kenyatta’s government. The political dimension of this event was never fully acknowledged nor conceptualized that it was an “organized political effort” calling for autonomy and recognition. Somalis were labelled as ‘Shiftas’ or ‘bandits’ and portrayed as anti-nationalists rather than as legitimate political actors.

Following the findings of the NFD commission 86% of the population supported secession and unification with Somalia. The Kenyatta government opted for the territorial integrity of Kenya by denying the NFD Somalis right to self-govern. With the collapse of a diplomatic means for unification, the Somalis resorted to guerrilla warfare. President Kenyatta sought to downplay the political significance of the political wing the Northern Province Progressive People’s Party (NPPPP) by describing its members as ‘hooligans’, ‘armed guards’ or youths called ‘Shifta” (Whittaker, 2008). This secession was termed as a ‘shifta war’ in all state discourses and was represented as an ‘anti-nationalists’ movement whose main motive was to weaken ‘national unity’. The government gained legitimacy from the rest of the country by claiming that ‘disloyal Somalis’ were threatening its ‘unity’ as a State.

The government responded to the Shifta insurgency through a military solution in an effort to contain the Somali ‘shifta’ using similar colonial tactics of brutality. The military enforced a variety of “counterinsurgency measures, including curfews, forced resettlements and villagisation, property seizures and collective punishments” (Andersson, 2014: 660). The military was given a carte blanche in their pursuit for ‘shiftas’, and collective punishment became a norm that eluded
legal scrutiny (Whittaker, 2008; Andersson, 2014). A state of emergency was immediately declared in the region that would only be lifted in 1990, 27 years later (HRW, 1991). This move was especially aimed at dismantling the clan coalition and the established political party Northern Province Progressive People’s Party (NPPPP). Noteworthy to observe how the Somali begins to be defined only in terms of negation as a result of the contradictions it presented to Kenya’s fragile efforts at state formation. The defiance of Somalis towards being constituted territorially and politically to the nation state marked the beginning of the misrepresentation of the Somali body and its association as the ‘Other’. These representations begun during British colonial rule and they were later adopted by the Kenyan State. The Somali secessionism allows us to empirically historicize the emergence of securitization and representation of Somalis as the ‘Other’.

Analysis

Constructing Otherness

1. **Fixing the nomad**
The main preoccupation of the modern State is establishing its legitimacy and authority through ‘order’. Borders brings order as it allows the state to exercise its full control such as levy taxes, manage property, command a military and so forth. Sedentary societies proved a blessing to the modern state as they were much easier to govern and control. However nomadic groups proved to be a paradox to the Hobbesian orderly framework. How was the sovereign to enter into a contract with ‘impossible subjects’ who could not be located or governed? Ringmar interestingly argues that in fact the ‘state of nature’ that Hobbes cautioned, was none other that “a state of nomadism” (Ringmar, 2016:6). “Savages were the nomads, the hunters and gatherers, travellers basically all people who lived in conditions of Statelessness” (Ibid:11). In Europe nomadic groups like the Roma, the Yenish and the Sami people frustrated the process of state formation and as a result ‘repressive policies’ became a political necessity (Ibid:7). It is during this time that Europeans developed a distinct anti-nomadic prejudice that was later exported to the colonies (Ibid). The encounter of Somalis a predominant nomadic
society with modern statehood through colonialism allows us to understand the implications of this belief in order.

Mobility has been an important part of the Somali culture as a result of a complex history of migration and cosmopolitan trade. Their interactions with other cultures exemplified a distinct sense of identity and culture among Somalis. This transnational fluidity significantly contributed to dominant discourses of what it meant to be Somali (see Samatar 1984, Kleist 2004; Horst, 2003; Lewis, 1994). Based on an “awareness of common culture and language, the concept of Somali identity preceded the development of modern nationalism” (Lewis, 2004:493). In the NFD, the British encountered Somalis who constantly wandered from one point to another in search of grazing land and water points, their migratory pattern contingent on the weather. Being nomads and traditionally transnational, their transient tendencies to move along the colonial frontiers in the Horn was a cause for panic. The British imposed Outlying Districts Ordinance (ODO) of 1926 and the Special Districts Ordinance (SDO) of 1934 to specifically restrict this movement (Burbidge, 2015). The SDO stated; “no person shall leave the district or area to which this ordinance has been applied” (Kenya Gazette, 1936:212). This ordinance was the most severe as it designated the frontier a ‘Closed District’ marking the beginning of an isolationist policy that is still in place today. This colonial policy altered nomadic pastoral patterns and ways of life as it restricted movement. Under this policy, ‘specific’ grazing lands were set up and inter-clan boundaries established which made internal mobility within the region difficult. These policies not only affected kinship ties and separated families it also changed the political structures of Somalis. Considering that the traditional Somali political system was consensus based as opposed to ‘central political authority’ decision making became compromised (Hersi, 1977; Lewis, 1994). The policies were part of a wider colonial practice of ‘divide and rule’ that have perhaps been the main cause of religious, tribal and inter ethnic discord.

The nomads who felt confined and restricted despised this securitizing move by the colonial government. By confining the Somalis to the ‘closed district’ of NFD
the colonial government failed to integrate Somalis to the rest of the Kenyan colony both culturally or territorially. They were legislated into a ‘separate identity’ and a marginalized status as they had limited interaction with the Kenyan Colony. These factors cultivated the feeling of not belonging to Kenya as they firmly believed they had little in common with the rest of the colony. Despite their reluctance NFD was handed to the newly formed Kenyan government and Somalis became a minority due to their size, religion, ethnicity and culture. Surprisingly the NFD is still not referred as Kenya, it is still viewed as a separate region from Kenya. Hudheifa Adan a Somali journalist notes “the whole subsection of NFD is not part of the country its an annex, and the people who live there are still seen as criminals” (Participant 4).

II. Systemic alienation
The British saw no value in investing in the region particularly due the semi-desert conditions that rendered its weather quite harsh. During a parliamentary debate on the NFD secession claims the Earl of Lytton who was a colonial officer referred to the NFD as virtually a ‘desert’ that was ‘twice the size of England’. The British could not fathom why the Kenyatta’s government wanted to inherit this region as they took it to be of no economic value. However considering that the NFD is about 30% or a third of the territorial land of Kenya relinquishing this region was not going to come easy. Sharmake Nur a political activist argues:

Kenyatta never wanted Somalis to be part of Kenyan he wanted the land to be part of Kenya, you only discover that we are here by accidents, we are still second membership citizens to date (Participant 5)

The attorney general Charles Njonjo confirmed this official government position:

Kenya could never agree to surrender part of her territory: Kenyans, be they Borans or Somalis, who did not support Kenya "should pack their camels and go to Somalia" (Njonjo cited in Ogenga, 1992:23).
This rhetoric of ‘go back to Somalia’ has become a common practice even in current state discourses that is used in the ‘unhoming’ of Somalis and in reinscribing colonial practices.

The NFD’s ‘unimportance’ made it a mere militarized buffer zone used to protect the rest of the British Protectorate from Abyssinian expansionism and the Italian proxy colony. Consequently no formal governance structures especially those pertaining to identification and registration were set up. For example the national identity card system (*kipande or colonial pass*) was established in the NFD as it was done in other parts of Kenya. The *kipande* system itself represents a residue of colonial practices of control that was used to segregate, classify and differentiate Kenyans. It is now however institutionalized and used to deny those without it access to basic services. The issuing of *kipande* and other legal documentation such as passports to Somalis has always been a contentious issue and utmost a matter of national security. The difficulties in differentiating ‘Somalis from Somalia’ and ‘Somalis from the NFD’ posed threats to both colonial and postcolonial administrators. During the Shiffa war Somalis were categorized as either ‘loyal Somalis’ or as ‘shiftas’ however this demarcation was self-defeating due to the ambivalences of Somali identity. A Kenyan politician stated in parliament “we do not want to be told that there are loyal Somalis, let loyal Somalis come out and show us their loyalty” (Hansard (1965) House of representatives 227, Vol V). Such statements point out to how the othering of Somalis was tolerated even in official speech acts. To rid itself of citizenship ambivalences among Somalis special “screening practices” for Somalis was instituted in 1989 to separate ‘law abiding’ Somalis from ‘shifta’ (Whittaker, 2015). Such discriminatory and xenophobic policies against Somalis make it difficult to declare the Kenyan state as being any different from the colonial administration. Another institutionalized practice of othering still in place is the numerous vetting of Somalis to prove their Kenyan identity before issuance of any legal document. Nanjala Nyabola a Kenyan political analyst points out:
Nobody is asking people from the rest of Kenya to be vetted six times before they are issued with national identity documents. So not only are we asking people from Northern Kenyan to do the same as everybody else but we are asking them to go further [...] To be more Kenyan than Kenyans (Participant 1)

According to Salah Sheikh (Participant 2), author of Blood on the Runway vetting is not part of the Kenyan law but it has been made a requirement for Somalis. He claims such practices of Governmentality are what constitute ‘Kenya-ness’ and as a result it has only amplified Somali resentment to the government.

III. Stereotyping

Even though typifications are necessary for production of meaning, both negative and positive stereotyping emerges where there are forms of power hierarchies. Consequently it arises when there is an encounter with ‘otherness’ or ‘difference’. “Stereotyping symbolically fixes boundaries and excludes everything which does not belong” (Hall, 2013:259). The historical disavowal of Somalis in Kenya is based on several markers or fetishes of differences relating to their language, culture or religion. However othering and stereotyping has its “own poetics, deeply invested in power, it is a product of discursive and hegemonic practices” (Ibid:253). Under colonial rule Somalis were stereotyped to be ‘hostile’, ‘warlike’ or ‘warriors’ which the Kenyan government assumed to be true representation of the Somali identity. In a British parliamentary proceeding, a colonial officer the Earl of Lytton portrays Somalis as ‘warlike’. He notes “if we stir up this wild, warlike people there will be infinite trouble” further he states “they are extremely good fighters and warriors, probably the best in Africa who would be extremely difficult to subdue, and they are experts in guerrilla warfare” (HL Deb. (1962) House of sitting. 248). This representation of Somalis as ‘warlike’ was articulated by the British to persuade the Kenyan state to grant the NFD its secession. The British were more concerned in maintaining geopolitical interests in postcolonial Kenya therefore Somali secessionism was if anything a disruption to this order. The Earl’s alarmist remarks that “there will be dragons teeth that will rise up and produce warriors against the Kenya Government” (Ibid) if the NFD became part
of Kenya was not taken lightly. It only discursively accentuated the distorted imagery of the Somali’s as ‘warlike’ or as ‘enemy of the Kenyan state’. The Somalis are today derogatory referred as ‘wariah’ a continuation of the colonial representation of their identity as ‘warriors’. These stereotypes of Somalis as ‘warlike’ influenced the Kenyan government perceptions of Somalis. By the time the NFD was handed over to the Kenyatta government stereotypes of ‘warlike’ Somalis contributed to the beginning of anti-somali sentiments. Some other derogatory repertoires that have been used in the othering of Somalis include; ‘Shiftas’, ‘Wariah’, ‘Jangili’, ‘Al-shabab’, ‘Al-shabab sympathisers’ and most recently ‘cash points’. Hudheifa notes “Jangili (criminal) was not meant for other people it was meant for Somalis because nomads were Jangili (criminals). These “images, real or imaginary have continued to influence the Kenyan authorities' behavior towards the Somalis leading to gross violations of human rights” (Ogenga, 1992:21).

**IV. Forced Villagisation**

The villagisation program imposed in 1966 is perhaps the most capturing example of how colonial practices of governmentality materializes and manifests on Somali identities. Villagisation was both to be used as a counter-insurgency strategy that would assist the security personnel in pursuing ‘shifta’ and as a development agenda (Whittaker, 2012). It was a targeted disciplinary measure aimed at “subversive civilian and shifta and also a means to rehabilitate the "criminal" nomad to a settled life” (Ibid:345). Represented as a ‘backward’ subject in the process of ‘becoming’, there was a need to bring the Somali nomad ‘out of his past’. Villagisation policies are embedded in the wider discourses of ‘progress’ and ‘modernity’ and perpetuate colonial sentiments of anti-nomadism (Ibid). The disavowal of nomadism and its eventual elimination was viewed as mission to be accomplished by social reforms and if necessary by law. The policy aimed at criminalising pastoralism and to transform the nomads to a more sedentary lifestyle. It was also a securitizing move for targeting and ordering Somalis and for gaining territorial control of the NFD. In a parliamentary motion
a member of parliament G.G Kariuki (prominent politician) presents the motion for villagisation of Somalis and is quoted saying:

“The problem of Shifta will never be defeated until Somalis are villagized in order to enable our security forces to deal with them effectively” (Hansard (1965) House of representatives 226, Vol V

“If we want to control Somalis, and if we want to defeat Shifta we must apply the same method as the Imperialist Government applied in order to defeat Mau Mau activities” (Ibid:226)

Such speech acts constituted a securitizing move that discursively gave legitimacy for the military to commit atrocities and violence in the region with full support of the state. The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission investigations on the shifta war disputed the official figures of 2000 deaths stating the number was higher. Other violations it documented was sexual violence of women, killing and confiscation of cattle as well as poisoning of livestock (TJRC, 2013:12). In my interview with Abdinoor Ahmed (a Kenyan Somali journalist) he tells me of all the policies imposed that of harming the livestock was the most insulting of all to the nomads. He notes ”the Somalis had camels so the government was shooting the camels to cripple them economically so that they don’t fight back” (Participant 6). How such colonial tactic of control become internalized and reproduced in the colonies echoes a postcolonial continuity of its hegemonic ideas and thoughts.

Even though it is debatable whether the Kenyan state succeeded in its efforts at forcing the Somalis into submission but one thing that is clear is its failure in gaining trust or loyalty of the Somali people. Unhoming practices such as the Shifta war, the villagisation policy and the constant suspicion of Somalis did little to cultivate feelings of patriotism or belonging to Kenya. Salah Sheikh states that following the atrocities committed in the region the population has become subdued due to the traumas it has had to endure. He notes:

No political parties has surfaced since then, the Somali quest for politics died after shifta war. We have been defeated to much on the ground that we only find solace in silence (Participant 2)
This initial negation for their demands for autonomy has led to the emptying of the Somali nomad as an equal political subject and made antagonism an inherent factor in their relations with the Kenyan state. As securitising means ‘Othering’, the shifta discourse is reproduced and emerges in various epochs of Kenya’s history to securitize the Somali as posing an ominous threat to Kenyan identity.

**Constructing ‘national unity’: Logic of Antagonism**

In postcolonial Kenya, Somali secessionism posed the limits of the liberal framework of modern statehood. The *Somali difference* provides a good ground for understanding how a sense of belonging to the nation is “invented, imagined or mythologized” (Hurrell, 2007:123). The existence of Somali otherness was central for the newly formed Kenyan State to achieve its ‘we’ identity, and eventually secure its means of Statehood. Just like an individual, the State endeavours to achieve a full identity by seeking “unity” through political “consensus”. However Laclau and Mouffe point out to the impossibility of this desire of achieving ‘rational consensus’, ‘unity’ or ‘stable political identities’ due to the existence of otherness. The constitution and the desire for ‘unity’ among all tribes into a nation state was not possible without the presence of a constitutive outside. Following traditional understanding of social relationships as ‘essence-accident’, Derrida’s ‘constitutive outside’ as theorized by Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 2001) can be useful to understand the initial relation between the newly independent Kenyan State and its Somali citizens. A dilemma for any ‘multicultural’ democratic system is the inherent presence of ‘particularisms’ or ‘different types of identities’ that present themselves in the political arena. Mouffe argues that in these types of political systems comprised of multiple identities “any consensus will be based on acts of exclusion” (Mouffe, 1994:103). The presence of the ‘Other’ prevents any subject from being fully itself or achieve its unity. (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001:125). The Somali ‘ethno-cultural particularism’ emerged as the ‘accidental’ or ‘outside’ that posed a threat to Kenya’s negotiation process for statehood from the colonial government. For the newly formed Kenyan state to acquire ‘national unity’ or an identity it required “difference in
order to be, and it had to convert difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty” (Connolly, 2002:64). Since identity is created on difference and hierarchy of relations (power), the ‘Other’ becomes a site for both possibility (hegemony) and impossibility (antagonism). During the independence period the two main political parties at the time had radically different postcolonial visions for the new state. They were able to find ‘unity’ in their opposition to the Somali quest for secessionism. As Campbell notes by putting a name to what we fear, we can fix who ‘we’ are (1998:170).

The Somali as the Other negated this sense of ‘national unity’ by revealing the ambivalences of the Kenyan state as a stable unified entity. In an attempt to eliminate social fragmentations, the Kenyan state deformed Somali difference into Otherness and presented it as an accident or a threat to its national unity. This was discursively articulated by portraying the Somali quest for independence as ‘secessionist’ and its people as ‘anti nationalist’, ‘shifta’, and ‘bandits’.

To understand this relationship further Mouffé argues for the distinction between le politique (the political) from la politique (politics). ‘The political’ is the arena of anachronistic contestations of difference, contingency, antagonism as well as agonism. ‘Politics’ on the other hand is the Hobbesian orderly framework of the state and its institutions where human relations are politically pre-determined (see Mouffé, 1994; Jean-Luc, 1997; Rancière, 2002). As demonstrated below the relation between the Somali subject and the Kenyan state is a relation of “conquest or conversion of the other” (Connolly, 1991:178):
This relation failed to recognise the dimension of ‘the political’ thus becoming one of exclusion and violence as it. According to Mouffe, ‘the political’ “is from the outset concerned with collective forms of identification” therefore the demarcation of us versus them governs the constitution of politics (Mouffe, 2013:31). If the differences posed by the ‘other’ is negated the relationship easily turns to an antagonism becoming one of friend/enemy. As my paper demonstrates the current friend/enemy relationship between the Somali and the Kenyan State has been in discursive formation from the colonial era to date. This relation derives its political practice from the ‘liberal model of democracy’ an offshoot of Hobbes framework of order that requires ‘unity’ and ‘harmony’ for security to emerge.

Security becomes the name of the certainty, while the Other is the name of this uncertainty. This uncertainty calls for their policing and their subsequent securitization to eliminate ambivalences and contradictions posed to the State. The impossibility of this ‘national unity’ further reveals how the Kenyan state engages in exclusivist politics by undermining the desire of Somalis to belong. What the Kenyan state has been doing all along is the elimination of this antagonism posed by Somalis. This relation is confined to ‘politics’ and little or no attempt is made to reconcile or understand the Somali. Kenya’s demands for Somali loyalty and a cohesive national community remains at odds with its own history that of lacking collective identity. Somali otherness continues to be reinvented and used as a tool for Kenya’s own precarious constitution as a ‘nation state’. Somali otherness (them) is an embodiment of ‘unification’ and provides an
anchorage to define what it means to be a Kenyan (us). Abdullahi Abdille explains how nationhood perpetuates this ‘unity’

Nationhood in the post-colonial context was always an experiment [...] nationhood was a fad that went viral [...] someone has to be excluded in order for the liberal Western model of nationhood to work [...] there has to be an underclass [...] what we are trying to do with people of the Northern region is that we are trying to create an underclass of people against whom we can measure our belonging [...] we are trying to create an other so that Us can be possible [...] there has to be an other who is not us, that is the parallels of statehood (Participant 7)

To be able to reconcile this violent relationship, Laclau and Mouffe’s ‘agonistic model of democracy’ offers a valuable democratic framework. According to this framework the Somali ‘ethno-cultural particularism’ and its subsequent quest for unity to Greater Somalia is in itself a hegemonic articulation. On the other hand the Kenyan state presents itself as another hegemonic project on a quest for its own security. The “struggle between these two opposing entities can in no way be reconciled rationally” or achieved through a non ‘conflictual consensus’ (Mouffe, 2013:40). Considering that these articulations of us/them are in itself “constitutive of politics” confrontations over meanings will always emerge (Ibid:36). In cases where such ‘conflicts’ do not appear chances are that political order is a ‘hegemonic’ one whose ‘contingency’ has been eliminated or forgotten. This confrontation “can take the form of an ‘agonism’ (struggle between adversaries) as opposed to an ‘antagonism’ (struggle between enemies)” (Ibid). It is the disavowal of political confrontation and of expressions of ‘anachronistic passions’ that necessitate the need to securitize. The Somali claims for unification with Greater Somalia prior to independence represents a hegemonic articulation. The failure to acknowledge this claim and provide it with a democratic outlet culminated to their military insurgency. The Kenyan state security response to this insurgency soared this relationship and transformed it into an antagonistic one. The liberal democratic model is the Achilles heel to a postcolonial state like
Kenya faced with diverse ethnocentrism and multiple identities that cannot be harmoniously reconciled without equally considering the “dimension of contest” (Ibid:44). Nanjala sums up this dilemma highlighting a departure with this model:

The larger European states had to eliminate what they had to eliminate to have this cohesive unity identity, Europe is not as on solid ground as it wants the rest of us to believe, what that means for the rest of us is that we have to be careful about the extent to which we refer to European theories, perspectives and systems as the guiding, because its not really working the way they are telling us is working [...] because the cracks are already emerging in Europe so why should we be following something that is already falling apart (Participant 1)

Constructing ‘national identity’: Logic of Hegemony

A myth of ‘national identity’ was discursively constructed from two hegemonic interventions; the Pan-africanist movement and from the Kikuyu struggle for independence (Mau-Mau). The logic of hegemony can be applied here to demonstrate how a ‘particular’ culture (Kikuyu) came to hegemonically inscribe itself on the ‘empty signifier’ of ‘national identity’. Additionally the logic of hegemony explains how anti-colonial identities came to mask particular identities by homogenising ‘African identities’ under the banner of ‘Pan Africanism’

Pan Africanism was able to unite all African nations against a ‘common oppressor’; the colonialists. Inspired by Marxist ideals of solidarity, this ‘unity’ was easy to achieve, as there was a common defined ‘enemy’. For the movement to be successful in overthrowing the colonisers the different states had to forego their internal fragmented identities and unite under a homogenous ‘single identity’ of ‘Africans’. This ‘single identity’ obliterated the numerous specificities of history and identity internal to each state. Additionally it did not take into consideration the internal identities and cultural particularisms that would constitute each country’s historical development. What followed was “national reductionisms” in which the States were tasked with the role of crafting abstract nation based
identities. National identities were basically framed as ‘anti-colonial identities’ that were defined in relation to colonialism. This social formation followed from the Marxist logic that there existed ‘essential reality’ and that all interests and identities were anti-colonial identities. The historical causality within the process of decolonization made it impossible to see or accept the complexity and contradictions that were present in the different states. In Kenya after the decolonization process, the transition was from ‘anti-colonial identities’ to ‘national identities’. In the discourse of nationhood, ‘national identity’ becomes the ‘empty signifier’ where partial hegemony ascribes its meaning. The Kikuyu’s cultural particularism came to dominate this discursive center for numerous reasons. Firstly the dominance of the Kikuyu in the Mau Mau rebellion\(^2\) meant they were able to overthrow the colonial regime and replace it with ‘Kikuyu hegemony’. Secondly Kenyatta, hailing from the Kikuyu tribe became one of the luminaries figures of Pan Africanism therefore it was easy to translate its ideologies to Kenya. The Kikuyu culture achieved ‘partial fixity’ in hegemonizing ‘national identity’ by creating a ‘chain of equivalence’ with the other tribes. While the ‘Pan Africanism unity’ was only achievable through the presence of the ‘colonial other’, a ‘national identity’ only becomes possible with the presence of the ‘Somali other’. Therefore ‘anti colonial’ identities and the resultant ‘national identities’ that followed were premised on traditional understandings of identity as ‘homogenous’. Identities are therefore conceived as sharing a common characteristic and come pre-determined unchanged by context, time or space. However according to Laclau and Mouffe, group “identities are always created by political and discursive processes” people may feel they belong to the same group-nation (Jørgensen and Phillips, 2000:33). They argue due to the existence of antagonism, there will always exist the struggle over the creation of meanings. The “construction of subject positions and hence identities is a battlefield where

\(^2\) The Mau Mau was a Kikuyu rebellion to reclaim land from the British that eventually paved way for independence. The colonialists had settled in the Kikuyu lands as it was the most fertile, being farmers the Kikuyu had no alternative but to rebel. It is important to highlight that colonialism in itself was not uniformly experienced among all groups, some like the Kikuyu had endured the worst forms of brutality under the British.
different constellations of elements struggle to prevail” (Ibid:47). Since identities or discourses are created through inclusion and exclusion, all that is included will fill the ‘empty sign’ with content thus constituting itself as discourse (partial fixation of meaning) and all that is excluded from the discourse will become the ‘field of discursivity’.

In pointing to the hyper visibility of the Mau Mau fight for independence and the silencing of the Somali claims for the same, Ochiel notes:

> The Shifta War was essentially identical in its motivations to the Mau Mau rebellion, after all. But while the northern Kenya region’s struggle for self-determination was an existential threat to “Kenya,” Mau Mau goes into history as a struggle for independence. (Ochiel, 2013:45-46, The New inquiry) (Kenya will never was)

Abdullahi Boru further highlights how a national identity has been created in Kenya in way that systemically excludes Somalis from belonging to a nation. He argues;

Somalis are theoretically part of the country but the way in which the national identity is being constructed by the state is saying you don't belong here, if you want to belong with us, if you want to enjoy the privileges of nationhood you have to look like us, you have to act like us. You have to go the extra mile…nobody is asking people from down country […] to jump through the same hoops to show their loyalty, nobody is asking them to be vetted six times before they are issued with national identity documents. So not only are we asking people from Northern Kenyan to do the same as everybody else but we are asking them to go further […] to be more Kenyan than Kenyans (Participant 3)

**Counter discourse: Nomadism**

> “Seems that we have a lot to learn from nomadic societies. Indeed learning from nomadic societies is an urgent task” (Ringmar, 2016:21)

The case study above presents a recurring dilemma in modern politics and presents two historical interpretations of ‘the political’. On one hand we encounter
a highly securitised state attempting to create a civic nationalism in abstract
historicist universal terms. On the other hand we have a particular cultural identity
resisting the attempts of this inscription. It can be understood as a discursive
struggle between universalist conception of the political subject versus a political
consciousness of a particular ethno-cultural identity. Nation making as a discourse
of ‘progress’ a discourse of ‘becoming’ is representative of ‘totalizing’ principles
of Modernity and Historicism (Chatterjee, 2004:16). The unfolding of this
universalism in the Kenyan colonial context was provincial. Just like any
discourse the colonial articulations of power was not a ‘unified discourse’. It
never achieves ‘discursive closure’ due to the contingency of history of ‘others’
who render this colonial history as ambivalent. As I have presented the ‘nation
making’ process was an attempt to re-write identity in civic terms. The resistance
presented by the Somalis in the NFD precipitated the use of disciplinary
mechanisms to de-ethnicise the subject from all forma of anachronistic allegiances
be it religious, cultural or ethno-nationalistic. A teleological narration of this
history will display a triumph of colonial power and the universalist discourse of
political Modernity. The need to re-write this history is useful in interpreting the
history of the modern. According to Chakrabarty “the writing of history must
implicitly assume a plurality of times existing together” (2000:109). The histories
of minorities reveal the contingency of any History particularly in relation to
hegemonic discourses like statehood, order, security and democracy, which are
symbols of power. He notes Western political modernity was if anything a ‘denial
of coevalness’ and the histories of minorities. Somali nomadism presents itself
like a “stubborn knot that stand out and break up the otherwise evenly woven
surface of the colonial fabric” (Ibid:106). The task of any postcolonial theorist is
in identifying avenues of voice and visibility of subaltern pasts from where
counternarratives can be centered and dislodged.

Despite the colonial and postcolonial disavowal of this practice, its far from being
antiquated if anything it’s a signifier of contemporary modernity. Perhaps a
paradox that appears in Newtonian political practice is the transformation from
order and borders to the current borderlessness and homelessness that characterize modern life (Ringmar, 2016). Instead of nomads we now have ‘globe-trotters’ who transverse the globe with little restraint. The “imagined state of nature was a rhetorical device of order that has become a historical reality” postcolonial states (Ibid:6). The European Union (EU) itself represents the contingency of this teleology of history by provincializing the concept of territorial borders. The current modern Subject can best be understood as a nomad, “with no fixed address” if anything he/she is stateless (Ibid:5). This chronology contradicts the ideology of progress as transformation from ‘pre-modern’ nomadic (savagery) lifestyle to one of ‘modern’ fixed civility. The EU demonstrates that in fact borderlessness is possible and that it does not necessarily translate to anarchy. This register becomes even more puzzling once we juxtapose it with a postcolonial state like Kenya where the project of political Modernity is still taken as empirical reality. The ‘territory’ and the ‘border’ have become sites of violence marred with histories of bodily displacements and war. The “territory is still treated either as a device in the hands of the state to control, contain, and discipline people or as a symbolic source of national identification” (Antonsich, 2009:13). Its beliefs on ‘order’, ‘security’, ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’ all the symbolisms of power and ‘the political’ remain frozen.

To demonstrate how the Somali nomad subverts colonial authority and the teleology’s of Western political thought I will present its own political consciousness. Nomads’ posses “several identities” or ‘hybrid identities’ acquired through their encounters with the ‘Other’ (Taylor, 2002:203). They are transnational political subjects who are discursively constructed and located as their identities is temporal and spatial.’ Their lives a continuous encounter with strangers and new ideas means that their identities is fluid and constantly changing. This adaptability and familiarity with otherness gives nomads the skill to negotiate across cultural boundaries and contexts (Ibid). The nomad can be regarded as a hybrid, an intermediary between the particularism (local) and the universal (objective). They bridge the gap between the rootedness (particularism)
and the cosmopolitanism (universalism). The incompatibility of these two desires is well articulated by Ringmar;

We want to live with others but also on our own; we want to be free but also rooted; we love the local but aspire to the universal (2016:21)

The nomad belongs to neither category they blend both aspirations of universalism and particularism in their cosmos a term Bhabha refers as hybridity. How the colonial subject becomes the embodiment of the ‘Sovereign’ and represents the wills of the ‘colonized multitude’.

The Somali in Kenya is an ambiguous citizen that emerges as an icon of cultural fluidity that is an identity that is caught up in the ‘in between’ of nation hood. They challenge the western democracy and colonial authority

The attempt of the colonial government at ‘fixing the Somali nomad’ to a particular location and furnish it with a new language, identity and culture is contested. Firstly the attempt to confine the Somalis within specific territories was achieved at only a certain extent such as the passing of SDO and ODO. However the frontiers of the pastoral system remained fluid and nomads continued crossing the borders of the colonial state. Secondly the colonial policies such as imposition of taxes became impossible, as Somalis were not consistent in paying due to their continuous migration within the ‘closed frontier’. Thirdly by the very act of demanding ‘self-governance’ and eventual ‘unification’ with Somalia, they inscribe a ‘partial positionality’ to the colonial discourse. By inserting their claims they do not necessarily displace this order but rather they inscribe it with a different meaning. Briefing the British parliament on the NFD claims for autonomy a colonial officer, Huntingdon is noted saying, “they do not wish to be governed. That is really their case” (HL Deb. (1962). 248). This political articulation is in itself presents a different political subjectivity that was already in place. Contrary to being passive subjects, they did posses agency Hudheifa Aden explains;
If you look at NFD in 1963 they were very proud people, even the way their speech was [...] even the way their quest was [...] they were very proud people. There was immense connection between the clans and they could actually unite [...] they were looking at life from a very different angle (Participant 4)

Power was not understood as emanating from a central authority (Samatar, 1984), territory (land) was taken to be a public utility belonging to community. This structure of society is differently understood from the liberal thought that constructs power as hierarchy and visualises land in terms of private property. Nomadism was not as parochial as it was represented nor is it a pre-modern idea that one needed to progress from. On the contrary nomads demonstrate that despite their rootedness “there was/is order to their societies although they live(d) in a borderless world” (Ringmar, 2016:21). Indeed the adoption of statelessness and borderlessness by the modern subject prove that historical coevalness in relation to political subjectivity is indeed possible only interpretation of meanings differs. Through these examples we see the subjectivities of Somali nomadic identities as introducing the “practice of cultural differentiation as an indispensable enunciative function” in the discourse of statehood (Bhabha, 1994:118). They unsettle the “mimetic or narcissistic demands of colonial power by turning the gaze of the back upon the eye of power” (Ibid:112). The Somali nomad could best be described as the ‘impossible subject’ who subverts the hegemonic political order of statehood. The Somali disavowal of colonial discourse and its modes of governance pose a disturbance to its representation. They demonstrate that Hobessian orderly framework is not ‘universally adequate’ and provincialize Newtonian political project. This articulation should not be understood as negation but rather as an ambivalent identity that the colonial power could not fully locate thus not fully coerce. Their NFD quest for political autonomy was a move for negotiating power and democracy but it was never utilized by both the colonial regime and the newly found government. Failure to transform this resistance into agonism but rather it has become an antagonistic
relation that has been filled with violence. The Somali and the Kenyan state mutually inflict conflict and violence on each other.

CHAPTER 4

Discursive Context of Terrorism and Counter-terrorism

For what else is the war on terror other than the violent return of the colonial past, with its split geographies of "us" and "them," "civilization" and "barbarism," "Good" and "Evil"? (Gregory, 2004:11).

Postcolonial Africa is now characterized by the rise of “new wars” of which ‘War on Terror’ (WoT) is just one of its numerous manifests. The risk of a terrorism contagion extending from the West African coast to the Horn of Africa has never been greater. The new wars even though local are “drawn upon a globalised social and economic arena” (Jabri, 2007:60). It can be argued that the present insecurities are the side effects of modernity, colonial histories, neo-liberal anxieties and the present War on Terror (WoT) legacies. Now more than ever, a renewed urgency to comprehend these security paradoxes presents itself.

Kenya has not been able to escape the universalizing logic of war on terror or its remit of operations. Its visibilities are easily manifested on the Somali subject the signifier of a ‘terror-being body’. Crisscrossed by the haunting legacies of colonialism and modern terror legacies it’s also a body marked by the fungibilities of border restrictions, surveillance and identity management. The ‘war on terror’ firstly as a discourse and secondly as a hegemonic practice conceives the “other” and constructs the Somali as an “enemy and a target of violence acts” (Jabri, 2007).

Currently Kenya is faced with a serious crisis of ‘national security’ within its borders and outside. Confronted with its colonial legacies and an ever-widening tribal divide, the country has been battling with domestic fragility and highest levels of insecurities.
CASE 2: Operation Linda Nchi

‘Operation ‘Operation Linda Nchi’ (Protect the Nation) was a military ‘incursion’ into Southern Somalia spearheaded by Kenyan army which begun in 2011. The ‘invasion’ was justified by the Kenyan state as self-defence of its territorial security, which they claimed, was under threat by Somali linked al-shabab militia. The internal security minister at the time warned that Kenya was faced with “serious threats of terrorism” and declared al-shabab its enemy (Daily nation, 2011). Initially the operation was foreseen as a short-term plan to create a friendly buffer zone to “undermine the al-shabab influence and build an internal force against them” (Anderson, 2015:4). The ‘invasion’ turned into an ‘occupation’ with the incorporation of the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) into the larger African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) a move that gave the operation greater political legitimacy. This has resulted in an expansion of KDF troops as part of the wider African Union peacekeeping mission with no effective exit strategy other than further militarizing the situation. Abdullahi Abdille a researcher I interviewed pointed out to the weaknesses of the Kenya’s military in implementing a complex security operation like the one in Somalia:

This military intervention into Somalia was never about the Somali people it was about masculinised egos who had been bruised by this attack on Westgate, not the loss of human lives, it was about revenge and ego [...] but can we afford this ego massage? We cannot afford because the military is not strong, its corrupt [...] its a hollow institution that is crippled by personal financial interests secondly the intervention was never about the Somali people and it never had the support of the Somali people rather all it did was put them in between the devil and the blue sea...thirdly this is an army that is not trained for war? What were we aiming to gain from Somalia? it was ego it was hubris (Participant 7)

The occupation has also seen a ballooning of Kenya’s defence budget. For example between 2010–11 “prior to the invasion, the military expenditure was at $587 million but this number rose dramatically to $821 million by 2012–13” (Ibid:27).
In 2015 alone Kenya received $100 million from the US as counterterrorism funding, which is an estimated 163% increase from the previous year of 2014. The European Union on the other hand “funded €356.7 million to Kenya between March 2007 and January 2013” (Ibid). Following the 9/11 era Kenya has been a strategic partner and ally in the US led War against terror operations. It has been argued that Kenya supported and implemented anti-terror policies “in the hope of attracting international economic, military assistance and Counter Terror assistance” (Mogire & Agade, 2011:284). This funding has largely been financed by the United States and Kenya’s cooperation has been viewed as strategic in ‘stabilizing’ Somalia. Abdullahi Boru a security analyst based in Kenya notes that War on Terror has made Kenyans very rich particularly after the signing of numerous arms deals in 2015 when US president Obama visited the country. He notes that one aspect often overlooked in the analysis of security and terrorism in Kenya is the context in which the security institutions (army) operates.

Factors such as arms deal, profiteering, misrepresentation of facts, bribes makes the official discourse a sham even though they constitute the deciding factors that tip the scale of conflicts one way or another. Security happens to people we have to think outside the institutions (Participant 3)

Domestically the invasion has been criticized for fanning the flames of ethnic and religious differences causing further internal polarization. Calls for the withdrawal of the troops has been intensifying as a result of an uptick in Al-shabab attacks within Kenya. A number of high profile terrorist attacks have occurred since the invasion however it was specifically the Westgate incident that drew a global gaze prompting the government to respond with draconian institutional and policy changes in its security apparatus. As a result a new operation dubbed ‘Usalama Watch’ was launched in Nairobi and Mombasa towns in an attempt to collectively punish Somalis who were viewed as ‘terrorist suspects’. This securitizing move resulted in massive deportations of Somalis, extra-judicial killings, enforced disappearances, illegal arrests, extortion of money and cases of rape of Somali women by security personnel were reported (HRW, 2013). The operation was
targeted at undocumented Somali ‘refugees’ who were blamed and perceived to be responsible for the Westgate mall attack. However the difficulties in making distinctions between Somali nationals from Kenyan Somali nationals or Somali refugees, resulted in a generalized targeting of all Somalis who were seen as either suspects or being complicit to al-shabab activities. The invasion and the security operations have been highly condemned by human rights groups on more than one occasion and numerous reports published on the human rights violations. This securitization moves occur on Somali bodies despite Somalis being the most targeted group by al-shabab activities in both Kenya and Somalia. It therefore becomes difficult to draw the line on who securitizes as Al-shabab offers a rival account of security by equally victimizing both the Kenyan state and the Somali.

The invasion and the subsequent outcomes have led to the re-emergence of the Somali subject in securitization discourses. Operation Linda Nchi marks a continuation of the securitization of Somali identities and constitutes the latest spate of atrocities. Somali identities have been reassigned within the War on Terror framework and framed as posing a threat to Kenya’s security a move that justifies routinized securitization. It becomes important to note how the War on Terror discourse has legitimized claims by the government of a ‘unified Kenya’ and distracted focus away from its historical violence on Kenyan Somalis.

The Somali identity continues to be politicized to serve the Kenyan state through new orderings. This case also points out how through terror and terrorism we are able to observe how “insecurities of States is increasingly becoming intertwined with the uncertainties of civilian spaces and persons” (Appadurai, 2006:104). To be able to empirically theorise how the WOT as both a discourse and a practice unfolds in the Kenyan context, I will focus on highly contentious Security Law that was passed in 2014. The law principally laid out a new counter-terrorism architecture that has resulted in major policy and institutional changes to Kenya’s security apparatus and wider ramifications to civil liberties.
**Model 1: Official Discourse**

The official discourse will be based from the articles of the 2014 contentious Security Law, official statements from the ruling Jubilee party and statements from parliamentary proceedings in which the bill was debated. In December 19th 2014 the Kenyan government hastily passed a controversial Security Law. The law is part of the fight against al-shabab and its perceived threats that have increasingly intensified following Kenya’s military operations in Somalia. This action could be seen as a securitizing move since the Bill was heavily criticised for not sufficiently engaging with the public and has been subjected to several amendments. Buzan notes that institutionalized securitization can be become a response to a recurrent or persistent threat (1998:27). Corresponding to this is a “new security governance architecture that is taking shape in Kenya” (Omeje & Githigaro, 2012). It could be argued that the new security law marks a fundamental shift in Kenya’s security agenda by particularly laying out an anti-terror framework and surveillance practices. For example Article 74, section (40a/1) of the law proposed the establishment of a “national counter-terrorism centre” (Security Act, 2014:351). In 2016, the center is fully operational with a vision of “Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and radicalization”. The center is already undertaking security related development programmes backed by several foreign nations including Denmark under the STRIVE programme. The US government is also poised to roll out a CVE programme that will help the Kenyan State in its fight against ‘radical extremism’. Additionally Article 42, section (I) authorizes the National Intelligence Service (NIS) to undertake ‘covert operations’ with little constitutional oversight. Under this section "special operations" is broadly defined as “measures, efforts and activities aimed at neutralizing threats against national security” (Ibid:343). This section gives the NIS legislative authority to take any ‘necessary’ action against those “perceived as ‘threats” to the national security. It is noticeable that this clause could pose considerable risks to the Somali community considering the atrocities committed by the NIS especially during the Wagalla Massacre. Salah Sheikh believes that
some Somali elites are part and parcel of this securitizing mechanism. He notes “Somalis are now sycophants and spies for the government” (Participant 2). Perhaps coincidental he further discloses that “the head of NIS is today a Somali”. This claim was made visible during the parliamentary deliberations of the security bill. The majority leader of the National Assembly Mr. Aden Duale compared the main opposition party (CORD) to the Alshabab claiming that “they speak the same language”. He noted “al-shabab has called for the withdrawal of the KDF and CORD has called for the withdrawal of the KDF, you are speaking the same language” (July, 2014:14). Duale a Somali politician from Garissa has been a major supporter of the occupation in Somalia and has numerous defended the Jubilee government despite its systemic targeting on Somalis.

Other controversial sections of the law include the Article 64, section (30f/I) that prohibits against “broadcasting any information which undermines security operations relating to terrorism” without prior police consent (security Act 2014:349). This clause could silence future atrocities committed by security personnel considering the questionable conduct of the police apparatus in Kenya. Additionally Article 52, section (6a/I) of the new law gives the police more powers to “stop, arrest and handover any person to the nearest police station whom the officer deems suspect” (Ibid:343). The law does not provide clear guidelines on what constitutes “a serious offence” exposing it to ambiguities and loopholes. Hudheifa notes “peoples experience of anti-terror measures is that they are punitive, against civilians, against communities, and increasing mistrust of the local communities” (Participant 4)

Following the passing of the security bill, in a public speech President Uhuru Kenyatta concluded;

I am confident that you will find that there is nothing in this law that goes against the Bill of Rights or any provision of the constitution. Its intent is one; to protect the lives and property of all citizens (KTN Kenya, 2014)

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3 Coalition for reforms and democracy
During the Jamhuri day celebrations marking 51 years since Kenya’s independence from the British, Uhuru Kenyatta further reiterated “no freedoms are being curtailed unless of course your are a terrorist yourself” (December 12, 2014).

At this juncture it becomes important to ask how are we constructing who is ‘al shabab or a terrorist’ and which order of truth dominates this construction? In his analysis of knowledge and power, Foucault questions how power produces reality, domains of objects and rituals of truth and also how the individual is directly implicated in this production (Foucault, 1976:194). According to the official discourse it appears that the State has the monopoly (power) to empirically prove (through speculation) who is a ‘terrorist’, what acts constitute terrorism and which acts are mere political violence. The “state is understood to represent this objective reality and offer interpretations of who a terrorist might be and its claim seen as legitimate thus justifying its own actions (Oliviero, 1998:134). As a consequence the state is rendered beyond question, thus maintaining hegemony in the construction of truth and saturate all forms of interpretation. Oliviero stresses the need to not view the State as an “answer but as a question” (Ibid:132). Is it possible to adopt an ambivalence definition to terrorism instead of an objective reality? a definition able to ideally “sustain multiple wills and multiple interpretations” (ibid).

Since politics entails a collective construction of meanings, multiple actors in the society need to be involved in its discursive construction to ensure a plurality of meanings. Most importantly terrorism analysed as a discursive practice and not simply as a spectacle of a series of events is more constructive. In both theory and practice, terrorism viewed as a “historically produced phenomenon, the product of a particular political discourse rather than the expression of certain underlying and fixed human capacities or action has the potential to be transformed” (Ibid:128). Therefore what the Kenyan State essentially is doing is depoliticization of security to the point that it becomes the sole referent of the truth about security and insecurity and about who is to be included and who is to be excluded.
Securitization therefore reaffirms the absence of ‘the political’ in Kenyan context as it leaves no opportunity for political inclusion.

**Analysis**

**Terrorism as the ‘Invisible Dragon’**

Terrorism is an ambiguous discourse that struggles with the vexing problem of ‘observables’ and definitions. Enchanted with the Cartesian anxiety of the ‘invisible dragon’ in Carl Sagan’s analogy, its study is a major epistemic dilemma (see Jackson, 2011:78). As a discourse terrorism encompasses both observable and unobservable entities. However in the absence of a terrorist viewing apparatus it becomes impossible “fully observe terrorism” This is because “something in the nature of this dragon prevents it from becoming manifest to the world” (Ibid:79). The anti-terror policies only focuses on the ‘observable incidents’, such acts of terrorism and the individuals considered being the “terrorists”. In Kenya ‘terrorism’ has been defined as “anti-state violent activities undertaken by non-state entities which are motivated by religious (Islamic) goals” (Mogire & Agade, 2011:473). This definition in itself highly political, relies on War On Terror framings and discourses that renders the minority Muslim population especially Somalis as its main target (Aronson, 2013). Aronson argues that the “current counter-terrorism strategy in Kenya neglects the history and geopolitics of the nation and is thus flawed in its most basic capacity” (2013:25). The adoption of the War on terror discourse and practices has resulted in the creation of religious divide in a country that has historically never had the problem of religious intolerance. For example following Operation Linda Nchi religious intolerance has increased in Kenya, with Muslim minorities (Somalis) being the most targeted by these state policies. Nanjala claims that religious intolerance ‘is not in the fabric of this country’ as Muslims and Christians have historically given each other room to practice their faith.

We have inherited a lot of WoT discourses from the West […] these approaches are predicated on Muslim being the Other and being external, Islam predates Christianity in
Kenya. Muslim as an identity in Kenya is not an ethnic identity we have a massive diverse number of Somalis. So the way identity works as a shorthand for profiling purposes in this WoT discourses in the West does not translate in Kenya (Participant 1)

She further argues that religious differences is an extra societal divide that is not needed in a country already struggling with class, gender, ethnicity and tribalism.

WoT has created a new dynamic a new point of violence, a new point of difference in a country that has not even mastered the ones that were there before, if ethnic group could create ethnic violence what about religious violence? (Participant 1)

She also explained how religion is specifically becoming a point of a fracture

What we have done with importing these frames without interrogating them is that we have created a hostility that is intractable? Because how can you tell someone that their faith is wrong? We have imported this framework that says normative Christianity is normatively good, Islam is normatively external and it created a fracture in a society that is already fractured along other lines (Participant 1)

Much of the counter-terror practices have resulted in further exclusion of Somalis who are its minorities through intensified militarization of Somali areas, extra-judicial killings, more policing, more surveillance, illegal arrests, deportations and renditions. The imagery of the Somali as ‘hostile’ continues to manifest itself in the Kenyan civic landscape where no clear parallels are drawn between the ‘al-shabab’ and the ‘regular Somali’. The War on Terror discourse enhances various orderings of Somali identities who are implicated in its remit of operations. The construction of the imagery of Somalis as ‘al-shabab’ is a continuation of the previous representations of Somalis as ‘threats’. Abdinoor Ahmed states that at the moment there is a general feeling that “not all Somalis are terrorists, but all al-shabab terrorists are Somalis” (Participant 6). This conflation of the Somali identities with the al-shabab has made it very difficult to separate who the counter-terror laws and policies is targeting. The depiction of Somalis as ‘terror being bodies’ is strongly attributed to media representations in Kenya. In 2014 the
Daily Nation, which is the most widely read Kenyan newspaper published an article which portrayed all Somali identities as ‘terrorists’.

It would appear that every little, two-bit Somali has a big dream – to blow us up, knock down our buildings and slaughter our children. We are at war. Let’s start shooting (Mathiu, 2014)

Considering that ‘terrorism’ is a ‘floating signifier’ there have been direct attempts by both the state and the media to ‘saturate it with meaning’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2011). Since a discourse is constructed through a process of inclusion and exclusion, Somali identities have been situated discursively in terrorism discourses and represented as ‘terrorists’. Such imagery of Somalis as ‘al-shabab’ is a ‘dominant discourse’. It also point outs to the conflation of Somali identities with al-shabab identities which makes securitization practices against ‘terrorists’ to blatantly mean its targeted at Somalis. There is a strong connection between the post-colonial construction ‘the Somali’ as al-shabab sympathizer to the discourse of ‘shifta’ which developed during the colonial period. The antagonism between Somalis identities and the Kenyan state is still a violent antagonism based on the elimination of the ‘other’. Their identities have simply become more securitized and excluded within the Kenyan postcolonial corpus. To contextualize just how accepted the discourse of Somali’s as the ‘other’ a Kenyan based political economist wrote a piece pronouncing the ‘Kenya project’ by claiming nationalism has failed. He was arguing for the separation of the NFD:

The Somali part of the country never wanted to be part of Kenya in the first place. From the brutal Shifta war, to the Wagalla Massacre to the latest round-up of Somali’s under the so-called Operation Linda Nchi, no part of the country has suffered for Kenyan nationalism like North-Eastern, and the Somali population in general (Ndii, 2016)

And yet, the State continues to treat them as second-class citizens, and some of us now see every Somali as a potential terrorist. What does Somali Kenya have to lose? Nothing. What does it have to gain? Dignity (Ibid)
Salah Sheikh claims that the War on Terror has further alienated Somalis in Kenya.

[...] We are where we were in 1963 we have gone back 50 years in terms of everything even the perception people have of us. This terrorism issue has taken us back [...] now you go back to any NFD town its the militarized the way it was in 1963 [...] the military is under every tree [...] it is justified through terrorism. Today to get an ID or passport is harder than 1963 so you have returned us 50 years back. (Participant 2)

Conclusion of chapter

As I have argued the NFD Somali was misunderstood from the beginning and they continue to posses an ambiguous identity within postcolonial Kenya. Any political system should endeavour towards a democratic framework that allows for ‘multiple wills’, ‘identities and differences to live together without necessary having an antagonistic or violent relationship. According to Mouffe democracy "understood as ‘rule by the people’, can therefore take other forms – for instance, forms in which the value of community is more meaningful than the idea of individual liberty.” (Mouffe, 2013:80). This was the case in the history of the pre-colonial Kenya whereby the society that constitutes modern Kenya allowed for multiple worldviews living side by side. The sedentary farmer, the nomad, the trader, the fisherman were able to live together. The success or failure of the post-colonial regime is based on maintaining this pre-colonial complexity. This view is indeed the "pluralization of hegemony” whereby there is no sovereign or centralized authority exerting its rule by force. The Kenyan State predominantly relies on a Newtonian framework for understanding security. This ontology renders the al-shabab threat a technical issue that needs to be solved through military machismo and force. The failure to come into terms with its political dimensions renders its elimination an illusion. Likewise the failure to
conceptualise terrorism as a discourse in Kenya has resulted in a sanitized understanding of its own history and violence. As a securitized State, much of its practices is not geared to bring about peace rather its essence is to pursue ‘peace’ through the elimination of the Other. This reductionist understanding makes world peace impossible and contributes to a subjugation of a few who remain victims. Additionally the adoption of the War on Terror framework has further brought more complications to a security situation that was already fragile. Its adoption in the Kenyan context reveal how geopolitics depoliticizes the local and fails to acknowledge the region’s complex history

Security discourse can be attributed to producing knowledge that is “reified and static one that ignores the whole in favor of a fetishization of the parts” (Wyn Jones, 1999:22). This has resulted in the fetishization of terrorism for example as an event and not as discourse that can be fully understood or situated in history. My paper has also demonstrated how limited much of the securitization theories is in understanding postcolonial actualities like the Somali case in Kenya. Laclau and Mouffe’s theory however provides a better outlook as it exposes the contingency of any social situation thus offering a theory of change and transformation. There is little research conducted investigating the complex discursive formation of Al-shabab or how Somali identities experience terrorism. Much of the analysis so far offers a militaristic understanding of Al-shabab and how Somalis are implicated or if conducted it’s within the War on Terror prism.

A group like Al-shabab does not come “preformed, rather they are produced in specific circumstances” (Appadurai, 2006:42). Viewing terrorism as a discourse allows us not to resort to a particular ‘objective’ understanding therefore able to trace changes in practices and meanings. In so doing we can avoid reductionist understandings of Al-shabab as ahistorical and timeless. Instead we need to explore the underlying transformations that lead up to the emergence of groups like Al-shabab. This will help draw clear lines and avoid life threatening reductionist representations that criminalizes all Somalis.
A similar scenario unfolding in Kenya is also becoming visible in not only many of the postcolonial states but it is also beginning to present itself here in Europe with the current debates on terrorism and migration. These events represent a confrontation with modernity and its loci of thinking which has been dominating international theory and order. Appadurai points out that terrorism is a globalization dilemma in which global processes are manifested in colonies and that minorities are signifiers of the failures of the modern Nation State (2006). While state policing, surveillance and the panoptic gaze is more in the modernised states, this scenario is becoming more pronounced in the post colonies. For its only recently that fingerprint identity cards were computerized as a result of a rise of mobile subjects. As we are witnessing emergence of a multi-polar order where profound security frictions are arising within states and not in the global arena perse. The fundamental dilemma will be how to conceptualize the global with the local particularly in relation to understanding terrorism and the impact of new wars. How do we understand our realities as an interplay of the local and the global political order? Now more than ever there is need to connect the unfolding in the post colonies with the metropolis in the West. Only by drawing these interconnections can we be able to connect our struggles. In these times the task of the post colonial scholar lies in “exposing the acts and practices of the State rather than hiding or suppressing them” (Oliviero, 1998:136). It becomes paramount to understand the power and knowledge dynamics of meaning construction in order to open the political space for alternative imaginaries.
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Appendix 1: Consent form

I volunteer to participate in a research project conducted by [Shamsa Birik] from Lund University. I understand that the project is designed to gather information about academic work of faculty on campus. I will be one of approximately 7 people being interviewed for this research. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the Study.

- I understand that taking part in the study will include being interviewed and audio recorded.
- I have been given adequate time to consider my decision and I agree to take part in the Study.
- I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time and I will not be asked any questions about why I no longer want to take part.
- I understand that most Participant s will find the discussion interesting and thought-provoking. If, however, I feel uncomfortable in any way during the interview session, I have the right to decline to answer any question or to end the interview.
- I understand that the researcher will not identify me by name in any reports using information obtained from this interview, and that my confidentiality as a participant in this study will remain secure. Subsequent uses of records and data will be subject to standard data use policies that protect the anonymity of individuals and institutions.
- I understand that my words may be quoted in publications, reports, web pages and other research outputs but my name will not be used.
- I have read and understood the explanation provided to me. I have had all my questions answered to my satisfaction, and I voluntarily agree to participate in this study.
- I have been given a copy of this consent form.

__________________________________________                  ________________________
Name of participant                           Date

__________________________________________                   ________________________
Researcher Signature                        Date

Appendix 2: Interview guide

Topic and Questions

Aim of the research: To really find out how and why Somali identities continue to be implicated within security framings and discourses to become securitized subjects. Why their place is continuously questioned within the Kenyan civic landscape and how their frantic search for identity and sense of belonging denotes to a wider issue of articulation of their political and citizenry rights.

Belonging/identity

1 - Can you tell me as a Somali who is born and raised in this country do you feel like you have a certain sense of identity? How do you define this identity? Which identity do you identify with the strongest? Why? i.e national identity of being Kenyan (National/self/cultural identity-national identity is hegemonic even though its abstract qualities)

2 - Do you feel like you are able to express your identity w/out fear i.e cultural or religious?

3 - Do you feel like you belong in this country? If yes/no why? How do you define belonging to a nation?

4 - In any way do you feel like you experience any crisis of identity?

5 - Do you feel sufficiently included in the political processes? Have you experienced/how have you experienced this forms of exclusion? Do you think it has something to do with your identity?

6 - Do you think Somalis have been given a different set of treatment (from the state and from society at large) that is different from other tribal groups?

7 - As a Somali have you encountered any form of stereotyping? What are some of the labels given to Somalis?

8 - This disavowal of Somalis does it have anything to do with the cultural, religious, differences of Somalis? Why has the Somali difference been seen as necessary a negative thing? How about the Maasai aren’t they almost similar
with Somalis? Why have they for example been encouraged to practice pastoralism and not necessarily Somalis?

Security/War on Terror

1 - Do you think the current political system (inclusive of high level Somali politicians) represents the interests of Somalis? Do you feel safe living in Kenya?

2 - Do you think there has been a link between Somalis in Kenya and security?

3 - What do you think of the current anti-terrorism policies and practices? Do you think the current approach is making any progress in ensuring national security?

4 - At what point in history do you think the othering/exclusion of Somalis begun?

5 - In the fight against terrorism why do you think the Somalis have been specifically targeted? Has this war on terrorism made things worse for Somalis?

6 - Why and how do you think Somalis are excluded? I assume the current insecurity is being experienced differently among Somalis but where do you think is the injustice most prevalent?

7 - Do you think al-shabab is a Somali issue as claimed?

8 - Do you think Somalis have become securitized subjects?

9 - Why has it been necessarily difficult for the government to separate a law abiding Somali citizen from al-shabab?

10 - Have different political regimes differed in their treatment of Somalis?
11 - Do you think the difficulties in distinguishing between Alshabab/Somalis and Kenyan Somalis/refugees constitutes the problem?

12 - Which actor/actors do you think contributes the most in the exclusion of Somalis

13 - Do you think there can be alternative ways of challenging the current security framings of the Somali identity?

**Citizenship/Irredentism**

1 - Do you think Somalis have been resisting to be constituted to the nation state? Why? Did those sentiments remain to date?

2 - Do you think the present insecurities Somalis faced has anything to do with Somali irredentist claims for self-governance during independence?

3 - Do you think its irredentist claims were justified? Or its claims for self-governance

4 - Can you draw any parallels between the shifta threat and the Mau Mau rebellion?
## Appendix 3: Participants profile

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<th>Name</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Citation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdullahi Boru</td>
<td>Security Analyst / Researcher as Amnesty International</td>
<td>Participant 3</td>
<td>08.05.2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharmake Nur</td>
<td>Political Analyst/Commentator</td>
<td>Participant 5</td>
<td>25.03.2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdinoor Ahmed</td>
<td>Freelance Journalist</td>
<td>Participant 6</td>
<td>15.03.2016</td>
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