Money Talks
A Realist Constructivist Account of the Motives of 21st Century Plutocrats

Author: Pauliina Parviainen
Abstract

Plutocracy is a subject that has not traditionally attracted the interest of scholars in the disciplines of International Relations and Political Science. This is unfortunate, as the number and importance of affluent private individuals in global affairs has steadily increased in recent decades. Since most existing academic research on contemporary plutocrats focuses on philanthropists and other ‘benefactors’, this research examines what drives the behaviour of the so-called ‘malefactors’ – in this case, enormously wealthy citizens from the Persian Gulf who fund Islamist extremism and the Koch brothers who fight against climate change mitigation efforts and U.S. government regulations. The research is guided by a realist constructivist hypothesis according to which plutocrats use their material assets to advance ideological causes that in the long run further increase their economic wealth. Qualitative content analysis was performed on select texts that dealt with these actors’ presumable and stated motives. The analysis of the Koch brothers suggested that the logic behind their political adventures closely followed this hypothesis. However, the case of Gulf plutocrats only partially confirmed the hypothesis, as ideological and identity-related reasons prevailed over material considerations in these actors’ motives.

Keywords: First Image, Koch, Plutocrat, Realist Constructivism, Terrorism Financing
Words: 19 952
Contents:

1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1
   1.1 Research problem and research question .............................................................................. 2
   1.2 Structure of the thesis ............................................................................................................ 4

2. Theoretical commitments ............................................................................................................ 5
   2.1 The first image ..................................................................................................................... 6
   2.2 The agent-structure debate .................................................................................................. 8
   2.3 Realist constructivism and smart power .............................................................................. 10

3. Methodology .............................................................................................................................. 13
   3.1 From hypothesis to interpretation ....................................................................................... 13
   3.2 Criteria for case selection and data collection ...................................................................... 14
   3.3 Qualitative content analysis ............................................................................................... 16

4. Analysis ....................................................................................................................................... 19
   Part I: The Koch brothers and American public policy .......................................................... 19
      4.1 The origins and nature of the Koch brothers’ political adventures ............................... 19
      4.2 What motivates the Koch brothers’ political manoeuvring? ........................................ 23
         4.2.1 Profits above all else .................................................................................................... 24
         4.2.2 Battle of ideas .............................................................................................................. 27
         4.2.3 Leaving a legacy .......................................................................................................... 31
   Part II: Gulf plutocrats and terrorism financing ................................................................. 35
      4.3 Contextualising private terrorism sponsorship in the Gulf region ........................... 35
      4.4 What motivates Gulf plutocrats to finance terrorism? .................................................. 39
         4.4.1 Terrorism as an investment ......................................................................................... 39
         4.4.2 Continuation of politics by other means ................................................................. 41
         4.4.3 True believers ............................................................................................................. 43

5. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 45
   5.1 Key findings and comparing remarks .................................................................................. 45
   5.2 Critical review and suggestions for future research .......................................................... 49

References
Appendix 1
1. Introduction

‘As a result of the disastrous Citizens United Supreme Court decision, billionaires and large corporations can now spend an unlimited amount of money to influence the political process. These billionaires already own much of our economy. That, apparently, is not enough. Now, they want to own the United States government as well.’

(U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders 2014)

‘These rich Arabs are like what ‘angel investors’ are to tech start-ups, except they are interested in starting up groups who want to stir up hatred. Groups like al-Nusrah and ISIS are better investments for them.’

(Investigative reporter Robert Windrem 2014)

***

This thesis analyses what motivates extremely affluent individuals to engage in actions that have global political and societal implications. It asks why wealthy private actors, informally and by bypassing conventional avenues of political participation, want to have a say in issues of regional and worldwide significance. It also asks whether or not realist constructivism can help us make sense of the likely motives of these private but politically oriented agents in a convincing and meaningful way.

These players have been described as ‘economic meritocrats’, ‘the new global elite’, ‘oligarchs’, and ‘puppet masters’, among other more or less flattering definitions varying from time to time and context to context. Many of these individuals, including those covered in my analysis, belong to the so-called ‘invisibly rich’ as a consequence of running private enterprises or of otherwise keeping a low, publicity-shy profile. This thesis refers to them as plutocrats: ‘[persons] with power or influence due to [their] wealth’ (Merriam-Webster 2017). In common parlance, these actors are often described as the ‘elite’ class of society: ‘[people] who have the most of what there is to have, which is generally held to include money, power, and prestige – as well as all the ways of life to which these lead’, and as people who on top of that occupy positions in major institutions (C. Wright Mills 2000: 9). Chapter 4 shows that individuals under examination in this thesis are easily recognisable from the above definitions.
1.1 Research problem and research question

Extraordinarily affluent private individuals who directly intervene in or more subtly shape formal political decision-making processes or the behaviour of non-state actors manage to make headlines from time to time, illustrated recently by president Trump and the individuals involved in the Panama Papers scandal (Deboer 2016). It is therefore interesting that plutocrats have been by and large absent from traditional International Relations (henceforth IR) theory. A literature survey on the topic implies that very limited attention has been given in the discipline to the role of highly influential individuals who are not politicians or state leaders as such but who instead exert influence via various alternative channels. Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of these works focus on global benefactors like Bill and Melinda Gates and George Soros.

What these accounts leave untouched is what motivates private actors other than the ‘good-doers’ to influence transnational political and social outcomes. Why are we not discussing players who deliberately shy away from the limelight and whose actions lack transparency and accountability? This thesis provides an exploration of this darker, more cynical side of the impact of private money on global matters.

There is no doubt that the influence of plutocrats’ political activities at the global level is voluminous, corresponding to the ample resources at these players’ disposal. Critical observers have noted with reference to what are arguably the world’s most exclusive elite gatherings, Bilderberg and the World Economic Forum:

‘It’s in forums like [the Bilderberg conference] that policy consensuses are formed, shaped and disseminated – and although the process is often unconscious, the outcomes are in no way random or accidental […] [The] consequences of these discreet, and largely unquestioned, forms of elite consensus have far reaching implications for all of us.’

(Richardson 2011)

‘For five days, the world’s leaders seem to agree on a narrative about how the world works. At Davos, even the most intractable differences are temporarily smothered by the globalisation consensus.’

(Rachman 2011)

This thesis does not examine Bilderberg or World Economic Forum attendees, or their motives for attendance; instead, it discusses two other empirical cases where affluent private individuals have engaged in matters of transnational political and societal significance. The first of these is the case of
Charles and David Koch: the brothers behind Koch Industries who jointly occupy place #8 on Forbes’ The World’s Billionaires 2017 list, each having accumulated wealth worth of nearly $50 billion (Forbes 2017). My second case concerns businessmen from the Persian Gulf who financially sponsor Islamist extremism, including al-Qaeda and ISIS. By exploring these two empirical cases, I seek an answer to the following research question:

**How can the motives of contemporary plutocrats who influence globally significant political and social projects or processes be interpreted from a realist constructivist perspective?**

This exploration responds to recent scholarly pleas to ‘bring the individual back in’ (European Consortium for Political Research 2017). It combines a slightly modified version of J. Samuel Barkin’s realist constructivism – a theoretical lens that has been relatively recently developed and only sparingly used – with a research topic that has not been previously studied with an explicit emphasis on the assumed and openly articulated motives of the actors involved. As such, the present thesis does a favour both to Barkin’s framework and to readers puzzled by what fuels private terrorism financing or the involvement of private domestic dynasties in U.S. politics. I use the word ‘assumed’ because real motives are not always revealed in any straightforward way by the actors themselves; instead, they are often more likely to be found in-between the lines or derived from something else the actor has said. There is even more reason to expect this to be the case when sensitive and controversial issues like terrorism financing are at stake.


Regrettably, apart from these scarce observations, motives of today’s politically oriented and wealthy private citizens have not been studied in any systematic manner. As the first explicit attempt to unearth the likely motives of contemporary plutocrats, this thesis is intended as a contribution to this nascent but currently not very extensive discussion. After all, hardly anyone can deny the notable importance of motives in determining and shaping human action; by extension, equally few can dismiss an attempt to reveal the motives of some of the world’s most powerful plutocrats as pointless or trivial.
1.2 Structure of the thesis

The thesis at hand is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides an overview of relevant previous IR theorising on individual agency and realist constructivism. These debates inform the development of my working hypothesis, which in turn guides my analysis in Chapter 4: namely, the expectation that material power enables plutocrats to promote ideological causes of their preference, and the ideological causes deemed worth advancing are those that bring home the greatest material benefits to these plutocrats.

Chapter 3 introduces the reader to the methodology and data used in this study. It clarifies my rationale for case selection and data collection, and details how I performed qualitative content analysis on the acquired materials. The aim of this chapter is to justify and make my methodological decisions as explicit as possible to the reader.

Chapter 4 first delves into the motives of the Koch brothers (Part 1) before proceeding to the motives of private financiers of Islamist extremism originating from countries in the Persian Gulf (Part 2).

Chapter 5 with its final remarks summarises my key findings, critically reviews the research project in retrospect, and suggests follow-up opportunities for future research on the topic. A list of references and an appendix of the texts analysed in Chapter 4 can be found at the end of this dissertation.
2. Theoretical commitments

As mentioned above, discussion on private individuals has not gained much traction in existing IR theory. While public figures in positions of power have been the focus of countless research efforts, references by IR scholars to plutocrats who engage in and shape local and global affairs in their myriad ways have been scant and passing at best. The present thesis intends to partly rectify this omission.

Admittedly, a vast body of contemporary IR literature does discuss one particular group of plutocrats - the so-called good-doers. Researchers of philanthropy and celebrity politics have problematized such distinct aspects of the phenomena as neo-colonial representations and stereotypes of ‘those in need’ (Bell 2013), celebrity discourses (Yrjölä 2012), the interplay of politics with popular culture (Street 2004), and the specifics and moral underpinnings of philanthrocapitalism (Rogers 2011 and McGoey 2012, respectively). These scholars have raised a number of pertinent questions regarding, i.a., the degree to which the ‘new philanthropy’ is really just about sugar-coating personal enrichment (McGoey 2012: 197) and burnishing personal or corporate images (Falksohn 2006), or whether the global economic elite should decide which policies poorer societies follow simply because they pay for it (Rogers 2011: 378).

Oddly enough, considerably fewer scholars seem interested in investigating why or to what effect plutocrats engage in dubious and controversial activities of equally great - if not greater - transnational relevance. Partzsch suggests that more scholarly attention should be paid especially to three emerging actors whose importance in international politics and global governance is expected to skyrocket in the coming years: celebrities, philanthropists, and social entrepreneurs (2016: 1). What I suggest is that, in order to fulfil our public duty as critical scholars, we should address the other side of the coin as well: the ‘malefactors’ whose undertakings, too, are IR and Global Studies problems par excellence.

This chapter situates my research problem within relevant IR debates and theoretical models, including Kenneth N. Waltz’s three images, Colin Wight’s multi-layered approach to agency, and Barkin’s realist constructivism. This cursory contextualisation makes my theoretical commitments, or roots, explicit and serves as argumentation for why I consider realist constructivism an appropriate analytical approach to my research problem. Towards the end of this chapter the interpretation of realist constructivism that I regard as most employable to the present research puzzle achieves its final form.


2.1 The first image

Historically, the first of Waltz’s three levels of analysis has not enjoyed very high popularity among IR scholars. Astrid Carrapatoso and Bernd Schlipphak lament that ‘[the] first image still seems to be disrespected and consequently less researched’, although this ‘is about to change as more and more empirical studies point out that the individual and its characteristics [do] have an impact on international relations’ (European Consortium for Political Research 2017). Apparently, not much had changed in this respect in more than ten years, as Wight remarked already in 1999 that ‘[the] concept of agency has received little attention within International Relations’ (1999: 126). By exploring what motivates contemporary plutocrats to influence transnationally significant politics and policies, I accommodate these so-far theoretically invisible but hugely powerful actors in the discipline of IR.

Waltz named the three main levels of analysis in IR the first, second, and third image in his 1959 classic *Man, the State, and War*. The book marked the first serious attempt at first image theorising in the discipline. My primary focus in this thesis is the first image, although already Waltz acknowledged that understanding international relations often requires taking into account all three, since analysis at one level only is likely to result in partial and limited accounts of whatever one tries to understand (Waltz 1959: 14). I return to this point later, but for a moment let’s keep with the first image.

The fact that Waltz theorised about public figures rather than private individuals does not need to mean that valuable lessons from his work could not be applied to my research problem. If, as the first image suggests, causes of individual action can be traced to human nature, it does not make much difference whether that individual is a politician or private businessman: both are representatives of the same species, *homo sapiens*. One can thus safely posit that Waltz’s first image is equally applicable to both groups, even if the author himself restricted his analysis to people in public positions. Importantly, just as ‘first-image-only’ explanations restrict our understanding of the social world by belittling the role of the state and the international system, traditional agential IR theorising that focuses exclusively on public figures results in equally limited accounts as it ignores the private dimension of individual agency. The remaining of this sub-section contemplates the nature of individual agency.

Waltz, along with most other realists, believed that people are self-interested by their very nature. However, it does not automatically follow from this that they will behave rationally: Passion, rather than reason, fuels self-interest and guides human decision-making, although reason can restrain this passion to a degree (1959: 23-24). Hence, the maximisation of self-interest is not necessarily the logical
consequence of calm and rational calculation but is instead driven by irrational and often unpredictable sentiments. Both reason and passion, rational choice and emotion, are likely to feature in the considerations of both the Koch brothers and Gulf terrorism financiers. Judgement of the relative weight of each is saved for Chapter 4.

In addition to being often seen as preoccupied with the concepts of self-interest and rational choice, realists are regularly accused of downplaying the role of ethics in international relations. On these grounds their critics have quickly declared that social constructivism and realism simply cannot cross paths. However, even such formidable realist figures as Hans J. Morgenthau have assured that ‘people are inherently moral as well as political animals’, and that all social action takes its ultimate form as a result of negotiation between the demands of power and those of ethics (Barkin 2003: 333). In the context of the present research problem, one could ask how big a role normative considerations and values play in plutocrats’ motives. Such considerations cannot be measured in crude terms nor are they always explicitly uttered in speech or writing. What acceptance of this position suggests from a methodological point of view is that the researcher somehow needs to access the ideational meanings actors attach to their actions. One such way is qualitative content analysis – my chosen research method.

Variation and diversity in human action is nearly endless, leaving one wondering how any fixed definition of human nature can convincingly make sense of the broad range of different actions and events we observe in the social world (Waltz 1959: 27). In keeping with the first image, we might rightly state that, for better or worse, the most important causes of political and social action can be found in human nature, but that this only gets us half way (ibid.: 42). Not everything can be reduced to the individual level. In Waltz’s own words, ‘human nature cannot […] be the single determinant’ (ibid.: 81). As a result, the researcher should also remain sensitive to external contexts, constraints, and incentives conditioning plutocrats’ efforts to bring about political and social change.

Hence, the ECPR plea to ‘bring the individual back in’ should not be understood as a call for more first-image-only theorising. Waltz was correct in reminding us that focus on any one image ‘may distort one’s interpretation of the others’ (1959: 160) and that ‘no single image is ever adequate’ (225). Rather, ‘bring the individual back in’ should more accurately be read as a theoretical exhortation for IR scholars to pay more attention to the private side of the first image. In practical terms, we should include in our analyses not only traditional political players but also private actors like plutocrats so as to keep up with changing circumstances, including the persistent rise and increasing influence of non-state actors in global politics.
2.2 The agent-structure debate

Calls for more attention to the first image tangle us to the enduring IR debate on agents and structures. For quite some time, scholars in the field have debated the relative importance of individual actors versus structural circumstances in affecting international outcomes. Alexander Wendt originally maintained that ‘social action […] is “co-determined” by the properties of both agents and social structures’ (1987: 365). Wendt’s position is echoed by Colin Wight, who, citing Roy Bhaskar, claims that ‘[n]othing happens in the social world save in virtue of human agency but in order to act in the social world agents must draw on antecedent materials’ (1999: 115). Hence, agents and structures cannot be told apart either theoretically or empirically.

Richardson invokes the agent-structure debate in his attempt to clear ground for more IR theorising that emphasises particularly the agent side of this debate – a theoretical preference that is also more in line with my approach in this thesis. He claims: ‘The omission of individual agency […] is curious since the structures within which individuals are assumed to be constrained were created by human beings and could not continue to exist without their […] participation’ (2009: 28).

What makes things curious is that structures tend to be invisible while agents – at least as far as individuals go – are easily discernable as physical subjects. Luckily, however, we can analyse the significance of even the most abstract of structures by observing their consequences in individual action, much in the same way as we can assure ourselves of the existence of unobservable elements of the social world by witnessing their observable consequences (Halperin & Heath 2012: 36). With respect to my research problem, one need not only focus on motives that are tangible and easily discernible from outside, such as economic gains or the reoccupation of territory - one can also look at the consequences of plutocrats’ actions and from these derive the likely motives underpinning their actions.

Acceptance of the importance of both structures and agents does not need to suggest that both had to be taken into account to the same extent. Not least for clarity’s sake, or due to time and space constraints, researchers often settle for intellectual explorations that emphasise only one or sometimes two of Waltz’s three images, or favour agents relatively more than structures or vice versa. Naturally, compelling grounds for such decisions, inclusions and exclusions, need to be presented. As alluded to in the above, what underpins my focus on agents in general and private individuals in particular is their apparent and unwarranted exclusion thus far from mainstream IR theory. Due to the nature of my research question, I find it legitimate to concentrate on individual agency rather than on structural circumstances. That said, I
still try and acknowledge the external forces that seem to have influenced plutocrats’ behaviour when I encounter them. However, since the invitation to ‘bring the individual back in’ was what initially drew me to this research problem, a focus on the individual defines my analysis in Chapter 4.

Some researchers have gone further than just criticising demands for the equal treatment of agents and structures. These scholars have distanced themselves from the confines of the conventional agent-structure debate, calling it unproductive and proposing alternative conceptualisations in place of the traditional narrative. Wight’s multi-layered approach to agency represents one such attempt to move beyond the limits of the current conversation. In Wight’s tripartite formulation three forms of individual agency coexist, with agency$_1$ denoting the person’s ability to act, agency$_2$ indicating her status as an agent of something, and agency$_3$ referring to her positioned-practice(s) (1999: 133-135). It does not need to follow from nuanced approaches of agency like this that structure be altogether downplayed: Quite the contrary, ‘we are born into a structurally ordered social system in which properties [...] are acquired involuntaristically’ and ‘[agents] are positioned in the social field’ (ibid.: 134).

An example from the world of plutocrats mimicking the one Wight puts forth in his article might make his model more comprehensible. Consider an affluent private citizen, B. B is a unique individual with a personality and appearances entirely of his own; this is agency$_1$. B has wealthy parents and he was born rich and privileged, making him a representative of this elite class and giving him agency$_2$. Finally, B’s occupation as chairman of board at religious charity Z adds a third dimension of agency to his identity: agency$_3$ is his positioned-practice, a place he occupies as a representative of and on behalf of his agency$_2$. Chapter 4 reveals that individuals in both Cases 1 and 2 fit this model, lending additional credence to my argument that private actors can be accommodated within current IR theory.

Linking up attributes of human nature and the agent-structure debate, Wight argues that agency$_2$ precedes agencies$_1$ and$_3$ in time: we are born into a given society (agency$_2$) before we even have capacity to act in it (agency$_1$), or to acquire specific roles in it (agency$_3$) (1999: 134). This suggests that humans are a social species by their very nature, and precisely this notion of our innate sociability allows for an examination of the compatibility between realism and social constructivism: a theme to be addressed next.
2.3 Realist constructivism and smart power

Jennifer Sterling-Folker argues that realists reduce such universal and ancient phenomena in human history as the formation of societies, power struggles, and conflicts between rivalling collectives to the social in human nature (2004: 342). She further recalls that social constructivists typically hold that our capacities as human beings remain dormant until we come into contact with other people (ibid.). These remarks hint at the potential of marriage of the two paradigms in realist constructivism. Sterling-Folker summarises the starting point of both theories elegantly: ‘[Our innate] sociability accounts for what both perspectives have observed: we are inevitably and simultaneously capable of unity-universalism and division-particularism’ (ibid.). The belief of both realists and constructivists in the universally social nature of individuals represents a promising first step towards a variant of realist constructivism with which to examine the motives of 21st century plutocrats. According to Barkin, ‘all social theory must begin with some theory of human nature’ (2003: 330). This might as well be the starting point of ours.

Barkin’s realist constructivism is a theoretical approach that reconciles realism’s preoccupation with power with constructivism’s understanding of global politics as a social construction (2003: 325). He develops the formulation of this integrative approach by refuting what he views as common misconceptions of classical realism. Misconceptions concerning the paradigm’s understanding of human nature were identified in sub-section 2.1. Another common but mistaken preconception regarding the core of realism assumes the paradigm to be exclusively concerned with material power. Barkin points out that in addition to military and economic resources, power can also originate from immaterial sources like doctrines (ibid.: 329-330). Richard Ned Lebow shares this stance, confirming that even the hard-core realists Morgenthau, Thucydides, and Carl von Clausewitz regarded identities and values as superior to material circumstances as determinants of political action (2004: 346).

It is noteworthy that the above authors thought of traditional political actors like state leaders when making their remarks. I justify my decision to apply their observations to private individuals with my earlier argument on the natural sameness of public and private individuals as representatives of the same species. Not everyone necessarily approves of such theoretical unorthodoxy. To those readers my only defence is that changing empirical circumstances require flexibility and imagination. Theory should ideally reflect reality, and even classics need to be interpreted and applied in fresh ways so as to ensure their relevancy.
In a nutshell, Barkin’s realist constructivism boils down to the following: (1) an understanding of human nature as social and self-interested, yet ethical; (2) a permissive conception of the sources of power as both material/observable and immaterial/unobservable. Barkin’s article spurred a number of scholars to articulate their respective stances to it, oppose arguments in the original piece, and refine his ideas. These responses were welcomed, as Barkin openly encouraged fellow academics not only to adopt his framework but also to adjust its components to better suit different research questions (2004: 349). I now proceed to introduce my development suggestion: the variant of realist constructivism I apply to my specific research puzzle in Chapter 4.

Janice Bially Mattern (2004) and Giulio M. Gallarotti (2010) propose that the concept of power should constitute the crux of the (un)holy alliance between realism and social constructivism. By following this proposal one can remain faithful to the realist inevitability and centrality of power considerations, while acknowledging in constructivist spirit that the forms of this power can be both material and immaterial and that power as such is an intersubjectively constructed concept (Bially Mattern 2004: 345). As Gallarotti puts it: ‘[…] nothing in [c]onstructivism […] proscribes power augmentation or even optimisation’ (2010: 44). And conversely: the surest route to the realist fundamentals of power and security is ‘diversification among hard and soft power resources’ (ibid.: 45). Gallarotti calls such manoeuvring an exercise of ‘smart’ power, arguing that physical and economic strength need to be combined with discursive or normative power in a world where globalisation has brought about a ‘hazy power space’ (2010: 4). Or, in relation to my research problem: ‘[…] to understand the real significance of elites in world affairs today, we need to look beyond crude ideas of power’ (Richardson et al. 2011: 2).

In conclusion, influencing the behaviour of others with the help of observable and unobservable instruments of power is compatible with the core of both realist and constructivist thought. The surrounding spatio-temporal contexts – structures - determine which assortment of power tools is the most appropriate one to employ. Adjusted to the research problem of this thesis, one can hypothesise that as a rule of thumb plutocrats exercise unobservable power to help bring about outcomes that benefit themselves materially. My expectation is that the material wealth plutocrats possess and their ability to mobilise that wealth effectively allow these individuals to promote ideological projects that in the long run would positively affect their economic assets. The relationship between the material and immaterial is thus expected to unfold in an essentially cyclical manner.
The above hypothesis not only clings right to the heart of realist constructivism by emphasising the complicated and multifaceted nature of power, but it also provides an effective instrument for killing two birds with one stone by linking a thus-far under-researched phenomenon with a theoretical perspective that has so far lent itself to very little empirical application. That said, I do not intend to claim that the findings of my forthcoming analysis can be reliably generalised to every existing empirical case in the world featuring a plutocrat who wants to make their money ‘talk’ to their advantage. Furthermore, economic wealth does not always lead to attempts to alter the prevailing consensus, even in the presence of powerful ideological incentives towards that end; however, if external circumstances and individual predispositions are favorable, such pattern of behaviour might well emerge.

Chapter 4 shows whether and to what extent my hypothesis is able to account for the motives of contemporary politically acting, affluent private individuals, and whether my expectation regarding the relationship between material and ideational considerations holds up to empirical evidence or conversely becomes rejected.
3. Methodology

This chapter unwraps the methodological core of this thesis. Sub-section 3.1 clarifies how I converted my working hypothesis into an interpretative tool; sub-section 3.2 provides rationale for case selection and data collection, and touches on potential ethical issues pertaining to this research project; finally, sub-section 3.3 explains why I opted for qualitative content analysis and spells out my coding approach.

3.1 From hypothesis to interpretation

Chapter 2 concluded by presenting my definition of realist constructivism and the hypothesis that emerged from this definition. With regard to the cases of both the Kochs and Gulf terrorism financiers, I expected to find a pattern whereby material assets enable these plutocrats to advocate ideological causes of their preference, and that the causes they choose to support in the first place are those that ultimately benefit them materially the most. As noted above, this statement is consistent with realist constructivism’s acceptance of the importance of both observable and unobservable facts in the social world and by consequence in the world of international affairs.

Interpretation is a central concept in this thesis. The terms ‘material’ and ‘immaterial’ at the heart of realist constructivism serve as conceptual instruments with which I approach and interpret my data: relevant expressions in the texts are those that refer to either material or immaterial motives. Qualitative research has typically aimed at thick description and deep understanding of a given phenomenon, and has considered the ability to present sustainable, solid, and justifiable interpretations as perhaps the most supreme virtue of a researcher. Other methodological attributes like statistical generalisability, commonplace in quantitative research, are generally seen as much more alien and even inappropriate standards against which to evaluate a given research effort (Eskola & Suoranta 1998: 61-67).

Those familiar with qualitative research readily accept that every interpretation is in some way loaded, and that no absolute truth claim can be established about the social world. The best we can achieve is several competing truths and possible meanings that can be ranked in order based on their plausibility: how convincingly they have been argued for and how critical the researcher has been about her subjectivity (Eskola & Suoranta 1998: 211-213). The present thesis does not break from this tradition; therefore, it also needs to be assessed on the above criteria.
3.2 Criteria for case selection and data collection

As mentioned above, I put my hypothesis to test by vetting it against reality in two empirical cases – the Koch brothers and Gulf terrorism financiers – in order to find out how it performs in these two very different contexts. Geographically speaking, the two cases have their origins in the United States and the Middle East, but neither is entirely local in their modus operandi and impact. Regrettably, the scope of this assignment as well as practical obstacles such as time constraints and the skill levels of yours truly made the analysis of only two cases an unavoidable compromise. It probably goes without saying that no matter how rigorous a perusal, when only two cases are examined, any finding - whether confirming or challenging – needs to be treated with adequate caution, and the conclusions drawn from it viewed as tentative and rather modest in robustness (Halperin & Heath 2012: 217).

Judging from the lack of previous research on these two cases, I suspect that not everyone necessarily regards them as critical and might thus question my decision to study the Kochs and Gulf terrorism sponsors. I therefore want to explain why I picked these two out of the available alternatives. First, the phenomena both parties are associated with – climate change and Islamist extremism – are among the most hotly debated empirical issues in IR today. The ways in which the Koch brothers and Gulf plutocrats are challenging the present world order by fighting against climate change mitigation efforts and by economically supporting terrorist groups pose serious risks to the global society at large, calling for responses and solutions from politicians and researchers. Second, both global threats and especially terrorism appear in the news on a recurring basis, indicating a strong public interest in them. Both topics are thus relevant to readers from in and outside the academia alike.

The Koch brothers and Gulf plutocrats, along with other ‘malefactors’, have also been largely neglected by IR scholars studying other private, globally acting individuals like the Gates, Soros, and Bono, suggesting that it is now absolutely vital to subject the ‘shadier’ side of the phenomenon under critical analysis for a change. Alternatively, I could have analysed the motives of Russian oligarchs, sponsors of the Tamil Tigers, or patrons of international drug cartels, for instance. There was no special reason to assume that the Kochs or Gulf terrorism financiers were exceptionally revelatory with respect to their motives, but neither was there reason to expect that any of the above examples held this advantage. In this sense, case selection in this thesis can be considered neutral.

The intention of this thesis is not to generalise patterns observed in my sample to wider populations of materials or to cases not discussed here; instead, the intention is to perform in-depth analyses of two
complex examples of contemporary plutocracy. For this reason, it was more sensible to select the materials studied in this research using a discretionary rather than random sampling strategy: in other words, choosing sources that seemed capable of providing answers to my research question (Eskola & Suoranta 1998: 18). The extent to which findings of my analysis can be considered valid and reliable depends on how strong and defendable my argumentation is - not on how widely the findings can be extrapolated (Halperin and Heath 2012: 328). By describing my analytical approach as unambiguously as possible I hope to encourage others to apply my procedures to new environments. I also try to make it effortless for the reader to follow my logic and draw their own conclusions based on the data I have presented.

As the name suggests, quality prevails over quantity in qualitative research, and an appropriate amount of data is synonymous to what is a necessary amount, as the size of the data set has no immediate impact on the successful implementation of the research project (Eskola & Suoranta 1998: 61-63). In order to avoid the pitfall of building one’s interpretations on random observations in the data, one needs to know their sources comprehensively, which of course is easier if the sample is small (ibid.: 120-121). The documents analysed in this thesis were picked with the below criteria in mind:

a) The selection process complied with the principles of source triangulation. The reasoning here was that the more variegated sources one uses, the more complete and objective a picture of a given phenomenon emerges. Furthermore, in this way no key position is either disproportionately represented or left out from the analysis by accident. Triangulation thus results in more credible conclusions and allows for balanced accounts between competing or mutually contradictory stances (Halperin & Heath 2012: 178).

b) The ‘voices’ behind the documents had to be well-informed and as unbiased as possible. On these grounds, sources explicitly associated with religious organisations or advocacy groups, for example, were ruled out as less likely to be neutral. An overwhelming majority of the sources are journalists specialising in political or economic reporting. Obviously, not even these accounts can be entirely theoretically or normatively neutral, which is why source triangulation was such an essential part of data collection.

There is reason to suspect that the use of random sampling could have compromised the fulfilment of the above criteria. As my comprehension of the available, appropriate materials increased, the apprehension
of which textual and audio-visual sources I should select for my analysis likewise sharpened. Due to unavailability issues, a considerably smaller amount of texts were analysed for Case 2 compared to Case 1. A detailed list of the documents analysed in Chapter 4 can be found in Appendix 1.

3.3 Qualitative content analysis

Two main reasons guided my decision to base this research on the study of textual materials: First, as an unobtrusive method of data collection content analysis helps reduce bias and avoid the Heisenberg effect; second, it allowed me to access the motives of individuals with whom personal contact would have been impossible to establish realistically (Halperin & Heath 2012: 318).

Qualitative content analysis suited the purpose of my research better than quantitative content analysis, because I was interested in discovering and interpreting the so-called latent content of the texts: namely, clues about the presumable motives of the actors involved (Halperin & Heath 2012: 319). Furthermore, my interest in identifying meanings in the texts rather than examining how the texts themselves produce meanings and my focus on the content of these texts rather than their contexts sealed my decision to reject discourse analysis as method (Eskola & Suoranta 1998: 196). Still, it is worth noticing that although content analysis detaches single expressions and entire texts from their original contexts, they have not emerged in a vacuum. Context need not get centre stage, but a healthy dose of source awareness should characterise all serious social scientific research.

Interpretation requires classified data. I decided to code the documents manually due to my lack of prior knowledge and experience with computerised coding. The coding was undertaken using open codes: no pre-defined themes were created ahead of the analysis since codes were expected to emerge from the data as I explored them (Halperin & Heath 2012: 322). The only categories defining my exploration of the data were the ‘material’ and ‘immaterial’ derived from my hypothesis. Considering the substantial length of many of the documents, the recording unit - the fraction of the text that I studied for emerging categories - was the full document rather than a single sentence or paragraph.

Potentially relevant expressions were first assigned a main category ‘M’ (material) or ‘I’ (immaterial), and then a sub-category, such as ‘POL’ (political), ‘ECON’ (economic), or ‘REL’ (religion), depending on the motive they referred to. The list of codes evolved naturally as new themes appeared. It is noteworthy that exhaustive coding was neither the ambition here nor possible in the first place: one can
always find new perspectives and thus new themes to accompany those on the original list (Eskola & Suoranta 1998: 157). Once the data had been deconstructed, similar codes were combined with each other in order to create something meaningful from what was otherwise a collection of fragmentary text mass (ibid.: 176). They were then analysed for patterns in light of my working hypothesis.

Motives in both cases were divided into three categories, or narratives, although it is worth recognising that motives from one category often interplay with motives from another; hence, boundaries separating the designated categories should be seen as directional and fluid rather than as fixed and static. Furthermore, since the process of qualitative content analysis is fundamentally characterised by the researcher’s interpretation of the data, every methodological decision she makes can be challenged by a rivaling interpretation. This applies to thematisation, too. Classifying themes is essentially a matter of interpretation, and the system used in this thesis reflects my interpretation of the data. Another researcher might have settled for alternative categorisations; I settled for what I considered the most logical and representative way to present the themes I identified.

Even at the risk of causing confusion, I chose not to mark sub-headings in Parts 1 and 2 of Chapter 4 with taglines ‘material’ and ‘immaterial’, as few narratives neatly fell under either main category. Whether a specific motive resonates more with the observable or unobservable elements of the social world is sometimes spelled out for clarity’s sake, but most of such interpretation is saved for Chapter 5. Attentive readers will probably arrive at such conclusions on their own well ahead of these final remarks.

Since the texts were manually coded, the risk of coding bias needs to be accepted as a potential yet minor issue (Halperin & Heath 2012: 326). It nevertheless needs to be taken into due consideration when assessing the reliability of the findings of my analysis. The reader should acknowledge that the entire analysis is based on my interpretation of the data, which is as accurate an interpretation of the contents of those documents as is anyone else’s with the same amount of prior knowledge and research experience. Furthermore, what I might regard as factual and neutral observations in the texts are in fact but someone else’s interpretations of something, coloured by their own presuppositions (ibid.: 330). This is especially the case with my analysis of Gulf terrorism financiers, which relies heavily on secondary interpretations of these actors’ assumed motives.

For fairly obvious reasons, terrorism sponsors are generally reluctant to be identified or associated with the dubious activity even if the act of financing terrorism were not criminalised in their home countries.
This means that first-hand information about the reasons guiding their actions is seldom available to researchers. In the absence of primary data, I reasoned that drawing inferences from documents written by renowned experts on the topic would have to be my next best choice. Due to this lack of primary data the scope of my analysis of Case 2 is somewhat more limited than that of Case 1. To compensate for the increased risk of bias that follows from using exclusively second-hand sources, I placed special emphasis on triangulation and source criticism in selecting my materials.
4. Analysis

Part I: The Koch brothers and American public policy

4.1 The origins and nature of the Koch brothers’ political adventures

This sub-section of Part I provides a concise overview of the creative ways in which the active and, up until recently, publicity-shy Koch brothers have projected influence over matters that concern not only American citizens but also people in other corners of the world due to the enormous size of the U.S. economy and the transnational nature of climate change, a phenomenon their activities help accelerate.

As a lead-up to the forthcoming analysis, I walk the reader through the ways in which the billionaire brothers’ flirtation with politics and public affairs has evolved over time, and detail their company’s record in violating state regulations. I also briefly introduce the reader to the website contents of major academic and non-profit recipients of Koch money in order to demonstrate the types of causes the plutocrats are drawn to. The objective of this review is to give readers less familiar with the Kochs’ case a sufficient amount of background information so as to make them better equipped to evaluate and perhaps also criticise the arguments I put forth below and the conclusions I draw from the data.

***

Koch Industries enjoys the status of America’s second largest privately held company (Rolling Stone 2014), providing jobs for 120 000 people globally (Koch Industries, Inc. 2017). The company is operational in a range of manufacturing and refinement areas from oil and gas exploration to chemicals, fertilizers, and forestry (Greenpeace 2010: 14). Or, as the firm itself puts it, ‘Koch Industries creates life’s basic necessities, while innovating ways to make them even better’ (Koch Industries, Inc. 2017). It continues, ‘[y]et our advocacy for a free and open society is what truly sets us apart’ (ibid.), hinting at the significant role values and principles play in its operations. Nowhere are these principles more visible than in the political and legal undertakings of the brothers behind the company: Charles and David Koch.

Brought up by an anti-communist father and with a past affiliation back in the 1960s with the radical Freedom School, Charles Koch adopted early on a libertarian ideology that can be best summarised as ‘the less government, the better’ (Doherty 2007: 407). With the help of Charles’s contacts and guidance, his younger brother, David, soon came to espouse the same free-market, antiregulatory worldview (ibid.), which poignantly testifies to the crucial role of favorable contexts as triggers of what often eventually
become complex chains of events. The Kochs were so keen to spread the ideology they regarded as an easy fix to much that was wrong with the US of the time that they ended up building what later came to be known as the ‘Kochtopus’: a network comprising activists, academics, lobbyists, legal advisors, and policy experts to the maximum strategic impact (ibid.: 410). The first steps in this direction were taken already in the 1970s, and the infrastructure at the Kochs’ disposal has but grown since then.

The notion of the Kochtopus is intimately linked to our discussion on agents and structures in Chapter 2. Sub-section 2.2 introduced Wight’s multi-layered approach to agency as one of the theoretical commitments of this research, and proposed that the model be equally applicable to public and private individuals alike. Although originally designed to describe traditional first image actors like political decision-makers, I argued that Wight’s model could also be successfully utilised to account for emerging, private power-brokers, such as the plutocrats analysed in this thesis. I also promised to offer concrete evidence in support of these arguments.

The examples of Charles and David Koch provide a strong case for the applicability of Wight’s model. First, both brothers have their unique libertarian worldviews and moral constructs (agency1), with Charles perhaps somewhat more committed to his ideology. Second, both represent the same socio-economic class - affluent, conservative businesspeople – and with their numerous legal and political campaigns have strived to further promote the interests of this precise segment of society (agency2). Third, their positioned-practices in the Kochtopus allow the Kochs to effectively project power over a plethora of public affairs (agency3). Charles’s positioned-practices include, i.a., his roles as CEO of Koch Industries, board member at the Mercatus Center, and director of board at the Charles Koch Institute, while David enjoys the statuses of Executive Vice President in the family company, founder of the David H. Koch Charitable Foundation, and chair of the Americans for Prosperity Foundation (Schulman 2014). Exactly how these positioned-practices have given the Kochs leverage in American politics is described in the following paragraphs that shortly address the major components of the Kochtopus.

Investigative reporters have disclosed that between 2007 and 2011 the Kochs’ foundations donated money to 221 U.S. universities, with the brothers’ pet college George Mason University receiving a staggering $16 million (Lewis et al. 2013). As befits the strategy of the Kochtopus, college grants have enabled donors to exert influence on future generations by shaping the university curricula, selecting ‘appropriate’ readings, and appointing ‘friendly’ speakers who share the donors’ unshakable faith in laissez-faire capitalism (ibid.). Or, as a spokesperson speaking on behalf of the brothers summarises,
'political success [...] begins with reaching young minds in college lecture halls, thereby preparing bright, libertarian-leaning students to one day occupy the halls of political power' (Levinthal 2015). But infiltration into campuses is only one part of the grand strategy: libertarian ideas need to be processed from raw material into refined products to make them better digestible to politicians. This is where the role of think tanks enters the picture.

Greenpeace documents that the Kochs have, via a jungle of different foundations and funds, given money to think tanks many of which lean to the political right and share their economic ideology: the five biggest beneficiaries, in descending order, include the Mercatus Center, Americans for Prosperity, Institute for Humane Studies, Heritage Foundation, and Cato Institute (2010: 4). A quick visit to the websites of each provides some guidance as to their values and missions, in addition to revealing some of the principles Koch money arguably finds attractive.

Americans for Prosperity (AFP) makes no effort to hide its libertarian mission, declaring that ‘[the AFP] protect the American Dream by fighting each day for lower taxes, less government regulation and economic prosperity for all’ (American for Prosperity 2017). Cato’s mission is nearly identical: ‘to create free, open, and civil societies founded on libertarian principles’ (Cato Institute 2017). The Heritage Foundation elevates itself to the status of the ‘bastion of the American conservative movement’ (Heritage Foundation 2017), whereas the Institute for Humane Studies envisions that the ‘future will be molded by intelligent, motivated people who are dedicated to individual liberty, the rule of law, limited government, spontaneous order, and tolerance’ (Institute for Humane Studies 2017). Finally, the stated objective of the Mercatus Center, which received impressive $9.2 million from Koch-connected entities between 2005 and 2008 (Greenpeace 2010: 4-5), is the exact same statement that Charles Koch has repeatedly made in public: to educate people on ‘how markets work to improve people’s lives’ (Mercatus Center 2017).

To be fair, not all Koch giving has targeted libertarian research bodies. Both brothers, and David in particular, have also been generous sponsors of medical research, arts, and other common-good causes, and their non-political giving is manifold to the amount they have spent on politics (Balko 2011). David has since the 1990s profiled himself as an enthusiastic sponsor of cancer research, sparked by his personal experience with the disease (Inside Philanthropy 2017). Frustrated at the negative publicity that Koch Industries has received in recent years due to its management’s controversial involvement in climate change-related issues, a company representative reminds that the brothers and their foundations have also supported ‘many projects outside the scope of energy or environmental matters’ (cited in Newsmax
2010). However, for us this latter point on environmental issues offers a too-convenient-not-to-be-exploited opportunity to explore this shadier side of the Koch brothers’ public figure in a little more detail, as well as to briefly discuss Koch Industries’ record of compliance with environmental regulations.

In the early 2000s, Charles and David Koch suddenly found themselves in the last place either of them would have wanted to: in the midst of an ugly scandal revolving around their presumed sponsorship of climate change sceptic research and their opposition to green energy sources. Not long after the scandal had calmed down, Greenpeace published a 44-page-long investigative report into their company’s environmental (mis)deeds. One such instance was the so-called ‘ClimateGate’ of 2009, which saw the propagation, *i.a.* by AFP, Cato Institute, and Heritage Foundation, of carefully selected sentences from illegally obtained emails that climate scientists had sent amongst themselves, with the ultimate intention of proving that a powerful conspiracy had been initiated by scientists in order to falsely convince the public of the human-induced nature of contemporary global warming (Greenpeace 2010: 9).

In an earlier example, a 2007 research paper written by a group of climate change sceptic researchers and funded partly by Charles Koch’s foundation argued that the polar bear was not threatened by anthropogenic global warming – a conclusion much welcomed by oil companies who interpreted it as a permission to continue energy exploration in delicate Arctic waters (Greenpeace 2010: 10). As devout libertarians, the Kochs referred to their first amendment rights in turning down a Senate investigation into their involvement in the climate change denial debate (Yuhas 2015).

Ironically, while eager to wield constitutional rights when it is in their personal interest, the Koch brothers’ attitudes toward the written and unwritten rights of Mother Earth seem considerably more relaxed. Their company’s reputation among environmental activists and officials is notorious, mildly put. *Rolling Stone* reports that in the 1990s Koch Industries was forced to pay a $30 million civil penalty for 312 oil spills in six U.S. states, and that the company used the Mississippi as an open sewer throughout much of that decade (2014). The conduct was not accidental - according to a long-time Koch employee, broken and leaking pipelines were not properly fixed due to economic reasons, and spills were casually covered up as they occurred (*ibid.*).

Polluting the nearby waterways has by no means been the only misconduct the Kochs have been charged with. Greenpeace also recalls how Koch employees were told from above to deliberately miscalculate the amount of oil they extracted from federal and Native American lands, how a corroded Koch pipeline
carrying flammable butane resulted in a fatal accident in Texas in 1996, and how a Koch refinery in Corpus Christi has released carcinogenic materials into the surrounding area (2010: 16). Evidence that the brothers show this little respect for existing laws and regulations makes one speculate what Koch Industries’ environmental record would look like in the absence of any regulations – the direction where they are swearing to take the United States.

Antiregulatory policies have been the focus of a great many of the Kochs’ political efforts. At times the brothers’ political enthusiasm has come at a cost, such as in the 1980s when David’s twin Bill sued his brothers for using corporate funds on political adventures (Wayne 1986, Wayne 1998). Their documented involvement in national elections, albeit through front organisations, began in 1996 and has multiplied in crude monetary terms since then (Fernandez Campbell 2013). Campaign donations from the Kochs to their preferred candidates have taken the forms of both personal giving and giving via the Koch Political Action Committee (Lewis et al. 2013).

Over the years, the Kochs have urged politicians on the right, mostly Republicans, to go even further right: to dismantle the social welfare system and to cut taxes for the wealthy (Mayer 2016b). *Rolling Stone* notes that the brothers and their donor network persuaded, via AFP, more than 400 U.S. Congress members to oppose the Obama administration’s climate change policies by signing a ‘No Climate Tax’ pledge (2013). Most recently, they have directed their energy to a fight against state subsidies to electric cars: industry sources say they are planning to spend $10 million a year on the campaign (Stone 2016). There is thus little reason to question Charles’s assertion in *Rolling Stone* (2014): ‘I’m going to ride my bicycle till I fall off.’ To be sure, once electric vehicles have been dealt with, something else will no doubt appear to keep the cogs of the Kochtopus in constant motion.

**4.2 What motivates the Koch brothers’ political manoeuvring?**

This sub-section of Part I explores the probable motivating factors behind the Koch brothers’ eagerness to influence public affairs and politics in the US in the ways described in the previous sub-section. A qualitative content analysis of the data on the Kochs’ case revealed that three thematic narratives concerning the billionaire brothers’ motives dominated the material. The below analysis presents each in detail: 4.2.1 addresses the profit-maximisation narrative; 4.2.2 analyses the extent to which the Kochs are driven by their ideological conviction; finally, 4.2.3 merges material and immaterial arguments regarding
the billionaire brothers’ motives in deliberating what they would like themselves to be remembered for. I begin my analysis with the profit-maximisation narrative.

4.2.1 Profits above all else

Mixed messages emerge from the data regarding the argument that the overriding motivation for the Kochs’ anti-regulatory crusades were the maximisation of their company’s profits – an argument frequently raised by environmental activists and political opponents, among others. Even the brothers themselves are elusive in their statements in this respect, sometimes admitting that they are committed to ‘expanding prosperity’ and at other times fiercely disputing the proposition that their political manoeuvring boiled down to simply making more money. Charles Koch is quick to deny such charges:

“We are doing all of this to make more money? […] I mean, that is so ludicrous.” (Charles Koch, cited in Mayer 2016: 763)

Elsewhere, on the critique that his sponsorship of economics departments at universities were guided by the calculation that it is in his company’s financial interest, Charles contents himself to a pithy rebuttal:

‘Are you kidding me?’ (in an interview with The Washington Post on 3 May, 2016)

Charles’s blunt rejection of the allegations mounted against him may not come as a surprise, but it provides little guidance as to where to look for his ‘real’ motives. An analysis by Tony Woodlief, a former Koch Industries management consultant, supports Charles’s denial. Woodlief sees Charles’s behaviour in business and politics alike as being driven by his innate curiosity and interest in working out puzzles of all sorts, be it a minor practical conundrum or how to put in place a multipronged political apparatus to advance an ideology of his preference.

“[Charles] doesn’t do it to make money, never has. […] He’s most excited when they’ve solved some problem. […] He just loves the discovery and the wealth followed” (Woodlief, cited in Schulman 2014: 132)

However, claims compromising these assurances are not difficult to discern in the data either. Perhaps with the exemption of David’s twin, Bill, all the quotes come from assumedly impartial individuals close to the source: from Koch Industries’ chief political advisor Richard Fink, Charles’s old friend Gus diZerega, and a former AFP employee (the nonprofit Charles founded back in the day). Keeping in mind that Bill has litigated against his brothers for decades, i.a. over feelings of having been unfairly treated in
the family company, his standpoint is likely biased, but similar statements by people who are in good
terms with the Kochs lend credence to its factuality. These assessments offer a stark contrast to the above
quotes that vouch the nature of the Koch brothers’ political and academic sponsorship as not being
motivated by material interests. Bill Koch insists:

“Koch Industries has a philosophy that profits are above everything else.” (in Koch Brothers EXPOSED
(Brave New Films))

The former AFP employee similarly confirms that the brothers established the nonprofit first and
foremost with the objective of using it as a lobbying force in Washington for more business-friendly
policies and as a means to mainstream libertarian ideas among the American public:

“[The AFP] in many ways is a tool in the toolbox of [Koch Industries] to advance its corporate
interests.” (cited in Schulman 2014: 450)

While not embracing the above commentary, David’s speech in his capacity as chairman of the AFP
Foundation does not rebuff it either. Notwithstanding the fact that David’s speech addresses ordinary
American citizens, whose ‘opportunity and prosperity’ the AFP promises to protect and increase, it is
obvious that the achievement of ‘more freedom’ also suggests more dollars in the Koch boys’ pockets:

“We want the maximum freedom towards businesses, create opportunity, and expand prosperity.” (in
Park Avenue (BBC))

Gus diZerega contemplates that the brothers’ political engagement – as well as the Kochtopus they
constructed to serve this purpose - may well have started out as a sincere, principled endeavour that only
later transformed into a more strategic money-making machine:

[DiZerega] suggested that the Kochs’ youthful ardour for libertarianism had largely devolved into a
rationale for corporate self-interest. (Mayer 2016: 302)

That economic factors have indeed been key to the Koch brothers’ anti-regulatory fight is perhaps most
directly stated by Charles’s right hand, Richard Fink, who readily confesses that the Kochs oppose any
government involvement in their company’s internal affairs - including follow-up on compliance with
safety and environmental regulations - chiefly because compliance comes at an unacceptably high cost in
their view. Levying a federal tax on polluting industries like energy companies would economically hurt
the brothers’ business both today and tomorrow, as it would not only reduce the profits that their current operations bring home but also make their investments in fossil fuel reserves of the future, such as Canadian tar sands, less lucrative (Meyer 2016: 436). Fink, if anyone, recognises the alarming consequences of such a tax:

[Fink] admitted that their campaign to defeat the energy tax had been motivated by their bottom line. (Mayer 2016: 327)

Fink acknowledged, “We want to decrease regulations. Why? It’s because we can make more profit, okay? Yeah, and cut government spending so we don’t have to pay so much taxes. There’s truth in that.” (cited in Mayer 2016: 722)

CEO Charles Koch is understandably more cautious in his public statements, but even he admits that the Kochs’ political spending has generated a positive return on investment from a business perspective:

‘I’m not confident. [...] I’d say there are some benefits.’ (in an interview with the Financial Times on 8 January, 2016)

Taken together, the above citations illustrate the difficulty of arriving at any unequivocal conclusion on whether the Koch brothers’ financial support to libertarian think tanks, their founding and funding of academic centres that follow free-market ideology, or their campaign donations to right-wing politicians who promise to ‘roll back’ government are all underpinned by the same rational, self-serving cost-benefit calculations the ultimate goal of which is to make the Kochs even richer.

In these circumstances, factoring in two additional insights from Mayer is instructive, tilting the scale more in favour of the material explanation. She remarks, ‘[a]s the country’s highest taxpayers, [plutocrats] would be the biggest beneficiaries of the tax savings produced by spending cuts. Moreover, none of them [needs] to rely on government social services for their health of welfare.’ (2016: 575). No doubt the Kochs would happily do away with social security, for their incredible wealth would guarantee that they will never need it themselves. Moreover, the resultant tax savings could be profitably invested in their political-ideological apparatus where they would yield interest and further increase the brothers’ political influence in the medium to long term.

Mayer continues, ‘[t]he Kochs’ routinely cast themselves as libertarians who deplored government taxes, regulations, and subsidies, but records show they took full advantage of the special tax credits and tax subsidies available to the oil, ethanol, and pipeline business, among other areas of commerce in which
they were engaged.’ (2016: 431). Charles Koch readily admits this, but defends his company’s incongruous, some would even say schizophrenic, position to corporate welfare by insisting that it is dictated by necessity – that is what playing by the rules of the game requires:

‘[…] so we make a lot of money off of it as any established company because it’s endemic in the economy.’ (in an interview with Fortune on 12 July, 2016)

This is a highly revealing discovery. It shows in a fundamental sense that the Kochs’ stated motivation to ‘maximise freedom towards businesses’ is problematic: True libertarians would oppose any government involvement in the economy instead of opportunistically blessing only those subsidies that are favourable to themselves. Such hypocritical behaviour powerfully indicates that self-interest, rather than any principled commitment to ideology, is the overriding motivation behind the Kochs’ anti-regulatory fight against the U.S. government in general and the two consecutive Obama administrations in particular. Reflecting back to the discussion on human nature in Chapter 2, the evidence here seems to suggest that reason prevails over passion in these two plutocrats’ political considerations.

Estimating what actual policies their libertarian ideology would lead to, once implemented, ultimately reveals the winners and losers of the Koch brothers’ approach: High-earning elites would reap the most benefits, while the ‘have-nots’ would become even worse off if public schools and health care were privatised and industrial plants allowed to continue using nearby rivers as outlets for toxic waste in neighbourhoods predominantly inhabited by working class people. Complete lack of government oversight in U.S. society would likely result in fairly adverse consequences: domestically, it would increase socio-economic polarisation and reduce standards of living for many Americans; internationally, letting fossil fuel industries continue their operations without restrictions would effectively accelerate global warming with unpredictable implications for all of us.

4.2.2 Battle of ideas

Crafty as the Kochs’ motives may appear (judging from the above arguments), these arguments are not unrivalled. Competing explanations to the plutocrats’ behaviour can be derived from the realm of ideology. The brothers have admitted that their father Fred instilled an all-encompassing distrust and disgust of government in his sons early on in their childhood. David recollects:
“[Father] was constantly speaking to us children about what was wrong with government and government policy.” (cited in Schulman 2014: 70)

Former Koch Industries’ management consultant Tony Woodlief verifies that Fred, the founder of the family business, served as a powerful source of inspiration especially to Charles:

“[Fred’s experiences in the Soviet Union] sparked the evolution of Charles’s political views” (cited in Schulman 2014: 70)

David, too, admits that the family patriarch’s ideological legacy lives on in his own political views and has played a role in his attempts to apply pressure on political decision-makers:

‘I have a value system that my father instilled in me and I’ve been following his beliefs and his value system all my life.’ (in an interview with ABC News on 14 December, 2014)

The Kochs’ exceptionally critical contemporary stance toward the state can thus to some extent be traced back to the environment where they grew up, bringing in mind the importance, touched upon in Chapter 2, of structures in conditioning individual action. It gained traction and became more pronounced when they got in touch with various underground libertarian communities inspired, among others, by the ideas of Ayn Rand. Charles’s interest in influencing how society functions was visible, for instance, in the 1970s when he as a member of the ultraconservative John Birch Society openly stated his distaste for the government:

“Our movement must destroy the prevalent statist paradigm.” (cited in Mayer 2015: 15)

Clayton Coppin, a teacher from George Mason University (where both the Mercatus Center and the Institute for Humane Studies are located) and the researcher hired to write Koch Industries’ history, associates Charles’s conservative views on the role of the government with his personality as a man who finds it very difficult to cope with anyone or anything that tries to exercise control over him or his business – a fact that also to a great degree explains his eagerness to maintain Koch Industries as a privately owned company. Coppin accounts:

“[Charles] was driven by some deeper urge to smash the one thing left in the world that could discipline him: the government.” (cited in Mayer 2016: 112)
Later, Charles came to the realisation that the surest route to this end required construction of the Kochtopus - an all-out system linking together those who produce knowledge (the academic community), those who make it policy-relevant (think tanks), and those who implement it (policy-makers). Even the most noble ideas would be futile in isolation; instead, they needed to be aggressively marketed to those who could make them reality:

‘[…] ideas do not spread by themselves; they spread only through people. Which means we need a movement. Only with movement can we build an effective force for social change.’ (Koch 1978: 34)

George Pearson, Charles’s first political advisor, and diZerega acknowledge that both brothers – and Charles in particular – wanted to see the worldview they held so dear materialise in actual practice, and regarded the application of pressure on politicians as an effective way to achieve their desired outcome:

“[Charles] did not see politicians as setting the prevalent ideology but as reflecting it.” (Pearson, cited in Schulman 2014: 493)

“Charles was a very committed libertarian […] He was very interested in ideas, very interested in talking about ideas, the implications of ideas, where they would lead, not just interested in power or money.” (diZerega, cited in Schulman 2014: 160)

Charles’s own testimonial supports the picture diZerega depicts of him:

“In short, market principles have changed my life and guide everything I do.” (cited in Mayer 2016: 97)

Not unlike many other ideological entrepreneurs, Charles prefers to wrap his political and social agenda in ethical rhetoric with the apparent objective of making it appear more legitimate and acceptable. In his 1978 article to the Libertarian Review, Charles portrays his glaring dislike of taxes as a position that any sensible, ethically thinking individual would hold:

‘[…] morally and strategically, tax exemptions are the opposite of subsidies. Morally, lowering taxes is simply defending property rights; seeking a subsidy is asking the government to steal someone else’s property for your benefit. Strategically, lowering taxes reduces government; subsidies increase government.’ (Koch 1978: 32)

David Koch, for his part, attributes his generous donations to culture and research to the 1991 plane accident he barely managed to survive. Invoking moral sentiments, both brothers deliberate that it is their ethical duty to give something back:
'I felt that the good Lord was sitting on my shoulders and that he helped save my life because he wanted me to do good works and become a good citizen. Following that revelation I became tremendously philanthropic.' (David in an interview with ABC News on 14 December, 2014)

‘[…] I’ve been blessed by learning certain principles and values that transformed my life and enabled me to accomplish more than I really had the ability to do or even dream possible. And so I decided that I wanted to give as many other people as possible the opportunity to learn these ideas and transform their lives as I had.’ (Charles in an interview with The Washington Post on 3 May, 2016)

‘[…] every position [my brother and I] take is, by trying to answer the question, will it make people’s lives better or worse?’ (Charles in an interview with the Washington Post on 3 May, 2016)

Taking the above excerpts at face value allows us to connect them to our earlier discussion in Chapter 2 on realist constructivism. Sub-section 2.3 concluded that one key theoretical assumption that both realists and social constructivists accept concerns human nature: both paradigms share the view that individuals are inherently social beings and show consideration to others. Charles and David’s above statements align with this starting point of realist constructivism by depicting the brothers as vigorous champions of what they understand as the definition of a ‘fair play – in other words, helping others through charitable giving. Whether their statements are sincere or sheer lip service remains subject to debate, but at least in theory the utterances work to support one of the core assumptions of realist constructivism.

Another sense in which realist constructivism features in both comments is through the merger of normative and non-normative considerations. As was pointed out in sub-section 2.1, one of the commonalities between realism and social constructivism is that both hold morality in high regard. Even though many of the Kochs’ political activities can rightly be described as stereotypically realist in the negative sense of the term, the fact that Charles and David also remain attentive to questions of right and wrong - at least in speech – implies that their behaviour is not just determined by the logic of a zero-sum game.

Further counterevidence against the argument that libertarian ideology were just a convenient veil for the Kochs with which to shelter what are essentially self-serving, economic interests can be obtained by comparing their public statements with the plethora of political, legal, and social causes they have either supported or opposed over the years. Given that these range from attempts to ease domestic prison sentences to condemnation of president Trump’s proposed stricter immigration policies for Muslims (Foley 2016), it is relatively easy to discover that the common denominator in their activities does indeed
seem to be their commitment to the defense of individual liberties. The Kochs’ ideology may be controversial, but at least it is consistent in this respect.

Besides, it seems quite improbable and logically untenable that the Kochs’ plutocracy were only concerned with making the brothers themselves richer: What sense would it make for them to fight against state regulations such as pollution taxes simply out of a fear that, if enacted, these would reduce their business profits? After all, the billionaires already have substantially more money than they can ever realistically imagine to spend in their remaining lifetime. Furthermore, even if they lost their anti-regulatory battle and had to factor into their expenditures penalty payments to the government, they and their children could still count themselves among the country’s – and the world’s - wealthiest people. All in all, then, material greed can hardly exhaustively account for their interest in U.S. politics and policies, implying that there is more to their motives than what meets the eye. The next sub-section delves more deeply into this complexity.

4.2.3 Leaving a legacy

Even though the Koch brothers are often treated as a single actor, there are nuanced differences as to what drives their plutocratic behaviour. While Charles seems to be motivated by the ambitious aim of genuinely altering people’s ideas about how a perfect society works, as well as by the even more ambitious aim of bringing about this perfect society, David’s donations are more specifically targeted and reflective of his private interests. For instance, his personal experience with an incurable cancer made him a generous donor for research that seeks a cure to that disease. This point subsequently underscores the vital importance of acknowledging that self-interest can mean much more than just the maximisation of economic gains, even for businesspeople. As a cancer victim himself, David has a very concrete interest at stake in any advances in the medical research of the disease. Charles’s perspective is considerably wider and more abstract. A long-time Koch employee describes the difference in his employers’ motives:

“David is a true philanthropist […] David’s [giving] is about making the world a better place. Charles’s is about changing the world.” (cited in Schulman 2014: 595-596)

David’s reply to an interviewer’s question of what he would like to be remembered for is revealing in this respect. Albeit consistent with his efforts to brand himself as a benevolent billionaire, his wish to leave a legacy also indicates that simply doing good does not satisfy him; rather, the good deeds his fortunes have made possible need to be explicitly associated with his character:
‘Well, I’d like [my tombstone] to say that David Koch did his best to make the world a better place and that he hopes his wealth will help people long after he has passed away.’ (in an interview with ABC News on 14 December, 2014)

Charles echoes the Koch employee’s assessment in his own description of the differences between his and David’s motives, although his comment puts more emphasis on the lofty, altruistic causes the brothers promote rather than on how their donations benefit themselves in the long run. Charles explains:

‘My brother David is much more interested in the political side. […] I’m more interested in the understanding, the education, the cultural aspects. Because I think that’s what’s going to drive what kind of country we’re going to have and whether [sic] can really change the trajectory of the country.’ (in an interview with Forbes on 29 September, 2015)

Charles’s response to the question of what the Kochs are trying to achieve with the money they have spent on and raised for political campaigns illustrates well the fusion of material and immaterial factors, passion as well as reason, in their motives:

‘[…] I see that the country headed towards a two-tiered society. A society increasingly based on control, dependency, and cronyism. Which is pitting individuals and groups against each other. And my dream would be to move us toward a society that maximizes peace, mutual respect, and well-being for everybody.’ (Charles in an interview with Fortune on 12 July, 2016)

‘[…] I’d like to see [the world] go in [the direction of] mutual benefit where we work together and have people feel liberated so they take chances and innovate. Which throughout history that’s what’s raised productivity.’ (Charles in an interview with Fortune on 12 July, 2016)

In aggregate, the Kochs seem to be concerned about the deteriorating state of individual rights and liberties in the US, and in their view this concern is equally urgent to both ordinary citizens and business executives. Interestingly, they appear to be treating what is good for them and what is good for the country as synonymous. As befits dedicated libertarians, in their interviews both brothers make frequent references to how they want to ‘help people improve their lives’ by ‘maximising freedom’ of pretty much everything. Realist constructivists would be quick to point out that in a number of statements the brothers clearly express their desire to see abstract libertarian ideals materialise in concrete outcomes. Through a realist constructivist lens Koch-backed campaigns, such as the plan to privatise North Carolina’s education system (Koch Brothers EXPOSED 2014) or the proposal to eliminate subsidies to renewable energy, are simply attempts to convert their immaterial agenda into material action.
A libertarian worldview thus markedly permeates every public or political action the Kochs take, but could it be that they just want to make it look like it is all just about ideology? Furthermore, is libertarianism not essentially an ideology that gives capitalists a *carte blanche* and as such tends to enjoy high popularity among many conservative executives? Mayer’s remark on the ultimately self-serving motives of the Kochs and their fellow plutocrats is startling in its acuity and echoed both by professor Jacob Hacker from Yale University and by Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel-winning economist:

[…] it was impossible not to notice that the political policies [American plutocrats] embraced benefited their own bottom lines first and foremost. Lowering taxes and rolling back regulations, slashing the welfare state, and obliterating the limits on campaign spending might or might not have helped others, but they most certainly strengthened the hand of extreme donors with extreme wealth. (Mayer 2016: 759)

“There’s been a reinforcing cycle. Those at the top have done well, they’ve invested in policies that are favorable to them and they’ve done even better, and they’ve turned a lot of that money back into politics.” (Hacker, cited in Park Avenue (BBC))

“Wealth begets power, which begets more wealth.” (Stiglitz, cited in Mayer 2016: 29)

Stiglitz’s reference to power allows us to briefly visit a point raised towards the end of Chapter 2: the concept of smart power. Since power is such an indisputably central term in both IR and Political Science, it is appropriate – in fact, necessary – to discuss it in the context of the Kochs’ political undertakings. As one might remember from Chapter 2, Gallarotti maintains that diversification between hard and soft power resources in a way that reflects the demands of current conditions is the best strategy for anyone who strives to have influence – in both domestic and international politics. There is little doubt that the Kochs have picked up on this strategy. After all, what would be a more apt description of the Kochtopus - their multifaceted political machine the dimensions of which stretch from education and research centres to citizen associations to professional lobbying groups - than the word smart?

The above citations from Mayer, Hacker, and Stiglitz bring us back to the original research hypothesis this thesis set out to test. At the beginning of this paper, I hypothesised that plutocrats use their material wealth to further an ideology which, provided that it is strategically implemented, further increases these actors’ material wealth. The above analysis has showed that the Koch brothers’ motives encompass both material and immaterial factors – from profit-making to the spreading of ideas -, which as such provides robust confirmation to realist constructivism’s core assumption according to which the social world consists of both observable and unobservable elements.
What the above analysis also suggests is that the relationship between the material and the immaterial does indeed seem to unfold in the way expected at the outset: material resources (in this case, plain money) enable an immaterial factor (here, libertarian ideas) to gain traction, which in turn results in an increase in the initial material resources. An alternative finding could have been one in which the popularisation and mainstreaming of libertarian ideas were an end in itself for the Koch brothers, and they cared little about whether or not they benefitted from it economically – the point for them would simply be the feeling of empowerment that follows from successful wielding of ideological power. However, in light of the brothers’ strategic legal targeting of competing industries like solar panel companies, and considering their backing of political candidates who propose tax cuts for the wealthy, a more plausible conclusion is that their behaviour is more in sync with the cyclical, three-stage hypothesis I put forth at the outset of this paper.
Part II: Gulf plutocrats and terrorism financing

4.3 Contextualising private terrorism sponsorship in the Gulf region

This sub-section provides a cursory introduction to terrorism sponsorship in the Gulf as a background to my upcoming analysis on the likely motives of private financiers of Islamist extremism in the region. It reflects upon financial support to terrorism from sources other than plutocrats, the historical context of private sponsorship to Islamist extremism, and the documented volume of this support.

Wealthy private citizens in Gulf countries are by no means the only sponsors of violent extremism, and plutocrats’ share of terrorism financing needs to be put into perspective by comparing it to other sources of funding, including friendly states with permissive environments for dubious economic activities, charities, and banks. Qatar, for instance, has been associated with providing cash to the Taliban in Afghanistan (Levitt 2014) and jihadist groups like Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria (Blair & Spencer 2014a); Hamas has reportedly received funds from official sources in Saudi Arabia (Levitt 2003); Hizbollah, for its part, has traditionally been economically backed by Syria and Iran (Club de Madrid 2005: 27).

Politicians who tacitly bless the use of public money on violent extremism or insurgencies in neighbouring states would be a natural research subject for IR scholars studying individual agency in the traditional sense of the term: as public figures. Since this thesis explores the less-researched, private side of agency, I restrict myself to acknowledging that there are public sources of terrorism funding as well. Due to political and diplomatic reasons, such conduct is often even harder to prove than that of plutocrats.

International investigations have also revealed that charitable organisations and foundations have served as convenient instruments for public and private terrorism sponsors alike to safely get their support through. Not only are relief organisations often situated in conflict zones and thus close to the intended recipients of plutocrats’ money, but they also provide effective means for money laundering and disguising sponsor identities (Aufhauser 2003, Levitt 2004). Individual sponsors are drawn to charities partly because they can be used to legitimise an otherwise reprehensible activity, and partly because charities provide access to critical communities (Hope 2017, CGCC 2013: 6). Charities listed by Western investigators as the most important financial backers of Islamist extremism include the Saudi World Assembly of Muslim Youth, the al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, the Muslim World League, the
Benevolence International Foundation, the International Islamic Relief Organization, the Muwafaq Foundation, and the Rabita Trust (Levitt 2002a and 2002b, Brisard 2002).

In addition to state sponsors and charities, Islamic financial institutions and banks in Western offshore jurisdictions have guaranteed terrorists a steady flow of legitimate money. Saudi Arabia’s biggest private bank, Al Rajhi Bank, was deployed by its founder Sulaiman bin Abdul Aziz al-Rajhi *i.a.* to channel money to 9/11 hijackers and al-Qaeda’s cell in Germany (Lopez 2012). Another poignant example is Saudi Arabia’s National Commercial Bank, founded by the Mahfouz family and known to have been used for money laundering by terrorists and arms dealers (Vardi 2012). The Arab Bank, in turn, has been employed for money transfers by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, al-Qaeda, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, while Bank al-Taqwa, with offices in the Bahamas and Luxembourg, has sponsored other extremist groups in the Middle East and North Africa (Levitt 2002a: 52-53).

Admittedly, there is often considerable overlap between the above sources, as businessmen have been found to financially assist terrorist organisations both in their capacity as privately acting individuals motivated by reasons of their own and in their capacity as government representatives or business figures. Besides, very rarely financial institutions themselves actively support terrorist groups; instead, their complicity typically manifests itself in their passive processing or facilitation of money transfers between terrorist operatives, or from plutocrats to secretive bank accounts managed by jihadists or their leaders.

Albeit an outlier among plutocrats due to his active involvement in the planning of al-Qaeda’s attacks, Osama bin Laden was probably the most well-known and extreme example of a plutocrat who got involved in terrorist activities. Originating from one of Saudi Arabia’s wealthiest families, bin Laden did not only found al-Qaeda and mastermind a great many of its destructive terror attacks but he also donated enormous sums of his personal assets (estimated in the late 1990s at more than $250 million), accumulated by his well-established and extensive international business empire, to anti-American Islamist armed groups across the Muslim world (Gerth & Miller 1996).

Another case in point is Yasin al-Qadi, a Saudi businessman and head of the Muwafaq Foundation who enjoys cordial terms with Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Morais & Tezel 2008). Intelligence confirms that al-Qadi’s support to Islamic fundamentalism varies from al-Qaeda to Hamas (in the early 1990s, he reportedly donated $820,000 to a Hamas front organisation based on U.S. soil), and that his Muwafaq Foundation serves as an intermediary between Saudi donors and al-Qaeda (Levitt 2002a: 51). A
third prominent example is Qatari Abdul Rahman Omeir al-Nuaymi, founder of the Switzerland-based
human rights organisation Al-Karama and president of the Qatar Football Association (Lake 2013). Al-
Nuaymi has been widely recognised as a ‘specially designated global terrorist’ for sending over a million
pounds a month to Iraq’s al-Qaeda and £375 000 to al-Qaeda in Syria (Blair & Spencer 2014a, Dettmer
prominent Qatar-based supporters of Iraqi Sunni extremists’ (U.S. Department of Treasury 2013).

All three examples bring to mind Wight’s multi-layered approach to agency introduced in Chapter 2,
according to which individuals exercise agency simultaneously on three levels. With respect to agency1,
bin Laden never concealed his hatred of the US and Israel (Prothero 2003), and al-Nuaymi was
commonly perceived as having an extremely conservative worldview, even by Qatari standards (Blair &
Spencer 2014b). In terms of agency2, all three represent a religiously devoted community of successful
business figures scattered across the Arab world (Prothero 2003, Mendick 2014). Lastly, each was able to
engage in terrorism financing largely by virtue of being in advantageous positions at the right time
(agency3) – positions that enabled them to maintain an ostensibly legitimate public façade behind which
to smoothly fund suspicious activities. In each occasion, the three dimensions of agency interacted and
jointly enabled these individuals to successfully sponsor international terrorism.

Not all boils down to individual agents, however, even if their agency were split into several dimensions.
Since all human action is contextually conditioned, a brief look into the historical origins of terrorism
sponsorship in the Gulf might enhance our understanding of what encourages plutocrats to engage in it in
this day and age. Several sources trace the roots of private terrorism financing back to the Cold War era.
The global oil crisis of the 1970s was influential in many respects, but one of them was to make a number
of strategically positioned Saudis lucky billionaires almost overnight – alarmingly, in some circumstances
these fortunes ended up supporting Islamic fundamentalism (Vardi 2012).

Proxy war in Afghanistan was one such instance. It urged affluent and religious citizens in the Gulf to
economically support the mujahideen; later, al-Qaeda adopted these very financing networks for its own
purposes (The Economist 2003, Smith 2008: 154, Brisard 2002). Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the triumph of globalisation that followed in its wake paved way for a need among Muslims in
the Middle East and the newly independent Central Asian republics to redefine their identity in a situation
where few attractive alternatives were challenging U.S. cultural hegemony – understandably, religion was
one of the few things people in these recently established nation-states could hold onto in such new, uncertain circumstances (Burr & Collins 2006: 119-120).

Current estimates about the approximate value of private terrorism sponsorship vary. According to one assessment, al-Qaeda received between $300 and $500 million in private donations during the 1990s (Brisard 2002). A more recent report confirms that ISIS was given at least $40 million during its first two years from both private and government sources in Gulf countries (Di Giovanni et al. 2014), while yet others note that private money from the Gulf to ISIS amounts to ‘hundreds of millions of dollars’ (Levitt & Plotkin Boghardt 2014, Plotkin Boghardt 2014a).

Although the value of this sponsorship is impossible to measure in exact numbers, its importance for keeping jihad alive is absolutely critical. Former U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, has argued that ‘[d]onors in Saudi Arabia constitute the most significant source of funding to Sunni terrorist groups worldwide’, including ISIS (cited in Walsh 2010). Experts argue that money transfers from Gulf ‘angel investors’ to Syria and Iraq were most desperately needed at the early stages of the self-proclaimed caliphate (Windrem 2014). As international pressure on governments to tighten their counterterrorist measures has recently increased, ISIS has made financial self-sufficiency its key priority (Plotkin Boghardt 2014b). Experts nevertheless remind that private regional sympathizers will remain an important source of its funding for years to come (Mühlberger & Ruohomäki 2017). A key point to recognise about terrorism financing is that even if the actual terror attacks could be carried out cheaply, disseminating propaganda, recruiting fighters, and providing services in dysfunctional areas requires substantial external sponsorship (Police of Finland 2017).

Researchers have noted that even a ‘few wealthy individuals are able to sponsor much terror’ (Levitt 2002a: 51); similarly, even though only a small minority of Islamic charities and banks either knowingly or by neglect financially assist terrorists, those that do so are regrettably among the most prosperous (Kaplan 2006). A group of plutocrats dubbed as al-Qaeda’s ‘Golden Chain’ (the organisation’s 20 most important private sponsors) consists of wealthy Arab businessmen, including the above-mentioned al-Rajhi and Adel Batterjee, founder of the Benevolence International Foundation (Prothero 2003). An alternative list features al-Qadi and Khalid bin Mahfouz, as well as other senior figures from bankers to chairmen of some of the world’s largest Muslim charities (Mowbray 2002). It is precisely these plutocrats whose motives for terrorism sponsorship the next sub-section explores.
4.4 What motivates Gulf plutocrats to finance terrorism?

This sub-section discusses the likely motives behind Gulf plutocrats’ sponsorship of Islamist extremism in light of the above-mentioned background information by interpreting explicit and implicit expressions in the select three texts hinting towards such motives. The most natural way to apply some order on the obtained information on Gulf plutocrats’ motives was by reference to three narratives: (1) terrorism as an economic investment; (2) terrorism sponsorship as a political statement; and (3) terrorism financing as a way to promote a fundamentalist belief system. Each is addressed individually below.

4.4.1 Terrorism as an investment

*Terror Incorporated* makes a strong case for the significance of economic and social considerations in underpinning private terrorism financing. At first this may seem absurd – after all, we are talking about some of the world’s wealthiest individuals. Surely these people, if anyone, would have more than plenty of whatever there is to have. And even if they did not, why would plutocrats think that funding terrorism could benefit them economically? From a layperson’s perspective, financing jihad seems like a very irrational investment decision. A majority of these plutocrats are exceptionally successful businesspeople, and it seems unlikely that such seasoned veterans would deliberately waste their hard-earned money by donating it to violent groups for no obvious return. Upon closer inspection, however, the logic of such behaviour makes more sense.

What some of these private players want to achieve with their money is a more equitable allocation of national resources: an allocation that would level the egregious income gaps between different socio-economic classes found especially in the oil-exporting Gulf monarchies. Members of the upper middle class have for long witnessed gross exploitation of their home countries’ natural resources by corrupt and autocratic regimes. They oppose domestic power elites who reap a lion’s share of revenues accrued from these countries’ abundant energy resources and sell it to Western markets while very little of those revenues trickle down to the domestic level to improve local conditions or to pay back government debts:

>*[The] real motives of the violent clash between the East and West are deeply rooted in a complex set of relations of economic dependency. Today, the conflict is between the big capital of the West and its Eastern oligarchic allies on the one hand, and the masses of the East and an emerging merchant and banking class on the other. (Napoleoni 2005: 104)*


“… Great merchants and contractors speak about hundreds and thousands of million riyals owed to them by the government.” (Osama bin Laden, cited in Napoleoni 2005: 104)

A common narrative throughout Terror Incorporated is one of a decades-long conspiracy between Middle Eastern political elites and their sponsors in the developed world – an alliance not too different from the situation during Western powers’ imperial rule in these countries. This narrative argues that resource-abundant Islamic countries are economically dependent on the ‘core’ countries for consumers of their energy resources, which in turn enables these core countries to negotiate trade deals that benefit their domestic companies. History shows that the economic, social, and environmental implications of these alliances for populations in the source countries are often of little concern to multinational petroleum companies, such as Koch Industries. But how does terrorism fit into this picture?

The above-described ‘Dutch disease’ inspires those with sufficient means to give some of their wealth to local variations of Robin Hood: groups that promise to remove unjust governments from power, regain control of domestic resources, and redistribute income derived from those resources more fairly to satisfy the growing middle class. In some people’s eyes, such forces are indeed modern-day Robin Hoods; other observers know groups like al-Qaeda, Hamas, and ISIS better as terrorist organisations:

[Voluntary gifts support] the favourite charities of the donors and can embrace anything from jihad to assisting the poor and feeding the needy. It is assumed that the wealthy, motivated by an “inner feeling of responsibility”, will support the congregation of Islam. (Burr & Collins 2005: Ch. I, p. 7)

“Feeding centres for the displaced are eagerly funded by wealthy Saudi fundamentalists […]” (Burr & Collins 2005: Ch. 5, p. 18)

These remarks bring us back to questions presented in Chapter 2: What is the relative weight of material vis-à-vis immaterial forces as drivers of these actors’ behaviour? Are their actions guided more by reason or by passion? Terror Incorporated suggests that the real motives of individuals who sponsor Islamist extremism can be reduced to material facts, such as hopes of an economically more prosperous future or a more equitable use of national resources. Those who fund terrorism expect to gain from it materially - to get a return on their investment. Plutocrats might hope that insurgent groups manage to oust pro-Western, corrupt leaders who restrict these plutocrats’ business opportunities and deliberately maintain their country’s dependency on foreign economic powers.
However, what the above excerpts, along with my earlier observations, also illustrate is that strategic and social, egoistic and consequentialist, considerations often mix in individual decision-making to help bring about a certain outcome. Put differently, rarely any single motive can exhaustively account for a certain behaviour. Suggesting that some Gulf plutocrats regard the financing of terrorist organisations as an economically sensible action implies rational calculation from their part. Yet what their eagerness to fund groups who claim to be ‘fighting for the poor’ simultaneously implies is that these individuals are not acting merely out of self-interest; instead, perceptions of right and wrong also guide their behaviour, even if violence as a method were easy to condemn. Gulf plutocrats’ desire for freer business environments and less exploitative political regimes may well be essentially self-serving, but if materialised, these objectives would have auxiliary advantages for wider segments of society, too, by increasing productivity and domestic standards of living. Hence, for some plutocrats, noble social and economic ends indeed seem to justify even the most dubious of means.

4.4.2 Continuation of politics by other means

Clausewitz has famously declared that ‘war […] is a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means’ (1989: 256). Past experience has shown that this insight is readily applicable to both state and non-state actors. The political motives of wealthy Gulf donors identified in the analysed three texts encompass opposition to Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, support for the Palestinian cause, and internal power rivalries.

As was brought up in sub-section 4.3, the origins of private sponsorship of Islamist extremism can be traced back to the Cold War era and the proxy war between the US and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. To keep the Soviets out and back the mujahideen forces fighting the communist government, affluent private people from across the Arab world donated money to what would later become al-Qaeda. Of course, much direct and indirect state support from regional governments also poured into the hands of the fighting parties, perhaps best exemplified by the critical involvement of Pakistan’s intelligence services in the conflict on the mujahideen side, but the jihadists nevertheless depended heavily on private donations. Both Terror Incorporated and Alms for Jihad recognise this:

_It was thanks to the voluntary donations of rich Arab organizations and individuals that the [Islamic] Parties were able to bridge the gaps and overcome shortages [of cash, ammunition, and food]. “Independent Arab money kept the anti-Soviet Jihad alive,” admitted a former Mujahid. (Napoleoni 2005: 86)_
Saudi princes and wealthy businessmen were extraordinarily generous in funding various Afghan-Arab movements fighting the Russians, and many mujahideen were Saudi citizens, often from influential families. (Burr & Collins 2006: Chapter 2, p. 3-4)

The flow of money from Gulf plutocrats to the mujahideen needs to be seen as a political statement and analysed in its historical context. Donors in neighbouring countries arguably opposed Soviet invasion into Afghanistan in the late 1970s out of a fear that it would result in a regional domino effect, which encouraged them to economically assist armed Arab factions that swore to ward off the communists. Explanations to the plutocrats’ actions can thus be sought from concerns of unwanted and excessive foreign influence, especially when analysed in light of the fact that jihadis were unaware of the indirect American interference with the conflict through Pakistan’s secret service (Napoleoni 2005: 87). When anti-Soviet jihadis, including bin Laden, discovered that the US had secretly meddled with their regional affairs all along, they felt humiliated – a sentiment that served as a powerful motivation for the attacks they later launched on Western targets (ibid.).

Another political cause wealthy Arabs have been eager to financially support both historically and today is the establishment of a Palestinian state in territories currently controlled by Israel, including the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Private donors to groups like Hamas and Hizbollah can be found i.a. in Palestinian diaspora communities and in the Gulf countries, and, not unlike the rank and file of the two resistance movements, these plutocrats, too, express fierce pan-Arabic and nationalist sentiments:


Consistent with what was argued earlier on economic and social motives, many ordinary Muslims find groups like Hamas appealing because of their ostensible defence of the ‘weak’ and their provision of numerous basic social and economic services in conflict zones. It thus makes sense that people in vulnerable positions regard them as responding to their material needs and are drawn to them. Yet to understand what motivates privileged individuals who do not depend on such ‘quasi-public’ services to support these groups requires analysis that takes into consideration additional, not necessarily material, factors. Terror Incorporated suggests that transnational ethnic sympathies feature powerfully in some plutocrats’ motives and at least partly explain their generosity to groups like Hamas.
Finally, internal political rivalries, disputes, and power struggles are cited in *Funding Evil* as the third main political reason behind both actual terror activities and private economic assistance to these activities. Evidence shows that successful businessmen from Iraq, for instance, have both lent their support to anti-government demonstrators in the past and more recently funded Sunni tribal leaders in Syria (Banco 2015). As the below excerpt confirms, many of the ruling powers that groups like al-Qaeda and their backers hope to remove from power are those that are perceived as having allied with Western administrations at the expense of their own people:

*The former head of the Saudi intelligence services, Prince Turki al-Faisal, [...] allegedly gave Osama bin Laden $200 million in 1998 to [...] keep [him] away from Saudi Arabia and to prevent him from overthrowing the Saudi royal family. (Ehrenfeld 2005: 58)*

### 4.4.3 True believers

Assuming that most plutocrats who donate their personal wealth to groups like Hamas, al-Qaeda, or ISIS also agree with the majority of these groups’ objectives, it can be posited that few of them would mind the materialisation of one particular long-term goal of many of these non-state actors – the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. A Western observer may wonder what makes such a religiously-led system of governance a better alternative than the current Islamic monarchies of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Pakistan – countries from which a number of influential donors originate.

Approaching the puzzle from plutocrats’ standpoint reveals something fascinating about their presumable logic. Identifying with these individuals’ situation suggests that it is not necessarily the strict religious order in absolute monarchies like Saudi Arabia that motivates bankers and business leaders to support efforts that promise to radically refashion the political systems of these countries. In fact, successful businessmen in the Gulf countries are often themselves devout Muslims many of whom would be delighted to see even more literal application of Islam to all aspects of society. Rather, and as has been mentioned earlier, what many of these individuals do seem to have a problem with are domestic elites that govern in ways that do not please citizens in the emerging middle class.

Since jihadists tend to promote and justify their activities in various propaganda materials with reference to their assumed spreading of the ‘true’ version of Islam, typically Wahhabism, or to their alleged restoration of Islam’s glory, it is unsurprising that pious plutocrats are keen to fund their operations. To these agents, a strong religious conviction can sometimes justify an otherwise dubious act like the
sponsorship of terrorism. Some wealthy citizens do this to fulfil what they perceive as their religious obligation as committed Muslims without realising that what claims to be an Islamic charity helping the marginalised is in fact a front organisation of an armed group of unscrupulous criminals. Others, however, donate with the aim of spreading their preferred interpretation of Islam and with a clear understanding of how the ‘charity’ in question intends to execute its ‘missionary work’ in actual practice. Both Terror Incorporated and Alms for Jihad suggest that this is indeed the case:

[the $3 million donated in 1999 by five top Saudi businessmen to front companies of bin Laden’s network] are part of a vast network of private donations set up by Islamic financial institutions to armed groups around the globe whose ultimate task is to promote a fundamentalist vision of Islam. This is another channel used for religious imperialism in the Muslim world. (Napoleoni 2005: 125)

Saudi financiers such as al-Rajhi, Khaled bin Mahfouz, and Yassin al-Qadi were all major instruments in the expansion of Wahhabism […] (Burr & Collins 2006: Ch. 11, p. 14)

As these remarks imply, religion is exploited as an attribute with which to sustain confrontation between the West and Muslim-dominated countries. In the jihadist discourse, Islam cannot be properly defined without reference to its ‘enemies’, which as such is an effective rhetorical tactic: people constantly (re)construct their identities not only by determining what they are but also by determining what they definitely are not. Religion is something people from all socio-economic classes share; hence, appealing to faith provides terrorists the indispensable luxury of reaching the widest possible audience, some of whom wonderfully wealthy. Not even the most educated and privileged members of this audience are always able or willing to resist such discursive persuasion. It is thus hardly surprising that Gulf plutocrats have sponsored groups who adhere to a ‘religious ideology that mirrors their own’ (Banco 2016).

The discussion on identity and ideology conveniently brings us back to human nature. Chapter 2 challenged us to remain attentive in particular to two questions when analysing plutocrats’ likely motives: Are they informed more by reason or passion, and what is the relative weight of each? Put differently: do sentiments prevail over rational calculations or vice versa? It is difficult not to view the aim to propagate a certain interpretation of Islam as a motive underpinned at least to some extent by passion and emotion, but with our earlier insights on the economic, moral, and political reasons behind Gulf plutocrats’ sponsorship of terrorism financing in mind it might not be too far-fetched to posit that religious rhetoric can also be used by these individuals in order to legitimise or hide more prominent, egoistic motives. Strategic cost-benefit calculations thus cannot be entirely ruled out.
5. Conclusion

5.1 Key findings and comparing remarks

This thesis has examined, through a realist constructivist lens, what motivates contemporary plutocrats to further processes or projects that from an ordinary observer’s perspective seem to have overwhelmingly negative local and global consequences.

Chapter 2 introduced the theoretical commitments of my analysis, arguing that the research problem can be attributed to such IR theoretical frameworks as Waltz’s first image, Wight’s multi-layered approach to agency, and Barkin’s realist constructivism, the latter of which was further refined with a special emphasis on the concept of power as multi-faceted and fluid. These theoretical roots gave rise to the working hypothesis I explored in Chapter 4. I expected my analysis of the Koch brothers (Part 1) and private Gulf terrorism sponsors (Part 2) to reveal that plutocrats use their material assets to advance an ideology that further increases their economic wealth. Chapter 3 introduced the data upon which I based my analysis, explained how I intended to explore my working hypothesis by means of qualitative content analysis, and contemplated on the potential ethical issues that such an approach might involve.

Part 1 concluded that the motives underpinning the Koch brothers’ political and legal campaigns can be divided into three main narratives. According to the first, rational calculations estimating the probable implications of various policies on Koch Industries’ profit margins are the single most important driver behind the brothers’ behaviour. Sub-section 4.2.1 questioned the Kochs’ affirmation that they oppose subsidies to renewable energy out of their general antipathy against excessive government involvement in the economy by pointing out that notwithstanding their pious rhetoric, the brothers have regarded subsidies to fossil fuel companies, including their own, as salutary. The sub-section also showed that by viewing the likely consequences of the policies the Kochs support it is not difficult to discern that the wealthiest citizens would be their obvious winners, which similarly suggests that material self-interest features prominently in their motives.

The second narrative contended that the Kochs fight for greater economic freedom and less red-tape chiefly because these objectives align with their ideology and values as ardent libertarians. Sub-section 4.2.2 proposed that at least in theory, and despite their profit-maximisation ambitions, the Kochs are also attentive to immaterial and normative considerations. Examples of the various causes the brothers have focused on over time, such as the U.S. justice reform, demonstrated that not every legal or political action
they take need to concern the brothers themselves. Furthermore, both Charles and David openly insist that the main driving force behind their philanthropy is a simple altruistic will to do good – they feel they ‘owe’ this to the world as some of its most privileged individuals.

Lastly, the third major account of the putative reasons for the Wichita plutocrats’ political adventures purported that their behaviour is best explained by reference to a feedback loop mirroring my working hypothesis. As to this account, ideological motives serve as auxiliaries for these plutocrats’ ultimate, material motives. In other words, the ideologies these actors choose to promote are those that represent the best ‘return on their investment’. Sub-section 4.2.3 argued that this is a prime example of an exercise of smart power: the mixture of hard and soft, observable and unobservable, reserves of power to a maximum strategic impact. While the relative weight of each type of power at any given time depends on contextual conditions, such as the prevailing political climate, the audience to be convinced, or the type of opposition a particular campaign is likely to face, as a rule of thumb both material assets and a persuasive discourse are required for a flexible and successful wielding of power.

Part 2 maintained that the motives of Gulf terrorism sponsors can similarly be classified by reference to three dominant narratives. According to sub-section 4.4.1, some Gulf plutocrats view terrorism sponsorship as an investment. The discussion on economic and social motives lent some credence to my working hypothesis by revealing that material wealth is used to support an ideological movement (Islamist extremism) which, provided it succeeded in its goals, could increase its supporters’ chances of accumulating additional wealth, as illustrated by the redistribution of Saudi oil revenues. This sub-section also showed that affluent individuals who act out of material motives need not by default be self-serving: some also hope that their donations to groups like Hamas can help improve concrete conditions in their home countries.

The second key narrative argued that terrorism financing, as terrorism itself, can be seen as a continuation of politics by other means. One of the most fascinating discoveries from sub-section 4.4.2 was the observation that the material and immaterial tend to blend in these plutocrats’ motives, generating mixtures of tangible objectives like occupation of physical territory or regime change and more abstract, identity-related themes like ethnic affiliation or support to a certain tribal group. Neither the importance of tangible political and economic advantages nor the role of sentiments and emotions should therefore be downplayed if one seeks a comprehensive and balanced account of these plutocrats’ motives.
Finally, sub-section 4.4.3 tilted the scale relatively more in favour of immaterial motives, making the case that many Gulf plutocrats perceive terrorism sponsorship as an effective tool to further particular interpretations of Islam. This sub-section proposed that the jihadist rhetoric of ‘true believers’ versus ‘infidels’ makes what is essentially a discursive construction appear as two worlds apart, encouraging religious members of Gulf business elites to sponsor violent extremism in the hopes of restoring the supremacy of their personal faith.

This last narrative leaves us with an intriguing paradox from political research’s perspective: Most jihadists advance a religious-political ideology that is fundamentally traditional, yet the means with which they promote it are predominantly modern. Similarly, it seems that many of their plutocrat sponsors are driven by an ambition to shake up the status quo in their restrictive home countries; however, what these individuals expect in its place is an even more restrictive system: the Islamic caliphate. Ironically, these private actors apparently see no contradiction in attempts to resort to radical means to achieve what are ultimately very conservative ends.

***

I now briefly discuss some key attributes that my chosen two cases share. Due to space constraints, and since the specific motives of each can be easily discerned from the above, I restrict myself to acknowledging what both cases have revealed to us in terms of dialogue between theory and empirics.

First, both cases demonstrate that Waltz’s first image and Wight’s multi-layered conceptualisation of agency are applicable not only to traditional, public individuals in positions of power but also to influential and globally significant private actors like plutocrats. One can thus safely posit that there is no reason to restrict agential analyses to conventional political actors, such as state leaders; instead, as emerging non-state actors are increasing both in their number and impact, theoretical models like these should be readily applied and, when required, adjusted and updated to meet these new circumstances.

Moreover, consistent with what was noted in Chapter 2 on human nature, the political behaviour of both the Koch brothers and Gulf plutocrats seems to be driven partly by reason and partly by passion: In some occasions, these individuals express clear signs of acting out of genuine altruistic reasons; under different circumstances, their actions seem primarily motivated by egoistic aims. This insight potently illustrates the explanatory power of realist constructivism: acknowledgement of the prominence of material and self-interested considerations does not need to rule out consideration to the others.
Another commonality between the Koch brothers and Gulf plutocrats is that both clearly want to have political leverage, and both want to have it through someone else: in the former case, through researchers, politicians, or think tanks; in the latter, through Islamic extremists. Notwithstanding David Koch’s short-lived experimentation with national politics in the 1980s, the reclusive billionaire brothers prefer to operate from behind the scenes, which makes sense given their contempt of the state apparatus. Similar aspirations to keep a low profile and act via intermediaries can be identified in the case of Gulf terrorism financiers, many of whom take great efforts to conceal their actual identities and escape the law, using friendly banks and charities for money transfers to armed non-state entities.

The use of creative means to project influence and exercise control over local and global matters is thus something the Kochs and Gulf plutocrats share. It brings to mind Richardson et al.’s notion that ‘[the] power to act in world affairs is driven by the power to influence prevailing consensus’ (2011: 1, my italics). What else are the Kochs trying to achieve with their formidable wealth if not the ability to challenge U.S. political status quo? What else are religious Gulf businessmen opposing if not their domestic regimes and Western presence in the region? Successful pulling of the strings of democratically elected politicians and influential researchers, or the funding of entities that lack public accountability and use violent methods to achieve their ends, if anything, constitutes leverage.

Still, perhaps the most important feature both cases share is the mixture of both material and immaterial motives in these plutocrats’ aspirations to bring about political and social change in their respective contexts. In the Kochs’ case, the promotion of an abstract libertarian ideology is conveniently paired with the promotion of Koch Industries’ economic interests; in the Gulf plutocrats’ case, the combination of concrete goals like the capture of physical territory and invisible but powerful ethnic sympathies gives rise to private donations to Palestinian armed groups, for instance. To this extent, both cases confirm the accuracy of my realist constructivist hypothesis by demonstrating that actors have both concrete and abstract reasons to engage in activities the ramifications of which are globally and regionally felt, albeit problematic from an environmental or democracy’s standpoint. The exact motives driving these individuals’ actions vary, but they both use both material and immaterial instruments of power in their attempts to achieve political leverage.

The Kochs’ case was more confirmatory when it comes to my initial expectations ahead of the analysis, whereas my analysis of private terrorism financiers was considerably less clear-cut as to whether their
logic unfolds exactly as suggested by the hypothesis. While some terrorism sponsors appear to be acting out of rational economic calculations, for the majority of them identity-related religious, ethnic, or political sentiments, rather than personal enrichment, seem to be the ulterior motivating factors. The fact that most Gulf plutocrats are satisfied already at the second stage of the hypothesis, i.e. when their preferred religious interpretation or ethno-political group wins over rivalling alternatives, suggests that in this case my working hypothesis was only partially supported by evidence. From research’s perspective, this discovery represents the single most important difference between the two cases.

5.2 Critical review and suggestions for future research

Judging from the diverse set of motives that my examination of the Koch brothers and private terrorism financiers managed to expose, it can be confidently argued that this research succeeded in its main task – namely, in providing a plausible answer to the research question introduced in Chapter 1. This chapter also presented previous researchers’ remarks on the possible motivating factors guiding the global actions of ‘benevolent’ plutocrats like Bill Gates and Muhammad Yunus. In retrospect, it is intriguing to notice that the reasons these scholars identified were largely identical to the motives my analysis revealed, ranging from self-interest and rational calculation to altruistic civic mindedness and emotional considerations. A bewildering conclusion from this is that similar motives drive such fundamentally opposite activities as attempts to tackle global health problems and advocate social entrepreneurship, on the one hand, and sponsorship of terrorism and fight against renewable energy sources, on the other. Human nature – and immense wealth - seem to be the only common denominators in the four examples.

The hypothesis guiding my analysis in Chapter 4 performed relatively well in terms of the distinct roles played by material and immaterial motives in shaping the plutocrats’ behaviour. The Kochs’ case convincingly confirmed it, while my analysis of Gulf plutocrats suggested that the hypothesis was valid only to the extent that private actors employ their economic fortunes to the furtherance of ideological causes. Mounting evidence indicated that the link from this ideological cause back to the actors’ material wealth was not nearly as straightforward or tenable as in the Kochs’ case. Despite the fact that the original hypothesis fully held up to reality only in Case 1, as an analytical guide it served well the ultimate aim of this thesis by providing an answer to my overall research question. Besides, I later discovered that a nearly identical feedback loop between money, politics, and ideas has recently been identified by Freeland (2012: 21), suggesting that plutocrats’ motives can indeed be successfully studied with reference to the above-described hypothesis.
Before proposing avenues for future research on globally significant plutocrats and their motives, I reflect upon some methodological compromises in this research that might give rise to ethical issues or challenge the reliability of my findings. As has been mentioned earlier, faced with the regrettable unavailability of primary sources for Case 2, I decided to base my analysis on secondary data on the topic. This decision inevitably carries with it an increased risk of bias and enlightened speculation, and signifies that a relatively greater share of my analysis in Part 2 relied on interpretation of the most likely motives of the actors involved than in Part 1, for which an ample amount of direct quotes from the plutocrats themselves was available. I nevertheless reasoned that as a phenomenon terrorism was topical and serious enough to necessitate investigation into why some individuals choose to lend their support to it.

Another methodological decision I made at the outset of this research was to conduct my analysis at the individual level. As was more thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2, this is a choice researchers in IR and Political Science frequently confront. It is also a choice that inexorably determines that the other two ‘images’ are neglected to an extent. No such account can claim to have entirely and exhaustively covered the phenomenon it set out to explore in the first place, and this thesis is no exception. Since I wanted to study individual agents, it was natural to seek explanations for their behaviour primarily from human nature - although I did my best to also acknowledge external structural forces where their impact on individual action was apparent, exemplified, for instance, by the Cold War origins of private donations to al-Qaeda, or the powerful influence of their childhood environment on the Koch brothers.

As the above remarks show, methodological trade-offs were necessary for the feasible execution of this thesis. I would therefore strongly encourage future researchers not to hesitate to further investigate and increase our knowledge of contemporary plutocracy and especially the so-called ‘malevolent’ plutocrats. A prerequisite for attempts to better monitor private financial support to causes that are likely to deliver mainly adverse global consequences is an understanding of the diverse root causes behind such support. Chapter 3 pointed out that I could have also alternatively studied the motives of Russian oligarchs, Tamil Tiger sponsors, or drug cartel patrons. Exploration of any of these three cases, or studying what motivates plutocrats in other contexts to finance activities that challenge prevailing power structures, threaten national or international security, or jeopardise welfare and the global commons is a fundamentally worthwhile effort – even more so, I argue, than studying why the ‘good guys’ do what they do.
References


Americans for Prosperity 2017. Available at: https://americansforprosperity.org [Last accessed on 9 May 2017].


European Consortium for Political Research (2017) ‘Bringing the individual back in’ – *International Relations and the First Image*, outline of a 2011 workshop, ECPR. Available at:


Foley, Stephen (2016) ‘Lunch with the FT: Charles Koch’, *The Financial Times*. 8 January 2016. Available at: [https://www.ft.com/content/3a5c5d40-b4a3-11e5-b147-e5e5bba42e51](https://www.ft.com/content/3a5c5d40-b4a3-11e5-b147-e5e5bba42e51) [Last accessed on 9 May 2017].


Heritage Foundation 2017. Available at: [http://www.heritage.org](http://www.heritage.org) [Last accessed on 9 May 2017].


Institute for Humane Studies 2017. Available at: https://theihs.org [Last accessed on 9 May 2017].


Mercatus Center 2017. Available at: https://www.mercatus.org [Last accessed on 9 May 2017].


**Appendix 1: Documents analysed in Chapter 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case 1: The Koch brothers</th>
<th>Author/director</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Charles Koch’s interview with Fortune</td>
<td>Fortune</td>
<td>2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Charles Koch’s interview with Forbes</td>
<td>Editor Daniel Fisher</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Sons of Wichita: How the Koch Brothers Became America’s Most Powerful and Private Dynasty</td>
<td>Journalist Daniel Schulman</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Park Avenue: Money, Power, and the American Dream</td>
<td>Director Alex Gibney (BBC)</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Koch Brothers EXPOSED</td>
<td>Director Robert Greenwald (Brave New Films)</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case 2: Gulf terrorism financiers</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Funding Evil: How Terrorism Is Financed - and How to Stop It</td>
<td>Counterterrorism researcher, Dr Rachel Ehrenfeld</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Terror Incorporated: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks</td>
<td>Journalist and political analyst Loretta Napoleoni</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>