Friend or foe

A qualitative field study on intergroup relations among Palestinian refugees in Lebanon

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Abstract

As the world becomes more global so does the conflicts and refugee movements. Whilst many have studied the tensions between the communities of host nations and refugee groups this thesis aims to explore what type of tension and conflict that occurs when one refugee group hosts another. In order to do so this thesis seeks to answer in what way, if any, the arrival of the Palestinian Refugees from Syria has affected the relationship among Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon. The study is conducted as a qualitative minor field study in Lebanon and semi-structured interviews has been used as the main source of information. The result is analysed according to a theoretical framework, the intergroup threat theory, which aims to single out important antecedents of threats and why symbolic and realistic threats occur between groups. The thesis finds that discrimination and tension exist between the groups and that the main reason behind it is due to provocative cross-cutting identities among the Syrian Palestinians and the economic difficulties the Syrian Crisis has brought along.

Key words: Intergroup Threat Theory, Lebanon, Syria, PRS, PRL Collective Identity, Refugee, Symbolic Threat, Realistic threat, Palestinian, Conflict
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List of abbreviations

NGO Non Governmental Organization
PRL Palestinian Refugee from Lebanon
PRS Palestinian Refugee from Syria
SRS Syrian Refugee from Syria
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
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1 Introduction

65.3 million people. That is the amount of forcibly displaced people worldwide according to the UNHCR’s most recent report (2015). Of these 12.4 million people were newly displaced due to conflict or persecution. As the world becomes more global so does the conflicts and refugee movements. Simultaneously as the number of refugees are growing in the world, xenophobia and nationalism are on the rise (BBC 2016). The mass movement of refugees into Europe has caused political instability in the European Union with demands on stronger borders and inner controls in the previous passport control free Schengen area. Even if it is only a few countries that has accepted the majority of the asylum seekers, the sudden influx of refugees has led to anti-immigrant protests all over Europe as well as a boost in support for the extreme right with roots in totalitarian movements. A future that holds more refugees than ever before, will with no doubt force countries to handle the most urging problem of our time; the peaceful cohabitation of groups with different cultures, religions and origins. In order to achieve such outcome, we must, however, first and foremost understand the most concerning challenges in intergroup relationship; why tension, prejudice and conflict occurs and how it can be avoided.

Whilst many have studied the European narrative with a focus on why tension occurs between the community of a secure host nation and a refugee group this thesis aims to study the consequences of one refugee group acting host community for another refugee group. Can lessons and basic understandings of antecedents of threats be drawn from groups that are more alike in order to find fundamental reasons of tension and obstacles of integration? What type of tension occur between two similar refugee groups and how are the similarities of the group affecting the situation? These are questions that this thesis is set out to answer by studying the Palestinian diaspora in Lebanon with a focus on the relationship between the Palestinian Refugees from Lebanon and the Palestinian Refugees from Syria residing in the Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon since the outbreak of the Syrian Crisis. The two groups share a heritage, a collective identity and the refugee status but how will their diametrical different living conditions affect the relationship? By conducting a field study in Lebanon with a focus on semi structured interviews this thesis seeks understanding of the type of relations, intergroup conflict and threats between the groups that occurs when the Palestinian Refugees from Lebanon acts host community for the Palestinian Refugees from Syria.
1.1 Aim

The aim of this study is to use the revised theory of intergroup threat to analyse the relationship between the PRL and PRS in Lebanon in order to identify threats and tension between the groups that could later result in destructive outcomes such as isolation, marginalization and conflict. The study hopes to bring greater understanding to if and why conflict and prejudice occurs between two groups with cross cutting identities and what the underlying causes are. By performing in-depth interviews with members of both groups as well as organizations working with the groups the study seeks to get a diversified sample of empirical data which can be analysed from a theoretical perspective. This thesis further argues that it is of great importance to better understand the problems beyond the practical and political difficulties of refugee crises, which tend to focus on administrative aspects and long term solutions. Therefore, this study aims to stress the importance of looking closer into the refugee communities to understand the parallel problems within before they escalate into conflict or political problems.

1.2 Research question

- Does threats and conflict occur when the Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon are forced to host Palestinian Refugees from Syria?
- If threats and conflict occur between the groups, how is it expressed and what are the underlying reasons and possible consequences?

1.3 Central concepts

1.3.1 Palestinian refugee

In this thesis, the term Palestinian refugee is used for “persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.” (Palestinian refugee 2017), the term does also include, in line with the official UNRWA definition, descendants of Palestine refugee males.

1.3.2 Diaspora
The concept diaspora is a complex and problematic concept since its meaning has stretched and varied a lot during the years. In this thesis, a diaspora is defined with the help of Brubaker’s updated version of Safran six criteria’s (Brubaker 2005). Brubaker points out three constitutive criteria’s: dispersion, homeland orientation and boundary-maintenance. Dispersion is to be understood as a forced dispersion over state borders, in this case the dispersion from Palestine to the neighbouring countries with a focus on Lebanon and Syria. Brubaker defines the second criteria as “the orientation to a real or ‘imagined’ homeland as an authoritative source of value, identity and loyalty”, for Palestinians the homeland plays a crucial role in the Palestinian identity where the most important and present struggle is *the right to return*. The last criteria are boundary-maintenance which includes "the preservation of a distinctive identity vis-à-vis a host society (or societies)". Those boundaries can be maintained by a self-enforced endogamy or as an "unintended consequence of social exclusion" (Brubaker 2005: 6). This criterion is very present for the PRL since they are systematically excluded and marginalized from the Lebanese host society.

1.3.3 Collective memory, collective identity and resistance identity

To understand the Palestinian diaspora and the mentality of its members it is important to understand what collective memory, collective identity and resistance identity means. The concept of collective memory is widely used in psychology to describe memories of a shared past that are shared by a large number of people over multiple generations (Agnew 2005: 200). The size of the group can differ and is of less importance than the shared memories that are passed on or constructed within a group. The memories are most often not personally experienced but rather memories, nostalgic feelings and stories that has been passed on and inherited (Agnew 2005: 200). Collective memories often work as identity formation for diasporas and displaced people to serve a higher purpose as well as strengthening the bond within the group which can be of great importance for exiled people such as diaspora groups.

Prior to defining the concept of “collective identity” we have to identify the meaning of identity. According to Coleman & Lowe (2007: 380) identity is to be understood as a conception of “a place in the social world” where the place “metaphorically stands for any position on any socially relevant dimension, including religion, ethnicity, ideology, gender, and so forth”. The concept of collective identity therefore refers to a shared place in the social world which includes a shared sense of belonging to a certain group. Therefore, it is not uncommon that individuals in a group with a collective memory also shares a collective identity. However, every individual can have multiple collective identities that can be both overlapping and conflicting. (Coleman and Lowe 2007: 380). Except from serving many important practical and symbolic functions, a
collective identity can also serve practical concerns as pursuing a struggle for rights, claim of land and/or the maintenance of a culture and way of life.

The last of the three important diaspora concepts for Palestinians is the “resistance identity” which according to Castells (2004: 9) might be the most important type of identity in our modern society. Castells argue that this type of identity building “constructs forms of collective resistance against otherwise unbearable oppression, usually on the basis of identities that were, apparently, clearly defined by history, geography, or biology, making it easier to essentialize the boundaries of resistance.”

1.4 Disposition

The first chapter of this thesis consist of an introduction to the subject, the aim and the central concepts. Thereafter a chapter about the background in a Palestinian, Lebanese and Syrian context will follow. In chapter three the theoretical framework will be presented. In chapter four the methodological approach, the case selection and ethical considerations will be discussed. The results of the interviews and observations during the ten-week long field study will be presented and analysed according to the Intergroup Threat Theory in chapter five followed by a discussion and conclusions in chapter six.
2 Background

To understand the relationship between the PRL and PRS in Lebanon it is of great importance to understand the backstory of the two groups, the modern history of Palestine and the events that led up to the creation of Israel resulting in 700,000 Palestinian refugees spreading over the Middle East in 1948, a year described by the Palestinians as “al-Nakba” (Arabic for the catastrophe). The years leading up to this outcome was dominated by three themes, the British mandate over Palestine, the holocaust of Jews in Europe and the UN partition plan (Bickerton and Klausner 1991). During the period of 1915 and 1922 the region of Palestine and Sinai was invaded by British forces that claimed mandate of the region. In 1922 they were officially given the mandate to govern the region by the League of Nations which lead up to several uprisings by the non-Jewish Palestinians. In 1947, after the second world war and its horrendous holocaust on Jews the British Empire announced their desire to terminate the mandate of Palestine in favour of a national home for the Jewish people (Bickerton and Klausner 1991). Shortly thereafter the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 181 recommending a partition of the Palestine region to an Arab state, a Jewish state and a special regime for the City of Jerusalem. While the Jewish population accepted the partition, which gave them 56 % of the land, and announced the state of Israel in 1948, the Palestinian Arabs (from now on called Palestinians, PRL or PRS) population rejected it which lead up to the 1948 Palestine war and the second stage of the war called the 1948 Arab-Israeli war (Said et al. 2013).

The consequences of the formation of the partition and the two wars was devastating for the Palestinian population and around 700,000 of the 900,000 Palestinians that lived in the region that was transformed into Israel, either fled, left or were expelled from their homes (Said et al 2013). The majority of the Palestinians fled to the West Bank (at the time controlled by Jordan), Gaza, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon where they still reside today. At this time, the Arab League instructed its member not the grant the Palestinian refugees citizenship in order to “avoid dissolution of their identity and protect their right to return to their homeland” (Hanafi and Sari 2014: 272). The situation and consequences following the UN partition plan and the creation of the State of Israel became so extreme that the UN decided to establish a relief and work agency for the Palestinian refugees alone, becoming the only UN agency to help refugees from a specific county or region. In order to provide humanitarian assistance and establish the agency the UN had to develop a suitable definition of “refugee” that was applicable for the Palestinians. The agency came to be named UNRWA and defined Palestine
refugees as "persons whose regular place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict." (UNRWA A, 2017).

The number of Palestinian refugees has since the 1948 conflict increased due to two factors, partly as a consequence of the Six-Day War where approximately 300 000 more Palestinians became refugees and partly because the refugee status is inherited to descendants of male Palestinian refugees. These two factors has increased the number of Palestinian refugees from around 700 000 in 1948 to today's some five million (UNRWA B, 2017). The majority of the countries in the Arab League has kept its policies regarding denying Palestinian refugees citizenship often leaving them entirely dependent on the services provided by the UNRWA. Since this thesis focuses on the relationship between the PRL and the PRS the following three sub-chapter describes the situation for those two groups prior the Syrian Crisis as well as the situation for Palestinians in Lebanon post the Syrian Crisis.

2.1 The Lebanese context

The history of the Palestinian refugee presence in Lebanon is complex and takes many turns during its 70 years. This subchapter will therefore focus on the main events of the period in order to bring greater understanding to the events leading up to the situation Palestinian refugees face in Lebanon today.

The founding of Israel or the Nakba in 1948 resulted in over 100 000 Palestinians seeking shelter in neighbouring Lebanon. Lebanon, who gained independence from France in 1944 and together with Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Transjordan declared war on the new state of Israel in 1948, first embraced the Palestinian refugees as a sign of solidarity with their Arab neighbours. This phase of welcoming and adaption lasted for nearly ten years and was characterized by a relatively open and positive attitude from the Lebanese government as well as the Lebanese population. Even though Lebanon followed the Arab League’s recommendations on not granting Palestinians citizenship and with the existence of some discrimination towards the Palestinians in Lebanon, the host country offered some opportunities for the refugee population during its first ten years. When the Maronite Christian General Chehab took office in 1958 the first crackdown started on the Palestinian community (Suleiman 2006: 21). According to Chehab the Palestinians with their large population and guerrilla activity in southern Lebanon towards Israel posed a threat to the internal politics of the country. This lead him to initiate a policy for tighter control of the Palestinians and the 15 official refugee camps. The crackdown ended in 1969 when the PLO and Lebanon agreed on the Cairo Accord which was brokered with the help of the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The accord
established principles and rights for Palestinians in Lebanon with a focus on the right to employment, self-governance over the camps, the right “to join the Palestinian revolution through armed struggle” and the right to launch attacks on Israel from southern Lebanon (Weinberger 1986:128). This increased the power of the PLO in Lebanon and shortly after the agreement was reached the Palestinian infrastructure in terms of social, cultural and economic institutions was immensely increased (Suleiman 2006: 21). The increased political and military organizational activity however resulted in much criticism and voices, mostly Christian, claiming that the Palestinian presence once again threatened the political infrastructure of Lebanon were raised. In 1975, the complex and multifaceted Lebanese Civil War that came to last until 1990 broke out between the PLO and the Maronite Christian party Kataeb. The PLO were soon joined by the leftist Lebanese Movement and the Sunni Muslims while the Kataeb called upon the Shiites to join them and the Syrian government and Israel to intervene which they both did. The Israeli intervention in 1982 resulted in such major setbacks for the PLO that they were forced to flee the country. Without the presence of the PLO the Palestinian community was weakened in terms of social and economic infrastructure as well as protection against the Christian militias and the Israeli forces. The Palestinian refugees endured many horrific events in the aftermath of the PLO expulsion with the most infamous one committed in 1982 by the Kataeb militia. Aided by the Israeli Militia the Kataeb Militia committed the Sabra and Shatila massacre were the Palestinian refugee camp Shatila was surrounded and then attacked resulting in the massacre of thousands of men, women and children (Fisk 2001: 382f) . The second most important event of this time was the “war on the camps” orchestrated by the Shiite Amal militia with the goal of liquidating the remaining pro-Arafat forces in the Palestinian refugee camps. The events culminated in the abrogation of the Cairo Accords in 1987 which resulted in major setbacks for the Palestinian refugee population in terms of self-determination, right to employment and freedom of movement (Suleiman 2006: 21). When the Civil War ended in 1990 it left the Palestinian community in a terrible position with three demolished camps and no framework replacing the Cairo Accords making them more marginalized and isolated from Lebanese society than ever before. The years following 1990 were characterized by deliberate neglect and later resumption of the official Palestinian-Lebanese dialogue after years of silence (Suleiman 2006: 22). The PLO and the Lebanese state resumed their contact but until today this day no major improvements has been made for the PRL.

2.2 The Syrian context

Compared to Lebanon, Syria took an entirely different approach in the administration and integration of the Palestinian refugees fleeing the Arab-Israeli
war in 1948. The nearly 100,000 refugees were, like in Lebanon, denied citizenship in favour for their Palestinian refugee identity. The Syrian government decided, however, to ratify the 1965 Casablanca Protocol, that stipulates that all Arab countries should guarantee Palestinian refugees rights to residency, freedom of movement and employment (Sherifa 2003). This paved the way for Palestinian refugees in Syria through legalizing their residence in the country as well as issuing important laws and resolutions to guarantee them a reasonable standard of living whilst preserving their Palestinian identity (Hassan 2012:1). These laws, stipulated under law 1311, gave them the same rights and duties as the Syrians with one exception, they were not allowed to vote in political elections or candidate for political positions. This makes Syria, apart from Jordan, the only country in the Middle East to give full access to government services to Palestinians (Sherifa 2003). The Syrian efforts of integrating the Palestinians into Syrian Society has made the work of UNRWA easier and less crucial compared to Lebanon. Even if the absolute majority of the Palestinians in Syria are registered with the UNRWA the official camps and children receive their primary and preparatory education at UNRWA schools while secondary education and university studies are accomplished at Syrian institutions (Sherifa 2003).

2.3 The situation for Palestinians in Lebanon today

There is no doubt Lebanon is currently in an unsustainable situation with nearly one fourth of its population made up by Syrian and Palestinians refugees. In the end of 2016 numbers from UNRWA showed that there were 1,011,366 registered Syrian refugees and close to 450,000 registered Palestinian refugees of which 32,000 were PRS (UNHCR 2017). While the Syrian refugees are entitled to services and the right to work in Lebanon their Palestinian counterparts are barred from exercising more than 36 professions including farming, law, medicine and public transportation, leaving them dependent on the services of UNRWA (UNHCR 2016). Scholars argue that the plight of the Palestinian refugees has been forgotten and undocumented during the Syrian crisis and that the PRS are in fact the most vulnerable sub-group of all due to its precarious legal status, lack of social protection and employment opportunities (Charles and Denman 2013). The unemployment rate among the PRL has risen from eight percent in 2010 to 23 percent in 2016, by comparison more than half of the PRS were unemployed in 2015 (UNHCR 2016: 5). The daily life is dominated by poverty, debt and overcrowded schools and according to UNRWA (UNRWA C, 2017) “Almost 90 per cent of PRS in Lebanon are under the poverty line and 95 per cent are food insecure.”. Lacking employment and right to governmental services, UNRWA provides the PRL and PRS with “a monthly multipurpose cash grant worth US$ 100 per family and an additional US$ 27 for each family member per month to
cover food costs” (UNRWA C, 2017). In addition to the poverty the Palestinian refugees struggle with overcrowded camps where the cheapest housing to be found costs around 200 USD a month. On top of that the camps are experiencing malfunctioning sewage, polluted water and recurrent electric power cuts, factors that heighten the risk of disease among an already vulnerable population (UNHCR 2017).
3 Theoretical Framework

3.1 Intergroup Threat Theory

The study of threats have for the past decades been an important part of peace and conflict studies in order to understand the components behind the actions that can spark conflict or be an obstruction to peace and reconciliation (Christie 2011:561). In order to identify such threats several methods and frameworks can be used depending on the situation and the scale of the conflict. One of the most famous and acknowledged frameworks is developed by Walter G. Stephan and was in its original version labelled “integrated threat theory” and in its revised version “intergroup threat theory”. The theory argues that in order to find belonging in a world polarized by religion, ethnicity, nationality, political ideology, religion, class etc. we create social groups based on certain criteria’s and boundaries (Stephan et al. 2009: 1). These social groups include some and excludes others by its nature and the formation of in-groups and outgroups based on criteria’s such as religion or ethnicity often creates tension between those groups that can later escalate into conflict. The intergroup threat theory aims to explain why and how these tensions arise and how they can be avoided. The theory suggests that an intergroup threat, a threat between two groups, occurs when a member of one group perceive (realistic or not) that the other group is in position to harm them in any way (Stephan et al. 2009). In the original version of the theory four type of threats and four types of antecedents of threats existed (Stephan et al. 2008: 58). The threats could either be realistic, symbolic or depend on intergroup anxiety or negative stereotypes. **Realistic** threats consist of threats to the in-group’s economic or political power or the physical well-being. **Symbolic** threats are threats to the in-group’s beliefs, values or worldview. **Intergroup anxiety** refers to "uneasiness and awkwardness in the presence of out-group members because of uncertainty about how to behave towards them” (Riek et al 2006: 341) and **negative stereotypes** are the in-group’s development of negative stereotypes of the outgroup. In addition to these threats the original theory pointed out four antecedents that could lead to threats: strong identification, history of conflict, negative personal contact and disparities in status (Stephan et al. 2008: 58). Although several conducted studies supported the first version of the theory some shortcomings and problems conceptualizing the threats was discovered leading up to a revised theory reducing the threats to two basic types: **realistic** and **symbolic** (Stephan and Renfro 2002). Even if the basic distinction between realistic and symbolic threats was retained in the revised theory a clear distinction on threats to the in-group as a whole and threats to individual
members of the in-group was made (Stephan et al. 2008: 60). This thesis will use the revised theory of threats to better understand the intergroup relationship between the PRL and PRS in order to identify threats and tension between the groups that can later result in destructive cognitive and affective outcomes.

3.1.1 Types of threats

The threats in the revised intergroup theory vary along two dimensions. The first dimension makes a distinction between if the threat involves symbolic or realistic harm and the second dimension makes a distinction whether the threat is perceived by the group as a whole (group threat) or by a single member of the group (individual threat). *Symbolic group threats* are threats to a group's shared values, religion, culture or worldview while *realistic group threats* are threats concerning actual harm to the group's welfare, power, territory or resources (Christie 2011:561). *Symbolic individual threats* on the other hand are threats to an individual's position, self-esteem or reputation while *realistic individual threats* concern the actual physical or economic well-being of an individual. It is important to keep the threats apart and make distinctions between them since they all have different consequences. Group threats are for example more likely to evoke anger than fear whereas individual threats function in the opposite way. Symbolic threats are thus more likely to lead to emotions while realistic threats cause feelings of insecurity and frustration (Christie 2011:562).

In addition to those threats the revised theory proposes four “antecedent variables that can influence the perception of threats from outgroups” (Stephan et al. 2008: 61) including *intergroup relations, individual difference variables, dimensions of cultural (or group) difference and situational factors*. In intergroup relations, the factors that can affect the perception of threat consists of the group’s relative power to each other, history of group conflict and group size. A low power group is more likely to experience threats than a high-power group due to its vulnerable position at the same time as the high power group is more likely to react more strongly to a potential threat since they have more to lose. If the groups have a history of conflict the perception of threat will be greater due to prejudices and preconceptions. Lastly, if the size of the two groups differ, the smaller group are more likely to feel threatened of giving up their traditions and culture in order to assimilate (Stephan et al. 2009: 12). The individual differences are largely made up of the strength of the in-group identity, outgroup knowledge and social dominance orientation, a measurement for support of group-based inequality. The people who are most likely to feel threatened by outgroups are those who “*are insecure, suspicious, fear death, are inexperienced with outgroups, are strongly drawn to their in-groups, desire an ordered society, and support social inequality.*” (Stephan et al. 2009: 16). When it comes to cultural differences the revised threat theory argues that “certain constellations of cultural values can influence the perception of threats” (Stephan
et al. 2009: 10). Generally speaking this means that cultures that are tighter or more extinguished than others are more likely to experience higher levels of threat since they are less probable to adapt. These threats are closely related to symbolic threats since the cultural dimensions consists of values, rules and norms. Situational factors of perceived threats are most likely to be in situations where people feel an uncertainty how to behave, where they feel unsupported by authority figures such as aid workers or when they feel that they are outnumbered and are experiencing a less favourable negotiating position than the other group. These types of threats are more linked to realistic threats (Stephan et al. 2009: 19).

![Figure 2. Revised model of the intergroup threat theory (Stephan et. al 2008: 62)](image)

It is important to highlight that this theory is usually applied on groups that differ in large, for example studies have been conducted to examine Israeli citizens attitudes toward Ethiopian immigrants (Stephan et al 1998) and the role of threats in the racial attitudes of blacks and whites (Stephan et al 2002). This thesis aims to examine if the theory is applicable on one group with cross cutting identities.

### 3.1.2 Consequences of threat

The original theory only entailed one consequence of threat, prejudice. The revised theory, however, posits additional potential outcomes that can be either psychological or behavioural in its nature (Stephan et. al. 2008: 62). The psychological responses to threat are largely internal and could lead to changes in the outgroup stereotypes or the impression of fear, helplessness and/or anger. The behavioural responses can be both external as well as internal and normally includes withdrawal, aggression, retaliation or forms of open intergroup conflicts (Stephan et al. 2008: 62). As showed in the above model the revised theory is circular meaning that all parts impact the others. Stephan’s et al. described the circular effect in the following way: “That is, psychological and behavioral consequences of threat have an impact on future relations between groups by influencing the variables considered to be ‘antecedents’ of threat. For instance, if people respond to threats by acting aggressively toward the outgroup, their actions will become a component of their subsequent perceptions of ‘prior intergroup conflict’ and have
an impact on perceptions of threat and the outcomes of these threats and so on.” (Stephan et al. 2008: 62)

In Stephan’s et. al (2009: 27) concluding comments additional aspects and consequences of threats are suggested for further investigation. This thesis aims to take a closer look on three of those suggestions in addition to the original outcomes of threats. The analysis aims to investigate: what actions on the part of outgroup that cause the greatest perceptions of threat, if different elements of realistic or symbolic threat have different consequences and how threats are affected by multiple cross-cutting identities such as Palestinian Lebanese and Palestinian Syrian.
4 Method

4.1 Intergroup Threat Theory

Since this study has been financed by Sida and their Minor Field Study-scholarship the focus of the thesis naturally lies in the findings of the empirical data collected through observations and interviews in the field. The empirical data has been gathered during nine weeks in Lebanon between December 2016 and February 2017. The data has been gathered in three different ways that will be explained more thoroughly in the coming sections. The first six weeks of the field study was used for participant observation and semi-structured focus groups in order to gain a greater understanding of the actual situation beyond the textbooks and reports as well as to get a better idea of the upcoming design of the questionnaire. During the last three weeks, the main source of information was conducted through semi structured interviews with leading Palestinian NGO’s as well as PRL and PRS in Baddawi Camp, Shatila Camp and El Buss Camp. These methods have been used in order to triangulate the final result of the interviews in order to understand the answers from more than one perspective. Apart from the empirical approach this thesis has a significant theoretical approach with a focus on understanding the empirical findings through the intergroup threat theory-framework discussed in chapter three. It is important to emphasize that no general conclusions can be drawn from this study since it is a qualitative study conducted on a small number of informants. The study, however, seeks to provide additional information which hopefully can be a part of a greater understanding of why prejudice and intergroup threats occur when one refugee group acts hosts for another refugee group.

4.2 Case selection

In the aftermath of the Syrian crisis and its consequences the focus of the majority of the articles and reports published has been directed toward the situation for Syrian refugees and the Lebanese struggle of handling the nearly two million refugees in a country of four million. In this overwhelming crisis, the attention of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and the Palestinian refugees from Syria residing in Lebanon has largely been forgotten due to a) their permanent refugee status and b) their status as Palestinian refugees and not Syrian (Charles and Denman 2013).
In the few reported cases the hardships facing Palestinians in Lebanon has been the focus. However, little attention has been shown for the fact that the Palestinians in Lebanon actually consists of two groups, the PRL and the PRS, with different background in terms of rights and traditions. Therefore, this thesis aims to study the relationships that occur when one Palestinian refugee group becomes host for another, different, Palestinian refugee group. The study will take place in three different camps, El Buss, Shatila and Baddawi. These three camps were chosen because of their different geographic locations (south, centre and north) as well as their reputation as more and less conservative. El Buss is known as the most liberal camp of the three, Baddawi as the most conservative and Shatila as a mix due to its mix of many different refugee groups. By choosing to conduct the interviews in camps that are both located in different parts of the country and differ when it comes to traditions and values the result will be slightly more generalizable and hopefully some type of pattern can be found.

4.3 Semi structured interviews

The main source of information for this study has been semi-structured interviews with in total five PRL and five PRS living in three different Palestinian Refugee Camps located in the south, centre and north of Lebanon. In addition to that two semi structured interviews have been conducted with the managers of two of the largest Palestinian NGO’s operating in Lebanon. Semi structured interviews has been chosen as the main method of information gathering for several reasons. First of all it is an unique way of gaining information and learning “of individual perspectives of one or a few narrowly defined themes” (Höglund and Öberg 2011). Secondly it is format that allow the interviewer to follow up the formalized questions with new leads which can lead to greater insight and a better understanding of the informant’s point of view. Thirdly it gives a better in-depth insight to the problem than any type of quantitative study with surveys could have done.

As Karen Brounéus points out in the book “Understanding Peace Research: Methods and Challenges” (Höglund and Öberg 2011) “The selection of interviewees for in-depth interviewing can be guided by the principle of credibility: what sources will maximize the reliability and validity of the results” (p.134). In this study, I have identified three groups of sources that maximize the reliability and validity. The first two are the PRL and the PRS since they are the main informant and naturally the most knowledgeable sources to find. The third group of sources is the leading NGO:s operating in the specific camps where my PRL and PRS informants lives. The NGO:s possesses a rich and broad amount of information about the situation which they continually gain through their work in the field and
close contact to the informants (Höglund and Öberg: 134). This gave me an opportunity to understand the situation from the donor’s ‘unbiased’ point of view. However, the donor’s or the NGO’s might have an political or ideological agenda which aims to favour their cause or the view on situation, something I kept close in mind during the study (Klave 2014:111). As a method of finding relevant informants for the study I used the snowball effect. This process included using my personal connections in the camps and my contacts in the NGO’s so as to find relevant and informed informants. In order to limit the negative effect of interlinked informants that share the same experiences I tried to ask for informants that were not connected in any way, nevertheless it is impossible to completely avoid.

The design of the interview guide followed Brounéus four steps in “How to build an in-depth interview” (Höglund and Öberg: 139). In the initial face, before starting the recording device I would introduce myself, the aim of the research and their right to anonymity. Thereafter I would ask if I had their permission to record the interview whereupon I would start recording the interview. The second step is to ask the initial questions which in my case regarded information about their age, place of birth, if they identified as Palestinian plus their country of residence, solely their country of residence or solely as Palestinian. These “easy” questions are asked in an attempt to make the interviewee feel comfortable and confident in their ability to give answers. The third step consists of the “mid-interview” which is the heart of the interview where more intellectual and emotionally demanding questions are asked. The “mid-interview”-questions, which can be found in the appendix, are asked to explore and gain new information about the core issue of the study at the same time as they are firmly anchored in theory. The nature of these questions are broad since they are sought to be followed by follow up questions regarding the specific answers. The last part and step of the interview is to close the interview in a gentle way and give opportunity to the interviewee to ask questions or clarify answers.

Since all the interviews except the ones conducted with the managers of the NGO’s were done in Arabic a professional interpreter was used. Considering the sensible topic, it was important for me that the interpreter had knowledge about the research subject and the situation for the informants, in addition to these criteria’s I followed the advice of Murray and Wynne (2001) who states that the interpreter should have a proficiency in both languages, be able to express the same intonations as the interviewer and have a degree of commonality, such as class, religion and gender, with the informants. This matter was specifically important to me since I learned, by experience and conversations, that many Palestinians lacked trust in Lebanese citizens because of the discrimination many have witnessed. This view was also shared by the local Palestinian NGO’s I spoke to, therefore I decided that the interpreter would preferably be a young Palestinian woman that would pose no hierarchal threat to the male interviewees at the same time as the female interviewees would not feel any patriarchal threat from a male interpreter (Höglund
and Öberg 2011). The interpreter I hired was recommended to me by a Norwegian journalist I met through a friend. She was Palestinian by birth, grew up in one of the camps, shared the same religion (Islam) as the interviewees, facts that made her “culturally proficient” and very helpful in the design of the follow up questions. The interpreter was, according to research standards, thoroughly briefed before the interviews, both on her role as an interpreter as well as the subject and the interview questionnaire (Murray and Wynne 2001: 169).

4.4 Semi structured focus groups and participant observations

During the first weeks of the field study I decided to broaden my picture of the situation for Palestinian refugees and the potential conflict between PRL and PRS. This was primarily done by following Morgan’s (1997) advice on why focus groups can be an important source of information “Group discussions provide direct evidence about similarities and differences in the participants' opinions and experiences as opposed to reaching such conclusions from post hoc analyses of separate statements from each interviewee.”. Therefore, I conducted two female and two male focus group within the PRL and the PRS community with a focus on (1) their greatest concerns about their situation today, (2) life before the Syrian Crisis (in Lebanon for PRL and in Syria for PRS), (3) the biggest change since the crisis and (4) their experience of the situation and relationship between the PRL and PRS. The focus groups were held in Borj Chamali Camp, Rachidieh Camp and Baddawi Camp. Unfortunately, I was not able to find a professional interpreter to interpret the focus groups which resulted in substandard translations that were deficient for transcription. Therefore the semi structured focus groups led to greater understanding of the situation rather than proper written material for this thesis.

Complementary to the organized interviews with the PRL, the PRS and the NGO directors, participant observation has been used as a method to observe the routines, conversations and life of the refugees in the camps. With participant observation researchers can, according to Professor Siah Hwee Ang understand what type of questions that are suitable and important as well as "…uncover factors important for a thorough understanding of the research problem but that were unknown when the study was designed. Thus, what we learn from participant observation can help us not only to understand data collected through other methods (such as interviews, focus groups, and quantitative research methods), but also to design questions for those methods that will give us the best understanding of the phenomenon being studied." (2014: 153). The observations took place during multiple visits to El Buss and Baddawi Camp as well as during a six-night stay in Shatila Camp. It is however important to be aware that participant observations may not always show the full
truth since the presence of an outsider might change their behaviour. Another problematic issue is that of language skills, since an interpreter has been used important nuances and content might have been missed.

4.5 Ethical considerations

This thesis touches upon several sensible and hard topics by its nature, therefore, several ethical considerations has been taken into account prior to performing the field study. Preceding the discussion regarding the considerations made for the field study it is important to acknowledge my role as a researcher. Since I have lived all my life in a peaceful country, never experienced any type of displacement and holds values which might not comply with the interviewee's the importance of my self-knowledge is vital for my approach toward the interviewees and the Palestinian/Lebanese/Syrian culture. Furthermore, informants will be in a situation constructed solely by me where I ask questions which might be sensitive and hard, therefore the interviewees knowledge about the study, me as a researcher and the use of their answers must been clear from the beginning. These ethical decisions are dependent on my knowledge about the situation and the differences we might have and are crucial for the quality of the scientific research (Teorell och Svensson 2007:21). Therefore I have throughout the field study followed the Swedish Research Council guidelines for "research ethical principles" (Vetenskapsrådet 2002). This involves four main requirements: informed consent, the right to confidentiality, how the research material is going to be used and the purpose of the study. Apart from implementing these four ethic codes I’ve also taken into consideration how the interviews might affect the interviewees during and after the interviews (Kvale 2009: 99). Furthermore, it is important to highlight the sensibility of the main subject of this thesis, the refugees. Being a Palestinian refugee in Lebanon comes with institutional discrimination, lack of rights and often severe poverty which puts them in a extremely vulnerable situation. Therefore, I have done my best to secure that the informants are comfortable, well informed and aware of who I am and what my purpose of the interview is.
5 Results and analysis

This study has shown that the situation for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is dire. The relationship between the PRL and PRS is complex and differs from camp to camp. In total, five PRL and six PRS has been interviewed in three different official refugee camps; El Buss, Shatila and Baddawi. In this chapter, the general findings of the situation for the PRL and PRS will be presented followed by four subchapters presenting and analysing the significant findings of the interviews according to The Intergroup Threat Theory.

All eleven informants expressed great concern and dejection over the current situation for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The situation was described by both parts (PRS and PRL) as “horrible” and “below zero” with major concerns regarding the incapacity of the UNRWA and the local NGO’s due to the record high demand and number of hardship cases. According to Bassam, a 47 year old PRL pastry maker living in El Buss Camp, there used to be some justice in the distribution of aid before the Syrian Crisis broke out and everyone who needed medical services could receive it. Today the situation is different and only the rare cases gets attention, the rest has to pay up to several hundreds of dollars for medication or surgery, often leaving many patients uncured with diseases and pain. Along with the medical clinics, the schools and infrastructure of the camps has been greatly affected by the “high” influx of refugees in the camps. Only in El Buss, Shatila and Baddawi the population has increased with up to 30 % during the last six years (UNHCR 2016). At the same time, the funding and attention of the international community has largely been directed toward the Syrian refugees; leaving the Palestinian refugees in an increasingly vulnerable situation that they faced before the crisis. The overcrowded camps in combination with the high rents and the incapability of finding work were in all focus group discussions pointed out as the most acute problems causing distress and vexation among the refugees. Several of the PRS admitted the immense difference from their lives in Syria had left them with depression and resignation. Naturally, the recent uprooting from a privileged life (in terms of rights) in Syria has left the PRS in greater despair and with worse prospects than the “acclimatized” PRL-community. Abed, a PRS father of three interviewed in Shatila points out that he is under constant psychological pressure due to the miserable situation and incapability of providing for his kids forcing him to consider hiring a smuggler to take the family to Europe by boat. At the same time several PRL accused the PRS of “stealing” their share of the aid and their jobs causing an unbearable situation for everyone.
5.1 Results according to the Intergroup Threat Theory

In this and the following subchapters, the result will be presented and analysed according to the Intergroup Threat Theory in order to test if the empirical findings fit with the theoretical framework. The results are presented in four steps analysing each type of threat and its antecedents individually. In order to deliver an overview of the findings a figure presenting the main findings and obstacles is attached below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of threat</th>
<th>Experiences of threat found in field study</th>
<th>Consequences of threat found in field study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic individual threats</td>
<td>Wage war, discrimination, rumours, patriarchal shaming</td>
<td>Isolation, undermining of individual’s self-esteem, anger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic group threats</td>
<td>Conservative values versus liberal values, treatment of women, relationship between sexes</td>
<td>Division, anger, prejudices, hyper masculine codes of behaviour, discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realistic individual threats</td>
<td>Bullying, physical beating, fear of leaving the house, loss of income</td>
<td>Isolation, prejudice, depression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realistic group threats</td>
<td>Loss of services, competition over aid and economic means, lost impact potential</td>
<td>Prejudice, anger, marginalization, discrimination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.1.1 Discrimination and wage war leads to symbolic individual threats

“Allah does not even discriminate between Arabs and foreigner. Between the Jews and the Christians. Why are we facing discrimination for being Syrian Palestinians?”, those are the words of 19 year old Azzah, a PRS women living in El Buss Camp. She shares the experiences held by many of the interviewed PRS, that symbolic individual discrimination from the PRL community is a part of the everyday life in Lebanon. The most common kind is the verbal insults such as blaming them for the poor situation, calling them “Syrians” instead of Palestinians and being verbally harassed on the streets for the way the women dress. These threats are mostly raised by the female PRS informants and the men tend to speak more easily about the problems and Abed, a 36 year old PRS living in Shatila says that “the adults and the elders know how to pay respect, the teenagers however blame the PRS and SRS for taking their jobs.”. This picture is shared by the majority of the PRL informants, they portray a situation where discrimination against the PRS is limited to “the young angry adults” and is not considered a problem. At the same time some of the PRL openly state the prejudices...
between the groups that the PRS has experienced. For example, Bassam, a 47 year old pastry maker living in El Buss camp says that “The PRS man is in control of the woman. It is their tradition and culture”. Even if the PRS informants from all camps has experienced symbolic individual discrimination, El Buss Camp stood out as the Camp where these type of threats were most common. The reason behind this might be that El Buss Camp is considered to be one of the most liberal Camps. The conservative PRS community might therefore had a harder time to fit in and adjust.

Another symbolic individual threat that is brought up by several of the informants is the wage war or the symbolic dispute over salaries. Due to the PRS more vulnerable situation many of them are prone to accept a lower salary than the PRL, creating social dumping that cause tension between the groups. Several of the PRL informants stated that the PRS settle for unacceptable salaries and that they should be ashamed for doing so. Bassam in El Buss Camp, says that the common opinion when it comes to jobs is that the “PRL are worthier of the spot”, since they have lived in the country for a longer time. At the same time Bassam is understanding the position of the PRS and says that the harassment against them for settling for a lower salary is creating misplaced anger since the “youths are just pouring their anger” on the newly arrived since they are “deprived and frustrated at anything that comes their way”. This is a feeling shared by many of the PRS and Hanadi, a 25 year old PRS volunteering in a print shop for 100 USD a month, connects many of the circulating rumours to the feeling of being unwanted by the PRL in the first place.

5.1.2 How traditions and values can pose symbolic group threats

When it comes to symbolic group threats, there is one specific difference between the two groups that causes tensions according to almost all informants. Despite the harsh living conditions and marginalization, the PRL has over the years adopted the liberal Lebanese attitude to religion and traditions. Lebanon, which, unlike the majority of its neighbouring countries, is characterized by religious pluralism and western influences, mainly from the Christian upper class, with a more liberal approach to veil, tobacco and amity between the sexes. According to four of the interviewed PRS, the situation in Syria was diametrically different. They describe Syria as a very conservative country where the women stayed to themselves, friendship between the sexes, except from family-related, was very rare and many women stated that they never used to leave the house without the company of their husband or a male relative. However, the crisis in Syria and the refugee to Lebanon changed and challenged these patriarchal structures strongly when the Lebanese approach was exposed to them. In addition to that the PRS-women increased their awareness of a different reality and a more liberal approach towards tradition and religion, several informants felt a strong contempt from the PRL community for being so conservative. Even Hanadi, a 25 year old PRS living in Baddawi Camp, which is
considered one of the most conservative camps, stated that "There is no tolerance or acceptance here, not even from our relatives. They look down on us."

The redistribution of power and freedom for the women has thus proceeded slowly. The Intergroup Threat Theory states, that the size of the group might work as an antecedent of threat. In this case it seems to play an obstructing role in the integration since the smaller group of PRS feels threatened by the larger groups liberal views. This appears to have led to hyper masculine codes of behavior by some of the PRS in order to reassert normative gender roles (Charles and Denman 2013: 103). According to one of the informants this behaviour has led to patriarchal shaming from male PRS both against the women in their own group but also against the more liberal PRL women whom does not wear a veil or has male friends. At the same time, several of the informants admits that many of the PRS have begun adapting to the current situation and norms leading to more freedom for the PRS women and a decrease in early marriages and polygamy.

The symbolic group threats that exists has however consequences; discrimination comes from both ways and is often directed toward how women dress and interfere with men. Because of this prejudice appears from both sides where the majority of the PRL informants believe that the PRS are too conservative and the majority of the PRS informants believes that the PRL women dress inappropriate. These prejudices further deteriorates the situation and the ideas that the groups are different.

5.1.3 Why realistic individual threats lead to isolation and prejudice

The most concerning finding of this study was the realistic individual threat several of the PRS had experienced during their time in Lebanon. The study found that there was no doubt that the action of the outgroup that created the greatest perception of threat among the PRS was the direct verbal harassment and discrimination. Mohammed, a PRS living in El Buss Camp, described the harassment against his family members as so profound it had completely isolated them from the rest of the community. Except from vocal harassments calling them Syrians instead of Palestinians and urging them to go leave the camp his ten year old son had been threatened with wood sticks by young PRL several times. A female PRS living in the same camp states that the situation is so bad that her family is always on her guard not knowing when people will start to yell after them accusing them of taking their jobs. She states that she is afraid of letting her kids play in the street since the neighbours treat them badly and that the situation of deprivation and isolation is so bad she rather goes back to the war in Syria than stays any longer in the camp. After saying that she adds “And we know what war is like! We’ve been there! I am talking from experience! While we were in the hospital, the roof fell on our heads! My husband’s brother and sister were killed! My husband’s father’s legs were both cut off?”. The only interviewed PRS that does not witness discrimination is a man named Abdullah living and working in Baddawi Camp. He admits that some of the PRS face separation but according to him, who works full time as an internet café manager, it is because of
their isolated situation without employment where they do not encounter any PRL in an equal way. However, most PRL proclaims a different take on the relationship between the two groups, one without any discrimination against the PRS. According to Fadi, a 27 year old PRL also living in el Buss Camp, there used to be some tension between the groups but it only lasted for the first months, today he cannot recall any problems the two groups face. Bassam, another PRL from the same camp shares that position in whole stating that there are some problems with harassment but it is restricted to the youths: between the adults the situation is friendly and tension free. The reality, however, is according to the PRS much different, even if not all of the informants witness harassment, discrimination and threats of violence, the majority does. Except from resulting in alienation the isolation may in the future lead to depression and psychological problems.

5.1.4 Competition over economic means creates realistic group threats

What permeates all the interviews is the economic vulnerability both groups are facing. The situation has deteriorated sharply in recent years due to the large influx of SRS and PRS and the stress on both UNRWA and the local NGOs is significant. Except from the fact that the resources are insufficient and the camps are overcrowded dissatisfaction has risen from the way the crisis has been handled. The reason for this is to be found in the early efforts made immediately after the major influx in 2011. While the PRS in many cases lived for free at their relatives and friend’s houses, many of the PRL claim they received more attention and contributions than the PRL. This created a dissatisfaction with many PRLs who, according to customs and culture, stood for accommodation and food for their guests as long as they were in need of it. Suddenly, the hosts felt more disadvantaged than their guests, and despite the fact that they often were as vulnerable and deprived as their guests, their situation deteriorated even more when more PRS arrived. The reason for the unequal distribution of the aid and resources was that many of the organizations that operated in the early stage of the crisis were funded only to help refugees that were a consequence of the Syrian crisis. These selective measures were according to Leila, the director of the NGO Najdeh, sometimes creating more problems than they solved. Although the informants did not express this exact explanation of the situation, many stated that the services were not just. Momtaz, a PRL from Baddawi Camp, had a clear picture of how the PRS are living their lives today “they enjoy higher living standards thanks to the UNRWA and the local NGO’s which has made them spend a lot of aid money on excessive things such as make up and phones.”. If there is truth to be found in Momtaz’s statement of excessive spending is not clear, however, it is clear that his perception of the situation is that the PRS are entitled to their money which composes a realistic group threat for the PRL. This struggle for aid was also heavily raised in the focus groups and many accused, often without evidence, members of the other group for receiving more contributions than they were in need of. It is clear that the high-power group, the PRL, are in a position where they are afraid of losing the small amount of money and safety that they have while the low power group, the PRS, are in a position
where they try to regain something of what they once had in Syria. As Stephan et al (2009: 7) states, high power groups has more to lose and are more likely to respond to these kind of threats. The most considerable sign of this in the study was that this competition over aid and resources increased the marginalization of the PRS group in terms of prejudices and social life. By some PRL the PRS were also considered less Palestinian than the PRL since they acted more like the SRS in terms of the willingness to work for less. This strengthened the perceived realistic group threats among the PRL and the prejudices that the PRS were different was even more diluted by the “unequal” treatment by the NGO’s. Apart from the direct consequences these threats might lead to a future separation between the two groups, something that will be discussed further in chapter 6.1.
6 Discussion and conclusions

6.1 How cross-cutting identities are affecting the intergroup relationship and why it risks draining the Palestinian collective identity in Lebanon

The first major finding of this thesis is the important role the PRS cross-cutting identity played in the formation of the relationship to the PRL. Whilst both groups had strong collective Palestinian identity with profound collective memories and a shared worldview the Syrian ‘heritage’ of the PRS occurred to be an unexpected obstacle. For a majority of the PRL informants the PRS could not be considered only Palestinian since they were also from Syria. At the same time the PRL considered themselves only Palestinians despite their Lebanese background. A conflict of what was to be considered ‘a righteous Palestinian’ seemed to exist and while the picture was clear for the PRL the PRS, whom also considered themselves Syrians, did not seem to understand the conflict of the cross-cutting identities. It is likely to believe that the PRL’s attitude is based on their extreme marginalization from the Lebanese Society. Throughout their presence in Lebanon they have been considered refugees without rights or claims which has forced them into disparity and marginalization. The Lebanese identity has therefore never been considered adoptable for the PRL. This has most likely strengthened their Palestinian identity and especially their resistance identity further. At the same time the PRS were able to enjoy the same rights as the Syrians which paved way for integration and prosperity in their former homeland. Adopting the Syrian identity simultaneously as keeping their Palestinian one was therefore most likely never in conflict in Syria. However, when these two groups met on new premises the larger and more influential PRL group felt threatened by the privileged PRS that were used to a higher living standard and civil rights. Despite all the similarities between the two groups the PRS felt threatened by the PRL community for their Syrian heritage. This led to isolation, harassment and discrimination and divided the groups in two. It is impossible to say if the main reason behind the prejudices and discrimination from the PRL was the Syrian identity but there is no doubt it caused severe tension between the groups. What the possible outcomes of this conflict might be is hard to predict but it is clear that the current situation is generating unwanted tension between the two groups. It might also result in a divided Palestinian diaspora in Lebanon where the two groups stick to themselves in order not to create further tension. The consequences of such an outcome could easily drain the Palestinian collective identity in Lebanon and weaken the community’s position in negotiations regarding civil rights as well as speaking with one voice for the Palestinian cause.
6.2 Economic vulnerability constitutes the main antecedent of threat

The second major finding of this thesis is that the most important antecedent of threat in the intergroup relationship between PRL and PRS seemed to be due to the economic vulnerability of both groups. Even if the cross-cutting identity of the PRS discussed in the previous chapter was a dominant antecedent according to the PRS themselves there are reasons to believe the main antecedent creating threats symbolic and realistic threats is actually the economic disparity. Throughout the study a conflicting image of the situation was told by both groups. The PRS seemed to feel threatened by the PRL in several different ways whilst the majority of the PRL informants believed they had been very welcoming. However, what the PRL did not realize was that they simultaneously partly blamed the PRS for stealing their jobs, aid and right to services. Even if the PRL did not see this, the PRS certainly did and felt threatened by it. The conflicting image was most likely diluted by the extreme situation the PRS were in with drastic changes of living standards and freedom. It is also possible that PRS has, due to this vulnerable situation, has interpreted the threats as more realistic than they actually were. This leads us to the conclusion that whether it concerned realistic or symbolic threats on an individual or group level it could often be derived from the economic disparity of both groups. A sound relationship between the groups existed long before the crisis and there are reasons to believe that the differences between the groups did not cause tension at that time. This is due to the fact that the relationship was then voluntarily and not forced by any outer force. The extreme poverty and disparity combined with harsh prospects has most likely been a hotbed for the creation of prejudice and tension between the groups. Even if it is impossible to say, these are reasons to believe that in a less challenged situation many of the perceived threats would not have existed

6.3 Concluding comments and further research

There are several clear signs that the relationship between PRS and PRL is destructive and long-term unsustainable. The study has shown that this is mainly due to economic vulnerability and conflicting cross-cutting identities. There are reasons to believe that these destructive and isolating consequences can pose a long-term threat to both groups and the Palestinian cause. At present, the tensions result in both psychological and physical vulnerability in the form of depression, social isolation and feelings of depravation. Furthermore, it fragmentises the Palestinian identity by dividing it into two categories, something that might result in a hampered struggle for a future solution for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. If the conflicts, tensions and marginalization within the Palestinian diaspora increases further, a solution for the well-being of both groups is
less likely to be seen. The worsened and fragmented negotiating position this would put the Palestinians diaspora in Lebanon in would possibly even risk to harm the Palestinian cause in whole. Another potential consequence of the threats reported in the study is that the isolation and vulnerability of mainly young men might lead to radicalization when totalitarian and extreme groups increases their presence in the camps seeking to recruit deprived individuals without the hope of a better future. Such an outcome would likely worsen the security situation in both Lebanon, Syria and other conflict areas of the Middle East.

The problems and tensions reported in this thesis could possibly, to some extent, have been avoided or, at least, minimized, by a few early efforts. First of all, if UNRWA or the local NGO’s could have ensured equal services and aid to both the PRL and the PRS, some of the earliest grievances and frustrations could have been avoided. Secondly, by providing work or common activities for both groups, the integration of the PRS into the PRL community could have been speeded up leading to less misconceptions and prejudices. Thirdly, some type of determined placement of the PRS based on traditions and values could have led to a faster integrating for more conservative PRS into more conservative PRL communities. Lastly, this thesis must emphasize that the situation of Palestinians in Lebanon is utterly unsustainable and that strong efforts must be made from the Lebanese State to ratify the human rights of Palestinians, the UNRWA to strengthen the education and ability to find work, and the international community to pressure the Lebanese state as well as secure the services needed in the meanwhile

Considering the findings of this thesis it appears very relevant and important to use the Intergroup Threat Theory in order to study and understand the mechanisms and consequences of intergroup relations between different refugee groups. However, the findings of this thesis must be supported by several equal qualitative studies or extensive quantitative studies in order to draw any general conclusions. This thesis, nevertheless, argues that more studies should be made on intergroup refugee relationships in order to find possible improvements of their situations as well as preventing negative future outcomes.
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Appendix: Interview guide

Introduction and consent:
- Who I am, background, family
- Why I am there and what the purpose of the study is
- Their right of anonymity
- Ask if I have their permission to record the interview for personal use
- Inform that this interview only focuses on this specific area
- Ask about the interviewee have any questions before we start

Orientation questions:
1. Thank you for taking the time to sit down with me. To start with, in what country did you live the most part of your life?
2. Would you define yourself as Syrian-Palestinian or Palestinian Lebanese-Palestinian or Palestinian?
3. Can you tell me about how and with whom you live today?
4. How come you live in this specific camp?
5. How would you describe your life as a Palestinian refugee in Lebanon?
6. Do you work at the moment or have you had any work during the last year?

Exploration questions:
7. How did the PRL-community react when you first arrived in Lebanon?
   How did you and the PRL-community react when the PRS arrived?
8. What was your living situation like?
   Did you host any PRS
9. Did you experience any division or tension between the groups when you/the PRS arrived?
10. Have the attention you get from NGO:s in terms of aid and services changed since before the PRS arrived?
11. Are most of your friends today from the same community (PRL/PRS) as you are?
    a. How would you describe the atmosphere when PRL and PRS are together?
12. In what way would you say that the PRL/PRS-community is different from your community?
13. Do you experience any division between the groups today?
    a. Would you say that there is any specific issue that cause division between the groups?
       Economic?
       Social?
       Identity?
       Norms/Values?
       Political?
14. What are the consequences of this division/tensions?
15. Do you see a future in Lebanon?

Concluding question:
16. Is there anything else you would like to add that we have not discussed?
17. How did you find this interview?