Policy (in)Coherence for Development

Narratives of international migration in the Swedish PGD framework

Kajsa Österberg Åström
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Abstract:

Policy Coherence for Development is a concept, framework and tool for achieving a more effective and organized global development agenda. Under the principles of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD), the potential conflicts of objectives between various policy areas should be identified and preferably resolved – with developmental objectives in mind. The PCD has named some policy areas as “expected incoherencies” meaning that the conflicts of objectives they present are typically difficult solve. This thesis problematizes PCD in its lack of definition and guidance on handling expected incoherencies. The research presented is in the form of a case study of the Swedish PCD framework called “Policies for Global Development” (PGD) and concerns one particular expected incoherency, namely international migration. Through a discourse analysis this thesis presents that formal and informal narratives in the Swedish PGD implicitly reveal a migration optimistic stance towards the expected incoherency. Founded upon values of mainly neo-liberal market beliefs and human rights values, the narrational stances principally prioritize the state interest over the global development agenda. Because of this, the Swedish framework portrays a policy situation in which synergies are fostered while the incoherency itself remains and becomes latent. The conclusion of the analysis holds that the migration-development policy nexus is an actualization of the conflictual role of the nation state in a globalizing world.

Keywords: Policy Coherence for Development; International Migration; Policy nexus thinking; Policy narratives; Sweden
To Clara and Marcus, thank you for always dealing with me.
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### Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>GFMD</td>
<td>Global Forum on Migration and Development</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>NPF</td>
<td>Narrative Policy Framework</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>PCD</td>
<td>Policy Coherence for Development</td>
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<td>PGD</td>
<td>Policies for Global Development (Politik för Global Utveckling)</td>
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<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<td>UDHR</td>
<td>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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Introduction: Policy Coherence for Development

The concept of “Policy Coherence for Development” entails that governments of nations and international organizations must make sure to align all of their policies with the global development agenda. The concept, commonly referred to as “PCD”, emerged in the late 1980’s with the European Union’s (EU) Maastricht Treaty. That coherence is preferred over incoherence must be seen as a logical idea - the concept of policy coherence in general is of course not particularly new. The novelty of the Maastricht treaty was the suggestion that policies should be made with consideration of the plausible effects they might have on developing countries. Policy coherence was for the first time articulated as a tool for achieving global development (Picciotto, 2005:310). Simply put, the concept of PCD points out that sophisticated development policies alone are not enough to achieve global development – the objectives of other policy areas, perhaps not traditionally connected to the development paradigm, also have an effect on the outcome.

The concept spread and evolved over the course of the 1990’s and today it is best described as a constitutional part of the current development paradigm (Sianes, 2013:134-135). It is of course easy to make the connection that the ideas that PCD builds on were articulated already in the 1970’s by the critical development theories explaining globalized dependency patterns (Hettne, 2009:82). However, the important turn that the introduction of the PCD in the EU policy framework represents is the internalization of responsibility in the Western world of policymaking. Today, the idea of sustainable development as a global concern that permeates all levels of society (and thus all policy areas) is as evident as it could be. The United Nations have already launched the second and renewed global development agenda with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), known as the “Agenda for 2030” or the “Global Goals” and any respectable modern company or organization has a “sustainability policy”.

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One policy area that is particularly interesting in its relation to the concept of a global development agenda is that of migration. Scholarly voices have over the last decade proclaimed an “age of migration” as the increase in global mobility has very tangible effects on for instance demography and economy (Castles, de Haas & Miller, 2014:13ff). Because of this, the two fields of migration and development have in recent academic debates been referred to as a nexus. The nexus holds, that the direction of causality between migration and development is not easy to establish. Poor conditions for development can be a catalyst that makes people migrate, and reversed, migration in general and migrants in particular are seen as having a positive impact on developmental processes (Nyberg Sørensen & Van Hear, 2003: 12ff). Notably, the one statement being true does not necessarily make the other false - this naturally complicates the job of policy makers within the field of the migration-development nexus.

The concept of PCD is aimed at creating awareness of how issues like migration affects development. Or more specifically; how migration policies (and other policies) can contribute to achieve development objectives. The complicated nature of the migration-development nexus has rendered that within the frames of the PCD concept, migration is labelled a policy area containing expected incoherencies. This means that international migration is perceived to be a particularly difficult policy area to “make coherent” for development because the two areas contain conflicting policy objectives. This thesis takes an interest in how expected incoherence is portrayed within the frames of a national PCD-framework, namely the Swedish one called “Policies for Global Development

Problem definition: what to do with the incoherencies?

If we wish to see a policy-making process which fosters innovation, creativity, ingenuity, diversity, and the capacity for self-transformation, then we should shout three cheers for incoherence (Parsons, 2004:51).
Some nation states have been making progress in implementing the concept of PCD as frameworks in their respective national governments’ organizational bodies. The member states of the EU are in fact bound by the union’s laws to implement a PCD framework, but only a handful of countries have come so far as to establishing it on a higher political level (Concord, 2013:2). What does it then mean for a government to implement the PCD concept? Well, the general function of policy is to guide political action. The concept of PCD is an attempt to dictate the contents of policy and establish a general awareness for developmental outcomes in the policymaking process. The PCD implemented is as such not a policy per se, but rather a policy framework. There has been praise for the countries that have made efforts in the direction of implementing a PCD-framework, mostly from the driving normative institutional forces of the development doctrine like the OECD and the UN. The results of the national PCD frameworks however, are less than satisfying. It has been stated that PCD is a strong and promising concept in theory, but that it has failed miserably in practice (Krätke, 2013).

A common critique is that being so holistic in its approach, a PCD-framework is difficult to evaluate at all. Policy areas are intertwined and a government is a complex apparatus. Hence, problems with mechanisms like monitoring, measurability and accountability will inevitably occur (Picciotto, 2005:319;328). This is indeed one of the inherent difficulties with development policy and practice in general: establishing that given recorded effects are of a net total positive developmental nature, and if so, that they can be causally linked to the measures taken and not an underlying variable (Anderson, 1999:146).

Although obviously difficult a task, PCD frameworks are of course evaluated: lack of clear political directive and confusing assignment of responsibility are among the most important explanations to why a PCD framework is unsuccessful (Concord, 2013; Sianes, 2013:143). These findings appear to be valid seeing that
one could easily argue that political directive and assigning of responsibility are essential elements of working policies in general.

This thesis highlights a more conceptual problem of PCD: the definition and identification of incoherence. Constituting for the general idea of pursuing PCD is that incoherencies in and between policy areas are identified and that synergies are created\(^1\) (OECD, 2016). To achieve coherence should by logical consequential thinking mean to resolve incoherence. Alas, the concept of PCD and the frameworks built on it does not account for exactly what is to be done when incoherence is identified. This thesis takes its point of departure in the lack of clarity in definitions around policy incoherence. The analysis builds on a case study of a national PCD-framework: The Swedish “Policies for Global Development”. The aim is to study how the expected incoherence of the migration-development nexus takes form in PCD framework. The problem studied and presented in this thesis can be exemplified with a quote from an evaluation, here on the issue of responsibility:

“The [Swedish] Government has not stated who is to settle identified conflicts of interest, how it is supposed to be done or how they [the conflicts] will be handled” (Swedish Agency for Public Management, 2014:32) (author’s translation)\(^2\).

The Swedish version of the PCD framework, “Policies for Global Development”, henceforth referred to as the Swedish PGD, was launched in 2003 and has thus been in place for about 14 years. The Swedish PGD is not made out of one sole document. Since the first official proposition “Prop.2002/03:122” also called “Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s Policies for Global Development” (author’s translation), many additions have been made. The Swedish PGD is thus a living framework, growing and evolving over time with various policy documents being added to it. The aim of this thesis is to understand how this framework, that does

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\(^1\) The definition of PCD will be extensively discussed in the theoretical chapter
not entail an explicit course of action for dealing with policy incoherency still manages the dynamics of it. To find a more clear direction for the study, the following research questions have been posed:

(1) How is the migration-development policy nexus portrayed in the Swedish PCD framework?

(2) As the expected incoherency is articulated, how is the PCD framework approaching it?

Purpose of the thesis

The PCD concept is to me a motley curiosity; it has insightful and ambitious aims but the means of reaching them are ill defined and almost naïve in their overarching manner. This paper contributes to the problematisation of the PCD concept in two ways. The first is by critically discussing the theory of PCD with a focus on the incoherence. As we will soon be aware, the available theory on the subject presents a jungle of definitions and meanings. The second is by the detailed analysis of a PCD-framework in itself and not of its outcomes, which is otherwise the custom way to evaluate policy.

There are a few reasons to why I have chosen this particular area of study. Firstly, this is a Master thesis for a major in Development studies and as its author I should consider current ideas in this field of study - my field of study. There is no doubt that migration is buzzing within the scholarly field of development. Second, I personally believe that the development paradigm still has a somewhat skewed focus on “developing the underdeveloped”. To me, the real problem is the “over-development” of the western world, which is why western policy is the focal point of this thesis.
Shortly about the case: the Swedish PGD

Sweden was among the first countries to promote a PCD framework and is also one of few countries to have implemented it on a higher political level\(^3\) (OECD, 2008:4). This means that if one is interested in how the PCD concept has been actualized on the national level there are not many cases that can provide enough analysable material as of yet. To study PCD on the national level makes sense since advocacy and responsibility are in general considered to be national commitments anyways, even in the context of a supra-national framework like the one of the EU (Sianes, 2013:138)\(^4\).

Moreover, Sweden has for long been seen as a normatively powerful actor in the case of development policy and practice. Sweden has strong international commitments and is also one of the most generous contributors to official development aid, seen to GDP per capita (Ingebritsen, 2002:16). Over the course of the last decade Sweden has shown explicit interest in the migration-development nexus as it for instance held the chair at the Global Forum of Migration and Development, and it has been promoting the importance of including international migration on the policy agendas in the EU as well as the UN (GFMD, 2017). The particular focus on the expected incoherency of international migration has been chosen because of Sweden’s clear engagement in the issue.

\(^3\) Other countries that have made equally strong commitments are Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (Concord, 2013:2)

\(^4\) A further discussion on the different definitions of policy coherence in general and PCD and its different levels in particular will be held in the following theoretical section.
Literature review

Defining the doctrine

As was mentioned in the introduction, the idea of Policy Coherence for Development (PCD) was first articulated in the early 1990’s as the European Union adopted what is called the Maastricht treaty (Picciotto, 2005:314). It involved a new orientation for increasing commonality in the Union’s security and foreign affairs, which included a new and cohesive direction for a number of its policy areas: “The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies” (European Council, 1992:8). Note that the term used in the Maastricht treaty is “consistency” and not “coherence”. Consistency and coherence had of course been mentioned before in developmental contexts. The Development Assistance Cooperation (DAC) of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) mentioned it in a policy document already in the late 1980’s, but in a more narrow sense that suggested that the outcomes of a policy should be in line with the policy objective (Hoebink, 2004:9). One might argue that this is what should be expected of any policy – that it is not self-contradictive.

Picciotto (2005:314) notes that it was when the United Nations (UN) fully endorsed the concept of PCD that it got its true recognition. The Millennium Summit in the year of 2000 and the large gatherings alike it in the following years that led to the signing of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are according to Picciotto (2005) the definite promotion of PCD. Apart from being characterized by a universality in the view of development problems of poverty, hunger and economic injustice, the UN agreement of the MDGs also entailed a specific framework for “mutual accountability” that is certainly at the core of the PCD definition (Picciotto, 2005:316). Never before had the global community seen such a legitimate promotion of this type of ideas, but they remained on the
promotional stage as no directives or benchmarks for how policies should be altered were incorporated. The framework for mutual accountability paradoxically enough could not hold the UN member states accountable for its implementation. Furthermore, the MDGs were criticized over the fact that the measures suggested to be taken for global development where largely ascribed to developing countries, leaving the developed economies of the global north without responsibility for the implementation. With the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) launched in 2015, this error had been more or less corrected. The new agenda, now working towards the year 2030 also goes under the name “the global goals” – referring to the equally shared responsibility of their fulfilment (ibid). Today, there are few Institutions working in the sphere of international development that do not support and promote PCD. OECD offered a definition of PCD in 2002. It says that a PCD framework should aim to

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\text{[...]enhance \ the understanding of the development dimensions of member country policies and their impacts on developing countries... It should consider trade-offs and potential synergies across such areas as trade, investment, agriculture, health, education, the environment and development cooperation, to encourage greater policy coherence in support of the internationally agreed development goals. (OECD, 2002).}
\]

Notably, this definition is from 2002 and is thus 15 years old. However, when looking at the latest update of the OECD webpage for PCD in 2016 the definition remains practically the same with the exception that the policy areas described in the 2002 definitions are summarized and that the terminology is of a slightly more general and familiar style. Sianes (2013:136) has done an extensive research on the concept of PCD and points to the fact that a universally used definition does not exist for the PCD in the doctrinal sense. Though, from what I can concur, the literature commonly refers to definitions from the OECD, like the one from 2002 as previously quoted. Carbone (2008:324) for example, states that a widely accepted definition of PCD is “taking account of the needs and interest of developing countries in the evolution of the global economy”, also this from the OECD, but in 2003. In my opinion, the latter of the definitions appears to be more

\[5\text{http://www.oecd.org/pcd/}\]
vague than the former but as also Sianes (2013), whose research can most accurately be described as a *state of the art*, refers to this definition I thought it reasonable to mention. Apart from a general vagueness, or perhaps openness, the latter definition differentiates grammatically from the former. It manifests an object, “the developing countries”, and implicitly a subject in the OECD-countries.

**Coherence, consistency and coordination**

As noted, when coherence for development was first articulated in the EU Maastricht treaty the word used was consistency and not coherence. Nuttal (2005:93) notes that the two terms are widely used interchangeably although they carry certain linguistic difference. He states that mostly, the preference for which term to use seems to be dependent on differences in language and not essential meaning. In EU documents “consistency” is preferred in English, and “coherence” in French (ibid). To my knowledge, consistency is close to the idea of repetition or perhaps even reproduction or persistence. Coherence, on the other hand, I would say refers to some type of unity or agreement. The former might perhaps lean on linearity in time, whereas the latter rather deals with questions of scope, width or inclusivity. Another example is Carbone (2008) who says that:

*To avoid incoherencies, the various policies need to be coordinated. Coordination, and consequently coherence, is not easily achievable when policy sub-systems relate to each other horizontally and there are only weak hierarchical coordination mechanisms* (Carbone, 2008:326).

Note here that we now have the words “coherence”, “consistency” and “coordination” at our disposal to understand the concept of PCD. I believe that this presents a linguistic scrabble to say the least. The three words are combined in number of ways. Take Nuttal (2005) for instance, he uses “consistency” instead of “coherence” – making the word synonymous. To others, like Carbone (2008), one of the words seemingly represents a prerequisite for the other. See in the
quote above how “coherence” follows after “coordination”. When studying PCD it is naturally beneficial to be aware of what theoretical concepts and definitions are attached to the concept. I will present the ones that I have made use of in the theoretical chapter.

The migration-development nexus

The research on the migration-development nexus can be divided in two simplified theoretical camps: the optimists and the sceptics. The theories supporting the idea of migration for development are most commonly described as part of the “neoclassical economic theory” (De Haas, 2008:4ff). The macro-level theory leans on “spatial-economic equilibrium model”, i.e. that migration patterns over the globe are a direct result of geographical labour scarcity (developed economies and cities) and surplus (rural areas in developing countries). As is obvious, this theoretical camp within the field of migration is closely related to the modernization theories in the development paradigm. The micro level of analysis in neoclassical economic theory is most often connected to the idea of “push-pull”, trying to depict what factor might want to make an individual leave the country of origin and respectively choose the country of destination. This model treats the migrant as a rational individual that weights options and picks the most beneficial one (ibid).

The migration-development sceptics on the other hand draw their theories ideas from the historical-structural corner, highlighting that the “option” to migrate is not really a choice but rather is a forced outcome of global dependency structures. The ideological adherence of the sceptics is rooted in neo-marxist development theories of the 1960’ and 1970’s like for instance the World Systems Theory, which understands the world as divided in regions with structurally ascribed power relations (core; semi-periphery; periphery). Migration is at large conceived of as a phenomenon involving very little freedom. While criticizing neoclassical
theories of push-pull for homogenizing migrants as group, the historical structural sceptics have in their turn been accused of victimizing them (ibid:7). The most important thing to note of the migration-development nexus and its polarized ideological and theoretical discourse is that since the turn of the millennium, there has been a remarkable upswing for the optimist stance, which is usually explained by the “rediscovery” of remittances\(^6\) as a development source (Nyberg Sørensen, 2016:63). De Haas is stating that:

*This raises the fundamental question whether the recent shift towards optimistic views reflects a veritable change in (increasingly transnationally framed) migration-development interactions, the use of other methodological and analytical tools, or is rather the deductive echo of a general paradigm shift from dependency and state-centrist to neoliberal and neoclassical views in general* (De Haas, 2008:2).

Betts (2013:46) refers to this optimism of the migration-development nexus as obvious evidence that it has become an *industry*. Usually, he means, international migration as a phenomenon is contextualized in relation to the functions of the nation state, such as border control and citizenship. This means that policy making of international migration has been a traditionally national affair, despite the inherently transnational nature of the subject.

In the European Journal of Development Studies, Nyberg-Sørensen (2016) reflects on the quite recent surge in migration optimism in the context of Danish PCD efforts. Alike Sweden, Denmark has been one of the proponents of integrating migration in the agenda of the global development policy makers\(^7\). Nyberg Sørensen concludes that the embedded incoherence in the migration for development agenda has been kept intact because the focus on the nexus has been directed to the developmental policy side. The real problems that migration might pose are not actually addressed. The article also depicts a policy debate in Denmark wherein policymakers “neglect migration realities” (Nyberg Sørensen,

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\(^6\) Remittances are the transnational money transactions that migrants make to support their families in the country of origin. It is widely accepted that the total sum of remittances sent over the globe is about three times that of the combined Official Development Aid (World Bank Group, 2016).

\(^7\) Although the Danish approach to migration policies in general and immigration regulation in particular has differed from the Swedish one.
2016:68). The policymakers’ answer when called on their neglect has been to accuse academics (such as Nyberg Sørensen) of being too far from the practical world in their suggestions and recommendations for policy measures (ibid). Altogether the migration-development nexus in the Danish PCD-framework has been far from a policy success.
Theoretical framework

This chapter presents firstly presents a few theoretical concepts of PCD. The general focus of this chapter is on critically assessing the *incoherence* rather than the coherence. A theoretical contribution to the literature is made as I combine two already existing concepts in a matrix. The matrix offers a conceptualization of *expected incoherence* within PCD. The second section of this chapter presents theory on discourse and narrative in policy.

Policy Coherence for Development in theory

*A conceptual map*

“Figure 1” shows Sianes’ (2013) conceptual map of the different types of PCD, or in other words how a nation state\(^8\) can implement the PCD concept:

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\(^8\) As mentioned previously in this paper, PCD assumes the nation state as the primary entity of evaluative analysis.
Circling the specific policy issue of *migration*, the focus of this thesis lands at the intersection of the vertical “Aid Policy” and “Foreign Policy” and the horizontal “Other National Policies”. Thus, theoretical definitions of interest include Hoebink’s (2004) External Coherence, Picciotto’s (2005) Intra-country Coherence and lastly Carbone’s (2008) Horizontal Coherence. Now, the remaining part of this section is dedicated to elaborating on these three definitions and how the problem definition of this thesis fits within them.

I will start with Hoebink’s (2004:8) *External coherence*, which he also refers to as “the broad definition”. I will note that he bases his definition on the PCD framework of the EU government structure, which is of course partly inter-governmental. However, this is of lesser importance as he also speaks of policy coherence in general terms in his definitions. The definitions are as such applicable to issues outside of the developmental policy issues, and to any type of government. Firstly, he understands policy coherence as “[t]he non-occurrence of effects of policy that are contrary to the intended results or aims of policy”. The *External coherence* then, that I take interest in, he explains to be the coherence between *development cooperation policies* and *other policies*. Any policy of any field can be included in the category “other”. Hoebink (2004) says that this particular type of policy incoherence is the most likely one to have a (negative) effect on developing countries (ibid). He also exemplifies the *External coherence* by stating that in the “themes” of migration policies and development policies, the conflict arises in restriction of immigration and reaching humanitarian goals (Hoebink, 2004:196).

Picciotto’s (2005) *Intra-country coherence* is defined as “the consistency among several aid and non-aid policies of an OECD government in terms of their combined contribution to development” (Picciotto, 2005:312). With “aid policies” he means all policies concerning development and not only those of financial aid. We see how his definition has more room for interpretation than the one offered by Hoebink (2004). Firstly, the wording “among several” points to the fact that policies and policy subsystems connect, overlap and intertwine in different
directions, all simultaneously. If we suppose that an intersection of two (or more) non-aid policies have an effect (negative or positive) on development, even if not directly tied to a development policy, it still fits the definition. The goal then, is seemingly to achieve a net coherence of all policies with a positive effect on development. He states that PCD is “the identification of trade-offs and synergies across policy domains towards achieving development objectives” (Picciotto, 2005:312). Unmistakably, Hoebink’s (2004) External coherence and Picciotto’s (2005) Intra-country coherence differ immensely although they are describing the same particular occurrence. To me, the former definition trumps the latter in analytical usefulness, at least in the context of the discussions undertaken in this thesis. Picciotto’s version simply leaves too much room for conditionality.

The third theoretical definition that I will present is the Horizontal coherence as presented by Carbone (2008). He says that:

*Horizontal coherence refers to the potential problems raised by the interaction between various policy areas; more specifically to development policy, it refers to the consistency between aid and non-aid policies in terms of their combined contribution to development* (Carbone, 2008:326)

The wording is surprisingly vague: “potential problems” could, in my opinion, mean almost anything. Also, the word “interaction” seems to suggest an active interplay between two policy areas, and that it is in this interplay that the potential problems can occur. One can for example suppose that two policies in separate policy fields can be contradictory to the outcome of a third goal (a developmental one for instance) although the policies are not directly in any interaction. Moreover, Carbone (2008) speaks of two types of imperative for pursuing policy coherence. The first is connected to the denotation of consistency as a politically positive value. Simply, it lies in the interest of any political actor (a government or politician for instance) to be perceived as consistent rather than inconsistent by the public or their opponents (Carbone, 2008:326). To pursue coherence and consistency is a matter of credibility. Second, there is the economic imperative. It
is likely that coherence between policies improves cost efficiency, as it would avoid an improvident use of scarce resources (ibid).

The three definitions of policy coherence that have now been discussed; Hoebink’s (2003) *External coherence*, Picciotto’s (2005) *Intra-country coherence* and Carbone’s (2008) *Horizontal coherence* all circle the coherence between policies for aid and development and policies of other political areas. These three definitions are among the most frequently quoted, and I believe that Sianes’ (2013) conceptual map is the best effort to a state of the art in PCD theory. I will conclude this section on theoretical definitions by presenting a fourth definition from a scholar that is not in the conceptual map nor as frequently quoted in the PCD literature as the other three. In my opinion, Ashoff (2005) approaches linguistic scrabble of “coherence, “consistency” and “coordination” in a quite manageable way in stating that “[p]olicy consistency is simply that policies are not incoherent. Policy coherence as a full conceptual idea also includes an active pursuit of coordination to foster synergies for a higher purpose or goal” (Ashoff, 2005:11). Furthermore he provides a two-fold definition of PCD:

 [...] *policy coherence from the development viewpoint means, as a first definition, the absence of incoherencies, which occur when other policies deliberately or accidentally impair the effects of development policy or run counter to its intentions. A second and more ambitious definition sees policy coherence as support for development policy from other policies or as the interaction of all policies that are relevant in the given context with a view to achieving overriding development objectives* (Ashoff, 2005:12).

Ashoff pinpoints a handy division of the PCD concept that none of the three previous definitions fully articulated, namely that there are two operational approaches. The first is to eliminate incoherence and contradiction, the second to add coordination and bridging initiatives. The possibility of splitting the concept of PCD in this way is useful for the type of analysis that I will present in this thesis, as it provides a more direct approach to understanding the difference between to *removing incoherence* and *fostering synergies*, two policy actions that are essentially different but both constitutive of the PCD concept.
The necessity and intention of incoherence

Hoebink (2004) notes that in the Maastricht Treaty, the language is vague regarding the importance of adjusting incoherence once it has been identified. Wordings like “taking into account” or “being aware of” incoherence do not guarantee that action will be taken to actually resolve the incoherence, which reveals a more passive side of the PCD concept (Hoebink, 2004:9-10). “Being aware” of the incoherence can simply mean to intentionally let it remain unsolved. Thus, we have the distinction of intended an unintended coherence. The typology is in a way complimentary to all the other theoretical definitions of PCD because it does not describe coherence itself but how it is approached. If we now look to a discussion that Picciotto (2005) has concerning the complexity of necessity of incoherence. He notes that:

*Through evaluation, one can draw critical distinctions between intended vs unintended incoherence and necessary vs unnecessary incoherence – both when policies are designed and when they are put into practice* (Picciotto, 2005:323). We have already discussed the dimension of intention. Now, there is a second dimension, namely that of necessity. Picciotto (2005:322ff) means that between these two dimensions of intention and necessity in incoherence is where the issue of accountability in PCD can be framed. He draws on basic ideas of the constitutive values of a democracy, and the relation between the governing and the governed. Citizens should demand that policymakers or other people of power make decisions that benefit the welfare of the society (and thus the citizens) to the greatest extent possible in whatever situation (policy problem) is given. Incoherence becomes acceptable only if possible outcomes have formerly been subject to democratic discussion i.e. deliberation (Picciotto, 2005:323). That policies are incoherent should thus be an intended choice. In a democracy, policymakers should be held accountable if it is not. I have put together the dimensions of Hoebink’s (2004) “intention” and Picciotto’s (2005) “necessity” in a matrix to suggest a simplified way to reason about their definitional value.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY INCOHERENCE</th>
<th>Intended</th>
<th>Unintended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Necessary</strong></td>
<td>Acceptable</td>
<td>Not acceptable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Should be the outcome of deliberation</td>
<td>Insufficient awareness with policy/decision-makers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unnecessary</strong></td>
<td>Not acceptable</td>
<td>Not acceptable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indicates faulty government structure and/or corruption</td>
<td>Strong indication of incapable policy/decision-makers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 2, “Incoherence in Policymaking” (Authors own illustration, based on Picciotto, 2005 and Hoebink, 2004)*

Note that this matrix only applies to policy *incoherence*, and not policy coherence. As shown in the upper left square, intended incoherence fits within the PCD concept, as perfect coherence is not achievable. The upper right square shows the *need* for the PCD concept. Or put differently, the problem showcased in the upper right square could be adjusted if awareness was added. If a PCD framework is implemented and functions perfectly (awareness added), the upper right corner in this in cross scheme would be empty. This matrix circles the problem definition of this thesis, i.e. when there is known conflict of policy objectives, *expected incoherency*, within a PCD framework. It also shows what incoherence should *not* be considered within the PCD concept i.e. the “unnecessary intended” and the “unnecessary unintended” as showcased in the two bottom squares.
The matrix *Incoherence in Policymaking* will be used as a theoretical platform for orientation as I analyse narratives in the Swedish PGD. Obviously, the matrix cannot perfectly fit all possible cases of incoherence, but it summarizes some important conceptual ideas and enhances their accessibility.

**Discourse in policy**

The case has been studied through the means of a discourse analysis. The analytical techniques of a discourse analysis cannot be detached from the ontological and epistemological assumptions it springs from. It comes in a methodologically “complete package” that must be considered a theory as much as a method. Discourse is a fluid concept, which has been defined in many ways. Though, some sort of common ideational ground is seemingly found in the assumptions of the importance of language and communication in society. The word discourse entails the ways in which a subject or issue is spoken of and understood. The discourse is simultaneously the product and producer of societal meaning - to study discourse is to look for patterns in the intertwined manner that they occur in speech text and thought. A characteristic for discourse is that it should be understood as a construct, ever changing. (Bryman, 2008:485; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002:4-5; Fischer, 2003:73).

There are a few different directions within the world of discourse, meaning that there are several philosophical packages to choose from. One that is specifically suited for the analysis of policy documents originates from the ideas of Foucault’s understanding of knowledge and power, thus usually referred to as the *foucauldian* type of discourse analysis. This type of discourse analysis is characterized by its epistemological standpoint of critical realism (Bryman, 2008:484). This standpoint entails that discourse is approached as in constant relation to societal power structures. Hence, the discourse itself is more of a generative mechanism for transferring power than it is anything else. An important dimension of foucauldian discourse analysis is that the intertwined
nature of how different discourses occur in language is sometimes competitive: discourses are in battle and the weaker have to give way for the hegemonic (ibid). In this type of discourse analysis the researcher is constantly aware of how power and ideology are structurally expressed. To Foucault, discourse is power and politics (see for example “Power/Knowledge”, 1980). As the migration-development nexus is presented as an overt conflict of policy objectives in the Swedish PGD (and as an expected incoherence within PCD in general), it is plausible that the policy framework will contain competing discourses. This is one of the fundamental assumptions of this thesis. Quite simply, to uncover the discourses in the Swedish PGD through a critical discourse analysis is a way of exposing the dynamic of the conflict of policy objectives.

Waagenar further lists a few of the plausible interests that a researcher might have in conducting discourse analysis on policy documents. One is to sort out “the social-linguistic construction of policy problems” (Waagenar, 2008:165). This adequately describes the problem definition guiding this thesis. I will investigate in how the migration-development nexus as an expected incoherence is constructed within the framework of the Swedish PGD.

I will make specification in concentrating on a particular type of discursive aspect of policy: the narrative. A narrative in policy has the same function as it does in any other aspect of society, namely to tell a story:

*The social meanings uncovered by interpretive analysis [...] are typically embedded in a policy narrative, designed to portray the fuller picture of a policy problem and the potential solutions. Built around interpretations, the narrative represents the policy situation, and offers a view of what has to be done and what the expected consequences will be* (Fischer, 2003:161).

The Narrative Policy Framework

The *Narrative Policy Framework* (NPF) offers sets of conceptual elements that
will work as an operationalization of narrative in this thesis. The NPF alike Fairclough’s CDA is aspiring to offer a complete package for analysis. The NPF characterizes as epistemologically objective as it accepts the idea of the existence of a reality. It also takes an ontologically subjective angle in its main assumption of the narrative as each story is bound to the storyteller’s own perception of the objective reality.

The main assumption of the NPF is that all humans to some extent share information in the form of stories; a plot, character and usually an ending that comes with a moral idea are part of our way to describe our reality. This is the assumption of the *Homo narrans* – the model of the individual as a tale teller. The idea of narrative lies close to that of rhetoric and communication and plays a pivotal role in the success of a given policy. The narrative of a public policy is quite simply a story of how a societal problem is solved. Politicians and policymakers use narratives to sell their idea of a solution. Policymaking is assumed to take this form of competing narratives because our post-industrial modern society is consumerist, and in it policy and ideas are consumed much in the same way as physical products. As information is easily accessible to the public and the choices are many, it is simply not enough to have the best solution in practice. The solution must be promoted and it is in this act that the policy narrative is born (McBeth et al, 2014:225).

The NPF consist of an applied set of *structural narrative elements* that according to the framework can be generalized to any policy. Accepting this format, the narratives become distinguishable and comparable. As the narrative elements are identified it provides the researcher with a nuanced picture of the *policy belief*. I will use the definition by McBeth, Jones, and Shanahan (2014:228) as it is a comprehensive and recent compilation. The elements constituting a policy narrative are according to their description as follows:

(i) Setting – describes the policy context and what different legislations, geographical or institutional demarcations that the policy problem
involves, the policy consequential phenomena. Policy actors usually latently agree upon the setting of the policy narrative, it is simply put taken for granted or obvious to the actors it concerns.

(ii) Character(s) – the policy narrative always has a minimum of one definable character. This character can be any type of actor, an institution, group or individual. The characters of a policy narrative have different roles, as in any story. Villains and heroes are responsible for actions and events, or they can be more passive and objectified victims.

(iii) Plot – describes the course of event that that the characters mediate and take part in within the narrative setting. The plot accounts for the relationships between characters, and as in most stories the narrative plot has a defined beginning and end.

(iv) Moral – in the moral lies the policy solution to the contextual problem. The moral of a policy narrative is the intent and idea of the narrator i.e. the policymaker (or other actor)

In the scope of this thesis then, I will identify narratives of migration and development within the Swedish PGD. In establishing what narratives are embedded in the policy framework one can draw a more clear and nuanced picture of the said incoherence as narratives speak of preferred policy solutions. The concepts of discourse and narrative are of course closely related – storytelling is one of the most basic and common forms that communication and discourse take. In the narrative, the essence of a discourse can be found and thus problematized (Fischer, 2003:163).
Methodology

A policy framework case study

The analysis in this thesis is based on material from one specific PCD framework: the Swedish “Policies for Global Development”. The initial choice of method can then most accurately be described as a qualitative case study. A case can for instance be an event, a person or an organization and the main objective is to understand its particularities by studying it in detail (Bryman, 2008:74). Here, the primary unit of analysis is a policy framework and this particular study it has a few clearly drawn demarcations. The Swedish PGD has a given time frame, from 2003 when it was launched until today's date as it is still in place (May, 2017). It also has an originator – the Swedish government. It is debatable whether the case is in fact the Government (as an organizational actor) or the policy framework. As the problem definition that guides this thesis takes primary interest in dynamics expected to occur within the PCD concept the framework ultimately becomes the case.

The material

As has already been mentioned: the Swedish PGD is a living framework consisting of several policy documents that have been added over time. Also, there is no official declaration of which policy documents are part of the framework since the idea is that all policies of all policy areas should be within it. The selection of documents for this study was made based on a few distinctions. Firstly, the research undertaken is not aiming to capture the discourse of migration or development as separate policy issues – but specifically how they are articulated as a nexus within the framework for policy coherence. The Swedish
Government provides a highly structured online database\(^9\) containing fully disclosed policy documents\(^10\). This database includes propositions, investigations and policy directives. The database is research friendly as it offers the function of various filtering options such as the application of a adding a time frame and the entering of keywords like “migration” or “Coherence for Development”. Within this database, relevant policy documents have been found by trying different combinations of keywords. Thanks to this function it is easy to establish what documents relate to the migration development nexus within the Swedish PGD. The selection has been made with the perspective of capturing the discourse of the nexus. For instance, there are hundreds of policy documents on migration, but not all contain references to development in general or to the PGD specifically. Likewise, not all development policy documents contain references to migration.

Some documents are “official” PGD-documents\(^11\). These documents have naturally been pivotal to the analysis but it has also been apparent that the depiction of the migration-development nexus ensues in many other documents not officially named “PGD”. Finally, this nexus-oriented approach resulted in a selection of approximately 120 documents. According to the operational guidelines, which will be presented forthcoming in this chapter, this selection of documents was then read again. Obviously, the documents are of varying types: some written in a very “sterile” policy language and some richer and more descriptive. The lion’s share of the documents in the selection proved to contain no narrative language, and hence, not possible to analyse seeing that the aim of this thesis is to capture a portrayal of a problem. These documents were consequently discarded leaving a little over 20 documents, which made out the final body of material for the analysis. All documents of narrational quality that mentioned migration and development were included. This final selection of documents is listed in the appendix on page 69.

\(^9\) [http://www.regeringen.se/rattsdokument/](http://www.regeringen.se/rattsdokument/)

\(^10\) Most policy documents are in Swedish. This has not presented a problem for me seeing that I am a native Swedish speaker. I will briefly discuss the issues this instead poses in regards to translation at the end of this chapter.

\(^11\) Prop. 2002/03:122; Prop. 2007/08:89; Prop.2013/14:154; Prop. 2015/16:182
There are additional aspects of a more circumstantial type that can be expected to affect the content in the policy documents of the Swedish PGD. These will be further discussed in the first section of the analysis.

A hermeneutic approach

The overarching methodological approach of this study is hermeneutic. The analysis was conducted through several readings of the material while continuously reflecting on the relation to theoretical concepts. The choice of theory in a foucauldian style of discourse as well as the idea of narrative as it is presented in the NPF directs this style of method quire clearly. The research is in itself built on interpretation. I will return to problematize this in the final section of the chapter.

Critical Discourse Analysis

So, how does one go about distinguishing discourses and narratives in a given set of material? The most common course of action is to use the three-dimensional approach as formulated by Fairclough (1992). The approach is called Critical discourse analysis (CDA) and it holds that any “discursive event” (such as a policy document) must be viewed as a text, a discursive practice and a social practice all at one (Fairclough, 1992:4). The three dimensions can be understood as:

(i) The examination of the actual content, structure and meaning of the text under scrutiny - the text dimension.
(ii) The examination of the form of discursive interaction used to communicate meaning and beliefs - the discursive practice dimension.
(iii) The consideration of the social context in which the discursive event is taking place - the social practice dimension (Grant et al, 2004:11).
What is important to note in regards to these three dimensions is that they are not steps or stages. The three aspects of the critical discourse analysis as shown above are dimensions of a discourse, not an order in which the discourse is to be analysed. If we look for example to the third dimension of the social practice, it focuses on the social context. The social context is the more general setting in which the given discourse takes place. A researcher is presumably always aware of the setting of their studied problem or phenomenon – in critical discourse analysis it is acknowledged that this setting is not a passive platform instead has circumstantial effects (Fischer, 2003:122). This is why it is not possible to exclude one of the dimensions from the analysis and the reason to why Fairclough refers to a document as a “discursive event”.

According to Waagenar (2008:165) the principal problem with CDA as a method is that it is so conceptual that it can appear to be more of theory than a method, as I have already flagged for. Fairclough, he means, creates ambiguity for the researcher intending to use CDA as an analytical tool because the concept can do and entail so much. If the researcher is not sure of what he or she is looking for in the material, they risk ending up with a great deal of confusion and unstructured results. So, for a critical discourse analysis to be a successful method, further specification might be required in the analytical procedure (ibid).

**Rhetorical devices**

Two researchers who have both specialized in narrative in policy are Hajer and Dryzek. They both implement a structured framework when conducting discourse analysis that build on the idea that narrative exposes the essence of a discourse as it is articulated in policy (Hajer, 1995). In “Making Sense of Earth’s Politics” Dryzek (2005) constructed an approach to narratives in environmental policies
that follows the conceptualization of narrative elements that the NPF provides. One aspect that both Dryzek and Hajer acknowledges as important for a storyline is the rhetorical devices that can be connected i.e. the characterizing language that of the narrative (Dryzek, 2005:19; Hajer, 1995:301). This is a prime example of how Fairclough’s linguistic idea of discourse can be operationalized in the identification of narrative. The rhetorical devices can be attached to the first textual dimension and it also helps in nuancing or even identifying the narrative.

The scope: Narratives in meso to macro

Narratives are found in all three levels of analysis: micro, meso and macro. This thesis concentrates on the latter two, leaving out how narratives are internalized and communicated by individuals. In research of the policy process the meso-level is called the policy subsystem, which is not specific for NPF but applies to all theories within this field of study. The study of a policy subsystem aims at understanding how different coalitional groups use narratives to strengthen and promote their view of how a given policy problem should be solved. Thus, it is at the meso level that the “competition” of narratives is the most evident (McBeth et al, 2014:230-232). Printed policies, like the Swedish PGD consists of, most often contain “ready made” narratives as it would not be beneficial for the policy to convey a narrative in the working - an unpolished storyline does not convince anyone (Fischer, 2003:168). In the meso-level of the NPF three are three types of policy strategies that actors use to convey their narrative. They help distinguish narratives in the material. The policy strategies are:

(i) Scope of conflict - When experiencing adversity, an actor is likely to widen the scope of the policy problem/conflict so that the narrative fits a “bigger picture”.

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12 Dryzek is not explicitly using the NPF elements, but his concepts are overlapping them.
(ii) Causal mechanisms - An actor can assign blame for a policy problem to an event/dynamic that lies outside the policy scope. It is the identification of possible causes for a problem.


For the meso level of analysis, the NPF is usually applied through content analysis of documents (McBeth et al, 2014:231). It is here that my combined methodology package of CDA and NPF is presented with a possible incompatibility. For, what is methodologically aspired in this suggested application of the NPF is to diverge from the interpretative sphere of research – at least to a certain extent. Content analysis employs a systematic reading, quantifying certain aspects of a document. The quantification includes coding and often counting of words. For example, in comparing the frequency of use of a specific word to another, the researcher can speculate in the importance the words have for the producer of the given document and the meaning that lies behind them (Bryman, 2008:283). In the NPF, the structural narrative elements (setting, character, plot, moral) are the codes. One might say that the heuristic devices are inherent to the theoretical framework. I will use these codes as part of the discourse analysis.

As we know, the NPF takes for granted that narratives operate on three levels of analysis simultaneously. In actual academic research though, the theoretical framework has been applied almost exclusively to the micro and the meso level – this is seen as a general weakness of the NPF (McBeth et al, 2014:246). There are however a few examples of how narratives in the meso level are connected to narratives in the macro level, and it is perhaps the connection that is truly interesting and not the analysis of the macro level in itself. For instance, there was a study in which consumerism was identified as the driving narrative in American economic habits (macro) as well as in American coalitional politics (meso) – the connection between how the narrative operated between the two levels was
obvious (McBeth et al, 2014:247). The macro level in NPF is referred to as the institutional-cultural level (McBeth et al, 2014:231). Here, it is not difficult to make connections to Fairclough’s third dimension of the social practice: the institutional-cultural level and the social practice dimension are both concerned with the wider context in which a narrative or discourse is situated.

A critical reflection

The interpretative form of analysis is inevitably tied to the researchers subjective understanding. Hermeneutics is the sequenced valuing of information, and the outcome can only be as broad as the mind responsible for the evaluation. Hence, any study of this sort will naturally lack generalizability. Fischer (2003:154) points out that where an empiricist seeks validity, the post-empiricist seeks credibility. One way of understanding this is that the subjectivity inherent to interpretative research is scientifically acceptable as long as the researcher can make reasonable arguments for the case that it is. The most obvious way to do this should be to thoroughly connect discussions to theory and to the material. This way the subjectivity becomes traceable and anchored. Also, to study policy is de facto a moral activity (Waagenar, 2008:5-7). I will go as far as to say that any research is a moral activity since there is always an underlying (or overt) intention that can be traced back to ideological beliefs. As I perceive it, adherence - be it moral, political or ideological - is not problematic. It’s simply a part of academic research and life in general. The problem, as it occurs, is lack of transparency about ones adherences.

I will again briefly mention the fact that this study has taken concepts usually applied through content analysis and used them in a discourse analysis. The compatibility of these two methods has been questioned due to the fact that the former is positivistic and the latter is not. This could imply a methodological conflict. However, if one instead recognizes their complementarity the benefits
may be many. Supposedly, bringing forth the discursive elements in content analysis (like this study proposes to do) is also the most accessible combination (Hardy et al, 2004:19ff). In the end, the philosophical crime of this methods framework has been in the form of conceptual cherry picking, from the suggested world of quantitative research into the qualitative one. As I see it, the primary “coding” of the material has not posed an impediment to the interpretative style of analysis; on the contrary it has opened up for clarity and nuance in taking on the material.

Finally, translation in research can be seen as problematic. This thesis is written in English but the material is almost exclusively in Swedish. The quotes in the analysis are thus all translated. The downside of this is that phrasings can get skewed and thus be present a somewhat faulty analysis. The upside is that reflection is demanded considering the meaning of words.
Narratives in the Swedish Policies for Global Development

The structure of the analysis

The elements that I will give account of are firstly the identified narratives. Through the three discursive dimensions will investigate in what meaning the narratives carry. As is obvious, there are quite a few aspects to this analysis and it might be difficult for the reader to summon the content. A structure to the presentation of the analysis is therefor needed. I will borrow one directly from John Dryzek (2005) whose apt exposition of environmentalist policies is easily obtainable and pedagogical. Clearly, I diverge quite a bit from Dryzek in topic of interest by I find that our methodological courses of actions are parallel, albeit he does not use the specification of the NPF to define his storylines. Dryzek sorts the findings in the material according to the narratives and discuss rhetorical devices and language typical for the narrative. He then gives an account for the praxis connected to the narrative. The benefits of doing this is that it becomes easier to compare the narratives as they are in focus. As I assume that narratives help explain the dynamic in the conflict of policy objectives, I will employ Dryzek’s way of presenting a discourse analysis - by narrative and not by document or year. As I am also adhering to the NPF and its levels of analysis, a distinction between meso and macro is necessary. The focus is on policy subsystem narratives (meso), and what plausible institutional-cultural narratives can be connected to them (macro). The institutional-cultural narratives will be proposed lastly because primary interest is to see how narrative might relate between the macro and meso level. For simplicity I will henceforth refer to the meso-level narratives as
“formal” and the macro-level narratives as “informal”. Formal in the sense of officially conveyed in policy documents, informal in the sense of institutional/societal discursive forces.

Some circumstantial aspects to be aware of

Since 2003 when the PGD was launched, a few events have taken place that could reflect change in use of narrative on migration and development in Swedish policy documents. In the general elections in 2010 the immigration hostile populist party the Sweden Democrats for the first time entered the Riksdag and gained a balance of power role. In the following general elections in 2014 the same party became the third largest (SCB, 2014). The results of the elections in 2010 and 2014 principally mean two things: that the Sweden democrats gained political power to affect policy and that public opinion had made a shift in focusing on migration policies. In November 2015 the effects of the “refugee crisis” had culminated in Sweden, and the Prime Minister announced that measures had to be taken to “give Sweden breathing space ” (Reuters, 2015).

Another factor to take in to account is that since 2003, four different governments and three Prime Ministers have taken office in Sweden13. Hence, the Swedish PGD framework can be expected to mirror narratives that are products of different political stances. I will not trace different narratives or documents back to political parties or politicians as to explain the political heritage of the narratives; this would have rendered a much too extensive analysis. I consider the Swedish PGD as an entity, accepting that it is not the product of a homogenous originator.

13 2002-2006: Göran Persson, Swedish Social Democratic party, minority government
2006-2010: Fredrik Reinfeldt, Moderate party, majority coalition government
2010-2014: Fredrik Reinfeldt, Moderate party minority coalition government
2014- now: Stefan Löfven, Swedish Social Democratic party, minority coalition (SCB, 2014)
Three expected incoherencies

As mentioned in the introduction is the migration-development nexus explicitly articulated as a challenge containing “conflicts of interests” in the Swedish PGD. I chose to call this the expected incoherence and it is in the material visible made as three officially acknowledged “conflicts”:

(i)  *The “brain gain” and the “brain drain”*.  
The gain that a migrant means to a country of destination in labour force is a loss for the country of origin. The conflict is unavoidable since the drain ultimately creates the gain, this because the migrant is the “good” that cannot be common. (Prop. 2002/03:122; Skr. 2007/18:89; Skr. 2013/14:154).

(ii) *The international labour migrants and human rights*  
That people can migrate to find work is positive, but both the act of migrating and working as a migrant are dangerous endeavours. The conflict lies in promoting a phenomenon that often concerns violations of human rights. (Prop. 2002/03:122; Skr. 2007/18:89; Skr. 2013/14:154).

(iii) *Remittances as a tool for development or terrorism*  
The money transfers that migrants make to their families at home contribute to development, but transnational transactions are sometimes financing terrorism. The conflict lies in an improvement of remittance services as it could indirectly support terrorist funding. (Prop. 2002/03:122; Skr. 2007/18:89; Skr. 2013/14:154).

The formal narratives
There are endless suggestions for political actions, ideas and statements in the material – only what can be expected from government policy documents. A narrative presupposes at least one character and it is clear that not all statements in a policy document are narratives. In the sorting of these suggestions and statements five narratives crystallized: reoccurring statements and ideas that bind information together and reveal a policy belief. These narratives represent the formal discourse of migration to development in the Swedish context. Each *formal narrative* is summarized with the help of the narrative structural elements of the NPF. As the formal narratives have been presented I will move on to discuss the underlying discourses, or *informal narratives*, that can be connected to them. Throughout the presentation of the narratives I will quote the policy documents that have been the body of data for the analysis so as to exemplify how the narratives takes actual written form.

*The pro-migrant approach*

The first narrative takes the migrant as its main character. It explains the dynamics of migratory flows through the *act* of migrating. In refraining from using the word migration, which describes the phenomenon, the migrant as an actor it automatically made visible. This rhetoric is constitutional for the narrative as whole, without the main character there is not much of a story to be told. The full storyline involves a circumstance that an individual perceives as non-beneficial, it can for instance be stated that

> [...]the reasons to why an individual moves are multifaceted and can involve everything from a strategic decision to benefit a future career to the flight away from persecution or poverty. Though, what all migrants have in common is a wish for a better future (SOU, 2011:28: 68) *(author’s translation).*

We see here that a key aspect of this narrative is to give prominence to the individual as well as to agency they possess. What is clearly communicated is that
we must see migration from the perspective of the individual, and no matter how precarious the circumstance that led to the decision to migrate it must be respected. The first section of this quote is in direct relation to the overarching goal of Swedish development and aid policy, which is to “create opportunities for better living conditions for people living in poverty and under oppression” (Skr. 2016/17:60:3)(author’s translation). Again, the focus is not on the phenomenon itself, in this case poverty, but on the people suffering from the circumstances it creates. An individual is not poor, but lives in poverty; an individual does not define as a migrant but becomes one when circumstances bids the choice to migrate as the preferable one. This stance is usually referred to as the “pro poor approach”. It originates from the theoretical camp of development studies that values agency, driven by economists like Amartya Sen (1999) who are generally critical to theories of economic growth as explanatory for development. The historical-structural theories of migration that emerged with the general critique of classical theories of migration overlooking agency also align with this focus on the individual, which is why I call this narrative the pro-migrant approach.

In the narrative, the focus on the individual and a pro poor stance is not used as an alternate theoretical explanation to an abstract phenomenon. It can rather be seen as a rhetorical device for invoking a sense of empathy. It may seem apparent, but this narrative has the function of “selling” the importance of development policy and practice in general. It is a well-used rhetoric indeed, perhaps so mainstreamed in the development paradigm that we do not even react to it as a narrative. For example, it is much more appealing to donate money to an aid organization that visualizes how the money you give helps people directly instead of how it fights societal structures. The visualization of a “people” is even sometimes done through a portrait of a single individual – a human being that we all can relate to perhaps a mother walking long distances for fresh water or a schoolgirl who has lost her access to education. Perhaps we can call it the humanist narrative, as it takes the individual’s angle on migration and development first and the systemic one second. As mentioned, this rhetoric can be perceived to be default in
development discourse, but we will see further along in this analysis that this is not the case. Nonetheless, there is a reason for presenting this narrative first namely that it represents a development rhetoric that is generally adapted within Swedish development policy.

In this particular case the function of the narrative regards the importance of migration, or rather migrants, as a part of the development paradigm. The moral of the story is that the circumstantial reasons to why people migrate and, thus become migrants, are objectively unacceptable. So, in a wider sense this narrative of the migrant as a victim legitimizes the idea that development is needed in the countries of origin. To connect this to the theory, when “push”-factors are depicted in this very problematic way it tilts this narrative toward arguing for the *necessity*\(^1\) of the expected incoherence of the “brain drain”.

It must be noted that a certain opposition exists in the promotion of individuality and the simultaneous homogenization of migrants. The way that dynamics of migration are presented in this narrative, the choice to migrate is yours and it is independent and admirable. However, the choice to leave transitions your individuality into a somewhat victimized state. The acknowledgement of the precariousness, i.e. the move, creates it so to speak. The narrative itself is not dubious as the plot and the moral makes logical sense, but the depiction of the main character is. A certain ambivalence can be noted in the relation that the originator has to subject (the migrating individual) of the narrative. It is of course a difficult task to acknowledge an individual’s agency while also stating their need of assistance as for example “a particularly vulnerable and exposed group of migrants […] who migrate because of poverty and who work in dangerous jobs with low salaries” (Skr. 2013/14:154:12) (*author’s translation*).

The praxis that follows the moral of this narrative results in liberal immigration policies. If the belief is that people choose to migrate for legitimate reasons, and

\(^1\) Refer to “Figure 2” on page 21 in the theory chapter
that it is the right of all individuals to improve their living standards, then national borders must be open for people to cross. The pro-migrant narrative has been dominating the Swedish PGD, and Swedish politics at large. Sweden has even been named a deviant case in the context of rising populism in Europe over the last decade. Right wing populism has in general meant the politicisation of immigration. Populist voters are also so called “issue voters” hence the populist parties’ focused problematisation of immigration. The mainstream parties usual response is to adapt their agenda to minimize the potential support that the populist party seeks in the given issue. In 2010 as the populist right wing party Sweden Democrats entered parliamentary discussion for the first time, the Swedish mainstream parties and government did the opposite to that and kept their liberal immigration stance (Loxbo, 2014:240ff). Keeping intact the alignment with the pro-migrant narrative is thus an empirically unexpected praxis in this situation, suggesting that the moral has strong foothold in the Swedish context.

The entrepreneurial migrant and the knowledge transfer

The second narrative also takes the migrant as its main character. If the pro-migrant narrative was in many ways dependent on the pro-poor approach, more general to the development paradigm as a whole, the narrative of the entrepreneurial migrant is centred to dynamic specific to migration and theories and attached theoretical beliefs. The pro-migrant narrative, as we have just seen, recognizes the agency of people choosing to migrate but mostly so in relation to the circumstance in the country of origin. The narrative of the entrepreneurial migrant might appear to be part of the same narrative, just in an elongated plot. In the first scan of the material I was convinced that this was the case. What sets the narrative of the migrant as victim of circumstances and the migrant as an entrepreneur apart is how they theoretically end up on opposite sides of developmental causality. The agency of the individual, constituting for the pro-migrant narrative, is reoccurring also in the narrative of the entrepreneurial
migrant. Although here, the agency is assumed to be a source for development, not the tool to escape the lack thereof.

The setting of the narrative of the entrepreneurial migrant is substantially tied to the country of destination, in this policy context - Sweden. This narrative applauds the individual not only for their agency but also for the contribution to a cause bigger than their own rescue. The migrant is smart and knows how to create a profitable situation. Sweden as a country of destination could then for example work for a "development of activities that can stimulate the entrepreneurial spirit among migrants in Sweden who wants to contribute to development in their countries of origin" (Skr. 2007/08:89:28) (author’s translation).

The rhetoric characterizing this narrative is built around the word knowledge. Knowledge is glorified and in this glorification a hint of elitist beliefs of what it is and who possesses it. A reoccurring example of a migrant that typically carry valuable knowledge is “international students and scientists” (Skr. 2013/14:154:17), implying an educated type of knowledge. It is acknowledged that because of improved ways of communication and travel this kind of migrant has an improved chance of being active and engaged in the societal development in their country of origin and in their country of destination (ibid). Migrants with a knowledge that can bring the society forward are thus a source of development. In migration theory this notion is called the “brain-gain”. This is mostly referring to the fact that highly educated individuals have a higher tendency for migrating abroad, granting of the country of destination. The other side of the coin is of course the “brain-drain” that happens in the country of origin. Note that this is one of the officially stated “conflicts of interest”. The discussion of this problematic in the Swedish PGD is quite interesting. It is for instance stated that

“[t]he increase in [global] mobility can for some developing countries mean a loss in resources central to the society and of investments in education, a so called brain drain. To focus on the prevention of brain drain through the control of migration is an incorrect approach. Individuals shall not be hindered from a legal search of better living conditions in another country” (Skr. 2007/08:89:27).
The responsibility for the brain drain is assigned to the country of origin. The problematisation of precarious circumstances that lead individuals to migrate are in this narrative slightly overlooked as part of he global development agenda (that a PGD framework is supposedly working for). The narrative implicitly accepts circumstances of poor development in a way that the pro-migrant narrative does not. The specific dynamic of drain and gain is explicitly recognized as a possible conflict of policy objectives, but the narrative is as evident from the previous quote concerned with accessing the benefits more than anything else. In this narrative, the migrant is first and foremost an asset and the victimization that can be associated with the pro-poor approach is not present, this is what sets the two narratives of the migrant apart. It is however acknowledged that labour migrants are a heterogeneous group of people (Skr. 2007/08:89:27), but common for the characterization in this narrative is that they contribute to society. In relation to PCD-theory, this narrative can be said to speak for both the necessity and intention behind favouring the sustaining of the labour market in the expected incoherency it poses to human rights values – also this one of the “official” conflicts of interest. The empowering depiction of migrants seems to suggest that as entrepreneurs, and not victims, they are further from risking human rights violations. Agency so to speak defies the state of victimization.

The knowledge, the gain for the country of destination (and country of origin should the migrant return), it is almost mythical. The underlying understanding of knowledge in this narrative it transfers to migrants who are receptive to it and respected for keeping it. So, the optimal setting for the plot of this narrative is a society that values multiculturalism and diversity very highly. These knowledgeable migrants are masters of seeing the opportunities that globalisation brings in terms of mobility, and their agency is in a way expected to transcend problems of for example citizenship and integration that might occur.

The praxis following this narrative has two distinct orientations. The first is connected to a theoretical concept from the field of migration that is called
circular migration. Circular migration describes the increased likelihood of continued mobility of migrants, back and forth between country of origin and country of destination, or even to a third country. The circular migrants are prime candidates of knowledge transferring. Central to the narrative of the entrepreneurial migrant is that praxis should promote the choice to migrate to Sweden. One example of such a praxis is to lower the required minimum number of months that a migrant has to be in employment to be able to count as a labour migrant (Prop. 2013/14:213). To promote circular migration is considered a key action in the migration to development agenda within the Swedish PGD. However, one could easily disconnect circular migration from the development agenda and still see how it is pivotal to Swedish policy regarding the national labour supply. As many other European countries, Sweden is dependent on imported labour force due to an increasingly ageing population (Bilaga 6 till LU15:19ff). In other words, it is likely that the praxis would take place even without the lexis being promoted in the Swedish PGD. Hence, the migration-development connection is not a priority. The second praxis connected to the narrative of the entrepreneurial migrant is remittance-related measures. Remittances are typically defined as the transnational money transactions made by migrants, usually to friend and family in the country of origin (Kapur, 2004:1). The praxis is to lower the transaction costs, which benefits the entrepreneurial migrant and their family. This is done by for example the creation of a webpage comparing prices of transaction agencies, aimed at lowering the transaction costs (Regeringsbeslut Ju2013/8747/KO). This is of course also creating incentive for migrants to use official instead of unofficial transferring systems, which to a greater extent includes remittances in official records of the Swedish economy.

Sweden - a frontrunner

The two narratives that have been presented thus far have in common that they take the migrant, or migrants as a group, as main character/s. This type of
storyline is easily detectable because it involves human individuals, easy to identify in the descriptions of traits and agency. A character in a policy narrative can however in accordance with the NPF take other forms than the human one. In the third narrative the main character is Sweden. The state as an actor is an idea that most people are probably accustomed to, states are entities we research in political science, states go to war or they negotiate. They can also be named fragile. When we speak of a state as an actor, we really refer to its institutional and political functions. In the policy documents of the Swedish PGD, the state is divided in different sub-actors, usually named when a specific action is assigned responsibility. In this policy narrative though, Sweden the nation is the main character. Sweden is not merely a gathered group of functioning institutions but an actor with human-like qualities. The typical way of recognizing this narrative is when Sweden is referred to only as “Sweden”, and not the “Swedish government”, "Swedish parliament”, “Swedish Department of foreign affairs” or the like. These entities represent the Swedish state and are always described with their institutional functions as previously exemplified. When the actor “Sweden”, is portrayed it invokes the sense of a state that beyond parliamentary functions that also includes organizations, the civil society and a people: a nation. In this narrative, the main character has the pronoun “we” and represent the idea of a national political identity.

Swedish is a small country. It does not stop us from being a great actor. Our strong support of the UN, our commitments in international organisations and the lack of colonial bonds makes us trustworthy. An open economy and free trade has built the foundation of our welfare. We realized early our need of and dependency on the outside world. Our longstanding and solid experience of development aid operations, not the least through popular movements, has given us insight and knowledge. (Prop. 2002/03:122:7-8) (author’s translation)

Sweden is proposed to have personal traits like trustworthiness and commitment, and is also “realizing” things. The way that the “we” presents itself is on the verge of self-righteousness. The moral of this story is that the Swedish nation is performing well, above what can be asked of it, but to the expected Swedish
standard. Thus, this it what should also be expected in the future. The narrative describes a nation that is a frontrunner in development practice as well as a normatively guiding guru in migration policies. Sweden is an actor that is very engaged in the global society, “fulfilling its share of the responsibility” (Skr. 2007/08:89:29). Important for the narrative is the contrast that Sweden is to other less benevolent nations, like hinted in this quote on the subject of a globalizing world:

*The world has become smaller. Borders between nations are being erased and mutual dependency increases. There are no longer any backyards in which countries can act uninterrupted and without being seen by the eyes of the global society. No country can disregard events in other parts of the world. Today, everything concerns everyone. Effects of economic success and backlash spread like rings on the water* (Prop. 2002/03:122:6) *(author’s translation)*.

The wording is aimed at shaming countries that have thus far not stepped up and taken global responsibility, a rhetorical device that fits the NPF-concept of the “Angel/Devil-shift”: Sweden’s good behaviour appears more glorious when one is presented with the bad behaviour of other countries. The way that it is suggested that it has been a hidden activity implies and exaggerates the criminality of being a country with self-interest. Implicitly it is communicated that Sweden is no country hiding in backyards, but more of a selfless role model.

An interesting part of this narrative is that the potential flaws in Sweden’s normatively correct role in development and migration policy are getting little attention: what could be described as a possible contra-narrative. An often-communicated fact in the Swedish PGD is that conflicts and war are among the prime reasons to why people are forced to migrate (Prop. 2002/03:122:11; Skr. 2007/08:89:25; Skr. 2015/16:182:47). Sweden is one of the top exporters of munitions in the world\textsuperscript{15}, with rising numbers over the last decade. The Swedish government has been subject of stark critique over this fact and the hypocrisy it means to simultaneously promote global development and human rights (Svenska

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\textsuperscript{15} Most weapons per capita. Sweden is exporting to countries in active conflict. Other top exporters are Russia and Israel (Senska Freds, 2016)
Fred, 2016). The Swedish approach in the policy documents of the PGD framework is that “The Swedish munitions export shall be conducted in a way that does not counteract fair and sustainable development” (Skr. 2007/08:89:38) (author’s translation), or similarly that “[...] the effects of the Swedish munitions export that are negative to the efforts of contributing to a fair and sustainable global development shall be avoided” (Skr. 2015/16:82:50) (author’s translation).

These statements are not denouncing the export of munitions as a praxis, giving the impressions that the Swedish approach does not see an inherent contradiction in the conflict of policy objectives itself but in how it is handled. We see here that when the intent of the incoherence is there but the argument for necessity is not, the incoherence becomes difficult to argue for. If we put this incoherence in the matrix of necessity and intention, it is likely that it would best fit in the bottom left square, which is not considered as legitimate within the PCD concept.

What is the praxis of a nation that perceives itself as a role model? It manifests and spreads its values. In 2013-2014 Sweden held the chairmanship of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD). According to the report of the chairmanship, the Swedish work was successful and the country consolidated its leading position in the migration for development agenda (Government Offices of Sweden, 2014:6). As has already been mentioned, Sweden is a firm believer of the developmental benefits of circular migration – pro-migrant and pro-development – which was one of the themes during Sweden’s chairmanship of the GFMD. This promotion of ideas in is of course a type of policy diffusion (Stokes Berry & Berry, 2014:316ff:), an act to get other governments to follow suit. Another thing that is diffused or promoted is of course the Swedish role modelling.

In regards to the export of munitions: in 2015 a new and restricted direction was taken in export control. The PGD framework is briefly discussed, but with no clarifications or connection to the conflict of policy objectives that the weapon export poses to the migration to development agenda, seeing that war and conflict is a catalyst for forced migration (Skr. 2015/16:114:7). The approach is to guard human rights, which is also the approach in the pro-migrant narrative, and not
how to prevent conflict. The discussion of how Swedish weapon export could lead to forced migration is left surprisingly untouched.

Migration flows – the threat to the state

The fourth narrative is different from the previous ones (and the fifth) as it is born out of a particularly event-specific context. The other narratives are all of a more general ideational bearing, traceable back in Swedish history of development and migration policy. The fourth narrative is about the country Sweden caving under the pressure of the drastic increase in asylum seekers in 2015. As I mentioned in the introductory part of the analysis this event was expected to have an effect on the narratives of the Swedish PGD. The storyline involves the character Sweden that we know from the previous narrative - a dedicated actor of the global society that contributes more than enough in the connected fields of migration and development. The narrative of the threat to the state is the depiction of how high numbers forced migrants fleeing to Europe was named a “refugee crisis” and how Sweden, usually a country that would “do the right thing”, had to go into crisis mode and implement a restriction of its liberal immigration policies. Ultimately, this is also the narrative of how the promise of migration as a source for global development had to be deprioritized to safeguard the Swedish nation state.

In this narrative, “The threat to the state”, we are again proposed the main character of the nation Sweden that we know from the third narrative “The frontrunner”. As the character is forced into a completely different plot, latent personality traits are surfaced. We will see how the moral of this story depends on the main character’s reaction to the plot. A drastic change in the description of migration within the Swedish PGD occurs in 2015, when the number of asylum seekers reached an unforeseen and historically unprecedented high (SOU 2017.12:08ff). A typical approach that all the previous narratives has built on was that:
Sweden will be better at fostering the developmental potential of migration, continue to give protection to refugees coming to our country and promote solutions to protracted refugee situations and internal displacement. With a sharpened coherence policy this challenge can be better handled (Skr. 2007/08:89:10) (author’s translation).

This dominant moral took a narrative turn in late 2015 when the portrayal of international migration as a challenge that has promising potential if correctly approached is adapted to the general story line of the “refugee crisis”. In a PGD policy document from 2015 migration flows are for the first time referred to as a distinctly negative security policy challenge along with issues like terrorism and pandemics (Skr. 2015/16:182:47). In December 2015 border controls were implemented and a new law was proposed allowing the government to announce special measures in case of a serious threat to the nation with the argument that “[…] the current situation is from a broad perspective posing a serious threat to common order and inner security” (Prop. 2015/16:67:7) (author’s translation). A characteristic rhetoric device used in this communication is that as in previous narratives, the migrant as an individual is still respected. The migrants are not a threat to the security of the Swedish state, but the migration flows are. It is said that different groups of people (migrants and refugees are separated) are in the flows. This implies the meaning of a migration flow as a phenomenon that exists independently of and not constituted by migrants. If we now remember the rhetoric of the first two narratives, the humane and sympathetic way of discussing migration was through the perspective of the individual. In policy documents from late 2015 and onwards, this rhetoric was reversed: it would indeed be offensive to claim that individuals would pose a threat to the Swedish state. Hence, the exclusive use of “migration flows” as a phenomenon in any reference made to a threat to the national security. This rhetoric device thus avoids an inhumane depiction of migrants by detaching them from the phenomenon of migration itself.

In the same policy document that first named migration flows a security policy challenge, two aspects of the main character’s self-perceived role in the plot reveals the moral of the narrative. Firstly, that Sweden was let down by the other
nations and EU in that they did not act in the morally correct way that Sweden did; Secondly, the refugee situation would not have become a crisis if administrated properly. A key word for this narrative is responsibility, Sweden has taken its fair share and now it is up to the rest of the global community to step up. Further, there is not mention of the threat to the nation state or a crisis – the migration flows are only mismanaged:

_Sweden has taken a great global responsibility concerning the management of the migration flows and is pushing within the EU for a more equal distribution of asylum seekers and also globally so that more countries will take on greater responsibility. To create a safe and responsible mobility of people migration needs to happen in an orderly and regulated way that respects human rights. Legal ways in to Europe are too few and the number of asylum seekers is very unevenly distributed in the EU. (Skr. 2015/16:182:32) (author’s translation)_

Evidently, in this narrative Sweden is the victim of lacking solidarity from the EU. The above quote clearly shows how a simultaneous angel-shift was used to portray the innocence and benevolence of the main character: Sweden had done all that it possible could. A devil shift of the EU is also clearly used in other statements that the Swedish government made during 2015 (See for example Regeringskansliet, 2017). However no direct denigration is visible in the policy document concerning the PGD. This narrative corresponds to the most commonly expect incoherence of the migration-development nexus: immigration control versus human rights values. Although this is not one of the officially stated conflicts of interests in the Swedish PGD it is obvious how the fourth narrative settles the incoherence in favour of restricted immigration policies by drawing heavily on the security of the state a non-negotiable necessity. The _intention_ is accordingly played of as a reluctant one.

The praxis that is connected to this narrative has to an extent already been presented: a restriction in immigration policies. However, restrictions of this kind are naturally difficult to fit into the generally migration-positive approach otherwise employed by Sweden. Border controls are by definition an issue of
national policy and it is difficult to imagine how they would contribute to the international development agenda. What was a threat to the security of the state and a refugee crisis in national policy was in the Swedish PGD narrated as lack of solidarity in the EU, and a mismanaged situation. Consequently, seeing that Sweden in the EU-context had done more than enough, it was granted a temporary suspension of Sweden's obligations under the EU relocation mechanism for refugees. The suspension means a one-year relief of fulfilling the reception of the "quota refugees" (European Commission, 2016). Although, the temporary suspension is of course rather to be seen a praxis of the EU. What Sweden did, that is of particular interest in the migration for development agenda, was to reallocate funds to finance the refugee reception. Out of the Swedish total budget for development aid a little over 20 billion Swedish kronor was allocated to costs regarding refugee management in 2015. Sweden has a particularly high budget for development aid in general, but the reallocations in 2015 still meant that the funds used for refugee management turned out to approximately double that of what had been initially planned. The total sum for the official Swedish budget of development aid in 2015 was 54 billion Swedish kronor, meaning that more than a third of it was in fact used for refugee management. This verified by the OECD/DAC, there are so to speak no conflicts in these numbers (Open Aid, 2016). It is however interesting to note how a challenge of international development nature can become so national. In 2015, Sweden was a country that granted development funding to itself.

**The promise of globalization**

The fifth and final formal narrative is in a sense compatible with all of the four previous narratives. Thus far this analysis has presented: The pro-migrant approach; The entrepreneurial migrant, Sweden the frontrunner and Sweden and the crisis. These narratives have two obvious aspects in common. Firstly, the storyline builds on a clearly defined main character – the migrant (narrative 1 and 2) and Sweden the country (narrative 3 and 4). Secondly, international exchange
and events in other parts of the world have a crucial impact on the storyline. In this second connotation there is in fact a narrative of its own in motion: the narrative of globalization as a force of nature.

In this narrative, there are many characters taking part in the plot. There is however no clearly defined main character – countries, organizations and migrants are all in their particular relationship with globalization. The distinctive assumption that lays the foundation of this narrative is that the phenomenon of globalization has an intrinsic force – it is the independent variable. Furthermore this force is typically depicted in positive terms:

Many rich countries might head toward a shortage in labour while the rest of the world has a surplus in labour. This affects the possibilities for growth and development. The globalization is opening up the world to goods, services, thoughts and ideas. The people’s mobility however, especially for those who are poor, is still limited. One challenge is to find new proper procedures for orderly migration so that people’s will to seek a better life to a greater extent can become a positive driving force for global development (Prop. 2002/03:122:12) (author’s translation).

The narrative perceives globalization as a force in which international exchange of various types takes place, and it is seemingly not equally available to everyone around the globe. The opposite way of defining globalization might be to state that international exchange is creating globalization, and that the phenomenon itself is lacking of force. Ahmad (2013:3ff) states that the concept of globalization and the way it is used in modern debates is heuristic. It describes the processes that in intricate ways are taking us closer to a global society. The process describes our current state: globalization is a system. There are many aspects of globalization; economic, environmental, political, cultural etc. All aspects have different impact on a given issue, like migration for instance. A pivotal observation that one must make in defining this narrative of globalization is how it differs from internationalization. Globalization is in its essence the merging of smaller societies (nations) into one global society, it is a process (again, see Ahmad’s definition) in which the nation state becomes less and less pertinent. Internationalization on the other hand describes the interaction between national societies – not suggesting their eventual dissolving (See for example Daly, 2004) What is usually stated, is that “international migration is a central dynamic within globalization” (Castles,
De Haas & Miller, 2014:5). Although in this narrative, as within the context of Swedish migration and development policy, the distinction between globalization and internationalization is indeed unclear:

There is no doubt that what the world now experiences surpasses all previous periods of in-depth internationalization regarding the number of people affected by the changes and the rate at which changes occur. At the same time, several billion people lack the prerequisite to fully benefit from the opportunities that globalization creates. The policies of the Swedish government shall help to break this exclusion. Globalization creates unique opportunities for poor and vulnerable people to improve their living conditions (Skr.2007/08:89:5) (author’s translation).

A setting for this narrative of globalization can be assumed to be the world, or the global society. However, as situated in the Swedish PGD it is distinctly focused to the Swedish labour market and partly how it interacts with the global labour market. Economic growth can be seen as one of the most presupposed aspect of the positive value ascribed to globalization. So the private sector is therefore seen as vital part of the setting, accounting for trade and industry (Skr.2007/08:89:19).

The moral of the narrative of globalization as a force is that there are benefits for all. Sweden, the international community, developing countries, the market, migrants – everyone is a winner. The truly interesting feature of this narrative, from the policy point of view, is that lacks a defined storyline. Perhaps is it possible to say that globalization in itself is the storyline: as an evolving phenomenon over time. Relating back to Ahmad’s conceptualization that holds that globalization is processes leading to a global society, one will have to question if this is also the belief in the narrative. As the NPF states, a policy narrative does not necessarily need a storyline to be a narrative, but the picturing of a story’s ending is often revealing a policy belief and subsequently a policy action. When it comes to positively narrating globalization in policy, a nation state can hardly expect its own vanishing as the end to the story.

The narrative of globalization as a force of nature is overlapping with narratives one to three as previously presented in this analysis. For the praxis of this
narrative it means that the praxis of narratives one to three are also applicable. Simply, it has been shown that a pro-migrant stance is a pro-globalization stance. When globalization is depicted as a force that moves on its own, that wont reverse its dynamic but rather generate it, the only reasonable action to take is to adjust. The promotion of circular migration for instance is not only an adjustment to globalization but a way to profit from it. Dependent on trade and imported labour, modern day Sweden is definitely dependent on globalization. Finally, to establish and implement a policy framework for global development must be regarded as a praxis accepting and promoting of globalization. Hence, finding narratives of globalization as positive force of nature in the Swedish PGD is not surprising.

Summary of the formal narratives

Following the general methodological structure of Dryzek (2005) I will present a summary of the narratives and their respective structural narrative elements. This provides a brief overview of the contents of the narratives:

1. The pro migrant approach
   \textit{Characters:} The individual migrant, the Swedish state and society
   \textit{Setting:} Country of origin with precarious circumstances (e.g. “underdevelopment”).
   \textit{Plot:} Migrants leave precarious circumstances; they come to Sweden in the search for a better life. It is a matter of surviving. Focus on “push-factors”
   \textit{Moral:} in respecting the migrant as an individual, Sweden must welcome and support migrants and their decisions.

2. The entrepreneurial migrant and the knowledge transfer
   \textit{Characters:} The individual migrant, the country of origin, the Swedish state and society
Setting: The country of origin provides no opportunities, Sweden is a country that does.

Plot: The migrant is an entrepreneur that through working contributes to the country of origin, the Swedish society and the development of the global society. The migrant carries indispensable knowledge. Focus on “pull-factors”.

Moral: The labour market must be global, flexible, and open so that circular migration is promoted.

3. Sweden – the frontrunner

Characters: The Swedish state and society, the international community, “other countries” and International organizations.

Setting: The global community

Plot: Everything is everyone’s business; Sweden is showing the way by its dedicated participation in the statutes of the international community.

Moral: If other nations were as responsible as Sweden, migration flows would not be a problem but now they instead pose a threat to the national security which is unacceptable.

4. Migration flows – the threat to the state

Characters: Sweden, the EU and the EU member countries.

Setting: A strained Sweden

Plot: Sweden tried to fulfil its responsibilities to the international community by welcoming refugees. The migration flows steered toward Sweden were more extensive than they should have been because the EU did not take its responsibility.

Moral: A crisis is only the result of mismanagement. International governance is needed to administrate the global migration flows.

5. The promise of globalization
Characters. Migrants, countries of origin and destination, the Swedish state, the global community.

Setting: The world, the labour market (national and international)

Plot: Globalization is a force of nature. It provides many opportunities but they are not accessible for everyone. Globalization is not an evenly spread good between rich and poor nations/regions.

Moral: Everyone should be able to profit from globalization, to migrate is to try and do so. In the end, development is needed everywhere so that the people who cannot migrate can profit as well.

The informal narratives

The NFP framework assumes that narratives operate on three levels. The five formal narratives that the analysis presented in the previous section represent the meso-level i.e the policy subsystem. The NPF does not offer any theories to analyse narratives on the macro level. Although, the assumption is that macro narratives are institutional/cultural, meaning that they are in a sense generally applied in a society a form of grand discourses. They work as an underlying force, thus indirectly affecting the narratives on the meso- and micro level (McBeth et al, 2014:247). Van Dijk (1980:112) explains macro-structures in discourse through a number of aspects that can be used to distinguish them. Two important aspects are to generalize and to remove information. One might say to find the macro-structures in a narrative it is first necessary to strip it of excess data and to go to the core of the narrative. Hence, by discussing the ideological content of the formal narratives I will be able to suggest what informal narratives may have affected them. In my assessment of the five formal narratives of migration for development that the Swedish PGD contains, I have pinpointed three informal narratives: The human rights doctrine, The neoliberal market belief and The sovereignty of the state.
The Human Rights Doctrine

The human rights doctrine is indeed a motley concept in its theoretical and ideological claims. There is great ambiguity in defining the concept as it may refer to different types of rights, like moral or legal. When it comes to the reference of human rights in an international context the debate is often revolving around whether or not legal human rights should be based on a set of moral ones, and either way – how can we establish a legitimate set of moral human rights? (Buchanan, 2012:280ff). The human rights doctrine is specifically interesting when investigating migration and the depiction of migrants and I believe that this thesis could have greatly benefited from a more extensive debate on this topic. However, for the moment I will discuss around the use of human rights concept without giving further account of its quite confused definitional nature. What can be said in general about the human rights doctrine is that it is a concept that in a unique way attempts universality. The idea of universality and sustainable global development are of course closely linked: a PCD framework without a distinct formal and/or informal narrative of human rights is difficult to imagine. The development doctrine was initially formed as a response to the ideological questions arising in the post war years, and it stems from a western quest to make the world a better place (Hettne, 2009:12ff). The most referred to doctrinal document of international humans rights is of course the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) from 1947, produced in the very same post-war era (UN. Org., 2017). Buchanan (2012:283) notes that one of the truly interesting aspects of the UDHR is that instead of assuming that rights are to be accounted for by the nation, they are ascribed a global legitimacy. The impact of the UDHR is evident in the formal narratives one, two, three and five.

Most obvious is of course the connection to narratives one and two: “the pro-migrant approach” and “the entrepreneurial migrant”. The core of both these
narratives is the respect of the individual – the human that becomes a migrant. It is clear that the morals of these two policy narratives correspond directly to articles 13-15\textsuperscript{16} of the UDHR: The right to freedom of movement (13), the right to seek and enjoy asylum in other countries (14) and the right to a nationality (15). I have noted before that when the individual and its agency is given prominence in discussions of migration, it is usually within the frame of historical structural theory. It is for this reason perhaps reasonable to believe that one of the informal narratives in the Swedish PGD would quite simply be “historical-structural” instead of “human rights doctrine” as I have now claimed. There is an ideologically logical explanation to why this is not the case, namely that the second informal narrative is the “neoliberal market belief” and that these two first informal narratives depend on one another and also bind the five formal narratives together.

\textit{The Neoliberal market belief}

The second informal narrative, the neo-liberal market belief, is of course only a specification within the general capitalist discourse. Fischer (2003:75) states that the capitalist discourse permeates society on all levels since the hegemonic world system is capitalism. Hence, it is not possible for a government to create a PCD framework that is not in relation to the system in which it is to operate, nor is it possible for a researcher of political science or a student of development to ignore that the capitalist system has an effect on the subject of interest for a study.

In the Swedish PGD the informal narrative representing capitalism is the neo liberal market belief. It is the most prominent in the formal narratives one, two and five. The neo-liberal market belief has two typical narrative aspects: an optimistic view of globally egalitarian opportunities and the constant reference to

\textsuperscript{16} The articles are much more elaborated than this in their original version. For the sake of simplicity they were summarized. See the full articles here: http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/
profit. The formal narratives one, two and five paint the picture of globalization as a phenomenon to profit from, for individuals (migrants) as well as for states. The optimist belief is that everyone should be able to profit from globalization, not once it is mentioned that globalization and global capitalism can be seen as two inseparable concepts and that the latter of the two presupposes a non-egalitarian order in society by default. In the Swedish PGD the informal narrative of the human rights doctrine is adjusted to the informal narrative of neo-liberal market belief: while the migrants possess human rights they are also seen as a marketable good of labour and knowledge for the country of origin and destination. The migrants should profit from globalization and the globalization allows for states to profit from migrants.

**The Sovereignty of the State**

The third informal narrative that permeates the five formal narratives of the Swedish PGD is that of the sovereign state. The state as an actor is prevalent in all five of the formal narratives. In the narratives assuming the migrant as their main characters, the storyline is bound by the involvement of the state – the state of the country of origin or the Swedish state as the state of destination. Two out of the five narratives take explicit focus on the Swedish state as the main character, one hails its work in the migration-development nexus of international policy and the other manifests the primacy of its inner security – even when the threat is made out by people seeking refuge. As was discussed in the presentation of formal narrative number five “the promise of globalization”, globalization is described as a phenomenon moving parallel with other world dynamics. There is no clear distinction between increased internationalization and globalization although the two phenomena are theoretically very different in their assessment of the nation state. In the formal narrative in the Swedish PGD, the indifference in defining the concepts automatically legitimizes the role of the state in the future. Whereas a recognizing of globalization as a process towards an increased internationalization in contrast would mention the decline of the state’s influence in the global
community (see the discussion of the definition of the global society in the presentation of formal narrative five). In theories of globalization international migration and the increase in global mobility in general usually reflects the fact that the traditional order of nation states, with typical functions like a national border are becoming of less significance. What international migration also does is that it manifests the power of the state in the ownership of its immigration policies (Nyberg Sørensen, Van Hear Engberg, 2002:293). This utterance of power becomes very evident as the problematisation of international migration (as it becomes immigration for the state of destination) is most commonly articulated by the developed economies of the Western world (Brettell & Hollifield, 2015:184).

Conclusion

The analysis showed that the Swedish PGD contained five formal narratives of migration for development. In critically assessing these five narratives, it was possible to distinguish three informal narratives that can be said to reveal underlying institutional and cultural ideological values. Now returning to the research question: what do these narratives, the formal and informal, say of the expected incoherence the migration-development nexus poses to the agenda of the Swedish PGD?

I had expected to find clearly contradictory narratives in the material. A battle, if you will, of political and ideological standpoints in the discourse. The method of a foucauldian discourse analysis was chosen for the purpose of mapping out such differing standpoints. The reason for my expecting this narrative contradiction is that if international migration is such an explicitly complex issue to the global development agenda it can only be assumed that there would be a thorough and overt problematisation of it. Also, the Swedish PGD is a living framework and
documents have been constantly added to it. This could lead to several plausible and suggested solutions evolving over time, creating alternate and competing narratives. Opposite to my expectations, the Swedish PGD revealed a rather consistent portrayal of the expected incoherencies. All five morals of the formal narratives are as it figures more compatible than they are incompatible.

There are four main conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis:

1. *The formal narratives are indirectly revealing the position that the Swedish state assumes in the three expected incoherencies that the Swedish PGD makes official thus providing a “settling” of the conflicts:*

   If we for instance focus on the first expected incoherence which is that of the brain gain of the country of destination versus the brain drain of the country of origin. Here, formal narratives 1, 2, 3 and 5 all support that the conflict is settled in favour of the “brain gain” of the country of destination, in this case Sweden. For example, the combination of a firm promotion of the right of the individual migrant (formal narrative one and two), the depiction of the country of destination as benevolent (formal narrative three) and the understanding of international migration as inevitable (formal narrative five) delegitimizes the idea of a brain drain as dramatic. In the same way, combinations of the structural narrative elements of the five formal narratives settle expected incoherence number two in favour of the labour market and expected incoherence number three in favour of remittances. All three conflicts are settled in the more migration optimistic alternative.

2. *The formal narratives also reveal the implicit position that Sweden takes in the expected incoherency of restricted immigration policies versus human rights as mentioned by Picciotto and Hoebink, although this expected incoherency is not among the three officially stated in the Swedish PGD:*

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The incoherence that narrative four is concerned with actually is the typical migration-development incoherence that Picciotto (2005:323) and Hoebink (2013:196) acknowledge, namely that when a nation restricts its immigration policies peoples freedom of mobility is limited and thus are international human rights violated. Note that this is not an expected incoherence in the Swedish PGD but as has been shown in the analysis, global mobility through for example the facilitation of circular migration is one of the most reoccurring narrative values in the Swedish PGD which must be interpreted as a stance for peoples right to mobility. Also, in 2015 when a situation of this by at least Picciotto and Hoebink expected incoherence takes place, there is no narration of its implications in the Swedish PGD. Instead, focus is directed toward the European Unions mismanagement of the situation. This means two things primarily for the settling of the expected incoherence: that restricted immigration policies are seen as a failure and that Sweden does not want to be held accountable for them. The incoherence is thus settled in favour of protecting human rights in lexis, although praxis ultimately followed the other opposite line. This points to an “intended/unnecessary” incoherence.

3. Neither the formal nor the informal narratives are internally contradictory, i.e there is no narrative competition in the two levels of analysis.

Compare for instance the pro-migrant narrative and the entrepreneurial migrant (formal narratives one and two) they ascribe the same main character different attributes. The migrant is portrayed in two completely different relations to the concept of development, as a victim of the lack of development or as a contributor to the creation of it. Although the storylines are divergent and could not be fused into one narrative, the final policy believes that they express are both clearly migration optimistic. Similarly, in the two narratives in which Sweden figures as
the main character (formal narrative three and four) the storylines are widely different as they portray a Sweden before and during the “refugee crisis”, respectively as a frontrunner and as a victim of the deficient solidarity of the EU. Especially in the fourth narrative in which migration flows are labelled a threat to the nation’s inner security one could expect that the moral of the story would convey a migration sceptic stance but it does not. It is likely that the compatibility of the formal narratives stems from the compatibility of the informal narratives. The cultural/institutional level is migration optimistic and so is also the level of the policy subsystem as narratives are operating in multiple levels simultaneously.

4. The compatibility of the informal narratives explain why the expected incoherencies are settled in favour of a migration optimistic stance

The informal narratives of the “Neoliberal market belief” and the “Sovereignty of the state” are closely linked. Although there is certainly a movement towards a globalization of trade and labour, markets are still inevitably tied to the nation states. This is an important aspect of the discussion on the difference between increased internationalization and globalization as have been mentioned in the analysis. So, the compatibility of informal narratives two and three is given. The truly interesting aspect is that the informal narrative of “Human rights” is adjusted to fit the other two informal narratives. If we generalize on the substance of the expected incoherencies we see that the conflicts are born out of the concern global markets and states causing violations of human rights. This is conceived as the primary impediment in the migration for development agenda. The analysis shows that the formal narratives of the Swedish PGD do not antagonize human rights values and neoliberal market beliefs, they combine them. Human rights values are in general conceived as attainable within a globalizing market system. Globalization and international migration are two concepts that are seen as inevitable and the pursuit of safeguarding human rights is consequently handled in relation to them.
If we now remember Ashoff’s definition of PCD:

[…], policy coherence from the development viewpoint means, as a first definition, the absence of incoherencies, which occur when other policies deliberately or accidentally impair the effects of development policy or run counter to its intentions. A second and more ambitious definition sees policy coherence as support for development policy from other policies or as the interaction of all policies that are relevant in the given context with a view to achieving overriding development objectives (Ashoff, 2005:12)

Relating these four main conclusions back to this two-fold definition we can state that the Swedish PGD handles the migration-development nexus in the second “ambitious” definition. However there is no resolving of expected incoherence as in the first definition.

A policy situation like this, wherein expected incoherencies are not resolved but synergetic measures are still taken to achieve a positive effect for the main goal should mean that the incoherence is deemed to be both necessary and intended. Now, relating this back to the matrix of incoherence in PCD: if an incoherency in is both necessary and intended it should have been deliberated – it then becomes acceptable within the frames of the concept.

So, what has been deliberated? The narratives of the Swedish PGD reveal in the case of the migration for development agenda is that the necessity and intention of the incoherency stems from sustaining the state interest, which can only be done within the realms of a free-market system. Take the example of promoting circular migration. In the Swedish PGD this is narrated as the support of the individual migrant’s freedoms and rights but circular migration is also pivotal to the Swedish labour market, which has a shortage. In the Swedish PGD the hegemonic discourse appears to be that of human rights combined with neoliberalism – the global market is an independent variable and the respect of the mobile labour (human rights) becomes negotiable. It has the outcome that policies will succeed in creating synergies of various types that are migration optimistic and in the states interest. There is no need for a state to deliberate over giving
primacy to its own substantiation: the incoherence of migration to development is accepted as latent.

**Reflections**

Political leader- and ownership of a PCD framework\(^\text{17}\) is of course desirable, but it is debatable whether or not it will induce a nation state to act selflessly for the good of international development. Policy solutions will be constructed to benefit the originator of the framework (the state) or at least to not demand any sacrificial actions from it. In the case on international migration, the state is ultimately bound to play by the rules of a globalizing market – also in its concerns of finding labour force supply to fill the national deficit. In the end, two things are in the way of fulfilling the goal of a sustainable global development: the free market system and the concept of the state. For, in this combination or the *necessity* of the state’s own interest requires no deliberation – it is s prerequisite. The reason to why issues like international migration are seen as clusters of conflicts of interest within PCD frameworks is that they touch upon the true nature of the incoherencies that impede the global development agenda: they are systemic. No matter how many synergetic victories that upholster a PCD framework it will only be able to create coherence in the extent that the systemic structures behind the incoherencies allow for it.

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\(^\text{17}\) The most commonly suggested measure for improving a PCD framework, see theoretical chapter for further discussion.
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### Appendix

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