Investing in activism and harnessing expertise

- Gendered and postcolonial constructs of civil society in the Women, Peace and Security agenda

Klara Backman
Abstract

In recent years, the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda have paid a higher degree of attention to the gaps in implementation and lack of financing that have characterized the agenda since the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in 2000. This development has also included more attention given to implementation through civil society organizations, and the establishment of a new financing instrument – Global Acceleration Instrument for Women, Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action (GAI).

This thesis critically analyzes the discourse of the WPS agenda concerning the financing of civil society organizations through this instrument. From a perspective of postcolonial feminism and feminist political economy it is argued that even though the GAI fund represents a well-deserved acknowledgement of the work of women’s organizations in the field of peace and security, and a shift in WPS discourse in its greater focus on women’s agency, the fund also reproduces a discourse of gendered and postcolonial constructs. These constructs are connected to processes of de-politicization of women’s civil society organizations, securitization of gender equality issues, an ignorance of structural root-causes to violence and conflict, and localization of conflict and women’s civil society organizations. The reproduction of these constructions within the framework of the WPS agenda could be argued to have limiting effects on both women’s organization, and sustainable financing for peace.

Key words: critical discourse analysis, postcolonial feminism, Women, Peace and Security agenda, United Nations, civil society
Word count: 19 813
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1 Introduction

This thesis analyzes discursive constructions in the financing of civil society organizations (CSOs) within the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda. The WPS agenda is the international normative framework consisting of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 and its subsequent resolutions, which addresses the gender-specific impacts of conflict on women and girls. It centers around issues of protection, women’s participation in peace and security processes and their roles as peace builders in the prevention of conflict (True 2016, 307).

The WPS agenda has progressed in different ways since the 1325 resolution was adopted in the year 2000. Following resolutions have in part prioritized sexual violence in conflict, in part focused more on women’s participation and less on victimhood. With its 15-year anniversary in 2015, a global review of the implementation of the agenda – the Global Study – was published, and a new resolution focusing on implementation – UNSCR 2242 – was adopted by the Security Council. These events mark a development of the discourse of the Women, Peace and Security agenda. This development involves a clearer focus on participation and agency, women’s organizing is brought to the agenda, and a greater attention to the lack of financing. This development takes place in an era of gender equality issues gaining evermore policy ground in international fora.

By looking at one specific UN financial instrument that was set up in connection to the marking of the 15-year anniversary, this thesis aims to explore which discursive constructs are present at this stage of the agenda. This will be done through a feminist critical discourse analysis, which analyses central material connected to the financial instrument at both a text, discursive and social practice level, from a theoretical approach of postcolonial feminism and feminist political economy.

This thesis will investigate the underlying constructions of gender in relation to conflict and post-conflict in the discourse of the international financing of civil society in the WPS agenda. There is a range of previous research which has analyzed the WPS Security Council resolutions texts from a postcolonial feminist perspective. This thesis aims to look more on the financing side of the agenda, and investigate the presence of gendered and postcolonial constructs in the financing of civil society organizations. Previous research has in specific country contexts shown that the focus of international donors on women as either peacemakers or victims of sexual violence has led to difficulties for women’s movements to develop into broader movements working with more structural issues (Debusscher and Martin de Almagro 2016, 310-311). It has also been argued that the implementation of the WPS agenda at national level lacks local ownership, as it directs the work of local women’s organizations to reflect an international agenda and the priorities of the international community (Basini & Ryan 2016). It has been shown how the ‘international community’ through the UN Peacebuilding
Commission constructs civil society as a subject in a specific, gendered way in the peacebuilding discourse (Shepherd 2015, 904). This thesis aims to investigate if and how such constructions are also present in the discourse of UN financing of civil society within the WPS agenda.

Guided by theories of postcolonial feminism, feminist political economy and previous research on the WPS agenda and civil society organizations, this thesis asks the research question:

How are civil society organizations constructed in specific gendered and postcolonial ways in the discourse of the Women, Peace and Security agenda and its financing?

This question will be answered through a feminist critical discourse analysis, where the main material is a promotional video for the UN financing instrument Global Acceleration Instrument for Women, Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action (GAI).
2 Background

2.1 The Women, Peace and Security Agenda

The adoption of the UNSCR 1325 was by many seen as a watershed moment for the global feminist movement, as the scope of the WPS agenda was considered truly transformative and a platform from which it was possible to imagine radical reform (Kirby and Shepherd 2016a, 249). UN Women states in its Global Study of the implementation of the resolution:

“It was born out of a truly global constituency of women’s organizations and advocates, and became one of its most powerful organizing tools. Its adoption, an historic milestone, was a triumph of decades of activism that culminated in one revolutionary idea—an idea that became a global norm and the official policy of the highest body tasked with the maintenance of international peace and security. This simple, yet revolutionary idea was the recognition that peace is only sustainable if women are fully included, and that peace is inextricably linked with equality between women and men.” (Coomaraswamy 2015, 28)

From this quote the close relationship between the women’s movement and the WPS agenda, from its inception, is clear. It was brought forward by women’s organizations, and women’s organizations have continued to work to improve the agenda. Seven resolutions have followed UNSCR 1325. They have focused on specific forms of insecurity experiences during conflict, specifically sexualized violence (UNSCR 1820, UNSCR 1880, UNSCR 1960, and UNSCR 2106), and the recognition of the importance of women’s participation in formal processes of conflict resolution (UNSCR 1889, UNSCR 2122 and UNSCR 2242) (George and Shepherd 2016, 300). Criticism has been raised that the resolutions following UNSCR 1325 had a stronger focus on violence prevention and protection issues than on women’s participation in peace and security governance (Kirby and Shepherd 2016b, 380). Resolution 2242, the latest resolution to be adopted (in 2015), focuses on addressing the gaps in implementation, including the persistent challenges to women’s participation and full involvement, and the underrepresentation of women at all stages of peace processes (True 2016, 309).

It has been argued that the success of the WPS agenda in policy documents and resolutions adopted is not matched by practice; that the ‘participation-for-peace’ norm is widespread but principally on paper and therefore ineffective (Kirby and Shepherd 2016b, 377). The success of the resolutions in terms of featuring in other
Security Council resolutions is indeed inconsistent. Of the 36 resolutions on Iraq since 2000, not a single one refers to WPS in its operative paragraphs. For the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 92 percent of the resolutions do (ibid., 378).

In 2004, the UN Secretary General and the Economic and Social Council requested that UN entities develop and implement mainstreaming plans for WPS (True 2016, 309). UN Member states have also been encouraged to show commitment to the WPS agenda by developing National Action Plans (NAPs), which map out how they will implement UNSCR 1325 (George and Shepherd 2016, 298). As of November 2016, 63 member states have adopted their own action plans (PeaceWomen 2016).

2.2 Women, Peace and Security financing

UN Women’s Global Study on the implementation of the resolution(s) includes a chapter on the financing of the WPS agenda, and the worldwide lack of funding is presented as a major obstacle:

“Despite the wealth of evidence highlighting the benefits that investing in women can bring in terms of conflict prevention, crisis response and peace, the failure to allocate sufficient resources and funds has been perhaps the most serious and persistent obstacle to the implementation of the women, peace and security agenda” (Coomaraswamy 2015, 372).

The financing section of the Global Study website highlight some examples of this lack of funding, including the fact that only 2 percent of aid to peace and security interventions in fragile states and economies in 2012-2013 targeted gender equality as a principal objective, that only 130 million USD went to women’s equality organizations and institutions compared with the 31.8 billion USD of total aid to fragile states and economies over the same period, and that the UNDP’s proportion of allocations targeting gender equality as a principal objective in conflict and postconflict countries has largely remained constant since 2011, standing at 4.2 percent of funds in 2014. It is also concluded that only 24 percent of UN entities currently have systems to track resources for gender equality and women’s empowerment (UN Women 2017).

The Global Study also stresses the problems with women’s organizations short-term funding and project support. It presents statistics that show that 48 percent of women’s organizations have never received core funding, and 52 percent have never received multi-year funding. The implication of this is that smaller organizations have to spend a disproportionate amount of time on donor-related activities (Coomaraswamy 2015, 382). In the global civil society survey that was undertaken as a contribution to the Global Study, lack of resources ranked highest among the barriers that CSOs encounter. Lack of trust with government and gaps between international policies and local level realities ranked second highest, and other “funding-related challenges” that were raised include “ineffective funding allocations; donors’ focus on numerical targets and ‘quantity rather than quality’; money given to large organizations rather than grassroots ones; uncoordinated and
erratic funding; shifting donor interests interfering with long-term planning; conditions set by donors on funding; and problems associated with civil society organizations becoming donor-driven rather than community-driven, which at times fuels competition between organizations” (Coomaraswamy 2015, 383). The study also notes that gendered equality focused aid overall is unpredictable and volatile (ibid., 374).

The Global Study also finds that the lack of funding at nation-state level compromises the development and implementation of NAPs (George and Shepherd 2016, 301). It was concluded that out of the 54 countries that had NAPs in place in 2014, only 11 had developed a specified budget to support their policies (ibid., 246).

2.3 Pooled funding and Multi-Partner Trust Funds

Pooled funding is a mechanism in the multilateral system where contributions from multiple donors are gathered to support specific national, regional or global development priorities. They can operate in different contexts, be UN or nationally managed, and have single or multiple funding windows. There are different forms of pooled funding, the main ones in the UN system being UN Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs), National MDTFs and stand-alone Joint Programmes (JPs). They have in common that they are intended to offer a flexible mechanism that does not require that participating organizations – the receivers of the allocations – comply with certain operating procedures (UNDP 2017b). The UN organization or organizations are responsible for the implementation of the funds, and the operations of the funds are directed by steering committees which are chaired or co-chaired by the UN (UNDP 2017c).

Pooled funding was developed to promote greater aid effectiveness. It is a part of the aid effectiveness agenda, most clearly articulated in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (UNDG & UNDP 2013). The Paris declaration demonstrates two clear principles in the development aid architecture. First, partner country ownership and donor coordination. Second, results-based management of aid. It has been argued that these principles are however not always reconcilable, since results-based management implies a focus on continuously measuring and reporting results but also stricter prioritization by donor governments (Sjöstedt 2013, 143-144).

The focus of this thesis is the Multi-Partner Trust Fund called the Global Acceleration Instrument for Women, Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action (GAI). The total contributions from donors to the GAI fund were 3,726,957 USD in 2016. For 2017, the contributions are 6,486,767 USD so far (as of May 8th 2017) (UNDP 2017).

To put the budget of the GAI fund in perspective it can be mentioned that the total contributions to UN Women were 307 million USD in 2015 (UN Women 2016). The total contributions to UNDP were 4,5 billion USD (UNDP 2016a). The
3 Theoretical framework

3.1 Postcolonial feminism

The theoretical starting point of this thesis is a postcolonial feminist perspective. Power is central to all studies of international relations. For the postcolonial approach to international relations the intersectionality of gender, class and race is central in the analysis of the production of power (Chowdhry & Nair 2002, 4).

The postcolonial feminist field has a focus on redefining the “Third World Woman”, problematizing colonialism in view of categories such as gender, sexuality and corporeality (de los Reyes 2001, 12). Postcolonial critique argues that “Third World Women” often are constructed as victims of male violence, as universal dependents, as victims of the colonization process, of familial systems, religious ideologies and development processes (Mohanty 2003, 23). The focus of this thesis is partly how such constructions remain in the global discourse on Women, Peace and Security. In Mohanty’s postcolonial critique, the false concept of universal sisterhood has as a consequence the erasing of material and ideological power differences within groups of women, especially between First and Third World Women (ibid., 116). It also erases women as political agents, by claiming an essentialist argument that women are simply “well-intentioned”. Women are constructed to “desire peace” in contrast to men who “cause war”, resulting in that “[t]angible responsibility and credit for organizing peace movements is replaced by an essentialist and psychological unifying desire” (ibid., 114). With the Women, Peace and Security agenda of the last 15 years, the “global women’s movement” which is subject to Mohanty’s discursive scrutiny, has changed its role and character. But this does not mean that colonial ideas are no longer present. Among others, Pratt has done a postcolonial reading of UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions. She argues that the resolutions re-conceptualize gender through re-inscribing racial-sexual boundaries, and that this not only instrumentalizes women’s agency, but also enables the international community to harness women’s agency in an imperialist manner (Pratt 2013, 780). This thesis analyzes how such processes could be said to be at play in the financing of CSOs within the WPS agenda.

In order to investigate which constructions are currently at play in the WPS discourse from a postcolonial perspective, this thesis will be by guided what Mohanty suggests is in contrast to the universalistic notion view of gendered oppression. This is to historicize and locate political agency, and to have “the
cross-cultural commonality of struggles, identifying survival, rather than shared oppression, as the ground for coalition” (Mohanty 2003, 117).

3.2 Conceptualization of gender

At this moment a brief reference to how gender is conceptualized in this thesis might be useful. Following Meger’s adoption of Sandra Harding’s conception of gender, it is seen as developed through three interrelated processes.

Here, individual gender refers to the socially constructed identity adopted and performed by the individual; gender symbolism to the shared normative associations of gender relationships within a historical and cultural context regarding the meaning and value of gender relationships; and gender structure to the consequences of the systemic employment of gender dualisms for organizing social activity and the patterns of power and of resource distribution which follows (Meger 2015, 418). This thesis focuses on the structural processes of gender, but acknowledges its interrelations with the other processes. In addition, it includes an intersectional perspective on the processes of gender, seeing multiple and interrelated systems of oppression as important. An intersectional perspective allows us to focus on the most important political struggles. Using Kimberlé W. Crenshaw’s words, if we begin “with addressing the needs and problems of those who are most disadvantaged”, that is when change will be obtained (Crenshaw 2011, 40). Having an intersectional perspective does not mean to leave the material perspective on oppression behind. Following Yuval-Davis, intersectionality is rather seen as going beyond the simplistic and misleading dichotomy of redistribution versus recognition. This allows us to see that recognition of social power axes, not of social identities, are of crucial political importance (Yuval-Davis 2011, 155; 160).

3.3 Feminist Political Economy

As Mohanty states, the struggle over discourse is not enough, a postcolonial feminist approach must also be grounded in material politics of everyday life (Mohanty 2003, 53). This materialist perspective connects to theories of feminist political economy (FPE), which is also a basis for this thesis. The feminist political economy perspective on the WPS agenda has a long-term perspective on prevention of conflict and violence, and emphasizes the gendered globalized structures that contribute to violence and conflict, such as gender-biased macroeconomic policies, supply chains, labor markets and political norms (True 2015, 422-423).

Jacqui True’s work examines the political economy of violence against women. She inquires the interplay between the economic and political marginalization or empowerment of women and their experience of violence in post-conflict settings.
True shows that gender-based violence often spikes in contexts where the conflict between armed groups is stabilized. Women’s mortality in war has been shown to be as high as men’s due to the lingering social and economic effects of war (True 2012, 135-136). True’s argument is that the failure to address equality in access to social and economic resources in post-conflict societies accentuates women’s economic poverty and material insecurity relative to men and consequently their vulnerability to violence (ibid., 139). The political economy approach claims that political stability and security cannot be separated from economic development, and is critical of most peacebuilding missions, which have primarily focused on establishing law and order rather than on securing social and economic livelihoods for women and men after conflict (ibid., 143). As this peace-keeping economy has concrete and negative impacts on local women (and men), there is a fundamental mismatch between the gender mainstreaming goals of the UN, and its participation in and upholding of this economy (ibid., 146). This “mismatch” is at the center of study in this thesis, where I claim that the support to women’s civil society organizations is in part trying to discursively bridge this divide. Even though these organizations receive a minuscule part of total peacebuilding budgets, they play an important narrative and discursive role, which works in specific gendered ways. The political economy perspective is useful for studying the consequences of this discursive process.

Sara Meger’s (2015) work on the feminist political economy of wartime sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) provides useful insights into the overlooked relationship between international political economy and gender hierarchy. She argues that sexual violence is directly linked to the political and economic drivers of conflict, and that gender on different levels works towards these drivers (Meger 2015, 417). With the example of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the pervasive sexual violence connected to this conflict, Meger illustrates how economic and political inequalities are the material bases that fuel SGBV in conflict, and how sexual violence in turn serves to reproduce these material relations of inequality (ibid., 418). The conflict is constructed within the paradigm of “ethnic violence”, thereby obscuring how the violence is facilitated by international processes. The SGBV is represented as something extraordinary, and it is ignored how this violence has facilitated the exploitation of natural resources and capital accumulation of exploitative industries (ibid., 427). This process of ignorance of root-causes to violence is a central perspective of this thesis.

The analysis will also be guided by a feminist political economy understanding of the concept of securitization. Securitization is a political and dialogical process whereby a social problem becomes a security issue. It a political choice made by a political actor, constructing an issue as a threat to security and legitimizing the use of means to address this threat (Meger 2016, 19). The concept of securitization has been argued to be an important alternative understanding of security within international relations, focusing on the political process. But feminists and critical scholars have also been skeptical of securitization. Both because who has the ability to articulate (in)security is based on (unequal) power relations and not necessarily democratic processes, and because through securitization political issues are constructed as “extraordinary”, which reinforces a dichotomy between normal versus extraordinary politics (Meger 2016, 20).
3.4 Feminist perspectives on the Women, Peace and Security agenda

To provide the background needed to be able to answer my research question, this thesis mainly reviews two areas of previous research. Firstly, the previous feminist research on the WPS agenda, including postcolonial critique and FPE perspectives. Secondly, I have looked at previous research on civil society and local ownership in peacebuilding implementation. This second part includes perspectives on civil society organizations as implementers, the UN as a promoter of 'local ownership', national ownership and implementation of WPS through National Action Plans, and CSOs as implementers of the WPS agenda. The selection has been made in accordance with the theoretical approach of this thesis, focusing on postcolonial and feminist analyses, with the aim of reviewing some of the main concepts and arguments in this well-researched field.

3.4.1 The lack of attention to gender constructs

Despite (or perhaps because of) its origin in the global feminist movement, the feminist response and critique of the WPS agenda has been extensive and diverse. Gender scholars have been divided over whether the agenda represents a shift towards a more inclusive, gender-sensitive global governance, an undermining of women’s grassroots struggles for justice or is mere rhetoric that changes little in practice (Pratt and Richter-Devoe, 2011, 499). Fundamentally, the agenda has been criticized for not challenging gender constructs to a higher regard. Pratt (2013), Cook (2016) and George and Shepherd (2016) have all reviewed critique of the agenda, which claims that it is essentializing and instrumentalizing women, cementing the role of the woman victim. The narrowing of the agenda to focus on sexualized violence in a majority of the resolutions following UNSCR 1325 has been described as a “chronic protection-representation dilemma” (Kirby and Shepherd 2016b, 381). There has also been criticism against the sexualizing of gender relations in the agenda (Pratt 2013) and against the general lack of a queer perspective on gender (Hagen 2016).

One common concern of those critical of the gender mainstreaming aspects of the agenda has been that it has de-politicized gender, and turned it into a technocratic tool stripped of its critical content (Cook 2016, 355). Such critique has argued that the language, substance and framing of UNSCR 1325 forecloses its transformative potential. Instead of challenging “liberal peace building projects” it supports them, and in this support engages with women in an essentializing way as gendered and vulnerable in need of protection (George and Shepherd 2016, 300).

When later resolutions following UNSCR 1325 moved away from the gendered construct of the vulnerable woman, critics have argued that essentialist aspects remain, that instrumentalizes women’s participation. For instance, resolution 1820 urges troop-contributing countries to deploy a higher percentage of women peacekeepers and police. It has been argued that this resolution is less about gender
mainstreaming and more about dealing with the problem of male peace-keeper violence and sexual exploitation and abuse (Pratt 2013, 776). This view of women’s representation has been seen as highly problematic. Not only because it fails to challenge the violent masculinity norms of peace-keeping missions, but also because female peacekeepers enable the re-inscription of a racialized hierarchy. In this hierarchy international institutions are the bearers of human rights and democratic values in the context of conflict zones, and with female peacekeepers the threat of peacekeeper sexual aggression is removed (ibid.). Gender scholars have also criticized how sexualized violence is addressed and is very much a focus of the WPS agenda, arguing that gender is fixed as a “pathological relationship based on sexed bodies” (Shepard cited in Pratt 2013, 776).

3.4.2 The lack of structural critique

The WPS agenda has been criticized from the perspective that violence against women cannot be examined just through the prism of security, war and conflict, but by confronting regimes of unequal entitlements and the masculine hegemonies that hold the hierarchal economic orders together (True 2015, 421). Such an approach broadens the concepts of peace and security, and importantly addresses the root-causes of violence, which have been lacking from the WPS agenda. True points to the fact that the Security Council resolutions 1820 and 2122 have been lacking in addressing root causes of sexual violence, such as the social structures of gender inequality, economic impoverishment and lack of opportunity (ibid). Similar critique has been articulated also from a more postcolonial feminist perspective which claims that violence against women is inextricably linked to political, economic and military processes in which UN member states may be implicated, but that the WPS agenda ignores this and instead links violence and insecurity to “culture” and “fanatical views”, thereby reducing it to the “barbarism” and “irrationality” of “brown men” (Pratt 2013, 775).

In Pratt’s analysis of the agenda, she argues that there is a silencing of postcolonial feminism within resolution 1325, which produces a particular configuration of gender, race and sexuality (ibid., 772). This has consequences not only for how the implementation of the resolution deals with gender, but also with race and sexuality. Resolution 1325 re-configures international security when it comes to gendered binaries, but it does so by re-inscribing racialized and sexualized hierarchies (ibid., 773). This is done by reproducing constructs of “brown men” and “brown women” in conflict zones as perpetrators and victims in specific ways. Pratt claims that other strands of feminist theorizing show a blindness to other social relations than gender, thereby failing to see how gender works in and through race and sexuality. She also underlines how resolution 1325 has worked to “securitize” its advocates, and helped the ‘international community’ to harness women’s agency to join the service of an imperialist feminist project rather than a transnational feminist project from below (ibid., 780).
3.4.3 The lack of anti-militarism

Even though the passage of resolution 1325 was celebrated by many organizations in the global women’s movement, there was also disappointment that the resolution was lacking in two major ways from an anti-militarist perspective: it only fleetingly mentions women’s role in preventing war, and does not mention at all the issue of ending war in itself. The lack of anti-militarist clauses has consequences for the two main themes in the resolution. The protection of women can be read as “making war safe for women”, or even as a legitimization of war, as in the invasion of Afghanistan. The theme of recognition and decision-making can be taken as women being used simply as a resource that can help the UN do their job (Cockburn 2007, 147).

On this topic, it has been asked: “[D]oes the security framework really help bring global attention to issues and groups of people that are normally marginalized? Has it meant more resources and more involvement by state and non-state actors? Or has it resulted in narrow, self-interested and even militaristic responses to complex social problems?” (Hudson, N. 2007, 3)

The WPS agenda has been subject to a lot of critique from the feminist scholarship for its claimed imperialist aspects. It has been described as giving ‘gender legitimacy’ to the expansionary mandate of the Security Council, and as complicit in promoting a particular kind of peace, namely the ‘liberal peace’ where democracy and economic liberalism are considered universal methods for post-conflict reconstruction. (Basu 2016, 364). It has also been seen as cementing hierarchies between intervening and donor countries and weaker post-conflict states. But theorists such as Soumita Basu have also raised the argument that such descriptions have tended to make out actors in the Global South as passive recipients, and to overlook these actors’ contributions to the WPS agenda (Basu 2016).

3.5 Theories on civil society and local ownership

3.5.1 Critical perspectives on civil society as peacebuilding implementers

The discourse of civil society as an important peacebuilding actor started evolving in the 1990s, in light of the international peace- and state building failures of Somalia, Rwanda and the Balkans. It was almost undisputedly concluded that civil society was a key actor in achieving and sustaining peace, and civil society established its place in the conceptual framework of the liberal peace. This also led to a massive rise in donor initiatives and funding (Paffenholz 2011, 138). In the peacebuilding field, since the mid 1990’s the practice has been strongly influenced by Lederach’s middle-out approach, where empowerment of the middle level is
assumed to influence peacebuilding both on the macro and grassroots levels. Paffenholz argues that this has led to a mushrooming of conflict resolution training and dialogue initiatives for mostly urban middle and upper-class NGOs, executed by international and national NGOs (ibid., 142).

Civil society is important in the construction of the ‘liberal peace’. Through the constitution of civil peace, non-state actors, agencies, and civil society provide wider legitimization by giving international actors access to the norms, regimes and human security discourses that civil society deploy. This also contributes to constructing a peace that is more representative of the ‘local’ (Richmond 2005, 127-128, 130). The role of civil society is, however, conditional upon their contribution to the liberal peace, meaning democratization, free market reform, legal reform and an anchoring of this in the institutional context of global governance (ibid., 128).

The critique against civil society implementing the liberal peace has also been that this changes the organizations themselves. By being a part of the liberal peacebuilding part and parcel, thereby agreeing to the holding of the impartiality principle, civil society organizations can lose their ability to advocate for radical social change (Paffenholz 2011, 143-144). However, Paffenholz argues that a more diversified view on civil society is needed both from the proponents of the liberal peace and its critics. The narrow understanding of civil society has led donors to primarily fund urban elite-based NGOs, while ignoring relevant activities such as mass mobilization and other social change activities. In addition, from a wider perspective, general support for civil society cannot replace political action, and the major disabling conditions for civil society arise from coercive states and high levels of violence (ibid., 149-150).

Richmond argues that there is an inherent dilemma of local or international ownership of peacebuilding in the UN peacebuilding architecture, which indicates the legitimization of one at the expense of the other. The result of trying to solve this dilemma has been contradictory positions in which local ownership is watered down to participation in externalized rather than localized processes. But when citizens do not own their own politics or markets, or the decisions over the distribution of resources, there is none of the autonomy necessary to build locally legitimate institutions. The rhetorical device of local ownership then represents a dangerous separation of local communities from their political, social and cultural landscape, which allows for abuses to go unchecked, given the limited state capacity and dependence on international resources (Richmond 2012, 362).

Previous studies have mapped out the hegemonic peacebuilding discourse which (re)produces the UN as the ‘architect’ and legitimate knower of peacebuilding practice, and the communities working on building peace as the ‘laborers’ and known objects (Shepherd 2015, 889). This has implications for the way that civil society organizations are engaged in peacebuilding activities, where ‘local’ knowledge is at the same time valued and subordinated (ibid., 887). Although the UN acknowledges that civil society engagement is central, the UN is still the primary actor and the agenda of the UN is achieved through rather than with civil society partners (ibid., 903).
3.5.2 Implementing Women, Peace and Security through National Action Plans

At the national level of implementation of the WPS agenda, the 1325 National Action Plans (NAPs) are central. They have been described as the driving force facilitating state action on the agenda (Coomaraswamy 2015, 241). As the NAPs are considered to constitute prominent policy documents of the WPS agenda, they have also been the subject of a range of academic study. Jacqui True has studied the patterns of adoption of the NAPs with the aim of finding common traits and explanations for the diffusion of the WPS agenda through these plans (True 2016). The NAPs differ widely from state to state, and focus on different issues and actors. Criticism against some western states’ plans have been raised that they are superficial in their complete external focus, geared only at conflict-affected developing countries and not scrutinizing the gendered impacts of the own institutional and policy-making processes (ibid., 312).

The NAPs have also been criticized for their lack of inclusion of civil society, drawing on women’s leadership in civil society organizations in a very limited way. Only about a third of the NAPs specify civil society involvement in their planning and drafting, and around 45 percent mention civil society involvement overall (Kirby and Shepherd 2016b, 383-384). The exclusion of civil society from the NAPs can make them elitist and irrelevant, and could also increase the militarization of the WPS agenda by reducing it to the inclusion of women in military and police forces (ibid., 384). Another argument comes from Helen Basini and Caitlin Ryan. They argue that implementation of the WPS agenda on national level has been lacking local ownership, as the NAPs direct the work of local women’s organizations to reflect an international agenda and the priorities of the international community. The NAPs reflect a specific kind of ‘local ownership’ where it is the ‘external’ that tells the ‘local’ what it should own, and their goal is fulfillment of the obligations to the international community rather than substantive changes to support gender equity. Further, the international WPS agenda is legitimized by claiming this local ownership. By reflecting the international agenda rather than the local context, the NAPs can also potentially misdirect the real agency and knowledge of women in post-conflict countries (Basini & Ryan 2016, 392-393).

3.5.3 Civil Society Organizations in the Women, Peace and Security agenda

In the global narrative of UNSCR 1325, civil society organizations have been seen as the ‘natural advocates’ for the WPS agenda, as the WPS resolutions enable the voices of women to be brought “up there”. Citing Pratts and Richter-Devroes (2011) critique of this narrative, Basu highlights how this neglects how the liberal peacebuilding agenda of UNSCR 1325 offers only limited potential for “women’s movements engaged in a more radical agenda of social and political transformation”. By assuming that UNSCR 1325 is always compatible with the
work of local and national CSOs, the hegemonic WPS discourse is imposed on these actors (Basu 2016, 369-370). This is a relevant critique of how the WPS agenda risks becoming a top-down rather than a bottom-up agenda, as the power relations and different material conditions for the different actors and stakeholders is not taken into account. However, it is also argued that there will always be a hegemonic WPS narrative, as international policies generally cannot fully reflect specific local realities, but that this narrative exists within a much larger discourse on WPS. This discourse includes experiences and insights of the Global South, which can help reframe the understanding of global gender and security governance (ibid., 371).

The construction of civil society in the NAPs has been analyzed in the context of Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovia. It was found that in both countries’ plans there is a construct of the role of civil society as primarily an implementer of government policy, and an ignorance of the important watchdog function of civil society. Civil society is engaged as a space for service provision, filling in the gaps of lacking state service (Björkdahl and Selimovic, 2015, 327-328). This hinders civil society from developing its advocacy functions, as an entity pushing the government to make public institutions work.

Shepherd poses related arguments, in her analysis (2015) of the gendered constructs of civil society in global governance. Her analysis of how the civil society concept has been integrated in United Nations policy points to a shift in how the UN system (primarily the entities involved in peacebuilding related activities) conceives of civil society, from consultant to implementing partner. Civil society works as a legitimizing actor for UN peacebuilding as bearer of certain forms of (local) knowledge (Shepherd 2015, 904). The logics informing the construction of this bearer are also gendered and gendering. The UN Peacebuilding Commission specifically and exclusively identifies ‘women’s organizations’ as a part of civil society that it should consult with. This feminizes civil society, and reproduces the association between women and civil society (as opposed to women and the realm of formal politics). Further, this discursive construction relies on assumptions of women’s capacity by virtue of their femininity, connected to the assumption of pacifism and peacebuilding potential (Shepherd 2015, 904-905).

In a study of how regional and local women’s organizations in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo have used UNSCR 1325 for organizing and advocacy, Irvine (2013) finds that organizations have had some success in using it to promote inclusion of women. Success has however been limited when it comes to addressing structural sources of inequality including militarism and neoliberal models of economic development (ibid., 20). UNSCR 1325 has been a useful though limited tool for empowerment and advocacy for inclusion and human security. It has been used in a ‘double boomerang’ strategy by women’s organizations, sometimes appealing to international norms and authorities to pressure national and local authorities and sometimes appealing to local and national constituencies to pressure international authorities. But the Balkan experiences show that resolution 1325 appears to result in both main-streaming, which has bureaucratized and diluted feminist goals, and side-streaming, which has isolated gender from other post-conflict concerns. It has also failed in providing a tool for tackling economic bases of inequality (ibid., 37-38).
4 Aim of this study

It is not new for the international community to use civil society for implementing policies in the fields of development, democratization and peacebuilding. As the theoretical review above have shown neither is critique against this practice. The specific entry point for this thesis is that the justification and legitimization for civil society financing and partnering has taken partly new forms with the establishment of gender equality as a major policy goal within international relations, not least within the UN system. Both the instrumental value of women’s participation in the three fields, and the moral legitimacy it provides, is important for the donor community’s continued claim to create peace, democracy and economic development.

This instrumentalization and moral legitimacy is created through discursive constructions of gender. This thesis examines how the reproduction of these constructions within the framework of the WPS agenda could be argued to have limiting effects on both women’s (political) organization, and sustainable financing for peace. This thesis is not intended to analyze the success or failures of women’s organizations. The focus of the analysis is on the WPS agenda, meaning the UN infrastructure that guides international initiatives relating to women’s participation in all aspects of peace and conflict, and how this agenda is articulated and its language reproduced in a specific financing instrument. Through a feminist critical discourse analysis both text, discursive practice and social practice connected to this instrument is analyzed.

Laura Shepherd has in previous research investigated both the representations of women in the WPS agenda and how the principles in the agenda have spread to other UN entities (Shepherd 2016), as well as how constructions of the UN architecture and civil society as actors are reproduced in the peacebuilding discourse (Shepherd 2015). This forms a solid base of previous research for this thesis. Shepherds research focuses on the peacebuilding architecture of the UN, with the Peacebuilding Commission as its main study object. I wish to direct the analysis to the efforts of increasing the financing of the WPS agenda, and specifically financing of civil society. As Shepherd (2016) shows, the peacebuilding architecture of the UN constructs civil society in a specific, gendered way. Again, this thesis is not about criticizing the work or the potential of local women’s movements and organizations. On the contrary, it aims to illustrate the shortcomings of the ‘international community’ and donors in the framing of ‘women’s civil society organizations’, which I claim leads to a narrow understanding of the potential of women’s and feminist organizing.
5 Methodology and material

The research problem is investigated through a feminist critical discourse analysis (CDA). The basic assumption of the thesis’ approach is that unequal power relations affect both language and social constructions, which is appropriate to investigate with discourse analysis. In CDA, discursive practices are seen as being in a dialectical relationship with other social practices – discourse is socially embedded (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 78). I believe that this perspective on how discourse functions ideologically, and discursive practices are linked to unequal power relations (ibid., 63) is appropriate for the subject for this thesis. I am interested in these links, how the constructions of women’s civil society organizations in the WPS discourse connects to the social practice of the financing to them.

A critical discourse analysis usually consists of textual analysis on three levels. The text itself is described through its vocabulary, grammar and structure. The discursive practice of the text is interpreted through its production and consumption, and the social practice of the text is explained through its situational, institutional and societal context. In the third level of analysis, we ask: is the text reproducing or challenging power relations? (Kolankiewicz 2016).

With a feminist critical understanding of the processes of construction in discourses, we acknowledge that the categories that we use to think with, frequently assumed to be descriptive, such as ‘white’, ‘female’ or ‘heterosexual’, are politically constituted rather than reflective of identity. Such categories are always normative, rather than technical (Shepherd 2015, 889). As Shepherd states: “Through understanding the discursive terrain of an institution, it is possible to identify, problematise and challenge the ways in which certain ‘realities’ become accepted as ‘real’ in contemporary global politics” (ibid., 905).

5.1 Theory of Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as articulated by Norman Fairclough is a methodological approach, consisting of philosophical premises and theoretical methods as well as methodological guidelines and specific techniques for linguistic analysis (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 60). Its philosophical and theoretical assumptions are well in line with the approach of this thesis.

Five features are common for all CDA approaches (ibid., 61-64):

1. Discursive practices are viewed as an important form of social practice which contributes to the constitution of the social world. Some social phenomena are however not of a linguistic-discursive character.
2. Discourse is seen as both constitutive and constituted. Discourse is a social practice in a dialectical relationship with other social dimensions.

3. Language use is empirically analyzed within its social context.

4. Discourse functions ideologically. Discursive practice contributes to the creation and reproduction of unequal power relations between social groups, and this is understood as ideological effects. CDA is ‘critical’ in that it aims to reveal the role of discursive practice in the maintenance of the social world.

5. A critical approach which is not politically neutral but is politically committed to social change, and on the side of oppressed social groups.

The focus of CDA on the dialectical relationship between discourse and other social dimensions, and the ideological function of discourse, connected to power relations, is at the core of this thesis. Here, the relationship between discourses of gender, international development cooperation and peace & security (and the order of these) are analyzed in relation to other social practices in the context of UN financing of women’s civil society organizations. Regarding the social practices relevant to the analysis, the economic organization of the UN development system, peace and security activities and UN Women, are central.

Fairclough’s approach is poststructuralist in its claim that discursive practice not only reproduces discursive structures but also challenges the structure. But it diverges from poststructuralist discourse theory as it concentrates on empirical research through systematic analyses of language, and detailed text analysis of how discourse operates linguistically in specific text (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 65). This is combined with analysis of societal and cultural structures and processes. This analysis must be done according to the logic of that social practice, in its own terms using the appropriate analytical tools (ibid., 73). For this study, the material of GAI will be analyzed through detailed text analysis. This will be combined with analysis of the broader UN and development cooperation context, informed by both gender theory, IR theory and feminist political economy.

In CDA, two dimensions of discourse are important to the analysis: the communicative event – a newspaper article, a film, a video, an interview or a political speech; and the order of discourse – the configuration of all the discourses and genres used within a social institution or a social field (ibid., 67). The order of discourse can be seen as the discursive aspect of a field, in a Bourdieu-iian sense (ibid., 73). For this study, the field is the Women, Peace and Security agenda. The order of discourse is a system, but it is not completely stabile. The system can be altered through single communicative events, as well as be reproduced by them. My use of the concept of a “field” will follow Shepherd’s definition, although she calls it the ‘discursive terrain’. In the context of her investigation of the discursive terrain of two institutions with authority over UNSCR 1325, she defines this concept as “the multiple discourses that the institutions are product/productive of and the multiple practices of power and representation that constitute the boundaries of that which is intelligible within the institutions” (Shepherd 2008, 384).

CDA is useful in disclosing the discursive nature of social and cultural change. Language is scrutinized as a site of power, and the analysis often shows the fallacy of the assumption that language is neutral (Wodak & Meyer 2001, 6-7). While
Fairclough often focuses on the mediating and constructing role of media institutions in such analysis, I claim that this approach is useful also in the study of the discursive terrain of international institutions. As Wodak and Meyer point out, for CDA language is not powerful on its own but gains power by the use of powerful people. This is why the analysis is often from the perspective of those who suffer, and why it critically analyses the language use of those in power, responsible for inequalities and who have the means to improve conditions (ibid., 10). In the topic and material of this thesis, the international institution of the United Nations, but also its member states, are seen as such actors.

5.2 Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis

I believe that a feminist CDA is in full accordance with a postcolonial feminist study, as it allows for questions of hegemony, power and social change to be asked. As Michelle Lazar puts it: “The aim of feminist critical discourse studies, therefore, is to show up the complex, subtle, and sometimes not so subtle, ways in which frequently taken-for-granted gendered assumptions and hegemonic power relations are discursively produced, sustained, negotiated, and challenged in different contexts and communities” (Lazar 2007, 142).

Lazar emphasizes that CDA acknowledges a multimodal dimension to language that is often lacking in other linguistic approaches. This means that in CDA, language is analyzed together with other modalities such as images, layouts and sounds, which allows for an enriching analysis and has great value for a holistic feminist critique of discursive constructions of gender (ibid., 142). As the material for this study is multimodal (in terms of including both language and images), this kind of analysis is well-suited.

In feminist CDA, gender is of course a central social practice. This is seen on two levels: gender functions as an interpretive category (that helps make sense of the world) and gender is a social relation that enters into and partially constitutes all other social relations and categories (based on the asymmetric meanings of male and female) (ibid., 145). The approach to gender ideology as structural means that it is enacted and renewed in a society’s institutions and social practices, which mediate between the individual and the social order (ibid., 147). This approach works well with the theoretical approach to gender from Sandra Harding that is a starting point for this thesis, where it is seen as developed through three interrelated processes (individual gender, gender symbolism, and gender structure) (Meger 2015, 418).

In feminist CDA there is a dialectical tension between structural permanence and the practical activity of people engaged in social practice, making gender ideology contestable (Lazar 2007, 147). Just as with CDA in general, feminist CDA focuses on the power struggles of ideology that are visible through discourse. The aim of this thesis is to focus on this very struggle and tensions that arise through interdiscursivity, and the focus of the analysis is on the tensions and ruptures of discourse. This is what Foucault calls 'points of diffraction of
discourse’ (Foucault 1972, 73), the tensions of the discursive terrain that illustrate the instability of meaning and how meaning is constructed through discursive practice (Shepherd 2015, 891). As Lazar emphasizes however, it is important not to romanticize agency, as it depends on constraints and possibilities afforded by particular social structures and practices (Lazar 2007, 147).

The intersectional and postcolonial approach of this thesis is easily aligned with the approach of feminist CDA. Feminist CDA is implicitly comparative rather than universalizing, and interested in discursive aspects of the forms of oppression and interests which divide as well as unite groups of women, and its task is to examine how power and dominance are discursively produced and/or (counter-)resisted (Lazar 2007, 149). As a focus of this study is the conditions for women’s organization in conflict and post-conflict contexts, this approach and task is highly relevant. Here, the relationship between an international institution and women’s organizations is examined through structures of power and dominance, with a focus on how discourses are both reproduced and resisted, acknowledging discursive tensions and points of diffraction.

The overtly political research approach of CDA and feminist CDA has been criticized for lacking in objectivity and ‘scientificity’. However, from the feminist position the idea of scientific neutrality itself is raised as problematic, as it does not recognize that all knowledge is socially and historically constructed and based on values (Lazar 2007, 146). In a feminist theory of science, the social-political position of knowledge producers is included into scientific theory (Schulte 2016). Feminist theorization and analysis include a variety of social considerations that typically get precluded from other types of research, perhaps making it more objective than others (Lazar 2007, 146).

5.3 Methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis

The CDA procedure begins with a preparatory stage. The approach is pragmatic and problem oriented, and begins with identifying and describing the social problem to be analyzed. This includes focusing on a specific social problem which has a semiotic aspect, and to identify the dominant styles, genres, discourses constituting this semiotic aspect. (Wodak & Meyer 2001, 28)

The next stage is the analytical stage, which consists of three levels: a structural analysis of the context, analysis which focuses on linguistic features such as agents; time; tense; modality; and syntax. And an analysis of interdiscursivity is made, which compares the dominant and resistant strands of discourse (Wodak & Meyer 2001, 28-29). The three analytical steps can be described as focusing on social practice, text, and discursive practice, respectively.

The text analysis is mainly linguistic, although a multimodal analysis can be done (focusing on images and sounds as well). The text analysis can also include analysis of speakers, metaphors, vocabulary and grammar, including modality and transitivity. Modality refers to the speaker’s degree of affinity, meaning the level of commitment to their statements. One type can be truth, another permission. The
chosen modality has consequences for the discursive construction of both social relations and knowledge and meaning systems (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 83-84). Transitivity refers to the subjects and objects in the grammatical structure, and what roles they are given in the events and processes described in the text (ibid., 82-83).

For the analysis of the discourse “the first concern is to locate the discourse in relation to the network of orders of discourse”, and to examine how it draws selectively from the network (Chouliaraki & Fairclough 1999, 63). The order is a fluent construction of socially set genres and discourses in a given field (ibid. 58). The analysis focuses on which discourses and genres are articulated in the production and consumption of the text (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 69). Examples of discourses in this context could include ‘neoliberal discourse’ or ’feminist discourse’, and a genre could for example be advertisement, documentary or TV news genres.

The analysis of discursive practice includes looking at the level of interdiscursivity, meaning the way that different discourses and genres are articulated together. A high level of interdiscursivity is associated with change, while a low level signals reproduction of the established order (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 73; 82). Interdiscursivity is an aspect of intertextuality, meaning the way that all texts draw on earlier communicative events, and the influence of history on a text and a text’s influence on history. Intertextuality can mean both continuity and change, as drawing on discourses in new ways can create change but the possibilities for this is limited by power relations (ibid., 74).

Critical discourse analysis also includes connecting discourse to broader social and cultural structures, relations and processes (ibid., 63), as discourse is one kind of mechanism working in combination with other mechanisms (economical, physical, psychological) to constitute a social practice (ibid, 71). For this level of analysis, social and cultural theory is used. The main aim is to explore the links between language use and social practice (ibid, 69). This is done by a mapping of the wider context of the discursive practice, ‘the social matrix of discourse’. This can be for example the institutional and economic conditions of the discursive practice (ibid, 86). On this level of analysis, the ideological consequences of the discursive practice are addressed: Does it reproduce the order of discourse and contribute to the status quo, or has the order of discourse been transformed, thereby contributing to social change? Does the discursive practice conceal and strengthen unequal power relations in society, or does it challenge power positions? (ibid, 87).

5.4 Material

As the material for this study, I have chosen to look at a UN financing instrument named the Global Acceleration Instrument for Women, Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action (GAI).

To address the financing gaps in the Women, Peace and Security agenda, a group of representatives from donors, conflict-affected states, United Nations
entities and civil society was established in June 2014. This Group subsequently initiated the Global Acceleration Instrument (GAI) for Women, Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action. The establishment of the GAI was recommended by the Global Study on the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 and welcomed by the UN Secretary General and the Security Council, through resolution 2242 (UNDP 2017).

The stated mission of GAI is to enhance women’s engagement in peace and security and/or humanitarian action by:

“Breaking silos between humanitarian, peace, security and development finance by investing in enhancing women’s engagement, leadership and empowerment across all phases of the crisis, peace, security, and development continuum

Addressing structural funding gaps for women’s participation by improving the timeliness, predictability and flexibility of international assistance,

Improving policy coherence and coordination by complementing existing financing instruments and promoting synergies across all actors: multilateral and bilateral entities, national governments’ women’s machineries; and local civil society organizations.” (UNDP 2017)

The fund is administered through the Multi-Partner Trust Fund office of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), but its secretariat is located under UN Women which is responsible for its policy issues (UNDP 2017). The main goal of GAI is to enhance women’s engagement in peace and security and/or humanitarian action. A minimum of 50 percent of the funds are expected to be allocated to civil society organizations (UN Women 2016). In the Global Study one goal for UN Member States, the UN and civil society when it comes to financing the WPS agenda is stated as follows:

“Increase predictable, accessible and flexible funding for women’s civil society organizations working on peace and security on all levels, including through dedicated financing instruments such as the new Global Acceleration Instrument on Women, Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action” (UN Women 2015, 415).

The GAI could thus be described as an important entity in the financing of CSOs in the WPS context, which is the topic of this thesis.

On the GAI website, which presents the mission, funding, key figures and other information about the fund, there is a link to a video material called “Accelerating Impact: women preventing conflict and building peace” (GAI 2016). This video is the main material for this study. In order to analyze both the textual, discursive and social levels, other material connected to the fund such as the “2-pager” information material, the extensive Global Study on WPS from UN Women from 2015, and protocols from the Security Council Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security is included as well.

A transcription of the spoken and shown text in the video material, made by the thesis author, can be found below as Appendix I, and screenshots from the video can be found in Appendix II.
6 Analysis

6.1 Multimodal text analysis

The video starts with a text sign, which indicates the title of the material: “Accelerating impact - women preventing conflict and building peace”. The video can then be said to consist of four sections. First there is round of seven different people as “talking heads”, the majority identified through text name signs, talking about the subject of women, peace and security. Then the video focuses on three different geographical contexts where women have been involved in peace and security activities, in Colombia, Burundi and the Za’tari refugee camp in Jordan respectively.

Starting with the syntax and word use in the material, “women” is a central word. It is spoken or written in the material 30 times. The use of the word is to a large extent in a universal sense. The category of women is meant to signify “not men”. Wording like “voices of women”, “women’s activism” and “engagement of women” is not further specified, signaling that these concepts are universal and unifying.

The word “men” is spoken 4 times. This dynamic of the text, which focuses on the concept of women and does not pay much attention to the concept of men, can be said to connect to a specific kind of gender perspective. In the context of peace and security, women were for a very long time completely invisible in the international discourse and policies. There is now a political momentum for gender equality in the international arena and in the UN system, so it is a natural development that efforts such as the GAI would want to repeat the message of including women as much as possible. At the same time however, this is reminiscent of the kind of gender policies which introduced in the field of international development in the 1970s, later criticized for simply trying to “add women and stir”. This kind of perspective does not challenge the power structures between the genders, calling in to question the power and practices of men and masculine ideals. The category of women is spoken of as something that can be included without changes being made to the existing structure. By using the concept of “women” rather than “gender perspective”, the material can be said to conceal important power relations.

By including images to the multimodal analysis, we can see one instance where a clear dichotomy between men and women is being shown. The very first image shown after the title text is of a group of women sitting at a market stand, and a man in military uniform shaking their hands. The women sit on the ground, or
maybe on low chairs or stools, while the man is standing up. After the uniformed man has shaken their hands, the camera zooms in a bit to the face of one of the women. She is not smiling, but rather has a reserved expression, looking up at the uniformed man (see Appendix II, screenshot 1). Around 1 minute and 15 seconds into the video, we get to see military uniformed people shaking hands with civilians again. Here the uniformed are two women, one with a shirt labelled with “UNMISS” (The United Nations Mission in South Sudan), and one with a uniform labelled “POLICE”. In this sequence, the women greeting the uniformed women are smiling, and one of the civilians and the woman with the UNMISS shirt hug. All women are standing. As they are all on the same level, this is interpreted as more of an equal situation. Since they are also smiling and hugging, it is also interpreted as a friendlier exchange. This references the goals of the WPS of including more women in armed forces, with resolution 1820 urging troop-contributing countries to deploy a higher percentage of women peacekeepers or police. This type of instrumentalist representation has been argued to be problematic because of the lack of challenge to masculinity norms within peacekeeping missions, and female peacekeepers working as an alibi for a hierarchical relation between international institutions as the bearers of human rights and democratic values, and the populations they are deployed to protect (Pratt 2013, 776).

Looking at the verb use of the material, it is visible that there is a lack of active verb use in the first section of the video. In this section, the seven people that speak can be said to have the role of experts. They are both women and men, and identified with names, titles and their origin countries. The modality of their speech is with a high degree of affinity, their statements are spoken with certainty and commitment. For example: “What we need is (…)”, “there will be no peace”, “when it comes to actual doing you don’t find it”, “engagement of women should be standard practice”. This confirms their roles as experts, as they are able to confidently speak on the complex issue of women, peace and security.

When it comes to the syntax of these statements, there is a low degree of identified subjects. On the issue of including women in work for peace and security, the following is said by three different people:

“If women aren’t involved, if girls and young women aren’t involved in defining their peace and security, there will be no peace”

“What hasn’t changed is the lack of resourcing. Investing in women’s activism for peace and security”

“If you exclude more than half of the population in defining the problem, and prescribing the solution, you’re not going to have stability”

In none of these statements is it clear who the active subject is. Therefore, it remains unclear by who the action to include women is supposed to be taken. The non-specific character of these quotes also add to the universal sense of the problem that is addressed in this context.

This dynamic could be interpreted as connected to the complex power relations of the United Nations and its member states. A promotional material like this, intended to spur further donations by the member states, is likely to want to stay away from placing blame on specific nations for not including women. Neither is it
likely to want to point out weaknesses or failures of the United Nations and its
different entities, as the UN managed fund is the intended destination for the
further donations. The universal tone of the statements in the material connects to
the language culture of the UN, which often underlines the global character of the
challenges in the world, and the equal responsibility of the member states to
collectively address them.

The different sections of the video are separated through both imaging and
sound. When the section on Colombia begins, there are text signs which give
background to the context of the Colombian peace process. Simultaneously, the
background music of the video changes to some kind of pan flute. When the next
section about Burundi is introduced through text signs, the music changes to
another instrument, some kind of xylophone. The same thing happens with the next
section on the Za’tari camp, when string music is played. The choice of music is
indeed intentional, as the instruments played in the section on Colombia as well as
Burundi give specific geographical associations. The pan flute is closely associated
with South American culture, as is the kind of xylophone or marimba with African
culture that is played in the Burundi section. Here, the material clearly moves away
from the universal tone of the introduction section to instead be geographically
specific. The exception is the section on the Za’tari refugee camp in Jordan, where
a kind of classical string music is played which can be interpreted as associated
with European or “western” culture.

Another difference between the introduction section and the geographical
sections are which languages are being spoken. In the first section, the
identified “talking heads” come from different countries. They all speak English, and there
are no subtitles. In the Colombia, Burundi and Za’tari sections, the persons all
speak in different languages, and there are subtitles in English. This further adds to
the sense of the “local” in contrast to the first section of “international experts”,
speaking the lingua franca of international politics, English.

The person speaking about the Colombian peace process is identified as
Bibiana Penaranda with a text sign. It is not specified what her title is or which
organization she works for, just that she was one of the women that “campaigned
tirelessly to be represented in the peace process”. In the Burundi section, three
people speak. They are identified as Béatrice Nseyimana, mediator in Rutana,
Léocadie Ndikumana, mediator in Rutana and Jean De Dieu Niyonkuru, Socio-
Cultural Advisor to the Governor in Rutana. In the section on the Za’tari refugee
camp in Jordan, two people speak: Yusra, Centre Administrator, Cash for Work
Beneficiary, and Walaa, Jewelry Maker, Cash for Work Beneficiary. The two
women from the Za’tari refugee camp are the only ones identified with first names
only. The are also identified as beneficiaries of the program in the camp run by UN
Women.

In the images from Colombia and Burundi, we get to see women as actors. The
footage shows women performing different kinds of activities, such as speaking at
a panel, protesting or demonstrating, speaking to men and women in individual
meetings, speaking in front of larger groups of people. In the Za’tari section, we
first get to see the woman speaking being active in a domestic setting, preparing
beverages, making the bed and speaking to her children. Then, when she speaks
about the work she does through the UN Women-run program, we see women
active with handicraft, making mosaic. The intention to show women as actors and not victims is clear, connecting to the progression of the WPS agenda of not only including women as victims but as important actors.

The narrative of the video could however be said to in some sense conceal the remaining power inequalities which exists practically everywhere in the world. The actor focus creates a success story narrative, which gives an impression that women in the contexts which are portrayed now have full opportunities to have their voices heard and participate equally. The perspective is very much focused on the potential of women’s participation, and not on the obstacles to this participation or what doors remain closed to women. In the Burundi section, the women mediators are portrayed as a community function that eases the tensions between formal political representatives. The male representative, who is an advisor to the governor, says that the “Women mediators have supported us to organize dialogues involving all political parties from our province. It successfully countered rumors and strengthened social cohesion.” From this we learn that even though the efforts by the women mediators are appreciated by the formal power, they do not hold formal power positions. The women mediators are valued for their close connection to the community, and are portrayed in contrast to the party politics. This is however not portrayed as a problem, instead the women mediators represent a success story.

In the context of Colombia, the success story narrative focuses on the inclusion of women in the formal peace negotiations between the government and the FARC guerrilla, and the creation of a commission on gender. In the context of the Za’tari refugee camp, the success story narrative focuses on two individual stories of women who describe their first time in the camp as one of hardship and difficulty. They then describe how the UN Women center has changed their situation and given them new opportunities. This narrative focuses more on economic development than the previous. It also has an individual perspective, focusing on how these two women now got a source of income. This kind of narrative can be seen in the light of a common discursive construct in the field of gender and development, which is the female entrepreneur. On an individual and family level, as well as a community and national level, women are seen as having the potential to raise the economic productivity of the whole family/community/nation, if only given the opportunity.

In elements of both imaging and text, we can see symbols representing the “peaceful woman”. In addition to the implicit universality of women which is conveyed through statements simply referring to “women”, the quote from Bibiana Penaranda is an explicit statement of women’s shared experiences in relation to peace and conflict:

“A big contribution of women is the way in which we build peace. Men build peace with weapons, with a uniform, with vertical power. Women are telling men there are other ways to relate to each other, there are other ways to solve conflicts.”

In a sequence of images which are shown in the introductory section of the video, women in white clothing holding protest signs that read “Say no to war” are shown (see Appendix II, screenshot 3). The color white is of course a highly symbolic
color of peace. In the video’s section from the Za’tari camp, the women at the UN Women center are shown making mosaic. The mosaic is in the form of white doves, another universal peace symbol (see Appendix II, screenshot 4). The use of this kind of symbolism reproduces the constructs of the female gender as innately peaceful. Not only does this limit the scope of women’s potential agency, as it constructs women’s participation as connected to a single, universal issue rather than women belonging to a political spectrum just like men. It can also be seen as connected to the way that “women’s activism” is constructed as non-threatening, an issue I will return to.

6.2 Discursive practice

6.2.1 Production and consumption of the text

The material is presented on the website for the Multi-Partner Trust Fund website under the headline “Film”. The video has the file name GAI_Launch_Video.mp4, which of course indicates that this video was produced as a launch material for the Global Acceleration Instrument. This has meaning for the discursive place of the material. A launch, being an introduction to something, indicates that this is something new that the audience will see for the first time. It also indicates that the video material relates to some sort of product which it is intended to promote, rather than it being a general information material. In this case, the product is the Multi-Partner Trust Fund, which relies on voluntary financial contributions. Thus, as a material, the video can be placed both in the genres of PR and advertisement, of UN information material, and of filmed documentary.

There is no stated sender or producer of the material, other than it being found on the GAI website. The only other online link to the video material is via the website of the Permanent Mission of Spain to the UN (Permanent Mission of Spain to the UN, 2017). There is no direct reference to the GAI fund in the video, or any information about who has produced it. In terms of genre this could be interpreted as increasing the sense of documentary or news story, as it seemingly exists in the world without a clear “seller”. The genre of UN information material is in this way downplayed.

The material has been produced through filming and interviewing in at least three different geographical locations (we do not learn where the “experts” in the first section of the video are located). Filming on different locations is often time and resource demanding, and so effort has been put into sharing the direct experiences of women from different parts of the world. This could be interpreted in a similar way to how the women are clearly portrayed as active subjects. As the message is that women are important as actors, it is important that the material provides the actual speech of women in different contexts. It could also be interpreted as intending to mitigate some of the postcolonial critique that the WPS
agenda has previously been subject to, by giving direct space to the women actors involved in peace and security activities themselves. However, the division between the initial “expert statements” and the following sections on specific locations remains problematic from a postcolonial perspective. The first voices in English are not placed geographically, and their statements are general and referring to a global and international situation. The following sections are portrayed as “local”, with the music and subtitles creating a contrasting sense of cultural specificity.

In analyzing the consumption of this communicative event, one can assume that the main intended audience are representatives from donor states, as it promotes contributions to a donor fund. The level of affinity that the statements on the benefits to women’s inclusion are delivered with, could be a sign that the intended audience is one which is already “on board” with the WPS agenda as a whole – already committed to women’s participation and inclusion. Although Security Council resolutions are binding for all states, different member states have different levels of open commitment to the agenda. An example of this is the Group of Friends of 1325, is an informal network chaired by Canada, consisting of 51 member states representing all five regional groups of the United Nations (United Nations Security Council 2016, 52). The intended function of the material could be interpreted to be to show how the fund gives a direct opportunity for member states to fulfill binding Security Council resolutions. Resolution 2122 from 2013:

“Encourages concerned Member States to develop dedicated funding mechanisms to support the work and enhance capacities of organizations that support women’s leadership development and full participation in all levels of decision-making, regarding the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), inter alia through increasing contributions to local civil society.” (United Nations Security Council 2013, 4)

Resolution 2242 makes direct reference to the GAI fund, stating that the Council is:

“Recognizing the new Global Acceleration Instrument on women’s engagement in peace and security and humanitarian affairs, in addition to existing complementary mechanisms, as one avenue to attract resources, coordinate responses and accelerate implementation” (United Nations Security Council 2015, 3)

But the video could also be said to promote WPS commitment in a broader sense, beyond contributions to the specific GAI fund. It shows the virtues of the WPS agenda, the “common sense” of its principles, and how it could be effectively implemented through civil society support. 63 member states have adopted National Action Plans on how to nationally implement the agenda, so this could be seen as a “sellable” message for these states on how to reach national policy goals. As gender equality has become an integrated and evident part of international policy, a feminist message could also be seen as sellable to states wanting to belong to a relatively widely shared international norm.
6.2.2 Order of discourse and interdiscursivity

The order of discourse in this material and the level of interdiscursivity is connected to the place of both the feminist and economic discourses of the United Nations. Several statements in the video clearly relate to feminism and women’s activism and empowerment: Sharon Baghwan Rolls, identified as the co-founder of FemLINKPacific states that: “What hasn’t changed is the lack of resourcing. Investing in women’s activism for peace and security.” Images are shown of women demonstrating. Bibiana Penaranda from Colombia states that a “big contribution of women is the way in which we build peace.” Léocadie Ndikumana in Burundi says that the women mediator initiative further empower women as leaders. In the section from Za’tari refugee camp, we see images from the “Women and Girls Oasis” with women working and smiling, as a contrast to the situation which Walaa and Yusra speaks about, before they became involved in the program and were in financial and emotional distress.

This narrative of women’s organization and participation as a way to prosperity is not something new in itself, but is is quite new in the context of peace and security. In this way the material can be said to demonstrate an interdiscursive mix, both signaling and driving change. By using discourses in a new way, in this case by combining a feminist discourse with a peace and security discourse, the order of discourse in the field in question can be changed. Here this means that the field of the WPS agenda can be changed to further include feminist language. However, it could also be claimed that this material reproduces the order of the discourse where a neoliberal world view is dominant, and only a perspective on gender equality which does not fundamentally challenge the status quo is visible. Women’s organization is portrayed mainly as a convener, as something that will improve an existing order and way of doing things. Existing power relations are questioned to a very low degree.

There are indeed signs of both continuity and change in the material. When resources to “women’s activism” is raised as an important part of working for peace and security, this illustrates a discursive shift in the field, as the global discursive arena of peace and security has historically been one where neither women nor activism has a place. The argument is that what is needed is “Investing in women’s activism for peace and security”. The term “investing” has meaning in several ways. Firstly, it signals that the resources given to women’s organizing and political participation is something that should yield a revenue, that women’s activism is instrumental to a greater goal. The gendered aspect of this statement is important. Not only because women’s activities have a history of being seen as instrumental to other goals in the field of international development, but also because the statement becomes unlikely if it would have referred to male activism. Male activism as a concept has different connotations, not as instrumental to other societal goals, perhaps not even desirable. That women’s activism can be generally referred to as something inherently positive can be connected to gendered constructs such as women’s innate peacefulness, and the marginality of women’s organizing.

Secondly, the statement introduces an economic language to a context which is usually not measured in such terms, namely women’s civil society organization.
This can be seen in light of a general framework of financial control and results based management in the field of international organizations, that is part of the neoliberal world view and the new public management paradigm. To conclude, there is a certain level of interdiscursivity, with the discourses of feminist activism and economic discourse being combined. There is however continuity in the way that feminist activism is framed within the existing paradigm, where women’s empowerment is meant to function as a way to reach pre-existing peace and security goals.

6.2.3 Intertextuality

A key feature of critical discourse analysis is to see the text in a chain of communicative events which influence each other. In relating this material to other communicative events I have looked at the latest Security Council Open Debate on Women, Peace and Security, which was held on October 25th 2016. I argue that this is a highly relevant communicative event which reflects the discourse at hand, as the Security Council is the primary vehicle for international security policy and the Open Debate is its main event addressing the WPS agenda. In this debate, I have looked closer at the references that are being made to the GAI fund. I have also looked at statements regarding civil society engagement in the WPS agenda more broadly.

The GAI fund is mentioned explicitly in the debate by eight countries, in addition to the Canadian representative of the “Group of Friends of Women, Peace and Security”, the Executive Director of UN Women, and the UN Secretary General (although here it is referred to only as “the new pooled fund that was created to channel more resources to women’s organizations working for peace” (Security Council 2016, 3). These countries are Ireland, Spain, Kazakhstan, Australia, Bangladesh, Guatemala, Botswana and the United Kingdom (see Appendix III) Australia, Canada, UK, Spain and Ireland have all contributed to the fund.

The promotional material that the video represents can be seen in an intertextual chain with the Open Debate statements. A particular kind of WPS agenda implementation is the narrative in, and is being promoted in the video. This narrative of the GAI fund is then promoted by the Member States in the Open Debate. Their statements can be seen as a way for the Member States to position themselves as true promoters of the WPS agenda whom also take financial responsibility. They also urge other states to follow their example. This is of course in line with the stated goals of the fund – to cover structural funding gaps. As the fund relies on voluntary contributions, this narrative is indeed something that needs to be “sold”.

The Open Debate statements in favor of the GAI not only positions these countries as states with certain political values and priorities – committed to gender equality – but also frames the WPS agenda and civil society engagement in the agenda in a specific way. The GAI fund is presented as the way to financially support civil society and women’s organizations in conflict affected contexts.
One narrative that the video conveys is that in the field of peace and security, the place of women is in civil society. Although it is important to acknowledge that civil society is a hugely important arena for women’s political participation, when women’s participation and civil society organizations become concepts are used almost interchangeably this can create limiting narratives. This narrative is reproduced in a number of Open Debate statements:

“From now on, women will expect to take part. Civil society will demand to be heard. More stakeholders will want to have a say, because it has been done before. And even though the Syria talks are not moving in the direction we hoped, the Geneva process has achieved something new: women and civil society are consulted regularly through innovative formal mechanisms. We now have very concrete examples of inclusion. We have been very happy to support these developments” [Statement by Norway] (United Nations Security Council 2016, 32)

“In these challenging times, it is essential to promote partnerships with civil society, and in particular with women’s networks. Colombia is a perfect example of the role that civil society women’s networks can play in peace and peacebuilding efforts.” [statement by Switzerland] (United Nations Security Council 2016, 35)

“We support women’s participation in peace processes through the support of civil society organizations. For example, together with UN-Women — I am glad to see the head of UN-Women is here — we assist female members of Syrian civil society to unite in the Syrian Women’s Initiative for Peace and Democracy” [statement by Netherlands] (United Nations Security Council 2016, 40)

“Women play a key role in areas affected by conflict in ensuring the livelihoods of their families in the midst of chaos, and are particularly active in community building and peace movements at the grass-roots level.” [statement by Hungary] (United Nations Security Council 2016, 43)

The discourse that is reproduced is also primarily one of women’s engagement in peace and security on a local and community-based level. In an information material published by the GAI fund on April 28 2017 this is an explicit strategy - described as one of the ways of implementing the “Grand Bargain’s Humanitarian Financial Reforms”:

“LOCALIZATION: By investing directly in local women’s groups, the GAI is an effective and efficient way to provide significantly higher levels of direct support to local responders.” (GAI 2017)

This echoes the instrumentalist views which have been a part of the discourse of gender equality in international relations and development, from the ‘Women in Development’ approach emerging in the 1970’s to the ‘smart economics’ paradigm that gained ground during the 2000’s. In criticism against these efficiency approaches, the dangers of conflating the empowerment of women as individuals with the feminist goal of removing the structural discrimination which women face as a gendered constituency has been highlighted. Critics have also warned against
feminists working in coalition with individuals and organizations who have fundamentally different aims, and adopting their language (Chant & Sweetman 2012).

6.3 Social practice

This part of the analysis aims to provide a wider context of the discursive practice, ‘the social matrix of discourse’ (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002, 86). It will give a context to what is described in the communicative event, to the economic and institutional conditions of the GAI fund. This will be linked to the feminist postcolonial theory and feminist political economy theory that provide the theoretical framework for this thesis. This analysis will draw both on the language use in the communicative event that is the video material, and the additional material from the Security Council Open Debate and other material related to the fund and its donors.

6.3.1 Social contexts of the geographical situations and of local civil society organizations

The narrative of the success story of the Colombian peace accord is interesting in light of the development of the peace agreement. When a first peace agreement was reached by the government and the FARC guerrilla, this was hailed internationally as an example of the success of the women’s movement and a uniquely gender equal and inclusive peace agreement was proposed. After a referendum voted no to the agreement however, the spotlight has in part turned elsewhere. It has also been argued that the strong gender language was sacrificed in the revisions of the agreement that were made, in order to please conservative groups. Rights of women, minority groups and LGBT groups were diminished in favor of writings about the importance of family and religion (Mänsklig Säkerhet 2016). These developments are not included in the video material.

The Za’tari refugee camp in Jordan hosts around 80,000 Syrian refugees. It was established in 2012 to host refugees fleeing the war in Syria. The GAI promotional video states that 80 percent of the population in the camp consist of women and children. Firstly, this reflects a common trope in both development, peace & security and humanitarian policy language, of connecting “women and children’. Feminist IR theorist Cynthia Enloe coined this as a one-word phrase ‘womenandchildren’ in her critique of the Gulf war (Enloe 2000). The statistic of only 20 percent of the camp’s inhabitants being men is not problematized further. It follows the pattern of the video of not including men in the narrative to any large extent. However, this conceals an important gendered dynamic of the humanitarian crisis of Syrian refugees. The reason for the women and children dominated population in Za’tari is partly that men to a higher degree has fled to Europe. This in turn is because of the lack of safe passage for refugees to seek asylum in Europe,
which causes men to leave their families behind to make the dangerous travel
themselves. The framing of ‘womenandchildren’ in this part of the material also
continues with the portrayal of women in a domestic setting, and taking care of
children. The absence of men is not problematized.

Regarding the context of Burundi, I have argued in the text analysis section that
the women mediators were constructed as more closely connected to the local
population and valued for this, but portrayed in contrast to the formal power which
is represented by a man (an advisor to governor). By looking at the representatives
of formal power in Burundi, we can conclude that there is a clear gender division.
In 2015, out of Burundi’s 18 provinces, 17 had male provincial governors. Rutana,
the province featured in GAI video, is one of them (Wikipedia 2017).

We can here see a pattern of structural gender inequalities being central to the
contexts portrayed in the material, but not being a part of the narrative. The
discourse of women’s empowerment is not narrated in relation to gender relations.

The discourse of “localization” is interesting in relation to the findings in the
Global Study, which to a large extent make up the rationale and background for the
fund. In the Global Study it is concluded that donor conferences are critical for
focusing global attention to a country’s post-conflict priorities, but that despite
women’s central importance to reconstruction, women civil society leaders and
organizations have been marginalized by the donor assistance pledging process.
Further it notes that initial findings show that there is a strong correlation between
donor conferences that have clear channels for women CSO representatives, and
outcomes of donor pledges targeting gender equality (Coomaraswamy 2015, 378).
With this in mind, a more strategic and comprehensive way to address the
structural funding gaps to gender equality interventions could be to increase the
presence of women’s organizations in international donor contexts. Instead, the
GAI fund constructs a narrative of women CSO leaders being very much part of
the “local”, their main advantage being their closeness to the community.

The construction of women’s organizations as “local” is connected to the
concept of “local ownership” in the implementation of the WPS agenda, which has
been a central concept not least through the National Action Plans. This kind of
“local ownership” has however also been criticized for being ineffective and
insufficient, and for its overemphasis on bureaucratic and technocratic solutions.
The NAPs in Sierra Leone and Liberia for example, favor quantifiable outcomes
which can be easily measured within a results-based management format by the
international community (Basini & Ryan 2016, 392), rather than local priorities.

6.3.2 Institutional and economic conditions of the GAI fund

The total contributions from donors to the GAI fund were 3,726,957 USD in 2016.
For 2017, the contributions are 6,486,767 USD so far (as of May 8th 2017).
(UNDP 2017). The dates for the fund are stated on the main website, with the start
date being 24 February 2016 and the end date 31 December 2020.

Financially, the GAI fund has a very marginal place in the development
architecture, when for example compared to the total UNDP budget of 4,5 billion
USD (UNDP 2016). Its relatively larger importance in the discourse however,
could be illustrated with the references to the fund in the Security Council Open Debate statements (see Appendix III). They illustrate a narrative of the problem with funding gaps being acknowledged, and the problem addressed by contributions to the fund. But if we put the contribution sizes in relation to the overall budgets of the contributing Member States, or of the administrative UN organizations, it could be questioned whether these amounts have the capacity to “address structural funding gaps”. The time limitation of the fund, and it financing short-term projects rather than multi-year core funding, could be seen as a continuation of the kind of results-based aid which is an inherent part of the Paris Aid Effectiveness Agenda.

Although the Global Study brings up the results from the global civil society survey on what barriers civil society encounters, it is not mentioned how the GAI is going to address these barriers, or how funding is going to be allocated in a way that is not problematic in these aspects (ineffective, quantity-focused, favoring of larger organizations, uncoordinated, donor-driven, short-term). Indeed, as a special fund based on voluntary contributions, it could be claimed that the GAI fund could be even more vulnerable to such problems.

There is also a certain lack of transparency regarding the distribution of the funds. In a brief information material from 2016, a box is included which lists the 22 “GAI countries in 2016”. These are Afghanistan, Burundi, C.A.R., Colombia, D.R.C., Iraq, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands (multicountry), Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Syria crisis (multicountry), Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, and Yemen (UN Women 2016). However, from the Multi-Partner Trust fund website for the GAI fund, only two distributions are recorded in the “Delivery Analysis”. One is to another Multi-Partner Trust fund for postconflict projects in Colombia (2,000,000 USD), and one to an instrument named “UN Women NGO Implemented Project”, which in turn records having contributed to the “ME Function of the Global Acceleration Instrument” in Burundi and Fiji (1,670,270 USD in total) (UNDP 2017).

Currently, seven UN member states have contributed to the fund: Australia, United Kingdom, Canada, Spain, Ireland, Lithuania and Liechtenstein. Australia is the largest donor, with a financial commitment of 3,053,025 USD. UK and Canada follow in contribution size. Australia has long been seen as a friend and promoter of the WPS agenda. Australia has made a strong rhetorical commitment to the agenda, aligned itself with global feminist goals to enhance the protection and political participation of women in conflict-affected regions, and has been a rhetorical supporter of a concept of global security that points out gender relations as a source of insecurity. But critical studies of Australia’s implementation of the WPS agenda have shown that the practice does not match the words, and that the Australian NAP from 2012 lacks concrete measures to ensure strong, consistent, and comprehensive action (Lee-Koo 2016). It has been argued that despite its rhetorical WPS commitments, Australia’s aid to fragile and conflict-affected states has had less of a gender equality focus than its general aid (Shepherd & True 2014, 266). The Australian NAP has also been criticized for not recognizing civil society as an asset and resource to effective implementation (ibid., 270), and for not scrutinizing the gendered impact of the own country’s peace and security institutional and policy-making processes (True 2016, 312).
The dynamics of the Australian national policies concerning WPS are in part reflected in the dynamics of the GAI fund found in this analysis, including feminist rhetoric, project funding rather than systematic structural funding, inconsistency in the inclusion of civil society, and a perspective on WPS as something happening “over there”. This suggests that the GAI fund, although “a partnership between Member States, United Nations and civil society”, is still at least in part donor-driven, or reflective of donor priorities. What is perhaps new in this regard is the donor-driven wish for feminist rhetoric. This can be seen in light of a broader development of appropriating feminism for commercial gain or enlightened self-image. Whether it is used by advertisers or governments and other institutions, it entails a subversion of feminism as a political force (Lazar 2007, 152-153).
7  Discussion on the findings

In the analysis of the main material of this thesis, we can see that some themes are recurring in the text, discourse as well as social matrix of the material. The research question for this thesis is:

*How are civil society organizations constructed in specific gendered and postcolonial ways in the discourse of the Women, Peace and Security agenda and its financing?*

With the aim of answering this question, connecting back to the theoretical entry points for this thesis, and building on the previous research in this field, the findings have been organized in four themes below. They should however be seen as interconnected and partly overlapping.

7.1  De-politicization of women’s organizations

The first theme is the de-politicization of women’s organizations. This refers to how local women’s organizations give ‘gender legitimacy’ to the ‘liberal peace’ project, as they are further involved as implementers of the WPS agenda (Basu 2016, 364). It also refers to how women’s organizations as these implementers become part of the new public management financial structure, where technocratic and institutionalized solutions to women’s equality are prioritized, and quantifiable outcomes measured within a results-based planning format are favored (Basini & Ryan 2016, 392).

In the analysis we can see that women’s innate peacefulness is underlined several times, including with the quote from the Colombian activist speaking on how women “build peace”. I have also shown how this can be seen as connected to the way that women's activism is seen, as something that is to be invested in. This creates a discourse of women’s civil society organization as non-political, and non-radical. Women’s organizations have long fought to be included in the international dialogue on peace and security, and a primary arena for this dialogue is the Security Council. Women’s organizations are now included in the discussion, but it can be argued that they are so in a very specific way, as implementers of already set-up goals. The financing of women’s CSOs is promoted, but it is through a fixed instrument with fixed goals and priorities, which can harm smaller organizations’ independence and limit the room for politically radical action. Especially when it comes to civil society action that is critical and protesting against the state or government, there is a clear dilemma within the framework of WPS. The main vehicle of national WPS implementation are the National Action Plans, which may or may not take civil society demands in consideration. Colombia does not have a
Nation Action Plan for 1325 implementation, but Burundi adopted a NAP in 2011. This specifies the role and responsibility of civil society, with specific mention of three organizations (Miller et al 2014, 87). In other national contexts, it has been argued that when the WPS agenda and the NAPs ask of the recipient state to “own” the process of developing plans even though the agenda, norms and processes are not local but international, this can misdirect the agency of women from their own priorities to the priorities of the international community (Basini & Ryan 2016, 401).

The inclusion of civil society is not necessarily effective or even benign. It has been argued that it is especially risky to fund CSOs in states without a history of voluntarism and activism where there has been a sudden proliferation of CSOs which are highly dependent on external finance. Here there is a danger that project-based funding cause organizations to be created because donors want to see them. This can distort local agendas, foster competition rather than cooperation within civil society, and thereby hamper the development of the women’s movement and a diverse and mature civil society in general (O’Neil 2016, 11).

In Liberia, it has been found that the challenges for the women’s movement actually stem from the original success of the movement. This has resulted in different organizations competing for the credit of the success story, the national government trying to appropriate the story, a mutual disappointment in the relationship between the women’s movement and international partners, and a stagnation of the women’s movement as it is stuck with a peacemaker label, unable to redefine itself to engage in other political challenges (Debusscher & Martin de Almagro 2016, 293-294).

The dilemma for feminist activists in relation to WPS of working either from ‘inside or outside the system’ is also a recurring discussion. It has been described as the “femocrat strategy” in opposition to a more fundamental feminist critique of the state system (Kirby and Shepherd 2016b, 390). It has been claimed that during the time building up to the adoption of UNSCR 1325, the women’s movement at the policy level in New York was diluted into the UN policy and bureaucratic process, which made the 1325 in the end a product of compromise, not questioning war itself (Cockburn 2007, 148). Looking at how women civil society organizations are now included in the WPS discourse, it could be argued that a similar process is occurring. The framework of WPS including the NAPs indeed “harness” the expertise of women’s organizations, but they could also become swallowed by these policy priority frameworks which are not necessarily their own. As Basini and Ryan have shown in the case of the NAPs in Liberia and Sierra Leone, they do not support substantive changes to gender equity but instead allow states to fulfil their obligations to the international community (2016, 393).

The way that the concepts of “women’s voices” and “civil society” are conflated within the WPS hegemonic discourse could be harmful to both these concepts. As Shepherd has shown, the feminization of civil society reproduces the association of women with civil society as opposed to the realm of formal politics. It also relies on essentialist assumptions of women’s capacity by virtue of their femininity, assumingly associated with pacifism and peace (Shepherd 2015, 904-905).
Improvements of the WPS agenda in terms of including women’s voices and highlighting women’s agency can be interpreted as positive for a global feminist peace movement. Women are clearly depicted as actors in the material for this study, and efforts have been made to make women the subjects of the narrative. But it also means that this movement becomes framed in a specific way, and the space to act outside of it for radical political change can diminish. The kind of civil society engagement that is deemed appropriate will adhere to international standards and preferences, not necessarily the activities most needed. One might think that since the support is directed at “local” organizations, that the agency automatically becomes genuine and fulfilled. But when the support is still framed within the specific framework of the WPS agenda, this might not increase the genuine agency. This framework excludes both calls for radical political change, resistance against international actors, and challenging of masculinity and militarism. As the role for civil society in peacebuilding is conditional upon their contribution to the liberal peace, meaning democratization, free market reform, legal reform and an anchoring in global governance (Richmond 2005, 128), a more politically radical agenda, as well as the watchdog function, is made more difficult.

7.2 Exclusion of pacifism and securitization of gender equality

The theme of de-politicizing women’s organizations is connected to a securitization of gender equality and the exclusion of pacifism in the WPS agenda. A fundamental peace perspective is ignored in the hegemonic discourse of the WPS agenda, as its militaristic perspective prevents it from condemning war, leaving the whole international security architecture intact (Cohn 2008, 198). When the agenda expands to include further areas, this also means a securitization of the issue of gender equality, and that the mainstream discourses of both development and gender equality becomes part of a security narrative. In the material of this analysis, gender equality is constructed as part of a security agenda. This can be seen as linked to the short-term perspective of the agenda which fails to include long-term perspectives on and root-causes to conflict and violence and the specific ways it affects women, the failure to include economic structures and policies in the analysis, and the reproduction of narrow and militaristic view of security.

Feminist scholars have been skeptical of the securitization concept when it comes to gender issues, since this process affects the ways in which other issues are constructed (Meger 2016, 20). The powerfulness of the security paradigm means that related issues can be overshadowed. In this way there is a risk of including certain types of “women’s activism” – involved in for example mediation – as this can crowd out other kinds of activism. On the issue of sexual and gender-based violence, it has been argued that the security paradigm has made this issue a “decoy” of feminist concerns, as it obscures rather than challenges the structures beneath this violence and social and political determinants behind its perpetration (Meger 2016, 21).
In the material for this thesis, a securitization process can also be seen in the inclusion of humanitarian action in the GAI fund’s activities. Firstly, this places humanitarian work in the realm of peace and security, which can be seen as controversial because of the importance of neutrality of humanitarian actors. Secondly, it seems to shift the narrative away from the mission of the fund – to enhance women’s engagement in peace processes. It is unclear how the example of the cash for work-program in Za’tari enhances this engagement. With the level of women’s actual engagement in formal peace processes being so low (between 1992 and 2011 only nine per cent of negotiators in major peace processes were women (Coomaraswamy 2015, 14), it could be risky to include another operative goal (that of supporting women in humanitarian settings) to this particular fund. This should also be seen in the context of the humanitarian financial needs being larger than ever before. As of March 2017, the financial requirement to meet humanitarian needs was estimated at 22.8 billion USD. The humanitarian appeals are funded at 2.7 billion USD, leaving a shortfall of 20.1 billion. (UN OCHA 2017). By including humanitarian action in a peace and security narrative, the “one size fits all” construction of “women’s empowerment” that is the main narrative of the material, has to fit an even wider range of sizes.

Securitization of gender equality is also made with the imaging of the male and female uniformed military in the video, as the inclusion of women is framed within a militaristic practice. The WPS goal of including more women in armed and police forces has been a criticized one, especially from the anti-militaristic women’s peace movement. This narrative is thus not a new one, but a continuation of a problematic dynamic which has been in the WPS agenda since its inception. In addition to instrumentalizing the inclusion of women, it has been criticized for not addressing neither the problematic masculinity norms within peacekeeping forces, nor the racialized hierarchy which the relation between “international peacekeepers” and local civilians create (Pratt 2013, 776).

The securitization aspects of the WPS agenda are connected to the consequences for economic and social policies. As Hudson has argued, securitization is not merely a symbolic or linguistic act, but a political one with real world implications. Securitization affects the possibilities for what is seen as a legitimate use of force and the ability of the state to take special powers, but it also substantially affects where the state’s resources go. The human security discourse has been one way of securitizing the issue of women’s rights, and has been used in this strategic way (Hudson, N. 2007, 7-8). However, including women’s rights in the security paradigm in this way can also be risky, as the rights agenda may adapt to the security agenda. The UNSCR 1325 has been summarized as fitting comfortably into the concepts and practices of the Security Council, and the paradigm of states defending state security through military means. To let some women into decision-making positions is a small price to pay for leaving this war system essentially undisturbed (Cohn cited in Cockburn 2007, 148).
7.3 Exclusion of gender structures as root-causes to violence and conflict

The third theme is the exclusion of gender structures as root-causes to violence and conflict. The WPS agenda has a history of lacking in addressing root-causes to sexual violence, such as the social structures of gender inequality, economic impoverishment and lack of opportunity (True 2015, 421). The constructions and financing of women’s organizations can be interpreted through this process of failing to address equality in access to social and economic resources in post-conflict societies.

The ignorance of root-causes to violence in this material is linked to a lack of criticism of hierachical gender relations, violent and militarized masculinity and how this is connected to political economy. Looking at the exclusion of gender structures, we can connect it to the general exclusion of masculinity as a central concept in the WPS agenda. In the GAI material the only mentioning of some kind of masculinity norm connected to militarism is by the Colombian activist Bibiana Penaranda, when she says: “Men build peace with weapons, with a uniform, with vertical power. Women are telling men there are other ways to relate to each other, there are other ways to solve conflicts”. The actual processes and projects that are being portrayed in the video do not seem to challenge the fundamental connections between masculinity and violence, or masculinity and militarism. This echoes the UN peacekeeping discourse as a whole, which has been found to not include a discussion of militarized masculinities at all (Cockburn 2007, 149).

As have been shown in the context of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), there is an important overlooked relationship between the structures of gender hierarchy and international political economy, which connects to the widespread use of SGBV (Meger 2015, 416). In DRC, the violence against women is connected to the “international violence of the global political economy” (ibid, 429). In the presentation of the WPS agenda in the GAI material however, political and economical drivers of conflict are not mentioned. As True has argued (2012, 159), to realize the deed and not just the text of UNSCR 1325, the underlying structures of socioeconomic inequality must be addressed. For this to happen, a politically independent civil society and women’s movement, which can advocate for structural economic reform, is key. As have been shown in the case of Liberia, “the international gaze” on the women’s movement have to be broadened, so that efforts can be put into professionalize and develop the capacity of civil society organizations beyond peacemaking and crisis-prevention. This will enable them to participate in the international arena and hold the government accountable (Debusscher & Martin de Almagro 2016, 312).

The discourse that is reproduced by the GAI material places focus on women’s participation and agency, but the root-causes that can hinder such participation is not present in the narrative. Despite the previously prominent place of issues of sexual and gender based violence in the WPS agenda, these issues are not included here. This reflects a problematic dichotomy in the WPS agenda, where women are either peace-making agents, or sexual victims. The analysis is not deepened to
include explanations on how SGBV can be the very thing obstructing women from being active participants in society. Neither is the link made to more structural economic change, which affects both the level of SGBV and women’s political participation. Women’s participation is instead constructed as a tool in itself, with potential high yields for investors.

7.4 Localization of conflict and civil society

The localization of women in conflict can be seen as a discursive process that both de-politicizes conflict and the work of women’s organizations, and obscures root-causes to conflict. Hudson has written on this subject: “Since the causes of conflict, state fragility or underdevelopment are constructed as a domestic problem and not sought in an unjust global political economy or specific historical context, intervention is stripped of its political underpinnings” (Hudson, H. 2012, 447). The construction of conflict as a domestic problem can be found in the GAI promotional video. We do not get to see anything of the causes of the conflicts portrayed in the video, and not even when it portrays refugees living in another country than their own are any international relations acknowledged.

From a postcolonial perspective this construct is perhaps not that surprising, as the WPS agenda has been subject to this kind of criticism before (see for example Pratt 2013, Shepherd 2015, Basu 2016). The ‘international’ is only present as an upholder of peace, human rights, and gender equality, and the conflict in question is seen a domestic problem. Though this narrative may seem outdated I believe that the feminist discourse, that is present in the material and which is now to a larger extent included in the hegemonic WPS agenda, offers a sort of alibi to keep this postcolonial view on conflict. The main narrative becomes that of “women’s empowerment”, which can conceal the fact that no power relations are actually questioned, neither on an individual level, a symbolic level nor a structural level, to speak with Harding’s concepts (Harding 1986).

The universalization of “women” is a linked process. When the contextual conditions of women are not specified, the power dynamics that work through intersecting power relations are overlooked. This has for long been a critique from postcolonial feminists, as it erases material and ideological power inequalities (Mohanty 2003, 116). Postcolonial feminists instead look at the complexity of power relations and overlapping identity constructions of race, gender, class and culture in specific historical and geographical contexts (Hudson, H. 2012, 447). I argue that this perspective is excluded from the hegemonic discourse of the GAI fund and the WPS agenda.

The discourse of localization can also be problematic in that it can convey a false sense of local decision-making and bottom-up approach. The subcontracting of peace activities to private actors can mask the tendency to represent international rather than local consensus (Richmond 2005, 133). The overall agenda which is to be implemented does not necessarily reflect the priorities of the local organizations. The “investment” which is being made is intended to reach the goals of that
agenda, which can then clash with the needs and wants of the receivers of such investments.

Although the discourse seems to have altered somewhat from a previous construction of Global South actors as passive recipients (Basu 2016), the localization discourse risks constructing women’s organizations as local service providers rather than watchdogs and political agents of change. This has been shown to happen before in the Balkans (Irvine 2013) as well in Rwanda (Björkdahl and Selimovic, 2015). Constructing women’s organizations as inherently ‘local’ can also be a lost opportunity in the way that it can undermine the potential of transnational and global networks of the women’s movement. It has been shown that the network power of the transnational feminist movement has been instrumental in the diffusion of gender mainstreaming, bringing the issues of gender equality to the agenda (True and Mintrom, 2001).
8 Concluding remarks

The four main themes of discursive processes described above are all linked to each other and to gendered and postcolonial constructs within the hegemonic discourse of WPS. Seeing – with Fairclough’s words – discourse as both constituted and constitutive, there is a relation between the social contexts of women’s civil society organizations, and the language that is used around them in the WPS field. The social context is characterized by scarce funding, and resources allocations have to be build up by a certain rationale. This rationale – this narrative – is marked by discursive constructions with gendered and postcolonial aspects. This narrative then in part sets the framework for the financing of women’s civil society organizations – meaning that the discourse constitutes the social.

I argue that there is a level of interdiscursivity in the material, signaling change in power relations. The feminist discourse and narrative of women’s agency is a new one to the peace and security arena, which has previously mainly included women in instrumental ways in peacekeeping activities, or included them as victims. Following feminist CDA in focusing on the contestability of gender ideology and tensions in discourse, we can see this as a new kind of inclusion of gender issues in the discursive terrain, focusing on women’s organizing and participation.

However, by critically examining this inclusion we can see that this also entails problematic processes, from a postcolonial, gender and feminist political economy perspective. These processes echo the critique which feminist scholars have previously aimed at the agenda. I argue that constructions of the “Third World Woman” are still prevalent in the discourse. The perspective of the marginalized should not be forgotten, meaning that the long-term goal is not necessarily a full implementation of WPS, but rather a fulfilment of the goals of local women’s organizations. It must be acknowledged that these are not automatically synonymous.

The case of GAI should be viewed in a larger perspective of how development aid functions, in terms of new public management-style reporting, short-term financing, and implementation through CSOs rather than the build-up of state functions. I argue that gender equality and women’s organizations create a narrative, an alibi for the continuation of this paradigm. The GAI fund is an example of this, as the fund too consists of short-term project financing which is voluntary and volatile. The fund can be argued to have good intentions, as does the ambition of increased funding to the WPS agenda. The fund is trying to address a very real problem of ignoring both women and the civil society in peace and security activities. However, when this plays out in the context of new public management, the messaging is simplified to answer to donor demands. And it is simplified in a way that plays into postcolonial and gender stereotypical constructs,
leading to processes of de-politicization, localization, securitization of gender equality issues, and exclusion of gender structures as root-causes to violence.

It can be argued that the GAI fund is not addressing the problem with unpredictable and volatile funding, since it is short-term, project-based and voluntary. It is telling that in the Security Council Open Debate, the donors to this fund avoid mentioning the 15 percent earmarking of all funds to programs that address the needs of women and girls, that was a call made by the then Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon (United Nations Security Council 2016, 3). The gendered constructs in the material can in this sense be seen as connected to the failure of the international community to genuinely address gender equality issues, with robust resources and across-the-board representation. The GAI fund is still an add-on in this sense, only with a feminist narrative.

What is then lacking is a more structural challenging of the peace and security agenda as a whole, and socio-economic reforms that could be beneficial to women’s empowerment and a strengthened gender equality long-term. Heidi Hudson refers to the “inadequacy of universalist tools to address complexities at the ground level” (Hudson, H. 2012, 454). While this is still true, when international donors support women’s organizations this problem is in part concealed by the discursive construction of empowerment of the universal “woman”, which has both postcolonial and gendered problems.

The women’s movement has been an important part of the WPS agenda since the adoption of its first resolution. When financing of women’s organizations in conflict areas is now promoted by the agenda, the movement has to be aware of the potential limitations that this might entail. As we have seen, pooled funding should be seen as a part of the aid effectiveness agenda which to some extent is always donor-driven. It might not be beneficial in the long term for politically radical or government-critical organizations to become part of such an agenda. Even though the GAI fund could be said to represent some of the most progressive work on peace and security of the UN, the harnessing of feminists’ expertise and the investment in their activism might still be more benefit to the hegemonic security paradigm than to the feminist movement.

This thesis has focused on the discourse of the WPS agenda. As the projects financed by the GAI fund start being approved, implemented, reviewed and evaluated, this offers an opportunity for valuable further research.
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Appendix I: Transcription of the GAI Launch video

(Name and text signs in cursive.)

Text sign:  Accelerating Impact: women preventing conflict and building peace

Anwarul Chowdhury - former ambassador to the UN, Bangladesh
“Equality between women and men is inextricably linked to peace and security.”

Yasmin Sooka, Executive Director, Foundation for Human Rights (South Africa)
“What we need is sustainable peace, and for sustainable peace you need the voices of women”

Sharon Baghwan Rolls, Co-founder, FemLINKPacific (Fiji)
“If women aren’t involved, if girls and young women aren’t involved in defining their peace and security, there will be no peace”

[No name sign]
“Those of us who are in the forefront of the work are invited back here, but when it comes to actual doing you don’t find it, when it comes to funding for their work you don’t find it, when it comes to holding governments accountable [difficult to hear] don’t also find those things happening”

Sharon Baghwan Rolls, Co-founder, FemLINKPacific (Fiji):
“What hasn’t changed is the lack of resourcing. Investing in women’s activism for peace and security.”

Youssef Mahmoud, Senior Advisor, International Peace Institute
“If you exclude more than half of the population in defining the problem, and prescribing the solution, you’re not gonna have stability”

[No name sign]
“Wherever there is war and violence women exist, women have things to tell us, and systematic structured engagement of women should be standard practice in any international engagement in a conflict area.”

Text signs:
In 2012, Colombia’s President Santos announced formal discussions with FARC in an attempt to end decades of internal armed conflict.
Women campaigned tirelessly to be represented in the peace process.
Bibiana Penaranda was one of these women.

Subtitles:  “One of women’s achievements has been the creation of the commission or sub-commission on gender.”
“This is the result of pressure by women’s organizations at the local and national level.”
“Being present, speaking up and having our own voice as women…”
“If the government truly sits down with all organizations to hear the voices of women, the voices of indigenous communities, with the voices of the Afro-Colombian communities, If the government does this, I believe we can have a nation in peace.”

“A big contribution of women is the way in which we build peace. Men build peace with weapons, with a uniform, with vertical power. Women are telling men there are other ways to relate to each other, there are other ways to solve conflicts.”

In Burundi, political and electoral conflicts have led to violent confrontations, and the displacement of thousands. Networks of women mediators work to diffuse tensions and bring opposing factions together to foster peaceful dialogue.

Béatrice Nzeyimana, Mediator / Rutana
Subtitles: “My role, like all other women mediators, is to build peace among our communities. We do so by building peace within families and then expand it to the rest of the community.”

Léocadie NDIKUMANA, Mediator / Rutana
Subtitles: “All sorts of people turn to us for support. Many children come, sometimes because they have been victims of child abuse. We also aim to defend and protect the rights of women. They are the ones who call upon us most of the time and we make sure we support them the best we can. Today, even men come to us and increasingly trust us with their problems.”

Béatrice Nzeyimana, Mediator / Rutana
Subtitles: “It was during the electoral period that political conflicts erupted. During this time, there was a high level of mistrust between political party members”

Jean De Dieu NIYONKURU, Socio-Cultural Advisor to the Governor/Rutana:
Subtitles: “Women mediators have supported us to organize dialogues involving all political parties from our province. It successfully countered rumors and strengthened social cohesion.”

Léocadie NDIKUMANA, Mediator / Rutana
“What makes me really proud is that community members value us because they entrust their problems to us and we solve them in an impartial manner. Given the sensitive context of Burundi at present, this initiative further empowers women as leaders.”

Text signs:
The Za‘tari refugee camp in Jordan is home to 80,000 Syrians, 80% of which are women and children [sic]

Caravan home, Za‘tari refugee camp

Yusra, Centre Administrator, Cash for Work Beneficiary
Subtitles: “My name is Yusra, I am originally from Daraa. Things got really difficult in the village we were staying in. We found that the only solution was to come to Jordan. So we came here. But in the beginning we faced a lot of hardship. My children had a hard time adjusting.
They kept asking to go back to Syria. The only difference was that, here, we could sleep without bombardment. For a year, our situation remained difficult until I found a cash for work opportunity through UN Women.

Text signs:
*UN Women runs three Oases in Za’atari camp, safe spaces for women and girls.*
*UN Women’s centres support over 10,000 women and children.*

Walaa, Jewelry Maker, Cash for Work Beneficiary

Subtitles: “Because I am the oldest in my family, I felt a responsibility because there was no one earning an income for us. Before I came to the centre I was in a very difficult emotional state. I felt lonely and sad, as I didn’t leave home. I felt constrained, pacing from one window to the other as if I was in prison. But when I got the opportunity to work at the “Women and Girls Oasis,” I met new people and I learned a new skill at the jewelry workshop which will benefit me in the future.”

Text sign:
*Accelerating Impact: women preventing conflict and building peace*
Appendix II: Screenshots from GAI Launch video

Screenshot number 1:

Screenshot number 2:

The following are the references in the Open Debate to the *Global Acceleration Instrument for Women and Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action*. They are selected quotes from the Open Debate, not the statements in their entirety.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon: “I call on members to earmark a minimum of 15 per cent of funding on peace and security to programmes that address the needs of women and girls, and to make full use of the new pooled fund that was created to channel more resources to women’s organizations working for peace.” (p. 3)

UN Women Executive Director Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcukva: “UN-Women is already responding to many of the findings and recommendations of the global study and the appeal issued in resolution 2242 (2015). We are serving as the secretariat for key new mechanisms, such as the Council’s new Informal Expert Group on Women and Peace and Security and the Global Acceleration Instrument for Women and Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action.” (p. 4)

Spain: “Fifthly, we must all make greater efforts in financing. We have earmarked €1 million of the 2016 budget to support exceptional instruments, such as the Global Acceleration Instrument for Women and Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action, and to strengthen certain capabilities, particularly the gender units within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations or the Department of Political Affairs.” (p. 8)

United Kingdom: “Finally, an increase in our ambitions for women and peace and security should be matched by an increase in the financing underpinning it. That includes more support for the Global Acceleration Instrument for Women and Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action (GAI), and for UN-Women and civil society. It means making our development spending gender sensitive, something that the United Kingdom continually strives for. And in the most basic terms, it means increasing our spending on projects related to women and peace and security. The United Kingdom has increased its spending by more than 50 per cent, to $10 million in this financial year, including $1 million for the GAI, and I hope others will do the same. But in conclusion, we need something more than money. We need leaders — leaders like Rita Lopidia.” (p. 27)

Kazakhstan: “We commend the ongoing mechanisms set in place after the 2015 high-level review panels on peacekeeping and peacebuilding and the 15-year review of resolution 1325 (2000), which powerfully highlighted the women and peace and security agenda. Notable among these mechanisms are the Security Council’s new Informal Expert Group, the Global Acceleration Instrument for Women and Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action, the network of women and peace and security national focal points and the Peacebuilding Commission’s gender strategy.” (p. 38)
Australia: “By harnessing the expertise of civil society organizations on the ground we can be more effective in our efforts to remove barriers and create meaningful opportunities for women to engage equally in all stages of peace processes. Civil society groups represent those whose lived experience is most relevant. In most instances, they existed before the conflict and they will exist after it. That is why Australia, working with partners, established the Global Acceleration Instrument for Women and Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action (GAI). The GAI helps women’s civil society organizations to contribute to conflict prevention, crisis response, and peacebuilding. We encourage other Member States to support that practical mechanism.” (p. 58)

Ireland: “Finally and crucially, with regard to civil society organizations, those on the front lines of the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda are often those most in need of support. Ireland has contributed almost $500,000 to the Global Acceleration Instrument for Women and Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action since its launch last February, and we encourage other donors to support this civil society organization-driven fund. When we speak at next year’s debate, we hope to be able to point to even greater progress within the frameworks of peace and security, all with the women and peace and security agenda at the core.” (p. 51)

Canada: “Recognizing that Member States and regional organizations are influential actors in the implementation of all women and peace and security resolutions, the Group emphasizes the importance of national action plans, with appropriate resourcing, monitoring and civil-society consultation. The Group welcomes the establishment, led by Spain, of the women and peace and security national focal point network, which will periodically share and exchange lessons learned and best practices. The Group also welcomes the establishment of the Global Acceleration Instrument as one avenue to attract resources, coordinate responses and accelerate implementation.” (p. 53)

Bangladesh: “The inherent resilience of our women gives us the conviction that women themselves have the capacity to act as agents of change in the face of the humanitarian consequences from which they disproportionately suffer in different situations. We feel encouraged to see that notion gaining traction in the humanitarian discourse. The mandate of the Global Acceleration Instrument for Women and Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action has the potential to support a further demonstration to that effect in response to specific needs in conflict and post-conflict settings.” (p. 60)

Guatemala: “Moreover, we acknowledge the contribution of mechanisms, such as the Global Acceleration Instrument for Women and Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action, together with additional existing mechanisms, as a way not only to raise resources, but to coordinate responses and accelerate implementation. The participation of women is essential to ensuring operational effectiveness and ensure sustainable peace. The concept of sustainable peace is very important, as Ambassador Rosenthal mentions in his report (S/2015/490).” (p. 63)

Botswana: “We consider today’s open debate to be of the utmost importance to assessing the progress made following the 2015 global study on the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), the 2015 report of the Secretary-General on women and peace and security (S/2015/716), and the adoption of the Global Acceleration Instrument for Women and Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action. In that regard, Botswana welcomes the adoption of the Global Acceleration Instrument, which aims at accelerating the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda by building capacity and increasing funding for women’s
participation, leadership and empowerment, as well as humanitarian action. We are pleased that although the Global Acceleration Instrument is still in its infancy, women mediators in some conflict-affected countries have been involved in conflict prevention and resolution efforts. The outcomes of such efforts have been encouraging. Given the positive outcomes of the Global Acceleration Instrument, we appeal to Member States and civil society organizations to support that noble initiative.” (p. 74)