B-Uppsats

Institutionalization before Liberalization theory tested on Côte d’Ivoire
Abstract: Following the election of 2010, Côte d’Ivoire suffered through “La Crise”, a civil war which lasted until 2011 and came only a few years after the end of the first Ivoirian civil war. In 2015, Côte d’Ivoire held an election without an eruption of violence. This study attempts to explain why using Roland Paris’ Institutionalization Before Liberalization theory, which focuses on the dangers of liberalization, arguing that political liberalization can lead to violence if the country has not gone through an institutionalization process. The purpose is to test the IBL-theory on a new case by conducting the same focused analysis of the country in the years before both elections. This study found that the electoral design had not changed, and therefore could not explain the peaceful outcome of the 2015 election. However, notable changes were discovered regarding the electoral institutions as well as the civil society. This study also examines if other variables, omitted by IBL, can explain the successful elections, and formulates a brief criticism of the theory.

Key words: Côte d’Ivoire, Ivory Coast, IBL, Liberal peace, peacebuilding, institutionalization.
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1. Background, theory, and methodology

1.1 Introduction

The aim of this paper is to explain the relative absence of violence during and after the 2015 election compared to the 2010 election, which lead to a conflict known as “La Crise”. The paper initially explains the political and demographic situation in Côte d’Ivoire, as a short brief of the existence of identitarian politics and complex demographics, as well as the Ivoirian electoral institutions. The basic hypothesis is that Roland Paris’ so called “Institutionalization before Liberalization” theory can explain the success of the 2015 election, ie it was thanks to increased institutionalization. By testing this theory on a new case we can gain more knowledge on the strength of the theory in itself.

We use the French term “Côte d’Ivoire” instead of “the Ivory Coast” as it is standard practice even in English. The adjective used is “Ivoirian”, though the terms “Ivorian” and “Ivory Coast” can be found in some of our sources and is also considered correct. The second Ivoirian civil war (2010-11) is often referred to as “La Crise”.

Purpose: The purpose of the study is twofold. Firstly, we wish to explain the drastic difference in the outcomes of the two elections. Secondly, we wish to form a constructive criticism of the IBL theory by applying it on a new case, this case being the peacebuilding process of Côte d’Ivoire. Research question: Can the IBL theory explain why the 2010 election lead to violence, but not the 2015 election?

1.2 Background

President Houphouët-Boigny, though a skillful politician who held Côte d'Ivoire together during his long reign, conducted policies effectively blurring the line between Ivoirian and non-Ivoirian (Bakhtar 2010 p. 603). In 1993, Felix Houphouët-Boigny died and his 33-year long reign ended. Through a strategy of inclusion Houphpuët-Boigny managed to improve the integration and economic growth in the country (El-Khawas 2014 p.41). This was done through policies aiming to incorporate people of different ethnicity and religion into the political system. The most striking example being the appointing of Alassane Ouattara - a muslim economist from the country's northern regions – as prime minister in 1990 (Miliam 2011 p.179).
Under his reign, Houphouët-Boigny implemented some democratization in Côte d'Ivoire, though never facing any serious political opposition (Miliam 2011 p.179). After his death, different political figures started preparing for election. The most prominent contestants being Alassane Ouattara and Henri Konan Bédié, the former speaker of the national assembly and belonging to a mainly christian ethnic group. In order to undermine Ouattara’s chances of winning the election, Bédié implemented the doctrine of “Ivoirité” that called the muslims ethnic group’s nationality into question. Different political tactics have been employed to explicitly pit different ethnic groups against each other. The most notable of these examples was the change in electoral law that prevented anyone without two Ivoirian parents from running for presidential election, as well as requiring that any Ivoirians running have lived in the country for the past five years (El Khawas 2014 p. 42). The politics of Ivoirité continued under the Gbagbo government and exclusion of Muslims in the country.

Through this and the fact that Muslims primarily supported Ouattara, Bédié managed to force Ouattara to withdraw (Miliam 2011 p.179). This exclusion of ethnic groups would continue to be a thematic in Ivoirian politics. Bédié would later be overthrown and succeeded by Laurent Gbagbo.

Though promising otherwise, Gbagbo did not make any steps toward deconstructing the doctrine of Ivoirité which was consolidating the ethno-cultural differences within the country. Following a growing discontent amongst the northern muslim population the military from these regions started rebelling (El Khawas 2014 p.44). This would mark the beginning of the first civil war, ending with French intervention.

Following the events of the first civil war; UN launched the UNOCI/ONUCI (United Nations Operations in Côte d'Ivoire) mission in Côte d'Ivoire in order to try to uphold the peace agreement between the two former combating parties. A five-year delayed election would go on to be held in 2010. Ouattara would in this election go on to be internationally recognized as the winner. Gbagbo on the other hand denounced the internationally recognized election results announced by the Independent Electoral Commision (hereafter CEI) and refusing to give up his power. (Miliam 2011 p.180-181) Instead he referred to the Constitutional Council (hereafter CC) recounting of the votes. Following this, new violence broke out in Côte d’Ivoire and a second civil war, known as “La Crise” was a reality, ending in international intervention and Ouattara becoming president. In 2015, the country held a successful peaceful election, with Ouattara being reelected. Though this time the opposition chose to boycott the election.
Côte d’Ivoire is a complex multicultural country whose divisions may be analyzed from an ethnical as well as a religious stand point. The purpose of this section is to clarify what groups exist, where they exist and what role this heterogeneity may have played in the peace process. Questions of ethnicity and nationality are always of a sensitive nature, wherefore we hope to treat this issue with the sensibility and respect it demands.

The exact number of ethnic groups is difficult to quantify and may be considered a matter of definition. Normally, sixty ethnic groups are listed and placed into four main clusters (Landinfo, 2006, p. 5-7). The largest of these clusters are the Mandé, Gour, Krou and Kwa. Of these groups, the Mandé and Gour are predominately muslim and the Krou and Kwa\(^1\) are mainly Christian. Furthermore, the Mandé and Gour are mostly found in the North whereas the Krou and Kwa inhabit the South (Landinfo, 2006, pp. 7-9). Thus, we can also see a North-South religious divide. This is well expressed in a map used by McCauley, shown below.

\[\text{Map taken from McCauley, 2014, p. 629}\]

\(^1\) Different terms may be used in different literature to denote these clusters, and some literature specifically analyzes two major peoples (Bété and Baoulé) as single entities and not part of a cluster. See Basset (2003, 2010) and Collett (2006) for more detailed studies on Ivoirian demographics and identity.

\(^2\) Map taken from McCauley, 2014, p. 629
There is some debate on whether or not such a division is truly valid, primarily because of migration and ethnic and religious mixing. However, research has shown only 5% of the North is Christian and only 5% of the South is Muslim (McCauley, p. 269). Furthermore, we may consider the division during the first Ivoirian civil war a strong indicator that the country is indeed divided across a North-South line to an important extent. However, it is important to keep in mind that ethnic groups which are primarily Muslim have settled large parts of the South, primarily the Southwest, increasing the ethnic and religious diversity of those areas (Collet, 2006, p. 616).

How are these divisions expressed politically? They are primarily seen as two clusters having a very strong bias towards either FPI or RHDP\textsuperscript{3} candidates. Furthermore, some divisions transgress the North-South divide due to the migratory patterns the country has gone through, wherein some peoples entered what is today the territory of the Ivoirian state after the French colonization began, and are not fully considered “ethnic ivoirians”. This allows for a Northern candidate to have increased support in parts of the South.

1.4 General summary of theory

Following the dramatic liberalization after Houphouët-Boigny death, Côte d’Ivoire became a much more unstable country. As shown above, the country went from being peaceful and inclusive to being marked by conflict and segregation. In order to understand the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire after the 2010 election and the absences of it after the 2015 election we will use Roland Paris’ Institutionalization Before Liberalization theory.

The main thesis of Paris’ theory is that through liberalization tensions between social groups within a state may increase. To increase the likelihood of a liberal peacebuilding process to succeed institutionalization must forego the liberalization. Paris talks about some ‘Pathologies of Liberalization’ These are the negative effects that might occur under liberalization. The pathologies, Paris argues, comes from the social competition caused by liberalization. (Paris 2004 p.159) In order to combat the social competition caused by political liberalization Paris proposes that institutions should be in place before the liberalization process begins. Three aspects of institutionalization are relevant for this study.

\textsuperscript{3} For more information on these parties, see chapter 2.1.
Our hypothesis is that the institutions during the 2011-2015 period became much more able to manage the negative effects that political liberalization may create in accordance to Paris’ theory. Through their increase in capacity, the election of 2015 did not end in conflict.

1.5 Aspects of institutionalization

1.5.1 Wait Until Conditions Are Ripe For Election

Paris argues that elections can increase tensions within a country in transition (Paris 2004 p.163). Additionally, elections can also create a medium for politicians to sabotage the democratization in the country in order to avoid political competition (Paris 2004 p.164). One way of combating these problems, Paris argues, is to postpone election until conditions allow for a peaceful outcome of the election. This can be assessed by determining whether the prominent political parties represent a more moderate policy and whether the governmental institutions are able to resolve disputes over the result. (Paris 2004 p.189-190)

1.5.2 Design Electoral Systems That Reward Moderation

Paris argues that for a state to keep having peaceful elections there must be an electoral system in place that promotes moderate policy (Paris 2004 p.191). Paris notes that phenomenon called ethnic entrepreneurs can cause election to increase societal tension. Through ‘fear of domination by ethnic stranger’ political figures can consolidate their support (Paris 2004 p.162). In order to combat this Paris argues that the electoral system must promote a more moderate policy.

1.5.3 Good Civil Society

Paris points out that quantitative focus on civil society can damage the peacebuilding process. Through liberalization and promoting of civil society without concern for what their values are, groups that reject ‘the liberal principle of toleration’. These groups are what Paris notes as Bad Civil Society. (Paris 2004 p.160) In order to avoid a Bad Civil Society to spawn from an expanding civil society there must be measures that promote the Good Civil Society - that being the society that promote democratic values and break down social barriers. Measures must also be made to prevent Bad Civil Society (Paris 2004 p. 194).

1.5.4 Economic liberalization and free media

There are two other important aspects of liberalization which can potentially obstruct peacebuilding that used in the IBL-theory which we do not use. The first of these is economic liberalization. Paris argues that the negative effects of
economic liberalization can have destabilizing effects in the short term and aggravate an already sensitive situation. The second is liberalization of media. In his case studies, Paris has found that free media may be used to incite violence and hatred between peoples and increase the likelihood of violence erupting. (Paris, 2001, p. 189). However, when comparing the elections of 2010 and 2015 we do not believe these variables can explain the outbreak of violence or lack thereof.

Côte d’Ivoire in an economic context is a unique case in sub-Saharan Africa. Under the reign of Houphouët-Boigny CI experienced a - for the region - uncharacteristic dominant liberal market policy (Boone p.445). As the reign of Houphouët-Boigny began after the French decolonized Côte d’Ivoire in the 60s, the country has had a long time adjusting to the liberalization. We therefore argue that economic liberalization cannot explain the outbreak of violence after the 2010 elections. We also conclude that liberalization of the media cannot explain why war erupted. In the years before “La Crise”, there was no liberalization of media in Côte d’Ivoire. Under the Gbagbo regime, the country acquired a “not free” score by Freedom House in the years 2010 and 2011 (Freedom House, 2010, 2011). Radio was forbidden from reporting on political issues and all television and radio was completely controlled by the state (Freedom House, 2010). This is particularly important because of the great rates of illiteracy in Côte d’Ivoire, which make radio one of the principal forms of media (Internews.org, 7-11-2016).

Note that the liberalization of the media after 2010-11 is not relevant to our study. The theory being tried specifically argues that the liberalization itself leads to conflict, but no conflict erupted after the peace of 2011.

1.5.5 Case Selection

Côte d’Ivoire has been selected as a case for two reasons. Firstly, its long going economic liberalization allows for a sort of control of economic liberalization as a factor. Second, using the most-similar method we may easily identify differences between the two cases.

The country has not changed dramatically in many other ways between these two elections as it is a short time period.

As we argued before, the case of Côte d’Ivoire provides a good ground as a typical case study for the IBL-theory. We are able to identify some of the pathologies causing conflict in countries experiencing liberalization in the election
year of 2011, such as rapid political liberalization, previous conflict and ethnocultural divisions.

We know that through tensions between social groups existed in the country before the election of 2011, as caused by Bédié’s “Ivoirité” policy. Also Gbagbo claimed through the Constitutional Council that half a million of Ouattara votes were invalid. (El-Khawas 2014 p.48-49) Which were in dispute with the CEIs results. As the international community claimed the CEI to be the correct the claim by Gbagbo can be seen as a move toward eliminating political competition. We can also note that Gbagbo may have used ethnicity as a way of consolidating political power through continuing the doctrine Ivoirité.

As we can note, these so called pathologies of liberalization we can draw the conclusion through the lenses of the IBL-theory, that the institutionalization was not developed enough to combat these, since the outcome of the 2011 election was a civil war. In order to explain the presence of conflict in 2011 and the absence of it in 2015 we will investigate these aspect of institutionalization.

1.6 Material:

Cote d’Ivoire has been studied within academia for some time and those studies are a valuable resource for this paper. The focus of many academics has often been quite narrow, focusing specifically on religion, on ethnicity, the electoral system or other particular aspects of the case. We use this research in a broader scope, combining different studies in order to create a broader analysis of Côte d’Ivoire and its electoral processes. We also use reports from the UNOCI peace keeping mission, material from predominant CSO’s, newspapers and other research organizations such as Freedom House. We deem this material to be valid and credible, from reputable sources.

1.7 Method

Using Paris’ theory on institutionalization, three variables relating to the election process will be analyzed to establish if the apparent lack of violence following the 2015 election can be explained by these factors. The method is structured in the sense that we ask the same questions for the different cases being compared, thereby allowing us to make a systematic comparison. The method is focused in the sense that we only look at certain aspects of the case (see George, Bennet, 2005, p. 67-70). Only the criteria that are directly related to the democratic process, and therefore political liberalization, are examined.
The goal of the method is not, however, to create a value for the different variables that would either classify the country as “institutionalized” or “not institutionalized”. The method is based on observing a difference: if our operational indicators show an increase in institutionalization then we can conclude that they may have contributed to the peace following the 2015 elections. If we see no difference, we must exclude this variable and cannot argue for a causal effect. In this sense, we potentially disprove the role of a variable rather than prove it.

More specifically, we are testing Paris’ theory. If it can be used as a strategy in practice (i.e. actual peacekeeping missions) then it should also be able to explain why peacekeeping missions have either failed or been successful. By isolating different criteria, we can examine each one separately to find which had a likely causal effect on the Ivorian peace process. Furthermore, the method of comparison is similar to that used by Roland Paris (see Paris, 2001, p. 58) in order to avoid systematic errors, i.e. applying his theory incorrectly and therefore not testing it in a valid manner. Finally, we use a typical theory trying method wherein we examine if underlying variables can have affected either our dependent or independent variables (see Esaiasson et al, p. 91).

1.8 Operationalization

Institutionalization is difficult to break down and measure, wherefore we use the variables already established by Roland Paris. To then apply this theory on our cases we have developed operational indicators that allow us to measure a difference in the level of institutionalization between the two elections.

Variable 1: Conditions Ripe for Elections

Op: Are there mechanisms in place that ensure the parties will respect the outcome of the election?

Our analysis is based on reports from the United Nations detailing the progress of the democratic process in the country as well as on reports from the CEI and the Constitutional Court. The hypothesis we base our research on is that the institutions directly relating to the elections have gained in credibility, which would in turn increase the likelihood that parties will respect the outcome of the election. This could explain why opponents to Ouattara did not engage in violence following his re-election.

Variable 2: Electoral systems that reward moderation
Op: Is there an electoral system that rewards moderation and encourages candidates to look for support not based on ethnic groups?

We use two methods to examine whether a change in the electoral system can explain the relative lack of violence in 2015. For the first of these, we examine the electoral system itself. What changes can we see in actual electoral design and the construction of the electoral roll? Secondly, we look for an indicator of increased moderation. In order to do this, we first look at the results of the 2010 election and try to find a voting pattern based on ethnocultural belonging. This is followed by a comparison with the 2015 election results.

Variable 3: Good civil society

Op: Is there a civil society which encourages democracy and peace rather than violence and ethnic conflict?

Through an examination of the Ivoirian civil society before and after “La Crise” we can discern some notable differences. We wish to compare the civil societies to establish whether new organizations were formed which promote democracy breach ethnic and social barriers that can polarize society and increase the likelihood of conflict.

1.8.1 Limitations of the study

The study only focuses on few years before and after “La Crise”, with the two presidential elections of the period as focal points. This is of course a very short time period. Indeed, Piccolina (2016, p. 98) notes that though peace has persisted until now, the real trial for Côte d’Ivoire will be the 2020 presidential elections. Further research will have to be conducted after these elections to analyze their outcome. The study does not consider regional and legislative elections, since it was presidential elections which lead to war.
2. Empirical analysis

2.1 Conditions ripe for election

The purpose of this analysis is to measure the stability of the electoral institutions, namely the constitutional court and the CEI. In order to operationalize this variable we choose to investigate the political climate surrounding these institutions. As Paris notes: a criterion for a peaceful election is that there must be a guarantee for the electoral candidates to accept the results of the election. Therefore, we argue that the best way to investigate if the conditions are ripe for election is through the investigation of the political parties view on the CEI and the Constitutional Council as they both had an essential role in determining the 2010 election results.

The IBL-theory encourages postponing elections until conditions are deemed to be “ripe”. This of course requires us to examine what “ripe” means. In the context of post-conflict peace building we argue that conditions are “ripe” if all parties accept the election results and violence does not break out. Evidently, by these standards conditions were not ripe in 2010. The remaining question is then why, and may be answered by an analysis of the electoral institutions’ role. The most prominent electoral institutions relevant for this paper is the CEI, in charge of counting ballots and preparing electoral lists and the CC, acting as the supreme court of Côte d’Ivoire which can invalidate ballots or confirm election results. The parties considered are the Ivoirian Popular Front (Front Populaire Ivoirien, hereafter FPI) and the Ouattara lead coalition (Rassemblement des houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix, hereafter RDHP) (Piccolino, 2016, p. 98). As these parties represent the two major forces of the political spectrum in Côte d'Ivoire

The reports carried out by the UN through the UNOCI/ONUCI peacekeeping mission will serve as material in order to determine whether we can see an improvement in the acceptance of the institutions from the year 2010 to 2015.

2.1.1 2010 election

Observations conducted by the UN in Côte d’Ivoire found that in the period running up to the 2010 election found that there was mistrust in the CEI from the FPI. The FPI accused the president of CEI for fraudulently creating 400 000 eligible voters for the upcoming election. (UNOCI 2010 May 20 p.12) The FPI therefore demanded the president of the CEI, Robert Beurgé Mambé, to resign which he refused. This lead Gbagbo to disband and reform the CEI. Despite this
the FPI continued to express concern over fraud in the CEI, claiming that the provisional electoral list was marked by fraud and needed to be audited. (UNOCI May 20 2010 p.2), despite the efforts of the CEI being monitored and widely praised by 423 different international organizations (UNOCI, November 2010, p. 3).

These concerns were not shared by the opposition. The opposition in CI was both against the reforming of the CEI and the claims of fraud in the provisional electoral list. (UNOCI 2010 May 20 p. 2) Reports also surfaced claiming the FPI had requested the local courts to purge ineligible voters from the provisional electoral list. Following this violent protest broke out (UNOCI 2010 May 20 p.2). Gbagbo and the new president of the CEI announced in a joint statement that they would revisit the electoral lists. This decision was rejected by the RHDP, arguing that it among other things would not be finished in time (UNOCI, May 2010, p. 5).

In preparation for the elections, president Gbagbo appointed a new president of the CC by decree, despite protests from the opposition and without broad political support (UNOCI, September 2009, p. 5). Evidently, this does not follow typical democratic protocol, and left the highest deciding body of the nation firmly in the control of Gbagbo, against the wishes of the opposition. Ultimately, it would be through the CC that Gbagbo invalidated 400 000 votes claiming them to be illegitimate, all in regions predominantly supporting Alassane Ouattara (El-Khawas 2014, p. 48) (Milam, 2011, p. 181). Though such invalidations is indeed within the jurisdiction of the council, the circumstances under which it happened cast severe doubt over the CC’s independence and the validity of its actions. Initially claiming it needed seven days to verify the validity of the votes, it managed to go through over 20 000 tallying sheets in just one day, once the CEI had presented its provisionary result, backed by the international community (Basset, 2010, p. 477-478).

Overall, the electoral institutions suffered from a significant lack of credibility as well as questionable independence. This becomes even more urgent as one considers how quickly and easily the CC invalidated key votes, granting the victory to sitting president Gbagbo. But even before the election there was great doubt over the independence and legitimacy of Côte d’Ivoire’s electoral institutions, with Gbagbo reforming the CEI and appointing his own man to the CC without consult or support from the opposition.
Following the post-election crisis of 2011 some disputes surrounding the legitimacy of the CEI were observed. Though this time a dialogue between the ruling party and the opposition were present and some actions were made in order to guarantee a wider acceptance of the CEI. As Ouattara assigned new members of the CEI the FPI expressed concern over the balancing of representation in the institution. In order to manage this concern the ruling party invited the opposition to discuss the problem. (UNOCI 2011 December 30 p.3) The 2013 local election were boycotted by the FPI. The FPI felt that despite both encouragement to participate and economic help from the government the CEI still did not represent the opposition fairly. (UNCOI 2013 June 26 p. 2)

In 2014 Ouattara signed a bill restructuring the composition of commissioners in CEI. This was done through dialogue with the opposition which criticized the first incarnation of the CEI for not guaranteeing fairness of representation and announced that they would not be a part of the restructuring. Renegotiations were held which ended with the opposition participating in the process of restructuring the CEI (UNOCI 2014 December 12 p.2) Later when electing the ‘beureu’ of the CEI the FPI chose not to participate in the election. They argued that they also in this aspect felt that the representation of the opposition was not fair. They in protest suspended their activity from the FPI but stayed open for discussion with the government. The government succeeded in reaching an agreement with the opposition to change the law of the CEI and increase its beureu from six members to nine. Though still not satisfied the opposition acknowledge the amend of the law as steps toward better representation. (UNOCI 2014 December 12 p.2)

Evidently, the situation is far from perfect with electoral institutions still being subjected to debate. Despite this, the opposition is clearly consulted and parties attempt to agree on the electoral structure beforehand.
2.2 Electoral Design

The basic hypothesis tried in this section is that there has been a measurable decrease in ethnic polarization following a change in electoral design. This primarily regards the question of citizenship, related to the aforementioned policies of “Ivoiriété”, as well as ethnic patterns in voting. These are both strongly related to the fear of “domination of ethnic stranger” evoked by Paris (2001, p.196).

The constitution of Côte d’Ivoire from the year 2000 contained restrictive rules preventing many Ivoirians from being candidates in the presidential elections. It is again an extension of the doctrine of “Ivoiriété” and the attempted exclusion of some groups due to ethno-cultural differences. Though the constitution was not formally changed until after the 2015 presidential election (Le Monde, 2016, 1), article 35 was reinterpreted during peace talks to end the first Ivoirian civil war, allowing a legal practice to take precedence over some interpretations which would have prevented anyone not born of two Ivoirian parents from running for president (Bakkhar 2014 p. 607). It is, however, easy to argue that such a re-interpretation is made on political, rather than legal, grounds. Indeed, the wording of the Ivoirian 2000 constitution is quite clear:

“He must be of Ivoirian origin, born of a father and a mother themselves of Ivoirian origin.”

It is worth noting that the revision of article 35 for the Ivoirian constitution was not merely a tactic to exclude all of a non-native background. It had specifically been put in place to eliminate the candidature of the former Houphouet prime minister turned presidential hopeful Alassane Ouattara (Bakkhar, p. 612). Furthermore, Bakkhar identifies the unanswered citizenship question as the primary obstacle for peace in the electoral system (Bakkhar, p. 615).

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4 Original text in French: « Il doit être ivoirien d'origine, né de père et de mère eux-mêmes ivoiriens d'origine. » (Ivoirian constitution of the year 2000, Article 35)
Despite citizenship being less of an urgent issue, conflicts over land have remained, and again fit the North-South divide, precipitated by the strong migration waves of the past along with the former 20\textsuperscript{th} century policies insisting that land belonged to “he who cultivated it” (Collett, 2006, p. 616). Overall, the principal issue was never resolved.

As described in chapter 1, there is a North-South divide with a predominantly Muslim North and a Christian South. This can be seen not only in the front of the first civil war, in which the country was effectively divided in two, but also in the result of the 2010 elections, shown on a map below.

![Map of Côte d'Ivoire showing the North-South divide](image)

However, migration patterns to the south-west have changed the demographics there as well as in Abidjan – this was crucial to the Constitutional Council who then abolished a large portion of the South-Western vote, a traditionally Christian area now largely populated by Muslims (Landinfo, 2006, p. 7). Evidently, the South-West was a contested territory between the two candidates, leaning towards Ouattara. It is therefore notable that the CC targeted the South-west in particular: it was a region within the Christian heartland in which a majority of votes were by Muslims and for Ouattara. Indeed, the west and Abidjan experienced some of the worst violence during “La Crise” (VERBATIMS, 1).

The major electoral boycott of 2015, in which only 52.9\% of the electorate participated in the elections, poses some issues for analyzing the electoral results. Without a mobilized opposition going to the voting stations, Alassane Ouattara fetches between 99 and 50\% of the votes in virtually every department (Piccolino, 2016).

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5 Map taken from Basset, 2011, p. 474
Despite this major boycott, we can still observe an electoral bias based on results by department. Notably, Alassane Ouattara’s biggest electoral victories were achieved in the North, gaining as much as 99.63% of the vote in Folon with comparable results over 90% across the northern half of the country. Furthermore, similar results were seen in the south-west, populated by Northern Muslims. In the departments around the district of Abidjan, however, Ouattara’s results were significantly less impressive, falling between 60 to 45% of the vote, and even losing one department (Abidjan.net, Scrutin du 25 Octobre 2015). This encourages us to believe the results were not only a consequence of the boycott, but also a reflection of the ethnicity of the various regions.

Furthermore, another indicator strengthening this view is the participation rate divided by regions. As seen below, the difference in participation rates almost perfectly reflects the North/South frontier from the crisis shown in chapter 1. Since the boycotts were ordered by the opposition, one can clearly see how the South remained strongly pro-Gbagbo.

![TAUX DE PARTICIPATION](image)

6 Map from Abidjan.net, Scrutin du 25 Octobre 2015
2.3 Good/Bad Civil Society

The IBL theory uses the somewhat crude expressions “Good” and “Bad” civil society. The world is seldom in black and white, which somewhat hinders us from placing the civil society in one box or another, and what may be considered “Good” by one group can be considered “Bad” by another for political, historical, or cultural reasons. With this said, for the purpose of trying the IBL-theory we define a good civil society as one that works against identitarian politics and encourages a democratic process. This is in line with Paris’ use of the terms. Furthermore, in keeping with the IBL-theory we do not measure the quantity of civil society but rather its quality due to the potential misleading figures that can be given if one measures the quantity of a “bad” civil society as an indicator of institutionalization (see Roland Paris, 2001, p. 160). This division is further discussed in chapter 3.

There is, however, an advantage in the structuring of the Ivoirian civil society. A larger association convenes a great number of organizations sharing a common purpose. Thus, we are able to assume that any CSO that is part of the convention is the sort of “good” civil society envisioned by Paris.

Furthermore, through a short interview with an Ivoirian contact working for the Human Rights Department and with the electoral process, I have identified some key organizations and developments of interest for this paper, notably the POECI, CSCI and VERBATIMS. This should allow us to avoid the systematic error that Paris warns of.

Prior to “La Crise”, the electoral observation was mostly handled by the international community. UN documents tell us of how the preparation for the 2010 election was, unfortunately, less than adequate. The concerned parties regularly missed deadlines for producing electoral lists and voter registration, and technical difficulties as well as strikes by unpaid workers stalled the election (UNOCI, 2009 September, p. 5). There is a notable indicator of a well-developed democratic civil society having developed after the 2010 election. This is that the EU and France decided not to send their own election observers, a stark difference from the 2010 elections. Additionally, the UN did not have a mandate to observe this election as they had had in 2010. Rather, Côte d’Ivoire’s civil society mobilized to ensure the democratic process was not endangered by violence or electoral fraud (Piccolino, 2016 p. 104). This is to a large extent thanks to the
mobilization of a large cluster of CSO’s uniting under POECI (POECI, *Présentation et Organization*). In June of 2015, it successfully updated the 2010 electoral roll and observed electoral process across the country (POECI, 2015b).

A notable new addition to the Côte d’Ivoire CSO’s is the influential VERBATIMS organization. VERBATIMS is a major CSO acting in some of the most mixed and sensitive regions of the nation, including the multicultural economic capital of Abidjan and the aforementioned West, to which many non-natives have migrated to cultivate the land and where ethnic diversity has been problematic in the past (VERBATIMS, 1). Being part of the *Convention de la Société Civile Ivoirienne*, a major regroupment of CSO’s in Côte d’Ivoire, we can also trust its status as a “Good” CSO by Paris’ standards.
3. Between case analysis

In this chapter, each of the three variables are analyzed based on the results of the empiric analysis in chapter 2. In doing so, we are able to compare the periods before and after “La Crise” in a structured and focused manner.

3.1 Conditions ripe for elections

The first variable we chose to analyze is whether ‘the conditions are ripe for election’. Through the existence of mechanism that can ensure that parties will accept the outcome of the election. Through the rapports provided by the UNOCI mission we can note the disputes over the CEI was a lot milder after the 2011 election compared to the time before that. Running up to the 2010 election we can note that both the FPI and the RHDI had criticism toward the CEI.

In the period after 2011 we can note that the parties cooperated increasingly more to solve problems in the CEI and that the parties were less concerned with the ability of the CEI to cast an election, as vote fraud never seemed to be a problem. The concerns toward the CEI were instead the representation of political actors.

A destabilising factor may have been that the FPI tried to eliminate Ouattara. Paris notes that political actors may destroy the democratic process in order to eliminate political competition. This was the case in Côte d'Ivoire. As the 2010 election were approaching the FPI were more concerned with the illegitimate votes from the primarily Ouattara supporting regions. This provides some explanation to why the 2010 election ended in conflict. With the absence of a trusted institution that could solve the dispute of the electoral result, both sides used force in an attempt to reach their political goals.

As we noted; the mistrust in the CEI seemed to be weaker after the 2011 election. As none of the political issues surrounding the CEI concerned the ability of the institution to cast an election we may be able to explain the absence of a conflict in 2015. The political issues instead concerned the representation of the opposition in the CEI. Thus trust in the CEI:s ability to solve political issues we created. Since the opposition may not had believed that the issues concerning the CEI would directly affect the chance of winning, it would also explain why they did not dispute the result. If the trust toward the CEI were greater it would make less sense for the opposition to dispute the results. Following, the increased trust in CEI it would also be more likely to be able to resolve disputes over the results.
Besides the role of the CC during la crise, some mistrust toward the institution were reported by the UNOCI. As mentioned, the opposition protested the assignment of a new president of the CC in 2010. Though following the 2011 conflict, disputes were absent. Once again, because there were not mistrust toward the CC, it would also explain why the opposition did not dispute the election results.

Though some other factors may have been able to play a part in the absence of conflict after the 2015 election. UNOCI noted that the FPI had a hard time uniting. The party had been divided by Gbagbo-loyalist and supporters of the new party leader and former prime minister Affi N’Guessan. (UNOCI 2015 p. 2) If the opposition were unable to produce a homogenous rhetoric it could be argued that they would have a hard time disputing electoral results and create unrest. Following this, the opposition also boycotted the 2015 election granting Ouattara an easy victory. The opposition accused the preconditions for not allowing for a transparent and free election. (Piccolino 2016 p.106) Giulia Piccolino suggest that the elections in Côte d’Ivoire will be determined by whether the parties are able to mobilize. (Piccolino 2016 p.106) While the opposition argued that the conditions did not guarantee a free election a boycotting of the election may have been a small price to pay for a big statement, since they did not expect to win.

3.2 Electoral design

It is notable that we found few differences in the level of polarization and the importance of citizenship in the electoral design. Both of these seem to have remained at comparable levels, and furthermore not been as widespread and important in 2010 as we had originally expected them to be. Indeed, Basset found that among two major clusters, no particular bias for either candidate was found in the 2010 elections (p. 477).

Despite important steps being taken by the Ouattara government to reconcile the nation after war and legitimize his own candidature, the major boycott of the 2015 election and Ouattara’s landslide win can be considered a form of democratic failure. Interestingly, the National Democratic Institute (hereafter NDI) warned of such an outcome. Two years before the 2015 election, it wrote:

“The electoral process of the country could lose its legitimacy in the eyes of nearly half of the electorate who had supported Gbagbo in 2010. These supporters indeed believe that without the confidence of the parties and the
Indeed, despite the attempts of president Ouattara to announce reforms in the electoral design (NDI, 2013, p. 10) it seems to still be an ethnic issue for many groups, and Gbagbo’s supporters still boycott the elections (Piccolino, 2016, p. 98). Furthermore, the analysis of the 2015 election results still show a bias similar to that of the 2010 elections, and without a new constitution in effect the policy of “Ivoirité” was only halted by the re-interpretation of the constitution, just like in 2010. Overall, very few differences can be observed regarding the electoral design itself, and our operational indicator for an electoral system which encourages moderation is not changed. Such a difference, however, cannot be observed among all religious groups.

3.3 Civil society

The IBL-theory uses a qualitative method which divides the civil society of a post-bellum country into either a “good” or a “bad” category. It rejects the use of quantitative methodology which uses overall number of CSO’s as an indicator of a “Good” civil society. But how valid is this method? It is certainly correct that we should not assume that all CSO’s are naturally good. For instance, in Côte d’Ivoire CSO’s have been reported to be used for personal profit or simply lacking the capacity to effectively influence, control or expose the government, potentially even being used by corrupt elements within the government for personal gain (see MacManus, Civil Society and state corporate crime, 2014). It is reasonable to assume that we must be vigilant and carefully analyze what kind of civil society it is we are looking at. However, it also creates certain issues. The method used is based on identifying the qualities of notable CSO’s, or their lack thereof. For instance, reports of a religious organization inciting hatred would be an operational indicator of a “Bad” civil society, whereas new or growing CSO’s bridging gaps between peoples and encouraging a liberal democratic process are considered to be indicators of a “Good” civil society.

The methodology certainly allowed us to observe a difference between the two time periods, primarily because the period before “La Crise” was characterized by

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7 My translation. Original text in French: « Le processus électoral du pays pourrait perdre de sa légitimité aux yeux de près de la moitié des électeurs qui avaient soutenu Gbagbo en 2010. Ces derniers soutiennent en effet que sans la confiance des partis et de la population, même une élection techniquement bien menée risque de faire renaître la violence et les conflits. »
a distinct lack of organizations combatting identitarian politics and an underdeveloped civil society incapable of effectively controlling or influencing the government, or organize large scale democratic actions. Furthermore, the presence of a large, well-developed, and capable CSO combatting identitarian politics and fostering peaceful contact and understanding between groups is a massive step forward and a great difference between the two periods.
4. Result of theory test and constructive criticism

4.1 Result of theory test

Since our operationalization was based on questions, we show the result of our between case analysis through a simple model in which we compare our results from chapter 3 to Paris’ theory. In order for a variable to pass the theory test, the following questions (one question for each variable) should be answered in the affirmative. If a positive answer is given, then we can conclude that there is a difference between the two cases and therefore not exclude it is a causal variable. If, however, a negative answer is given we must exclude it as a causal factor since no difference will have been observed.

Are there mechanisms in place that ensure the parties will respect the outcome of the election?

The chapter 3 analysis indeed shows significant differences in both the composition of the CC and the CEI, as well as how parties reacted to them. The most notable difference is Ouattara’s inclusion of the opposition in the development and structuring of the electoral institutions, in stark contrast to the previous regime acting without consulting the opposition, indeed despite its protests.

Is there an electoral system that rewards moderation and encourages candidates to look for support not based on ethnic groups?

No significant differences were found which either showed a different electoral design or an indicator of lessened ethnic bias in voting patterns. Particularly, voting patterns seemed to be the same, indicating that no progress had been made at all.

Is there a civil society which encourages democracy and peace rather than violence and ethnic conflict?

The absence of a well-developed civil society before “La Crise” is quite evident when compared to the period before the 2015 elections. Côte d’Ivoire is particularly impressive when it comes to managing an election without foreign interference, as even the active ONUCI peacekeeping mission did not send its own observers. It is important to remember how sensitive the situation in Côte d’Ivoire was in prior to the 2010 election, as the country had just barely concluded the first Ivoirian civil war.
Note that a variable being shown to not have played a role in the peace building process is not to be interpreted as irrelevant in all cases. Rather, we simply find that it is not relevant in this particular case.

4.2 Factors not taken into account by the IBL-theory

A theory could be developed taking into account more than just the institutionalization of a country.

Indeed, several researchers have placed their focus on areas not specifically brought up by Paris.

These could potentially form underlying variables affecting our operationalized variables (see Esaiasson et al, p. 97). Though Esaiasson specifically uses it for statistical analysis, the same reasoning can be applied to this case. Our variables may seem to correlate with the dependent variable due to the presence of another factor.

Our analysis thus far has brought some key issues affecting the peace process otherwise not found in the IBL-theory’s case studies. The first of these is the issue of a divided opposition. Though the variable 1, *Conditions Ripe for Elections*, seems to be due to strengthened electoral institutions, it could well be that the institutions weren’t resisted due to the divided opposition being unable to unify without Gbagbo to lead them. Indeed, Gbagbo even issued a statement asking candidates not to use his name to associate themselves with him (Piccolino, 2016, p. 102). Such a relationship is shown in the model below.

Another potential variable that may not be as relevant as the IBL-theory makes it out to be is the electoral design. In Côte d’Ivoire, the opposition found a new way to protest against the Ouattara regime through their boycott.
Unfortunately, the IBL-theory does not offer a method to examine the importance of other variables falling outside the scope of institutionalization. Furthermore, the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire may be vastly different from typical African conflicts. As Bakkhar notes, “La Crise” stood out having “a clear political cause that is not reducible to the ambitions of a warlord” (Bakkhar, 2010 p. 597). He specifies that the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire is specifically a matter of citizenship (Bakkhar, 2010, p. 598). Even if the country were more institutionalized, it is possible that it wouldn’t lead to peace due to a singular issue (citizenship) causing the ethnic turmoil leading to conflict. Paris seems to take for granted that it is electoral design that encourages and allows for “ethnic entrepreneurs” to pit groups against each other.

With that said, variable 1 and variable 3 do indeed seem to be causal factors on the road to peace. By applying the IBL-theory on this case, we effectively made three predictions, expecting change in these variables and thus higher degree of institutionalization. This study confirms that, though the electoral design did not change notably, the electoral institutions and civil society matured and developed into the sort of institutions that can soften the blows of political liberalization.

4.3 Beyond Liberal Peacebuilding

The IBL-theory is of course very general, and through his six points he touches on virtually everything in society. This is a sound design when trying to establish a strategy to avoid war in the future, but it makes it difficult to use it to understand a specific case as one factor may be far more relevant than the others.

Paris of course brings this up in his book. The case studies examined are all specific examples, and by identifying key issues in the peacebuilding process he has built his strategy, effectively becoming a “one size fits all” strategy. It provides researchers with an outline by which they can examine peacebuilding and the road to liberalization, but in doing so we may not need all of these. A
clearer strategy would have a process in which key issues are identified, rather than all. Though electoral design may play a huge role in one case, it can be close to irrelevant in another. This is not an issue for a researcher trying his strategy, but it may be a hindrance to peacekeeping missions that focus on the wrong things by not having access to a clearer strategy that outlines precisely which criteria are relevant in this particular mission. Paris reminds the reader that each case must be treated in a focused manner (Paris, 2004 p. 58) Thus a deeper understanding of the case is important while implementing the IBL-theory.

It can be argued that the liberal framework of the IBL theory hinders a deeper understanding. Some critique toward the liberal peacebuilding have suggested that the interventionist nature of liberal peacebuilding is a form of imperialism. (Paris 2010. p.344) David Chandler suggest that states that practice peacebuilding are colonizing state-institutions. In a study of the democratization of Bosnia, Chandler suggest that through extensive peacebuilding administering states were able to do as they wish. (Chandler 1999 p.144) While Paris argues that through a liberal ethical framework one can determine which situations that are best for lasting peace, a reading of Chandlers may suggest that western intervention may produce institutions that do not cooperate with the society on a local level. Thus creating weaker institutions less able to combat the ‘pathologies of liberalization’ as they may not be legitimized by the population.

As Piccolino notes, the rhetoric of Gbagbo during the civil war framed the conflict as a war for independence (Piccolino 2016. p.20–22). The international interventions were portrayed as an affront to the sovereignty of the Ivoirian state, and by extension also the Ivoirian people (Piccolino 2011, p. 8). So it may not only have been the absence of institutionalization that created the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire, but also the interventionist approach.

Other readings of the case of Côte d'Ivoire that are not liberal provide may provide explanation to why the 2015 election were absent from conflict. As mentioned before, the opposition is in a struggle to unite. If they choose to unite under a Gbagbo loyalist leadership we may see a return to a rhetoric of sovereignty. In combination with a perception of institution as an extension of colonialism, the opposition may distrust these institutions. Following this the reality may be a new conflict. If distrust is once again is placed on the CEI, the opposition may not accept an electoral result and a new civil unrest may be a reality.
5. Conclusion

The purpose of this study has been to test the IBL-theory on a new case. The IBL-theory presents five variables which can explain why peacebuilding either fails or succeeds. After controlling for economic liberalization and liberalization of the media, we were able to isolate the variables specifically dealing with political liberalization. Of these, we showed that there was a notable difference between the maturity and development of the electoral institutions of the country, as well as the civil society. Thus, we maintain that those valuables can explain the peaceful outcome of the 2015 election. However, we have not found significant changes in the electoral design, nor in our operational indicators of decreased ethnic voting.

We deem Paris’ method, based on qualitative study demanding that researchers familiarizes themselves with their cases, to be valid. However, it lacks a way of controlling for other variables outside of the scope of institutionalization theory. This becomes especially apparent when testing the theory on Côte d’Ivoire, due to its uncharacteristic nature. This text also explored the liberal nature of the IBL-theory, finding that the interventionist approach may in itself be a destabilizing factor. Thus, to avoid destabilizing the situation, it could be suggested that one should look outside the liberal framework in order to understand how the interventionist approach itself may affect the peacebuilding process.
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