Justifying measures: Security and humanitarianism in migration policy

A critical discourse analysis of the 2016 EU-Turkey statement

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Abstract

Ever since the end of the Cold war, there has been a change in what is considered a security threat. A discourse of security is traditionally linked to military threats; however, it has become more and more visible in migration policies. In the past ten years, a discourse of humanitarianism has also gained momentum and is often used in connection to a security discourse. In this thesis, I have examined how the EU uses these discourses in the 2016 EU-Turkey statement, which was implemented as a response to the occurring refugee crisis. I have, through Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis, analysed five policy documents surrounding the statement. This thesis goes on to show that the EU uses a discourse of security and a discourse of humanitarianism strategically to justify the measures taken against irregular migrants; and concludes by discussing what consequences this might have on irregular migration and migrants over all.

Key words: EU, EU-Turkey statement, Security, Humanitarianism, Critical discourse analysis
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1 Introduction

Ever since the end of the Cold war, migration has become more and more politicized. With the increased freedom of movement, both with the fall of the Berlin wall and the enforcement of the Schengen treaty, EU’s external borders have become progressively patrolled. Migration is often seen in connection to security (and thus placed within the debate about a broadened security concept) and this politicization of migration as a security problem has provoked emergency responses (Geddes 2003:151). Since the start of the Syrian war in 2011, more than 11 million people have fled their homes. 6.6 million Syrians are internally displaced and more than 4.8 million people have fled to other countries. Nearly 2.8 million of those Syrians have fled to Turkey and about one million have applied for asylum in the EU, with the culmination in October 2015. Almost all migrants arriving in the EU has done so via Turkey to Greece (UNHCR 2016b, Syrian refugees 2016). These irregular migrants are portrayed by the EU as an uncontrolled flow that threatens the security of the union; however, they are also portrayed as people in need of saving.

The EU and Turkey has had a readmission agreement in place since October 2014. The agreement implies that refugees can be sent back to their country of origin or transit country since the EU regards it - in this case Turkey - as a safe country (Boswell & Geddes 2011:166). In November 2015, a Joint action plan was established as a way to share the burden of the occurring refugee crisis with concrete measures (European Commission 2015). Nevertheless, the EU felt it necessary to speed up the implementation process, creating the more detailed EU-Turkey statement (ETS) which came into force on the 20 March 2016. The ETS was enforced to stop all irregular migration from Turkey to the EU, as well as to break the business model for the smugglers (EC COM(2016)231 final:2, Press release 144/16).

Thus, the need for swift implementation of the ETS has been evident, since the agreement was put into place ahead of schedule – an emergency response to the ongoing refugee crisis. According to several scholars (e.g. Geddes 2003, Vaughan-Williams 2015) the implementation of a variety of migration policies has provoked emergency responses by framing issues of migration a security matter. Since the early to mid-1990s’ a discourse of humanitarianism can also be seen in the security debate, for example in the form of human security and other humanitarian conceptions of security. This broadening of the security concept also affects migration policies. Discourses of security and humanitarianism have been present in migration policies in the EU for several decades. The placing of migration in a security context has been extensively studied, however, a humanitarian discourse and the relationship between the two has received far less attention (Vaughan-Williams 2015:2, 11). Therefore, I intend to discursively
analyze the ETS through the lenses of a security (Buzan et al. 1998) and a humanitarian discourse (Barnett & Weiss 2008, Ticktin 2016).

1.1 Purpose and research question

The aim and purpose of this thesis is to examine how the EU justifies the measures taken against irregular migrants in the ETS. This will be done by discursively analyzing the language used in the statement. Through language, we not only explain the reality, we create and change it. As pointed to by Jørgensen and Phillips; the reality is differently perceived depending on how something is rhetorically and discursively described (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:9), thus discourse can be used strategically to further a certain agenda. The ETS is a relevant object of analysis, since it is the latest agreement (involving the EU) made with concern to the current refugee crisis. The enforcement of the ETS affects many different actors (EU member states, Turkey and especially irregular migrants), and its outcome hold severe implications for said actors. Therefore, the analysis of discourse and formulations in the ETS is of high relevance and importance in order to elucidate how language is used to justify and hasten policy measures.

The research question of this thesis is the following:

*How does the EU discursively justify the measures taken against irregular migrants in the EU-Turkey Statement?*

1.2 Disposition

As mentioned above, this thesis aims to examine how the EU discursively justifies the measures taken against irregular migrants in the ETS. In order to contextualize the research, chapter 2 offers a brief background of migration policy in the EU as well as the understanding of the security concept. This is followed in chapter 3 by an account of the EU-Turkey statement – its inception, contents and implementation. In chapter 4, I introduce Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis; the method used for this research. In this chapter I also account for the material, delimitations, as well as the validity and reflexivity of the research. Next, in chapter 5, I introduce a discourse of security and a discourse of humanitarianism that will work as the analytical framework for the analysis. In chapter 6, I present my analysis and how the discourses can be found in the documents analyzed. Each discourse is presented with concrete examples from the texts. In chapter 7, the result of the analysis is discussed and situated in the wider social context.
Finally, in chapter 8 I discuss my findings of the analysis, present my conclusions and offer suggestions for future research.
2 Background

In this chapter I will give a short overview of migration politics in the EU and the understanding of security in policy and politics as a way contextualize my research.

2.1 European politics of migration

After World War II, migrants were recruited from the South to the North to help the Northern countries develop their industries. At this time, most of the migration took place under bilateral agreements, which meant that the migrant obtained its papers before moving; hence being legal. After the oil crisis in 1973, labor migration was no longer sought for by the Northern countries. Until the end of the 1980’s, irregular migration was rather small and negligible. Then, with the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, restrictions on international travel for the people of former communist countries were lifted. By the middle of 1990, many European countries had put up migration restrictions and created laws defining illegal immigration and created sanctions against irregular migrants (Triandafyllidou 2010:9-11). Nevertheless, it was first with the free movement and lifting of internal controls through the implementation of the Schengen agreement in 1995, that a need for further external controls was created as a way to monitor irregular movements (Vaughan-Williams 2015:19, Triandafyllidou 2010:12, Ticktin 2016:262, Geddes 2003:137, 147).

In October 1999, with the Amsterdam Treaty, heads of government called for a common EU migration policy. This policy was to be based on:

1. partnership with countries of origin (links between internal security concerns and foreign policy as well as trying to keep migrants closer to their countries of origin)
2. a common asylum procedure and uniform status for those granted asylum
3. fair treatment of third country nationals legally residing in the EU
4. the management of migration flows, common policies on visa and readmission agreements (Geddes 2003:137-139).

Between 1999 and 2005 the focus was on creating legal frameworks in respect to both external border controls and asylum standards. In 2005, the EU created Frontex who’s mission “is to promote, coordinate and develop European border management in the line with the EU fundamental rights charter and the concept of
integrated border management” (Frontex 2016). It is the agency tasked with the management of EU’s external borders which it does through risk analyses, training of border guards and joint return operations (Aas & Gundhun 2015:2). Since 2010, the focus has been on both mainstreaming human rights and strengthening external border controls (Vaughan-Williams 2015:19).

The latest measure to control EU’s external borders was made on the 6 October 2016 with the launch of the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG) on the border of Bulgaria and Turkey. The new agency (Frontex with expanded tasks) will “closely monitor the EU’s external borders and work together with Member States to quickly identify and address any potential security threats to the Schengen area” (EC News 2016). Among its tasks is to monitor migration flows, monitor the management of the EU’s external borders as well as play an enhanced role in returns of migrants (EC News 2016).

According to Geddes, there are two types of migration. There is the skilled labor migration (mentioned above) that could help save the welfare state; and there is the asylum-seeking migration that is often viewed as exploiting the system. The first one is wanted and the second one is rejected. Just by defining asylum-seeking migrants as irregular/illegal, the EU attempts to regulate international migration (Geddes 2003:4, 6). Whether migration is viewed as a good or bad thing, has little to do with the personality and character of individual migrants, than it has to do with decisions made within the EU (Geddes 2003:3).

A byproduct of policies to restrict entry into the EU is irregular migrants. Irregular migrants are those that enter into the EU without relevant authorization, or who remain in the EU after their visa has expired (Boswell & Geddes 2011:33). The EU makes big distinctions between migration by non-EU citizens and the free mobility and movement by EU citizens (Boswell & Geddes 2011:3). By providing different rules to those within the union compared to non-members, means that they treat people differently (Geddes 2003:24). There are not many options for migrants to legally enter the EU and in order to enjoy the right to seek asylum, one must almost always cross the border into the EU. Even when a migrant has been able to reach the border of the EU, they must through their asylum application prove worthy of staying. Since the EU is doing everything in its power to prevent irregular migration, one might argue that they do not respect the human right to seek asylum (Geddes 2003:145, Yilmaz 2014:4, Ticktin 2016:260).

The Return Directive and readmission agreements, further explained in the next chapter, are important parts in keeping the irregular migration flows to the EU at a minimum. Without the ability to return those whom do not meet the requirements for asylum, would jeopardize the confidence in the EU asylum system as well as its external borders (Haddad 2010:90).
2.1.1 The EU’s Return Directive and readmission agreements

The Return Directive was put in place as a way to standardize the procedures regulating the expulsion of irregular migrants. The rules of the directive function as limits to how harsh a country may. The key aspects of the directive focus on the treatment of irregular migrants when an application for asylum has been denied. It regulates the time one has for a voluntary return, the time one can be held in custody if one refuses to leave the country and the special consideration with regards to children. Member states must follow the non-refoulement principle1 (Boswell & Geddes 2011:140-141). However, in order to be able to send refugees back to their country of origin or a transit country, member states have to make sure that they are a so called ‘safe third country’. When establishing that a transit country is safe, the EU can reject an application for asylum on the basis that the migrant passed through a safe country on its way to Europe. In order to implement this concept, the EU has signed a number (17 to be exact) of so called readmission agreements with third countries (Boswell & Geddes 2011:166). One of those agreements is with Turkey and the EU-Turkey statement is created as an action plan for the implementation of that arrangement.

As evident from the discussion concerning politics of migration, the issue of migration is heavily influenced by a logic of security; from border control/security, to the ability to control and secure the migration flow towards the EU. Next I will discuss the nature of security in politics and policy, and elucidate how matters of security have become diversified; since the end of the Cold war security is increasingly thought of in a non-militarized way, as also non-traditional threats are highlighted within security policy. This development has had consequences also for the articulation of migration policy.

2.2 The understanding of security in politics and policy

In this chapter I will briefly introduce the concept of security and the changes the concept has gone through since the Cold war. I will further elaborate in this in chapter 5.1.

The concept of security has traditionally been thought of in military terms, and the traditional realist perspective has been dominant within international politics for the last decades (Morgan 2007:16). This state centric view of security can be traced to the birth of the nation state, and the state is traditionally seen as the referent object of security. The Hobbesian tradition is strong within a traditional

1 States may not return refugees to countries where their lives and liberties would be at risk (Boswell & Geddes 2011:35).
realist perspective on security, and while there are different strands also within the realist tradition (see for example Mearsheimer 2001), the focus lies on military threats to the state. After the end of the Cold war, alternative conceptions of security gained foothold as a response to the state centric realist view. These non-traditional views of security are often influenced by constructionist and post-modernist scholars such as Derrida and Foucault. While the state remains prominent within these conceptions, the role of the state is different, and critical security scholars advocate contextual sensitivity and the ability to respond to changing circumstances in the nature of threats (see for example Krause & Williams 1997).

Within this (granted, very diverse) non-traditional field of security studies we find the Copenhagen School, which contributed the concept of securitization. Securitization explains how non-military issues can become matters of security through a speech act. While a certain issue might not pose a direct threat to the state, it can still be framed as a threat by being presented as an existential threat towards an objects survival; thus being securitized through a speech act (Buzan et al. 1998: 21-25, Emmers 2007:111-113). I will further elaborate on securitization in chapter 5.1.1.

Also the concept of human security rose to prominence after being included in the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report (UNDP 1994), and visualizes the conceptual struggle between traditional and non-traditional security (Kerr 2007). Human security is closely related to a human development agenda (see for example UNDP 1994), drawing on the concept of humanitarianism, which is often connected to NGOs, not political actors (Barnett & Weiss 2008:11), and will be further accounted for in chapter 5.1.2. The relationship between traditional and non-traditional security – between security and humanitarianism – has in different ways affected policymaking over the last decades, and will be further examined in relationship to contemporary migration policy within the EU throughout this thesis.

In the next chapter I will account for the EU-Turkey statement – its inception, contents and implementation.
3 EU-Turkey statement

The EU-Turkey statement (ETS) is an agreement made between the EU and Turkey that aims to stop all irregular migration from Turkey to Greece. As mentioned in chapter 2.1.1, there has been a readmission agreement in place since October 2014. On the 29 of November 2015 a Joint action plan\(^2\) between the EU and Turkey was agreed upon to share the burden of the occurring refugee crisis (European Commission 2015). The ETS was produced as the next, more advanced step in that action plan and came into force on the 20 March 2016, only two days after it was signed (EC COM(2016)231 final:2).

The main goal of the ETS is “to break the business model of the smugglers and to offer migrants an alternative to putting their lives at risk” (Press release 144/16). In order to achieve this goal, they have come up with nine action points:

1. All irregular migrants arriving after 20 March 2016 will be returned from Greece to Turkey. The return of irregular migrants started on the 4 April 2016, only 2 weeks after the ETS was enforced.
2. For every Syrian being returned to Turkey, one Syrian will be resettled to the EU; the so called one-for-one principle.
3. Turkey will take any necessary measures to prevent new illegal routes of migration.
4. A Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme will be activated once irregular migration from Turkey to Greece has ended, or at least substantially and sustainably reduced.
5. The fulfillment of the visa liberalization roadmap will be accelerated and the visa requirements will be lifted for Turkish citizens if/when Turkey meet the remaining requirements.
6. The EU, in close cooperation with Turkey, speeds up the disbursement of the initial 3 billion euros under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey to ensure the funding for future projects for persons under temporary protection. An additional 3 billion euros will be mobilized and distributed up to the end on 2018.
7. The EU and Turkey both support the continued upgrading of the Customs Union.
8. The EU and Turkey reconfirmed their commitment to re-energize the accession process by the opening of chapters.
9. The EU and Turkey will work together to improve the humanitarian conditions inside Syria (EC COM(2016)231 final).

The Commission has also set up a task force to make sure that the migrants who might consider travelling to Greece are informed about the consequences of the statement. The task force is supposed to identify the channels that migrants and smugglers use to get their information. They are then using these channels to counter-narrate the arguments of the smugglers and spread their own information (EC COM(2016)231 final:3).

In the implementation reports published throughout the period of the ETS, the EU clearly states that they regard the statement successful; with a daily arrival of only 81 migrants. During the eight months leading up to the statement, 865,425 people arrived on the shores of Greece; that is to be compared with the 22,838 people whom arrived during the eight months after the enforcement of ETS (EC COM(2016)792 final:3, 5). Nevertheless, in the later implementation reports, the EU is careful to stress that even though the ETS continues to deliver results, one needs to monitor the new safety concerns arisen on the Greek islands. Due to the implementation of the ETS, almost all migrants arriving in Greece applies for asylum there, putting further pressure on an already strained asylum system. More than 16,000 people are present on the islands, whilst the official capacity is only 7450. As of 8 December 2016, 748 persons have been returned to Turkey under the ETS. Hence, the speed of returns is the most pressing issue for the EU in order to ensure a sustainable situation (EC COM(2016)792 final:2, 7).

There are several concerns concerning the implementation of the ETS. One of them is that the press release about the statement was made on the 18 March 2016 and the ETS came in to force on the 20 March, only two days later. When the earlier readmission agreement was made known, some critics where at least somewhat comforted by the fact that the implementation would not start until 1 October 2017. During that time, they hoped that the actual implementation and the needed resources would be in place (EC COM(2016)231 final:4-5, Yilmaz 2014:24). Unfortunately, due to the current refugee crisis, the process was sped up and we are already seeing the consequences. A big problem is the lack of personnel on the ground in Greece; interpreters are especially hard to find due to the rare language combination of Greek and Arabic (EC COM(2016)231 final:5-6).

Another criticism against the statement is that it is almost exclusively focused on Syrians. The safe alternatives to using smugglers, offered by the EU, only apply to Syrians. The ETS clearly states that “For every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU…” (Press release 144/16). However, the EU are only offering up to approximately 70,800 persons this opportunity which, compared to the 2.8 million Syrians residing in Turkey, is far from enough (EC COM(2016)231 final:7, Syrian refugees 2016).

As mentioned in chapter 2.1.1, since Turkey is considered a safe third country, an asylum application may be denied on the basis that the applicant transited through a safe country before irregularly entering the EU. A risk with the statement and increased border control can be potential push-backs when irregular migrants are detected on their journey to Greece. Push-backs can result in a

As can be seen by what has been presented so far, the politics and policy of migration is in no way straightforward. In order to thoroughly examine the policy documents about the ETS, I have decided to use a critical discourse analysis, which will be accounted for in the next chapter.
4 Method

In order to answer the research question, I will conduct a qualitative critical discourse analysis of the EU-Turkey statement. Using this method allows me to deeply study and examine the strategic use of discourses within the chosen texts. Five documents from the European Commission regarding this statement will be thoroughly analyzed through a discourse of security as well as a discourse of humanitarianism (for reasons specified in chapter 1). Before accounting for the method, I will briefly present the ontological and epistemological assumptions on which I build the research.

4.1 Ontological and epistemological assumptions

This thesis takes the epistemological approach of critical realism, assuming that a real world exists regardless of how we understand and view it, but is also partly constructed by human action and discourse (Bryman 2012:537). In accordance with Fairclough, reality consists of both discursive and non-discursive practices (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:70-71). The ontological position of this thesis is constructionism (often also referred to as constructivism, see Bryman 2012:33), assuming that we as researchers portray our own perception of a reality and that reality can never be definite (Bryman 2012:33). In all social constructionist approaches to research one believes that reality is socially constructed and truths are discursively produced. Nevertheless, there is no absolute truth because truth is discursively constructed; and discourses change (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:13).

4.2 Critical discourse analysis

As mentioned above, I have decided to use a critical discourse analysis (CDA) as the methodological framework for this thesis. More specifically, I use the framework developed by Norman Fairclough since this is argued to be the most advanced method among the different CDA approaches. CDA is based on social constructionism. As previously stated, this approach believes that discourse is part in producing the social world; it does not merely neutrally reflect our world, identities and social relations - it is part in sustaining and changing it (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:4-5). Fairclough argues that discourse is just one among many practices in this construction of the social and discourse is also shaped by those practices and structures (Fairclough 1992:66, Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:62, 65).
In other words, there is an objective reality, but also a social reality that is discursively constructed.

CDA also claims that discursive practices contribute to the creation and reproduction of unequal power relations between different social groups. Discursive practices are used to further the interest of particular social groups. This thesis treats the EU (i.e. EU member states, EU citizens and EU policymakers) and irregular migrants as two different social groups. CDA is critical in the sense that it aims to reveal this relationship and in turn aims to contribute to a social change with a more equal power balance in society at large. CDA takes the side of the oppressed social groups and is therefore not politically neutral (Fairclough 1992:5, Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:63-64).

When using CDA as a method, Fairclough has developed a three-dimensional model focused on text, discursive practice and social practice (Fairclough 1992:72-73). The analysis should start with the text and its linguistic features with the aim of mapping what discourses are present. In order to do this I will mostly be using different analytical tools: transitivity, nominalization and modality. Analyzing transitivity focuses on how events and processes are connected (or not connected) with subjects and objects. Nominalization is when a noun stands for the process and the agent is omitted. These tools are looking at linguistic features that reduce agency. Modality analyses the degree of affinity and affiliation the author has to its statement. Truth is a type of modality and texts can come across as presenting knowledge that is true and inconvertible. Since I am looking at how actions are justified by the use of discourse, these features are important to examine (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:83-84, Bergström & Boréus 2012:376).

The second dimension focuses on the discursive practice; how the text is produced and consumed. This is done through intertextuality and interdiscursivity to see how the text draws on earlier texts and discourses. In this way I can study the reproduction of discourses where either no new elements are added or new combinations of discourses are seen. It is through new combinations of discourses that we see discursive change and thereby also the change of the social and cultural world. In this thesis it will be shown by referring to earlier research on EU migration policy (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:7, 73-74, Bergström & Boréus 2012:376-377). However, due to the size of this thesis, I will not be able to include the discursive practice of how the texts are consumed; this would be a thesis on its own.

The third and final step in the analytical framework is that of social practice. This is where you analyze the wider social practice to where the text is situated. It is the relationship between the text and social practice that determines whether or not the discursive practice reproduces or restructures the existing order of discourse and what consequences this has for the social practice. This is where the critical aspect to the analysis comes in (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:86-87, Bergström & Boréus 2012:377). In chapter 7, I aim to study how discourse, and more specifically a security and a humanitarian discourse, is used as a strategy to justify the measures taken by the EU against irregular migrants transiting via Turkey to Greece and what consequences this might have on the wider social
context. I also intend to discuss if this creates and reproduces unequal power relations.

4.3 Delimitations and justification of material

The material chosen for the analysis is the press release constituting the actual ETS, as well as four communications from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council about the implementation of the statement. Even though the ETS builds on the Joint action plan which in turn builds on the readmission agreement, I have decided to only conduct a CDA of the documents specifically related to the ETS. The reason for this is twofold. First, the ETS is the most recent of these documents, and is drawing on contents within both the Joint action plan and the readmission agreement. Second, the scope and size of this thesis would not allow for all three sources/documents to be analyzed, therefore the focus lies solely on the ETS. As previously stated in chapter 1.1, another reason for my choice of material is the fact that the ETS is affecting the lives of many different actors (see chapter 1.1). Hence, the discursive analysis of said material is of great importance.

4.3.1 Validity and reflexivity

A researcher cannot be free from her pre-existing knowledge and social position. Therefore, some acknowledgements concerning validity and reliability in qualitative research are in need of clarification. In the analysis and throughout this thesis, I will clearly explain which steps have been taken when conducting the research as a way to try and strengthen the validity (Holliday 2007:8). In the analysis, I will account for the analytical tools used as well as give representative examples from the documents as a way to further achieve validity and transparency (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:126). In all social constructionist approaches to research, where one believes that reality is socially constructed and truths are discursively produced, the researcher must be reflexive about her own construction of reality through her thesis (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:21-22). The knowledge created in this thesis should not be considered as the absolute truth, but as a contribution to the public debate aiming to achieve social change (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:181). Therefore, the findings of this thesis are my own interpretation of a reality.
5 Theoretical framework

As stressed within chapter four, the theoretical positioning for this thesis stems from the social constructionist paradigm within qualitative research. Critical discourse analysis, used as theory and method, examines the role of discourse in constructing the social world (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002:7). Furthermore, I will use a discourse of security and a discourse of humanitarianism as the theoretical framework for the analysis of the documents. These discourses will be further explained in chapter 5.2.1 and 5.2.2.

5.1 Discourses

Discourses of security and humanitarianism have existed for several decades in the context of migration policy in the EU. Nevertheless, it is only in recent years (since the Arab spring in 2011) that they have gained significant momentum (Vaughan-Williams 2015:2). There is an ambiguity within the EU migration policies where irregular migrants are perceived as both lives to be protected and a security threat to be protected against (Vaughan-Williams 2015:3, 30). The securitization of migration (see below) has been extensively covered in the literature; however, the emergence of a humanitarian discourse and the relationship between the two has received less attention (Vaughan-Williams 2015:11). Below I will account for the two types of discourses in more detail.

5.1.1 Discourse of security

Before an event can be perceived as a security threat it must be put into a security context. According to Buzan et al., a matter of security is a matter of security first when it has been framed as such – a process referred to as securitization. However, even though the event might not be directly spoken of as a threat, it can still be rendered as such if it is institutionally and discursively put in policy frameworks of defense. This is called a speech act and can thus only occur when one conceptualizes security as something that is much more than just a threat or problem (Buzan et al. 1998:24, 26, Huysmans 2006:4). The threat or problem needs to meet strictly defined criteria to distinguish it from the merely political and it must be presented as an existential threat to the state/territory. The security threat then justifies the use of force and extraordinary measures, otherwise outside of the normal bounds of political procedures, to handle them. The issue is only securitized if and when the audience accepts it as such. The way to study
securitization is to study discourse and political constellations (Buzan et al. 1998:5, 21-25).

The Copenhagen school believes that securitization is a political choice and not just a rational response to an event (Buzan et al. 1998:29, Huysmans 2006: xii). To argue that something is a security threat is to argue that that the issue is more important than other issues and as such should take priority (Buzan et al. 1998:24). For the EU, securitization of migration can serve in a number of important ways; it can consolidate a sense of shared collective identity, loyalty towards the EU citizens and legitimate the Union as the protector of external threats. With this kind of rhetoric, otherwise illegitimate policies become justified; and it is arguably used as a way to enhance their control and power (Boswell & Geddes 2011:42, Buzan et al. 1998:21).

5.1.2 Discourse of humanitarianism

Humanitarianism is mostly regarded as something only NGO’s and the UN can conduct, not states. The essence of a humanitarian act is “motivated by an altruistic desire to provide life-saving relief […] and to do more good than harm” (Barnett and Weiss 2008:11). Humanitarianism is not supposed to be political; however, some actors argue that this is impossible to avoid, especially when the humanitarian act is done by a political actor (Barnett & Weiss 2008:4, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh & Pacitto 2013:6).

Humanitarian discourses look at the arguments, claims and evidence used to justify intervention or non-intervention in different contexts by different actors. A humanitarian discourse can be used to argue for the intervention to help people in need of protection and/or to secure the human rights of the disempowered (Fassin 2012:2, Hasian Jr. 2016).

Using a humanitarian discourse also divides people into different groups: innocent (those worth saving, migrants) and guilty (those not worth saving, smugglers). This creates a hierarchy of humanity, rather than just protecting humanity as a whole. It is thus not always an obvious case of the innocent being preyed on by the guilty. E.g. migrants might need the help of smugglers to reach the borders of the EU in order to apply for asylum (Ticktin 2016:258). Migrants putting their lives at risk and in the hands of smugglers is also a consequence of being forced to circumvent the extensive border controls (Walters 2011:147). This focus on combating the smuggler instead of helping the migrants furthers the securitization of the border; all the while exempting the EU from responsibility (Ticktin 2016:258). The rhetorical framing of migration creates different relations towards refugees; securitization sustains fear of refugees were as framing it as humanitarianism frames refugees as right holders and allows for compassion (Huysmans 2006:xii).
5.1.3 Interplay between the discourses

Scholars point to how a humanitarian discourse is used to justify the securitization of a certain event and the extraordinary measures taken as a result of the securitization of said event (see for example Horsti 2012:304). Humanitarian discourses are often used in connection with a security discourse and can even occur in the same sentences (Horsti 2012:307). This is closely related to a debate concerning the concept of human security, which has been understood both in traditional (military) and non-traditional (humanitarianism) terms (see for example Kerr 2007, Huysmans 2006:4-5). This once again showcases the inherently contrasting views on how to treat and understand matters of security; how to pinpoint the referent object of security (human or state?), as well as how to fill the concept of security with meaning.

Next, I will analyze the policy documents with the help of the discourses previously described.
6 Analysis

In the following chapter I will analyze the documents by using a CDA combined with the theoretical framework of a security and humanitarian discourse.

All the documents in this analysis have been written by the EU, and the EU is the actor exerting the measures taken against irregular migrants. The textual analysis shows a language use with a high level of modality, using expressions such as:

“All migrants will be protected…” (Press release 144/16:1) and
“…there is no benefit in following the route offered by the smugglers.” (EC COM(2016)231 final:2).

The arguments and claims are presented as the truth with the author showing a high degree of affinity and affiliation.

Nominalization is also occurring throughout the texts; usually by the removal of migrants as participants.

“...there has been a substantial decrease in the numbers [my emphasis] leaving Turkey for Greece…” (EC COM(2016)231 final:2).

Intertextually, there is a change in the potential effects of the statement when comparing the different implementation reports. The first report sees very positively on the implementation of the statement; whereas the fourth and last report shows a somewhat different outlook. The first report states the following:

“The sharp decrease in the number of irregular migrants and asylum seekers crossing from Turkey into Greece not only proves its effectiveness [my emphasis] but also that the business model of smugglers can be broken”. (EC COM(2016)231 final:12).

The fourth report, however, presents a different, somewhat bleaker, picture:

“During the period covered by this Fourth report, the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement has confirmed the trend of a steady delivery of results, albeit in the face of many challenges”. (EC COM(2016)792 final:2).
There is a shift in the ETS being extraordinary and temporary to now being “...firmly rooted as a stable and sustainable pillar of EU policy” (EC COM(2016)792 final:2).

According to this quote, found in the fourth implementation report, measures that was at first presented as temporary and extraordinary has now become a permanent part in EU migration policy. This swift sustainable integration of policy would not have been possible if it were not for the securitization of the issue of irregular migrants.

In accordance with the analytical dimension of discursive practice, looking at the documents interdiscursively reveals that there is a prominent use of a security discourse. The most obvious evidence is that military actors, such as Frontex, NATO and EBCG, are used to implement the action plan.

“...standard operating procedures between the European Border and Coast Guard and NATO Maritime Command...” (EC COM(2016)792 final:4).

“...cooperation in the Aegean Sea has deepened in the form of a common situational picture, early warning, surveillance activities and sharing of operational information with the Greek and Turkish Coast Guards.” (EC COM(2916)792 final:4).


“...stepped up security efforts by the Turkish coast guard and police...” (Press release 144/16:1).

As shown by the quotations above, these actors are using surveillance and border patrolling; efforts traditionally used when detecting security threats.

On several occasions migrants are described in the terms of being a “flow”.


“...there remains a significant flow of people [my emphasis] arriving in Member States...” (EC COM(2016)349 final:9).

This rhetoric portrays migrants as a force or a phenomenon and as such dehumanizes them. An “uncontrolled flow” can be perceived as a threat; thus needing to be managed and controlled. By describing migrant movement as an uncontrolled flow, migrants are portrayed as something in need of protecting against. Hence, migrant movement is being securitized when the ETS is using such language.

Migration is also often rhetorically put in connection to criminal activity; e.g. the EU felt the need to include issues such as human trafficking, organized crime and terrorism in the ETS, as shown by the following quotation:
“The refugee crisis also needs to be viewed in the wider context of ongoing conflicts in the region and of terrorist threats [my emphasis].” (EC COM(2016)231 final:2).

“Europol and the Turkish National Police signed an agreement [...] targeting in particular the fight against organized crime, smugglers and terrorism [my emphasis].” (EC COM(2016)231 final:3).

“The Turkish authorities have set up units on migrant smuggling [original emphasis] and human trafficking [my emphasis]...” (EC COM(2016)349 final:3).

Irregular migrants are also treated as if they were in fact criminals. They are e.g. placed in special detention sites by the host country while awaiting a response to their asylum application or their expulsion:

“...creating additional detention capacity or extending current sites on the islands to increase closed pre-removal capacities.” (EC COM(2016)792 final:7).

Connecting migration to matters of security in this way highlights once again how the ETS is securitizing migration. According to Buzan et al., an issue is securitized once it is put in a context of security through a speech act. Further, arguing that measures are temporary and extraordinary, is to argue that it is justified to work outside of the usual scope of interventions:

“Turkey will take any necessary measures [my emphasis] to prevent new sea and lands routes for illegal migration opening from Turkey to the EU...” (Press release 144/16:1).

“It will be a temporary and extraordinary measure [my emphasis] which is necessary to end the human suffering and restore public order”. (Press release 144/16:1).

The quotation above implicates that the current state of public order is actually a state of disorder, and therefore needs to be restored. Hence extraordinary measures are needed to secure public order.

As shown by the following quote, securitization is also used as a way to speed up a process of enforcement.

“...swift [my emphasis] and determined efforts are needed.” (Press release 144/16:1).

“A buffer of funding will also be foreseen in order to swiftly respond [my emphasis] to urgent and unexpected humanitarian needs.” (EC COM(2016)231 final:10).

“...ensure that the asylum decisions can be taken swiftly [my emphasis], as well as to step up the pace of returns.” (EC COM(2016)792 final:14).

Quick measures are needed to handle the refugee crisis. Securitizing migration (situating migration within a security discourse) gives it priority over other issues, and enables swift action concerning formulation and implementation of migration
policy. Thus further evidence for the EU using a discourse of security in a strategic way is the fact that the readmission of migrants to Turkey was enforced more than a year ahead of schedule (EC COM(2016)231 final:4-5).

The EU is also using a humanitarian discourse throughout the documents, among other things, eagerly pointing out that:

“These measures are carried out strictly in accordance with the requirements of EU and international law, and in full respect of the principle of non-refoulement [original italics]” (EC COM(2016)792 final:5).

There are two major lines of argumentation within the humanitarian discourse. First, hindering migrants from leaving Turkey and reaching EU’s border is argued to be done in order to save lives. Second, migrants are described as victims of smugglers and any intervention by the EU is seen as protecting the migrant against these criminals (Horsti 2012:304-305).

“In order to break the business model of the smugglers and to offer migrants an alternative to putting their lives at risk [my emphasis], the EU and Turkey today decided to end the irregular migration from Turkey to the EU.” (Press release 144/16:1).

“The Commission is also working with organisations such as UNHCR […] which developed a series of videos with direct stories from victims of smugglers [my emphasis] and traffickers.” (EC COM(2016)231 final:3).

“Smugglers will continue to seek to exploit vulnerable migrants [my emphasis] and try to find new routes.” (EC COM(2016)231 final:8).

Here migrants are clearly the innocent being exploited by the guilty smuggler. Portraying migrants as innocent victims subsequently makes the EU saviors of those victims (Ticktin 2016:260). Migrants may also be perceived as guilty, guilty in that they decide themselves to make the dangerous journey (Ticktin 2016:261, Horsti 2012:304-305).

“...means sending a strong signal towards migrants that getting on a boat in Turkey, and endangering lives in the process, is not the right way to come to Europe.” (EC COM(2016)231 final:12).

A humanitarian discourse is also visible in specifically three action points: the fifth, the sixth and the ninth. The fifth action point concerns a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme. Once the Standard Operating Procedures are finalized an assessment will be made whether the conditions for the implementation have been met.

“...the scheme will be activated once irregular crossings between Turkey and the EU are ending or at least have been substantially and sustainably reduced.” (EC COM(2016)792 final:10).
The sixth action point concerning the Facility for Refugees in Turkey will ensure funding for projects for persons under temporary protection in Turkey. The projects should be of the character that is traditionally seen as humanitarian interventions:

“...in the field of health, education, infrastructure, food and other living costs...” (Press release 144/16:2).

The ninth and last action point concerns the cooperation between the EU and Turkey in trying to improve the humanitarian conditions inside Syria, with a focus on areas close to the Turkish border. If successful this would:

“...allow for the local population and refugees to live in areas which will be more safe.” (Press release 144/16:2).

The quotations above indicates that the humanitarian interventions are done in order to further the agenda of the EU; i.e. ending all illegal migration. Hence, a discourse of humanitarianism is also used strategically by the EU in the ETS.

As shown by this analysis, both a security discourse and a humanitarian discourse are frequently used within the documents concerning the ETS. And just as argued by Vaughan-Williams and Horsti, we can see that a humanitarian discourse and a security discourse are used in combination to justify the measures taken against migrants.

“It will be a temporary and extraordinary measure which is necessary to end the human suffering and restore public order”. (Press release 144/16:1).

“NATO contributes to international efforts to stem illegal trafficking and irregular migration through intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in the Aegean Sea.” (EC COM(2016)634 final:4).

Another example concerns the humanitarian action of the one-for-one scheme. The candidates for resettlement go through several steps of assessment; i.e. being selected by Turkey and referred to the UNHCR, whom after assessing their vulnerability, refers them to the specific member states (EC COM(2016)231 final:7). As can be seen by the quote below, candidates for resettlement are still treated as threats.

“Member States will make the final decision regarding the selection of people to be resettled and will carry out their own security checks” [my emphasis].” (EC COM(2016)231 final:7).

As mentioned above, both a security and a humanitarian discourse are visible in the ETS documents. However, it does appear as if a security discourse is more prominent and that a humanitarian discourse is used as a compliment to further legitimate the securitization of migration. Hence, a humanitarian discourse is used
strategically to justify the securitization of migration; and a security discourse is in turn used strategically to justify and hasten measures taken against migrants.

The next chapter will further discuss the findings of the analysis and situate it in a wider social context in accordance to the dimension of social practice.
7 Discussion

As has been shown in the analysis, both a security and a humanitarian discourse are used throughout the ETS documents. The securitization of irregular migrants has made it possible for the EU to hasten the implementation of actions that would not be accepted if irregular migrants were not perceived a security threat. The victimization of irregular migrants has made the securitization seem less extreme. Arguing that the measures taken against irregular migrants are done in order to save their lives might make these measures easier for the general public to accept.

The picture presented by the EU of the irregular migrant, through the ETS, might also have consequences for the social world – also in regards to legal migrants. Portraying irregular migrants as security threats may have continuous effects on the acceptance of migrants as a bigger group. It is impossible to visually distinguish an irregular migrant from a legal migrant. Hence, all migrants may be perceived as threats. Further, this argument can correspondingly be connected to the debate about the victimization of the migrant. Being portrayed as innocent victims without agency and in need of saving may also have lasting consequences if/when they are granted asylum; migrants may be perceived as incapable to provide for themselves, thus being perceived as a burden in the eyes of the host country.

The analysis of how discourses of security and humanitarianism are used to implement and enforce the ETS has shown how securitization and victimization of irregular migrants are used strategically to further the interests of the EU. By portraying the EU as the savior of the vulnerable migrant, this view sustains the unequal power relation between the two social groups; the EU (EU member states, EU citizens and EU policymakers) and the irregular migrants (and, in turn, “migrants” as a whole). Using the textual analytical tools of transitivity, nominalization and modality brings forth a picture which elucidates how EU policy sustains an unequal balance of power between these social groups. For example, as the EU is creator and enforcer of the measures taken against irregular migrants (who lacks a voice in this policy), the power relation between the EU as an enforcing actor and irregular migrants as receivers of those measures, are sustained and solidified. Solely by the existence of borders, we are dividing people into those having the right to cross them and those whom do not. This furthers the construction of “us” and “them”, and those that are not “us” are different and might therefore be subject to exclusion from the territorial space that is the EU. The construction of irregular migrants as threats and victims thus reproduces a reality where people are socially divided.

Intertextually, these documents clearly build and draw on each other and earlier EU policy on migration. By the presence of a security and a humanitarian discourse in migration policy, this clearly shows on interdiscursivity, hence a
discursive change has taken place. This in turn, may lead to a change of the social world, similar to the discussion above. In accordance with CDA, the reality consists of both discursive and non-discursive practices. When using discourses as strategies, as the EU does in the ETS, one can create a reality that suits one’s own interests and it may in fact end up changing the interpretation of the social world.

This thesis has made evident how the broadening of the security concept can be seen also in policies of migration, and this development – for example through securitization - has in many ways made possible measures such as the ETS. The securitization of migration, in this case, can explain how the ETS could be implemented ahead of schedule. The reason for its hastened implementation can be traced to the Copenhagen Schools argument that the securitization of an issue enables extraordinary and immediate measures, which would not be possible without the securitizing act.
8 Conclusion

The aim and purpose of this thesis has been to examine how the EU discursively justifies the measures taken against irregular migrants in the ETS. Through a CDA, this thesis shows that a security and a humanitarian discourse are frequently used in the policy documents. They are often used in concert and in a strategic way to further the agenda of the EU. In other words, to answer the research question; EU discursively justifies the measures taken against irregular migrants by using the security and humanitarian discourses strategically.

By illustrating that the EU maintains its role as the actor exercising power over the innocent and victimized migrant, I hope to illuminate that the use of discourses in the ETS further sustains an unequal balance of power. Since the social world is somewhat constructed and produced through the use of language, I hope that this thesis, through illuminating this unequal power relation, will contribute to a social change. For future research one could look at what consequences this has and has had for migrants and asylum seekers. This not only pertains to a wider debate about social groups and potential consequences for said groups, but also what consequences the ETS might have for non-EU countries regarding migration policies. Since these measures are accepted by the EU, other countries and regions might follow. Hence, using said discourses strategically may have affects on global migration as well.

Furthermore, future research might look at how the texts of the ETS are consumed by the readers – in this case the citizens of the EU. Researching the consumption of the ETS might produce different results than those presented in this thesis and thus present a different reality of the social world.

It is my hope that this thesis also has contributed to the debate about a broadening of the security concept, by interdiscursively examining the use of security discourse in relation to, firstly a wider discourse on migration, and secondly, in connection to a discourse of humanitarianism. While the connection between security and migration has seen extensive research, it was my intention at the outset of this thesis to further the knowledge about the role of a humanitarian discourse relating to this, more researched, connection. Still, this “three-way relation” could benefit from more attention in future research endeavors, both to further the knowledge about migration policy, as well as advancing research within the field of (critical) security studies.
9 References


