Concept, Space, Home:

A Conceptual History of Social Space, Functionalist Homes, and the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930

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Abstract:
The field of Conceptual History is often criticized for considering only a small slice of the historical vocabulary it intends to historicize. What about the discourse of the silenced, working at home, robbed of a pen? Concepts are indicative of many contexts of meaning: in this thesis, therefore, propelled by the foregoing question and statement, it is argued that the main protagonist of German, conceptual history, i.e. Reinhart Koselleck, in theorizing time, temporality, and the nature of historical times, and writing from within the temporalizing tradition (Heidegger, Gadamer) he is famous for having elucidated, that Koselleck, in failing to integrate the material-semiotic category of “space”, a category adding phenomenological depth to a field (i.e. conceptual history) that is said to thrive in it, that Koselleck ultimately limited the (otherwise far-reaching) scope of his pluralizing, conceptual history. Following an introductory chapter, therefore, i.e. a short chapter wherein the subject-matter, research-material, and delimitations are adequately charted, this thesis – with the help of the “Neo-Marxist” philosophy of Henri Lefebvre – proceeds hypothetically by assembling a methodology capable of accounting for the production and preservation of concepts in social space. This chapter constituting a “Theory and Method”, by incorporating a broader range of conceptual sources – architecture, street-corners, urban landscapes, bodily practices – the field of conceptual history is aligned with the vocabulary of the “spatial turn”. Armed with a methodology of space, time, and concepts, a method capable of deciphering their dialectic interactions, this thesis proceeds by asking the question of its main theme: what is the history of the concept of “Home”? Constitutive of a “Background”, this question, granted the space of a second chapter, results in a schematizing history of Westernized dwellings, the history thus sketched being both plural, diachronic, and comprehensively onomasiological. But these two chapters – the “Background” commencing with the feudal word Heim, tracing its conceptual embellishments, transfers, and intensifications up until the end of the nineteenth-century – are only preparatory, the “Main Analysis” being a “case-study” on the Swedish concept of “Home” as it was used, lived, and contested during the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930 (as a vivacious demonstration of Functionalism and its architectural interpretation of “modern homes”). The common thread of this thesis being “a conceptual history of ‘Home’”, its purpose is thus threefold, the text being divided into three, main chapters, each chapter dealing with a separate research-question: what is the relation between “concepts” and “space” (the “Theory and Method”)?; what is the history of the concept of “Home” (the “Background”)?; and how was this history translated into and contested by the socio-political, conceptual context of the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930 (the “Main Analysis”)? Consequently, this thesis intends to kill two (or three) birds with one stone, the conceptual history of “Home” being unique in its conceptual emphasis, and the analysis of the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930 being unique in that it pins down the semantic economy (and self-understanding) of a context never analyzed in the manner indicated. A concluding “Conclusion” summarizes the findings, among them the possibility of a second Sattelzeit, a “modern modernity”, this thesis bordering the scholarship of what it means to be “modern”.
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1. Introduction, or “at Home”

“Dwelling, in the proper sense, is now impossible […] it is part of morality not be at home in one’s home”1 – Theodor Adorno

“It does not seem to me, Austerlitz added, that we understand the laws governing the return of the past, but I feel more and more as if time did not exist at all, only various spaces interlocking according to the rules of a higher form of stereometry, between which the living and the dead can move back and forth as they like.”2 – W. G. Sebald

“I’m coming home / I’m coming home / Tell the world I’m coming home / Let the rain wash away all the pain of yesterday / I know my kingdom awaits and they’ve forgiven all my mistakes / I’m coming home, I’m coming home”3 – Sean Combs (alias Diddy)

It is my assumption that “introductions” are often crafted (or finalized) at the very end of a scholarly project, when the questions have already been answered and re-defined, and when the “heart of the matter” is no longer obscured, veiled by archives not yet explored; since nothing is ever “in order”, however, and I am here allowing my assumption to sprout, and since “introductions” are meant to constitute such an order, the “knowing-the-answers” of the introduction is also a “knowing-the-non-answers” of the conclusion – the beginning of visibility is also the border of its dissolution, that of a mistiness residing “outside” the models of one’s reasoning: an abstract (but quietly familiar) structure, i.e. a “Home”, built upon the foundation of questions both answered and unanswerable, the borders of knowledge not being threatening as such, but only where it has fissures and cracks, forgetfulness and slothfulness, where the “outside” is penetrating the walls of discourse, and where the negations of “Time” are parasitizing on the affirmative processes of “Space”. Pursuing this analogy to its very end, the “introduction” – and I am here being overly hypothetical – is safeguarding the gate of the text, transforming into an aspect of the edge, defending it, perhaps embellishing it (“State your purpose!” engraved on the semi-circular archivolt of the heavy door, a tympanum ornamented with promising signs of figurative life), inviting the reader – already reading – to knock, to eavesdrop, to peek, the author standing on the other side, “at Home”, in the lit-up rooms of a well-built structure, the homey light – hearth, electricity? – fading into the wavelike haze of an undefined “outside”, the light escaping from the windows of allowance, windows that are themselves escaping, running away from the unmistakable movement of a by-passing train of

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thought. “Out there”, perhaps, in a world of uncertainty, every thought is “homeless”, looking for a place of surviving reflection, a book, a paper, or a note on the refrigerator, a “field-of-care”, or a text, an artifact of the mind, alarming survivors of life and death, outliving both, as if all writing – looking for a “Home” – inevitably had to be “homeless”. The “introduction” – perhaps conscious of this paradox – is a “writing home”, a memory and a plan, i.e. a “letting go”, the finishing touches on “becoming Self”; and with that hypothetical opening, the “introduction” of this thesis has been introduced.

If the preceding analogy is deemed “trivial” (and I would agree with such sentiments), then I have succeeded in emitting the dual nature of the protagonist of this study, namely, the concept of “Home”, a word both trivial and potent, embellished and intensified, ossified and fossilized, referring not only to a representational space of intimacy and comfort, but also to the metaphorical yearnings of a modern (and western) self-understanding, i.e. the “Tell the world I’m coming home” of a liberal subject in the making. As “space” and as “concept”, “Home” is both familiar and compelling, as are all acts of “returning Home”, whether spiritual or “in the everyday” – following a tedious day at work, for example, or a year-long hike in the unfolding mountains of the Himalayas. Trivial and potent, therefore, the concept of “Home” – and its field of connotations – has coalesced into an important aspect of the positioning of one’s western, modern Self: a state of being in the world, the concept of “Home” – just like the concepts of “Crisis” and “Revolution” – splits our emotional vocabulary into a game of zeroes and ones, “homelessness” and “at Home”-ness. In the global flux of a spinning reality, even the most advantageous of “Childhood-homes” – the nature of “advantageousness” being historical – requires a therapeutic questioning: “What places do I call ‘Home’, and if I have no ‘Home’, how do I find one?” With devastating causes and effects, for many, “Home” is something that must be left behind, something that must be overcome; if the future of this present is to believe the words of our journalists, we are now living in a world of “Crises” and “homelessness”, the only certainty – in a world of unhappy uncertainties – being that all humans – rightly so – deserve a decent, functioning “Home”. But “Homes” are never standing alone, just like “loneliness” could never be a “Home”: as implied, most of us are living in a complex network of entangled “Homes”, a network of spaces interlocked, penetrated by the borders of social space lived – one of my own “Homes”, for example, that of Sweden-as-a-Nation, a space of collectivity colored by the socio-political sentiments of the “People’s Home”, the “Home” I call “Sweden” is penetrating the three-dimensional depth (the comfort and intimacy of my well-being) of two other spaces called “Home”: first, that of my “Childhood”, and second, that of my homey presence. So what is “Home”? A space? A
concept? If “Home” is both a space and a concept, then what is “space”, and what is a “concept”? What type of “space” is “Home”, and what type of “concept” is “Home”? And lastly, what is the nature of the relation – if any – between all these notions, i.e. “space”, “concept”, and “Home”?

In this thesis, finally, propelled by the spiraling thinking of the preceding paragraphs, I thus ask the question of the relation between “space”, “concepts”, and “Home”, my primary field of enquiry being that of German, conceptual history, a field – most commonly associated with Reinhart Koselleck – not only concerned with the semantic trajectory of a European, socio-political vocabulary, but also the social histories of its users, i.e. the socio-phenomenological experiences of futures, pasts, and presents. The writings of Koselleck – having captivated more than one historical imagination – provide an explanatory framework not only for the problem of “concepts”, but also for the problem of “Time”, the German historian, influenced by the philosophy of Heidegger and Gadamer, nevertheless – and due to his “fascination” with “Time” – leaving gaps that the following study is meant to “fill”. By “filling”, I am simply referring to the notion of “space” (what better “filler” could one ask for?), my understanding of this (analytical) notion in large part resting on the theory and method of Henri Lefebvre, a French philosopher from whom I draw heavily in my methodology. Be that as it may, I am not only interested in the theory and method of conceptual history; enthused by my discussion on “space”, “concepts”, and “time”, I ask: what is the conceptual history of “Home”? With my “knowledge” of the Swedish language – Sweden being my “Home-country”, and conceptual historians being spread out on a diverse field of languages and cultures; my “knowledge” of the Swedish language should thus not be overstated – I travel from a schematized Europe into the wooden synchronicity of a Swedish inter-war summer, the point of which is to do a case-study on the spatially oriented conceptual history proposed. Of course, although its conceptual quality has escaped conceptual historians, “Homes” have been studied at great length and in many fields, e.g. Anthropology, Economics, Gender Studies, and Comparative Literature, the point of this thesis – its justification discussed below – not being a discovery of things forgotten; indeed, this thesis resides in a living City of Texts, an urban sprawl ever growing, a City accommodating both “Homes” and “concepts” (but never the concept of “Home”), my ambition simply being to add to this sprawl, connect the dots, construct an intersection, my discussion on “Space” – I hope – shedding new light on things both familiar and compelling, trivial and potent. In the following “introduction”, then, I intend to clarify how, why, and where.
1.1 Research objective: purpose, questions, structure

The common thread of this thesis being “a conceptual history of ‘Home’”, its purpose is threefold, the text therefore being divided into three, main chapters, each chapter dealing with a separate research-question (asked below). First, and as mentioned, since within the very productive field of conceptual history – to which the following is a contribution – attention is most often directed towards the temporal dimension of conceptual use, I ask whether “space” (however this notion is interpreted) is a useful category for analyzing (diachronically) socio-political, conceptual experience; second, since my intention is to apply – as a method – the preceding discussion on “space”, and since the concept of “Home” – its conceptual status being investigated, not assumed – carries spatial implications (and meaning), I sketch a conceptual history of “Home”, my study covering Europe in general and Sweden (as well as England) in particular (the Europeanized perspective being criticized accordingly); third, and last, applying a synchronic approach (rather than diachronic), and informed by my preceding findings, including those of my methodology, I do a “case-study” on the concept of “Home”, the context investigated being that of the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930. Condensing these intentions into a set of research-questions, my hope is that their solutions – taken together – are constitutive of a conceptual history of “Home”.

- the conceptual history of Koselleck emphasizing “time” and “temporality”, within this field of historical research, how should one understand the relation (analytical or other) between “concepts” and “space”, and would such an understanding be of any value (methodologically speaking)?;
- what is the history (or “histories”) of the spatial concept of “Home”;
- and finally, how was this, plural history translated into and contested by the socio-political, conceptual context of the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930?

From these research-questions emerges a recognizable thesis-structure: if the first question represents the “Theory and Method” of this thesis, and if the second question represents the “Background”, then the last question – that of the Swedish exhibition on housing and functionalism – represents the “Main Analysis”. Of course, typically, in thesis-works, methodological chapters are not introduced with a separate research-question, the same “rule of conduct” being true for historiographical “Backgrounds”; my methodology being untried, however, and the machinery of this methodology being assembled in my “Theory and Method”-
chapter, each of these questions – together constituting a “conceptual history of Home” – will generate a distinct, *historical thesis* (supportive of the other two), my ambition being threefold yet singularized, the first question, for example, in regards to its philosophical content, requiring a far-reaching, investigative discussion. As a contribution to the discipline of the history of ideas, I thus intend to theorize a “new” methodology capable of producing a “new” historical thesis, my “Main Analysis” (i.e. the third question) depending (analytically) on a generous method and background. If it seems odd that the method and background is here turned into separate research-questions, then I can only justify this structure by referencing the knowledge therein produced, presented, and hypothetically gathered. More specifically, then, in the following chapter, that of my methodology, I intend to systematize the theoretical and methodological vocabulary of Koselleck, thus allowing me to critically apply his thinking on the history of the concept of “Home”. Moreover, as mentioned, in the same chapter, by vocalizing an open-ended perspective on the writings of Koselleck, I intend to expand on the temporalizing vocabulary of conceptual history, primarily by referencing the notion of “social space” as theorized in the “neo-Marxist” philosophy of Henri Lefebvre. In sum, then, in this chapter, my ambition is to align the impressive undertaking of conceptual history with what has “recently” been called the “spatial turn”, an alignment – lacking in predecessors – that is hopefully as thought-provoking as it is suggestive. The notion of “space” being as difficult to grasp (theoretically) as it is easy to “be in” (as an inescapable dimension of life), I will allow this chapter to be extensive, one of the purposes of this thesis – again – being to adequately explore the relation between “concepts” and “space”. By “adequate”, I nevertheless do not mean “philosophical disclosure”, the main objective here being to provide the following two chapters with a productive method (which is why most of my examples on the theoretical vocabulary of Koselleck and Lefebvre stay true to the theme of “Home”). Naturally so, in the end, I argue that an understanding of “concepts” is incomplete without an understanding of “space” (and vice versa); since I work hypothetically, moreover, opening rather than closing, in the best of worlds, this chapter would prove the value of further investigating the relation between “concepts” and “space”.

The hypothetical nature of my reasoning is true for all arguments here offered; if there are reasons for correcting my narrative, then I would be happy to be corrected. In my general history of the concept of “Home”, informed by my methodology of “space” and “concepts”, I attempt a Koselleckian, conceptual history (albeit modified), my area of inquiry – beginning in feudality and ending only in the nineteenth-century – being that of a transforming, “revolutionary” Europe (for reasons perhaps excusable, in this chapter, I rely on
secondary sources, a point to which I return below). Lastly, in the subsequent chapter, i.e. my “Main Analysis”, before summarizing my findings in a concluding “Conclusion” (chapter 5.), I limit my investigation to the conceptual structure of “modern Homes”, and even more specifically, to the concept of “Home” as it was debated during the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930. An energetic demonstration of “functionalist” architecture and its well-faring visions of the future, the Exhibition of 1930 – raised on the verdant banks of Djurgården, one of the many summer-islands of Stockholm – introduced the unwary, Lutheran Swedes to a modern mode of organizing their homes. Hence my reason for choosing this context: the plural voices of the Exhibition – ranging from urban planners to domestic housewives – both negated and preserved the history of the concept of “Home” (as sketched in my “Background”), producing a tension that I intend to delineate and entangle; in many ways, therefore, the “Main Analysis” takes off where I left the general history of the concept of “Home”, the “Background” serving its purpose well, preparing the grounds for an analysis of a modernizing modernity. Be that as it may, in this thesis, I am doing conceptual history, not political history (nor museology), my reliance on (and analyses of) “contexts” being limited, reduced to my interests as a conceptual historian. Moreover, in my “Main Analysis”, since my intention is here to dig deep into the textual (and pictorial) archeology of a transforming history, I rely on contemporary newspapers, journals, photographs, and floor-plans, one of the ambitions of this thesis being to bring new, conceptual sources into play: architecture, street-corners, urban landscapes, non-verbal imaging, “natural” events and habitats, bodily practices, and the spatial action of groups or individuals (street-art, festivals, etc.). Even though – in this, last chapter – my findings are very specific to the Swedish context studied, my hope is to raise questions regarding the very meaning of “Modernity”, “Home” – I suspect – resting at the core of modern, conceptual discourse. But these are topics that must now be deferred, each of the notions here referred to – “Space”, “Time”, “Modernity”, “Home”, “concepts”, “modernization” – having their place in the chapters to come. In sum, then, divided into three chapters, my threefold ambition is to craft a conceptual history of “Home”, my hope not only being to demonstrate the importance of considering “space” in processes of conceptual change, but also to demonstrate the amorphous, ubiquitous, and conceptual quality of the word referring to our beloved dwellings.

Clearly, the three chapters are interconnected, each chapter supporting the next, and the concept of “Home” dwelling at the center; if the reader is only interested in one of these

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questions, however, e.g. the history of the concept of “Home”, or the writings of Koselleck, or the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930, it is possible (but not advised) to read the chapters separately, each chapter – due to their respective length – having a proper introduction and conclusion. Furthermore, if the methodological chapter is more philosophical and less historical, the contrary is true for the remaining chapters, this thesis – after all – being a contribution to the discipline of the history of ideas. Finally, and again, it must be noted that I am not the first – nor the last – to write a thesis (or paper, or book) on the topic of “Homes” and/or “concepts”; the same is true for the Stockholm-Exhibition of 1930, a vivacious display of Swedish modernism (political, social, aesthetic), and of undisputed interest to all scholars of Swedish modernity. Before addressing my research-questions, therefore, I must now review the literature dealing with the many subjects here tackled.

1.2 Knowledge and context: related work

For purposes of structure, in the following, where I discuss works and studies related to this thesis (including a discussion on my sources), I will proceed chapter by chapter, starting with my “Theory and Method”. And so, in my chapter on Koselleck and Lefebvre, the point of which is to “unite” their philosophies into an applicable method, I rely on works that have been translated into English: in the case of Koselleck, two collections of essays, *The Practice of Conceptual History* (2002) and *Futures Past* (2004), translated from German and offering a comprehensive discussion on the practice and theory of conceptual history, and in the case of Lefebvre, his *The Production of Space* (1974), a book on the experience, conception, and perception of “social space”. Besides these two authors, I have consulted the spatial philosophies of Martin Heidegger, Michel de Certau, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Michel Foucault, and Yi-Fu Tuan, my use of these thinkers – sharing the traditions of phenomenology, and often referring to each other in a manner indicating intimate, mutual knowledge – nevertheless being rather sketchy, my reason for introducing them having two, intersecting nodes: first, to understand Koselleck, it is necessary to have at least an idea of the thinking of Heidegger, the same relation of dependence (and negating independence) being true for all elements of the network of spatial thinking here consulted; secondly, since these authors are building on each other, one vocabulary adding to the next, to satisfy the needs of my methodology, and to emit a sense of the density of the problem addressed, I must introduce a spectrum of spatializing thinking, the writings of Lefebvre and Koselleck not being enough for the purposes here pursued. Moreover, for reasons of both time and space (although required of a topic such as
this, I do not want my “Theory and Method” to turn into a thesis in itself), when writing on these, latter philosophers, I read only what I deem sufficient and/or necessary, i.e. a lengthy article from Tuan (“Space and Place”, 1979), a chapter from Merleau-Ponty’s *Phenomenology of Perception* (1945), a lecture from Foucault (“Of Other Spaces”, 1984), one of the many books by de Certau (*The Practice of Everyday Life*, 1980), and bits and pieces from Heidegger (a few chapters from *Being and Time*, 1927, as well as the lengthy, late article titled “Building, Dwelling, Thinking”, 1971). In short, my delimitation of the reading-material – here constituting my source-material – is based on the questions addressed.

In the important case of Koselleck, however, even though I do not read everything available, I aim for a comprehensive understanding of his theory and method (after all, I am intending to do a conceptual history), such an understanding – in my case – necessitating a use of secondary sources; by now, the writing on the writings of Koselleck is well established, Niklas Olsen, for example, a Danish scholar on the topic, offering a detailed account of Koselleck’s life and work. From Olsen’s celebrated book – *History in the Plural* (2012); in this book, Olsen carefully traces the thinking of Koselleck to his scholarly milieu, that of Heidegger, Gadamer, and Carl Schmitt – I gather a nuanced perspective on the many influences afforded by Koselleck, Olsen being particularly pedagogic when delineating the philosophical stimuli just noted. Yet another book on the writings of Koselleck (but with a different edge) is Kari Palonen’s *Quentin Skinner: History, Politics, Rhetoric* (2003), a book in which the Finnish Professor of Political Science (i.e. Palonen) elaborates a comparative perspective on conceptual history (Quentin Skinner representing the “analytical” version of conceptual history), a comparative perspective that I will myself not be pursuing. For that, same reason, in my chapter on Koselleck and Lefebvre, I will not make use of the (otherwise instructive) anthology *History of concepts: comparative perspectives* (1984), one of the earlier examples of the international impact (the book being authored by scholars from several nationalities) with which Koselleck theorized his influential method. Apart from these, three books, there are more than many articles on the topic of conceptual history, most of them – if siding with Koselleck rather than Skinner – referring to a general discussion on the methodological problems of German *Begriffsgeschichte*, meaning – ultimately – that the academic world is not short on credible, effective, and well-written summaries of the practice of conceptual history.  

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very worthwhile articles, and given my philosophical pretensions, I will be most helped by the methodological critique offered by Janet Coleman (“The Practical Use of Begriffsgeschichte”, 1999) and Michael Pickering (“Experience as Horizon”, 2004).

Evidently, my summary of Koselleck’s theory is not unaided; since my intention is here to systematize the writings of Koselleck, however, and since I intend to offer my own perspective and examples, the summary must ultimately be said to be my own, hopefully providing the reader with an interpretation both nuanced and productive. Since this interpretation will be shorter than a book but longer than most articles on the topic, my hope is that it will serve the purpose of a good, detailed, and clarifying introduction (if not more) to the elusive theory of Koselleck. But that is not all (of course): as mentioned, the purpose of this chapter is to expand on the methodology of Koselleck. And in doing that, I mostly rely on the philosophy of Lefebvre, my single source on this philosopher being his The Production of Space (my summary of the philosophy of this book – which will be equally comprehensive – may very well be appreciated by the reader interested in dialectics, “space”, and/or semiotics). In fact, the principal contribution of my methodology will be established here, i.e. in the merging of Koselleck and Lefebvre, producing a method for understanding conceptual history in social space. If I am not guilelessly mistaken, such a marriage – amounting to: a method of conceptual history also considering the production of social space – is without predecessors, combinatorial uses of the two philosophers of course existing, but in forms (very) dissimilar from mine. Indeed, since Koselleck is a philosopher-historian of “Time”, and since Lefebvre is a philosopher-historian of “Space”, it makes perfect sense to associate the two (thus getting two sides of the phenomenological coin), as does Beate Feldmann Eelend in her dissertation “Visionära planer och vardagliga praktiker” (2013), an ethnological study in which the author combines Lefebvre’s spatial dialectics with Koselleck’s anthropological and geological theory of time (these terms will be explained in the following chapters). This is the most in-depth arrangement of the two (of methodological consequence) that I have found (which does not necessarily mean a lot, the archives of knowledge being larger than life), Eelend’s dissertation nevertheless not having anything to do with the field of conceptual history: simply put, Eelend’s use of Koselleck and Lefebvre – pertaining to an understanding of “space”, “time”, and “social practices” – is considerably different from the conceptual history here sketched. If Eelend is looking for an ethnological theory of “time” and “space”, I am looking for a historical method

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of concepts (in time and space). Eelend’s discussion – although interesting – is therefore of no consequence to my own methodology, my hope – again – being to produce an innovative perspective on the relations between “homes”, “concepts”, and “space”. As mentioned, however, given the fame and legacy of the two thinkers, there are many articles referring to both, as does Michael Pickering – just to give one example – in his article “Experience as Horizons” (mentioned above). But referring to Koselleck and Lefebvre does not amount to a methodological combination of the two – in the existing, methodological “gap”, therefore, I attempt an unexploited melting-pot. And so: with Koselleck, Lefebvre, and the philosophy of Heidegger, de Certeau, Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, and Tuan, and by reading these philosophers with the help of Olsen (as well as a few articles on the practice of conceptual history), I hope that my methodology will prove valuable in sketching a history of the concept of “Home”.

The following chapter (chapter 3.) in large part being historiographical, I will now give an overview of the literature here conferred. Considering the far-reaching history of the concept of “Home”, and considering that this history – in my thesis – is only meant as a “Background”, I hope that the historiographical nature of this chapter can be excused; to my knowledge, however, a Koselleckian history of the concept of “Home” has never been done before, my dependence on secondary sources therefore being supplemented by a (very) specific “looking-glass”, i.e. the theory and method of my preceding chapter. The “newness” of this “looking-glass” – which is supposed to produce knowledge, not only refer to it – should justify the length of my “Background”, the ensuing perspective – of a conceptual history in social space – requiring a discussion on many topics related to that of “Home”. It should also be noted that I will make use of “historical” sources (mostly in my discussion on the philosophy of “Home”), my narrative nevertheless resting solely on the findings of others, primarily those of Phillipe Ariès (1914-1984), Witold Rybczynski, Ali Madanipour, Michael McKeon (and, through him, Jürgen Habermas and Hannah Arendt), Karen Harvey, as well as the History of Private Life series. These “sources of information” are now discussed in the order indicated.

In his well-known study Centuries of Childhood (1960), Phillipe Ariès – French historian and writer, also editor of A History of Private Life – argues that the concept of

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8 Some researchers employ the concepts of “concept” and “Home” without consulting the theory and method of conceptual history, the “concept of home” – in these writings – being no more than a name, a convenient differentiation not capable of explaining neither “concepts” nor the concept of “Home”; e.g. Pernilla Hagbert, home is where* (Master’s Thesis at Chalmers University, Design for Sustainable Development, Gothenburg, Sweden, 2011), accessed May 10, 2017, [http://publications.lib.chalmers.se/records/fulltext/136328.pdf](http://publications.lib.chalmers.se/records/fulltext/136328.pdf)
“Childhood” – and the corresponding, social practices – is a recent phenomenon, the “special nature of childhood” first establishing itself in the upper classes of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century. By studying the iconography of medieval art, and besides exploring the experience of childhood, Ariès dives into the historically defined relationship between adults and “children”, his most provocative thesis perhaps being that “parental love” was once sparse if not non-existent, most, medieval children dying before such a bond could crystallize into a social requirement. In making this argument, albeit unintentionally, Ariès re-produces the established narrative of a progressive, European evolution, a “whiggish” form of knowledge that has been questioned ever since its institutional formation. In fact, the same, historiographical tendency is true for most of the sources here relied upon; for that reason, in my “Background”, I will include an alternative (or challenging) view on the history of intimate relations, Jack Goody (The Development of the Family and Marriage in Europe, 1983) representing one such alternative, as does David Warren Sabean (Property, Production, and Family in Neckarhausen, 1700-1870, 1990), both of these authors spending time with historical sources often overlooked or ignored, that “overlooking” also being the criticism raised by Alan MacFarlane in his review of Lawrence Stone’s book The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England 1500-1800 (1977), a book not unlike that of Ariès. Importantly, then, as in all forms of conceptual history, the generalizations necessitated must be articulated with reservations; it must nevertheless be noted that the critique of Goody, Sabean, and Stone – even though applicable on some of the secondary sources used (hence my reason for introducing their critique) – is not damaging to the narrative of my historical hypothesis, a conceptual history of “Home” being very different from a general history of homes, and my semantic approach grabbing hold of information divorced from its “whiggish”, evolutionary framework (the conceptual framework instead being plural, my narrative resting on the finding of others by incorporating many perspectives). In any case, and concluding my summary of the writings of Ariès, since he is writing the history of “Childhood”, by default, given the conceptual economy of the present, he is also writing the history of the “Family”, one of the concepts (i.e. “Family”) most commonly associated with the concept of “Home”. Keeping the historiographical criticism of Goody (and others) in mind, therefore, most of my discussion on the history of the “Family” – as an aspect of the history of the concept of “Home” – will be based on Ariès, my discussion on British families (since Ariès is concerned mostly with French iconography) being supplemented by the findings of the following writers.

For an understanding of the spatial topography of a transforming “Home”, I rely on Home: A Short History of an Idea (1986), a book as enlightening as it is pleasant to read;
authored by the Scottish-born architect and writer Witold Rybczynski, this book, more like a lengthy essay, provides an overview of the spatial (and ideological) evolution of domestic culture. In the evolution of domestic living, argues Rybczynski, the notion of “comfort” played an important role, the idea-reality of “comfort” being essential to the development of – among other things – modern household-technology. Since Rybczynski’s book is covering everything from “privacy” and “intimacy” to “floor-plans” and “furniture”, tracing the material-cultural influences of their domestic evolution, my own narrative is comparable to his, but constructed with a different emphasis; although the title of his book is suggestive enough, in the end, Rybczynski never speaks of the concept of “Home”, the content of “ideas” being different from the semantics of a “concept” (as will be made evident below). Rybczynski is discoursing on the spatialized idea of domestic life, not on the semantics of a socio-political self-understanding, my own narrative thus requiring a much wider perspective than that offered by Rybczynski (which doesn’t make it better, just different). As an introduction to the developments of domestic architecture, however, *Home* is an excellent book, Rybczynski’s account of European, interior design (the looks as well as the “reasons why”) providing me with an appropriate, descriptive language. One writer often referring to Rybczynski is Ali Madanipour, Professor of Urban Design at Newcastle University; in his *Public and Private Spaces of the City* (2003), prof. Madanipour, by exploring the public/private-relations of “Mind”, “Home”, “Neighborhood”, and “City”, sets out to explain – historically – the modern distinction between “Public” and “Private” spaces. In my “Main Analysis”, I will attempt such an explanation myself, but in a different context, and with less generalizable results, my dialogue with Madanipour therefore being constricted to the purposes of my “Background”, Madanipour here complementing the spatial insights given by Rybczynski. Furthermore, in his chapter on “Homes” and “Domesticity”, Madanipour defines “Home” (as he is defining all aspects of the private/public-distinction), such definitions being inconsequential to (and radically different from) the method of conceptual history (a method that – in my interpretation – is instead recording the history of definitions, a record that is used for more elaborate, socio-political analyses); nevertheless, on the one hand, for the reasons just specified, if Madanipour’s definition of “Home” will be used as an example of present-day history (of the concept of “Home”), then – on the other hand – his discussion on the private/public-distinction (which is very informative, starting in Greece and ending in the present) will be used as a productive source of information and inspiration.

Understandably so, the private/public-distinction is a vital aspect of the history of “Home”. Besides Madanipour, therefore, for an even better understanding of this distinction, I
have read Michael McKeon’s *The Secret History of Domesticity* (2005), an expansive book—immensely detailed—on the public/private-relations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Referring to all parts of British society (by way of court-documents, diaries, paintings, floor-plans, engravings, novels, poetry, etc.), and adopting a literary-historical analysis, McKeon, Professor of English at Rutgers University, traces an intimate, deep-seated relation between the (i) public/private-distinction, (ii) the division of sexual labor, and (iii) the division of knowledge (Science, Arts, etc.), the practices of “domesticity”—carrying the “secret history” of the novel—resting at the very heart of these relations. McKeon’s impressive study concerning itself with British domesticity rather than European concepts (even though, naturally so, McKeon finds many reasons for deliberating on the latter), more than anything else, in my “Background”, I will refer to McKeon’s discussion on the public/private-distinction, the author offering a particularly enlightening disentanglement of the relations between State, Civil Society, the Market, Domestic Economy, and the Private Sphere. As is perhaps to be expected, McKeon often refers to the works of Habermas (1929-), a Frankfurt-school-philosopher that I will myself be reviewing in a discussion similar to that of McKeon (but confined to *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, 1962). As was the case with Foucault and Merleau-Ponty (etc.), and the same is true for the philosophy of Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), when reading Habermas, I will limit that reading to what is deemed relevant (in the case of both Habermas and Arendt: the private/public-distinction), thus forcing me to ignore the impressive oeuvre that constitutes the philosophy of a life-time. In any case, the nature of that reading will be made clear in the following.

In her article “Men Making Home”, Karen Harvey—Professor of Cultural History at the University of Sheffield—investigates the seventeenth-century concept of oeconomy (in short, the economy of the household), her main argument being that men were once central to the management of the household (oeconomy being a discourse of masculinity), the female gendering of “Home” (as well as “domesticity”) being a phenomenon of “Late Modernity” and its conceptual separations. In my “Background”-chapter, importantly, this argument will stabilize the general, generalizing narrative of my conceptual history, the question of gender (and a division of the sexes) sometimes turning into a topic too polarized; since Harvey introduces her argument with a detailed etymology (on “domesticity” as well as “Home”), her main sources being dictionaries from the period, I will also refer to Harvey when tracing the semantic trajectory of the word “home” (the Oxford English Dictionary here being my primary source), Harvey reaching the same conclusion as me (or rather: me confirming the conclusion of Harvey), namely, that the word “home”—in the eighteenth-century—was both embellished
and intensified, ultimately separating itself from the word “house” (with which it was previously overlapping). In a way, Harvey provides a condensed, British conceptual history of “Home” (limited in time and space, naturally), my own conceptual history therefore being an expansion on some of the road-markers offered. For this expansion, finally, I have read *A History of Private Life*, a five-volume collection of social history from which I will be using only Volume II and Volume IV. In this impressive series (which is French in origin), edited by (and I am now only listing the editors of the volumes read) Georges Duby, Arthur Goldhammer, Phillipe Ariès, and Michelle Perrot, it is shown how western society has moved from a “public” to a “private” articulation of life, the many authors deliberating on such topics as homes, self-perception, architecture, families, fashion, ownership, festivals, rituals, politics, and more. My own narrative not really relying on that presented in *A History of Private Life, I will use this series for “filling in the gaps”, for giving life to the theoretical structure of my historical inquires; in other words, I will be referring to many of the articles – spread out on an extensive floor-plan – for many reasons, the extent of this referral being limited only by its instrumental value. Of course, the same is true for all the secondary sources just summarized (in a crude fashion made clearer by the chapter in which they make a return), my overall ambition being to pit them against each other while keeping the narrative coherent, the point of my “Background” – besides providing the reader with a convincing history of the concept of “Home”, i.e. a *historical hypothesis* – being to prepare the grounds for what is yet to come, i.e. the “modernization” of housing as it was demonstrated at the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930.

Finally, then, I turn to my “Main Analysis”; since this thesis is framed by the discipline of the history of ideas, and since most of my anthropological “time-travelling” is deferred to the research of this chapter, i.e. my “Main Analysis”, in terms of historical (as in archival) work, my “Main Analysis” is also my “Main Chapter”: in this archival chapter, therefore, I will mostly rely on writings of the past (rather than on the past), i.e. the *primary sources* of discourse once lived, my methodology of “Homes”, “Space”, and “concepts” – as established in the preceding chapters – hopefully allowing me to access the material with an outlook both nuanced and distinctive. My delimitations – as in: *what* historical material will I be using, and *why* (the “how” should by now be introduced)? – will be elaborated upon below. The Stockholm Exhibition of 1930 being a well-studied phenomenon among both scholars and students, it must be noted – again – that I am not the first to look at the wealth of information surviving its temporary setting (theory being a matter of viewing-distance). Be that as it may, my reading of newspapers, journals, photographs, floor-plans, pamphlets, speeches, and books should amount to at least a small degree of historical resurrection: the spatiotemporal “looking-
glass” of my method will be reacting to sounds – voices of the living dead, the archive – perhaps irrelevant to studies conducted from a different point of view (or hearing), the vibrations of history reverberating on different frequencies of visibility, and the historian, as an audio engineer, constructing instruments – always limited – for purposes of recording, manipulating, and reproducing the information of only a small slice of those vibrations. Since I intend my instrument of recording (i.e. my conceptual history) to be specialized and specific, it is more likely than not that I will be citing information that has never been cited before (i.e. within the framework of an academic agenda). Given the popularity of my field of study, however, such citing is of no significance; and for reasons elaborated upon below, in this “main” chapter, since the primary sources conferred (i.e. the history studied) are not sufficient for a comprehensive understanding of the socio-political context of the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930, when necessitated, I will also consult the developing wealth of secondary sources: in the following paragraphs, therefore, by summarizing the nature of my (limited) dependence on secondary sources, I will review (parts of) the existing literature on the Exhibition of 1930 (and its immediate context), the purpose of such a review being to demonstrate the quality of my contribution to the disciplines of knowledge here bordered.

Indeed, due to the popularity of this field of study, it would be impossible to here review the entirety of the literature on the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930. Scholars have approached the topic from a wide array of perspectives, e.g. the encyclopedic approach, provided by Ursula Lindqvist, or the ideological-critical approach, introduced by Yvonne Hirdman in her Att lägga livet till rätta, or the monographic approach, employed by Eva Rudberg in more than one book and article; moreover, as is to be expected, there are many studies conducted from the point of view of gender (e.g. Maria Göransdotter), aesthetics (e.g. Modern Swedish Design, see below), economics (Carl Marklund and Peter Stadius), and the history of Swedish housing (e.g. Kerstin Thörn), my own point of view – within this “City of Texts” – nevertheless carrying the equivocal quality of “something new”, the study most similar to mine perhaps being a paper authored by Hans Dahlqvist (on the concept of the “The People´s Home”, discussed below). In the following, then, with less applicable literature deferred to the footnotes (as in: applicable within this study), I proceed by assessing the authors just mentioned, most of them – in one way or another – being referred to in my “Main Analysis”.
For an opening understanding of the format of the exhibition, I have read Ursula Lindqvist’s encyclopedic article “Stockholm 1930”.9 Published in the Encyclopedia of World’s Fairs and Expositions, Lindqvist’s article – short, coherent, and informative, as most encyclopedic articles tend to be – purposefully describes the conception and execution of the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930; in short, Lindqvist’s article is a respectable introduction to the organizational features of the exhibition here studied. Carl Marklund’s and Peter Stadius’s article “Acceptance and Conformity” is perhaps more in line with the critical dimension of my analysis,10 the main argument of this article – the authors comparing the Exhibition of 1930 with the Chicago Exhibition of 1933-1934 – being that the rhetoric of the Stockholm-exhibition was self-consciously propagandistic, that its organizers were making use of history as a means for constructing an acceptance of the “new” (i.e. functionalism), appealing to “Swedishness” and “Progress” in the same sentences, thus conflating the polarity of an alienating, modern world. In my conceptual analysis, I will propose a hypothesis similar to that of Marklund and Stadius, albeit with a different emphasis and interpretation; the viewpoint of these scholars being ideological and economical, and my own viewpoint being conceptual and historical, I will allow my reading – which is also more spacious – to go a few steps further (in terms of: identify more polarities than Marklund and Stadius; relate these dichotomies to their conceptual economy, historical as well as contemporary; explain historically the distribution of these dichotomies; delineate the phenomenological implications of these dichotomies, including the effects of their conceptual conflation, e.g. “old” merging with “new”; explain the intertwinement of “Sweden”, “Home”, “Progress”, and “Modernity”, “Home” sitting at the center of my analysis, not its edge; etc.), my analysis amounting not to a critical examination of the ideology of the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930, but to an investigation of the organization of its conceptual economy (that is to say: the meaning of the concepts used). In fact, even though highly compatible with the line of reasoning here implemented, in my conceptual analysis, Marklund’s and Stadius’s argument is inconsequential to my own, their article – as an enlightening, rewarding account of the competing ideologies of interwar-Sweden – instead being helpful as an introduction to the ideological-economic context of the exhibition of 1930 (e.g. Lutheranism, social-democracy, conformism, the Depression, etc.).

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If my analysis is compatible with that of Marklund and Stadius (as well as Lindqvist), then it is perhaps less compatible with Eva Rudberg’s *Stockholmsutställningen 1930* (1999), Rudberg – architect, scholar, and writer – being the author of several books and articles on the topic of Swedish, architectural modernism. As a monography, *Stockholmsutställningen 1930* is descriptive (rather than argumentative and/or investigative), my primary sources – intersecting with those of Rudberg – allowing me to access the historical experience therein condensed (I have already made a methodological point of giving my reading some breathing-room: descriptive accounts of an event that I will have to describe myself are potentially counter-productive, just like a postcard of a place once visited re-shapes the memory of that very visit, or just like too much preparation – before travelling, that is – creates expectations that obscure the reality of one’s interpretations, e.g. the fact of mediocrity being displaced by an expectation of excitement; with that said, however, and obviously so, comparable perspectives are vital, that being the very point of the following paragraphs). Returning to my (very minor) disagreement with Rudberg, finally, in her monographic book *Stockholmsutställningen 1930*, it is argued that functionalism – as an aesthetic discipline – came to terms with the past only by denying it, an interpretation of functionalism (as a “radical” modernism among other modernisms) overlooking the more benevolent reading referred to above: for me as well as for Marklund and Stadius, the functionalists did not repudiate the past, but claimed it as their heritage, a merging of past, present, and future resting at the core of their argument. This, latter reading of Swedish functionalism – giving functionalist architecture a traditionalist, propagandistic edge, thus isolating it from more “radical” modernisms (e.g. futurism) – is itself “radically” different from an interpretation taking the aesthetics of functionalism at face value (the aesthetics of functionalism – with almost no ornamental features – of course being different from the neo-classic historicism preceding it). That said, however, my intention is here not to discredit the edifying work of a scholar far more knowledgeable (than me) in the field of architectural studies, Rudberg’s book – and her many articles – preparing the grounds by describing them (with an awareness for detail not possible in my conceptual analysis). For similar reasons, I will not engage with the well-known study *Att lägga livet till rätta* (1989), authored by Yvonne Hirdman and memorably provoking to its

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contemporary audience; in unravelling the “utopian” content of the “ideology” of the Swedish State, Hirdman narrates the backyard-history of Swedish well-fare politics, applying an investigative perspective previously unexploited (or popularized). By studying the 30s and the 40s, and in arguing that social-democratic politics – to gain entrance into the private sphere, i.e. politicize it – had to restore a strict division of gender and sexes, Hirdman makes a (justified) point of attacking the “social engineers” of Swedish well-fare-society, particularly the degradation of human self-empowerment therein imposed (by politicizing the private sphere, the social-democrats “took care” of private individuals therefore robbed of their ability to take care of themselves). Agreeing with many of Hirdman’s arguments (e.g. her discussion on the politicization of the private sphere, or the significance attributed to the space of “Home”, or her discussion on and introduction of the notion of “social engineers”), and positioning myself within the critical tradition she helped to popularize, I am less inclined to agree with her choice of words, the “utopian” dimension of social-democracy – including Swedish functionalism – not being as transparent as Hirdman – given her language – inadvertently makes it. In fact, many of the “social engineers” of Swedish well-fare politics – and this is a matter of my “Main Analysis” – distanced themselves from the “utopian” thinking of a larger, European milieu. In the chapter most relevant to my own study, for example, Hirdman describes functionalist housing in terms of a “rationalist utopia”, an evocative – and therefore concealed – argument incompatible with the evocative arguments of my own narrative; in sum (perhaps because of her counter-discursive efforts), Hirdman is too critical, her “postmodern” language sometimes turning into a narrative of victimization and exaggeration – regardless, Hirdman does not spend much time on the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930, my analysis of this event being supported by more specified studies.

Arguably, the Exhibition of 1930 is inseparable from the functionalist “manifesto” acceptera, published in 1931 and authored by six of the coordinators of the exhibition. For insights regarding the aesthetic context of these “events” (i.e. the manifesto and the exhibition), I have read Modern Swedish Design (2008), a commendable anthology providing its English-speaking reader not only with translations of three, paradigmatic texts on

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13 Evidently, English literature does exist on the topic, e.g. Ken Worpole, Here Comes the Sun: Architecture and Public Space in Twentieth-Century European Culture (London: Reaktion, 2000); Allan Pred, Recognizing European Modernities: A Montage of the Present (London: Routledge, 1995); Michael Asgaard Andersen (ed.), Nordic Architects Write (Oxon: Routledge, 2008); Gertrude Sandqvist, “Art and Social Democracy”, transl. by Michael Garner, Afterall: A Journal of Art, Context, and Enquiry (1998). The latter of these – an essay by Gertrude Sandqvist – holds an argument that will be important to my own, namely, the argument that functionalism as an art-form is inseparable from the politics of social-democracy.
Swedish design (among them, a translation of acceptera), but also articles on the topic of Swedish modernism (authored and edited by Lucy Creagh, Helena Kåberg, Barbara Miller Lane, and Kenneth Frampton). These articles provide an insightful introduction to the aesthetic history of Swedish modernism (including functionalism), my discussion on the aesthetics of functionalism nevertheless being limited to my interests as a conceptual historian. If my references to Modern Swedish Design are therefore limited, and the same delimitation is true for Helena Mattson’s and Sven-Olov Wallenstein’s Swedish Modernism at the Crossroads (2009) (a compressed article-book – published in three languages: Swedish, English, German – on the aesthetic context of acceptera), then my conceptual inquires have more things in common with Hans Dahlqvist’s article “Folkhemsbegreppet”. In this article, following a discussion on the theory and method of Koselleck, Dahlqvist re-writes the history of the concept of “The People’s Home”, a concept – fundamental to the well-fare-discourse disentangled by Hirdman – that I will myself have to tackle from the point of view of the concept of “Home”; Dahlqvist argues that the concept of “Folkhemmet” had many meanings in many contexts, an early use of the concept being oriented towards the cultural meaning of the Swedish “folk” (similar to the German Volksgemeinschaft), and post-war (that is, post-WWII) use being oriented towards sentimentalism and remembering, Per Albin Hansson – as the prime-minister of the 30s – instead using the concept on conditions of hope and expectation. Since Dahlqvist is interested in political actors and their conceptual use, not necessarily the semantics (nor the semantic history) of the concept of “Home” (which is a different concept altogether), my own discussion on “The People’s Home” will be complimentary to but dissimilar to his: whereas Dahlqvist is narrating the history of the uses of the concept, tracing its transformative application and meaning, I am intending to explain the meaning and economy of its elements. Dahlqvist’s conceptual history – sketching the history of the principal actors, much like Quentin Skinner does – will therefore be invaluable as a conceptual contextualization, my own analysis – diachronic and synchronic, my focus being the concept itself, not its actors – taking off where Dahlqvist leaves his.

Yet another like-minded article (relative to this thesis) is Maria Göransdotter’s “Från moral till modernitet”, an article in which the functionalist “home” is compared to the nineteenth-century “home” of the bourgeoisie; in this article, Göransdotter delineates the

relation between homes, functionalism, and the women of the 30s, her main argument being that the authors of *acceptera* viewed women as “carriers of modernity” (and I agree with Göransdotter), the female knowledge of household-work acting as a segue into the overall rationalization of Swedish homes. Her emphasis being architecture and gender in the 30s, not the history of home, Göransdotter’s historical perspective is naturally limited, reduced to a few sentences regarding the spatial (gendered) organization of bourgeoisie-homes; moreover, since Göransdotter has no intention of doing conceptual history, my own discussion on homes, functionalism, and gender will be somewhat different from hers, even though, naturally so, I will end up confirming some of her arguments (by making others). As should be evident by now, the writing on the Exhibition of 1930 is well-established, my contribution to this historiography simply being a function of my methodology: generating questions previously unanswered (e.g.: what is the history of the functionalist concept of “Home”)?; what was the position of this concept within the conceptual economy – or discourse – of interwar-Sweden?; what elements – of the “old” concept of “Home” – survived the semantic fields of functionalism, and what elements were therein negated?; how did interwar-Swedes use such concepts as “Modernity”, “Progress”, and “the Public”, and did functionalism – standing on the transforming platform of bourgeoisie-living – intend to give these concepts “new” meaning?; how did interwar-Swedes understand their own time, space, and self?; etc.), generating questions hitherto unanswered (by default), my methodology will provide me with a new perspective on *historical things discoursed*, my simple contribution – since we are now dwelling in a language of numbers – being of an accumulating nature. In exemplifying this accumulation, I could mention the dissertation “En bostad för hemmet” (by Kerstin Thörn, published 1997),17 or the collection of lectures titled *Hem och bostad* (1986),18 both titles – “A Place to Call Home” and “Home and housing” respectively – *indicating the conceptual* difference between “bostad” (housing, residence) and “hem” (home), but neither one of them *engaging* with the difference indicated (except for a few, suggestive lines). In the case of the dissertation by Kerstin Thörn, the translation of the title – which is her own – is very telling, the word “bostad” therein disappearing completely (“bostad” becomes “place”), a different

17 Kerstin Thörn, “En bostad för hemmet: idéhistoriska studier i bostadsfrågan 1889-1929” (PhD diss., Umeå University, 1997). Thörn’s study ends where my study begins (chronologically speaking), her emphasis also – again – being very different from mine. As a history of Swedish housing-organizations, however, Thörn’s dissertation is remarkably detailed.

18 Ronny Ambjörnsson et al. (ed.), *Hem och bostad: Bostadsidéologier i ett historiskt perspektiv: fem föreläsningar från ett symposium* (Umeå: University, 1986). In one way or another, the lectures here published are discussing functionalism; as lectures, however, I did not find them very informative.
meaning altogether); and so, in my own analysis, concluding this example (of the nature of my epistemic contribution), the semantic difference between “hem” and “bostad” will be of outermost importance, my conclusions (as a conceptual historian) resting on the semantic relations therein implied. Summarizing what have so far been said, then, even though well-established, the historical writing on the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930 has some “gaps” in need of “filling” (to re-use a metaphor already overused), my methodology providing me with a perspective both complementary and tallying.

Lastly, concluding this “literature-review”, and disregarding all the studies concerned with post-war functionalism (the welfare-politics of Sweden really taking off in the wake of European destruction and devastation; staying “neutral” in the war, the awakening nation of Sweden, keeping its citizens safe by making ideological-moral compromises, also capitalized on the deadly desire for steel, Sweden feeding the war with both weapons and ore),¹⁹ I should not fail to mention the book Formens rörelse (1995), a collection of articles on the past, present, and future of the organization called Svensk Form, celebrating – at the time of publication – an impressive 150 years of strenuous existence (in English, Swedish Design, the Swedish society for arts, crafts, and designs, once called “Svenska Slöjdföreningen”, a name that will reappear in the following, “Svenska Slöjdföreningen” being the very birthplace of the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930). Of the many articles having a place in this illustrative book, two have direct relevance for the purposes here pursued: “Stockholmsutställningen bakom kulisserna” by Björn Linn and “Rakkniven och lösmanschetten” by Eva Rudberg. Narrating by way of quoting (some of these quotes will be important to my own analysis), Rudberg introduces the debate taking place in Svenska Slöjdföreningen following the Exhibition of 1930, some board-members not being as happy with its execution as others. Rudberg’s article is convincing and coherent, her narration of the debate nevertheless being entirely descriptive, offering no interpretation nor analysis; the same is true for Björn Linn’s article on the spatial disposition of the Exhibition, Linn’s article carrying more quotes than actual writing, the book Formens rörelse being published by the very society it “investigates”. That concludes my review on the literature bordering my “Main Chapter”, the literature here discussed – most of the articles referred to in my analysis – hopefully being representative of the knowledge in relation to which I define my analytical interests; importantly, within this field of study, it

should be concluded that my conceptual approach is untried, that my analysis – a “testing” of the “instruments” of my methodology – will generate an opening of new investigative dimensions (small or large remains to be seen). By asking the question of language (unasked in the literature here reviewed), in my “Main Analysis”, I thus intend to uncover the socio-political self-understanding of a Swedish society transforming. Oscillating between the history of meaning and the socio-political self-understanding of a transforming collective, therefore, my analysis, tracing the semantics rather than the actors (diachronically and synchronically), and looking back (at history) rather than forward (at the future), my analysis will amount to an investigation into the question of “how, why, where, and when” the elements of language are *indicating* as well as *being factors in* the social history of change. Having my threefold purpose in mind – producing: a method capable of accounting for the relation between concepts and space; a conceptual history of “Home”; a conceptual history of the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930 – my intentions are not simply to describe a “context” and its “texts” (as some literature on the topic tend to do), but to disentangle the historical relations of meaning in which “contexts” and “texts” play a supportive role. If each chapter is a “contribution” in itself, then the interaction between them – the first, and second chapter supporting my “Main Analysis”, and my “Main Analysis” being a “case-study” on the method proposed – is constitutive of my principal, scholarly input. Before attempting such an input, however, I must first explicate my archival delimitations.

1.3 “Problems”, delimitations, and archive: final considerations

If I am to define the “problem” with which this thesis is busying itself, then I must go back to the research-question of my methodological chapter: the conceptual history of Koselleck emphasizing “time” and “temporality”, within this field of historical research, how should one understand the relation between “concepts” and “space”, and would such an understanding be of any value? To me, the fact that conceptual history has yet to engage with the vocabulary of the “spatial turn” is indicative of a “problem”, the category of “space” – as an inescapable dimension of life – adding depth to a field (i.e. conceptual history) that is said to thrive in it (i.e. depth). In other words, if Koselleck – his main, scholarly influences philosophizing from an episteme of “temporality” – theorized only one side of the phenomenological coin, and if conceptual historians have persisted in emphasizing textual meaning (=narrative=time), then the problem is one of *tradition*, of philosophy obstructing itself, relaxing, pleased with the framework of “Time” as established by the temporal thinking of Heidegger, Gadamer, and
Koselleck. My methodological chapter is not only addressing this problem, but also introducing it, meaning that in the following – any “answers” – if such things are even possible – will have to be more suggestive than conclusive, satisfactory solutions always-already awaiting the negative dialectics of their communication: from the viewpoint of the “affirmation, negation, negation-of-the-negation”-scheme, therefore, if the Koselleckian framework of conceptual history is most often affirmed (critique being leveled only within the framework of “Time”), then this thesis is a spatial negation awaiting its negation-of-the-negation. In sum, then, in addressing this problem, this thesis will be associating itself with the “spatial turn”, a line of reasoning insisting that a social or cultural phenomenon cannot be “torn from its spatial context, that geography is not some subordinate afterthought to history in the construction of social life, that no meaningful understanding of how human beings produce and reproduce their worlds can be achieved without invoking a sense that the social, temporal, the intellectual, and the personal are inescapably always and everywhere also the spatial.”

If this is the general orientation of my thesis’s “problem” (elaborated upon in a moment, i.e. in the following chapter), then my conceptual history of “Home” – materiality and meaning intersecting – is constitutive of a “case-study”, my methodological “negations” therein being “tried” accordingly. Given the absence of a Koselleckian, conceptual history of “Home”, however, I intend to kill two (or three) birds with one stone, my history of “Home” being novel in its emphasis (producing a historical hypothesis, an untold story of the concept of “Home”), and my analysis of the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930 being novel in that it pins down the semantic economy of a socio-political self-understanding (also productive of a historical hypothesis, a “new” perspective on the Swedish experience of “Modernity”). But these, introductory remarks – particularly the “problem” of present-day, conceptual history – will be fleshed out in the following chapters; deferring that elaboration, therefore, before concluding this introduction (finally), I must quickly discuss the nature of my archival work.

As indicated, I will here only discuss the primary sources of my “Main Analysis”, the remainder of my research-material finding adequate “space” above. Since these sources will be properly described in the analytical context in which they appear, the following is only meant as an introduction (a naming), the sum of my sources nevertheless giving rise to some final considerations. And so, disassociating myself from a conceptual history concerned only with texts, in my “Main Analyses”, I will make use of photographs, paintings, and floor-plans, my

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discussion on the organizers of the Stockholm-exhibition (that is, their self-understanding) in large part resting on – besides articles and books authored by its chief architects (including acceptera)\(^21\) – the official catalogues of the exhibition;\(^22\) these catalogues are loaded not only with illustrations, floor-plans, and photographs, representative of all buildings of the exhibition, but also argumentative articles, the catalogues – together with acceptera and the quarterly journal of Svenska Slöjdföreningen (published between 1905 and 1931, one of its editors being Gregor Paulsson, perhaps the most ardent of functionalists)\(^23\) – therefore making up my principal sources on the experiences and expectations of the organizers. For a discussion on the expectation-experiences of the visitors of the Stockholm-exhibition, and for insights into the general applications of the concept of “Home” (i.e. the metaphorical embellishments of its every-day-use), I rely on newspapers and journals – popular or political, mainstream or not. Within the category of (daily) newspapers, I have read 

Aftonbladet, Dagens Nyheter, and Svenska Dagbladet, big newspapers from the Stockholm-area distributing news and opinions up until this day, representative of the mainstream press and leaning from left to right (politically, that is); in 1930, the circulation of these newspapers reached the numbers of, for Aftonbladet, 27.300 copies, Dagens Nyheter, 118.000 copies, and for Svenska Dagbladet, 87.198 copies, large numbers considering that Stockholm at the time only had a population of about half a million (and Sweden a population of six million).\(^24\) Within the category of Swedish journals, I have read Morgonbris (1904-1992; published by the social-democratic women’s movement), Husmodern (1917-1988; edited by Ebba Theorin, popular in character, addressing the “housewives” of Sweden, non-political, as are the following two journals), Hemmets Veckotidning (1929-present; edited by Paula Peterson et al.), and Vårt Hem (1921-1951; edited by Sigurd Westberg et al.), the last two journals – weeklies, supplying easeful turns of phrases, i.e. stories, games, reportages, and recipes – addressing people in the need of entertainment “at Home” (a “killing of time”, perhaps). From these journals and newspapers, I have read not only articles on the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930, most often authored by an exclusive clique of Public, well-educated men, but also interviews (concerning all levels of society) and letters (to


\(^{23}\) Svenska Slöjföreningens tidskrift: organ för konstindustri, handwerk och hemslöjd, årsbok (1930).

\(^{24}\) “Projektet Nya Lundstedt”, Kungliga Biblioteket, last modified May 18, 2017,
http://tidning.kb.se/nld/nld/main?katId=39&sortering=info&PFD=1930-01-01&PTD=1930-12-31&sok=S%C3%96K#tab
the editor), my ambition being to have an inclusive perspective on the concept of “Home”, Koselleck often being criticized for his empirical demarcations. Naturally, that is the reason behind my decision to read Husmodern, Hemmets Veckotidning, and Vårt Hem, these journals – for purposes of business – addressing a public much broader than that of the eloquently manufactured newspapers (attempting to preserve an academic standard, their editorial writers being public figures). And by reading newspapers from all colors of the political spectrum (Svenska Dagbladet being conservative, Dagens Nyheter and Aftonbladet “liberal”, and Norrskensflamman – a socialist newspaper from the north of Sweden – leftist), my hope is that the inevitable political-ideological interpretations of the concept of “Home” – as they were made in the context studied – will be both pronounced and compensated for (my intention – ultimately – being to find the “common denominators”). Since the journal Morgonbris was openly social-democratic, and since the Exhibition of 1930 was a case for the politics of social-democracy, this journal will be valuable as an access to voices elsewhere silenced (but not as a source for studying the general reception of the exhibition). In sum, then, by reading journals, newspapers, interviews, letters, catalogues, floor-plans, illustrations, and photographs, my intention is to study not only those in charge of the representations of space, but also those segments of society not given the privileged opportunity of representing themselves.

But why did I limit myself to the context of the Stockholm-exhibition? The Exhibition being a contribution to the “housing-question” of Swedish welfare politics, showcasing a spatial rhetoric perhaps more powerful than words could ever be, it ignited an outburst of “yays” and “neys”, dividing its viewers into camps of negation and affirmation. By asking the obvious questions – “What did people agree with, and what did they not agree with?” – and hopefully finding the answers, the concept of “Home” may be outlined, negations and affirmations, if looked for among the many rather than the few, being particularly potent in the search for a “general view of things”: the exhibition – and most scholars of Swedish modernity would agree with me here – was a beginning and an end, transformative processes therein being set in motion (and as a conceptual historian, transformative processes are of the utmost importance). But that answers only one element of my question, namely, my decision-making. In terms of my delimitations, primarily, I rely on source-material from the years 1930 and 1931, only a small fraction of my primary sources existing outside of the context of the Exhibition (be that as it may, some of the newspaper-articles studied – when particularly relevant to the

25 I must be mentioned that – without exception – my primary sources are here in Swedish, translations being provided only for acceptera (David Jones, in Modern Swedish Design). Unhappy as this circumstance is, it is necessitated by time-constraints, the context of this thesis also being Swedish-speaking.
arguments made – were published in 1928, 1929, and 1932). Indeed, my temporal delimititations follow the discourse of the Exhibition, the historical significance of this context being explained both above and below. And so, corresponding to the exhibitionary emphasis of this section of my thesis, these delimitations will allow me to consider a greater number of sources from the few years studied (including those of “space” and iconography), in turn allowing me to produce a comprehensive perspective on a singular event – that is: in stark contrast to the onomasiological approach of chapter 3. Of course, my analysis will compare itself to the history it is built upon, my delimitations – i.e. the Exhibition-years – being inserted into and compared to the temporal matrix sketched in my preceeding analysis. At this point, two objections can be raised: first, processes being processes (i.e. requiring time), by limiting myself to a few years, I will not be able to record the transformative nature of those processes, only their inception and conception; second, since most of my sources are from the Stockholm-area (except: Norrskensflamman, Morgenbris, and Hemmets Veckotidning, the latter from Malmö), I am limited not only in time, but also in space, the difference between “rural” and “urban” conceptions of “Home” remaining a question unanswered, as does the relationship between modern rurality and modern urbanity (the latter perhaps ever more dominating in its organization of social space). These objections must be explained from the point of view of what they lack, i.e. time and space, this thesis already being far more spacious than is perhaps required, and this thesis – as a thesis – carrying insurmountable time-constraints – indeed, ideally, if I had both the time and the space, I would add a chapter on the post-war world of rural Sweden, such an inquiry nevertheless having to await the ardors of another project. That said, however, given the rupture-like effects of the Exhibition of 1930, and given the long history of its geological formations (sketched in chapter 3.), in terms of the research-questions here asked, and in terms of stimulating, thought-provoking material, the context of the exhibition will prove to be more than enough, contemporary Sweden resting on the sediments of its volcanic breach. But “the future” of interwar-Sweden must remain a topic for another research-project, as is the case for all the questions raised throughout these chapters, my method – in the end – being oriented towards reservations, hypotheses, and insufferable generalizations. And these are the characteristics to which I now turn.
2. Conceptual History in Social Space: Hypotheses

“The being of being ‘is’ itself not a being” – Martin Heidegger

“[The] meaning of words can be defined exactly, but concepts can only be interpreted” – Reinhart Koselleck

“What is an ideology without a space to which it refers, a space which it describes, whose vocabulary and links it makes use of, and whose code it embodies?” – Henri Lefebvre

What is a “concept”? Is it itself a concept, a set containing itself, collapsing signifier and signified? Or should one argue – in line with the quote from Heidegger – that the concept of concepts “is” itself not a concept, that metaphysical abstractions could only obscure the nature of what is being investigated, transforming all concepts into mere possibilities, unsatisfactory copies of an ahistorical original – i.e. the concept of concepts? Is it a mistake to pursue this question philosophically? As a metaphistorical category ultimately understood from a historical point of view, should one simply treat the concept of concepts hypothetically, as a methodological identifier in lack of a better name? If so, it would certainly be more fruitful to attempt a sociological-linguistic-psychological-historical definition, connoting not the conditions of a possible ontology, the question of “is”, but the diachronic structure of the socio-political functions some (“strong”?) words serve within the ever-changing game of language. Would such a definition even need a scientific standing, a position within the conventional models of linguistic investigation, or could it simply refer to – what I assume to be – a common-sense understanding of the importance of certain (“strong”?) words, assumptions about the hierarchy of language, the equalization of what is unequal?

In the following, these questions, however preliminary, will be elaborated upon from the perspective of the discipline in which they appear, namely: German Begriffsgeschichte. My primary reference is here the theory and method of Reinhart Koselleck, arguably the most important theorizer within the German version of conceptual history. But the purpose is here not to biographically account for – or explain historically – the unsystematic writings of the German historian. Instead, my ambition is twofold: first, in preparation for what follows, my ambition is to emphasize and – to the extent that this is possible – systematize the

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theoretical and methodological vocabulary of Koselleck, thus allowing me to critically apply it on the history of the concept of “Home”; second, by vocalizing an open-ended perspective on the writings of Koselleck, I intend to expand on the temporalizing vocabulary of conceptual history, primarily by referencing the – admittedly elusive – notion of “social space” as theorized in the “neo-Marxist” philosophy of Henri Lefebvre. In short, then, my ambition is to align the impressive undertaking of conceptual history with what has “recently” been called the “spatial turn”, a turn, moreover, also asked for in the growing field of comparative history – a field less interested in variations in time but more interested in variations in space. The position that I am here extrapolating may also be summarized in the words of Michael Freeden, one of the practitioners of comparative history: “the differences in the meanings carried by basic political concepts require illumination on the dimension of comparative ideational and cultural settings as well. Time and space become two intertwined parameters. Although conceptual historians have begun to engage in comparative studies, their strength understandably lies in a refined and complex interpretation of time.” Finally, then, as pledged, before I venture into a discussion on the notion of “space” (as well as a discussion on what the “spatial turn” could possibly refer to), I will begin this thesis by outlining the theoretical and methodological vocabulary of Koselleckian Begriffsgeschichte.

2.1 Possibilities of futures past: a Kosseleckian theory of history

Reinhart Koselleck (1923-2006), serving in the German military during the war, would, after Soviet captivity, return home to study history, philosophy, law, and sociology at the university of Heidelberg; starting in 1954, after submitting his celebrated doctoral dissertation, translated into English as Critique and Crisis, Koselleck worked as a lecturer at the University of Bristol. He returned to Heidelberg two years later, and from 1960 onwards, he participated in – among a series of seminars – the “Arbeitskreis für Moderne Socialgeschichte”, a research-group led by the distinguished historian Werner Conze (1910-1986), one of the main protagonists of German, social history. Koselleck published his habilitation – Preußen zwischen Reform und Revolution – in 1965 and subsequently assumed the position of professor in historical theory at the University of Bielefeld. As an intellectual of several academic contexts, Koselleck would embrace the many scholarly influences thus afforded. Among those most important to the work

of Koselleck should be mentioned Otto Brunner (1898-1982), Carl Schmitt (1888-1985), and Werner Conze, all of them practitioners of an early form of conceptual history later developed by their mutual friend and student: if Brunner wanted to revise the meaning of socio-political concepts by studying their historicity, Conze eliminated this political dimension by concentrating on the socio-historical meaning of such concepts as “Pöbel” and “Proletariat”. For Koselleck, it would nevertheless be the Strukturgeschichte (Structural History) of Conze that most influenced his writings, especially as it was expressed in the socio-historic themes of structural processes, the separation of state from society, and the technological and economic developments of a modernizing Europe. Schmitt, finally, with whom Koselleck kept a personal correspondence for most of his career, wrote a political – and sometimes rather controversial – form of conceptual history that – similar to the Anglophone, conceptual history of Quentin Skinner, discussed below – stressed the performativity of conceptual content and use, something which Koselleck would also theorize himself. Apart from these influential figures, to which one could add the philosopher Karl Löwith (1897-1973), from whom Koselleck extracted an understanding (and definition) of modernity as driven by expectations of change, a future-oriented secularized eschatology, it is important to note, in regards to Koselleck’s reflections on historical experience, the personal and philosophical influence of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002).

The influence of Heidegger and Gadamer will be elaborated upon below, and it is here sufficient to note the impressive range of Koselleck’s scholarly context: arguably, this range is reflected in the non-dogmatic (or open) nature of Koselleck’s own theory, a theory of possibilities, hypotheses, and self-reflection rather than finality, deduction, and paradigmatic self-preservation. As Niklas Olsen writes in his book on the work and life of Koselleck, “he wanted to thematize a mode of historical writing that view history as composed by a plurality of non-convergent histories that can never be shaped entirely according to human desire.” From this theme emerges a critical perspective formulated in opposition to the philosophical-historical notion of a singular, unified history, a notion, Koselleck argues, fundamental to the historical philosophy of utopianism and relativism (only by standing on the top of an idealized History could one proclaim the relativity of all historical positions). Critical of the socio-political implications of a form of historical writing polarized by the universal claims of

32 Ibid., p.189.
33 Ibid., p.4.
utopianism and relativism, “he wanted to carve out a stable, non-relativistic common viewpoint from which historical change could be described and a parameter of judgement on the basis of which the past and the present could be discussed.” The plurality of this viewpoint, since it not only referred to Koselleck’s political interests, but also his methodological and theoretical writings, inevitably makes his writings somewhat challenging and unsystematic.

Already at the outset, therefore, it could be objected: why systematize something that does not want to be systematized? This tension – or rather: the tension between a theory of plurality and the discovery, description, and interpretation of this plurality, i.e. the method – is apparent in Koselleck’s own writing, and takes the form of a disclaimer: “We can risk making statements of necessity”, he says, “insofar as we formulate them with reservations”. The meta-historical categories employed by Koselleck “refer to the finitude that sets history in motion, so to speak, without capturing in any way the content or direction of such movements.” Without such theoretical premises, he argues in “On the Need for Theory in the Discipline of History”, historical research retreats to mere philological, positivist recording, devoid of any understanding of the “conditions of possibility for histories [in the plural]” in which all humans act, suffer, and hope. In sum, even though the meta-historical categories – the “statements of necessity” – may be historical themselves, theory is necessary for asking questions that the historian need to ask. If concepts – including history – equalizes the unequal, conceptual history, by asking the right questions, could pinpoint the very process and illusion of conceptual equalization. Or, to highlight another applicability: “Depending on the way questions are asked, a very different organization of time – in terms of specific strata, regions, nations, continents, or the world as a whole – can be found for defining an epochal boundary that marks the commencement of something like ‘modernity’.”

Method and theory – and the questions arising from these – are thus necessary for making the plurality of history visible, for making the sources “speak”: in conclusion, then, as long as my own account does not obstruct the visibility of this plurality, the objection here raised is secondary if not empty; in fact, on the opposite, by clarifying the method of Koselleck, its potential as a method of plural histories is probably even greater.

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34 Ibid.p.5.
36 Ibid., p.3.
37 Ibid.
A topic related to this discussion is the feasibility of the separation between theory and method: as “post-modern” methodology itself makes evident, this separation, at least in the humanities, is as artificial as that between narrative and description. In the following discussion on the vocabulary of Koselleck, therefore, it is most often the case that the method of conceptual history follows from the terminology in which the theory is expressed; in other words, the vocabulary signifies a theory by implying a method, just like any signifier – in a self-referring fashion – implies the very act of signification. The Foucauldian word “bio-politics”, for example, indicating a theory of political discourse, imply questions (of a methodological nature) needed to be asked if there is to be a theory at all. And so, to give the following some structure, I will divide my discussion into three “Theories” consequently unified by the method they imply: first, I will discuss what I would like to call the “Theory of Concepts”, secondly, Koselleck’s “Anthropological Theory”, and finally, his “Theory of Historical Times”. Within each heading certain words (or concepts) will be highlighted, explained, and related to the structure in which they have an important standing. This division is nowhere to be found in Koselleck’s own work, and it is important to note the mutual dependency and interrelation of the three rubrics; in fact, as an unwilling interpretation, the division seems to entail an order not present in the writings of Koselleck. “As separable entities”, it is suggested, and I am here letting my own, tripartite division speak, “each theory produces questions independently applicable, regardless of the status of the remaining two”. Such independence is not the case here, even though, of course, one could do conceptual history without assuming the validity of Koselleck’s anthropological thesis; with this reservation in mind, the tripartite division is justified solely in reference to the structure it provides, a structure that nevertheless – and this is my objective – is true to the method implied by Koselleck’s work. Again, my ambition is not to paint a life-like picture of a thinking Koselleck, but rather to structure this thinking around what inevitably must be an interpretation. For this interpretation, I rely on Koselleck’s collections of essays The Practice of Conceptual History and Futures Past, translated from German and offering a comprehensive discussion on the practice and theory of conceptual history. Besides these two books, finally, and besides the secondary literature dealing (and sometimes not dealing) with the problems of conceptual history, I have read what is translated from the celebrated Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, a 1972-lexicon of conceptual history still stimulating to its international audience, including the writer of the present.

39 Here, one could easily add a “Theory of Historiography”; Koselleck’s understanding of (and contribution to) historical writing will nevertheless be discussed as a “plural” principle integrated into the sum of his writings.
2.1.1. A Theory of Concepts

At the heart of conceptual history – or at the heart of the critical reader of conceptual history – lies the question of what a concept “is”, if it “is” at all. This question could be re-phrased as follows: what is the difference between a word and a concept? Koselleck offers a variety of answers and recognizes the importance of finding one. In the article “Begriffsgeschichte and Social History”, where, in an unusually exposing manner, Koselleck delineates the method and theory of conceptual history, he writes that “Methodological restriction to the history of concepts expressed in words must have a basis that renders the expressions ‘concept’ and ‘word’ distinguishable [...] Each concept is associated with a word, but not every word is a social and political concept.”

Here, Koselleck departs from the classic, linguistic triad of signifier (word as sound or form), signified (the concept), and object (i.e. the object referred to); similarly, on a parenthetical note, he tends to avoid the Saussurean distinction between langue and parole, the former term lacking the socio-historic dimension in relation to which Koselleck’s conceptual history is defining its interests. Returning to the distinction between signifier, signified, and object, whereas the word, in Koselleck’s account, indeed carries such a distinction, the concept is characterized by the fact that it is not: “Signifier and signified coincide in the concept insofar as the diversity of historical reality and historical experience enter a word such that they can receive their meaning only in this one word, or can be grasped only by this word.”

Words, therefore, due to this separation, carry potentialities of meaning: over time, for instance, the word “brick” may change its meaning completely, but without the preceding meaning in any way having a lasting effect on its semantic trajectory – the potentialities are never actual simultaneously, making words – hence lacking their own history – targets for lexical definitions. The opposite is true for concepts, uniting within themselves “a plenitude of meaning”, concentrating “the variety of historical experience together with a collection of theoretical and practical references into a relation that is given and can be

40 Etymologically speaking, whereas the English “concept” is partly modelled on the Latin conceptum, meaning “that which is conceived”, e.g. a fetus, or “that which is conceived in the mind”, and partly modelled on the Latin concepiō, meaning “to receive” or “to derive”, the German “Begriff” has a more spatial origin, meaning, in Middle High German, “region” or “area”. Theoretically speaking, the etymological difference – interesting as it may be – is of no significance here, the purpose of the following being to produce analytical definitions “overriding” all etymological traces; as will be clear, however, those traces inevitably survive, the spatial origins of the notion of concepts resonating perfectly with what will be discussed in the second part of my methodology. (“concept, n.”, OED online, Oxford University Press, September 2015, accessed March 1, 2017, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/87869?rskey=a9tG8h&result=1&isAdvanced=false&eid)


42 Ibid., p.85.
experienced only through the concept.”\footnote{Ibid.} If only that without a living history can be defined, like words, then concepts escape definition via the historical dimensions they signify: as a signifier, “crisis” is inseparable from its signification, i.e. the concept of “Crisis”, there being no other word – nor could there be another word – referring to the historical experiences here embodied, lived, and feared. And so, as Koselleck himself summarizes it, “The concept is connected to a word, but is at the same time more than a word: a word becomes a concept only when the entirety of meaning and experience within a sociopolitical context within which and for which a word is used can be condensed into one word.”\footnote{Ibid.}

That is probably as close as one gets to a Koselleckian definition. Concepts, as opposed to words, have incorporated all aspects of the context of meaning wherein the words – signifier and signified coinciding – are used. The context of meaning is here understood in social rather than linguistic terms, the content of these meaning-contexts being, first of all, historical experience, and secondly, the historical and theoretical understanding of this experience (as formulated in a social setting). One could perhaps object that novel words – to pursue the limits of this definition – convert into concepts by default, these words, introduced to describe a new experience, always incorporating the contexts of meaning wherein the new word is used. The word “technology”, for example, a nineteenth century neologism constructed out of \textit{techne} and \textit{logos}, once connoted the scientific study of human manufacturing; since “technology” was then defined by the scholars making up the socio-political context of the discipline of Technology, it automatically incorporated all aspects of the contexts of meaning wherein the word was used. If this is correct, then Koselleck’s “definition” is too broad (if not too vague). Of course, what is missing here is a condition of \textit{use} that Koselleck – in a different setting – describes in terms of “democratization” (see below): besides the conditions of satisfaction already discussed, concepts, to be concepts, need to be used beyond the social setting of their word’s inception. Concepts are used within more than one context of meaning, thus allowing the conceptual historian to make statements referring not only to the individual user, but also the linguistic premises (the semantic field) making that use possible. Today, arguably, the word “technology” is much less definable, referring as it is to many contexts and uses. And with many uses and contexts follows a larger number of social functions: “It is precisely the exciting possibility of combining so many functions”, Koselleck writes, “that defines the term as concept: it takes hold of old experiences and transforms them metaphorically
in ways that create altogether new expectations.”

These terms – *experience* and *expectation* – will be discussed below, but it is important to note that they are here referring to both subjective and intersubjective content, Koselleck being interested in the relation between – and conjunction of – an occurrence and the larger, societal structures making that occurrence possible.

Seen in this way, concepts have some interesting qualities. In modernity, concepts have taken the form of *collective singulars*. Referring to both an object and a subject, the collective singular appears to contain within itself the possibilities of all individual instances in which it occurs, the collective singular of “History”, for example, containing all possible histories within its own use and concept (it refers to *all of* History, not its subsets: both the event – the object – and the graphical interpretation of this event – the subject – is seen as examples of something singular, namely History “pure and simple”, the latter including historical experience as well as the writing of that experience).

Collective singulars are thus conceived of as being separated from their natural origins, events, and occurrences, as meta-historical object-subjects (or acting objects) “ordering” history along a linear axis targeting the great *telos*, utopia: in modernity, histories became “History”, and the multitude of experiences following widespread technological and social transformations were collectively *singularized* under the name of “Progress”. In other words, a collection of possible significations concentrated in a singular signifier.

A hierarchy among concepts makes itself evident here. Koselleck writes that “‘Crisis’ belongs among the fundamental concepts, that is to say, irreplaceable concepts, of the Greek language.”

Some concepts are *fundamental*, *irreplaceable*, or more *general* than others. The concept of “Revolution”, for example, can “be defined as a flexible ‘general concept’ that means a least something anywhere in the world, but which in a more precise sense fluctuates enormously from country to country and from one political camp to another.”

Koselleck here explicates the condition of satisfaction – that concepts, to be concepts, at least in modernity, need more than one context of meaning – proposed earlier; nonetheless, the linguistic hierarchy implied is too vague (even though plausible) for a lengthy, methodological discussion (if there

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are different kinds of concept, is a concept really a “concept”?). Instead, I would like to highlight two other qualities associated with the concept as defined above.

When a concept is transformed into a collective singular, it is most often the case that a counter-concept is formed. The counter-concept – always negated by its collective singular, the linguistic glue of the social setting – is used by the group (the “functional agency”) as an instrument of exclusion, much like “homeless” people are negatively excluded – literally and conceptually – from the group of people partaking in the privilege of owning a “Home”. The counter-concept stands in an asymmetrical relation to its counterpart: “homelessness” is not a neutral description of a state of being in the world, but more like a word of disgrace or pity. “The linguistic usage of politics, like that of everyday life, is permanently based on the fundamental figure of asymmetric opposition.”

Koselleck is here influenced by a “structuralist” understanding of language and thought, even though – now with an eye towards “post-structuralism” – he is careful to point out that historical experience is always more complex – and less dichotomous – than what his binary models allow. Since counter-concepts are asymmetrical, they are useful in politics – as a means of negating and undermining the political enemy – but useless in science. More importantly, however, the asymmetry thus articulated depends on the structure of a limited number of conceptual pairs, these pairs being meta-historical categories existing beyond the expressions of a changing, social language. The meta-historical character of these pairs should not be confused with the meta-historical appearance of counter-concepts; in fact, since the counter-concepts are pouring into and occupying – so to speak – the asymmetrical structure of the pairs, the meta-historical appearance of the former is an illusory effect of the reality of the latter. Koselleck is not very clarifying here, but he writes that “The structure of the counter-concepts does not depend solely on the words from which the conceptual pairs are composed. The words are replaceable, whereas the asymmetric structure of the argument survives.”

And so, illustrating a questionable assumption about the polarized structure of human thought, Koselleck, in his article “The Historical-Political Semantics of Asymmetric Counterconcepts”, discusses three, such pairs, namely, the conceptual pairs of “Hellenes-Barbarian”, “Christian-Heathen”, and “Human-Nonhuman”. In the case of the counter-concepts of “Home” and “Homelessness”, then, to exemplify the relationship between counter-concepts and their meta-historical pairs, Kant once wrote that “Man´s identity is thus residential, and that is why the revolutionary, who

50 Ibid., p.159.
has neither hearth nor home, hence neither faith nor law, epitomizes the anguish of errancy.”

Since “Man’s identity is [...] residential”, Kant relates the counter-concepts of “Homeowner-Homeless” to the conceptual pair of “Human-Nonhuman”, thus endowing the former with an asymmetry already existing – meta-historically speaking – in the latter. But the wording of the pairs does not matter here: ultimately, argues Koselleck, what structures the plurality (of histories) is not the conceptual pair of “Human-Nonhuman” *per se*, but the social, asymmetrical logic of belonging and exclusion therein contained. Conceptual pairs, unlike counter-concepts, “can be separated from their original conditions of emergence and their former concrete context: they are historically transferable.” This allows for a history of the “effects of concepts”, a point to which I will return when discussing the so called “Theory of Historical Times”.

Related to this – especially the notion of counter-concepts – is the study of the *semantic field*, a (metaphorical) field of associated terms in which the concept in question has a unique position. As the editors of the book *History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives* argue in their introductory chapter, a semantic field is comprised of “characteristic synonyms, antonyms, [and] associated terms.” Since the concept, in Koselleck’s account, has a position within a semantic field, and since this position is taken to be the focal-point of conceptual meaning, as if the concept was superposed on a semantic field hitherto disconnected, Koselleck often emphasizes the study of the concept over the field in which it has a position. Even though – and this follows from his own method – he is always relating the concept to its associated terms, i.e. the words through which the concept is historically conceptualized, one often gets the impression that the concept under study is of a – meta-linguistic – importance far exceeding that of the linguistic system in which it is expressed – or that the system itself is reflected only in the concept, a Leibnizean *monad* within the modal universe of language. A more “holistic” approach – or rather, since I am here arguing that Koselleck is wrong not in method, but in emphasis: “an approach phrased holistically” – would position the concept and its field on the same, methodological level, thus offering more clearly questions related to the semantic structures of an *enabling* language, i.e. the relationship between a part and its whole – how, for example, associated terms accentuate (and even accelerates) the impact with which a concept

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52 Koselleck, “The Historical-Political Semantics of Asymmetric Counterconcepts”, p.159.

is used in daily life, the history of the concept of “Home”, for instance, being inseparable from the uses of such notions as “intimacy” and “comfort”. If too much emphasis is put on the concept of “Home”, one could easily come to think that these notions carried no significance – nor existence – prior to their association with the concept. But the semantic field is still of great importance to Koselleck’s methodology. The study of terms designating the same concept – as elements within the semantic field – is, in Koselleck’s vocabulary, called onomasiological, an approach thus separated from the semasiological study of the different meanings of one, single term (as well as the historical changes of this term). In fact, by separating these two fields of conceptual enquiry, Koselleck anticipates the structure of my “holistic” reservation. The onomasiological approach, he says, is important for understanding how concepts are formed, the synonyms (and antonyms) of the semantic field being more relatable to institutional history (as well as the history of ideas) than the concept standing by itself could ever be. Semasiology, on the other hand, as the study of concepts and their meanings, could only provide a lexical recording of semantic change. My “holistic” reservation could therefore be expressed in the following way: in the remainder of my paper, where I sketch a history of the concept of “Home”, I will spend a lot of space investigating the history of its semantic field, emphasizing the onomasiological approach, thus, hopefully, allowing me to trace the structural entanglements of a concept in the making.

Moving on, Koselleck writes that without “the invocation of parallel or opposed concepts, without ordering generalized and particular concepts, and without registering the overlapping of two expressions, it is not possible to deduce the structural value of a word as ‘concept’”. The “structural value” of a concept – i.e. its potential as a structuring component in the interpretation of reality, yet another dividing line between the nature of a word and the nature of a concept – is deduced onomasiologically from the synonyms of the semantic field. The semantic field, then, indicative of the linguistic structures underlying the meaning of the concept, is also indicative of the contexts of meaning in which the concept is used. If this is a correct interpretation of Koselleck’s understanding of semantic fields (as well as concepts), and if the contexts of meaning – in which the structural value is expressed – are always partly social, then the semantic field is indicative not only of the semantic intertextuality of the concept, but also of the social experience in which the concept is used. Concluding my discussion on the notion of semantic fields, it follows – I argue – that the latter establishes a connection between

54 Koselleck, “Begriffsgeschichte and Social History”, p.87.
55 Ibid., p.88.
social reality and conceptual use, an interpretation not far off from Koselleck’s own account of *Begriffsgeschichte*. For Koselleck, abridging the divide between social- and conceptual history, concepts – as defined above – are both indicators of and factors in social experience and change.

Concepts, for Koselleck, are not only indicators of social experience and change, but also play a part in these experiences and changes. “Each concept establishes a particular horizon for potential experience and conceivable theory”, he writes, “and in this way sets a limit.” The influence of Heidegger’s “language-as-a-house-of-being” is here evident, even though Koselleck departs from the philosopher by assuming the prominence of extra-linguistic factors, the walls of semantic discourse setting limits that are sometimes transcended. Nevertheless, the “concept is not merely a sign for, but also a factor in, political or social groupings.” Again, concepts work as a kind of social glue, holding the group together by negating the Other, negations that – as counter-conceptual forces in socio-political rhetoric – accelerates the emotional value of transformation: concepts are thus factors in social experience and change, the revolutionary spirit being far less revolutionary without the self-identifying concepts of “Revolution” and “Emancipation”. As limits and potentialities of social meaning, then, concepts, since they are recorded in mediums ranging from caricatures to writing, are especially effective for studying social experience and change.

When studying these experiences and changes, Koselleck proceeds *diachronically* and *synchronously*. Even though the synchronic approach – the study of a language (whether langue or parole) during a specific point in time – is important, says Koselleck, and the conceptual history of Quentin Skinner may here be taken as a case in point (excluding the problem of defining “a point in time” and/or “context”), it is the *diachronic* approach – studying change along the dimensions of time and meaning – that distinguishes the practice of *Begriffsgeschichte*. “Hence”, Koselleck writes, “the diachronic principle constitutes *Begriffsgeschichte* as an autonomous domain of research”. Methodologically speaking, it is concluded, conceptual history starts off by recording the difference in meaning over time (i.e. semasiologically), and then, when the lexical history has been recorded, ensues synchronically by studying the nature and organization of the semantic fields (i.e. onomasiologically), here asking questions about the socio-historical causes for potential change. On a practical level, however, the synchronic is always diachronic, every semantic field being an indicator of the

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56 Ibid., p.86.
57 Ibid., p.83.
temporal processes producing change. If the synchronic approach is more socio-historical than conceptual-historical, then the “sociohistorical relevance of the results increases precisely because attention is directed in a rigorously diachronic manner to the persistence or change of a concept”.58 Understood as a diachronic field of study, conceptual history is thus important because “Persistence, change, or novelty in the meaning of words must first be grasped before they can be used as indices of this extralinguistic content, as indicators of social structures or situations of political conflict.”59

The relationship here implicated, that between language and social reality, is nevertheless rather vague and underdeveloped in Koselleck’s writings. As a methodology, Begriffsgeschichte is based on the (rather plausible) assumption that without language there is no society (and therefore no politics). Conversely, however, and as already mentioned, Koselleck admits that “our concepts are founded in socio-political systems that are far more complex than would be indicated by treating them simply as linguistic communities organized around specific key concepts.”60 There are extra-linguistic (e.g. psychological), pre-linguistic (e.g. structural, societal, or “natural”), and post-linguistic (e.g. events set in motion by but never represented in language) elements in all social action, elements that transcend the socio-political concept and its potential content. Here, Koselleck departs from the Heideggerian house-of-being by recognizing a rift between language and reality not only enlarged by the difference between a being and its representation, but also by historical occurrences themselves, some of them perhaps not even representable. But Koselleck do not exaggerate the depths of this rift: on a subjective level, since mind (which is linguistic) and body is never separated (language, to follow George Lakoff, to whom Koselleck sometimes refer, is spatially-bodily oriented), the pre-linguistic and the linguistic is brought together in experience (as in “memory of”), the former being (literally) inconceivable without the other, just like minds are impossible without bodies (as in “brain-substance”). But this is not a relationship of strict identity, experience always being different from the representation (or memory) of that experience. On a social level, therefore, the non-identical relationship between an experience and its representation is subject to change and rupture, every concept both indicating and being a factor in the locomotive of social reality, creating a tension – between concepts and the experience of social formations – characteristic of history in the plural. If we think what we experience and experience what we think, there are always inter-subjective or pre-linguistic forces provoking

58 Ibid., p.82.
59 Ibid., p.83.
60 Ibid., p.76.
the way we experience our thinking, sometimes even contradicting these experiential body-mind-events. For many, I assume, including cultures on both sides of the Atlantic, it was difficult to fathom the encounters set in motion by Columbus famous misconceptions. Tensions arose, and history changed both socially and conceptually. As Olsen summarizes it: “[Koselleck’s] point is that Heidegger and Gadamer tended to regard language as a form containing all possible human experience. In this way, they lost a perspective on concrete languages (or provinces of languages) and their historicity, their function as indicators and agents of historical change […] consequently, they did not realize that such limits are changeable.”61 For Koselleck, it is precisely this changability that proves to him that there must be experiences beyond language, something extra-linguistic to set the linguistic change in motion – language is not an isolated system.

With that said, it is obvious that Koselleck’s position is closer to Hayden White and Roland Barthes than Leopold Ranke: the representation of history (as the events of social reality) is not identical with that history, and the mode in which one represents is therefore of greatest, theoretical importance. But that is on the historiographical level. To return to the theory of concepts and their relation to social reality, Koselleck believes that language has a reality beyond its immediate and individual use, that concepts, by defining the nature of extra-linguistic events, e.g. a natural disaster, condition their social meaning and impact. The 1755 earthquake in Lisbon, for example, would have different meanin
gs and impacts (since society acts not on events per se, but on the meaning of these events) depending on the conceptual vocabulary applied (e.g. eschatological, Leibnizean, or progressive), a point that is perhaps most famously satirized by Voltaire and his Candide. The concept of “Revolution” is a better example, more in line with the writings of Koselleck: quoting Hanna Arendt, Koselleck writes that before the French Revolution of 1789, “One ‘possessed no word which could have characterized a transformation in which the subjects themselves became the rulers’ […] Social Emancipation as a revolutionary process still lay outside experience.”62 Henceforth, the concepts of “Revolution” and “Emancipation” structured the very thinking of revolution, social events of great, transformational value subsequently being named and acted on accordingly. Since concepts also have an expectational value, they condition the events themselves, the concept of “Emancipation” binding together the social forces necessary for producing change. The concept is here not an imperative – an “open the window please”, producing immediate

62 Koselleck, “Historical Criteria of the Modern Concept of Revolution”, p.49.
change – but a structural element in which thought and action is made possible, as if concepts constituted a meta-linguistic (but transforming) sphere on par with the inescapable structures of human existence: life, death, and the spaces in which we live.

The latter view would be contested by the likes of Quentin Skinner, arguing that thought is constituted by the normative structures of the uses of language, and that no hermeneutics is needed to uncover the unconscious content of circulating concepts: for Skinner, if a word is used to produce a certain effect, in order to understand that utterance, one needs “only” to understand the context of use of the use itself, any extra (historical) meaning existing only in the mind of the wrongheaded interpreter. If Koselleck distinguishes between word and concept, and if this distinction reinforces his semantic approach (the distinction rests solely on a difference in social meaning), then Skinner repudiates that distinction altogether. For Skinner, drawing from the philosophies of Wittgenstein, Austin, and Searle, the meaning of a concept is determined by (and thus methodologically secondary to) the uses of the word with which the concept is identical. If, for Koselleck, concepts are defined as a certain function of meaning, then Skinner argues that all instances of meaning, regardless of their conceptual status, originates in and change according to their social use. Indeed, for Koselleck, thought is diachronic (and synchronically unconscious) language-use coupled with extra- and pre-linguistic experiences of “being-in-the-world”: concepts, as one form of thought, set some

63 As one of the most important conceptual historians of the day, albeit in an Anglophone setting, an overview of the theory of Skinner here seems appropriate. In speech-act theory, from which Skinner draws heavily, developed by J.L. Austin as a challenge to propositional accounts of language, meaning is not analyzed in terms of truth-values, but rather in terms of its performative function, i.e. as a mode of action: speech in general – and political speech in particular – is perceived as performing the very action referred to in the speech, a performance, furthermore, characterized by (i) the deployment of authorial intention (the illutionary act) and/or (ii) the intention to bring about an effect within the situated understanding of the listener (the perlocutionary act). The meaning of the political text, then, argues Skinner, has to be analyzed in terms of (i) and (ii), that is, in terms of its intended meaning and effect. “The essential question which we therefore confront”, writes Skinner in his polemic article from 1969, “in studying any given text, is what its author, in writing at the time he did write for the audience he intended to address, could in practice have been intending to communicate by the utterance of this given utterance” (Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas”, History and Theory 8(1) (1969): p.49.). This question pertains to a careful analysis of the linguistic conventions in which the performative is uttered, this being the only logical method with which to understand conflict, innovation, and subversion as it is enacted in the political text. The Skinnerian principle could perhaps be characterized as follows: conceptual change follows innovation; innovation, in turn, as a performative act, is logically dependent on existing conventions (i.e. the context of linguistic action, or the “linguistic field”, to paraphrase Koselleck); in order to recover the historical meaning of the conventional, subversive, or innovative political argument, therefore, one must first understand the historically situated conventions conditioning the rhetoric of the linguistic actor. Finally, then, I believe that such a synchronic approach (onomasiology) to conceptual history is highly compatible with the diachronic approach (semasiology) of Koselleck – that is to say, as long as the notion of “concept” – as well as the analytical relationship between language and reality – is worked out more rigidly, i.e. on analytic terms resonant with the philosophical attitude of Skinner (see, for example, Kari Palonen’s Quentin Skinner: History, Politics, Rhetoric, 2003).
limits to what can be experienced. As he himself remarks: “language and history depend on each other but never coincide.”  

Finally, to conclude this part of the story, I should not fail to mention some of the critiques leveled at Begriffsgeschichte. Janet Coleman, for example, albeit sympathetic to the project of Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, asks the following, critical questions, aimed at the practice of conceptual history rather than the theory here charted: what criteria are used to identify and privilege socio-political concepts (instead of, say, economic concepts)?; the source material used in conceptual history (lexical items, philosophical inquiry, and juridical documents) is indicative only of that which has survived the destruction of time, and one could therefore ask if Begriffsgeschichte really captures the social reality it attempts to represent?; and if we are able to assess only the voices that survived, how can we determine conceptual change?  

These questions are both difficult and important, and I will later attempt to answer them (but only partly); the promised discussion on the notion of space is – among other things – meant to bring new types of sources into play, thus deferring at least one of the questions aimed at Begriffsgeschichte. It is also important to note that the concept of concepts – as discussed above – has no real, linguistic equivalence: from a linguistic point of view, the definitions offered by Koselleck are not enough. Even though I see the potential for asking question about the syntactic or cognitive structure of concepts (to use Noam Chomsky’s grammatological terminology, aiming at the Cartesian “unicity of the deep structures of discourse and the generality of the field of consciousness”), I will not pursue a full-blown definition of concepts here. Why? If I am interpreting Koselleck correctly, whereas the syntactic function of concepts is of no importance to his definition (it could be the same as for another set of words, e.g. “substantive verbs”), their relationship to thinking (as in mentalité) is of some importance, demanding of the historian not a linguistic definition, but a philosophical-cognitive one. Such a definition would have to respect the common-sense assumption about some words being more significant (stronger?) than others, an assumption, I believe, that is enough for the historian asking questions about social reality. In the end, theories are methodologically useful in so far as they produce questions that (i) produce a field of enquiry and (ii) do not restrict the possibility of falsifying the hypothesis out of which the question is produced. Koselleck’s theory of concepts satisfies both of these conditions, and to paraphrase Keith Tribe, the

66 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, p.61.
translator of *Futures Past*, as well as summarize what have so far been said, the theory – and its hypotheses – here outlined produces the following questions pertaining to a historical method: is the concept in common usage?; is its meaning disputed?; what is the social range of its usage?; what contexts is it used in?; does it have a semantic field, and is it paired?; what is the value of the term in socio-political discourse?; who uses the term, and for how long has it been used? When sketching my history of “Home”, it is my ambition to have all these questions, definitions, and reservations – as discussed above – in mind; if my use of the vocabulary of Koselleck may seem dogmatic (which it isn’t), it is because the sum of its parts is inseparable from these parts themselves, the question of contexts, for example, being effortlessly captured in the notion of semantic fields. That said, it is now time to examine the so-called “Anthropological Theory”.

2.1.2. *Koselleck’s Anthropological Theory*

More than once, I have stumbled upon the terms *experience* and *expectation*. Together, in the oeuvre of Koselleck here analyzed, they constitute an anthropological theory (partly) separable from the conceptual history they are meant to illuminate. As with the “Theory of Concepts”, I will begin by looking at Koselleck’s own definition of the two terms. And so, in an article titled “Time and History”, he writes that “on the one hand, every human being and every human community has a space of experience out of which one acts, in which past things are present or can be remembered, and, on the other, one always acts with reference to specific horizons of expectation.”

A more straightforward definition is offered in the article “Space of Experience and Horizon of Expectation: Two Historical Categories”, in which he writes that whereas “experience is present past, whose events can be incorporated and remembered”, the notion of expectation, subjective as well as intersubjective, “also takes place in the today; it is the future made present; it directs itself to the not-yet, to the non-experienced, to that which is to be revealed.”

Experience as the present past out of which one acts, and expectation as the “future made present” in reference to which one acts. Accordingly, they both constitute a form of present, namely, the present of the past and the present of the future. To differentiate these “presents”, Koselleck calls them “space of experience” and “horizon of expectation”, thus

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indicating the difference in their respective mode of being. These metaphors, he says, has a substantiated argument: “It makes sense to say that experience based on the past is spatial since it is assembled into a totality, within which many layers of earlier times are simultaneously present […] By contrast, it is more precise to make use of the metaphor of an expectational horizon […] The horizon is that line behind which a new space of experience will open, but which cannot yet be seen.”69 A horizon always moves in relation to the position you occupy: space, on the other hand, constituting that position, thus acting as a determinant for the nature of your expectational horizon, is multilayered and total, a form of non-chronological presence.

Nonetheless, the space of experience and horizon of expectation are more than just fancy metaphors. For Koselleck, they are meta-historical, anthropological categories, fundamental existential structures that condition the possibility of all human history. Indeed, all human history – or all “histories”, since the latter, for Koselleck, are always realized by human agents – is therefore structured by the (anthropological) relationship between experience and expectation, a relationship that – as is the case with most of Koselleck’s vocabulary – refers to both an individual and a collective-social level. Accordingly, “these two categories are indicative of a general human condition; one could say that they indicate an anthropological condition without which history is neither possible nor conceivable.”70 Moreover, these categories claim the highest degree of generality: as applicable historical categories, enhancing historical understanding, they resemble the categories of space and time. Be that as it may, and poking at my discussion on the notion of space, the categories, despite their spatial metaphors,71 are of the temporal order, expressing as they are a phenomenological relationship between the dimensions of past, present, and future (personal and social). And just like our temporal notions of past and future, there is no experience without expectation, nor any expectation without experience.

Importantly, for Koselleck, even if history is structured by these categories, it is never determined by them. As formal categories in the study of history, he says, “what is experienced and what is expected cannot be deduced from the categories themselves.”72 The

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69 Ibid., p.260.
70 Ibid., p.256.
71 On the use of spatial metaphors, Koselleck writes that “We are always using concepts that were originally conceived in spatial terms, but that nevertheless have a temporal meaning […] Here, our expressions are taken from the spatial realm, even from geology […] We live by naturally metaphorical expressions, and we are unable to escape from them, for the simple reason that time is not manifest (anschaulich) and cannot be intuited (anschaulich gemacht worden) […] All historical categories, including progress […] are spatial expressions by origin”. (Koselleck, “On the Need for Theory in the Discipline of History”, p.6-7)
72 Koselleck, “Space of Experience and Horizon of Expectation: Two Historical Categories”, p.256
phenomenological relation between past, present, and future – represented by experience and expectation – does not itself determine the content of its elements. The categories of experience and expectation are thus formal and meta-historical, empty of deductible histories; whereas their standing as such is static – one always experience and expects, regardless of the history one lives – the relationship between them is not. In fact, it may very well be the case that the content of one’s history determines the relationship that – inversely – signifies that very history. As will be elaborated upon below, for instance, one of the major features of modernity is that expectation has been – to an increasing degree – differentiated from experience, thus shifting the temporal focus through which socio-political concepts are temporalized: “As long as the Christian doctrine of the Final Days set an immovable limit to the horizon of expectation […] the future remained bound to the past.”73 Following processes of industrialization, scientific advancement, social upheavals, and confrontations between previously separated cultures, the future became a sphere of expected unexpectedness, an open movement towards enlightenment captured elegantly by the concepts of “Progress” and “History in general”. It became impossible to act on and interpret the future from the position of your previous experience, thus causing a rift between the categories of experience and expectation; the categories stayed the same, but the relation between them changed. Such transformations, enacted in the tension between experience and expectation (or fact and possibility), “brings about new resolutions and through this generates historical times.”74 And so, evidently, there is a strong correlation between language, history, and the temporal mode of being of that history, a correlation that – and here is my methodological point – may be used to effect by the conceptual historian. At least that is how the argument goes; for now, I will leave it as it is, its implications being expanded upon under the following rubric.

Returning to the formal and temporal character of the anthropological categories of experience and expectation, it should be noted that they are in no way opposed, and that the structure of their relationship is not asymmetrical (as was the case with the conceptual pairs). The difference between experience and expectation is instead of a temporal nature: whereas experience, as past made present, is “drenched in reality”, expectation, as future made present, is instead drenched in what not yet is. Of course, expectation is experienced and therefore – in some sense – real; the point is here that these categories represent a temporal self-projection, an understanding of the world and one’s self in which the future has no reality (as-of-yet). The

73 Ibid., p.264.
74 Ibid., p.262.
difference could thus be formalized as a case of dissimilar modes of temporal existence, the temporal structure of experience resulting from the deferred alternations in experiencing (remembering) one’s experience (as we travel in time, our memories of past experiences change, causing our temporal existence in the past to transform along a temporal axis, not unlike Henri Bergson’s formula for time and memory, wherein every new experience is accumulating and transforming simultaneously), and the temporal structure of expectation resulting from the hopeful or fearful projection of that experience. In sum, again, whereas experience is past made present (continuously, ever-changing), expectation is future made present (through a form of temporal projection). Regardless, the implication is not that expectations can be deduced from experience: even if the “gain in experience exceeds the limitation of the possible future presupposed by previous experience”,\(^75\) meaning that expectation is not possible without experience, there are always elements of the former – societies with no experience of war could still fear war – that are necessary for and independent of the latter, aforementioned *fear* being a universal feeling of expectation assuming different expressions during different times. Conversely, since the unexpected happens all the time, forcing us to add experiences previously un-had, expectation is always *more or less* than experience: sometimes we expect the unexpected, and sometimes we don’t. To quote Koselleck, “The penetration of the horizon of expectation, therefore, is creative of new experience”,\(^76\) but “the previously existing space of experience is not sufficient for the determination of the horizon of expectation. Thus, space of experience and horizon of expectation are not to be statically related to each other.”\(^77\) As meta-historical categories, they are static; as the sum of a relation, they signify changing tensions symptomatic of historical times.

To get a better grip on the two categories, it is now time to explicate the influence of Heidegger and Gadamer (for this, I am indebted to Olsen’s book). In *Sein und Zeit*, famously so, Heidegger argues that to be is to be in time. Humans are thrown into their mortality, the temporal boundaries of life and death – in other words: their *finality*. This finality is unquestionable, meta-historical; when experienced and understood, the finality of being structures the self-understanding (and world-understanding) of that being. Since the finality of being is a temporal condition, temporality is transposed to the structure of self-understanding: in other words, due to this transposal, self- and world-understanding is a form of self-projection in the three dimensions of time, i.e. a temporal positioning of one’s being (with an inevitable

\(^{75}\) Ibid., p.263.

\(^{76}\) Ibid., p.262.

\(^{77}\) Ibid., p.263.
More than self-understanding, however, this positioning is one of self-constitution: we are in time as we live in time, “taking care” – in time – of ourselves and our surroundings. For Gadamer, on the other hand, it is not so “simple”, self-understanding being not a fixed, temporal projection, but a reading of one’s self structured by the nature of the experiences and expectations previously had; naturally, therefore, different experiences cause different self-understandings. For Gadamer, in his Wahrheit und Methode, accepting the Heideggerian notion of finality, every person – as “historically-effected” beings, i.e. conditioned by historical contexts – has a “horizon”, a field of vision both limited and dynamic – limited since it is bound to the finality of one’s life, dynamic because we have new experiences in relation to which the horizon adjusts itself. The self-awareness of the limit of the horizon (i.e. finality) is essential for real experience: by realizing one’s constraints, the impossibility of achieving certain things (especially when they transcend the borders of death), it is possible to realize what in fact can be achieved, the possibility of actualizing expectations. The terminology is similar to that of Koselleck, the main difference being that Koselleck is concerned with subjective as well as social phenomenology: again, for Koselleck, experience and expectation refer to both levels of being, a being that, moreover, is not necessarily being-towards-death (as in Heidegger). Interestingly, however, Koselleck having a political interest in the human capability of nuclear self-annihilation, the subjective notion of finality, used in both Heidegger and Gadamer as a phenomenological a priori, could in fact be collectivized on the level of societal expectation: The Cold War – under the shadow of which Koselleck wrote – indeed epitomized such expectations of apocalyptic mass-finality. Regardless, the notion of finality is not as important for Koselleck as it is for Heidegger: in Koselleck, being-as-experience/expectation is not constituted solely by the awareness of its death. Where Koselleck instead draws most from Heidegger and Gadamer is the phenomenological terminology of experience, expectation, horizon – the spatial metaphor of horizon, always relative to its Gadamerian (space of) experience, is almost unaltered in Koselleck – and the temporality of being as encapsulated in the relationship between experience and expectation. David Carr, in his review of Vergangene Zukunft (i.e. Futures Past), makes the following observation: for Heidegger, arguing that we

78 Olsen, History in the Plural, p.185.
80 Of course, this is highly reminiscent of how we read books, the hermeneutic circle: according to Gadamer, we enter these readings with pre-conceptions formed by our previous experiences and expectations, these pre-conceptions being revised when the new (reading-)experiences do not abide with what we initially expected, creating new expectations that – again – are revised when we turn the page. And so, we “fuse horizons” with the text.
81 Olsen, History in the Plural, p.223.
make sense of the world and ourselves not through the past, but our projected future, “the prime
dimension of human temporality is the future: possibility has priority over actuality […] Thus
the subject-matter of history is in an important sense not fact but possibility, not past but future;
or, more precisely past possibilities and prospects, past conceptions of the future: futures past.”82 That may very well be the connection between Heidegger and the title of Koselleck’s
book, even though I do not agree with its implications. As already argued, in Koselleck’s
writings, there is no hierarchy between experience (past) and expectation (future); as existential
fundamentals, they are equally important for formulating temporal self-understanding, as is fact
and hypothesis (possibility) for formulating historical research. The title, I take it, simply refers
to what is being studied, namely, past futures and the difference between them; if anything, the
premise of that difference is more Gadamerian than Heideggerian, past futures in plural
implying dynamic and not fixed temporal relations.

There is one more element of Koselleck’s “Anthropological Theory” that
deserves mentioning. To the list of conceptual pairs discussed above, I must now add four more,
the following dichotomies being less “culturally specific” than – for example – the conceptual
pair of “Hellene-Barbarian”. Olsen lists these pairs by tracing their origin: “These four
contectual pairs comprised those of friend/enemy, taken from Schmitt; master/slave, taken
from Hegel; man/woman, and parents/children (which belong to the concept of generativity,
and which Koselleck later integrated with Arendt’s concept of nativity), and the geopolitical
concepts (that he in later writing specified as “inner” and “outer”, taken from Hobbes).”83 These
pairs Koselleck added so that he could complement the subjective phenomenology of
Heidegger and Gadamer with a socio-historic dimension. Naturally, as with the concepts of
experience and expectation, these categories allow Koselleck to write a “plural” history (see
above) devoid of relativism and utopianism: in other words, Koselleck’s meta-historical
anthropology allows him to disregard the relativist viewpoint by employing categories also
lacking in historical direction (utopia is nowhere implied, the categories lacking real content).
Olsen writes that “Instead of acknowledging the anthropologically given human limits and
possibilities as encompassed in the human finality and in the friend/enemy and master/slave
relations, modern man envisioned worlds in which these distinctions were either done away
with or defined in excessively asymmetrical fashions. The aim to counter these visions is the
crux of Koselleck’s work, and his reinterpretation of the notion of finality is essential to this

83 Olsen, History in the Plural, p.65.
aim.”\(^{84}\) In conclusion, this reinterpretation takes form of a relationship between spaces of experience and horizons of expectation – enacted, conceptually at least, in the socio-historic game of conceptual pairs.

Now, finally, there is the question of whether the anthropology of Koselleck is plausible or not. As a theory on the temporality of human beings, I believe that it is, there being no reason to deny the notions of past, present, and future as expressed in the categories of experience and expectation; even if some cultures – allegedly – experience time differently, in a “circular” or “spiral” fashion, i.e. non-linearly, that non-linearity would still rely on the cognitive functions of memory and planning, circularity being impossible without the recognition of a position being returned to (implying, as does our DNA, experience and expectation, memory and planning: one remembers how things were done – experiencing them – so that it can be done again – as expected). In *The Savage Mind*, Lévi-Strauss famously makes a distinction between “cold” and “hot” societies, “the former seeking to annul the possible effects of historical factors on their equilibrium and continuity […] the latter resolutely internalizing the historical process and making it the moving power of their development.”\(^{85}\)

“Equilibrium” and “Development” – as two forms of temporal understanding – are equally impossible without the experience of experience and expectation. A better question is: could one add a third or a fourth category? Is it enough to speak in terms of experience and expectation, or should one also add “spatiality” to the list of meta-historical, anthropological givens? What about imagination and fantastical thinking: is that not fundamental to the temporal situation of human beings? For now, since I am here primarily concerned with conceptual history, not existential ontology, I leave these questions as they are, i.e. as reminders of the reservation that Koselleck’s theory is anything but conclusive, unquestionable, or universally applicable. Take the four, conceptual pairs: are they really that basic, and what other pairs could be added, if any? When sketching a history of “Home”, if these pairs are referred to, they are referred to as generalizing binaries rather than *generalizable* categories of historical dialectics; in fact, and in tension with Koselleck’s “plural” and “non-directional” history, the pairs imply a binary origin to be transcended historically, dialectically, and teleologically. Master/Slave and Friend/Enemy: as motors of history, do we not wish for these binaries to synthesize? Moreover, when these binaries *are* transcended, which they sometimes are (if not always), as is the case with the questionable gender-pair of man/woman (it would be rather

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\(^{84}\) Ibid., p.76.

presumptuous to organize historical research around the conceptual “opposition” between men and women), the historicity achieved makes them less valuable as tools of meta-historical inquiry. For that reason, instead of assuming the structuralist thesis that thinking can be boiled down to a set of binary pairs, I will assume the opposite (which, anyway, is more Koselleckian), only referring to these conceptual pairs when the asymmetry they express has an explanatory value (social or rhetorical).

On a more fine-tuned note, one could question the metaphorical structure of the two categories, as does Michael Pickering in his article “Experience as horizon: Koselleck, Expectation, and Historical Time”. In said article, Pickering writes that “Changing the terms of Koselleck’s conceptual couplet for the experience of historical time shifts the theoretical balance from possible stasis to possible change. It allows possibility and change a fuller presence in the ways the couplet may be analytically applied.”

Pickering proposes that the couplets trade metaphors, the space of experience becoming a “horizon of experience”, and the horizon of expectation becoming a “space of expectation”; whereas the horizon of experience, he argues, signifies a “finite limitation which is exceeded”, the space of expectation, “which is thereby reconfigured as the space in which an experiential possibility is realized”, allows us to move “beyond the limit of what has already been attained.” Such a trade, it is argued, would better capture the tumultuousness of a (modern) reality in which our experiential horizons are being constantly transformed; effectively, the metaphorical trade would temporalize experience (as something that is “beyond”) as well as accentuate the existential quality of expectation (as a space in which one lives). “The horizon defines a limit, but that limit is never fixed either spatially, or in its metaphorical extension, temporally. The space of expectation is limited only by the rate at which the horizon of our experience expands.”

The analytical advantage of this reversal is twofold: first, more emphasis is put on the ever-changing horizon of experience, and secondly, expectation is given a fixed structure (read: an embedded structure) shaped only by the field of vision of experience. My problem with this is that it seems to capture Koselleck’s understanding of modernity – where, I recall, socio-political concepts were temporalized in favor of expectations – only by losing the representation of an experience-focused pre-modernity. Ever-changing experiences and expected un-expectedness (as a fixed, structural component of being) may very well be the birth-marks of modernity (thus captured more

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87 Ibid.
88 Ibid., p.238.
efficiently with the metaphorical exchange of Pickering) – but is not the opposite true for the subjects of feudal Europe? Did they live expectation and envision experience? As will be made evident in the following, Koselleck would answer the latter question with an emphatic no; Pickering’s metaphors are not meta-historical, as they should be, but modern, as they intend to be. For that reason – I nevertheless agree with Pickering’s thesis that the spatial metaphors of Koselleck are anything but self-evident – I will continue to speak of “spaces of experience” and “horizons of expectations”, these metaphors – and this is reason enough – being far more intuitive than the ones offered by Pickering. A final reflection on this problem may act as a segue to the next: perhaps the modern separation of expectation from experience could be described in Pickering’s terms, as a metaphorical trade-off, spaces of experience losing their fixedness to expectation, instead gaining a horizontal quality? That is the area of inquiry to which I now turn.

2.1.3. A Theory of Historical Times

As for Koselleck’s “Theory of Historical Times”, I will try to keep my account as short as possible; first of all, it is less a theory than a series of hypothetical statements, and secondly, the plural history it is meant to support has already been discussed. If the theory and method of Foucault (that is, one of his methods) is described in terms of an “archeology”, then the theory and method of Koselleck could be described in terms of a “geology” – as he himself does when commenting on the spatiality of his many metaphors. Geology, as a science, covers all of earth’s history, its temporality being indicated by the kaleidoscopic layers of space on which we stand, act, and depend. In line with the geological analogy, the structure of historical times, Koselleck argues, not a singularized being-towards-telos, is instead made up of a series of temporal layers (Zeitschichen). These layers, in interacting with each other, generate historical times, a term that, if it is to have any meaning, “is tied to social and political units of action, to particular acting and suffering human beings, and to their institutions and organizations […] each of which has its own temporal rhythm.” Socio-political time (i.e. historical time) is different than the natural, physical, and astronomical time by which it is measured: the earth revolves around the sun, and night turns into day – historical time, on the other hand, constituted by the interactions among its multi-layered sediments of socio-political actions, transcend the

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90 Koselleck, “Time and History”, p.110.
recurring rhythms of natural phenomena with the help of which – subsequently – a chronology of time is instituted.

Indeed, for Koselleck, what characterizes these temporal layers is that they all have different structures: in other words, each layer has its specific durability, speed (i.e. velocity of acceleration or retardation), and pattern of repetition (these are, in part, my terms). Some historical phenomena, such as the socio-political structure of the church, are more durable than others, even retarding the accelerating functions of other structures, such as the social, economic, and political discourse of scientific investigation; a durable structure like church-law may therefore repeat itself within institutions supposedly disconnected from its initial context of meaning (I am here thinking of public laws regarding kin), consequently, as a geologist would describe it, constituting a temporal layer on which the present of the surface is – inadvertently – carried away. With generalizing intentions, Koselleck identifies three levels – and their mutual interactions – from which historical time is generated: the first level is that of the event, e.g. an assassination, experienced by humans as singular and unique; on the second level, these events are continuously inscribed into and conditioned by the recursive structures of more durable histories, e.g. the repetitive enmity of conflicting beliefs, themselves divided into sub-levels of speed, durability, and repetitive bearing; on the third level, lastly, we find the most durable structures, meta-historical even, e.g. the “Anthropological Theory” of Koselleck, or the biological, geographical, and cognitive limits (as well as possibilities) of “being-in-the-world”. And so, as a form of structural history, referring to these levels, Koselleck sets out to investigate “the relations between the singular events and the different levels of movement and change taking place within the recursive and transcending structures.”91

As a theoretical framework, “geology” thus has its method.

The reader of Fernand Braudel (1902-1985) will recognize the three levels as a separation between (i) the slow history of human environments, (ii) the dynamic history of social, political, and economic structures, and (iii) the history of events.92 If, for Braudel, these layers are ontologically separated, then, for Koselleck, what matters is the interrelation between them: again, historical time is a consequence of their entanglement, Koselleck’s ontology – if anything – being more “flat” than Braudel’s. Returning to the notion of speed, modernity, for Koselleck, is characterized by acceleration on all levels of temporality (take the third level of longue durée, for instance, climate change accelerating as it interacts with accelerating

91 Olsen, History in the Plural, p.227-228.
technological advancement; hence, the *Anthropocene*), an acceleration understood in terms of “shorter and shorter time-spans” interlocking the socio-political actions of a modernized earthliness. Not very surprisingly, at the very outset of modernity, this process of acceleration – notoriously envisioned in the secularized eschatology of “Progress” – was halted by the retarding forces of clerical and feudal hegemony; the conceptual consequence, says Koselleck, and my attempt is here to illustrate the methodological usefulness of these terms, was, initially at least, a “futureless future” of “evil endlessness”, a battle for the better in which progress was sought but never made.

Evidently, the relation between *event* and *structure* is of greatest methodological importance: in other words, studying this relation is tantamount to studying the interrelations of historical times – that is to say, the *nature* of historical times. Structures, says Koselleck, are only expressed through events, and it is therefore not the case that one describes the former while always narrating the latter. It is nevertheless important to keep event and structure apart: “The interrelation of event and structure must not be permitted to lead to the suppression of their differences if they are to retain their epistemological object of disclosing the multiple strata of history. The before and after of an event contains its own temporal quality that cannot be reduced to a whole within its longer-term structures.” All events – generating a temporality of “before” and “after” – are thus based on preexisting structures in turn becoming a part of the event (as a repetition of itself). But this “preexistence” should not be described as a “before”: events happen within structures, not “after” them. Furthermore, events and structures are equally real, and whereas events can gain structural significance (e.g. the French Revolution), the durability of structures can turn into events (e.g. long-lasting anti-Semitism turning into an event of WWII, depending on the storyteller, of course). Events are supra-individual and intersubjective, transcending the space of experience of the subjects involved in the event; in sum, geologically speaking, events, as ruptures of space, are triggered by structural forces of temporal layers not unaffected by the cataclysm thus released.

Because of all the interactions between “older” and “newer” layers of history, what characterizes historical time is a *contemporaneity of the noncontemporaneous*, or a *simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous (die Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen)*, the latter of these terms (i.e. *Ungleichzeitigen*) being borrowed from the works of Ernst Bloch.

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describes the simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous – also found in Lenin’s principle of uneven, global development – in the following way: “A differential classification of historical sequences is contained in the same naturalistic chronology. Within this temporal refraction is contained a diversity of temporal strata which are of varying duration, according to the agents or circumstances in question, and which are to be measured against each other.”97 As an example, Koselleck discusses the relation between Europe and its colonies, the discourse of this relationship encapsulating an experience of differing temporalities; Europe, it was argued, was ahead of the times of its colonies, thus justifying the horrors of an aligning civilization-effect. Similarly, “varying extensions of time are contained in the concept of Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen”,98 not only the notion of the past, anticipations of events that have not yet occurred still being rooted in the present. In other words, in modernity, the simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous was both experienced and expected, most modern (temporal) concepts being deductible from the combination of the temporal experiences of irreversibility, repeatability, and the simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous. As will be discussed below, the second of the terms, i.e. “repeatability”, is typically “pre-modern”, referring as it is to a figurative mode of temporality; if my interpretation of Koselleck is correct, therefore, the simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous has two levels of occurrence, one being the experience and expectation of historical times, the other being the disciplinary interpretation of this experience-expectation (allowing the historian to describe both experience and the conceptualization of that experience). On a final note, it is here possible to trace some influence from Hegel and Marx: the modern experience of a simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous – evident in the socio-political structures of early capitalism – inspires change and transformation, the modern buzzword of “Equality” standing in direct opposition to the social implications of a simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous. Whether we act on this buzzword is another question: when watching documentaries on the tribal communities of sub-Sahara, enjoying the bluish comfort of our digital entertainment, are we inspired by the simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous thus experienced, longing for the past, or perhaps instead living our future?

With all these terms in mind, it is now time to discuss the notion of modernity, separated from pre-modernity by the cataclysms of the Sattelzeit, a Koselleckian term corresponding to Foucault’s thesis that in the eighteenth-century, a rupture of meaning emerged – a discontinuity, so to speak, grabbing hold of the rationalism of the Cartesian order. The

98 Ibid.
Sattelzeit ("saddle-time"), writes Olsen, “refers to how, in the period between 1750 and 1850, deep-seated societal-political changes went hand in hand with fundamental changes in the conceptual topography, so that basic social and political concepts acquired meanings that no longer need to be translated in order to be understood today.”99 Koselleck characterizes the Sattelzeit as a “complex process whose course is in part invisible and gradual, sometimes sudden and abrupt”.100 The term Sattelzeit is artificial and hypothetical, capturing – more than anything else – the new experience of time (the Verzeitlichung) as discoursed by Koselleck in his Futures Past; and so, in the article “Historia Magistra Vitae: The Dissolution of the Topos into the Perspective of a Modernized Historical Process”, by tracing the semantic processes of the Sattelzeit, Koselleck delineates the transforming temporality of an ensuing modernity. The topos to be dissolved into the “Perspective of a Modernized Historical Process” refers to the Latin phrase “Historia Magistra Vitae”, a Ciceronian idiom indicating the function of historical knowledge in its pre-modern setting. Temporal experiences prior to the Sattelzeit, argues Koselleck, differed fundamentally from the temporal experiences of modernity: before its dissolution into a modernized conception, history was “a teacher of life”, events repeating themselves along a continuum of futurity inseparable from its pasts (allowing for, among other things, the narrative insertion of figurative mythologemes, e.g. the lives of saints).101 As a continuous space of experience, therefore, the past, expected to be repeated, could teach life by disclosing all interpretations of the future: in other words, in pre-modernity, by knowing the outcome of past occurrences, one could predict the best of potential future actions.102

Following the Sattelzeit, in the German world, the word Geschichte, initially referring to an occurrence, replaced the word Historie as a concept for history (meaning, in the pre-modern context, the account of an occurrence). Geschichte, in replacing Historie, simultaneously assumed the meaning of the latter, and so carried a dual meaning referring to both an occurrence and the representation of that occurrence. This shift, argues Koselleck, changed the meaning of the topos, ultimately emptying it: the instructiveness of Historie as written representation was no longer epistemologically adequate, and if life was to be instructed at all, it had to be by Geschichte.103 This semantic replacement, apart from demarcating “a new

99 Olsen, History in the Plural, p.171.
101 Ibid., p.29.
102 Ibid., p.28.
103 Ibid., p.33.
experiential space” where one no longer acted from a knowledge of the past, also carried a grammatical modification in the use of the word Geschichte. Koselleck notes that, up until the middle of the eighteenth century, die Geschichte was used in plural, referring to the plurality of histories implied by the topos. With the semantic replacements of the Sattelzeit, however, Geschichte gained the novel form of a collective singular.\(^{104}\) The singularization of a pre-modern plurality, denoting a universal reality of historical processes collected under a singular movement, involved what Koselleck calls a “temporalization of history”: natural time, as it is manifested in celestial movements (among other phenomena), was divorced from historical time, the latter losing its figurative and seasonal-cyclical mode, instead becoming a linear entity. Denaturalized and temporalized, History (as Geschichte) gained what the topos lost, i.e. meaning. “Progress”, writes Koselleck, “became the prime category in which a transnatural, historically immanent definition of time first found expression.”\(^ {105}\) The concept of “Progress”, implying a constantly renewed difference, made the old Ciceronian idiom meaningless: whereas the utopian horizons of expectations directed one's gaze forward, toward an assumed state of happiness, the teleological space of experience, ascribing otherness to a past now devoid of its potential recurrence, emptied history of its instructive value. In short, past(s) was lost to future(s), and experience separated from expectation.

The character of modern experiences was discovered in modernity itself (primarily, in the Enlightenment), as is made evident by the concepts with which this, new experience was expressed: the notion of an open future; the periodization of “Middle Ages”; the linguistic use of the term saecula, i.e. centuries; the colonial theorem of the simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous; the development of historicism, the relativization of historical perspective.\(^ {106}\) Since these notions were first conceptualized in the eighteenth-century, a time that called itself modern, Koselleck finds it adequate to locate the advent of modernity in Enlightenment-thought: “There enters into the philosophy of progress a typical eighteenth-century mixture of rational prediction and salvational expectation […] This self-accelerating temporality robs the present of the possibility of being experienced as present, and escapes into a future within which the unapprehendable present has to be captured by historical philosophy.”\(^ {107}\) Finally, then, the Neuzeit (i.e. modernity) “contains a multitude of temporal indicators. For one, Neuzeit can be retrospectively understood as a period. At the same time,

\(^{104}\) Ibid.  
\(^{105}\) Ibid., p.37.  
\(^{106}\) Koselleck, “The Eighteenth Century as the Beginning of Modernity”.  
\(^{107}\) Ibid., p.22-23.
however, it refers to political thrusts of events understood in shortened intervals as far-reaching, new, and epochal. In the longer term, Neuzeit proves to be a period of transition.\footnote{Ibid., p.165.}

As a period of transition, the Sattelzeit marks the liminality of a rupture in the geological structure of historical times. As expected, however, the ensuing periodization is not one of fundamental relativity: in contrast to the archeological model of Foucault, for Koselleck, in the geological model of historical times, there is no incommensurability between the different layers/periods of history, every simultaneity being simultaneous with the nonsimultaneous. Again, some historical processes, products of older ruptures, accelerating and retarding in relation to the ever-changing present, remain active in this evolving collection of presents, and so bring about a heterogeneity of commensurable temporalities.

So far, my discussion on the Sattelzeit has focused on the temporalization of concepts (the Verzeitlichung), i.e. a changing conception of time. In Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, and in Koselleck’s personal oeuvre, he proposes three more processes – he calls them “hypotheses” – of modern, conceptual change.\footnote{Koselleck, “Introduction and Prefaces to the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe”.

\footnote{Olsen, History in the Plural, p.171.}} During the Sattelzeit, it is argued, besides being temporalized, most if not all socio-political concepts were politicized (Politisierung: the number of people using and being mobilized by concepts increased, thus making the concepts effective as slogans and catchwords), democratized (Demokratisierung: concepts grew in social scope, meaning that they were used by groups other than the elite, i.e. lawyers, scholars, and aristocracy), and ideologicized (Ideologisierbarkeit: concepts were abstracted – as in becoming more abstract – and integrated into philosophical systems of concepts formulated in accordance with the interests of the group in question).\footnote{Olsen, History in the Plural, p.171.} As with the notions of experience and expectation, one could ask: is there no room for a fifth or a sixth “hypothesis”, e.g. a “nationalization” of concepts, or a “spatialization”? Whereas the “hypothesis” of “nationalization” is elaborated upon in my history of “Home”, the second “hypothesis”, that of space and “spatialization”, is explored in the following analysis of conceptual space. I will therefore leave this discussion by remarking only two things: first, the close relationship between theory, hypothesis, and method should here be noted, the method of conceptual history – investigating these conceptual transformations, thus confirming or falsifying our understanding of the Sattelzeit – following from hypotheses themselves derived from a geological theory of historical times (the significance of this relationship has already
been discussed); secondly, encouraged by the preceding remark, the notion of the *Sattelzeit* – and its four hypotheses – will therefore be of some importance to my own conceptual history.

Finally, as customary, some well-deserved points of critical reflection: the “Theory of Historical Times” seems outdated in that it proposes a linear periodization of before and after, the *Sattelzeit* simply being a function of modernity in which one throws the old-fashioned rhetoric of pre-modern experiences; consequently, the “before” and “after” becomes “then” and “now”, as if we “modern people” exist in a coherent singularity. In fact, that is exactly how Koselleck understands the modern understanding of history; his own understanding of history, however, as argued above, is that “pre-modernity” is “still here”, but in layers separated from pre-modernity itself, thus making it impossible to speak of an ontological separation between modernity and pre-modernity. The separation nevertheless has epistemological value: if divorced from the normative implications found in Enlightenment conceptions of modernity (the notions of “Dark Ages” and “Renaissance” being two cases in point), periodization can be used as an important tool for understanding history, the *Sattelzeit*, for example, being a useful term for capturing the – sometimes disputed – fact that *something* happened, and that we are now living the consequences (good and bad). Periodization is bound to fail as a singular mode of representation, but so is our knowledge of the past if not represented periodically. And so, the distinction between modernity and pre-modernity will be used as a point of reference in the following history of “Home”, supplemented with other epochal indicators (e.g. “feudal age”, “Antiquity”, “industrialization”) when specific aspects of the (empty) categories are being referred to; with such use, my hope is simply to avoid any normative implications. More important than anything else – of course – is avoiding conceptual anachronism: is that not the *raison d'être* for pursuing a conceptual history?

Moving on, Koselleck’s “Theory of Historical Times” supports a plural history often overlooked when conceptual history is practiced: in some cases, conceptual history generalizes (by overlooking an infinity of sources) to the point of overwriting the social reality it describes. But conceptual history – as a theory – is at its best when producing frameworks for more detailed analysis, an analysis that may very well correct or contradict the framework without which the empirical research would not be possible. To reuse a quote from Koselleck, “We can risk making statements of necessity insofar as we formulate them with reservations”.\(^{111}\) Conceptual history is at its best when instead of answers, it produces questions, reservations, and hypotheses highlighting the historical plurality in which the contemporary

conceptualizes its socio-political being. The generalizing effect of conceptual history does not exclude the possibility of exceptions – without frameworks to be revised and commented upon, the past is truly dead, a nothingness of impenetrable voices. With Habermas, one could ask: what is academia without the contradicting dialectics of rational communication? On a more theoretical note, regarding the relation between, on the one hand, the framework of Koselleck’s “Anthropological Theory”, and on the other, his “Theory of Historical Times”, Olsen finds a concluding problem: if the categories of experience and expectation are viewed as prior to the temporal layers of history, thus standing outside of time, then the experience of the layers would depend on these categories rather than the “free play” of social reality; if the categories are instead understood as posterior, i.e. as a basic layer of time, the static nature of this layer would invalidate the transforming character of the other layers.\(^{112}\) I would argue that Olsen is wrong in using a temporal terminology for describing the relation between experience, expectation, and historical times. It makes more sense, I believe, to speak of experience and expectation as existing within the temporal layers of time, events and structures thus penetrating our fields of experiential spaces and expectational horizons, just like, as Koselleck himself argues, events exist within and not after structures. We are historical (temporal) beings, and being-towards-time, our history is within us just as much as we exist within our history. But this is a topic for the next few pages, where I ask the question of how the notion of space could be integrated into the temporalizing vocabulary of conceptual history. My initial reflections on the “theories” of Koselleck are therefore at their end, even though, as has already been made clear, the method here outlined will be used in the conceptual history of “Home”.

2.2 “Spacing Concepts”:\(^{113}\) space as a category of conceptual change

As should be evident by now, the vocabulary of Begriffsgeschichte, at least as it is theorized by Koselleck, is primarily oriented towards time and temporality, the experiences and expectations of Being. It would nevertheless be absurd to deduce – from this fact – that Koselleck did not consider “space” – however this notion is interpreted – as a vital factor (and indicator) in conceptual history. First, as has already been noted, propelled by the metaphor-theory of George Lakoff, almost all of Koselleck’s metaphors are spatial: humans are incapable of escaping such metaphors, Koselleck argues, “for the simple reason that time is not manifest

\(^{112}\) Olsen, History in the Plural, p.231.

\(^{113}\) I find the sub-title of The Practice of Conceptual History more suggestive than conclusive.
(anschaulich) and cannot be intuited (anschaulich gemacht warden) […] All historical categories, including progress […] are spatial expressions by origin.”114 Second, as Niklas Olsen confers, Koselleck did in fact advance ideas concerning “the relation among space, time, and history.”115 These ideas, never developed into a full-fledged theory, were inspired by the geo-political discourse of Schmitt – die Raumordnung, the political ordering of geographical space – as well as the Hobbesian pairs of “inner” and “outer”, land and sea; for Koselleck and Schmitt, the conceptual pairs of “inner” and “outer”, as a form of geo-political self-understanding, played an important role in early state-formation.116 Third, later in his career, Koselleck became interested in war-memorials and collective memory, the symbolic power of materialized recollections; symptomatically so, however, rather than the materiality of memorials as such (i.e. the spatialization of time), his emphasis was here the temporal relation between memory, identity, and experience.117 Fourth, in delineating the Verzeitlichung, Koselleck sometimes touches upon the modern experience of space: “The transition from the stage-coach, by way of trains and motor cars to jet planes has fundamentally changed all time-space relations and with them our working conditions, social mobility, war technology, global communication factors”.118 Obviously, for Koselleck, in his geology of historical times, the third level of temporality – the longue durée – calls for an investigation of the spatiality of historical time itself, an investigation that is mentioned but never pursued: “I could also mention the given geographical and spatial factors which in the long-term stabilize everyday life or which may also provoke political conflict situations which in the course of history are similar to and repeat one another.”119 Naturally, the (re-)discovery of the heliocentric trajectory of the earth, as well as the infinite quality of the universe, called for some novel conceptualizations of space. Hence, as a fifth and final point of Koselleckian, spatial considerations, on the level of the concept, Koselleck sometimes speaks of a temporalization (or spiritualization) of previously

116 In Scmitt’s Der Nomos der Verde, writes Olsen, “the word nomos (law) is used to refer to an eternal division and order of political space.” (Ibid., p.106.) Importantly, Schmitt’s notion of “space” refers to the level of socio-political self-understanding. My ambition is here to add more levels to the discussion.
117 Especially interesting he finds the commemoration of violent death (Totschlagen). In such memorials, Koselleck finds reason to collectivize Heidegger’s being-towards-death (Sein zum Tode), as he did when theorizing the anthropological conditions of human being. Modern war-memorials celebrate not heroic death, but mourns killing as such, the latter always implying more than one person. In modernity, therefore, we are towards murder (Sein zum Totschlagen), not finality (Sein zum Tode). (Reinhart Koselleck, “War Memorials: Identity Formations of the Survivors”, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002)).
119 Ibid., p.123
spatialized (or territorialized) concepts, a spatio-to-temporal mode of transformation that he nevertheless fails to theorize fully (again). The concepts of “Progress”, “Crisis”, and “Revolution”, he argues, “turned into temporal concepts, and their initial spatial or natural meaning dissipated with the Enlightenment as they became primarily historical concepts.”

Koselleck’s reflections on the notion of space – here represented in list-form – are inconclusive at best: for Koselleck, drawing heavily from Heidegger, to be is to be in time – not necessarily towards death, our subjective finalities, but from experience and in relation to expectation: in sum, for Koselleck, we are temporal beings of experiences and expectations. In distancing himself from the utopian and/or relativist writings of historicism, therefore, Koselleck finds himself within its underlying premise, a tradition of thinking primarily concerned with history, time, and the nature of historical times. Foucault, as a critical student of this tradition, here paraphrased by Edward Soja, asks “why is it that so many think of time as movement, dynamic, dialectic, development, process, while space is considered fixed, dead, unproblematic background, the stage or container of social processes and history.”

In the age of Orientalism, for example, coinciding with the origins of this tradition, as well as the space-time compressions of an emerging industrialization, what was beyond Europe was considered before Europe, i.e. nonsimultaneous with the simultaneous sameness of an “advancing” Europe (a Beckettian mise-en-scène, filled only with actors of time). Koselleck himself traces this temporalization to the dislocations of the Sattelzeit, a time of conceptual and philosophical transformations in which – ultimately – he finds his own, temporalizing vocabulary. Working himself out of the temporal entanglements he is simultaneously dis-entangling (e.g. by speaking of “plural histories” instead of a “singular History”), Koselleck, by subscribing to the anthropological notions of experience and expectation, these notions – besides being temporal – illuminating a rift in time (namely, the transition from “modernity” to “pre-modernity”), Koselleck thereby conforms to the temporalizing episteme he sets out to

120 Koselleck, “The Conceptual History of ‘Crisis’”, p.239.
122 The historical materialism of Marx, for instance, tracing the temporal rather than the spatial: the primary dimension of the spatial metaphors of “base-structure”, “super-structure”, “division of labor”, and “forces of production” is temporal, i.e. revolutionary time, referring as they are to the conditions of possibility of developmental stages in the dialectics of historical times. Henry Lefebvre analyzes the philosophical tradition of time as a reaction to the “fetishization of space” of Hegel: “According to Hegelism”, Lefebvre writes, “historical time gives birth to that space which the state occupies and rules over… Time is thus solidified and fixed within the rationality immanent to space.” Moreover, “As for time […] overwhelmed by the establishment of an immobile space which is the locus and environment of realized Reason, it loses all meaning.” (Lefebvre, The Production of Space, p.21). For Hegel, the space of the State is the end and meaning of history; for Marx, the meaning of history is to be found in its historicity.
historicize (but not relativize, hence the epistemological partiality). The simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous structures Koselleck’s own, modern thinking; and against this temporalization of space, the “spatial turn” defines its interests. Promoted by such scholars as David Harvey and Edward Soja, the spatial turn – argues the editors of a collection of essays on the topic – is “involving a reworking of the very notion and significance of spatiality to offer a perspective in which space is every bit as important as time in the unfolding of human affairs”.123

Are we not also beings in space (again, however this notion is defined)? Of course, the naivety of this question should not be interpreted as an inquiry into the reality of the external world, the “thinginess” of the physical world; interpreted phenomenologically, the question is one of experience and relations: do we not experience ourselves as bodies of intentions standing in a dynamic relation to other bodies (with or without intentions)? The scholars of the spatial turn – the “turn” here refers to a series of similar shifts in scholarly attention, e.g. the “linguistic turn”, the “cultural turn”, the “affective turn” – insist on the epistemological value of this question, orienting their attention toward the principles that a social or cultural phenomenon cannot be “torn from its spatial context, that geography is not some subordinate afterthought to history in the construction of social life, that no meaningful understanding of how human beings produce and reproduce their worlds can be achieved without invoking a sense that the social, temporal, the intellectual, and the personal are inescapably always and everywhere also the spatial.”124 In sum, the spatial turn challenges the traditional, Cartesian notion of space as a uniform, isotropic background (res extensa) simply containing the action of temporality and temporality of action, instead analyzing space as a “variegated, complex, often bewildering series of different types of locations: physical, mythological, symbolic, imagined, linguistic, cartographic, perceptual, representational, i.e., space as suspended between matter and meaning.”125

Allying myself with such views, I must ask: what is “space”, if it “is” at all? A Kantian category of understanding – an a priori of consciousness, transcendental and ungraspable? An unstoppable flux of temporal non-identity, as for Heraclitus, or a static illusion of movement, as for Parmenides? A container of time, gravitationally folded, relativizing the nature of time? Is “space” a field of energy, the mass of the Higgs field, a collapse of the wave-function? Or a field of entropy, bodily degradation in Bergsonian duration? A collective

124 Ibid., p.7.
125 Ibid., p.9-10.
singular standing for concealed plurality? As an aspect of experience, social and subjective, what is the relationship between “space” and its concepts (or concepts-in-general), between language and experience? Is “space” itself a concept? If it is a concept, what is its conceptual history? Has it been relativized by the notion of time, temporalized? Finally, what is the nature of the relationship between “space” and socio-political history? These questions, regardless of the naivety with which they are asked, pertain to three hypotheses meant to bring conceptual history and the spatial turn in (metonymical) alignment:

(1). First, in the following, I will explore the hypothesis that space (or spatiality) – like time (or temporality) – is a fundamental aspect of being, that we are in space as we are in time – or that we are toward time as we are toward the world. I will investigate the possibility of integrating this aspect of being into the anthropological theory of Koselleck, even though – since I am here doing History and not Philosophy-proper – I am compelled to leave this part of the paper sketchy, faulty, and hopelessly underdeveloped. Nonetheless, if understood from the framework of Koselleck, this hypothesis produces the following questions: could one speak of a changing conception of “space”, as does Koselleck of a changing conception of “time”; and if so, could one add to the four processes of the Sattelzeit a fifth, namely, the “spatialization” of concepts (as integrated into a changing conception of “space”, including “de-spatialization”)?

(2). My second hypothesis, closely related to the first, concerns the history of the discourse on “space”, the history of spatial concepts; to understand and historicize (1), it is necessary to investigate (2), self-understandings of space being accessible only through the language and space (sites, architecture, archeology) with which they are expressed. Importantly, included in this hypothesis is the study of all concepts related to space, not just that of “Space”. As concepts, their standing in the Sattelzeit need investigation: have they been temporalized, or politicized? The concepts of “Space” must be divorced from “space” as a fundamental aspect of being, just like the concept of “time” is historicized whereas the notions of experience and expectation are not. In other words, being-in-space needs a vocabulary differentiating it from space-as-a-conceptual-abstraction: since the concepts could change within a continuous experience, the historical investigation of (1) (through such concepts as “matter”, “nature”, “cosmos”, “substance”, “physical reality”) reaches beyond the conceptual scope of (2) (constituted by those concepts).

(3). My third hypothesis concerns the relation between language and the social experience of space, the material life of concepts: obviously, as is the case with monumental architecture, or the homey division of labor, concepts are often materialized, indicating (as symbols) as well as being factors in (by constraining and making possible movement and practice, e.g. the avenues of Haussmann restraining the forces of
emancipation) social experience and change. But how should one understand this relationship between language and spatial meaning? How is language influencing spatial practice, and how are spatial practices influencing language (if they do)? These questions imply a relation to (1) and (2), the spatial influence investigated being both perceived and conceived (lived).

That concludes my initial discussion on the three hypotheses of a spatially oriented conceptual history. As hypotheses, they are derived from the theory of Koselleck; as hypotheses, moreover, they imply questions demanding areas of inquiry – and corresponding methodology – not necessarily found in the theory from which they were derived. To pursue these hypotheses (i.e. “test” their value) I must therefore introduce new “instruments” – new tools of analysis. Consequently, the purpose of the following – lacking all philosophical pretensions of “disclosure” – is to introduce a vocabulary with which to understand a conceptual history enacted in the phenomenological and material realm of spatiality. In fact, my primary concern is here to find a definition of (human) space applicable within the field of conceptual history; moreover, since (1) and (2) demand treatises on their own, and on top of that, treatises that reaches far beyond the scope, know-how, and ambitions of the present, I will leave them as they are, i.e. as hypotheses, instead spending most of my methodological energy on the third hypothesis. In other words, when discussing (1) and (2), I am only suggesting a line of thinking in dire need of more elaborate analysis. And as a final disclaimer, it should be noted that I am here intending to consult several prominent philosophers without respecting the overall nature of their work and legacy; to facilitate an understanding of (1), (2), and (3), I pick and choose as I go, my use of Henri Lefebvre, for example, being restricted to his book The Production of Space (and from this book, I only use what I deem relevant and/or sufficient, avoiding, in part, Lefebvre’s “neo-Marxist” framework). With the “spatial turn” in mind, my intentions are not to “fetishize” space, but simply to introduce a terminology capable of “capturing” another aspect of conceptual history – an x-ray of historical space?

2.2.1. First hypothesis: Being and spatiality.

“Let everyone look at the space around them. What do they see? Do they see time? They live time, after all; they are in time. Yet all anyone sees is movements. In nature, time is apprehended in space.” Indeed, my ambition is not to fetishize space, but to add to the equation of temporality the dimension of spatiality. In his book The Production of Space, just quoted, Henri Lefebvre (1901-1991), attempting a “meta-philosophy” of (social) space, intends to reconcile

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126 Lefebvre, The production of Space, p.95.
the notions of physical, mental, and social space as separated in the machinery of modern philosophy. Above, I used the terms “perceived”, “conceived”, and “lived”; these are Lefebvre’s phenomenological terms, corresponding (with modifications) to my own, hypothetical triad, referring – in Lefebvre’s book – to the three “moments” of (the production of) social space, moments that are intrinsically connected (as are my hypotheses) but simultaneously capable of producing space “on their own”. As a phenomenological concept, in Lefebvre’s method, perceived space – the sensations of materiality – is reinforced by the notion of spatial practice, the latter term referring to the (syntagmatic) use of space, the mode – characteristic of each social formation – in which our bodies communicate, interact with, and constitute our environments. Similarly, conceived space – the thought necessary for perceiving space holistically and meaningfully – is reinforced by the notion of representation of space, this notion referring to the conceptualizations of theorizers, architects, map-makers, urban planners, and those in control of the hegemonic discourse on space (expressed in logic, maps, descriptions, definitions, plans, theory, etc.). Lastly, lived space – the inexhaustible everydayness of space – corresponds to what is translated as representational space (les espaces de représentation), a term not referring to space itself, but to its symbolic dimensions, the imaginary principles of space “lived through its associated images and symbols” (trees, buildings, monuments, artifacts, artworks, landscapes). The dialectic structure of this triad, argues Lefebvre, its phenomenological dimension (“perceived”, “conceived”, and “lived”) reinforced by the material-semiotic notions of spatial practice, representations of space, and representational space, allows for an investigation into the relation between, on the one hand, theory, knowledge, and practice, and on the other, power, hegemony, and the domination of lived, social space. The methodological relevance of this dialectic structure will be elaborated upon below; for now, since I am here only concerned with the phenomenology of space, i.e. the experience of spatiality, I will restrict myself to Lefebvre’s notion of perceived space (and spatial practice), which, incidentally, is much more tied to societal and material characteristics than my own hypothesis. More specifically, I am here investigating fundamental existential structures that condition (spatially) the possibility of all human history. Again, I should note that the following discussion is forced into speculation, that I am here re-enacting de Certau’s “textual poaching” – looking for ways in, so to speak, by stealing from the privileged and wealthy.

127 Ibid., p.38–39.
Rightly so, I believe, when delineating the structure of perceived space, Lefebvre begins with the body, namely, the sensation of bodily centeredness necessary for demarcating and navigating space, i.e. the world.  

These sensations – on which perceived space is built – structures the movements of spatial practice, the latter – the use of space – also being organized around the representational spaces of meaning, such spaces *mapping* bodily use and movement.

The body is structured by its physiological rhythms (the course of nature, seasonal activity, or the heart and its heartbeat: i.e. time), generating a set of *gestures* that – besides being restricted physiologically – embody ideology and knowledge, history and society, thus forming a dialectic link between body, representation, and societal meaning. “Organized gestures”, says Lefebvre, “which is to say ritualized and codified gestures, are not simply performed in 'physical' space, in the space of bodies. Bodies themselves generate spaces, which are produced by and for their gestures.”

The body could therefore be used to illuminate the triad of the production of social space: the use of the body is a moment of perception; but the body is always-already represented, a subject of knowledge and ideology; *lived* body-experience, then, intervened by its culture and tradition, incorporates rhythms and gestures structured by the representations in which the experience is unfolding. As a body among other bodies, its practice is always social, mediating between the mental and the social realm, blurring the distinction between subject and object.

Lefebvre’s view is intuitive enough, except that the Marxist notion of *production* – which, in Marx, as a non-teleological moment, embody the object/subject-transcendence – takes the center-stage, thus reducing the perceptions of spatial practice to the history of production in which they evolve. In the age of neo-capitalism, for example, spatial practice might be defined “by the daily life of a tenant in a government-subsidized high-rise housing project.”

Such determinism may seem rather harsh (i.e. structural), and that is why, “updating” Marxism, Lefebvre instead speaks of production in terms of a transformation of the environment with the help of “expenditures of energy”, such a definition also allowing for spatial production (and re-production) on the level of *individual*, spatial practice (without invoking labor, division of labor, instruments of labor, etc.). In sum, for Lefebvre, on a social as well as individual level, the relation between space-as-body and space-as-world is one of production, an *active* relationship of mutual dependency ultimately transcending – or overcoming – the distinction between object and subject. “The past leaves its traces; time has

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128 Ibid., p.192.
129 Ibid., p.216.
130 Ibid., p.38.
its own script. Yet this space is always, now and formerly, a present space, given as an immediate whole, complete with its associations and connections in their actuality. Thus production process and product present themselves as two inseparable aspects, not as two separable ideas.”

Agreeing with this aspect of Lefebvre’s writings, i.e. the distinction between body and world, sublated in their interaction, I am nevertheless not convinced that the relationship of body-world is one of production (nor I am convinced that space should be analyzed as an immutable presence, synchrony). Meta-historically speaking, are we always experiencing a productive relationship to space, the way we are always experiencing experience and expectation? Is that not a discourse on Being rather than a discourse of Being, i.e. a Marxist interpretation of terms that in themselves are meta-historical, namely: body and world? The notion of production brings spatial practice – as expressed in gestures and rhythms – closer to societal characteristics, the performativity of specific societal formations. All this amounts to a definition of spatial practice not resonating with my own hypothesis: for Lefebvre, spatial practice is just that, i.e. practice, a socialized form of material-rhythmic production, whereas for me, at least as I formulated my hypothesis, the relation between body and world is more reductive, Ego-based, a way of being in the world, or towards it, not expandable to a set of societal gestures and rhythms (indeed, since I am here concerned with conceptual history, I must stay within the realm of the sign; the relation between my three hypotheses and the structure of Lefebvre’s triad – my hypotheses being less oriented towards spatial analysis – will be discussed more thoroughly below). To modify the notion of spatial practice, new-old thinking must therefore be introduced.

Heidegger, in Sein und Zeit, asking the question of the meaning of being, Da-sein, famously writes that “The spatialization of Da-sein in its ‘corporeality’ contains a problematic of its own not to be discussed here.” Regardless of this disclaimer, and against Kant, who viewed spatial, outer experience as a necessary mediator for temporal, inner experience – Kant does not belong to the tradition of thinkers prioritizing time over space – Heidegger argues that “the specific spatiality of Da-sein must be grounded in temporality.” For Heidegger, Da-sein does not constitute a position within Cartesian space, but “makes room” in space through its directionality and de-distancing. Characteristically enough, de-distancing does not refer to a reduction of spatial distance, but to a “making-present” belonging to the “unity of

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131 Ibid., p.37.
133 Ibid., p.336.
Cartesian space, if it is to have any meaning, is dependent on – but not equal to – the de-distancing of useful things, the “present-at-hand”;135 useful things may exist in and constitute Cartesian space, but are always realized in the equipmental spaces (e.g. an office-space, places of function and involvement) of the de-distancing of Da-sein, implicating that one must strip away the worldhood of equipmental spaces (i.e. the involvement of Da-sein) to understand the abstract meaning of Cartesian space. Moreover, in making things present, and turning “ecstatic”, Da-sein loses its sense of temporality, future and past being subsumed into the presence of things made present, thus emitting a sense of the power of space, explaining – like Koselleck did – why most of our metaphorical expressions are spatial rather than temporal. But Da-sein is still temporal: the “here” of a factual location does not signify a spatial position, “but the leeway of the range of the totality of things taken care of nearby”, the taking-care-of here connoting the essence of a being-toward-time.136 Later in his career, in an article titled “Building, Dwelling, Thinking”, Heidegger approaches the question of spatiality from a different perspective: here, for Heidegger, taking as his departure the similarity between building and thinking, Da-sein consists of dwelling, the poetic habitation in which Da-sein unfolds. This unfolding, taking place in those spaces where Da-sein feels at home, is enacted as an appropriation of always-already existing practices and meanings – historical and cultural – of being in the world (specific to those homey spaces where one unfolds): “Dwelling, however, is the basic character of Being in keeping with which mortals exist.”137 Finally, this basic character of Da-sein (as an argument against modernity, I presume) is realized in the safeguarding of one’s being (i) on earth, (ii) under the sky, (iii) before the divinities, and (iv) among mortals. In Being and Time, therefore, as expected, Heidegger falls back on the temporalizing vocabulary I am here avoiding; in “Building, Dwelling, Thinking”, with an argument of appropriation similar to that of Lefebvre, Heidegger explores the connection between space, practice, and knowledge, the fourfold essence of dwelling nevertheless having normative implications less meta-historical than nostalgic.

A more nuanced philosophy is needed (in terms of: accounting for the structure of spatial consciousness), a philosophy also compatible with the writings of Koselleck. Yi-Fu Tan (1930-), drawing from the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), offers

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134 Ibid., p.337.
135 The “ready-to-hand” – the being of equipment – is instead concealed from consciousness by functioning properly and without obstruction.
136 Ibid.
a potential segue. Since the former is expanding on the latter, I will begin this discussion by summarizing (rather crudely) some of the points made by Merleau-Ponty in his *Phenomenology of Perception*. For Merleau-Ponty, if things have a “positional spatiality”, i.e. a location, (organic) bodies instead have a “situational spatiality”, an awareness of orientation based on the intentions of Being (as in Da-sein). As bodies of “I can” rather than “I think”, our bodies are being-toward-the-world, living this world rather than inhabiting it (in the Cartesian sense). Space is existential and existence is spatial: humans dwell in “anthropological” space, not geometry, *conceived* space always being both *perceived* and *lived* (as argued by Lefebvre). Like Heidegger’s “making-present”, the body, for Merleau-Ponty, is temporal, the “I can” always being present, existing in a field of perception constituted in part by the “I”-bodies of the past made present: naturally, this field of perception situates our perception in the presence on which we reflect. Hence, for Merleau-Ponty, there is only one, self-confirmatory time, namely the present, in which the past is always supplanted whereas the future is always anticipated, and in which the subject and object are perceived as two abstract moments in the same structure of presence. Similar to what Lefebvre argued, and not unlike a hermeneutical circle, our bodies interact with the world in a state of *co-existence* (I prefer this term over the Marxist “production”, especially if existence is interpreted as a process rather than a fixed quality): “we must say that my experience breaks forth into things and transcends itself in them, because it always comes into being within the framework of a certain setting in relation to the world which is the definition of my body.” The distinction between object and subject is thus impossible: space is not a pre-given, empty container, nor a set of geometrical relationships, but a condition of Being in relation to which the body is defined. Things and “otherness” are nevertheless not reduced to the moment of perception: things, existing in the world regardless of my perception of them, constitute a horizontal background against which my perception can transcend itself; similarly, common corporeality makes possible a social world, a world wherein the “I” is transcending itself when perceiving and interacting with the “other” thus transcended.

Evidently, in both Lefebvre, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, there is an initial distinction between body and world – the latter with sub-divisions: things, objects, representations, equipmental space, dwellings, “others”, etc. – transcended dialectically in

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139 Ibid., p.489–490.
140 Ibid., p.353.
141 Ibid., p.423.
presence. Intuitively, the two elements of this distinction could serve the function of static, metahistorical categories, collectivized – like experience/expectation – as “Us” and “Them” or “Same” and “Other”: if so, when looking in history for a changing conception of space, a rift in spatial experience, that change could very well occur in the relationship between body and its worlds, a relationship thus viewed as one of production or co-existence (or nodal networks, to invoke Bruno Latour). Perhaps the nature of that relationship could be described in terms of a spectrum ranging from alienation to belonging (pathology excluded)? What is the modern experience of space? Compared to pre-modernity? Could one trace any change to the modes of production of that change? There are reasons for viewing this relationship in terms of space and time, the intention of the “I can”-body being a “making-present” in time, and the world itself, against which this temporal body defines its constitution, always indicating its temporal dimension, the scars of the edges of the sidewalk, or the concentric age of a cut-down tree. With Koselleck’s anthropology in mind, could one perhaps speak of a bodily space of experience and a worldly horizon of expectations? For the philosophers discussed, the temporality of space is that of presence (past or future made present); albeit pre-mature, my previous question therefore raises another one, namely, the question of whether space has past or future? For this, finally, I turn to Tuan.

Drawing from Merleau-Ponty, Tuan, in his article Space and Place, writes that “Body implicates space; space coexists with the sentient body.” In line with Merleau-Ponty, Tuan argues that there is an “original pact between body and space”: “Visual perception, touch, movement, and thought combine to give us our characteristic sense of space. Bifocal vision and dexterous hands equip us physically to perceive reality as a world of objects rather than as kaleidoscopic patterns.” More importantly, however, for Tuan, spatiality, which could now be defined as the relationship between body and its worlds, is dividable: first, there is the horizon of objects, visual space; second, visual-aural space, dynamic, in which objects can be seen and heard clearly; third, and lastly, Tuan speaks of the affective zone, the space of touch and smell. Of course, in experience, i.e. spatial practice, these zones fade into each other – regardless, the visual-aural zone can be divided even further:

I am engaged with people and things: they are in focus and lie at the foreground of my awareness.

Beyond, in the middle ground, is the physical setting for the people and things that engage me fully.

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143 Ibid., p.390.
The middle ground may be the walls of a room or a hall. It is visible but unfocused. Foreground and middle ground constitute the patent zone. Beyond the patent zone is the latent zone of habituality (the past), which is also the latent zone of potentiality (the future). Although I cannot see through the walls of the hall, the unfocused middle ground, I am subliminally aware of the existence of a world, not just empty space, beyond the walls. That latent zone is the zone of one’s past experience, what I have seen before coming into the hall; it is also potentiality, what I shall see when I leave the hall. The latent zone is the invisible but necessary frame to the patent zone […]. It acts as a ballast to activity, freeing activity from complete dependence on the patent, i.e., visible space and present time.\footnote{144}

The content of this quote permits me to conclude my discussion on the first hypothesis. What Tuan identifies is here difference, essential to space (as well as time) but somewhat blurred in the recurring theme of presence. But one always finds absence in presence, a “there” in the “here”, possibilities and limitations: death makes difference, as does walls (and death is also spatial: why would we otherwise desire a body in heaven?). Difference is a moment of identification, the possibility of totality, of futures and presents: in other words, by identifying difference, what is not “here”, it is possible to identify the nature of one’s field of presence, “the range of the totality of things taken care of nearby”. But this is not a difference of identities: X is not different from Y because of their stable identities; X and Y are always different from themselves, the field of presence existing in a constant flux, a changing relation between body and its worlds. This is the argument of Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) and Pierre-Félix Guattari (1930-1992), for which space, as an origami-like structure, is always cracked, fissured, and folded, repetitions of spatial practice producing difference in its similarity.\footnote{145} Language has the capability of recognizing such difference, of referring to absence. The past can only be experienced in space: on the battlefield of lost days, we “feel History” and its heartbeat, the weight of what was once lost. Moreover, when divorced from the embrace of our mothers, this newfound absence, albeit traumatic for some, creates a new presence, the presence of our bodies in a world of different bodies. The finality of our being-toward-time is also a being-toward-absence, a recognition of the difference between being “here” (now) and being “there” (then), however the latter is defined (as future, paradise, or past, memory?).\footnote{146} This difference (as absence-made-present, not things; we cannot live in absence per se, nor can we live in the

\footnote{144}Ibid., p.399.
\footnote{145}Jessica Ringrose, “Beyond Discourse? Using Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis to explore affective assemblages, heterosexually striated space, and lines of flight online and at school”, in Educational Philosophy and Theory 43.6 (2011): pp.598-618.
\footnote{146}It would make sense to consult the philosophy of Lacan and Derrida here, invoking the notions of “différance” and “the Real”, i.e. the linguistic dimension.
future) exist in the latent zone of past and future, demolishing the locks on the prison of presence. And talking about prison, is that not one of its punishments, the reduction of expectation to the “here” of experience? I propose a distinction between things made present and absence made present, absence-made-present existing only as experience and expectation (future pasts and past futures), i.e. as time (utopias and dystopias). Do we not desire absence (make it present), things-not-made-present? Space has future, absence made present: one expects to be somewhere else, or where one has always been, i.e. at home; one expects to have different space, or dreams the nomad. Similarly, therefore, time has space, here’s and there’s. Every person is a body – a center – and a position – a relation to the world. The expectation of difference (or similarity) structures the relationship to space experienced – “What happens in Vegas stays in Vegas”. One always acts from one’s body, which is filled with past experiences (memory: motoric and symbolic), and one always acts in reference to the world, the horizon of things which are not yet here, i.e. in the presence of an extended body. Presence is the moment in which the spatial and temporal dimensions meet, meaning that the space of experience and horizon of expectation are dependent on but not identical with the space of the body and spatial horizons of the world: I am thus arguing (i.e. speculating freely) that space and time are inseparable but not reducible to one another. Take the space-time compressions of the railway: the unexperienced possibility of “making” landscapes “present”, of bringing the Atlantic home, was not only a case of reducing the time of travel, but also a case of reducing spatial absence (always temporary, i.e. temporal), the spatial limitations of being-toward-world. One could thus expect the relationship between body and its worlds to change, to produce new modes of coexistence: perhaps a relationship of alienation, bringing difference to the forefront of spatial experience, the possibility of always being in a different world, of approaching the sky, transcending it, leaving earth, make appointments with our cybernetics Gods, or the immortality of space itself? If so, one could perhaps speak of a “spatialization” of concepts, of concepts being integrated into an alienating experience of space, collecting a sense of (spatial) difference previously reserved for belonging? If so, a “de-spatialization” of concepts – as a form of “spatialization” – would make meta-historical sense. For some time, it is juxtaposed, we belonged to the slow landscapes of History, its seasonal changes and recurring rhythms; now, when space is nothing but difference, a case of geometry and places, forgotten or found, we instead search for shelter in the “progressiveness” of History, the temporalized difference between past and future. The thesis that previously spatialized concepts were temporalized thus needs a footnote: besides being temporalized, concepts were perhaps also de-spatialized (now understood as a form of spatialization).
Naturally, I realize the superficiality of the preceding discussion; in dire need of actual, philosophical reflection, what is being said here is short of the history it pretends to describe. From this hypothetical superficiality, I nevertheless hope, regardless of all the loose ends it offers, that two things may be concluded: first, that there is room for reflecting on the experience of space as a fundamental, meta-historical aspect of being; second, that the Koselleckian metaphors of “space” and “horizon” leave room for more than just metaphorical content. As realized by the protagonist in Kurt Vonnegut’s *Player Piano*, “no man could live without roots – roots in a patch of desert, a red clay of field, a mountain slope, a rocky coast, a city street. In black loam, in mud or sand or rock or asphalt or carpet, every man had his roots down deep – in home.”

2.2.2. Second hypothesis: space as a concept.

My second hypothesis, corresponding to Lefebvre’s discussion on representations and thought (conceived space), is more self-explanatory, especially when viewed from the theory of conceptual history as outlined above. Consequently, I will here be as brief as possible, a history of the concept of “Space” (and related concepts) being the topic for another paper. For reasons of clarity, however, some hypothetical remarks are necessary. First, it must be noted that “concepts” are dissimilar from Lefebvre’s “thought” and “representation”, that concepts, as elements of language, structure the thought and representation of social space, but that these latter (verbal) phenomena have their own content and history: just like institutional representations of space may negate the spatial thinking of the individual (the urban planner negating the desires of the urban resident), they may also negate the concepts structuring that thinking, producing new understandings of space not resonant with consensus (see my third hypothesis for a more detailed explanation of this negation). In fact, as dispersed, discursive tools, concepts mediate the relationship between conceived space (phenomenological) and its representations (institutional). Second, now jumping to the body of this, second hypothesis, if “Space” is a concept, different from “body” and “worlds” in the same way that the concept of “Time” is different from “experience” and “expectation”, then it is likely to have a semantic field: in this field, one would expect to find such notions as “matter”, “nature”, “cosmos”, “substance”, “physical reality”, and – of course – “Time”. In fact, as modern concepts, temporalized, politicized, democratized, or ideologicized (a matter of historical research), it would be rather fruitful – as a point of entry – to investigate the counter-conceptual quality of

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147 Vonnegut, *Player Piano*, p.204.
“Time” and “Space”. Moreover, as a concept, one could ask: did “Space” transform into a collective singular, containing within itself the possibilities of all individual instances in which it occurs, or was it always referring to “everything”, the Cartesian space of res extensa? As I will now show, this question leads me back to the first hypothesis.\(^\text{148}\)

Representations of space, according to Lefebvre, “are tied to the relations of production and to the ‘order’ which those relations impose, and hence to knowledge, to signs, to codes, and to ‘frontal’ relations.”\(^\text{149}\) These representations are most often tied to institutions and organizations of power, either being fixated on the opaqueness and measurement of space, as in geography and urban planning, or, as is the case with the philosophy of Bachelard, too focused on the deep, psychoanalytical structures of spatial representation. As such, and leaving this polarized (hegemonic) tradition behind, Lefebvre sets out to investigate their relationship to spatial practice and representational space, tracing the dialectic of social space as enacted in the moments of the triad – modernity, for example, materialized in the spirit of its planners (e.g. Robert Moses), ultimately being characterized by the subordination of representational space to the vertical mania of discourse and representation. But modernity should here not be interpreted as an afterthought of the Sattelzeit: against all Koselleckian odds, Lefebvre identifies what he considers a major difference between two of the most notorious harbingers of modernity, Frank Lloyd Wright and Le Corbusier, the latter ever-more dominating in his representations of space. In any case, Lefebvre argues, “We may be sure that representations of space have a practical impact, that they intervene in and modify spatial textures which are informed by effective knowledge and ideology. Representations of space must therefore have a substantial role and a specific influence in the production of space.”\(^\text{150}\)

Since Lefebvre is much more interested in the dialectic of the triad than the general history of concepts, conceptual history, as a theory of concepts and historical times, could, mirroring what I am here doing, supplement the theory and method of Lefebvre. By analyzing the semantic field of the concept of “Space”, for instance, conceptual history could add to Lefebvre’s method a more nuanced understanding of the relation between socio-political history and the language with which it is expressed; if conceived space refers to thought (in general), and if representations of space

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\(^{148}\) Sigfried Giedion, in his *Space, Time, and Architecture*, identifies three periods in the history of space: the social, exterior space of ancient Greece and Egypt; the interiority of the Roman domus; and the contemporary, Christian attempt at overcoming the dichotomy of exteriority/interiority (see Sigfried Giedion, *Space, Time, and Architecture: The Growth of a New Tradition* (5. ed., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008)). Another interesting point of conceptual comparison would – naturally – be Bakhtin’s notion of chronotope, the literary representation of configurations of space and time.

\(^{149}\) Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, p.33.

\(^{150}\) Ibid., p.42.
refers to discourse (knowledge and ideology), then the vocabulary of Koselleck – mediating (analytically) between socio-political history and the language of that history – could help explain the relation between, on the one hand, the social phenomenology of conceived space, and on the other, the discursive representations of space as articulated within the institutions of power and knowledge. And so, Koselleck’s terminology, capable of identifying the social distribution of meaning (through the investigation of semantic fields, counter-concepts, and the four processes of the Sattelzeit), could be used for investigating the difference and/or similarity between these, two moments of thought, thought (in general) always being an interpretation of the discourses on offer. Moreover, the hypotheses of temporalization, politicization, democratization, and ideologicization could possibly help explain the emergence and survival of abstract space, discussed by Lefebvre in terms of an urban homogenization of space, a disconnection between Life and Logos, desired only by the actors of urban knowledge and ideology (e.g. Le Corbusier).\(^\text{151}\)

As noted, without considering the discipline of Begriffsgeschichte, Lefebvre points toward his own history of the concept of “Space” (and concepts related to social space, e.g. “Home”): crudely, this history begins in old Greece, within the absolute space – as in: a unity between perception, conception, and living – of ancient times, a space not only populated by humans, but also by naturalized gods and demons, unifying Logos and life, much like Heidegger asked for in his safeguarding of the fourfold,\(^\text{152}\) a history ending only in 1910, i.e. within contemporary abstract space, intervened by a wave-like chronology of greater and greater abstractions, Roman, Medieval, Renaissance, and Enlightenment modes of representing space. Regardless of the credibility of this history, a trajectory from absolute to abstract space, when reading Lefebvre, it is hard to deny the historical nature of the spatial concepts in question; as argued, it would be fruitful to compare the content of this nature with other concepts of the Sattelzeit, a comparison that might find the Renaissance and Enlightenment – as does Lefebvre, but only in part – to be particularly interesting periods in the history of European space.\(^\text{153}\) In the renaissance, argues Lefebvre, following the invention of linear perspective, an obsession with scientific-artistic realism, and the introduction of Muslim

\(^{151}\) Ibid., p.50–51.

\(^{152}\) Ibid., p.251.

\(^{153}\) One of the problems of theory here makes itself evident: if one takes the theory of the Sattelzeit for granted, it may very well be the case that one looks too hard for one, major transformation of the concept investigated. Obviously, as Lefebvre would argue, something else – a fundamental relativism – might be true: perhaps the Sattelzeit was just one major transformation of many, or perhaps the concept in question transformed independent of the history of the Sattelzeit? Indeed, by enlightening, theory obscures the periphery.
codifications of geometry and vision, representations of space became more abstract, preparing for the Cartesian separation of subject from object (ocularcentrism). Epitomized in the panoptic visions of Bentham, and propelled by the secularization of knowledge, time, and urban landscapes, these abstractions formed a long-lasting link between capital, centralized power, and the spaces of their accumulation. Discourse became obsessed with “visualization”, the logic of the visual, eventually collapsing the medieval language of space, a code existing “on the practical basis of a specific relationship between town, country, and political territory, a language founded on classical perspective and Euclidean space”. The history of visual abstraction is one of violence, culminating in the French Revolution: among the “revolution’s effects”, writes Lefebvre, “direct and indirect, was the definitive constitution of abstract space, with its phallic, visual and geometric formants.” But the “definitive constitution of abstract space” did not entail the complete disappearance of absolute space; as an appropriated place, fusing conception with perception and living, absolute space, at least for the few select, survived in the form of churches, graveyards, and museums.

Barney Warf, with more than one eye towards Lefebvre, in his contribution to The Spatial Turn, provides more clues for the conceptual history here outlined. Newton, says Warf, in conflict with the relational view of Leibniz (viewing space as relative to the absoluteness of God), emerged as the victor of the discourse on space, promoting an understanding of space and time as absolute, measurable entities. Following this victory, the elaborate, convoluted, and aural-visual world of pre-modernity changed into an understanding of space as uniform, infinite, and isotropic. This change, argues Warf, was boosted by the science of cartography, the two-dimensional representation of three-dimensional space: as a part of the scopic regime of scientific knowledge, cartography served not only the colonial accumulation of capital (enabling pre-capitalist navigation), but also the rise of the nation state, smoothing space by reducing it to distance. The symbolic relations of objects in space – a cave for gods, sacrifices placed in the vicinity, movement restricted to the “here” of mortals – turned visual, instead becoming a quantitative relation in which size had distance rather than symbolic value. As the French philosopher Michel de Certau writes, “Medieval maps were memorandum prescribing actions”, not unlike the Ciceronian “Historia Magistra Vitae Est”.

154 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, p.17.
155 Ibid., p.290.
157 Ibid.
158 Michel de Certau, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p.120.
In pre-modernity, form inseparable from content, space and time were intertwined conceptually. In modernity, however, seeing became knowing; and that which was seen could also be commodified, the printing press commodifying space itself, the mapping of distance.\textsuperscript{159} “The printing of maps”, writes Warf, “began to accustom Europeans to visual, grid-based representations of a territorial order, helping to establish abstract space as the dominant model of the early modern period. Thus, printing utilized the spatial organization of knowledge widely and effectively, generating visual surfaces with abundant and intense meanings, with enormous consequences for human perceptions of space and time.”\textsuperscript{160}

I have not yet discussed the notions of “internal” and “external”, elements of the semantic field of “Space”. For Koselleck, Warf, and Lefebvre, whereas the internal/external-distinction is characteristic of the abstract spatializations of the nation-state, pre-modern people – lacking the border-maps of this nationhood – lived and perceived their surroundings before conceiving it, thus making the borders between internality and externality – always existing on the level of conception – less rigid. The terms “internal” and “external” could therefore be used to highlight my stipulated spectrum of alienation-belonging: in terms of the relationship between body and worlds, alienation would then be characterized by a rigid distinction between internal and external elements of space (“I am a subject among a world of objects”, or “I am a Swede among a world of foreigners”), belonging instead fusing the two, producing a social space where one is living and perceiving what is simultaneously conceived (the panteist philosophy of Spinoza, or the sensation of “being one with God”, one’s surroundings, could represent such an experience), i.e. an absolute, social space. And so, I am back where I started, within the speculative topic of my first hypothesis. Is studying the history of the concept of “Space” the same as studying the spatiality of Being? Just like the notions of experience and expectation, one would expect the meta-historical categories of body and worlds to be of structural significance: not in terms of body and worlds, but in terms of the semantic structure of most if not all concepts. Experience, expectation, and the relationship between them are expressed in language; but the language may change where the relationship remains identical. In the end, like all theoretical tools, the meta-historical categories of Koselleck are used for illuminating an aspect of their own history. As meta-historical categories, then, the spatial categories of Being could be used for illuminating most if not all concepts, not just that of “Space”; of course, if the purpose is to unravel the historical relationship between bodies and

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., p.63.
\textsuperscript{160} Ibid.
their worlds, it would be more efficient to focalize the semantic field of “Space”, a form of emphasis nevertheless not amounting to a study of Being-in-history.

Returning to the conceptual history of “Space”, it is vital to take into consideration the gendering of space, as does Luce Irigaray (1930-) in her celebrated work This Sex Which is not One: is not Cartesian space yet another aspect of the (white-)male order of dominated “things”, reducing women to containers, empty space (except during pregnancy), the bodily symbol of home, promoting men to temporality, the content of this space, the meaningful action of history, thought itself? With an intersectional point of view, localizing the spatial order of colonial, capitalist, and male-centered power, mapping the maps of history, and focalizing the view of the body, spatialized in some cases (women, labor, other), temporalized in others (white, wealthy men), the history of the concept of “Space” could be of fundamental value to the study of the development (and interrelations) of capitalism, androcentrism, colonialism, and nationhood.

2.2.3. Third hypothesis: the material life of concepts.
It is now time to “wrap it all up”, to connect the loose ends of my texture – I must now state more clearly the methodological value of my three hypotheses. And so, pushing back Lefebvre’s notion of perceived space into the realm of phenomenology, a realm that he considered overly idealistic, disconnected from the material reality it undoubtedly needs, I will now expand somewhat on Lefebvre’s notion of representational space. Whereas Lefebvre, who, methodologically speaking, is most interested in the interrelationship between the three moments of spatial production, i.e. the historical mechanics of the production of social space, my own interest simply consists in the possibility of integrating spatial analysis into the field of conceptual history – which is why, even though lengthy, I am here only adding to Koselleck’s theory of concepts, not introducing a new area of research, nor attempting an innovative “methodology”; indeed, despite the prominence here given to the notion of “space”, what is eventually concluded must be interpreted from the point of view of conceptual history. My focus is less the production of space – understood as a general phenomenon – than the methodological possibility of identifying the following two “moments”: on the one hand, (i) concepts as produced by and/or preserved in social space, and on the other, (ii) concepts producing and/or preserving social space. The definition of space is here that of Lefebvre: space, in human terms, i.e. as body-milieu, is always social, and as such, it is always socially composed, simultaneously producing situations of social composition – or, in more generalizable terms: space, as a social product, also produces that which is social, i.e. the social
relations of production and reproduction. This space is subjective and phenomenological, societal and structural: “Could space be nothing more than the passive locus of social relations”, Lefebvre asks, “the milieu in which their combination takes on body, or the aggregate of the procedures employed in their removal? The answer must be no.” Social space is constituted not “by a collection of things or an aggregate of (sensory) data, nor by a void packed like a parcel with various contents.” Social space, instead, is always-already meaningful and meaning-making – “(Social) space is not a thing among other things, nor a product among other products: rather, it subsumes things produced, and encompasses their interrelationships on their coexistence and simultaneity.” Social space is real and “permits fresh actions to occur, while suggesting others and prohibiting yet others.”

To grasp the implications of (i) and (ii), therefore, one must grasp the “dialectics” – or, less demanding: “the mutual constitution” – of concept, milieu, and the nature of spatial experience, the purpose of the following being to elucidate the ensuing methodology: first, I will delineate the method of Lefebvre, second, explicate my own approach, and lastly, add to this discussion some spatial insights offered by philosophers mentioned but not yet conferred.

The interconnection between the three moments of production, says Lefebvre, and the same is true for my three hypotheses, is nothing less than a logical necessity. Lefebvre’s triadic dialectic, yet to be outlined, is in no way a reproduction of Hegel (“thesis, antithesis, synthesis”) or Marx (“affirmation, negation, negation-of-the-negation”); again, for Lefebvre, each of the three moments are capable of producing space on their own, thus making the three, dialectic elements equally important, there being no “synthesis” (nor a “negation-of-the-negation”), but instead a never-ending history structured by complex negations, alliances, and conflicts between the three moments of spatial production. Regardless, one of the three is always prevailing, the abstract space of modernity being characterized by visualizing representations made possible by the separation of conceived and lived space, previously allied. But we are not living at the end (the “synthesis”) of a history of abstractions: society is characterized by contradictions, and since the three moments of the dialectic of social space are of equal importance, those contradictions – perceived, conceived, and lived – are always in the process of being overcome. This overcoming – or sublation – is both a negation and a preservation of that which is overcome, the abstract space of modernity preserving the absolute

161 Lefebvre, The Production of Space, p.11.
162 Ibid., p.27.
163 Ibid., p.73.
164 Ibid.
spaces (e.g. churches, graveyards) it simultaneously negates; in fact, for Lefebvre, the “opening up” of a new social space, of spatial production, is a possibility existing “in between” the negation and preservation of the elements of the triad: the dialectic transcendence of the subject/object-distinction – discussed in my first hypothesis – should therefore be reinterpreted as a transcendence also preserving that which is negated, our bodies always being something of which it is not, i.e. its worlds, those of its social other. In short, for Lefebvre, since space is at once perceived, conceived, and lived, there can be no “pure” thought on space, nor any “pure” experience of it.

Consequently, when analyzing space, with this dialectic structure in mind, one could begin that analysis by identifying the activities and interactions constituting spatial practice (the movements on the street, for example, and the recurring rhythms of work-home-travelling), then proceed by analyzing the manner in which language and discourse demarcates the content of that practice (the possibilities and limitations afforded by the urban planner), and finally compare the nature of these practices and representations with the order – or principles – of representational space (the predominant symbolism of space): how are people living their homes, and how are people living the city?; are people behaving in space as intended by the urban planner, or are people appropriating these spaces for their own use and meaning, thus creating new spatial practices preserving that which is negated, an old space becoming new, producing novel representational spaces turned into topics for new forms of representation (e.g. the scholar theorizing the squatter)? A Lefebvrian analysis of social space investigates not only how the three moments are productive on their own, but also how social space is produced because of their opposition and alignment. In the following, then, expanding on the topic of representational space, I turn my attention to the methodological nature of these dialectic relationships, exemplifying the vocabulary with which Lefebvre himself explains them. In other words, repeating the structure of my discussion on Koselleck, I will now delineate the method of Lefebvre by highlighting the terminology most relevant to my own purposes – those of producing reflections on the conceptual production of (social) space.

Representational spaces, I recall, such as the public square, or the space of the home, are lived social spaces structured by their associated symbols and meanings. Since every society (or period) produces its own representational space, and since these spaces “map” spatial practice, each society has its own rhythms, its own mode of living space. Rhythm – an analytical term signifying the dimensions of gesture and duration – bridges the gap between being-in-time (duration) and being-in-space (gesture, body). And so, since each society (or period) has its own rhythms and spatial practices, each society also has its own mode of living
time. The modern separation of work from home, for example, producing rhythmic difference dependent on the position of the subject (a dictatorship of the clockwork), at work or at home, is one of the distinguishing features of modernized, westernized societies; in pre-modernity, however, there being no such separation between the representational spaces of sleep and work, the rhythm of everydayness was instead dictated by the same space of dwelling, differentiation being a function of the political practice of the agora and/or the religious obligations of the church. Such interpretations are compatible with my hypothetical remarks on the spectrum of belonging-alienation: modernity, it is argued, in terms of social space, is much more specialized and differentiated than the social spaces of pre-modernity, the rhythmic exteriority of the streets, for instance, mediating between the interiorized – and radically different – rhythms of work and home.165

Modern dwelling-space – separated from the space of production, work – exists within the confining boundaries of another space, namely, the exteriority of its environment, most often urban, this environment itself being confined within the – less dynamic – social space of the nation. “Social spaces”, says Lefebvre, “interpenetrate one another and/or superimpose themselves upon one another”,166 allowing for a preservation of that which is negated. The study of the persistence of the preconditions of social space – i.e. old, social spaces; in particular, the “long-lasting” persistence of “nature” – is called “spatial architectonics”, a term that I will myself not be using, even though its implications are here of relevance: the basis of social space, says Lefebvre, is nature, and upon “this basis are superimposed – in ways that transform, supplant, or even threaten to destroy it – successive stratified and tangled networks which, though always material in form, nevertheless have an existence beyond their materiality: paths, roads, railways.”167 Instead of spatial architectonics, and aligning the writings of Koselleck with those of Lefebvre, one could perhaps speak of a presence of the nonpresent (my term), each presence allowing for a superimposed simultaneity (negating that which is preserved), thus spatializing the simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous identified in Koselleck’s theory of historical times. Since each such presence has its own time – the nationalized borders of land and sea connoting centuries of glorious pasts and futures, the whitewashed walls of the dwelling reaching back only one, two, or three generations (represented on the walls in the form of photographs, the dead negated and preserved) – and structural significance, the notion of a presence of the nonpresent, understood as a spatial pre-

165 Ibid., p.45.
166 Ibid., p.86.
condition for the possibility of all history, is one (spatializing) way of making Koselleck’s “simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous” more potent as an analytical or explanatory tool. Instead of describing “underdevelopment” in terms of differentiating temporalities (beyond as before), and instead of explaining structural recurrences in terms of their time, i.e. history, is it not more accurate to speak of the global presence of non-present infrastructure (that of Europeanized capitalism, a concrete abstraction, an absent presence), and is it not more clarifying to speak of “social structures” in terms of their social space, the prohibitions and allowances afforded by the meanings preserved in historical space? Indeed, by investigating the interconnections between spatial practices, representations of space, and representational spaces, it is possible to study the very relation between space and time – the simultaneous nonsimultaneousness of the present nonpresence. “Time”, says Lefebvre, “is distinguishable but not separable from space”; with that formula in mind, I will now dig deeper into the methodological virtues of the triad and its dialectics.

On the level of spatial practices, Lefebvre identifies an opposition between appropriation and domination. Some representational spaces – especially that of home – support counter-discourses and resistance, i.e. an appropriating, passionate use of space negating the hegemonic discourse of representations. Inversely, as is the case in prisons, this discourse, structuring the map of spatial meaning, is instead sometimes dominating the nature of spatial practices. Social space – as are concepts – is always relatable to power and its preservation, occupied space being utilized for preserving the hierarchical order of the society doing the occupying: “occupied space”, writes Lefebvre, “gives direct expression […] to the relationships upon which social organization is grounded.” In the bourgeoisie-home of the nineteenth century, its residents would not only distinguish between public and private areas of the house, but also – typically – place the children in separate rooms, thus producing gendered, generational boundaries meant to preserve the social relations of production and re-production. Spaces of wealth and accumulation, representing the order of this wealth by comparing their “progress” to the “backwardness” of other social spaces, use both spatial and temporal concepts to suppress, dominate, and justify the proto-industrialized habitations of the “periphery”: partly dominated, spaces of otherness are simply said to exist on the outskirts of a “sphere of influence”. Sometimes, however, echoing the uprising of the sexualized bourgeoisie, e.g. the solitary reading of the pornographic novel, these spaces are re-appropriated in acts of colonial

168 Ibid., p.175.
169 Ibid., p.229.
resistance, the pacifist appropriations of Gandhi being one, paradigmatic example among a long list of national heroisms (importantly, “appropriation” is here not the reverse of “authenticity”). In short, therefore, domination and appropriation have their own, curious history, enacted in the triad of spatial production and reproduction. In the game of appropriation and domination, nothing is absolute, the repressive space of the *Bastille* being demolished in a particularly meaningful act of spatial appropriation. After years of living under its occupying shadow, the French, collected under the collective singulars of “Freedom” and “Emancipation”, seized the possibility of transforming the space of their city, demolishing – in the process – the hegemonic representations of space – i.e. the spatial reproduction of the social order – as embodied in the occupation of the *Bastille*: in social practice, concepts have spatial consequences; in social practice, spaces have conceptual consequences (the *Bastille* becoming a counter-concept to “Freedom”).

As expected, the dialectic of domination and appropriation also applies to the body. If the Christian church once dominated the body through a doctrine of pan-optic (in the Divine sense) self-punishment, and if forces of “early” capitalism dominated the body by representing and using it as labor, then there was always room for individualized forms of bodily appropriation: gymnastics, for instance, or boxing and intercourse. Of course, these dominating representations survived the advent of post-modernity, extra-marital intercourse still being regarded as a great offence, and westernized societies making labor out of the bodies of their former colonies; hence, by considering Lefebvre’s dialectic method, the history of domination-appropriation thus indicated, it is possible to identify a simultaneous nonsimultaneousness of spatial import. It should be noted, however, as Lefebvre himself notes, that the body – inherently social – is not inserted into a pre-existing world of culture, that the body, mediating the dialectic of representations and representational space, always produces and/or re-produces that culture, asserting and negating its domination. Again, the relation between the three moments of spatial production is unstable: the “pre-existence of space conditions the subject’s presence, action and discourse, his competence and performance; yet the subject’s presence, action, and discourse, at the same time as they presuppose this space, also negate it.”170 A wall is traversed, a detour is taken, and a structure is demolished.

Evidently, spaces *inhibit and make promises*: whereas some spaces, like streetscapes, are accessible for most, other spaces, naturally or politically hostile, enforce forbidding boundaries, both spatial and morbid. Structured by the knowledge and ideology of

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170 Ibid., p.57.
representations of space, these inhibitions and promises, taking the form of representational space, direct the rhythmic nature of spatial practice; space allows, asserts, denies, and negates, the phallic symbolism of verticality, for example, confirming the male-centered order of public and private behavior. Social space is never neutral: the church, says Lefebvre, is not primarily a work of religious art, but rather a political statement, just like ancient statues, now serving the gazes of modern art-consumers, were once meant to save the people from the wrath of the gods; more, modern cities, rather than being the experiment they sometimes claim to be (e.g. Berlin), serve economic, social, or political agendas, only sometimes, as is the case with street-art and underground-festivity, being appropriated for uses other than that of the hegemonic order. Representational spaces thus contain and assign the social relations of production and re-production. “Social relations”, Lefebvre writes, “which are concrete abstractions, have no real existence save in and through space. Their underpinning is spatial.” Moreover, representational space, ensuring the continuation of these relations of production and reproduction, often support their inherited symbolism. The photographic exhibition of family-members (dead or alive) epitomizes the everyday-preservation of the social relations of reproduction, and the fancy office of the self-indulging boss, representing the bitter-sweet hierarchy of modern labor, ensures – as a symbolic representation – the maintenance of the social relations of production (i.e. the undesired desire to climb up the corporate ladder). Monuments, often serving religious or nationalist functions, ensure the continuation of identity and belonging, as does schools and class-rooms, promoting a linear understanding of national identity. Social space, in representing the social relations of the occupying power, has a behavior, and “the behavior of [the space of its subjects] is at once vital and mortal: within it [the subjects] develop, give expression to themselves, and encounter prohibitions; then they perish, and that same space contains their graves.” Importantly, however, and as should be evident by now, the behavior of space is not solely dictated by linguistic discourse: language, says Lefebvre, is not a pre-condition of social space, nor a simple formulation of it; as an element of the dialectic of the three moments of spatial production, representations of space, including concepts, are producers of space (think of Le Corbusier’s “machines”) as much as they are produced by it. Appropriations of representational space – through new (or old) modes of spatial practice – transform the logic of representations by contradicting it. Because of the inconsistency with which language – representations of space – is applied on lived, spatial

171 Ibid., p.53.
172 Ibid., p.404.
173 Ibid., p.34.
reality, its discursive hold on society, like most discourses, is bound to be replaced by yet another spatial code.

Every social space, Lefebvre argues, has a spatial code: it “is not simply a means of reading or interpreting space: rather it is a means of living in that space, of understanding it, and of producing it. As such, it brings together verbal signs (words and sentences, along with the meaning invested in them by a signifying process) and non-verbal signs (music, sounds, evocations, architectural constructions).” The spatial code, as the totality of the signs through which one lives, understands, and produces space, thus encapsulates the triadic dialectic as delineated above. Summarizing what have so far been said, then, in the absence of true space, there is discourse in space (perceived space), about space (conceived space), and of space (lived space), the sum of these discourses, dividable into verbal and non-verbal signs, constituting the spatial code through which we live, understand, and produce space. The spatial code of verbal and non-verbal signs gives rise to what Lefebvre calls a spatial economy. “This economy valorizes certain relationships between people in particular places (shops, cafés, cinemas, etc.), and thus gives rise to connotative discourses concerning these places.” Lefebvre’s connotative discourses generate conventions and consensuses, e.g. unsigned contracts of non-violence on the streets. But Lefebvre also speaks of denotative discourses, quasi-legal, directing spatial behavior through – for example – road-signs and road-markings, ultimately engendering strategies of property: what is mine is not yours, and my hedge is there to remind you of the “fact”.

The Lefebvrian understanding of language in space – in which I will eventually locate my own findings – need some extra attention. Again, therefore, space is produced to be lived and not read, the language of space being an element rather than a pre-condition of that space: this living – most people respect the boundaries of the hedge without having to interpret the social meaning of the hedge – is a reproduction of the meaning demanded by the connotative and denotative discourses of space. Space is not primarily visual, as modern representation would have it, but a matter of iterability, identity, and simultaneity, the traversal of the discourses of space being unproblematic for most (as is speech, meaningful only in its iterability). More concretely, on the topic of architecture, Lefebvre writes that “it is helpful to think of architectures as ‘archi-textures’, to treat each monument or building, viewed in its surroundings and context, in the populated area and associated networks in which it is set down,

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175 Ibid., p.143.
as part of a particular production of space. Buildings, for Lefebvre, even though they have a symbolic value (and symbolism), are not signifiers *per se*: one does not read buildings, but live them, the wall of the building being a non-verbal (rather than a linguistic) sign. When penetrating these walls, one knows that it is prohibited to demolish them, or that the window is not a point of entry (unless one is attempting the impractical or illegal, acts of non-discursive behavior); instead, one looks for verbal signs pointing towards the door, the conventionalized gate of interiority/exteriority. Penetrating the walls in this, abiding manner, does one *read* the building, its signs, *interpret* the *meaning* of the building? Clearly not. Another example might better illuminate the distinction between language and *archi-texture*: even if, metonymically speaking, in language, the “Parliament” may be said to stand for the nation-state of X, it does not mean that the *building* is signifying the borders of X. Be that as it may, and obviously so, the notion of “Parliament” – connoting not only X, but also the concept of “Democracy”, its violent history, “Progress” – preserves the social function (meaning) of the building, a concept that is simultaneously being preserved by the archi-textural prominence of form and structure, most often built – in an urban setting, importantly – to assert and justify the significance of the socio-political order occupying it, i.e. the democratic extension of X: concepts produce and preserve the form and structure of social space; social space, occupied by socio-political actors using language to justify and assert their occupying, produce and maintain the form and structure of concepts. Language thus divorced from both space and archi-texture, and language understood from the point of view of the dialectic of social space, it is now time to extract from the preceding re-construction a method of my own, a method not only influenced by the “neo-Marxist” mechanics of Lefebvre, but also framed – more so – by the conceptual history of Koselleck.

First, it may be concluded that (social) spaces, depending on the relations between power (as in institutionalized power), use (as in *actual* practice), and social function (as in the meaning of the space in question), produce and preserve socio-political possibilities and limitations; concepts, as semantic tools of knowledge and ideology, inserted into the relation between, on the one hand, social space, and on the other, power (concepts designate and justify spatial occupation, e.g. the parliament), use (concepts prohibit or allow certain actions, e.g. taboos), and social function (concepts designate the relationship between culture and space, e.g. the cosmic significance of the church), concepts are thus *socio-spatial* (my term), every concept both *indicating* and *being a factor in* the ever-changing reality of social space. This summary

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176 Ibid., p.118.
allows me – finally – to clarify the value of exploring my hypotheses through the triadic looking-glass of Lefebvre: my first hypothesis, even though philosophical, is somewhat reductive, the phenomenology of space here being interpreted from the point of view of conceptual history (and its associated questions), Lefebvre instead considering the material (physiological) reality of an otherwise idealized Ego (the notion of “spatial practice” expands on the phenomenological notion of “perceived space”); similarly, my second hypothesis reduces the Lefebvrian notions of “representation” and “thought” to one of their elements, namely, concepts, ultimately allowing for a more concentrated (or theorized) understanding of the socio-political history of social space; lastly, and again, my third hypothesis, that of the material life of concepts, is more specified than Lefebvre´s understanding of “representational space”, said materiality – with Lefebvre – here being re-interpreted as the conceptual elements of social space lived. Clearly, therefore, Lefebvre´s method is here condensed into a conceptual history in the making, my hypothetical triad nevertheless being true to the dialectic structure of his triadic tensions – resulting not in a Hegelian synthesis, but in a never-ending (plural) history marked by the conflicts and alliances of social space experienced, theorized, and lived. And so, recalling the dual nature of Lefebvre´s dialectic, one of the triadic pairs being phenomenological, the other material-semiotic, its conceptual content can now be clarified: mediating the relation between language and experience, concepts are also mediating the relation between, on the one hand, the language of social space, and on the other, the experience of social space, my three hypotheses – derived from conceptual history – thus functioning within Lefebvre´s dialectic. My own method, not really “my own”, simply emphasizes the conceptual (rather than the general) history of social space; hence, after having investigated the dialectic relationship of Lefebvre´s triad, and now emphasizing its conceptual history, it will be possible to outline what I identified as the primary focus of this part of my paper, namely, (i) concepts as produced by and/or preserved in social space (social space indicating and being a factor in the history of concepts) and (ii) concepts producing and/or preserving social space (concepts indicating and being a factor in the history of social space).177 The terms of (i) and (ii) (concept, social space, preservation, production) have already been defined, and in the following, therefore, I only expand on their mutual relations.

The socio-spatiality of concepts – as one quality among other qualities – could now be defined as the sum of (i) and (ii). Concepts, as elements of the set of verbal signs, are

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177 On the spectrum of Lefebvrian space, in “Absolute space”, analytically speaking, it would be impossible to disentangle (i) and (ii); in “Abstract space”, one would find (ii) to be the prevalent “moment”.

socio-spatial only in so far as they interact with non-verbal signs, their connection to social reality (as indicators and factors) having no meaning if non-verbal signs of the body and its worlds (i.e. spatial practice) are not activated and experienced: there is no world without a body, nor can there be a mind without a brain. In practice, aiming for an explication of (i) and (ii), i.e. the socio-spatiality of concepts, the conceptual historian may ask: following conceptual change, is it possible to identify alterations in social space, and following alterations in social space, is it possible to identify conceptual change? Whereas the vocabulary of Koselleck makes possible a study of conceptual change, Lefebvre instead offers a comprehensive understanding of social space (and the mechanics of its alterations): in sum, therefore, I am here proposing a history of concepts both conceived and lived (or theorized and materialized). Of course, such a history is specified empirically, the method of its investigation having empirical consequences discussed only in my final chapter; deferring that important topic, the terminology of this method now need some final embellishment.

As argued, my discussion of social space must here be reduced to the interests of conceptual history, i.e. the meaning and context of concepts (the latter including social space, not only politics; Koselleck does speak of “pre-”, “extra-”, and “post-linguistic” factors of conceptual history, social space being just that, an aspect of conceptual history nevertheless not theorized by the German historian). In the end, Lefebvre’s method is covering much more ground than my own, his discussion on the relation between language and space nevertheless allowing me to elaborate on – or conclude – the methodology here outlined. Consequently, I propose that one think of spatial codes in terms of semantic fields (its elements “spiritualized” by the non-verbal signs of social space), and that the relation between their elements is understood in terms of a “spatial economy”. As with the semantic fields of concepts, the semantic fields of space are shared, i.e. collective: spatial codes, economies, and discourses are thus collectivized semantic fields of space, social meanings capable of mapping spatial practice. The difference (and relation) between the two semantic fields is one of language: whereas the semantic fields of concepts are verbal and conceived (thought), the semantic fields of representational spaces are primarily lived (including the use of non-verbal signs). Whereas the notion of “Family” is an element of the semantic field of the concept of “Home”, the pictures of the members of this family are a part of the semantic field of the social space of “Home”

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178 The non-verbal signs of spatial codes nevertheless being of interest to the method of conceptual history; I am here thinking of the visual metaphors of “Light” and “Dark”, or the “aura” surrounding important, socio-political structures (buildings).

179 Since these non-verbal signs are always meaningful, I see no problem in labeling them “semantic”.
(distributing meaning, and, in extension, social practice). Notably, today, “Home”, as a social space, and the same is true for “Home-country”, is both a concept and a representational space, its semantic fields intersecting to the degree that they are aligned – the “nuclear family” inseparable from its suburban habitat, the spatial imagery of “Home” is preserving the social relations of production and reproduction as encapsulated in the semantic field of the concept; and what would a “Nation” be without the illusion of a coherent, material culture, including the borders of land and sea? When the elements of a concept are intertwined with the elements of a representational space, e.g. “Home”, “Body”, “Nature”, and “Nation”, that concept has a socio-spatial structure; in socio-spatial concepts, I argue, not only signifier and signified coincide, but the object referred to as well, every “Home” – as a materialized context of meaning – becoming integral to the signifier doing the signifying. In processes of conflating semantic fields, whereas concepts are materialized, space is conceptualized. But all concepts are not necessarily aligned with a representational space, just like all representational spaces are not necessarily aligned with a concept (“Crisis”, “Enlightenment”?). Moreover, in the case of “Homes”, there are always non-verbal signs – the changing fashion of kitchen-ware, for example, or individualized desires of a satisfying interiority – of the spatial code (semantic field) not constituting an element of the semantic field of the concept (even though “fashion” as such could be an element of the concept in question). In the “Homes” of the old bourgeoisie, the conceptual and spatial public/private-distinction (see part 3.) was often conflated on the level of spatial practice, that of living, the practices of representational space sometimes negating the concepts structuring that space. Likewise, the sum of available concepts is not equal to the sum of available representations of space, the latter, naturally so, occasionally conflicting with the elements of the semantic fields of concepts, such conflict often transpiring when there are plans of demolishing deteriorating neighborhoods. Yet, inconsistent as we humans are, on the ideological level, this demolishing, at least in some cases, is called for by democratized collective singulars for which the old spaces of the city (and their interpretation) is a problem: “Progress”, “Democracy”, “Equality”, “Well-fare”. The relation between the two semantic fields is never one-to-one, the “spatial economy” of a representational space

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180 Of course, as in language, semantic fields are always interpreted (individualized): if the concept of “Home” is evocative of the notions of “leisure” and “comfort”, then these semantic elements, at least for some, could be all together absent in the semantic field of the representational space of home (instead incorporating “labor”, “pain”, “captivity”), just like the semantic field of “Democracy” is different from the semantic field of its institutions (e.g. the parliament) depending on your access to these institutions. But people do not produce interpretations of space independent from the society in which they live, the significance of “comfortability at home” being painfully shared by those with less “agreeable” experience: the painful absence of an experience is only possible when the normative presence of an experience is recognized.
sometimes even negating the economy of a conceptual, semantic field (I am here thinking of the urban spaces of the homeless, negating the concept of “Home”, a counter-space, or the life of the nomad, negating the “Nation”, the integration of the former into the latter being anything but a smooth affair); indeed, as expected, by studying the negations and alignments between the two semantic fields, it is possible to identify the specifics of (i) and (ii). Why is it important to “own” a “Home”, to be a “Home-owner”, important enough for people to behave “irrationally”, economically speaking, collectively cause a global, financial disaster (setting aside the ludicrousness of Wall Street), ultimately causing wide-spread and (sometimes) self-inflicted “Homelessness”? Is that “ownership” an element of the (Americanized) concept of “Home”, producing and preserving a spatial imagery (the name on the front door, the mail-box, personalized items sitting everywhere, the dirt in the corner, the childish scribbling on the wall, the movement of a woman in the kitchen, the lawn-moving father, the smell of barbeque in the back-yard) in turn preserving the element of “ownership” (that spatial imagery being relatable, ubiquitous)?

I would argue that what makes a representational space unique (not only historically, but synchronically as well) is its semantic field, just like the economy of the semantic field of a concept makes that concept distinguishable; since these fields are shared, i.e. collectivized, in part through the mediation of concepts, i.e. language, it takes no effort to recognizes the presence of a square (or a “Home”) or the behavior therein appropriate. Consequently, if one approaches social spaces onomasiologically, by studying their semantic fields, it is possible to distinguish analytically between one representational space and another. In effect, spatial practice affirming the connotative and denotative discourses of representational space is identical to the performativity of “behaving properly”, amounting to a reproduction of the social relations of production and reproduction (e.g. showing appropriate reverence when visiting the cemetery); negating these discourses is perhaps more conceptual in orientation (partly), the practice of “squatting”, for example, not being a misunderstanding of the discourse of “ownership” and “hominess”, but rather a full-blown, conceptual negation of the practical implications of these elements (squatting, as a concept, is nevertheless meaningless without spatial action). As argued by Lefebvre, space is not primarily visual, but a matter of iterability, identity, and simultaneity, the negation of this iterability, resulting most often in an appropriation of social space (temporary or not), thus and always being conscious, i.e. conceptual (the consciousness of negations seems to be a logical – if not Marxist – necessity, “originality” being impossible without the recognition of similarity); accordingly, the appropriation-domination-dialectic is not only perceived and lived, but also conceived, that is
to say, enacted in the tensions or alignments between the two semantic fields – “I want freedom, as does everyone else, but being in prison, that is impossible; outside, at home, my family awaits me”. Those tensions may even be the cause for change, both individual and collective, the elements of the semantic field of a concept sometimes being desirable but not lived (i.e. as an element of the semantic field of representational space): in the age of industrialization, for instance, the collective singular of “Home”, materialized only in the representational spaces of the well-off players of the market, was nevertheless widespread among the larger population of the European fin de siècle, causing a tension between the two semantic fields, one standing for that which was absent, i.e. “Home proper”, the concept thus being subsumed into processes of politicization, ideologicization, and democratization – expectations of experiences not had, or future space. In fact, through concepts, hypothetically, one could even speak of a temporalization, politicization, ideologicization, and democratization of representational space. The same tension is perhaps true of such concepts as “Communism”, “Freedom”, and “Utopia”, abstract promises of a social space not had, of semantic fields transcending that of one’s own life; indeed, many concepts are inseparable from the social space to which they refer, as is the case with the concept of “Revolution”, referring not only to a socio-political idea, but also to the social space of the transforming “Nation”, even when that, same revolution is – supposedly – “International” or earth-bound. Similarly, even if the semantic field of urban streets – streetlights being one element therein, a non-verbal sign – does not correspond to a concept in the same manner as aforementioned geography of the “Nation”, urban streets, as social spaces, are still intertwined with the semantic field of such concepts as “Privacy” (antonym), “Public” (behavior), and even “Crisis” (in a “state of emergency” – or during festivity – the meaning of the street is transformed, the streetlight losing its discursive meaning). In sum, concepts are lived, the elements of their semantic fields sometimes materializing in the semantic fields of representational space. Lastly, then, if the semantic field of concepts – by ossifying meaning – structure the semantic field of representational space (spatial codes, discourses, and economies), and if representational space structure the rhythm and gesture of spatial practice (by being meaningful), then the conceptual history here outlined, utilizing Lefebvre’s dialectic triad, ultimately takes the following, methodological form: by studying the intersections, conflicts, and alignments between the two semantic fields, it is possible to specify the history of (i) concepts as produced by and/or preserved in social space and (ii) concepts producing and/or preserving social space. That said, and with the aid of philosophers not yet conferred (I

181 I realize that my examples are overly simplistic.
advise a closer look at the following footnotes), it is now time to expand somewhat on this analysis of representational space, my hope here being to harvest a better understanding of its conceptual structure.

With the method and theory of Lefebvre in mind, and “representational space” so delineated, could one speak of and identify “non-representational” spaces, thereby allowing for a better understanding of the former? In response to this question, I will again consult Tuan. For Tuan, much like de Certau, there is a difference between spaces and places. Reversing de Certau’s terms, however, for Tuan, places, as opposed to spaces, are rooted in the present while growing into the future (I recall my argument that being-in-space is not only a matter of “making tings present”, that space also has future, expectations of difference and similarity, utopias and dystopias, absence-made-present): places, each with its unique personality, are sites of belonging demanding both affection and awe. “A place”, Tuan writes, “is the compelling focus of a field: it is a small world, the node at which activities converge.” Spaces, on the other hand, is the totalized experience of being, the body moving through a non-nodal landscape, the in-between-two-points; when the doorsteps of one’s home is reached, or when the street-corner is loitered, one is thus entering the realm of the place, “the node at which activities converge”, or where concepts reside. During the temporal time-lapse of a carnival,

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182 Michel de Certau (1925-1986), the Jesuit-scholar, opposing – more rigidly than Lefebvre – the practices of conceiving and living space (espace), explores the everyday-tactics and strategies used for appropriating urban places (lieu) lost to modernity: “The ordinary practitioners of the city”, de Certau writes, “live ‘down below’. Below the thresholds at which visibility begins. They walk – an elementary form of this experience of the city; they are walkers, Wandersmänner, whose bodies follow the thicks and thins of the urban ‘text’, they write without being able to read it. These practitioners make use of spaces that cannot be seen.” (de Certau, The Practice of Everyday Life, p.93). Moreover, the “networks of these moving, intersecting writings compose a manifold story that has neither author nor spectator, shaped out of fragments of trajectories and alternations of spaces: in relation to representations, it remains daily and indefinitely other.” (Ibid.). The manifold tactics of spatial re-appropriation may here serve to illuminate the spatial practice of everyday life; when walking, de Certau argues, below the threshold of an Archimedean view-point, we enunciate speech-acts, the rhetoric (“ways of operating”) of everyday-action being subsumed into a collective “chorus of idle footsteps”. This walking has three characteristics: it is present (agreed on by all philosophers so far discussed), discrete (creating and actualizing the limitations and possibilities of space), and phatic (the mobile organicity of small-talk and communication, Lefebvre’s connotative and denotative discourses) (Ibid., p.97–100.). More importantly, semantic elements are always involved: names, symbols, stories, and myths make people walk (“You have to go ‘there’, it is absolutely beautiful!”), indicating and organizing the prominence of space, different from place in that it has meaning beyond the discourse of the urban engineer. “Stories”, writes de Certau, “thus carry out a labor that constantly transforms places into spaces or spaces into places.” (Ibid., p.118.). A “spatial story is in its minimal degree a spoken language, that is, a linguistic system that distributes places insofar as it is articulated by an ‘enunciatory focalization’, by an act of practicing it.” (Ibid., p.130.). For de Certau, I conclude, the body speaks to the world by practicing it; space, instead of being an “empty” pre-condition of movement, is articulated in the enunciatory relations of that movement, i.e. the speech-acts of living and talking space: naturally, these speech-acts are mediated by language, discourse, and verbal conventions – the spatial code of representational space, intersected with the semantic field of concepts (walking and talking, we enunciate speech-acts).

183 Tuan, “Space and Place”, p.411.
for example, the directed space of the street is transformed into a non-directed, heterogeneous *place*. Moreover, for Tuan, places, corresponding to Lefebvre’s representational spaces, can be divided into different *types*, all with their own logic of habituation. Beside mythological-conceptual place, argues Tuan, wherein conceiving and living converge, just as in Lefebvre’s absolute space, there are, first, *visual places*, such as the public square, “public symbols”, and secondly, *fields of care*, this latter place – reminiscent of Heidegger’s analysis of spatiality in *Sein und Zeit* – requiring prolonged, aesthetic experience, the “taking-care-of” of Da-Sein. In relation to fields of care, the relevant question is how meaning can be deduced from maintenance (i.e. prolonged experience), and in relation to visual places, the relevant question is how space – the form and structure of the public symbol – can organize meaning (the preceding discussion is meant to answer both questions). “Monuments, artworks, buildings, and cities”, says Tuan, “are places because they can organize space into centres of meaning.” Since we are our own centers of meaning, we engage in a hermeneutic dialogue with these places of public symbolism, creating a horizon – now invoking Gadamer – of meaning in which the two centers fuse. By contrast, fields of care “carry few signs that declare their nature: they can be known in essence only from within.” Like “Home”, here anticipating the next part of my paper, the field of care “is indubitably also a place if the people are emotionally bound to their material environment, and if, further, they are conscious of its identity and spatial limit.” Be that as it may, the intimate relation between objects does not add up to a place; social as we humans are, for a space to be a place, it needs interpersonal ties and connections, these interpersonal relations in turn requiring objects to confirm, consolidate, and justify their emotional validity (Durkheim’s functionalist thesis); in the context of this paper, this could be taken as another reminder of the material significance of social (and conceptual) life, a *place* perhaps not being possible without the association of a concept (or many). Furthermore, in the case of loss, if the interpersonal ties are teared apart, then the field of care may lose its status as a place; most often, however, in the case of death, a field of care is increased or even founded, the graveyard having no emotional significance until a close relative is therein laid to rest. So what is the nature of this transition from space to place? It is one of repeated experience – of identity, iterability, and simultaneity, the pre-conditions of spatial codes: through the repetitive experience of maintaining space, i.e. by cleaning, dusting, and stroking the borders or objects of a place-in-becoming, the space in question transforms into an extension of ourselves, our

184 Ibid., p.415.
185 Ibid., p.416.
186 Ibid., p.417.
bodies, a world taken care of, different than the worlds of labor, commuting, and sickness (the hospital, as a place of taking-care-of, is filled with people unable to take care, the labor-ness of taking-care-of perhaps being an antidote to its essence). Ultimately, says Tuan, “The functional pattern of our lives is capable of establishing a sense of place”.\textsuperscript{187} The home, cleaned, dusted, and stroked, would be one such place of care, rooted in the present and extending into the future;\textsuperscript{188} at home, “everyday” is multiplied by itself, spreading its “here” (now) to the temporality of “tomorrow” and “yesterday”. Accumulation of experience and hopes of expectation – in short: time – are thus necessary aspects of the constitution of a field of care, a sub-category of that place-ness discussed by Lefebvre in terms of representational space.

“Home” understood in this way, as a field of care lived through repetition and meaning, could perhaps be called – with Deleuze and Guattari – an “assemblage” with high “affective capacity”, a unity of consistency made up by heterogeneous elements; as such, one could ask whether it is “striated” – that is, hierarchical and rule-intensive – or “smooth” and dynamic, allowing for transformations and “lines of flight”.\textsuperscript{189} Of course, in most homes, there are strict hierarchies, gendered and generational, the “de-territorialization” of such hierarchical regimes – i.e. escaping the boundaries of the striated space only to re-position oneself within another regime (a “re-territorialization”) – perhaps being a consequence of the smoothness of related assemblages, the internet (or the book) – aspects of the practice of home – allowing for an emotional/sexual freedom, and the love between kin allowing for non-hierarchical interaction?\textsuperscript{190} Is that why “Home” is so valuable to us – through its associated smoothness, countering the striating forces of the abstract space of modernity? This question is a matter of historical research and can only be answered in the following. My reason for introducing the vocabulary of Deleuze and Guattari is nevertheless twofold: first, the notion of “striated” assemblages takes away some of the nostalgia and benevolence encapsulated in the notion of “field of care” (places, even though meaningful, could very well be meaningful because of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{187} Ibid., p.418.
\item \textsuperscript{188} For Heidegger, the temporality of “taking-care-of” is presence, Tuan instead allowing for an extension into the future, the knowledge of iterability being vital – arguably – for the consciousness of place-space. It is nevertheless easy to see why Heidegger persisted in reducing spatiality to the temporality of Da-sein: repeatedly, I return to the “present” (in which we undeniably and paradoxically live) and to “iteration” (which is a phenomena of time). Yet, “present” and “iteration” are equally impossible without the relations of space, the determination of “presence” or “iteration” depending on the spatial relations made present or being iterated (including thought, which is always spatial and somatic, oriented towards-the-world). The reduction of spatiality to temporality thus needs a strong and un-biased argument (I am here not discarding it): why not instead conclude that humans are both spatial and temporal, that space and time are inseparable but distinguishable categories? My understanding of absence-made-present as the temporality of spatiality pin-points exactly that.
\item \textsuperscript{189} Ringrose, “Beyond Discourse?”, pp.598-618.
\item \textsuperscript{190} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
pain they evoke); second, I find it important to note that the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari is highly relevant for the purposes here pursued, even though, apologetically so, there is no space-time to develop that relevance. Instead, I will conclude this part of the paper with some poaching commentary on Michel Foucault’s (1926-1984) celebrated notion of heterotopia.

Why is the notion of heterotopia important? As a sub-category of Lefebvre’s representational space, it refines not only the distinction between space and place, but also the analytical administration of the relation of space and time. Space, says Foucault in his lecture “Of Other Spaces”, now evoking my first and second hypothesis, “space itself has a history in Western experience.” The “space of emplacement” of the middle ages, argues Foucault, a hierarchical intersection of meaningful places (hierarchical intersections being fundamentally different from the abstract differentiations of modernity), was displaced by the Galilean discovery of the infinite openness of the universe, extension (Descartes) thus replacing the belonging of a paradigm of “localization”. Today, in the era of the “site”, defined as the “relations of proximity between points or elements”, our anxieties, says Foucault, have “to do fundamentally with space, no doubt a great deal more than with time.” In said lecture, Foucault sets out to discuss a type of site that contradicts all other sites, namely, heterotopias, juxtaposed primarily with those sites lacking a real place – i.e. utopias. Heterotopias are counter-sites, “an effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted.” The mirror, which is real, counteracting one’s position, is also unreal in that it provides an image of a position that is absent, virtual: as a heterotopia, the mirror “makes this place that I occupy at the moment when I look at myself in the glass at once absolutely real, connected with all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal, since in order to be perceived it has to pass through this virtual point which is over there.” In short, the mirror has a dual meaning in relation to what is considered real. Foucault proceeds by discussing a list of seemingly unrelated heterotopias: heterotopias of crisis, such as sacred sites, heterotopias of deviation, such as the prison and psychiatric hospital, and heterotopias serving societal (and historically specific) functions, such as the cemetery; moreover, there are heterotopias “capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible”, such as

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192 Ibid., p.2.
193 Ibid., p.3.
194 Ibid., p.4.
195 Ibid., p.6.
the botanical garden, attempting a representation of the totality of the world, and heterotopias of time, such as the museum or library, accumulating different times, heterochronies. About these, latter heterotopias, Foucault writes that:

the idea of accumulating everything, of establishing a sort of general archive, the will to enclose in one place all times, all epochs, all forms, all tastes, the idea of constituting a place of all times that is itself outside of time and inaccessible to its ravages, the project of organizing in this way a sort of perpetual and indefinite accumulation of time in an immobile place, this whole idea belongs to our modernity.\textsuperscript{196}

Opposed to the heterotopias of accumulated time are those of the festival, the temporal free-flow of transitory time and space. What unites all of them, finally, and what makes heterotopias different from public places, is that they presuppose a system of “opening and closing”, each entry either being mandatory (as in the case of the prison) or requiring permission, a rite of purification (as in the sauna). Lastly, each heterotopia serve a function in relation to the other spaces of society: “Either their role is to create a space of illusion that exposes every real space, all the sites inside of which human life is partitioned, as still more illusory […] Or else, on the contrary, their role is to create a space that is other, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled.”\textsuperscript{197} In sum, heterotopias approximate utopian beliefs, constructing parallel spaces for the containment of non-utopian, undesirable bodies.

The forgoing discussion is yet another example of the importance of taking space in consideration when analyzing the systems of meaning organizing a historical, conceptual vocabulary (and vice versa). As an approximation of utopian beliefs, heterotopias, requiring both spatial and conceptual analysis, is an excellent segue into the two situations identified in my third hypothesis: on the one hand, \( (i) \) concepts as produced by and/or preserved in social space, and on the other, \( (ii) \) concepts producing and/or preserving social space. Whereas the space of the prison is inseparable from the concept of “Punishment”, the concept of “History” is inseparable from the heterotopias of time (the semantic field of the “Museum”); to understand the historical development of these institutions, a method capable of capturing the historical development of space \textit{and} its concepts is needed. If the investigation of such a method has constituted the purpose of my preceding discussions, in the following, among other things, I

\textsuperscript{196} Ibid., p.7.
\textsuperscript{197} Ibid., p.8.
will ask: in any of its historical forms, is it accurate to describe the space of “Home” in terms of a heterotopia? Before leaping into the implications of that question, however, I must first summarize some of my initial findings.

2.3 Concluding openings

My analysis of the writings of Koselleck and Lefebvre, informed by related philosophies and perhaps better described in terms of a dialogue (my hope is to have leveled at least some critique against the two thinkers), produced an expansive field of methodological considerations. My horizon here being the history of the concept of “Home”, this field allows me to extrapolate the following methodological openings:

1. Koselleck’s “Theory of Concepts”, more a method than a theory (the lack of definitions circumscribes falsification), generate tools of analysis adequate for describing the semantic trajectory of concepts. Some surgery is nevertheless of consequence, my own approach to the concept of “Home” being more onomasiologically oriented than that of Koselleck (for my history of the concept of “Home”, I nevertheless adopt a diachronic perspective; in my concluding analysis of inter-war Sweden, my onomasiological approach is instead synchronic). In the following, therefore, taking advantage of this theory, my history of the concept of “Home” will be described from the point of view of semantic fields, collective singulars, counter-concepts, conceptual pairs, and concepts understood as indicators of and factors in social experience and change (concepts, like space, afford possibilities and limitations).

2. The “Anthropological Theory” of expectation-experience generates interesting – and, in my book, incontestable – hypotheses regarding the history of human temporality; regardless, and symptomatic of the historicist subordination of space, the anthropological claim to universality is reductive in its treatment of Being.

3. Koselleck’s “Theory of Historical Times”, even though “un-falsifiable” (as a theory), is perhaps best described as a postmodern structuralism uniting the best of two worlds: first, a belief in the non-relativized truth of historical reality, and second, a belief in the endless plurality of voices and stories, dead or alive, buried or forgotten. As an antidote to anachronism, utopianism, relativism, and teleology, Koselleck’s geological theory, positing temporal layers available to the historian asking the right questions, is constructive in so far as its metaphorical enunciation is not taken literally (the space of
that geology is never invited). Besides the plurality of its theses, from this theory, I will extract an inquisitive understanding of the four hypotheses of the Sattelzeit, i.e. the politicization, democratization, ideologicization, and temporalization of concepts. Moreover, in this context, I will utilize – rather liberally – the terminology of temporal layers (structure-events), including the very potent notion of the simultaneity of the non-simultaneous (also a symptom of the temporalization of the Sattelzeit).

4. Evidently, Koselleck’s methodology is one of temporal abstractions – of time, temporality, and the evolving temporalization of socio-political language. The spatiality of being is ignored or suppressed, Da-sein being reduced to the time of its un-folding. For that reason, a method capable of explaining the socio-spatiality of concepts is asked for: hence, I stipulated three (spatially oriented) hypotheses meant to integrate the notion of space (however interpreted) into the abstract vocabulary of conceptual history. These hypotheses concern the following situations (or moments): (i) concepts as produced by and/or preserved in social space and (ii) concepts producing and/or preserving social space. Most importantly, preceding the identification of (i) and (ii), I asked for a definition of (human) space. My first hypotheses, that of the spatiality of being, was discussed in a speculative manner not suitable to the methodological nature of its framework. From that discussion, I nevertheless concluded two things: first, that there is room for reflecting on the experience of space as a fundamental, meta-historical aspect of being; second, that the Koselleckian metaphors of “space” and “horizon” leave room for more than just metaphorical content. Moreover, conjecturing, I identified three, phenomenological pairs perhaps capable of being integrated into Koselleck’s theory of experience and expectation: Body-Worlds, Belonging-Alienation, and Interiority-Exteriority. Nonetheless, substantial work is necessary here, and I am therefore forced to leave the topic as it was initially conceived, i.e. hypothetically.

5. It would be of great value to adequately pursue a conceptual history of the concepts of “Space”, especially if the notion of space is theorized accordingly. Unfortunately, however, as was the case with my first hypothesis, this a topic for another paper, there nevertheless being many reasons for accepting the following (perhaps trivial) proposition: the notions of “space”, whatever their meaning, are inseparable from the general history of concepts. This fact, if it “is” a fact, i.e. the historical nature of the concepts of “Space”, not only ignites the analysis of my first hypothesis, but also functions as the primum movens of my third hypothesis. The proposition of my second hypothesis therefore provides me with a conceptual node connecting the writings of
Koselleck and Lefebvre; from the perspective of this node – with an understanding of representations pertaining to a conceptual history – a methodology capable of apprehending concepts-in-space may be outlined.

6. Consequently, in what follows, when analyzing the relation between concepts and space (as expressed in (i) and (ii), the socio-spatial quality of concepts, see above), I will expand on Lefebvre’s vocabulary by reducing it (in short: by emphasizing Koselleck’s understanding of concepts). In practice, this means that I will investigate the conceptual production of social space as enacted in the dialectic of spatial practice, representations of space, and representational space, but with an emphasis on the “downgraded” relation between the semantic fields of space and concept. On top of that lexis, explained and exemplified above, I will utilize Lefebvre’s terminology of rhythm, spatial economy, spatial codes (including verbal and non-verbal signs, e.g. “archi-texture”), domination-appropriation, denotative and connotative (spatial) discourses, the presence of the nonpresent (my term), as well as the possibilities and limitations afforded by space. This terminology was condensed into my discussion on “semantic fields of representational space”, the relation between these semantic fields and those of the concept amounting to (i) and (ii). Importantly, since the novelty of this method – less consequential than the length of the discussion would suggest – follows an arranged meeting between the writings of Koselleck and Lefebvre, the purpose ultimately being an expansion of the analytical range of conceptual history, that meeting allows me to counter a common objection made against Koselleckian history: who’s history is being written when only the texts of lawyers, philosophers, scholars, and politicians are considered? One of the aims of aligning conceptual history with the spatial turn is to bring new sources into play: architecture, street-corners, urban landscapes, non-verbal imaging, “natural” events and habitats, bodily practices (tattoos, scars, and the representation of these), and the spatial action (spatial practice) of groups or individuals (the destruction of the Bastille, street-art, festivals). In sum, I am proposing a conceptual history capable of describing the history of concepts lived.

7. Lastly, and supplementing Lefebvre’s own terminology, when discussing representational spaces, I will make a distinction between space and place (Tuan and de Certau), thus allowing me to reflect on the notions of heterotopia, fields of care, visual place (public symbol), and – finally – the opposition between smooth and striated space. With the remainder of this thesis in mind, that concludes my methodological openings.
3. Sketching a History of “Home”

“Homeiness is not neatness”\(^{198}\) – Witold Rybczynski

“The Group, which consists of a Father, Mother, and Children, is called a Family”\(^{199}\) – James Mill

“The man without a home is a potential criminal”\(^{200}\) – Immanuel Kant

In his essay “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral sense”, Friedrich Nietzsche writes that “Every concept arises from the equation of unequal things”, an anthropomorphic process ultimately leading to the conception of platonic universals.\(^{201}\) Moreover, asking what truth is, Nietzsche subsequently concludes that truth is “A movable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: in short, a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished, and which, after long usage, seem to a people to be fixed, canonical, and binding.”\(^{202}\) Elusive and allusive, itself a host of rhetorical embellishment, Nietzsche’s definition here articulates a form of social constructivism later to be epitomized in postmodern questions of truth, power and otherness; citing Nietzsche in the context of the following, my aim is nevertheless not to elaborate on the methodological model discussed in the previous chapter, but rather to summarize its limits, ambitions and reach, truth, in Nietzsche’s account, always implying the social history of its making. Next, therefore, having this definition of truth in mind, and extending it to the equalization of the unequal, i.e. the childhood of concepts, I will attempt to sketch a history of the concept of “Home”, this history thus being akin to “a sum of human relations which have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished”.

And so, in an unconventional move, beginning at the very end of this history, namely the present, Ali Madanipour, writing on the concept of domesticity, defines home as a “spatial unit that combines a number of traits of the private sphere […] It provides personal space, a territory, a place for being protected from the natural elements, as well as from the

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\(^{202}\) Ibid.
scrutiny of others, a location in the social world to engage in social life, which is socially acknowledged and legalized.” Inevitably, when invoking the word “home”, a network of relatable concepts/notions immediately comes to mind: Privacy, Intimacy, the Public (antonym), Comfort, Labor (in the household), Sexuality, Family, Childhood, Conjugality, Technology, Houses and Apartments (visual placeholders, representational space, the scene of sexuality and intimacy), Domesticity, etc. This set of concepts is constitutive of the semantic field of “Home”, the latter incorporating all aspects of the contexts of meaning in which its word is used; if, at work, the word “home” is uttered, one is – for example – necessarily involving the very opposition between work and home, thus incorporating – in the use of the word – the interrelated aspects of the word’s rather far-reaching contexts of meaning. This was not always the case, however, the relationship between public and private once lacking the clarity by which Victorian architecture expressed its bourgeoisie self-consciousness: in the feudal age, men and women worked and lived under the same, thatched roof.

Now reducing my discussion to the Swedish language, but staying in the present, the word “home” – in Swedish: “hem” – carries a certain weight, a taken-for-granted, metaphorical power, evident in such words as “Hemslöjd” (Handicraft), “Hemland” (Homeland, Country of birth), “Hemställa” (to Suggest, to Request), “Hemmaplan” (Home-field), “Hemsöka” (to Visit, to Obsess, to Afflict; the actions of demons and ghosts), “Hemuppgift” (Homework), and “Folkhemmet” (the People’s Home; a political concept discussed thoroughly in the next chapter). Furthermore, even though speculative, one is tempted to find traces of the word “hem” in less transparent, linguistic configurations, “Hemlighet” (Secret) and “Hemisfär” (Hemisphere) here being two, curious points of philological departure. In the English language, consider the phrases “Home is where the heart is”, “There is no place like home”, and “Home sweet home”, or all the compounds starting with the word “home”. Moreover, in Swedish and in English, when entering the World Wide Web, we travel from one “Home-page” to the next, searching for meaning, knowledge, and entertainment by exploring the depths of these digital homes. A quick search on Google, for example, may deliver a Christian home-page later

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204 It should be noted that I use the term “bourgeoisie” in its twentieth-century meaning, i.e. as a class-concept (non-proletarian and non-aristocratic). Earlier meanings – burgher, citizen – are thus excluded.
205 Interestingly, in the digital age, the practice of “working from home” has made a grand return. It is nevertheless important to note that such descriptions (“working from home”) would hardly make sense in the context of medieval artisanship; the idea of conflating work-space and home-space is dependent on the very separation of work-space from home-space (compare the word “homework”), a separation that was unavailable to most if not all feudal subjects. The history of this separation is crucial to any understanding of the concept of “Home”.

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directing you to a proclamation of the following interpretation of the Bible: “Heaven – The Home of the Redeemed”.206 Within the evocative realm of this interpretation, produced by the late pastor Lehman Strauss, the concept of “Home” is serving the function of a self-evident – or canonical, now invoking Nietzsche – metaphor: in lack of a better word for ultimate, spiritual fulfilment, the concept of “Home” simply says it all. In a more neo-liberal setting (but similar enough), “Home” is connoting the end of a journey towards Maslowian self-realization, the earthly yearning expected of contemporary, individualist subjects – as it does, for example, in Sean Combs’s (alias Diddy) successful song “Coming Home” (2010): “Is a house really a home when your loved ones are gone?”207 The Australian airline Qantas, advertising their mobile comfort, makes use of a cosmopolitan concept of “Home”, counter-acting the loss of “Home” – in terms of the homelessness of commodities and psychologies – associated with “globalized” economies. In one of their advertisement campaigns, called “Welcome Home”, we are thus told that “Boarding one of our planes should feel like you’re already home.”208 Naturally, to conclude this list of prototypical uses of the concept of “Home”, it is also protected under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10th 1948, article 12 of said declaration stating that “No one shall be subject to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, not to attacks on his honour and reputation.”209 The absence of experience here protected accentuates the natural presence of what is protected; within the social reality of refugee living, the concept of “Crisis” – referencing, it seems, the internal state of the hosting, European states – has more meaning than ever. Privacy, family, home – what more could the contemporary subject desire? To quote the famous slogan of IKEA: “Home is the Most Important Place in the World”. Indeed, “Homelessness”, in all cases, is a sign of serious deprivation. And so, as is made clear by these amorphous examples, there is no easy escape from the desirable structures of the word “home”.210 How so? It is also clear that sketching the history of this concept is no easy task, and that the following, an attempt at such a sketch, hardly

209 Quoted in Madanipour, Public and Private Spaces of the City, p.43. In Sweden, there is a law regarding “Hemfridsbrott”, i.e. the crime of “Disturbing the peace at home”, this law stemming from medieval times; importantly, however, to my knowledge, the law went from protecting “houses” to protecting “homes”, a form of semantic transformation confirming my historical thesis.
210 That is, in contemporary Anglo-Saxon culture.
will do any justice to all the social and conceptual histories subsumed into the contexts of meaning in which the word “home” is used. In the following, therefore, with this disclaimer in mind, I will do my best to keep this history short and coherent, the modest aim of this chapter being to explore (but not explain) some of the rhetorical embellishments, intensifications, and transferals of the human field of interactions constituting the concept of “Home”: what is the history of the word, and under what social, political, religious, scientific, philosophical, and economic circumstances (including parallel stories, dead-ends) did the word come to signify a normative set of spatially distributed relationships (e.g. the modern family) assuming both metaphorical and metonymic power?

As a concept with social as well as spatial implications, it is well-suited to the over-arching aim of this paper, namely, the writing of a conceptual history concerned with spatial and social intersections, i.e. the conceptual production of social space. Moreover, due to the Anglo-Saxon/Germanic nature of the word “home”, the writing of this history allows me to pinpoint some of the more troubling moments of the field of conceptual history, ethnocentrism and language-barriers (synchronic and diachronic) perhaps being the most acute, disciplinary charges; in this chapter, for example, I emphasize the Anglo-Saxon concept of “Home”, particularly as it was manifested in the notion of “Domesticity”, the latter an intensification of the former, a sign of something stirring, of relationships being defined, of concepts being re-defined. “Domesticity”, a rather technical term, widely discussed among scholars of 19th-century, British literature, is inseparable from the concept of “Home” (but not vice versa), as is made evident in what I understand to be the most accurate translation of “Domesticity” into Swedish, namely, “Hemliv” (literally, Home-life). The conditions of this translation (keeping the concluding chapter of this thesis in mind), as well as the history of these, two words, finally convinced me to write the history of “Home” rather than that of “Domesticity”: in sum, even though I do not see the two words as synonymous, and the following will be my case in point, I found a conceptual dependency between the two words giving weight to the concept of “Home”, a concept that in contrast to the notion of “Domesticity” is both flexible and fixed, transparent and opaque. Like the awareness of time, we know what “Home” is until someone asks us!

All this will be elaborated upon in the following, a faulty sketch of some of the trends prevalent in European conceptions of the semantic field of “Home” (I recall my discussion on diachronic onomasiology). I am not arguing that these trends are necessarily related to their future, i.e. Functionalist renditions of “Home”, nor am I making the argument that European and English mentalities easily translated themselves into the Swedish context.
Again, with the aid of secondary sources, the point of this sketch is to provide my case-study with a provisionary sense of the continuities and discontinuities of the history of domestic ideas. Re-using a quote from Koselleck, “We can risk making statements of necessity insofar as we formulate them with reservations”. Hence, now pronouncing my second disclaimer, I would be happy to be contradicted and corrected.

Finally, then, a rather odd question: in what way is the concept of “Home” a concept? The word implies a place – different from space – and a set of social relationships. Furthermore, quoting Karen Harvey, it “suggests something other than a collection of social relationships (family), an economic unit (household), a physical construction (house or domestic interior), or a co-resident unit bounded by household management (household-family).” “Home” is not constituted by any of these phenomena taken separately, but evokes the collective singular of their sum, indicating – historically speaking – as well as being a factor in social experience and change. Not necessarily evident – that is to say, appearing on the two-dimensional surface of self-awareness – to the social actors realizing their historical situation, the elements of the semantic field of “Home” have nevertheless played a central part in the commodification and westernization of life. But what about the navigation of geographical space? Are we not “coded” – biologically and psychologically speaking – to embody a desire for the “eternal return”, a deep-seated identification with the ever-lasting landscape of our childhood-memories? Naturally, even though irrelevant to my own purposes (those of the conceptual historian), the cognitive mechanisms of spatial recognition and mnemonic representation are important here; arguably, we share some of these mechanisms with other biological life-forms, such as the migrating birds, “returning home” from their wintery vacations in the sunny south. But this “returning home” is historical and human, sentimental and conceptual: the underlying association between “nesting” (the abode of the child) and “homeiness” (the comfort of Home) says more about contemporary (and nationalist) understandings of “Home” than the observable fact of patterned mobility. Why not call the place of wintery migration “Home”?

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3.1 Word, notion, concept: etymology, dictionary entries

If one of the aims of conceptual history is to defeat anachronism and teleology, then anachronism and teleology – in a case of “identification with the aggressor” – constitute two of the principle dangers of conceptual history: by emphasizing the language of the past, its historicity and otherness, and by situating itself at the end of this history (like I just did), in the language of the contemporary, conceptual history – as a method – is always threatened by the conflation of signifier and signified, the affirmation (rather than negation) of the present. The hope is, of course, that the dialectic between “now” and “then” comes together in a fruitful and critical self-awareness. Moreover, there is the difficult question of where to start: in Ancient Greece, implying a narrative of origins, deep affinities, conceptual-linguistic remnants linking Plato with Heidegger?; in the Sattelzeit, implying revolutions so ubiquitous that it is simply futile to speak of historical continuities?; with the word, the concept, or the transformation of the former into the latter, implying that words are but inanimate bricks in the functionalist game of language, bricks that sometimes – and only sometimes – are endowed with a breath of elusive, conceptual life?; and how does one explain such a transformation (through what processes, if any)?

Perhaps unjustifiably so, my single answer to these questions is to start with the word “home”, a proto-Germanic word providing me with a convenient shortcut: my own, conceptual history begins here, in the medieval spheres of feudal sociability, ending in the first half of the twentieth-century and referencing older conceptual configurations only when there is sufficient, methodological reason to do so (as is the case with the Old Greek notion of oikos). This shortcut nevertheless has an argument as well as an analogy: if words are like names for clothing worn by concepts, and if the elements of semantic fields are like threads of the fabric of that clothing, finely interwoven to form a recognizable, macroscopic pattern, i.e. the semantic pattern by which a concept can be identified and recognized (the meaning of the “uniform”), hiding the microscopic structure of the weary interrelations of the threads, threads eventually hanging loose, torn by the uses of time, then it seems perfectly advisable to start with the very word for clothing (i.e. “clothing”), the only static position in a history of changing patterns and fashions, the only fixed structure in a history of embellished content. In short, having Koselleck’s definition of concepts in mind, by starting with the signifier, it is possible to trace the history of a signifier coinciding with the realm of the signified.

The words “hem” (Swedish) and “home” (English) share the same etymological root: originally a proto-Germanic word, the word “home” is not only cognate with the Old
Frisian hēm, referring to a person’s house, abode, and homestead (the West Frisian hiem meaning yard or farmyard), but also related to Old Saxon (hēm, house), Middle High German (heim, abode, residence, dwelling), Old- and Middle Dutch (heem, heim, where one lives, dwelling), Old Swedish (hēm, heem, a person’s house or abode), Old Danish (hiem, hēm, a person’s house or abode), Old Icelandic (heimr, may refer to mythological space, e.g. Jotunheimr, lit. “the abode of giants”, or world), Old English (ham, plot of land, village, a place-name, e.g. Nottingham), etc. Etymologically speaking, there is thus a considerable, semantic overlap between the words “home” and “house” (haus, hūs, huus, huis: analogous Germanic origin, referring to “a building for human habitation”, e.g. an abode, thus equivalent to the Latin domus; haus could also refer to mythological space, much like heimr). In fact, one could think of the history of the concept of “Home” as a history of the separation of these, two words: to summarize and simplify this history from the point of view of etymology, the separation of “house” and “home”, not evident in early, vernacular forms, nor in Latin languages, came about in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century cultures of comfort and privacy, escalating into the peculiar notion of “Domesticity” as it was expressed among the nineteenth-century, Victorian bourgeoisie, a notion – and I repeat myself here – dependent on but not synonymous with the less well-defined – more amorphous, ubiquitous – concept of “Home” (one could perhaps think of “Domesticity” as a sub-concept of “Home”).

House, abode, dwelling: “home” as “the house where one lives, dwells”. As we know from social history (see below), before the Sattelzeit, it was more common than not – in a spectrum ranging from peasants to feudal lords – to share your living-space with people (and animals) not necessarily related to you by “blood” or conjugality. In pre-modern Europe, the words “privacy” and “family” simply had different connotations than those associated with them today. The history of the concept of “Family” will be elaborated upon below, and it is here sufficient to note the Latin and French roots of the term, familia, in classic Latin, referring to the servants of a household, and famille, in fourteenth-century French, referring to both

215 The word “comfortable”, from Latin confortare, once had the meaning of “strengthening” and/or “concoling”, i.e. a hierarchical act between two or more people, the “Comforter” often being the Holy Spirit; later, it would carry the meaning of “tolerable” and “sufficient”, only to be individualized into the contemporary semantics of “contentment” and “enjoyment”, suggesting, conceptually speaking, a history of individualized concepts also applicable to the words “house”, “home”, and “family” (now a private affair). (Rybczynski, Home: A Short History of an Idea, p.20.)
servants and “a group of people living under the same roof”. The Latin *familia* would reside in a *domus*, the Latin word for “house”, a spatial unit controlled by the *dominus*, the master of the *familia*. Regarding the word “privacy”, also discussed below, Georges Duby, on the topic of the history of private life, writes that “the root meaning of public is that of common possession by all the people; in opposition to this we have two derivative senses of private, one conveying the idea of exemption or departure from common usage, the other conveying a sense of domesticity – the private individual surrounded by those who are close to him.” In a legal context, later translated – rather benevolently so – from Roman law to medieval legal practices, whereas the notion of *res publica* referred to the larger community, protected from the private affairs of the market, the notion of *res private* referred to the sphere of *domus* and *familia* – a sphere that was subjected to the legal power of the *pater familias*.

The word “home” – once intersecting the semantics of the word “house” (*haus, hūs*) – had its equivalent in Latin and Slavic languages (compare Russian *mir*, meaning “commune”, or Latvian *ciems*, meaning “homestead”). The specifics – in terms of social implications – of this equivalence will be discussed below. Interestingly, however, now jumping to the age of modernization, the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century, an ever-changing context in which the Anglo-Saxon/Germanic word “home” already carried more meaning than its Latin/Slavic equivalence (there is no Latin word for “Home”, only for “house”: e.g. Spanish, “casa”), an exchange of words took place: at approximately the same time as the Anglo-Saxon word “home” introduced itself to the French language (together with such words as “comfort” and “baby”), an introduction that testifies to the novelty and uniqueness of the semantic separation of “house” from “home”, non-existent in Latin languages, the French word “domestique” gained importance in the self-conscious language of the British bourgeoisie.

In eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain, there is thus an increasing association between the words “domestic” and “home”, reinforcing, as it seems, said semantic separation of “house” from “home”: “As the [eighteenth-]century progressed, and as the printed dictionary genre itself transformed, dictionary definitions gave fuller meanings to these two terms [i.e. “domestic” and “home”];

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“home”], and also began to connect them.”

The 1706-edition of the *The New World of Worlds* by Edward Phillips – as well as *A New English Dictionary* by John Kersey, published nearly three decades later, in 1731 – defines “home” as a “house” or a “place of abode”. Noteworthy continuity: distinction without separation. In the *Universal Etymological English Dictionary* of 1783, however, whereas “domesticate” meant “to make domestic, to withdraw from the public”, the notion of “home”, as Karen Harvey interprets it, was defined as a “capacious entity: separate, comforting and familiar, a place of belonging but also of possession.” In this British context, towards the end of the eighteenth-century, the domestic act of withdrawing from the public was also defined as a quality – namely, the quality of being at “home”, engaged in family life. With such definitions and uses, the word “home” gained some weight: to quote Karen Harvey, researching dictionary entries, “home had already come to mean more than ‘house’ some time before 1755”, now signifying a set of emotional, spatial, moral, and physical interactions.

Of course, today, the word “domesticate” may refer to the act of domesticating animals, just as the word “domestic” may refer to the contextual quality of being or happening within the borders of one’s “home-country” (in fact, interestingly so, the Old High German *heima* meant both residence and homeland). The former definition, etymologically at least, is explained by the fact that domesticated animals – like contemporary *pets* – were considered a part of the household, the *domus*. The latter definition is more complex, taking part in questions of nationality, colonization, and family-hood; the concept of “Home” is intertwined with its larger context of modern Europeanization, and as a concept, I remember, it indicates as well as plays a part in the experiences of social change. I will now take a closer look at these experiences and changes.

### 3.2 Medieval homes: house, public privacy

Not yet a concept, distinct from but defined through the word “house” (that is, the house where one sleeps and/or dwells, without reference to a specific set of social relationships), what was the feudal-social meaning of the word “home”? Of course, relatively speaking, in the European

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222 Ibid.
223 Ibid.
224 Ibid.
feudal age (and I am damagingly concerned with Europe here), the conditions of living were often hard, the greater part of the population living in the countryside, exposed to the eternal returns of harsh winters, infertile soil, disastrous plagues, and violent acts of feudal discipline. But people lived and survived; not through the system of kinship presently known as “the Family”, a system based on the reproduction and cultivation of “Childhood”, but through a sense of belonging expressed in the fourteenth-century word famille, referring to all the people living in the same house, at “home-as-a-place-of-dwelling”.

In his famous study on the iconography of medieval art, Phillipe Ariès argues that the concept of “Childhood” (and “Family”) is relatively recent: “In medieval society, the idea of childhood did not exist; this is not to suggest that children were neglected, forsaken or despised. The idea of childhood is not to be confused with affection for children: it corresponds to an awareness of the particular nature of childhood, that particular nature which distinguishes the child from the adult.”226 In sum, with a relatively high death-rate among children, and infants disappearing from the space of experience, these were not given a place on the horizon of expectations; youngsters physically capable of partaking in labor and games were simply given the status of “young adults”.227 According to Ariès, the “special nature of childhood”, first manifested in the fourteenth-century, would establish itself only in the upper classes of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century, the child there-then being heralded as a sweet, simple, and amusing complement – dressed in the new art of specialized children’s clothing – to the “dreary” lives of their wealthy parents, eventually producing a moralist attack – on the affections of amusement – by the likes of Montaigne, this attack in turn being the very birth of a modern conception of childhood. Targeting the Christianized innocence of children, i.e. the latent possibility of turning all children – gifted with the virtues of tabula rasa; compare Émile ou de l’éducation (1762) by Jean-Jacques Rousseau – into good, Christian subjects, the ensuing moralism would psychologize the nature of the child, thus preparing the field of development and precariousness later associated with the concept of “Childhood”.228 And so, in the eighteenth-century, protected by the moral understandings of church and philosophy, and nurtured by a new concern with juvenile health, “the child [took] a central place in the family.”229

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227 As late as the 17th-century reign of Louis XIV, eleven-year-old nobles could join the army, led by fourteen-year-old lieutenants. Not to be confused with “child-soldiers” (Ibid.).
228 Ibid., p.128-132.
229 Ibid., p.132.
In the medieval world, however, the “nuclear family” was non-existent, perhaps unthinkable: the long-house – shelter for the many – served no distinctive, social function, domesticated animals of all sizes – dissimilar from humans, defining humans – living together with the *famille*; by “no distinctive, social function”, I am simply referring to the oft-repeated fact that the social space of the long-house – as an “absolute” field of care – functioned both as a space of re-production and as a space of production. Moreover, morally speaking, and disregarding the curious exception of the monastery, it was no sin for six people to sleep in the same bed; furniture was scarce and mobile, the powerful (or affluent) travelling from house to house without a fashionable concern for domestic interiors; quoting Phillipe Contamine, “in many cities, a hearth and a house meant the same thing, regardless of the number of people included in the household”, organizing the extensions of the social – and, perhaps, fragmentation – under one household-heading; again, the house – as “home” – was a space dedicated to both work and sleep, economy and life, resonating with some of the socio-economic structures of aforementioned *oikos*. The consequence of this amalgam is nevertheless not a lack of standard. Well-built houses were appreciated, and the bed, if afforded, meant a great deal to its users; in an enigmatic (or historical) turn of phrase, for example, Shakespeare, writing his will, gives his wife the “second best bed” in a collection of beds that must have had some importance.

Supporting a life less mobile than that of the feudal lord, *urban* dwellings focalized the big Hall, similarly used for both sleep and work: the home-as-house sustained a household-economy reproducing itself in the non-sentimental arrangement of sent-away child-apprentices. Filled with people of various social positions – in lack of public places, restaurants, and bars, the home-as-house became a natural melting-pot – the Hall and its residents knew no *modern* privacy. The most affordable example of such (private) privacy (as well as functional differentiation) is perhaps to be found in the monastery, each religious complex distributing meaning, practices, and functions on a spatial schema consisting of capitularies, infirmaries, libraries, cemeteries, chapels, hostelries, hospices, *mandatum*, latrines, refectories, *domus*, and

231 The Italian and French word for furniture is telling: *mobiliers, mobilia*. (Rycbczynski, *Home: A Short History of an Idea*, p.26.). On the same topic, Phillipe Ariès writes that the “transformation of the collapsible bed into a permanent piece of furniture undoubtedly marks an advance in domesticity.” (*Ariès, Centuries of Childhood*, p.395.)
232 Contamine, “Peasant Hearth to Papal Palace”, p.431.
Even so, utility, meaning, and ceremony fused in a space of experience devoid of modern separations of private from public, the conceptual distinction (between private and public life) here necessitated being less well-defined in the feudal age.

Again, the medieval house-home did not distinguish between professional and domestic space, the feudal Hall being a space of intimate (and not so intimate) interactions between masters, servants, laborers, relatives, “young adults”, guests, animals, and visitors (professional or other), interactions that – holistically speaking – constituted household-economies subsequently – and radically – transformed into homes-without-economy. Such socio-spatial arrangements echoed the underlying organization of medieval power. The feudal lord acted as a representation of social status (i.e. as a privatized public figure) rather than as a political element of a system of multi-lateral communication (e.g. a public debate), medieval, socio-political realities – thus structured – being determined by a relationship of extended household-ownership. If, in old Greece, there was a distinction between public and private actions, a distinction predicated on the condition that in order to be a public actor (of the polis), one must be a master of the private order (of the oikos), then this distinction evaporated in the symbolic realm of medieval institutions. Anachronistically worded, however, this conditional need some conceptual fine-tuning, it being of great importance to the remainder of my sketch. Parenthetically, therefore, now consulting the authors of A History of Private Life, and contrary to the proposition offered in my previous remark, it is argued – by aforementioned authors – that medieval subjects did in fact have a limited conception of “Privacy” (relative to modernity): “Study of the political vocabulary has shown the private-public distinction survived [the collapse of the Western Roman Empire]”, writes Georges Duby, proposing that a medieval sense of private life existed as a function of the famille, the household-community (res private) as it was then opposed to the larger community of Law and King (res publica). Duby here speaks in political, legal, and economic terms; in terms of the social, however, argues Habermas, due to the lack of social institutions, it is not possible to apply the Public/Private-distinction on the medieval, conceptual framework. Power was sanctioned and reinforced as a privatized aura amidst the spectacle of non-participatory publicity, giving life to the illusion

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237 Ibid., p.8.
238 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere
of a paradox: whereas the social experience of the public was close to non-existent, and whereas
the political experience (of public power) was privatized, private life existed as a function of a
community (*res private*) defined against a public (*res publica*) grasping for discursive air.
Consequently, as Duby himself concludes, “there is nothing absolute about the notion of private
life in the feudal age”.239 Arguably, however, even though inexact, the model of privacy was
one of servitude (to God, to the Household-Father, to the Lord), not kinship nor solitude: when
associating with the immediate community through work, one was enacting private life; and
following the institutionalization of confessional practice in the thirteenth-century, the custom
of penance promoted a new relationship between sinner and God, the solitude of secrets and
dreams thus transforming into a relationship of confessional, private servitude.240

Finally, then, there is no doubt that “homes” existed in the feudal world, that
houses, occupied by the rhythmic sounds of stories, work, and social re-production, indeed had
some emotional value for its serviceable residents, creating limitations and possibilities
depending on the nature of the dwelling. The castle, as a representation not of space itself, but
of power, maintained socio-political structures existing “on the practical basis of a specific
relationship between town, country, and political territory.”241 The social spaces therein
contained – perceived and lived more often than conceived, the functional-religious
differentiations of the monastery being an exception; maps prescribed action and symbolism,
not spatial relations – did not support a social meaning of *res publica*, the gates of the castle
being anything but inviting; instead, representative of the socio-spatial relations of production
and re-production, the castle enacted a presence of the nonpresent, discharging limitations – in
the form of soldiers and taxCollectors – unto the hearth-bound existence of a striated periphery.
Indeed, obviously so, there is no doubt that “homes” existed in the feudal world, that the social
space of the dwelling was of great importance to its users. For reasons clarified in the following,
however, in the case of these medieval homes, collapsing word and concept would only amount
to misrepresentation and anachronism: if a concept, to be a concept, needs to incorporate all the
contexts of meaning in which its word is used, then the socio-spatial hierarchies of medieval
society – lords occupying the symbolism of their castles, Godly people residing in their
fortresses of solitude, merchants dwelling in their urban offices, serfs telling stories against the
flickering of a hearth – did not support a merging of signifier and signified, each medieval,

239 Duby, “Introduction”, p.29.
241 Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, p.17.
representational space (as the house where one slept) serving a different function, rhythm, and spatial practice (depending on your social position). In other words, the castle and the long-house were never equalized (as they are in Disney’s romantic children’s stories, the journeys herein often starting in the hut by ending in the castle).

3.3 Processes of modernity: “Home” and “Domesticity”

3.3.1. The birth of the modern family.

As noted, and tearing apart the “organic” tissue of medieval privacy, not yet defined through the modern reverence of private space, nor that of conjugal solitude, the social content of the family changed. Not surprisingly, so did the content of the “home”. On a domestic level, in the European cities of the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century, space was striated both functionally and socially. In Paris, for example, the main Hall – the salle – was separated from the noisy ardor of cooking, the kitchen, only to be complemented with a set of functionally specific, secondary rooms: the chambre (exclusively for sleeping), the garde-robe (clothing room), and the cabinet (study; library; storage room). According to Ali Madanipour, quoted above, this “was a process of fragmentation and multiplication of domestic space that accompanied the processes of urbanization.” Consequently, from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, urban and rural housing improved in quality, the spatial separations simultaneously signaling a separation of family from household, the head of the family now sleeping in his chambre, the servants sleeping in the salle. “Before the idea of the home as the seat of family life could enter the human consciousness”, writes Rybczynski, “it required the experience of both privacy and intimacy, neither of which had been possible in the medieval hall.” The concepts of “Family”, “Privacy”, and “Intimacy” – discussed in more detail below – thus created and maintained the structure of a social space synchronously constructing and maintaining the social hierarchies implied (through their semantic fields).

But more processes were in play – in the home as well as in the family. In the upper-classes (including wealthy town-dwellers) of the sixteenth-century, children, instead of working as apprentices in unfamiliar households, enrolled in formal, non-religious schooling,

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242 In the following, the term “modernity” refers to (i) the Sattelzeit (as chronology) and (ii) the dialectic self-awareness resulting from modernism trying to grasp (and negate) the experience of modernization.


244 Madanipour, Public and Private Spaces of the City, p.83.

thus allowing them to be at “home” – i.e. at the house where their parents lived – far longer than previously had been the case. Parents could now see their children grow up, extending, through the conditions of schooling, the very life-expectancy of “Childhood”. Of course, this is true for boys: girls were still married away at early ages, thus forcing them out of a relativized childhood. Siblings of all genders – surveilled by the fresh eyes of the coddling parents – were nevertheless separated from the servants, making room – literally and figuratively – for a new form of conjugality.\footnote{Ariès, Centuries of Childhood, p.332.} According to Ariès, in this new, social game, the family triumphed, not individualism: the family, he writes, “had perhaps never before exercised so much influence over the human condition”.\footnote{Ibid., p.10.} Arguably, however, the family triumphed alongside individualism, these phenomena being anything but mutually exclusive (individualism is a socialization-process, not a desire to be isolated). It should also be noted that schooling – the key to childhood – was not class-based (class-consciousness being a modern phenomenon), that it was a function of the professional needs of the parents rather than their social standing. Consequently, the modern concept of “Childhood”, emerging in the bourgeoisie, and as is made evident by the question of gender, was never absolute. Ariès therefore asks if child-labor – particularly as it was experienced during industrialization – should be understood as a throwback to medieval terms? “The family”, writes Ariès, “scarcely had a sentimental existence at all among the poor; and where there was wealth and ambition, the sentimental concept of the family was inspired by that which the old lineal relationships had produced.”\footnote{Ibid., p.369.} Even so far as the nineteenth century, “a large part of the population, the biggest and poorest section, was still living like medieval families, with the children separated from their parents”, intersecting the concept of “Family” with notions of class, i.e. the self-awareness of industrialization.\footnote{Ibid., p.404.} As Koselleck would have argued, every social space, both produced and producing, is structured by the slow-moving processes of a plurality of stories and temporal layers (i.e. a simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous): aristocrats persisting in their use of castles and palaces (can one be noble without a noble space?), less privileged groups raising their children in accord with a system of meaning not separable from the long-lasting shadows of these nonsimultaneous, archeological palaces, and the bourgeoisie – separating servants from family, childhood from adulthood – aspiring to new forms of living by capitalizing the socio-political vacuum left by a transforming economy.

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{246} Ariès, Centuries of Childhood, p.332.
\bibitem{247} Ibid., p.10.
\bibitem{248} Ibid., p.369.
\bibitem{249} Ibid., p.404.
\end{thebibliography}
Indeed, as Ariès himself admits, there are many reasons for challenging the unilinear history of a family in the making, the plural presence of a simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous only being one of them. Already at the outset, therefore, even though it will be discussed more thoroughly below, I must raise a critical perspective on the historiography of European families. In his review of Lawrence Stone’s book *The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England 1500-1800*, a book not dissimilar to that of Ariès, Alan MacFarlane, exposing Stone’s lack of evidence – contrary to what is to be expected, court records, village documents, diaries, autobiographies, tracts, and pamphlets are never consulted – and source-criticism, ultimately disregards the “Whiggish” historiography of a progressive, singular evolution from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*.  

Obviously, such criticism is highly resonant with the theories of Koselleck; hence, it should be noted that I am here not attempting a teleology of “Home”, and that I happily admit the significant probability of certain “feelings” – love, homesickness – being felt and lived before the institutionalization of the concepts of “Home” and “Family”. As a conceptual historian, I am not arguing that medieval subjects did not experience “love” or “homesickness”, but that the interpretations of these experiences are conceptual and therefore historical.

In any case, on a more substantive note, it seems clear that the concepts of “Family” and “Home” developed in urban areas, i.e. within the *bourgeoisie*, far away from medieval long-houses and feudal castles: in short, the domestic family was an achievement of the urban dweller. In the seventeenth-century United Provinces of the Netherlands, for instance, formed in 1609, a large chunk of the population lived in towns and cities. Wealth poured in from financial and colonial institutions, allowing Dutch merchants to side-step the practice – common in London and Paris – of renting out their rooms. A special tax was imposed on those who hired domestic servants, enforcing the emerging self-awareness of the Dutch family; mothers raised the children by themselves, and many merchants built offices outside of their living-houses, thus constructing a spatial distinction between living-space and working-space, or – more importantly – a conceptual separation of public work-space from

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251 I am here repeating the argument of Witold Rybczynski, associating the concept of “Home” with cleanliness and comfort: teleologically so, where he finds cleanliness and comfort, he finds a modern idea of domesticity. In fact, Rybszynski goes so far as to deduce the notion of “Domesticity” out of comfort, implying – perhaps – a deterministic narrative: “In the seventeenth century, comfort meant privacy, which led to intimacy and, in turn, to domesticity.” (Rybczynski, *Home: A Short History of an Idea*, p.231.) Although questionable, Rybczynski’s narrative has the benefit of giving structure to a complicated story.

private leisure-space. For women and for servants, however, that separation would exist only in theory, everyday-life, for these groups, being confined to the androcentric space of home (the market-place perhaps being a liberating exception; as will be made clear in the following, the history of the concept of “Home” is one of domestic and extra-domestic inequalities). On the topic of the United Provinces, Rybczynski writes that “‘Home’ brought together the meanings of house and household, of dwelling and of refuge, of ownership and of affection”. The scaled-down replicas of Dutch houses, manufactured by the proud home-owners of the United Provinces, as well as the Flemish paintings of the golden age, remarkable depictions of unremarkable, domestic action, are testaments to the affection by which the Dutch now embraced their comfortable “homes”, a word on the verge of conceptual embellishment.

Similarly, all over Europe, from the sixteenth-century onwards, the iconography of the “Family” was both popularized and secularized (previously, the theme of the family had religious functions), replacing the old, medieval motif of craftsmanship and labor: within the movement of artistic and spatial discourse, the family thus distinguished itself from the famille. As Ariès puts it: “For a long time – until the seventeenth century, when the iconography of the family became extremely rich – the important thing was the representation of public life. This representation doubtless corresponds to a profound reality. Life in the past, until the seventeenth century, was lived in public.” Of course, the “public” should here be stripped of all its socio-political meaning.

Importantly, in line with these developments, as mentioned, the life-span of childhood increased, dividing the simple fact of existence into a taxonomy of evolutionary stages. The child, a representative of the future, thus became a representative of progress, an arrow of futurity discussed by Foucault in terms of “evolutive time”. Evolutive time, says Foucault, is the disciplinary differentiation of time into a series of terminal stages, every stage representing a task to be completed by the temporal subject (e.g. completing classes in school; climbing on the professional ladder of the corporate world). As a temporal phenomenon inserted into and protected by the social space of “Home”, it could be argued that “Childhood” – at least over time – temporalized the internal structure of the former concept, children now constituting an object of progress caressed by the field of care of home; the new “home” – separating servants from the family – became a representational space devoted to the spatial

253 Ibid.
254 Ibid., p.62.
255 Ariès, Centuries of Childhood, p.344.
256 Ibid., p.405.
practice of social re-production, the product of which – i.e. the “Child” – demanded more time “at home” (since the temporal structure of its development increased), thus putting more emphasis on expectation and future (and/or the generational gap). Within the expectational horizon of an emerging modernity, expectation divorced from expectation (see Koselleck’s discussion on the Sattelzeit), the “Home” became a place of moral and psychological development, of a “taking-care-of” the individualized future of the child. The conceptual marriage between “Home”, “Family”, and “Childhood” – the hypothetical argument goes – speaks for a temporalization of the former: assuming the close-knitted entanglements of semantic fields (conceptual and spatial), the concept of “Home” was integrated into a changing conception of time, i.e. the Verzeitlichung.

Now, for purposes of academic nuance, and as promised, it seems advisable to provide a narrative on European families different than that of Ariès. Jack Goody offers one such narrative, cautioning the historian against fetishizing change; the uncritical application of “ization”-processes, he argues, tends to place the case of Europe in a position of uniqueness, ultimately leading to eurocentrism. Goody instead highlights the distinctive character of the Christian family, developed in the fourth century and subsequently displaying continuity rather than discontinuity. For Goody, this continuity carried the name of “profit”: the church, he says, regulated the structure of the family to secure its own income (through inheritance); it created taboos (i.e. marriage between kin) to make sure the money was not kept within the family; and it alienated family rights, emphasizing spiritual (i.e. “love”) rather than natural kinship, the wish of the individual rather than the wish of the household.258 For me, such strategies imply a resistance within the thicker layers of medieval society, a resistance that the church consequently worked to subdue; even if Goody is correct, therefore, the validity of his argument does not defeat the findings of Ariès, findings that occupy a different discourse than that of church-law. Change is seldom unilateral: operating in the longue durée, the “Family” is a stage for both continuities and discontinuities. And as argued by Koselleck, the plurality implied by a historical set of temporal layers – with differing durability and velocity – makes plausible a plural representation capable of taking conflicting structures into account.

3.3.2. Public and private space: modern separations.

Interestingly, in the Dutch household of the seventeenth-century, whereas the lower floor was considered a public space, a realm of the visitor, the upper floor was forbiddingly private, a realm dedicated to the members of the family, now understood in terms of strict conjugality.\textsuperscript{259} Furthermore, the conceptual separation of public from private – separations being different than distinctions – is somewhat simultaneous with such spatial practices. In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Habermas, exploring that separation (in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century), argues that the public belonged to the bourgeoisie, the owners of the capitalist modes of production; narrowing the reproductive role of the pater familias, the modern bourgeoisie thus oriented its economic concerns away from the household, the oikos, instead investing in the world of commerce, the private market.\textsuperscript{260} In terms of the emerging, modern economy, “the market had replaced the household”,\textsuperscript{261} operating in a private sphere thereby separated from the privacy of the household. The polarization between State and Civil Society\textsuperscript{262} – existing on a higher-level order, not to be confused with the Public/Private-distinction – was repeated within civil society itself, now in the form of a polarization between public (the private market; commodity exchange) and private (the household; “home”) spheres. The replication of this polarization simultaneously reproduced its conceptual contradictions, i.e. the public nature of the private market, or – to borrow terms usually found in Marxist discourse – the political superstructure of an unpolitical (and economically independent) base-structure. These contradictions allowed for a conflation of what was previously separated, the private house itself becoming a (third) scene of the Public/Private-distinction (as was the case with the Dutch home). “The line between private and public sphere”, writes Habermas, “extended right through the home. The privatized individuals stepped out of the intimacy of their living rooms into the public sphere of the salon, but the one was strictly complementary

\textsuperscript{259} Rybczynski, Home: A Short History of an Idea.
\textsuperscript{260} Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, p.20.
\textsuperscript{261} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{262} As a parenthetical contribution to the theory of history here referenced, it should be noted, as Koselleck himself argues, that the concept of a civil society, societas civilis, resting as it is on the Aristotelian notion of a self-ruling community of citizens, was never realized as a political potential during the period now discussed: “The civil society of the nineteenth century could thus be characterized from the beginning as a transitional society whose estate-based past and whose democratic future held it under the constant pressure of change.”\textsuperscript{262} The political power of the bourgeoisie – as members of the civil society – should not be overstated; the feudal distinction between civitas dei (the general society of Christian subjects) and civis (rulers) lingered within the foundation of a modern societas civilis. Moreover, the very notion of bourgeoisie varied per its cultural installation, the German “Bürger” being more multivalent – and less political – than the English “citizen” (Reinhart Koselleck, “Three ‘bürgerliche’ Worlds?”, The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts (Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif., 2002), p.215). Conceptual translations are not uniform, and neither is history.
to the other.”  

In the important case of “apartments” – replacing houses as the urban norm of bourgeoisie-living – this, dividing line (of social-functional separation) is reflected in etymology, the word “apartment” being an Anglicized derivation of the Latin verb *partīre*, “to divide.”  

Paradoxically, then, the apartment signified a divided unity, a dialectic of separations eventually having significant, phenomenological consequences: according to Michael McKeon, the author of *The Secret History of Domesticity*, at the very end of this dialectic process, in the privatized experience of the individual, emerged subjectivity, an experience, furthermore, crucial for “formulating the terms of the rational debate”, i.e. the terms of the Habermasian, literary coffee-house-culture.  

In sum, as Habermas himself points out, paraphrasing the theorem by Adam Smith (stating that the public interest consists of the sum of private interests), the “bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public.”  

Deprived of its economic function, the household became a space of leisure and comfort, a private realm dedicated to the modern family. The association to freedom was now carried by the name of this realm: “Home”, no longer a “house”, nor a “place of abode”, had become a “capacious entity: separate, comforting and familiar, a place of belonging but also of possession.”  

This freedom – from work, from constraints, from public affairs – was negative, thus endowing the family with values of “voluntariness, community of love, and cultivation”.  

Naturally, however, within the intimacy of a freedom of constraints, there are always constraints of a private kind: with public laws governing the freedom of private women, and moral conventions governing the freedom of private thought, the intimate sphere of the “Home” simultaneously enacted a State in miniature (that is, a state more defined than previous incarnations), a super-ego of the private order, policing and disciplining social behavior, operating as a set of inequitable, human relations.  

Interestingly so, eighteenth-century Britain supported a mirror-image of the family-as-state, namely, the state-as-family: the family, writes

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263 Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, p.45.
266 Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, p.27.
268 Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, p.47.
269 In contrast to other protestant countries, English marriage law – post-reformation – kept many of the medieval laws intact, even though papal consent and canon law was no longer an issue; conflating the legal status of man and wife, but giving all the authority to the former, the *pater familias*, women were economically powerless, thus – legally speaking – associating them with the private. Freedom under conditions of constraint. (McKeon, *The Secret History of Domesticity*, p.122-136.)
Ariès, “became the social cell, the basis of the State, the foundation of the monarchy”; a form of conceptual politicization evident in the metonymical power of the word “cabinet”, an intimate space of the household now referring to the “most exclusive circle of power”, i.e. the Cabinet. In sum, the intimacy, secrecy, and interiority of the “Home” was politicized metonymically.

The unequal thereby being equalized, moral, legal, political, artistic, and economic discourse (excluding women in all cases but one, i.e. morality) would associate the emerging field of “Home” with what was then considered female (compare the Flemish paintings mentioned earlier, often focalizing the domestic role of women: as wife, as servant, as unfaithful lover), an association that soon played into emerging ideologies of domesticity: “One function of domestic ideology is to reconcile the increasingly common argument for the ethical superiority of women with the persistence, perhaps even aggregation, of their socioeconomic subordination.” Superior morality, inferior publicness. And speaking of artistic discourse, it was not only the case that women were made protagonists in domestic motifs; in fact, domestic art as such – flirting with pastoral serenity – was primarily produced for men, as a cultivating remedy for the neurasthenic gazes of a tired Public. If domestic art could pacify the nerves of urban men, the neurasthenic remedy was quite different for its objectified subjects: since the willful violation of the motherly role was seen as a primary cause for female neurasthenia, women were advised to “avoid the excessive intellectual stimulation of the marketplace” and instead return to their confining roles at “Home”. Representations of the female body, often found in the semantic field of the representational space of “Home”, thus re-produced – and reinforced – the gendered hierarchies of a domestic space both “striated” and “smooth”, strict and dynamic, ultimately inhibiting the spatial practices of its inhabitants. Such was the marriage between medicinal, artistic, and domestic discourse, played out on the fields of private and public space. In the long run, according to Michelle Perrot, writing on the topic of sexual differentiation, “the Revolution sharpened the distinction between the public and the private spheres, emphasized family values, and led to a differentiation of sexual roles by setting up a contrast between political men and domestic woman.” Consider the poem

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270 Ariès, *Centuries of Childhood*, p.356.
272 Ibid., p.168.
274 Ibid., p.115.
“The Song of the Bell” by Friedrich von Schiller: “Ah! The home’s most tender ties / are unloosed for evermore; / In the shadowland she lies / Who was mother here before. / How they miss her faithful guiding, / And the care she used to give! / In the orphaned home presiding, / Loveless strangers soon will live”.

276 Inequalities in the private always refer to structures in the public; as stipulated by Koselleck, events happen within structures, the act of domestic violence, for example, interpretable as an act of spatial domination, happening within the retarding durability of a long history of androcentric domination.

So far, I have been referring to the notion of “Domesticity” without considering its meaning, a notion integral to the embryonic qualities of “Home”. “Created in the constructions of new domestic architecture”, writes Karen Harvey, “embedded in modern concepts of the self through new forms of narrative, or performed through sociability using new items of material culture, for many it was during the eighteenth century that modern domesticity was invented.”

277 Harvey proceeds by identifying two of the processes integral to the intensification and embellishment of the notion of domesticity, a notion denoting actions and not abstractions: first, material changes related to comfort and sociability, consumer goods orienting female work patterns toward the home, and second, the new, domestic literature, thematizing “the gradual shift of normative weight from the public referent to the private reference – more precisely, the gradual absorption of the public realm’s traditional priority and privilege by the realm of private experience.”

278 And so, if “domesticity” signified the actions of “the private experience”, then, conceptually speaking, “Home” signified the abstract field of this experience, the spatial, moral, social, and economic conditions of its tangible realization; again, as noted above, in the late eighteenth-century, whereas the word “domesticate” came to mean “a withdrawal from the public”, the gendered act of privatizing subjectivity (i.e. realizing the quality of “being at home”), the word “home” – in contrast – supported a complex, semantic field in which “domestication” was integrated as a fundamental act. In fact, “domesticity” could here be interpreted as a notion referring to spatial practices mapped out by the semantic field of the representational space of “Home”; indeed, as argued, that seems to be the relationship between a concept and its notion, between a field and its descriptive actions – without a space called “Home”, no domesticity.

278 Ibid., p.621.
But how did it all look? And for whom did it look? Naturally, the conceptual vocabulary echoed in the spatial. Whereas the French now planned their houses with a chambre, a garde-robe, and a cabinet, the English started putting pre-fixes to all the new rooms – the dining-room, the bed-room, the drawing-room, the living-room – created in the name of functional and social differentiation. Of course, servants were excluded from these public-private configurations, re-iterating the victory of withdrawal as it was once won in the privacy-function of the chambre.\textsuperscript{279} In the 1830s, the word “home” was introduced in France, now signifying a moral (private) and political (public) concept, every voter needing a residence, “every prominent citizen” requiring “a prominent home in town”.\textsuperscript{280} As argued, depending on your social position “at Home”, the emerging configurations afforded possibilities and limitations represented conceptually in the private/public-separation: wealthy men of the public, privatizing space in the name of their leisurely rhythms, limited the spatial practices of servants, children, and wives, the latter assemblages instead exploring their freedom “below the thresholds at which visibility begins”. And below the threshold of visibility, paralleled by the emerging, Victorian subjectivity, an interest in interiority developed: interior decoration separated itself from architecture and became an art-form standing on its own, ornamental legs. Even though houses were still built with the front – the public image – in mind, the new-found interiority was pervasive, orientalism, for example, as an aesthetics of westernized domesticity, everywhere promoting the Arabic arabesques of reflection and inwardness (also resonant with Protestantism). Moreover, in Georgian and Victorian architecture, as well as in Dutch and French town-houses, the first floor was dedicated to the public, the hall functioning as a ceremonial space of (public) arrival and (private) departure. Affluence demanded more rooms, more functions: libraries, galleries, studies, billiard-rooms, and conservatories, signifiers of public power and wealth. But nationalized (or cultural) differences were not absent. In England, for instance, concluding these opening reflections on the aesthetics of the new “Home”, planning was somewhat flexible, allowing for two common-rooms, one less formal than the other.\textsuperscript{281} The English decorating style, inspired by the venetian architect Andrea Palladio, in decorating the floors with beautifying carpets, and in attacking the walls with plain wallpapers, thus differed from the sprouting ornaments of French rococo.

\textsuperscript{279} Louis XV, as an indicator of as well as a factor in social experience and change, unlike his predecessor, would sleep in private, isolated, the ceremony of lever and coucher only surviving in name, as a ritual. (Rybczynski. \textit{Home: A Short History of an Idea}, p.88.)
\textsuperscript{281} Ibid.
Again, I am here primarily concerned with England, as is most scholars of
domesticity: “If [...] eighteenth-century Britain was the birthplace of domesticity, then for
many it was certainly in nineteenth-century Britain that this culture of home became fully
realized.”282 This culture, argues Karen Harvey, combined a number of qualities – privacy,
intimacy, comfort, separation of work from home, family – into a “single commanding
concept”, namely, the concept of “Home”.283 As such, i.e. as a collective singular of the English
bourgeoisie, the concept is hardly generalizable, even though, arguably, especially after the
Napoleonic wars, in the anglophile age of Proust, British culture had some lasting influence on
the politics and culture of a growing Europe. Moreover, as I have pointed out more than once,
I am repeatedly – symptomatically so – neglecting the largest part of the population, the “poor”,
the working-class. It should therefore be noted that mentioned interiority – reserved for the
well-off players of the private market – rested on pillows of comfort and leisure not afforded
by all Georgian/Victorian subjects.284 Be that as it may, notions of the bourgeoisie did not linger
within this, particular section of society: “The acceptance of feminine passivity and docility”,
writes Catherine Hall, investigating the notion of “Domesticity” among the working-class, “the
belief that domesticity was ‘natural’ to women and that the division between the sexes was the
only possible basis for social harmony [...] indicate the extent to which such assumptions had
come to underlie thinking about sexual differences in sections of the working class.”285 Sections
of the nineteenth-century working-class – the notion of “Domesticity” intensified, embellished,
and transferred – longed for the social relationships of single family homes: in sum, there was
a democratized desire for intimacy and privacy – a hope for the collective singular of
“Home”.286

In any case, if afforded, spatial-social differentiation became the norm (i.e. a
collectivized semantic field of the representational space of “Home”); the private section of the
house – the upper-floor and/or the back of the apartment – thus experienced some innovative
modes of interaction. Novel separations came into being, based on earlier distinctions but
implemented through the requirement of separate rooms: not only sexes were separated, but
generations as well, giving rise to a growing sense of individuality and subjectivity, children

283 Ibid.
285 Catherine Hall, “The Sweet Delights of Home”, in A history of private life 4: From the Fires
of Revolution to the Great War, edited by Phillippe Aries, Georges Duby, and Michelle Perrot (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1990), p.84.
now being individuals rather than moral-parental products, confined to the silent reading-habits of their spatial isolations. Tensions arose, perhaps paranoia; servants – residing in areas separated from the “family” – were constantly surveilled by the panoptic arrangements of the household, giving rise to strategies of avoidance even among the masters: “The assignment of rooms for various uses, the location of stairways and corridors, the availability of space for private meditation, for grooming, for physical and spiritual pleasures – all these were governed by strategies of encounter and avoidance shaped in part by desire and concern for the self.” In Lefebvrian terms, one might here speak of “strategies of domination and appropriation”, the silenced reading of a book – or the dusting of a favored item – pertaining to an individualized association between (and production of) space and Self. In the context of urbanization and modernity, this very Self, commodified and temporalized, battled feelings of loss and homelessness. A longer quote from Walter Benjamin may here summarize the emotional significance of the new “Home”:

Ever since the time of Louis Philippe, the bourgeois has shown a tendency to compensate for the absence of any trace of private life in the big city. He tries to do this within the four walls of his apartment. It is as if he made it a point of honour not to allow the traces of his everyday objects and accessories to get lost. Indefatigably, he takes the impression of a host of objects; for his slippers and his watches, his blankets and his umbrellas, he devises coverlets and cases. He has a marked preference for velour and plush, which preserve the imprint of all contact. In the style characteristic of the Second Empire, the apartment becomes a sort of cockpit. The traces of its inhabitant are molded into the interior. Here is the origin of the detective story, which enquires into these traces and follows these tracks.

In a changing world, a fear of loss, of homelessness: the traces of private life signified a stabilized temporality, moments of past and present safeguarded from the unexpectedness of the future. Seemingly, as private space, “Home” functioned as a haven within the accelerating forces of modern temporality, as an island within the changing structures of past, present, and future. As a place of accumulated time (embodied in the temporalization of the Child), open only to some, the role of the new, bourgeois “Home”, encapsulating the cosmic quality of the private/public-separation, was to “create a space that is other, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled.”

287 Ibid., p.346.
of “Home” – as a real utopia, i.e. a heterotopia – enveloped a linear temporality thus controlled: past generations, portrayed on the walls, became origins already transcended, unable to represent the reality in which they hanged. If such (and other) memorabilia – with use-value – suggested lost pasts rather than future action, then time itself, articulated as fashion, nevertheless determined the exchange-value of what was kept. The concept of “Home” existed in time by encapsulating the modern, temporal notions of linearity, progress, and expectation, the spatial implications – a preservation of time (through memorabilia) – only confirming the unbridgeable difference between “then” and “now”. Today, we mark the height of our children by jotting on the wall, such markings indicating an archival desire ultimately determined by the sensation of a loss of time – the experience of childhood-moments – rather than an expectation of repeated experience. In short, as a field of care with both past and future, and filled by the voices of children losing their childhood, the concept of “Home” was both temporalized and temporalizing (as a social space producing the social), the notions of “childhood-home” (one’s past) and “dream-home” (one’s future) being contemporary cases in point. Moreover, the relation between experience and expectation here expressed, that of temporal “belonging” (a desire to have the categories fused?), also had a threat, a counter-conceptual dependency: homelessness, the pinnacle of instability, of collective turmoil and personal disaster, became a locked-out threat of modern reality (as an ever-growing experience of expected unexpectedness), an uncanniness suppressed.

Returning finally to the dialectic of separations, the publicness of the private, there is the unresolved question of how privacy should be analyzed. Without such an analysis, however preliminary, the concept of “Home” remains empty, exposed to the anachronistic projections of the contemporary; if a disproportionate amount of time is spent on the public/private-distinction, it is because the shifting character of this distinction is as crucial for understanding the history of western society as it is for understanding the concept of “Home”. And so, for Hannah Arendt, in modernity, the Athenian notion of the “Public” was contaminated with questions of consumption, desire, and want (labor), thus giving rise to an un-politicized sphere, “the Social”, annihilating the communitarian notion of zoon politikon, the political animal; consequently, it is argued, action (the plurality of the possibility of individual change) was destroyed by the economic and technological manipulations (work) of modern, mass society (concerned only with labor). Privacy, once carrying the content of deprivation, of being deprived of the public, publicus, is, in Arendt’s account, defined as the

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opposite of the “Social”, the conflation of oikos (the private household) and polis (public politics).291 In the nineteenth-century, therefore, the private sphere, existing in a space – the salon-home – that was at once both Private and Public, i.e. Social, perhaps contradicted – as an experience – its own setting, the conformism expected of its socialized members?292 I am here extending the notion of the “Social” to the third level of the Private/Public-dialectic, an extension that – given the political dimension of Arendt’s argument – is not self-evident; if, in the end, the public was contaminated by the politicization of private desires, and if every “Home” staged this contamination by balancing the separation of private and public spaces, ultimately conflating them (by socializing public and private behavior through a public concern with the private), one could ask if it is feasible to associate this, particular conflation with aforementioned “rise of the Social”? Arguably, due to the social exclusiveness of the nineteenth-century salon, and having Habermas rigid distinctions in mind, i.e. the public nature of the private market, it was only in the mass-societies of the twentieth-century that the “Social” expressed itself fully; in the preceding century, it follows, the “Social” was only latently unexpressed, one set of gestural norms belonging to the public realm – the salon and the coffee-house – and another set of norms belonging to the private realm – the privacy of the “Home”. Furthermore, whereas the economic dimension of oikos was transferred to the market of the polis, the morality of the household was not: the conflation of polis and oikos – requiring multi-dimensional transferals, e.g. the social State becoming a guardian of morality, assuming the qualities of “Home” (compare “Folkhemmet”) – first had to assemble the full effects of subsequent democratizations. Finally, then, nineteenth-century civil society, resting on pillars of a capitalist division of labor, i.e. the modern economy, did not fully integrate the social agenda of this division: already faring well, members of the public did not practice well-fare politics. And so, if nineteenth-century salons in fact did embody a discursive separation of public from private, a more accurate description of nineteenth-century privacy is needed. Avoiding the negative definition of Arendt, opposed to a Social sphere not yet experienced, privacy, among the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie, is perhaps better understood in terms of a “private presence”, opposed not to “public absence”, the pre-modern definition of “privacy”, but “public presence”, the theatrical gestures of the market and of the salon, epitomized in the public reception room of the Georgian house. Hence: “Privacy” as “a presence in the private

291 Ibid., p.38.
sphere” (and intimate solitude as a matter of the Social), a definition also resonating with the increasing significance of the concepts of “Home” and “Family” (as the private setting in which one’s private presence was confirmed). I borrow this articulation from Michael McKeon, summarizing the history of “Home” in the following way: “The development of domestic architecture in the following two centuries may be imaginatively encapsulated in the transformation of the withdrawing room from a negative into a positive space, from a public absence to a private sort of presence, a process that was marked by idiomatic usage in the positivizing shift from ‘withdrawing room’ to ‘drawing room’.” In any case, as presence rather than absence, privacy was socially accepted, even extending its reach to the private loge of the theater, or the privacy expected of a first-class ticket.

Conceptual analysis – of the sort just attempted – allows for a recognition of the semantic elements of the socio-spatiality of concepts, the social space of the bourgeoisie being produced not singularly as a response to techno-scientific advancement, but also as a response to the socio-political vocabulary of a transforming economy (with corresponding representations of space). The separation between publicness and privateness – or the separation of private and public “presence” – functioned as a representation of space – each type of space had its own, spatial discourse – thus determining bodily, spatial practice (also defined by gender and class). In turn, this, new “Home”, singularized into a conceptual-spatial fragmentation, was possible only because of those spaces not present, e.g. the social spaces of production: the concrete abstractions of the market simply re-interpreted the objectification of bodies as performed by the nonsimultaneous lingering of ecclesiastic domination. By decorating these “Homes” with a commodified “Orient”, the presence of the nonpresent was not only domestic, but also global, the conceptual designation of “otherness” allowing for a negative appropriation of the “never-there”. The conceptual distinction between publicness and privateness served a societal function that – not unlike the oikos, agora, and castle – both indicated and became a factor in social experience and change, property, if one had it, maintaining what would otherwise be lost, namely: meaning.

3.3.3. Property and capital; ownership.

I have already noted the affinity between “property” and “self”. On this topic, says Madanipour, Hegel, establishing a relation between the will of the individual and the objects of the world,

293 Hence, privacy does not equal intimacy (nor sexual activity); in the Social, however, as Arendt points out, privacy is defined in terms of the intimacy of the private. (Arendt, The Human Condition, p.39.)

294 Ibid., p.228.
argued that property, as an embodiment of personality, was necessary for a sense of self. Property, as an embodiment of personality, was necessary for a sense of self.

Privacy, property, and self – an equation turned on its head by Marx, who famously viewed property as a cause for alienation, property here meaning means of production rather than “objects”. Property (i.e. Hegelian “objects”), as noted by Benjamin, did have some phenomenological import, defying the logic of an exchange-economy by insisting on the use-value, temporality, and emotional significance of the private traces afforded by the collection of personal objects. Naturally, then, the history of private property – including: the accumulation of capital; the housing market; the cost of living; the philosophy of ownership – dictated the very experience of living – not to say: the conditions of living. More importantly, the social hierarchies of feudal organizations of power could not – and should not – be divorced from the reproduction of this organization through the patrimonial distribution of property and wealth (occupying forces always reproducing their occupying).

The history of property also plays into the distinction between private and public: “The emergence of the market as a central legitimizing institution brought the public/private distinction into the core of legal discourse during the nineteenth century […]. One of the central goals of nineteenth century legal thought was to create a clear separation between constitutional, criminal, and regulatory law – public law – and the law of private transactions – torts, contracts, property, and commercial law.”

The distinction between private and public – in legal and in economic terms – thus followed laws designating a distinction between the private property of Kings-as-feudal-lords and the

295 Madanipour, Public and Private Spaces of the City, p.56.

296 Ownership thus defines the situation of and relationship between family members, women being repeatedly robbed – by the law – of power, property, and the freedom to act on these (Ariès, Centuries of Childhood, p.355.). This marriage between law and property is long-lasting, the ancient Greek word for law – nomos – being derived from the word nemein, the latter word meaning “to dwell”, “to distribute”, and “to possess the distributed” (Madanipour, Public and Private Spaces of the City, p.56.). In the medieval setting, this marriage had the following expression: poles once being used to designate private land, the word “court” (i.e. Noble court) “comes from the Latin curtis, which in its primary meaning is synonymous with saepes, enclosure” (Duby, “Introduction”, p.12.). Of course, under feudal rule, most people did not own their land, serfdom being a far more common destiny among the medieval population. Furthermore, moving on in history, Pierre Bourdieu, studying social reproduction in Bern, argues that the legal equation between “first-born sons inheriting the land” and “the land inheriting the first-born sons” is a social structure conforming to the imperative of the social group: i.e. the imperative (as well as integral perpetuation) of patriarchal patrimony (David W Sabeau, Property, Production, and Family in Neckarhausen, 1700-1870 (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1990), p.90.). Otto Brunner, writing on the Hausvaterliteratur in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Germany, takes Bourdieu’s argument one step further, arguing that the concept of the Father (Vater) was a legal notion not alone defined by biological or sentimental meanings (Ibid, p.91.). Even though – as Sabeau points out – Brunner did not recognize the fact that these concepts (Vater, Haus) had moral implications controlled by the hegemony of church and state, it is clear, once again, that the family had a legal underlining (Ibid., p.91-92.). In sum, a history of the legal mediation of social relationships.

public property of Kings-as-Crown.\textsuperscript{298} Earlier (use-based) definitions of property could simply not support a full-blown distinction between public and private.

The conflation of the public/private-distinction – hitherto discussed as a discursive implication – now need some final elaborating. Consequently, walking down the dark corridor of Victorian homes, did one experience a demarcation of private and public presence, or a conflation of the two?\textsuperscript{299} Karen Harvey, exploring this question, points out the ordinariness of “Home”, the fact that people lived their own lives, not that of the prescriptive historian.\textsuperscript{300} Even though associated with femininity, the home was used by both men and women, the economy of the household – the oeconomy – in large part being a responsibility of the man. Harvey concludes that as “a meaningful discourse of masculinity, oeconomy emphasized a man’s managerial engagement with home. It made ‘housekeeping’ central to manly status. It also made men central to the home.”\textsuperscript{301} The conflations of the oeconomy – pointing towards the oikos and/or the medieval household – refers to the ordinariness of living, to the spatial practices associated with a field of care; the separation instead refers to what Lefebvre discussed in terms of conceived space, i.e. a discourse on space, spatial practices sometimes negating the semantic field of their representational space (i.e. the spatial separation of public and private rooms). In the end, however, the oeconomy of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century, separated from the private market in terms of its moral grounding, had to give way to the intensified separations of the nineteenth-century: “The flexible gendered distinction between inside and outside work was well on the way to becoming the ossified gendered separation between use and exchange, consumption and production, private necessity and public freedom.”\textsuperscript{302} Moreover, in the twentieth-century, as argued, these separations were conflated on the level of political discourse, i.e. in the context of “the rise of the Social”. Again, it is important to keep these terms where they belong: as already concluded, it is erroneous to associate the ordinariness of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century living with the socio-political developments of “the Social”, a notion that should perhaps only be applied in the context of twentieth-century mass-politics. In this context, privacy is defined as that which is not social, foreshadowing present-day definitions, those of social isolation and intimacy. Earlier, nineteenth-century conflations of public and private – privacy meaning “private presence”, or

\textsuperscript{298} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{299} And what is the nature of the modern experiences of “house-arrests”? What happens to the experience of the concept of “Home” when it is turned into a form for punishment, a prison?
\textsuperscript{300} Harvey, “Men Making Home: Masculinity and Domesticity in Eighteenth-Century Britain”, p.524.
\textsuperscript{301} Ibid., p.536.
a private body interacting with its field of care – are better described as (i) a conceptual implication of the triadic dialectic of the private/public-distinction and (ii) as a function of the ordinary interactions constituting social space, the ensuing “strategies of encounter and avoidance” (Lefebvre’s “living space”). Such (trivial) conflations (ii) nevertheless rested on the discursive separations of bourgeoisie-ideology (i), the dark corridor indeed functioning as an “ossified separation” of private from public presence. Finally, then, tracing this history backwards, before the modern age of separations, within the structures of the medieval household, the assignment of conflations is wrong simply because there were no separations; in the age of Francis Bacon, for example, the words “state” and “estate” were used interchangeably, never allowing the separation of politics and economy to be conflated.303

3.3.4. Religion and virtue: the moralization of domesticity.

The concept of “Home” thus instituted, taking the form of a collective singular of the bourgeoisie, indicating and provoking the conceptual separation of private from public presence, what was the domestic role of religion? As implied, religious beliefs did play a part in ideologies of domesticity, especially – staying in England – in the wake of the evangelical revival; concerned about the social effects of the French Revolution, Hannah Moore, one of the more prominent evangelists of the early nineteenth-century, expressing what would later become the common-sense-understanding of the middle-class, argued in favor of a paternal authority at home (the liberation of women being one, contradictory aspect of the Revolution).304 Masculinity – as paternal authority – and domesticity – as the ideology of both masculinity and femininity – were thus supportive notions (compare oeconomy), key-aspects of the creation, reproduction, and maintenance of patriarchal, heterosexual relations. Evangelic and Puritan revivals internalized the panoptic conscience of God, ultimately – since interactions determined the quality of “self”, the moral industry of determined salvation – making these patriarchal relationships an important aspect of Christian morality – every minute of every day, the strength of this morality was tested, in turn privatizing the quest for salvation: the house, the “Home” (now collectivized), divorced from the chaotic temptations of urban space, turned out to be a perfect place for practicing such beliefs. Ultimately, in the 1840s, evangelical blue-collars protesting against the enrollment of women in the industrial workforce, “men were legitimized as workers, women as wives and mothers, by the state, by middle-class

303 Ibid., p.17.
philanthropist, and by workingmen.” The division of labor between sexes – made sure by the exclusion of women from property – thus forced women to adopt the notion of domestic virtue, i.e. of “proper”, domestic behavior. Consequently, Victorian family-ethics were strong and well-defined: “People should marry for love and companionship, not money; they should take their duties as parents seriously; men should care for and protect womenfolk, whose nature it was to be dependent; home should be a place of rest and tranquility, not of conflict and strife.” Love, warmth, comfort, and peace; those were the nourishing ideals of English “Homes”. John Ruskin, the Victorian art-historian, in fostering these ideals (including the assumed passivity of women), epitomizes the serenity of this domestic theme:

This is the true nature of home – it is the place of Peace: the shelter, not only from all injury, but from all terror, doubt, and division. In so far as it is not this, it is not home; so far as the anxieties of the outer life penetrate into it, and the inconsistently-minded, unknown, unloved, or hostile society of the outer world is allowed by either husband or wife to cross the threshold, it ceases to be home; it is then only a part of that outer world which you have roofed over, and lighted fire in. But so far as it is a sacred place, a temple, as temple of the hearth watched over by Household Gods, before those faces none may come but those whom they can receive with love, - so far as it is this, and roof and fire are types only of a nobler shade and light, - shade as of the rock in a weary land, and light as of the Pharos in the stormy sea; - so far it vindicates the name, and fulfils the praise, of home.

Similarly, paraphrasing Michelet, de Certau asks Modernity where all the “old Gods” went: “Where are they? In the desert, on the heath, in the forest? Yes, but also and especially in the home. They live on in the most intimate of domestic habits.” Domestic Protestantism in place, church and state – as family – united. Interestingly, the privatization of salvation weakened the papal respect for authority, thus making religion an individualist household-matter – argues McKeon – eventually weakening the respect for patriarchal authority, no longer sanctioned by the authority of the state. Paradoxically, then, religion strengthened that

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305 Ibid., p.87.
306 Gervise Markham, in 1683, makes the following distinction: “...the perfect Husbandman, who is the Father and Master of the Family”, “for the most part abroad or removed from the house’, while his ‘English Housewife, who is the Mother and Mistress of the family [...] hath her most general imployments within the house”. (Gervase Markham, The English House-Wife. Containing the Inward and Outward Vertues which ought to be in a Compleat Woman (9th edn, London: Hannah Sawbridge, 1683), pp. 1–2.)
310 McKeon, The Secret History of Domesticity, p.34.
which it would later help to weaken, the new Gods of the household – and the temporalizing rituals of a field of care – turning out to be a liberating force to reckon with.

3.3.5. The science of domesticity.
The hearth as a signifier of the family-unit, a temple “watched over by Household Gods”: evidently, such eloquence resonates with medieval prose, the language of the “Hearth”. In the second half of the nineteenth-century, the virtue of spaciousness, religiously sanctioned, gave way to more effective planning, smaller houses with less servants.\textsuperscript{311} In turn, with smaller houses, it was harder to decorate the “Home” in accordance with the rules of traditional styles, the revived “Queen Anne”-style – irregular planning; convenient attributes; more windows; brighter interiors – being one, prominent solution.\textsuperscript{312} Moreover, houses, “not particularly airtight, were equipped with air ducts and ventilating flues.”\textsuperscript{313} In the context of epidemics and urbanization, the question of miasmic air, both indoors and outdoors, dictated much of the thinking of “Home”, making domestic safety and comfort a topic of scientific research. In 1841, for example, Catherine E. Beecher published \textit{A Treatise on Domestic Economy for the Use of Young Ladies at Home and at School}, stressing the economy of labor rather than that of beauty, thus, for a moment, contradicting the heteronormative prejudices of patriarchal authority, the male expectations of female, passive beauty. “The masculine idea of the home was primarily sedentary – the home as a retreat from the cares of the world, a place to be at ease. The feminine idea of the home was dynamic; it had to do with ease, but also with work.”\textsuperscript{314}

The scientific writing on “Home” – collectivizing and singularizing – allowed for some interpretations symptomatic of the historical setting in which they were made, i.e. the growing dominion of nationalist sentiments. The Oxford English Dictionary lists its first use of “Home-country” in the early eighteenth-century, a compound then intensified in the following centuries.\textsuperscript{315} Replacing the regional character of pre-modern renditions of collective identity (e.g. the Old High German \textit{heima}, meaning residence \textit{and} homeland), the nation-as-home, still denoting spatial qualities, homogenized an experience (of identity) thereby promoting its own, nationalist homogenization. Just as “Home” itself became a place of socialization, consolidating

\textsuperscript{311} In the United States, by 1900, more than 90 percent of American families did not employ any domestic servants (Rybczynski, \textit{Home: A Short history of an Idea}, p.155.). With no servants, arguably, the unity of the family-household was strengthened.
\textsuperscript{312} Rybczynski, \textit{Home: A Short history of an Idea}, p.179.
\textsuperscript{313} Ibid., p.137.
\textsuperscript{314} Ibid., p.161.
\textsuperscript{315} “home, n.1 and adj.”, OED online, Oxford University Press, September 2016, accessed December 9, 2016, \url{http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/87869?rskey=a9tG8h&result=1&isAdvanced=false&eid}
the collective identities of “Class” and “Family”, its metonymical consequence, the nation-as-home, would turn the regionalized population (associating with landscapes and place-names) into one cultural family, the homogenized culture of the nation. The analogy is not unreasonable: consider the phrases “mother-land” and “father-land”, referring not only to the social space of a single person, but also to a sense of belonging, an identity shared by all those associated with a social space reaching beyond that of the immediate family. As a collective singular, “Home” refers to a multitude of interconnected, social spaces, spaces both superimposed and – through an association with childhood – equalized: “Home-land”, “Hometown”, “Childhood-home”. Of course, as expected, all these home-places have been temporalized accordingly, the narration of “Home” – following the Sattelzeit – turning notoriously linear, the past of that narrative, even though glorious, operating as the strenuous fundament on which a better future is built. And so, if these, interrelated spaces were interpreted, produced, and maintained in agreement with a set of temporalized, historicizing concepts (“the Nation”, “the City”, “the intimate space of my Childhood”), then these concepts were themselves interpreted, produced, and maintained in agreement with the perception and conception of social space thus lived.

The national discourse of “Home” was both disciplinary and aesthetic, the notion of an “ideal home” – merging technological advances with pseudo-historical renditions of what was then considered traditional – informing the construction of public, national buildings, the Copenhagen City Hall, for instance, designed by Martin Nyrop and inaugurated in 1905, combining a political monumentality with domestic interiors, “traditional” building materials (brick), and ornamental motifs associated with “Old Norse” culture.316 The nature of the representational space of “Home” was thus politicized and “nationalized”; vice versa, national sentiments suddenly gave meaning to the nature of domestic practice. In Germany, for example, writes Nancy Reagin, “The typical Bourgeois home was thus filled by the late nineteenth century with objects preaching cleanliness, order and thrift, sometimes claiming these virtues for German women especially.”317 The scientific/educational treatises on domesticity found in England were likewise flourishing in the recently united nation of Germany. In 1896, the Volksschule (for girls) added an eight grade primarily devoted to the science of domesticity;318 “Symbols rooted in private life were powerful building blocks of national identity and were at

318 Ibid., p.47.
least as effective as public ceremonies or rituals, because the practices of private life were usually seen as ‘unpolitical’ and thus more ‘naturally’ and essentially German.\textsuperscript{319} The unpolitical nature of the domestic paradoxically made it into a powerful political tool, a focal point for national homogenization. The politics of the Social, politicizing the unpolitical, thus contaminating the spatial and conceptual demarcations of the public, as was the case with Copenhagen City Hall, merged national sentiments with the mass-concerns of modern politicization. In his dissertation \textit{Kritik und Krise}, Koselleck argues that this situation – i.e. the political essence of the unpolitical – developed dialectically from the separation of politics from morality, the former notion associated with the absolutist state, the latter notion associated with the public sphere. The utopian visions of Enlightenment philosophy, argues Koselleck, central to the self-conscious morality of a growing public, criticized the state as being inherently immoral. But this rejection would instead support “an authority based on ideology, where supposedly anti-authoritarian Enlightenment concepts such as ‘reason’, ‘equality,’ and ‘morality’ were used as weapons of power and control.”\textsuperscript{320} Whereas the politics of the State was interpreted as “evil”, the morality of the public discussion (and criticism) was interpreted as “authentic” and “true”. Accordingly, as was the case with nationalist items and sentiments, the “political anonymity” of reason, morality, and nature “defined their political character and effectiveness.”\textsuperscript{321} The unpolitical nature of these concepts secured their political essence; processes of democratization, evident in the institutionalization of \textit{Volksschule}, simply fueled the fire.

Indeed, through the political essence of the unpolitical, the concept of “Home” grew in social scope. The \textit{Werkbund}, for example, an Arts and Crafts movement founded in Munich in 1907, working towards an industrial transformation of the consumption, production, and design of everyday goods, aimed at “widespread social transformation.”\textsuperscript{322} The members of this association saw “the transformation of public and private spaces – and the space of the home above all – as integral to the modernization and nationalization of Germany.”\textsuperscript{323} One writer, Joseph August Lux, in a manual entitled \textit{Taste in Everyday Life}, even invoked the concept of “Crisis” – in regards to the interior of German homes – when arguing for the national

\textsuperscript{319} Ibid., p.14.
\textsuperscript{320} Olsen, \textit{History in the Plural}, p.49-50.
\textsuperscript{323} Ibid, p. 470.
significance of modernization and rationalization. As a collective singular, “Home” was representable, the representation of this representational space becoming a political and technological affair thereby democratized. Mechanization, modernization, and rationalization: in practice, the arrival of gaslight, ventilation, and vacuum-cleaners. The commodification of domestic technologies somewhat blurred the socio-economic boundaries (of domestic comfort) seen in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; nevertheless, as a case of the simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous, gendered boundaries remained intact, even reproduced themselves in the technologification of household-work.

In 1862, a Canadian engineer, Henry Rutton, exclaimed that “Amid the blaze of light which in this nineteenth century has so illumined the world, architecture alone lies motionless, covered with the dust of ages.” The domestic improvements of the nineteenth-century should not be overstated; engineers and architects still worked in separate spheres. Be that as it may, efficiency became a buzz-word in the developing science of “Management-studies”, Christine Frederick, for example, asking for efficient homes in her book *Household Engineering* (1915). Within a similar semantic field, Mary Patterson and Lilian Gilbreth published books titled *The Principles of Domestic Engineering* (Patterson, 1915) and *The Home Maker and Her Job* (Gilbreth, 1927). One of Frederick’s many articles, published in a journal called *The Ladies’ Home Journal* (1912), prepared the new philosophy: “The New Housekeeping” was scientifically supported – not, as John Ruskin would have it, a sacrifice to the Gods of the Household. In fact, these titles were widely read, “Home Economics” – in a case of restraining empowerment – being a subject at both MIT and Colombia. Efficiency in space-time freed up that space-time, and as was the case with the religious revival in England, the intensification of what was considered the female sphere, the household, ultimately allowed that intensification to be questioned.

### 3.3.6. Philosophical homelessness.

Parenthetically, I must now ask: was “Home” integrated into a philosophical system of concepts? It would be easy to exaggerate such a process of philosophical ideologicization (political ideologicization has already been discussed). To begin with, we have the idealizing phenomenology of Gaston Bachelard, integrating the concept of “Home” with a

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324 Ibid., p.465.
327 Ibid.
Marxist/Freudian vocabulary (Lefebvre, even though skeptical, was clearly inspired by *The Poetics of Space*). Working out a complement to psychoanalysis – namely, “topoanalysis” – Bachelard, criticizing the sky-scrapping proliferation of *flats* and apartments, argues that “Home has become mere horizontality”\(^\text{328}\) opposed to the intimate verticality of the tripartite psyche. The house of “our” Childhood, on the other hand, with a cellar and a basement, “has engraved within us the hierarchy of the various functions of inhabiting”, the intimate gestures of our bodies, thus making all other houses “but variations on a fundamental theme”, the vertical essence (as *phenomenon*) of the house, a place of daydreaming, memory, and intimacy.\(^\text{329}\) After reflecting on the example of the hut, however, since “all really inhabited space bears the essence of the notion of home”,\(^\text{330}\) the Frenchman retreats to a concentrated analysis of the essence of the house: regardless of the verticality of the intimacy of the refuge, the happy unconscious is happily *housed*. In other words, the hut passes as a purified form of “Home”, a space of time passed, a non-I taking care of the I – an argument, it should be noted, not compatible with the conceptual history here outlined.

Traveling back to the *Sattelzeit*, I have already mentioned a few, interesting examples of philosophical ideologicization: the development of a doctrine of the state based on the structure of the family, the state-as-family, Louis de Bonald being one political theorist making use of this analogy;\(^\text{331}\) theologians searching for a space of practical morality, ultimately finding it in the “Home”, a space of order and peace; and finally, the question of private property, discussed by Locke and Rousseau in terms of the order (natural or legal) by which it is considered a human right. The philosophy of aesthetics is another, obvious case of philosophical ideologicization, especially when concerned with the relationship between morality and its socio-spatial environment (which, as is the case with Ellen Key and the Myrdal-couple, Alva and Gunnar Myrdal, makes that philosophy *political*; the philosophy of Key, gifting the twentieth-century to the new-born avant-garde, i.e. the Child, is perhaps my best case in point).\(^\text{332}\) Domesticity being dedicated to the reproduction of bourgeoisie-individualism, i.e. the ownership of the means of production, as is perhaps to be expected, Marx and Engels – even though incidentally – afford some reverberating commentary on the concept of “Home”; in his treatise on *The Origin of the Family*, for example, partly based on notes by Marx, Engels

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\(^\text{329}\) Ibid., p.15.

\(^\text{330}\) Ibid., p.5.


argued that the concept of “Family” encapsulated the contradictions of its etymological past, i.e. the relationship between a Master and his serfs, women thus being subdued as a proletariat within the division of labor at “Home”.

Freud, not convinced by the conclusion of Marxism, wrote that “In abolishing private property, we deprive human love of aggression of one of its instruments, certainly a strong one, though certainly not the strongest.” Famously so, in splitting the human psyche, Freud – and Hitchcock – made the house – the attic, the ground-floor, and the basement – a metaphor for mental development (and under-development); in fact, in the universe of dreams, or the universe of the interpretation of dreams, the front-door of “Home” symbolizes a woman’s genitals.

Given the peculiar circumstances of modernity, it would perhaps be more fruitful to search for a philosophy of “Homelessness”, Marx, in such a modern context, appearing as the founding father of the self-consciousness of alienation. On the topic of homelessness, Kant writes that “To be at home is to recognize life’s slow pace and the pleasures of sedentary meditation […] Man’s identity is thus residential, and that is why the revolutionary, who has neither hearth nor home, hence neither faith nor law, epitomizes the anguish of errancy […] The man without a home is a potential criminal.”

The theme of homelessness is fairly common in modern literature: Novalis writing on the last hope of a promised home-coming; Thoreau exposing himself to the ultimate form of homelessness, the original “Home” (i.e. “nature”), later returning home to publish a book about his experiences…; Kierkegaard exploring the homelessness of Abraham, forced to depart from his ancestral home, thus homeless in the world but at home with God; Camus and his stranger, homeless in a world full of homes; or, as Adorno exclaims in his collection of aphorisms, Minima Moralia, “ Dwelling, in the proper sense, is now impossible […] it is part of morality not be at home in one’s home”, and Heidegger, philosophizing the dwelling of Being, opposed to a wandering existence: “What if man’s homelessness consisted in this, that man still does not even think of the real plight of dwelling as the plight? Yet as soon as man gives thought to his homelessness, it is a misery no longer. Rightly considered and kept well in mind, it is the sole summons that calls mortals into their dwelling.”

George Lukács, in a Theory of the Novel (1920), would coin the term “transcendental homelessness” (transzendentale Heimatlosigkeit), referring to the

337 Heidegger, “Building, Dwelling, Thinking”, p.159.
literary urge to be at “Home” in modernity. Indeed, as argued in my previous chapter, the dialectic between “Home-owner” and “Homeless”, here interpreted metaphorically, is also counter-conceptual (and counter-spatial), “Homelessness” being a threat not only to those who have a “Home” (materially and existentially), but to humanity itself, the identity of Man apparently being residential (Kant). Existentially, the concept of “Home” is a powerful metaphor; collectivized and democratized, the counter-concept of “Home”, i.e. “Homelessness”, surfaces as one of the most transparent failures of modernity. Unwillingly – the “nomadic threat” having a long history in Europe – “Homelessness” signifies a counter-discourse to – and negation of – the consciousness of “Progress”, a revolutionary act threatening the stability of the dominant order. The nomad (the rootless, the beggar, the refugee) is simply not allowed; it is a disgrace – the argument goes – that people are without a “Home”, as if the existential metaphor of “Being at Home” could be extended to the realm of the Social. Is it not possible to be “at Home” in one’s “Homelessness”? Or would that be – as Kant argued – outside of Man’s identity, in other words: un-human? The question of philosophical ideologicization hereby turns into a topic for another paper, and I must therefore leave this discussion alluding and answerless.

3.4 Concluding remarks; preparing a segue

Sketching a history of concepts, as I have been doing here, the point of which is to generalize, the risk is that these generalizations – instead of connoting some abstract truth – distort the underlying, historical reality, the experiences and changes as they were once lived and felt. As David Sabean points out in his book Property, Production, and Family in Neckerhausen, 1700-1870, one of the main risks consists in framing this story in accordance with the popular belief that before modernization “people lived in a world of kinship”, “that industrialization, mobility, and altered institutional arrangements brought the isolated nuclear family into being and reorganized society so that it moved away from solidarity toward competition and away from corporate groups to individuals sorted out into classes”.

In the village of Neckerhausen, for example, Sabean finds “activities, structures, processes, and logics that simply are not visible outside of the local context.” In this village, lingering structures of kinship – making

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338 George Lukacs, Theory of the Novel (MIT Press, 1974).
339 Supposing that historic reality equals a “now” that by definition has seized to exist. A sad equation indeed.
340 Warren, Property, Production, and Family in Neckarhausen, 1700-1870, p.36.
that context meaningful – were never transformed by global processes of agricultural capitalization, specialization, and industrialization. Nevertheless, my hope is to have (silently) challenged some of these prescriptive beliefs and generalizations, even though, concluding this sketch, I am forced to recognize the form of their reiteration. It is perhaps a symptom of any History, well-written or not, i.e. that tension between a framework and its expressions: a philosophical tension nurtured by the assumed rift between “reality” and “the knowledge of reality”, between history (whether it refers to an experience or an event) and its History? Reality does not necessarily conform to knowledge (even though disciplined): what is at stake is a relationship of illumination. And so, instead of correspondence, the conditions of satisfaction are illumination and prediction – falsification is not to be found in the exception (which would be the case if correspondence remained the condition of satisfaction); unscientific discourse occurs when that exception is not recognized due to the structure of the abstraction (i.e. as an unfalsifiable narrative), or when the exception, due to the social status of the abstraction, is interpreted as a confirmation of the language-game employed by the interpreter (a falsifiable narrative made unfalsifiable). In any case, if language stands in the way of ontological disclosure, I am not the one to satisfy the desire of that language; instead, I can only hope that my narrative is approximating an abstraction in line not with the local flavor of historic reality, but rather with the writing of History as it is here referenced.

This History continues; I conclude with a segue. I have not yet discussed the experience of travelling, of living in a hotel. Nor have I discussed the impact of the railway-system, the contraction of space-time and nationality: the very sentiments of “Domestic” and “Foreign” could perhaps be traced – partly – to the evolution of mobility, travel, and geographical approximation? These phenomena are nevertheless only relevant as antonyms, as that which the concept of “Home” is not.\footnote{Compare the Swedish idiom “Borta bra men hemma bäst” (transl.: It sure is nice to be away, but being home is always better).} preceding such semantic developments, developments simultaneous with the institutionalization of the Parisian hotel, there were no distinctions between hotel-living and residence-living, thus providing me with an example of what I have already argued.\footnote{Contamine, “Peasant Hearth to Papal Palace”, p.469.} Even though the word “home” was always referring to a specific location – the place where one slept and/or worked, e.g. the medieval long-house – it first had to acquire the emotional, social, and moral significance necessary for conceptual embellishment before coalescing into a fixed position in space \textit{as well as} time (in the memory of Childhood,
lost to future, i.e. our expectations). Nomadic cultures complicate this argument; it is my assumption, however, that the notion of hotels, in these cultures – as would be the case in the feudal age – carries no defining associations. In other words, hotel-travelling could only come to mean what it means today in the light of the concept of “Home”, i.e. as a function of the semantic field associated with that, amorphous concept. Even though it calls for an elaborate discussion, I am here satisfied with leaving the nebulous topic of hotels in terms of a symptom of trends already traced. Likewise, I am forced to keep the discussion of urbanity short, one of my arguments nevertheless being that the modern idea of “Home” developed in urban rather than rural areas. Pathologies of the city – agoraphobia, claustrophobia, neurasthenia, amnesia, hyperesthesia – prompted a retreat into a comfortable, domestic space realized by the urban separation of professional from private space. Curiously so, and perhaps as a symptom of this development, in Scandinavia, the rural is often idealized as an “authentic” site for feelings of hominess. The domestic motifs of Carl Larsson – women serving two functions: as (i) motherly, active caretakers or (ii) pastoral symbols of calmness – are here illustrative, as is the contemporary revival of wooden building-materials. Naturally, the exclusion, control, and desire of the rural is analogous to the domestic appropriations of orientalism, ultimately exposing the appropriating culture more than the culture appropriated (partly by hiding that very fact through the notion of “authenticity”). In any case, the relationship between “Home” and “City” will be elaborated upon in the next chapter.

Finally, then, the end of the nineteenth-century marked the beginning of a new way of living, namely, technological living. In 1882, Edison installed an electric generator in New York; light bulbs, electric motors, and resistance heaters were implemented in the system of comfort expected by the residents of modernity; after 1890, in line with these expectations, elevators, central heating, indoor plumbing, running water, and electric power were introduced on a domestic level. “By 1900”, Rybczynski writes, “electricity was an accepted fact of urban life”, saving time as well as energy, transferred from the output of manual labor to the input of electric power. The fact of perpetual development – historic denial – had its aesthetic equivalent in Art Deco, first showcased in 1925 at the Exposition Internationale des Arts Décoratifs et Industriels Modernes; following the colorful language of Art Nouveau (Jügend,

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344 As does emigration, but on a different note, namely that of travelling-as-homelessness, exile. In fact, Adorno connects it all, i.e. hotels, nomadism, and emigration: “The attempt to evade responsibility for one’s residence [i.e. dwelling-as-identification] by moving into a hotel or furnished rooms, makes the enforced conditions of emigration a wisely-chosen norm.” (Adorno, Minima Moralia, p.38-39.)
346 Ibid., p.151.
the Modern Style, *il sile floreale*), Art Deco ventured into unprecedented grounds, integrating (aesthetically) the new domestic technologies of a *fin de siècle*. During this Paris-exposition, and contradicting the eclectic forms of Art Deco, Charles-Édouard Jeanneret – collaborating with his cousin Pierre Jeanneret – constructed an austere pavilion memorably chocking to its European audience. C. E. Jeanneret, more famous by his *nom de guerre*, Le Corbusier, proposed a “purist” architecture in line with the “New Spirit” of modernity, a proposal not only exhibited in the pavilion at the Paris-exposition, but also in his book *Towards an Architecture* (*Vers une architecture*; 1923). Le Corbusier’s mechanical conception of “Home” – combined living rooms, built-in closets, shower baths, concealed lighting; known to Americans but alien and “new” to Europeans – differed from the scientific understanding of “efficiency” as it was expressed in “Management Studies”; the latter emphasizing the individual character of working-in-the-home, the importance – in the name of efficiency – of aligning work with your own desires, needs, and temperaments (i.e. rhythm), Le Corbusier instead proposed (and imagined) a universal set of needs thus formalized into a mechanical function of being-at-Home. For Le Corbusier, due to this set of desires, and in line with the process of democratization discussed above, “Homes” were – or ought to be – mass-produced objects based on standardized procedures. White (bright) walls; austerity in decoration; ornamental sparsity; smaller rooms; efficient planning; interiorized steel structures; rationalized furniture. Nonetheless, the pavilion of Le Corbusier, partly realizing the ideas of Adolf Loos, most reverently expressed in his essay “Ornament and Crime” (1908), was – as implied – rejected by the decorated gazes of its visitors.

To quote Proust, a child of anglophile domesticity and burdened interiors, of diminishing salons and electrified living, “The time, moreover, that a person requires […] to penetrate a work of any depth is merely an epitome, a symbol, one might say, of the years, the centuries even that must elapse before the public can begin to cherish a masterpiece that is really new.” If, as Rybczynski claims, the “Home”, by Le Corbusier, “was being remade in a new image, stripped of its bourgeois traditions and bereft of easeful intimacy and well-established

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347 Ibid., p.186.
348 Ibid., p.191.
349 It is important to note that Le Corbusier did not start off this way: his “first work, the Villa Fallet of 1907, in his native La Chaux-de-Fonds, Switzerland, was in a ‘Jura Regionalist’ mode that fulfilled many of the agendas of National Romanticism.” (William J. R. Curtis, *Modern Architecture since 1900* (London: Phaidon, 2013), p.143).
ideas of comfort”,\textsuperscript{351} then it is not strange that an appreciative posterity lingered not in the immediate present of Le Corbusier, but in a troublesome future discussing the merits of his legacy. Naturally, therefore, I end this sketch with two questions, a false disjunctive if you will: was this legacy – mechanization, standardization, industrialization – a threat to domesticity as it had heretofore been experienced? Or was it a necessary response to the growing, social scope of “Home” (as a collective singular), transforming its desires by adapting to the mechanized conditions of their realization? Perhaps Le Corbusier committed the fallacy implicit in my own narrative, an exaggerated association between spatial configuration, conceptual expectation, and social experience. In any case, and moving forward, it is my hope to answer these questions in the following.

\begin{quote}
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4. The Question of Home: Concepts of Modern Space

“Cities, like dreams, are made of desires and fears, even if the thread of their discourse is secret, their rules are absurd, their perspective deceitful, and everything conceals something else.”352 – Italo Calvino

“Ilium, New York, is divided in three parts. In the northwest are the managers and engineers and civil servants and a few professional people; in the northeast are the machines; and in the south, across the Iroquois River, is the area known locally as Homestead, where almost all of the people live.”353 – Kurt Vonnegut


I begin this chapter by asking yet another, intolerable question: is “Modernity” a space? Certainly, for people living “Modernity”, the meaning of that living is inseparable from the meaning of “modern” space, divorced from the wondrous spectacle of dead or “backward” realities, the commodified spaces of the temporalized other, sometimes praised – as achievements of Mankind – only because of their temporal quality, that of being produced “before” the very age of appraisal: “Are they not remarkable, the Roman aqueducts, built long before the invention of steel, computation, and dying labor unions?” Regardless of the chronological existence of a space called “Modernity” (or “Postmodernity”), it seems safe to conclude that “Progress”, as one of its concepts, indeed has social space, as does “Decline” – all respectable Nations take pride in their capital (I allow myself to generalize), and all capitals are in part chauvinistic, domesticating their past by securing their future; before stepping into the bewildering office of the new, advanced economy, the urban Wandersmänner, for a moment, starrling up at the conquered sky, might experience a breeze of “Freedom”, a feeling – I note – both threatened and promoted by the spiritual successors of Haussmann, the harbingers of democratic justice, order, and peace, antidotes to that which is unheimlich. But what is the meaning of “modern” space, if this notion may be said to “mean” at all? Is there such a thing as a “modern” home? And if so, what is its meaning?

After sketching the history of the concept of “Home”, it is now time to proceed onomaseologically, to freeze history and explore its synchronicity. In the following, therefore, I limit my investigation to the conceptual structure of “modern Homes”, and even more

354 Interview with Gustav Adolf Adolfsson, retired detective, Aftonbladet, October 7, 1933, p.4.
specifically, to the concept of “Home” as it was debated during the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930 (henceforth, “the Exhibition”), held between May and September that year and attracting over four million visitors to its temporary set of pavilions and alleys. An energetic demonstration of “functionalist” architecture and its well-faring visions of the future, the Exhibition introduced the unwary, Lutheran Swedes to a radically modern mode of organizing life; during a few, dazzling summer months, Stockholm, the capital of Sweden, resting as it is in the solitary inlet of an archipelagic landscape, hidden in the lush geography of a European periphery, hosted the arrival of its modernity. The Exhibition – as an event as well as an argument – will be discussed thoroughly below, and it is here sufficient to note the basics of its organization. Conceived in 1927 at a board meeting of Svenska Slöjdföreningen (The Swedish Society for Crafts and Design), and receiving financial support from both the Swedish government and the local municipality, the Exhibition would revolve around the socio-political question of cheap and effective housing (at the time, housing was very expensive in Stockholm, the poor constituting a relatively large number of the population), dividing its layout into three interrelated sections: first, household goods, e.g. furniture, standardized details of life in the everyday; second, urban space, the organization of extra-domestic movement (public transport, streets, gardens, etc.); and third, the “Home”, functionalist interpretations of the private sphere. With no buildings on the fairground deviating from the ideology of the functional, and having no international pavilions (as opposed to most world-fairs), the Exhibition was a statement exclusively devoted to the question of Swedish “progressiveness”, i.e. the virtues and spaces of a modernized Sweden. Disrupting and disturbing, displaying a Functionalist vision of the future perhaps not shared by everyone involved, the Exhibition was nevertheless considered a great success, an important “contribution to modern architecture, trumping all earlier European exhibitions on the same theme” (as one, present-day scholar puts it).

Before further exploring the semantic context of the Exhibition, however, for reasons of clarity, I must now summarize (and translate) the method as it was theorized in the methodological chapter, such a summary allowing me to adequately account for (and justify) the source-material here used. First, I would like to recall the focalizing purpose of this method:

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355 Anti-industrial Art- and Craft-movements existed all over Europe, promoting traditional craftsmanship in a nationalist setting. Obviously, however, not all members of the board of Svenska Slöjdföreningen were anti-industrial, the Exhibition being an argument in favor of industrialized goods.


in short, I asked for a method capable of accounting for a conceptual history in social space. In pursuing that purpose, with the aid of Lefebvre, I expanded on the concept of concepts by invoking their “socio-spatiality”, defined as the sum of (i) concepts as produced by and/or preserved in social space (social space indicating and being a factor in the history of concepts) and (ii) concepts producing and/or preserving social space (concepts indicating and being a factor in the history of social space). The socio-spatiality of concepts – as the spatial aspect of concepts-in-history – was explained in terms of a function of the interrelations (conflicts, alliances, and intersections) between, first, the semantic field of concepts, and second, the semantic field of representational space (discourses, economies, and spatial codes), these interrelations existing within the triadic dialectic of Lefebvre, as are my three hypotheses. The conceptual emphasis thus achieved is somewhat limiting when considered from the point of view of Lefebvre’s general history of social space: I posited three hypotheses – first, the spatiality of Being, second, the history of concepts related to “space”, and third, the conceptual meaning of representational space, the socio-spatiality of concepts – ultimately reducing the scope of Lefebvre’s triadic mechanics, hypotheses that, if taken together, are hopefully capable of designating said “conceptual history in social space” (with Koselleckian overtones). In the following, however, instead of exploring the so-called spatiality of Being, and instead of writing a history of modern “Space”, my focus will be the socio-spatiality of concepts, the other two hypotheses being considered only when there is sufficient ground for invoking them. Moreover, since my own triad – and its elements – function within those of Lefebvre, dual in nature, and since this, conceptual triad is standing in a constitutive relationship to his three “moments” of spatial production, in the subsequent discussion, the terminology of the French thinker will also be referred to.

But how is my method translated into practice, work? The Exhibition being a contribution to the “housing-question” of Swedish welfare politics, showcasing a spatial rhetoric perhaps more powerful than words could ever be, it ignited – or more accurately: put more wood on the fire – an outburst of “yays” and “neys”, dividing – in a crystallizing moment, just like the Crystal Palace had its Dostoyevsky – its viewers into camps of negation and affirmation. By asking the obvious questions – “What did people agree with, and what did they not agree with?” – and hopefully finding the answers, the semantic field of the concept of “Home” – as it was structured in the context of the Exhibition – may be outlined, negations and affirmations, if looked for among the many rather than the few, being particularly potent in the search for a “general view of things”. For that purpose, I will study not only those in charge of the representations of space, the manifestos and theories of the architects and urban planners,
but also newspapers, literature, and journals (weekly and monthly, ranging from politics to entertainment), one of my interests being interviews with – and stories of – those segments of society not given the privileged opportunity of representing themselves. As mentioned, constraining myself, I limit this interest to only a few years, namely, those years neighboring the Exhibition of 1930. The investigation implied, that of designating the semantic field of the concept in question, here seems transparent enough: by studying the uses of the word “Home”, its contexts of meaning, including the very interesting notion of “Folkhemmet” (the People’s Home), I hope to explain the content and structure of the concept. Proceeding in a less transparent fashion, the semantic field of the representational space of “Home” will be looked for in the same, plural stories, but here with the addition of photographs, drawings, and architectural plans. By studying the critical assessment of functionalist space, i.e. the voices raised against it, a critique not aiming at the textual content of functionalism-as-a-theory, but rather at the experience of space, the “ins” and “outs” of the Exhibition itself – by studying the critical voices of space perceived, it will thus be possible to determine the spatial code of “Home”, the affirmations and negations of its discourses and economy. And so, finally, by comparing these semantic fields to the Europeanized history of the concept in question, the Exhibition being nothing less than an argument in favor of a new attitude towards the representational space of “Home”, I will be able to identify the “newness” of the Functionalist “Home” (if it was “new”), and res extensa, its preservation and production of conceptual elements. What elements of the concept were preserved in the new space of functionalism, and what new elements were added to the semantic field of the latter, conceptual or not? How did people react to the preservation of old, conceptual elements, positively or negatively, and how did people react to the new elements of the representational space, in favor or against them? By identifying the conceptual elements preserved in the representational space of functionalism, and by identifying the conceptual elements therein negated (leaving room for new elements of the concept of “Home”, i.e. semantic “additions”), the socio-spatial quality of “Home” – as it was experienced during these, few years – may be traced onomasiologically. Importantly, since the onomasiological approach is invoking a wide array of relatable concepts, it allows me to assess the larger, linguistic context, the hierarchy of concepts proposed and received: within the context of the “housing-question”, if these, relatable concepts were considered more “important” than the concept of “Home”, the architects thus constructing representational space in accordance with concepts other than that of “Home”, creating a tension between concepts and representational space, i.e. their semantic fields, then the very economy of the conceptual vocabulary of the “housing-question” may be explored. Ideally, obviously, since the socio-
spatial quality of concepts is temporal in structure, indicating a process rather than something fixed, after describing the two “moments” of socio-spatiality exhibited, I would take a closer look at the future of these pasts, the “Homes” of post-war Sweden, or even the “Homes” of today, such time-travelling allowing for more conclusive conclusions regarding – in particular – the history of (i), i.e. the spatial production of concepts. For reasons of time and space, however, said time-travelling will have to await the future of another paper.

Lastly, before jumping into the history of functionalist “Homes”, it should be noted that I am here performing as a conceptual historian, that I am trying not to fetishize “space”, but simply add this “pre-”, “extra-”, and “post-linguistic” aspect of history to the vocabulary of Begriffsgeschichte: in the end, the so called “socio-spatiality” of concepts is only one, conceptual quality among many. Consequently, and as should be evident by now, in the following, I am not writing the history of neither “functionalism”, the Exhibition, nor the interwar politics of Sweden, my main concern being – again – the concept of “Home” and its semantic reach. The prominence attributed to my discussion on “space” – not a consequence of its methodological significance – must be justified in terms of the difficulty inherent in merging a framework of “Time” with an understanding of “Space”. A theory of “space” is not sufficient: as noted, and this explains the structure of my paper, I was looking for a method capable of deciphering the history of concepts, not necessarily that of social space. Consequently, in the following, returning to Koselleck, much (if not most) time will be spent on the semantic structure of the concept of “Home” – that is to say: its meanings and contexts (the latter explanatory of the former), the meaning of “Home” extending far beyond the context of the Exhibition, into the realm of the metaphor, the realm of nationalist sentiments, of temporal self-understanding, of the context of “Time”. Yet, that context, in which people live their lives, is partly spatial; if concepts have a life, and if concepts are lived, and I am now exposing the true raison d’être of this paper, if concepts have a life, and if concepts are lived, that life cannot be understood without a recognition of what we inevitably are: social bodies in a social world.

4.1 Exhibiting space: place, heterotopia, and the concept of “Home” conceived.

The Exhibition acting as a focalizing force both in this study and in what is being studied, I must begin my conceptual analysis by ignoring the concept, my first concern instead being an introduction to its context; consequently, for reasons of disclosure, and deferring the language of the Exhibition, I will now delineate its organization (i.e. conception and structure). If one is to believe the commissioner of said Exhibition, namely, the art-historian Gregor Paulsson, later
professor at Uppsala University, the idea of exhibiting “modern”, Swedish architecture came to him – and no one else – after visiting *Exposition Internationale des Arts Décoratifs et Industriels Modernes*, wherein, I recall, Le Corbusier presented his famous “machines of living”.\(^{358}\) Paulsson brought this idea to the table of *Svenska Slöjdföreningen*, where, at the time, he was the sitting president, resulting – now consulting the memory of one of the Exhibition’s main architects, Uno Åhrén, himself often remembered as a “radical” or visionary – in a discussion-group meeting regularly at Paulsson’s “home” (no irony implied): “Vid dessa sammankomster mognade så småningom den tanken: en utställning av bostäder för vår tids människor bör, om den verkligen skall ge någon behållning, angripa bostadsbyggandets och bostadsinredningens problem från grunden. Den måste ta ett radikalt tag i frågorna.”\(^{359}\) With the support of *Svenska Slöjdföreningen* (as well as the government),\(^{360}\) the plans eventually ossified around the “problem” of “housing”, the committee formed – made up by the architects Eskil Sundahl, Hakon Ahlberg, Erik Bülow-Hübe, Sigurd Lewerentz, Ture Rydberg, and Sven Wallander – deciding that the Exhibition-to-be was best organized as an architectural contest.\(^{361}\)

And so, after completing a series of inquiries into the conditions of housing in Stockholm (the Exhibition only really addressed the Stockholm-area, as is this thesis, by default), and after identifying what they considered to be the nature of the “housing-problem” (in short: housing was expensive, overcrowded, and therefore non-hygienic), the committee proceeded by assembling a list of conditions that the contesting architecture needed to meet: to be constructed at the Exhibition, i.e. chosen by the jury,\(^{362}\) the competing structures, besides meeting the unavoidable criteria of reason and opinion, needed to take into account certain standards – set by the committee – regarding the relation between the size of the household (as in the number of members), the size and cost of apartments, the density of living, and the percentage of the salary reserved for the cost of housing (as per the social category of the salary-taker).\(^{363}\) Ultimately, these criteria produced a number of socio-economic categories, so-called “behovstyper” (literally, “types of needs”), each (chosen) contestant being categorized into a certain type (corresponding to certain needs): the “lowest” type was designated as a single-

\(^{358}\) “Hur utställningstanken föddes”, *Svenska Dagbladet*, April 16, 1930.


\(^{360}\) *Financially supported by Svenska Slöjdföreningen*, an anti-industrial organization, some of its members viewed the Exhibition with suspicion, the ensuing schism leading to a public debate (partly covered below).

\(^{361}\) Åhrén, “Bostadsavdelningens planläggning och tillkomst”, p.25.

\(^{362}\) The jury: Ivar Tengbom, Erik Lallerstedt, Wolter Gahn, Eskil Sundahl, Sven Wallander, Gregor Paulsson, and Gunnar Asplund. (Ibid., p.30.).

\(^{363}\) Ibid., p.26.
person household with a yearly income of 3,000 Swedish kronor, and the “highest” type as a family of six (including a servant, importantly) with a yearly income of 15,000 Swedish kronor. Moreover, on top of this, if possible (within previous constraints), the committee asked for, first, structures providing separate rooms for each adult, and second, a bigger room meant only for common use, the essence of modern society – it was argued – ultimately being an interplay between individuality and collectivity (see discussion below). This interplay – as a form of self-understanding – was similarly projected on the imagined, urban landscape, Gregor Paulsson asking for houses also conforming to the urban system proposed, the Exhibition not only being an argument in favor of “modernized” housing, but also an argument in favor of the “modernized” city (the individual villa was conceived not as an isolated unity, but as an aspect of the circuits of the city). Even though I am not concerned with the question of whether these demands – or desires – were structurally, aesthetically, or economically satisfied, it may here be assumed that the buildings ultimately built, i.e. the structures eventually demonstrated, indeed worked towards realizing such a satisfaction, the Exhibition being successful in communicating its reformatory purpose (convincingly or not) – in short, by attempting to reduce the cost of building, living, and planning, the architects worked towards achieving effective, efficient, and utilitarian housing.

Evidently, if asking the organizers of the Exhibition, its purpose was not to create a utopian system of modern, urban planning, nor to fulfil the aesthetic dreams of a future-looking avant-garde, but rather to demonstrate what could be described as a Swedish contribution to the politico-ideological objective of providing respectable housing for the masses: “Utställningens ändamål är att åskådiggöra Sveriges insats i nutidens strävanden att med tillgodogörande av konstnärliga krafter förläna åt bostäder och bohagsföremål, särskilt de för den stora allmänheten avsedda, en god kvalitet och ett tilltalande utseende samt att uppvisa resultaten av likartade strävanden på angränsande områden.”

Functionalism, more than an aesthetic theory, the “ism” here being a label that the functionalists themselves did not necessarily adhere to, oriented its principles toward politics and engineering, the afterthought of which has been described – critically – as “social engineering”. As asserted by one, contemporary journalist, the housing-situation in interwar-Sweden, even though technologically progressive, was one of the worst in Europe, decent housing therefore being a

364 Stockholmsutställningen 1930, p.164.
367 Stockholmsutställningen 1930, p.18.
topic far more important than the search for aesthetic truths. Of course, functionalism did have some aesthetic principles built into it, the most obvious reference, besides Le Corbusier and Bauhaus, being that of Louis Sullivan (1856-1924), an American architect setting the stage – by merging values of beauty with values of reason – for a “rational” form of modern space: in decreeing that “form follows function”, Sullivan argued that beauty – discarding superfluousness, as did the positivists – would always follow an instructive demarcation of the function of the object in question. Moreover, in this aesthetic context, one should not forget to mention Adolf Loos, Walter Gropius (1883-1969), Ludwig Mies van der Rohe (1886-1969), and Frank Lloyd Wright (1867-1959), Swedish functionalism – as did all aesthetic modernisms – developing from both authority and tradition (as well as the concepts of abstract, modern space). As mentioned, the Exhibition was itself a disciple, not only of world-fairs in general, the history of which I must here ignore, but also of expositions specifically concerned with the (liberal-democratic) question of modernization, standardization, and better housing: the Stockholm-exhibition of 1919, arranged by Svenska Slöjdforeningen, covering industrial art and design, or the exhibition of 1917, also arranged by Svenska Slöjdforeningen, revolving around working-class homes, or the Werkbund Exhibition of 1914, held at Rheinpark in Cologne, or – finally – “Die Wehnung” (1927) in Stuttgart, arranged by Deutscher Werkbund, Le Corbusier leading its modernized charge. Moreover, and importantly, the city of Stockholm was not completely unaccustomed to the works of functionalism, the student union at KTH (The Royal Institute of Technology), one of the landmarks of the topography of Swedish, architectural modernity, designed by Sven Markelius and Uno Åhrén in 1928, receiving praise from the mainstream press. Since the history of art and architecture is well beyond the scope and proficiency of this paper, however, I must now ignore – or set aside – the question of aesthetic influence, my main concern – again – here being the Swedish concept of “Home”. Similarly, my perspective on the politico-ideological context of interwar-Sweden is limited, this context nevertheless demanding some basic delimitations, my hope being to describe it in terms of the social space built (i.e. at the Exhibition).

The many buildings of the Exhibition, white-washed and “rational” (devoid of ornamental anachronism), were assembled at Djurgårdsbrunnsviken (in more detail: on the southern shores of Ladugårdsgrädet, between Kavallerivägen and Djurgårdsbrunnsviken, one section resting on the opposite shoreline, i.e. on the banks of northern Djurgården, the whole

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369 e.g. “Teknologernas hem skönt funkisformat”, Dagens Nyheter, October 7, 1930.
Exhibition being cut off by a row of barracks, by then obsolete), an archipelagic stretch of land formerly owned by the King; in inviting the whole world to these royal (and military) grounds, marked by their historical tone of feudal exclusivity, the Exhibition geo-graphically signaled its reformative ideology of welfare and inclusion. “The planners and architects of the 1930 exhibition”, writes Ursula Lindqvist, “successfully crafted a prototype of Sweden’s future social welfare society”, a future that was definitely settled when the Social Democratic party won the election two years later. Gunnar Asplund, the main architect of the Exhibition, viewed his “white structures as a holistic background upon which the social life of a city could be inscribed”, the aesthetics of functionalism – yet to be discussed – thus reflecting the ideological landscape of contemporary, Swedish politics. And so, financially supported by the Swedish government, and cherished by the King-to-be (but viewed with suspicion by the King-in-place, Gustaf V of Sweden), the Exhibition functioned according to a set of idea-logics that would later dominate the political scene: the future then-there imagined was not only spatial, but also ideological, producing an epistemic environment in which the rhetoric of the future – the ideology – also had a presence. The Exhibition should nevertheless not be viewed as a full-blown or coherent ideological manifestation. First, regarding the aesthetics of functionalism, i.e. its values of beauty, opening up towards strokes of infinity, the straight, shooting line, one is tempted to describe the relation between functionalism (as an aesthetic opinion) and technology in terms of a (Futurist) fetish, i.e. as a psychological relation only unconsciously ideological: the uncurling demarcations of the functional building, directing the rays of the sun as a spoiler directs the wind, ultimately dissolving the distinction between outside and inside, allowing the former to penetrate the latter, the un tarnished surface of the privatized household, were often compared to and justified in terms of the speedy technology of the day. In a journal published by aforementioned Svenska Slöjdföreningen, Gustaf Näsström, journalist and writer, gives voice to such a view (by criticizing it), questioning whether it is feasible to locate architectural beauty in the luxurious function of speed: “Bilen, racern, oceanångaren och aeroplanet ha för (Le Corbusier) stått som de klaraste exponenterna för tidsenlig skönhet, och under det dussintal år, hans propaganda pågått, har europeisk arkitektur tydligt orientoerat sig inte bara i riktning mot radikal ändamålsenlighet utan också i riktning mot just de skönhetsvärden, som äro specifika för samfärdsmedlen men som måhända

371 Ibid., p.261.
icke äro lika motiverade i arkitekturen och i det bofasta hemmets inredning.”

In fact, and secondly, the symbols of late capitalism, or the logic of industry and commodification (an important aspect of all expositions), permeated the whole environment. An advertisement-mast – standing 80 meters tall (see figure 1) – was constructed at the very center of the fairground, not only naturalizing the mediation of capitalist meaning (by advertising advertisement as a “natural”, architectural ingredient within the new, urban space), but also glorifying the victorious path of industrial progress; like the Eiffel-tower of Paris, the advertising-mast, designed by G. Asplund, N.E. Eriksson, and H. Quiding, was an iron-spectacle worthy of its day, crowned by a L-shaped wing – the main symbol of the Exhibition, resembling a razor opened only in half – signifying both progress and victory, progress as victory.

A gallery for the press – the journalists of modern life – was built at the bottom of the mast, the notion of “news” now being inseparable from the market and its commodities. Moreover, suspended between the gallery and the advertisement, and supported by rombic iron-steps (inviting the eyes to climb, to dwell in a blue sky conquered by both air-planes and neon-lights), was “Time” itself, a massive clock, signifying – as an element of the semantic field of “Progress” – the standardization of time, made possible by the expanding network of a new relation to “Space”: trains, relativizing time (Einstein), ultimately standardized it, the space of Sweden, compressed and localized, slowly working towards homogenization, progress, and modernity. As a spatial representation of “Progress” and “Modernity”, therefore, decipherable from all angles and social positions, the mast – an element of the semantic field of the Exhibition – made clear that these concepts were not only politicized and democratized, but also economized, advertisement being integrated into the new world of urban housing.

373 Stockholmsutställningen 1930, p.169.
Capitalism and socialism: the spatial code on offer was not only one of welfare and inclusion, but also one of capitalization and industrialization, the advertisement-mast, around which the whole fair-ground revolved, replacing the once-existing functions of a naked statue – overwriting the discourse of the city of the past (compare with Piccadilly Circus and/or Times Square), the mast not only occupied an old, social space, but also produced a new one, namely, that of the spectacle, of a new type of public square (bordered by the functional). And what was the Exhibition if not a commodification of the future, of time itself, an attempt to sell the functionalist vision of what it meant to be “modern”? The tension here implied should nevertheless not be exaggerated: the Sweden of 1930 had not yet been hit by the ripples of the Depression, and it would be wrong to assume that, at the time, social democracy was organized as a binary alternative to capitalism (and its failures). As Marklund and Stadius argue in their article on the Exhibition, one of its key-points was to advertise for the path of industrial-technological progress, “explicitly defined as industrialism, mass production, mechanization of all sectors of production, urbanism”, or, in short, a modern mode of societal organization.  

Ideologies of modernity are not working in a vacuum, there being conceptual and economical

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elements common to most forms of capitalism, socialism, and even literary modernism (the “City”, for example, or “Crisis”) – in other words, modern ideologies sharing common denominators, urbanism, industrialism, and mechanization are not phenomena exclusive to neither capitalism nor socialism (is socialism not always liberal?). And so, since the political context – and its conceptual structure – will be elaborated upon below, it is here sufficient to note that the social-democratic notion of affordable housing worked hand in hand with an organization of the economy – and the psychology of aesthetic opinion – based on the hopes allowed by an industrialized society.

Figure 2. Plan over the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930 (Source: Appendix to Stockholmsutställningen 1930 av konstindustri, konsthanter och hemslöjd, maj – september: officiell huvudkatalog).

Obviously, my main concern is here the “housing”-section of the Exhibition, spread across – and interacting with – the lush banks of the panoramic bay. In this section, with each house and apartment divided into a type (corresponding to certain needs), the visitors could enter and reflect on the virtues and vices of the new, functional buildings – some bigger than others, and some smaller. Besides apartments – exhibited in a hall, not an actual high-rise, and including a collectivized day-care meant to support its imagined residents – constructed by the very influential cooperative association for housing, H.S.B. (Hyresgästernas sparkasse- och byggnadsförening), founded in 1923 as a reaction to the speculative nature of the housing-market, the visitors were invited to ponder upon the temporarily constructed villas, cottages (for leisure and recreation), and row-houses, what at the time – in a curious turn of phrase –
was called “egna hem”, the latter term – occupying a central position in the political discourse of the day – essentially referring to houses owned by its occupants. The space of the row-house was relatively new to the Swedes, the concept of “egna hem” carrying associations of nature, privacy, and spacious romanticism therein denied (partly): “Den allvarligaste anmärkningen mot villastaden sådan den utformats här i Sverige torde dock först och sist vara, att vi fått en så allmänt utbredd och inrotad föreställning, att det egna hemmet absolut måste bestå av den friliggande stugan på en liten tomt i trädgårdsnästan […] Stockholmsutställningen har med anordnandet av bostadsavdelningens egna hem försökt att, inom den snäva ram som utställningens ekonomiska förhållanden medgav, få fram nya uppslag för denna bostadsform.”

The villas and apartments were carefully furnished with household-items designed by Swedish companies working towards – and with – standardized procedures, Electrolux perhaps being the most noteworthy contributor: textiles, rugs, refrigerators, chairs, tables, lamp-shades, paintings, chinaware, desks, and so forth, designs meant to convince its consumers that the fact of standardization did not equal a loss of individuality or personality, but that the affordability of said standardization, if consumed correctly, indeed had both style and variability, each house being equipped with designs making that space both unique and fashionable. Some of the household-items were on sale, a large part of the Exhibition – now considered as a whole – consisting of big exhibition-halls, similarly built in accordance with the principles of functionalism, these halls comprising everything from Swedish textiles (“hemslöjd”) to modern airplanes (again, one section of the Exhibition was dedicated to the circuits of urban space, buses, trains, cars, roads, etc.). As mentioned, it was important that the houses were built not in isolation, but within an urban system covering both the ground and the sky, the organizers even constructing a small hospital, functional, effective, and cheap, armed with the latest technology of medicine. Be that as it may, the most curative experience of the Exhibition could perhaps be attributed to the gardens, the organizers attempting to convince the Swedes that functionalism – as an architectural principle – did not disrespect the soothing effect of natural environments, that functionalism, on the contrary, respected the beauty of the natural world in an architectural manner hitherto unseen, one of the houses allowing a tree to sprout

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375 In an article from the journal of Svenska Slöjdföreningen, “egna hem” is translated as “Ideal Homes” (English), “Eigenheime” (German), and “Propriété” (French). The English translation – as opposed to the French and German translation – perhaps exposes the true meaning of “egna hem”, i.e. a deep connection between desire and ownership. (Olof Thunström, “Egna hem på Stockholmsutställningen 1930”, Svenska Slöjsföreningens tidsskrift: organ för konstindustri, handverk och hemslöjd, årsbok (1930)).

through its cantilevered roof, and most houses dissolving unto the archipelagic granite on which they were standing. The distinction between outside and inside was made obsolete, each house – including the row-houses – ending only in their associated gardens, their patios and terraces – no pilasters of the Italian Renaissance, no shells of the French Rococo, no Oriental minarets – producing segues of wood upon which to banish the distinction. This play on “Swedishness”, on the self-identity of the Swede (as a person of the outdoors), was awarded accordingly: “men redan nu är det fullt tydligt att det mest geniala greppet på utställningsarkitekturen ligger i dess fina och rika samspel med den utomordentliga naturliga miljö, i vilken den är inkomponerad.”

And so, a visit to the “housing”-section meant a traversal of a plethora of shops, exhibits, advertising, restaurants, and gardens. Beginning at the main entrance, and leading up to the restaurant Paradiset (The Paradise), an undivided avenue (the unpretentious, straight line of functionalism), inscribing its linearity onto the flat landscape of the temporarily erected city, invited the visitors to a pleasant summer stroll. The Paradise performed the narrative conclusion expected of a linear, epic story, the avenue – representing this story by determining the spatial practice of its visitor, like the pages of a book – being flanked by halls and museums exhibiting the history of Swedish industry. The promenade was accordingly referred to as “Corson” (see figure 2), an abbreviation of the Italian phrase “Il Corso” (“course”; “running race”), a phrase here denoting the industrial course of progress on which the Swedish nation supposedly was running. This Italian (or Futurist) promenade, on which all visitors were walking, had its logical extension in the museum called Svea Rike (The Kingdom of Sweden), an architectonic landmark erected not far from the self-proclaimed paradise of the functionalist universe. A mishmash of anthropology, history, statistics, and racial biology, the museum displayed a teleological interpretation of the nation and its inhabitants: through a medial abundance of maps, numbers, charts, and images, the museum narrated a singular, progressive movement inevitably ending in a new, modern, and productive Sweden, a story also singularizing its history by establishing a direct relationship between the glorious past fought on the European battlefield and the industrial battles of the present. The museum is described by the organizers in the following, innocuous way: “en intressant specialutställning med syfte att på ett populärt sätt visa, hur Sverige nått fram till sin nuvarande ståndpunkt på det

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Ekonomiska, kulturella och sociala området samt vilka utvecklingsmöjligheter framtiden bära i sitt sköte.”

Embodying the history of the nation in the form of a politicized, collective singular, the museum of *Svea Rike* – by association – also embraced the epistemology of biology (starting with Carl Linnaeus, this system of knowledge has its fair share of prominent Swedes). Consequently, at the very end of the exposition, the story of the nation transformed into a story of the body, and as the visitors moved into the final section of a long, directed narrative, they were rewarded with a taxonomy of human “races”. Of course, within this taxonomy, the “Nordic-Germanic” type came to epitomize the cultural and biological evolution in which Swedishness now played a significant part, the “Nordic-Germanic” race being idealized as the biological space best fitted for conditions of modernity. “Scientifically” nurtured by Herman Lundborg, head of *The Swedish Institute for Racial Biology*, the ideal, Nordic Man was a direct translation of Functionalist aesthetics: envisioned as an athlete (on the two pictorial representations of this man, he is skiing and running), as an efficient set of white, “pure”, and well-structured lines, the ideal, Nordic Man signified the ultimate utilization of bodily functions. Juxtaposed to the clumsy, un-defined body of “Medelson” (“Mr. Middle”), the unable-to-do-anything-guy, the ideal, Nordic Man was depicted as a modernized space to which all Swedes should strive – in sum, then, the evolutionary discourse then-there displayed carried an ideology of the Modern Man that was projected on the “unhealthy” spaces (the house, the body) of the average worker.

Modernity, progress, and the bodies of embodiment: the principles of functionalist modernity applied to urban as well as bodily space, both of which had their material manifestation (temporary realization) in the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930. The narrative here outlined, imposing upon its readers the reality of a spatial modernity, and telling the story of a pastness progressing into (indeed, making possible) the modern industrial, productive, and functional forms of the present, therefore conforms to an organization of time exposed by the Foucauldian notion of heterotopia. I have repeatedly referred to the concepts of “Progress” and “Modernity” when outlining the organization of the Exhibition, these concepts, often used by the organizers themselves (the words used are “utveckling”,

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378 *Stockholmsutställningen 1930*, p.159.
379 “Svea Rike på utställningen”, *Svenska Dagbladet*, April 16, 1930, p.29.
380 A concept also applicable on *Skansen*, the world’s first open-air museum (1891), standing on Djurgården ‘til this day, preserving homes and houses to the afterworld, i.e. the space negating them. As a preserver rather than producer of space, interestingly enough, occupying the same space of Djurgården, *Skansen* functioned as a counter-space, preserving the time negated, allowing the negation to “happen”.

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development, and “moder nitet”, modernity), temporalizing the very content of the Exhibition. As a museum of the future, manipulating its origins, the Exhibition exemplifies the “heterotopia of time”, the role of which is “to create a space that is other, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled.”381 Setting the semantic field of Svea Rike aside, the meaning of the concept of “Progress” – and “Time” – thus materialized in the representational space of the Exhibition: sharp, speedy lines, furniture made of steel, the L-shaped wing-symbol, the neon-lights of the advertisement-mast, new technologies of transportation (boats, buses, cars, airplanes), the open space of the fair-ground, standardized furniture from an advancing industry, modernized textiles (preserving a tone of tradition), the lighting at night, loudspeakers provided by Philips, the mouthwatering smells of an international future. The very meaning of “Modernity” – as the Exhibition made evident, not least Svea Rike – was spatial and urban, the temperature of “Time” being measured by urban “Space” lived. Characteristically, this space was nationalized: pastness domesticated by a national framework, it fitted the present by justifying a future (which could only be conceived in terms of social space lived), thus – ultimately – stabilizing the unorderly layers of “Time” by bringing them home. As a heterotopia of time, not festivity (I recall that the visitor was directed spatially, that there was no “free-flow” of spatial practice), the Exhibition aimed at order, not unrest: temporally speaking, therefore, the elements ordered were those of “past”, “present”, and “future”, the name of the order being that of “Sweden”, the nation, Koselleck’s understanding of “collective singulars” here being perfectly applicable; socio-politically speaking, as will be made evident below (and as already argued), the elements ordered were those of “individuality” and “collectivity”, the name of the order again being that of “Sweden”, a “good” society being possible only where its citizens were “healthy”. Finally, this ordering differentiated between the elements ordered, the past being interpreted as something contested by the present, i.e. as something that had to be overcome: a heterotopia, Foucault writes, is “an effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted.”382 The Exhibition, as is time itself, was both real and unreal, present and future, the temporary character of the Exhibition – the buildings would later be demolished – contradicting its stabilization of time: on the one hand, paradoxically, this temporary character allowed the visitors to criticize the

382 Ibid., p.3.
Exhibition without fear of negating their own time and identity, and on the other, it allowed the organizers of the Exhibition to fully explore their imagined future.

And so, concluding this introduction to the Exhibition, functionalism, the new, naked language of facts, “form following function”, reducing “style” by glorifying use, carried a rhetoric easily associated with its larger context, i.e. the institutionalization of racial ideology in Northern European interwar-politics. Purely rationalistic with an emphasis on transparency; extreme simplicity in a hygienic (urban, social, physical, and mental) environment; utilization of new technological possibilities to free the ill of their illness: these functionalist guidelines – if framed accordingly – bear a resemblance to a rhetoric that will forever scar the European landscape, a rhetoric that also made way for the eugenic politics (forced sterilization) to be institutionalized in Sweden five years after the Exhibition. Whatever its meaning, architecture is never neutral, space always being social, and in extension: conceptual.

4.1.1. The semantic field of the concept of “Home”.

Cornices, friezes, architraves, columns, capitals, fillets, and whatever ornaments the anachronistic mind could think of; shadows, darkness, inequality, overcrowding, filth, traffic, and a loss of orientation: these were the spatial features of the past, the functionalist planners instead envisioning a future – that of “Modernity” – built with nature, entertainment, openness, authenticity, movement, air, equality, the sun, and a rational organization of traffic in mind. Now zooming in, how did the same planners speak of “Home”, the private area of modern space? In the following, finally, I thus begin my analysis of the concept of “Home”, my focus here being the masters of the representations of space, i.e. the carriers of discourse, the “other” being consulted only “after the fact”. As already concluded, for the organizers, the Exhibition revolved around the “question of housing” (the social space of the Exhibition instead revolving around the advertisement-mast, exposing tensions not evident in the text, the meaning of “Progress” as it was then imagined). From this fact alone, considering the political, social, and economical investments, it may be concluded that the “housing-question” (“bostadsfrågan”, “bostadsproblemet”) was one of the most important, socio-political questions of the day, Ellen Key (1849-1926), the essayist and philosopher, writing on the topic as early as 1897. Key associated the consumption of “beauty” (at home, and as opposed to the depersonalized items

383 The association here made is one of mentalité and aesthetics, not necessarily ideology; Sven Markelius was the president of the Anti-Fascist Cultural Front-Group, thus making the association less transparent.

of the industry) with a “good life”, the correlation thus identified, that between a personality and its environments, later being reinterpreted on more functional – and less demanding – grounds: four years after the Exhibition, the over-achieving Myrdal-couple, Alva and Gunnar Myrdal, published a book in which they deliberated on the housing-question (among other questions), the problem of housing here being described in terms of a crisis. Instead of “beauty”, and the same is true for the Exhibition, the Myrdal-couple asked for “good” or “decent” housing, such environments producing “normal” and “healthy” citizens (rather than a “good life”, which is a term entertaining difficult, moral implications), the correlation between a personality and its environments nevertheless being the same as for Key. Gregor Paulsson attempted something similar: “Känslan för hem och samhälle icke blott som andliga värden utan också som yttre gestaltningar är en av de viktigaste uppbryggande krafterna hos människorna [...] På miljöns beskaffenhet – från taket över huvudet till det av högststående hem och välordnade instituioner bestående samhället kan ett lands och en tids kultur bedömas.” In fact, as the raison d’être of the housing-question, I am tempted to promote this correlation (or philosophy of socialization) to the position of one of the fundamental principles of social-democratic politics, a collection of “good” citizens producing a “good” society, such a society being capable – in turn – of caring for its citizens (restarting the cycle). Ignoring that promotion, the obvious must first be clarified: I am here referring to the “housing”-question and not the question of “Home”. Before anything else, therefore, the distinction between these, two words needs to be sorted out.

The word “bostad” (housing, dwelling, residence), different from both “hus” (house) and “hem” (home), itself a compound (“bo” and “stad”, literally “urban living”, even though the etymology is here false), is used in a curious array of politically oriented compounds: “bostadsproblemet” (“the housing-question”), “bostadspolitik” (“housing-politics”), “bostadsområde” (“neighborhood”), “bostadsmarknad” (“housing-market”), and “bostadshus”. The last compound, that of “bostadshus”, the more benevolent translation being “residence”, and a more literal translation being “housing-house” (or “residential house”), carries a

385 Alva Myrdal and Gunnar Myrdal, Kris i befolkningsfrågan (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1934).
386 The organizers of the Exhibition did ask for “beauty”, Gregor Paulsson writing a polemic article in 1919 called “Vackrare Vardagsvara” (“Better Things for Everyday Life”), it nevertheless being of more importance to the organizers that housing was affordable, hygienic, and meeting the standards of the day. Moreover, as will be discussed, and as opposed to Key’s Kantian understanding of beauty, functionalism interpreted beauty in terms of authenticity (relative to modern life).
distinction preceding that of “bostad” and “hem”, namely, the distinction between “bostad” (Heim) and “hus” (Haus): as argued, in Swedish as well as in English, the word “hus” (house) has been separated from the word “hem” (home), the former word now referring to any building, regardless of its function, public or private. The compound “bostadshus” is thus a specification of the function of the house in question, designating it as a “bostad”, i.e. a residence or dwelling; not a tautology, the (rather awkward) translation “housing-house” encapsulates the difference between house and housing. As a house for housing, a “bostad” must partly be lived in, Le Corbusier’s “machines for living”, in the context studied, always being referred to as “bostadsmaskiner”, i.e. “housing-machines”, “bostäder” carrying the burden of being lived (and, given the element of “stad”, signifying the urban setting of that living). Moreover, just like the concept of “Home”, the word “bostad” is singularizing, the differences between apartments, villas, and row-houses being obliterated by their common denominators: walls and roofs, enclosing living, the word “bostad” being a continuation of the proto-germanic Heim. In the separation of the word “house” from “home”, discussed in my history of the concept of “Home”, “housing” emerges as the diachronic mediator, a semantic heir (to Heim), allowing the word “home” to separate itself from itself (as well as “house”), to take up meaning not found in the word “bostad” (nor in the pro-germanic Heim): be that as it may, as a mediator, the word “bostad” fulfills its semantic function, the quality (or nature) of “enclosed living” being nowhere implied. If a house has walls and roofs, and if it is partly lived in, regardless of the nature of that living, that house is a “bostad”. Housing has no representational space, but is instead defined by its quantifiable, abstract dimensions, expressed in terms of problems and solutions, ultimately making the word perfect for political, economic, and social (or scientific) agendas, e.g. “bostadsproblemet” and “bostadsmarknaden”. The singularizing capacity of the word – translatable into numbers and rationality – is simply a function of its abstract meaning, a meaning, furthermore, perhaps attributable to the semantics of modern, abstract space: if “Home” is indicative of some of the elaborate, convoluted, and aural-visual worlds of pre-modernity, then “housing” is perfectly modern and ocularcentric, its primary expression being that of the architectural drawing, the plan, i.e. homes translated into numbers and figures (and thus made reproducible). Lacking a semantic field, the word “bostad” is definable, itself being an element – an “associated term” – of a capacious entity escaping definition, namely, the concept of “Home” (in the same manner as “uprising” is associated with “Revolution”). A quote from the journal Morgonbris, i.e. the main, Swedish organ for the social-democratic women’s-movement, may here exemplify the use of the word “bostad”: “Bostadsproblemet är ett av vår tids viktigaste problem, som ständigt pockar på sin rationella
lösning. Det gäller att finna utvägar ur de hopade svårigheterna. En av dessa utvägar går, enligt sakkunnigas mening, just genom standardisering.»

In short, it would be outrageous to speak of a standardization of “Homes”, standardization being reserved for the vocabulary of “housing”.

Whereas all “hem” (homes) are also “bostäder” (housing), not all “bostäder” is a “hem”. “Home”, as a concept, with an intricate semantic field, is a capacious entity, its contexts of meaning extending far beyond that of “bostad” – in fact, there is no metaphorical usage of the word “bostad”, nor any idiomatical usage, such contexts being reserved for the concept with which the word is associated. The difference between the two words is encapsulated in the following two quotes, both extracted from the journal Morgonbris. The first quote is from an article discussing the “housing-question”, thus also – again – asserting its socio-political significance: “Hemmet är ju samhällets grundval heter det. Men hemmen är till stor del beroende av bostaden. Just därför måste denna vara av en socialt godkännbar typ.”

The second quote is from an interview with Sven Wallander, one of the architects of the Exhibition, also a member of the board of H.S.B., Wallander here being critical towards the collectivization of housing as it was then experimented with in Soviet-Russia: “Hemmet, det som hittills givit värden, vilka betytt en hel del för oss människor, har ersatts av bostaden och kollektivhushållet.”

Or consider the following remark, found in the then-liberal newspaper Aftonbladet, made by Hans Wåhlin in regards to the organization of the Exhibition: “Man har gjort klart för sig, att huvudkravet på bostaden är att den skall duga till hem. Man har till och med i otvetydiga ord uttalat den sunda sentensen, att hemmet i detta avseende har en uppgift att fylla, som icke endast är en funktion utan en mission.”

The “bostad”, as a space, is like an empty shell, the edges of an unfilled paper, “Homes” instead already offering life, i.e. a field of care. As will be elaborated upon below, whereas “bostad” is a word of the public order (referring to: a problem, a market, a neighborhood), singularizing housing by making it a public affair, “hem” is instead a word of the private order (referring to: the personal, the intimate, the comfortable; being “at Home” is an emotional affair), singularizing the plethora of homes by way of preserving its semantic field, allowing that field to be both democratized and politicized. In other words, the “housing-question” – itself democratized and politicized – would not be as

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important if it was not for the inevitable marriage between “bostad” and “hem”, i.e. the desire to achieve the latter: ultimately, as the previous quotes make evident, people wanted “Homes”, not housing.

The relation between individuality (“hem”) and collectivity (“bostäder”) implied, a relation built into the very grounds of the Exhibition, turned out to be the very essence of modern space. That is: according to the authors of acceptera (accept), a provocative book sometimes referred to as the “manifesto” of Swedish functionalism, its lack of antagonistic utopianism nevertheless not fitting neatly into the manifestoing needs of a contemporary, European avant-garde. Published roughly one year after the Exhibition, summarizing its intentions (for those who misunderstood them), and co-authored by six of the key-players of the Exhibition (with no indications of who wrote what, mirroring the argument of the book), i.e. Gunnar Asplund, Wolter Gahn, Sven Markelius, Gregor Paulsson, Eskil Sundahl, and Uno Åhrén, acceptera would receive – for the most part – encouraging reviews by the mainstream press; composed in a modern, urban language, with bold-faced, punch-line-worthy headings, and supported by a curious use of wide-ranging illustrations and photographs, it is easy to see how acceptera came to be known as a “manifesto” for Swedish functionalism, its criticism of historical eclecticism also resonating with avant-gardist denials of values past. Nonetheless, the content of acceptera is rather sober, its main argument being that people – of all camps – needed to accept the emerging conditions of modernity, namely, those of globalization, urbanization, and technological commodification: a new “type of human” (“människotyp”) was being created, the authors asking for an acceptance of its needs, and consequently, for an acceptance of time itself. The relation between individuality and collectivity is appealed to at the very first page: “Det personliga eller det allmängiltiga? Kvalitet eller kvantitet? – en olöslig frågeställning, ty vi kan icke komma ifrån kollektivitetens faktum lika litet som vi kan komma ifrån individens fordran på självständigt liv. Problemet heter i våra dagar: kvantitet och kvalitet, massa och individ. Det är nödvändigt att söka lösa det även i byggnadskonsten och konstindustrin.”

393 Gunnar Asplund et al., acceptera (Stockholm: Tiden, facsimile, 1980 [1931]), p.3. (Transl.: “The personal or the universal? Quality or quantity? – insoluble questions, for the collective is a fact we cannot disregard any more than we can disregard the needs of individuals for lives of their own. The problem in our times can be stated as: Quantity and quality, the mass and the individual. It is necessary to solve this problem in building-art and industrial art.” (Gunnar Asplund et al., acceptera, transl. David Jones, in Modern Swedish Design: Three Founding Texts, ed. Lucy Creagh, Helena Käberg, and Barbara Miller Lane (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2008), p.143.).
Drawing from a long list of thinkers and writers, including Ellen Key, Oswald Spengler, and Francis Delaisi, the authors begin their discussion by relativizing all values, the simultaneity of the nonsimultaneous – characteristic of modern, historical thinking – being identified in terms of a distinction between “A-” and “B-Europe”, the latter co-existing with the former, but 150 years behind, parts of rural Europe (and Sweden) still being untouched by processes of industrialization. Moreover, the authors argue, within the urban, industrial reality of an advancing “A-Europe”, modern life can be divided into six areas, each area existing in its own, nonsimultaneous time: work, the home, the effort of raising children, recreation, religion, and societal concerns. Religious life being practiced as if it was still the sixteenth-century, and domestic life being lived in the eighteenth-century, the following, 200 pages or so turns out to be an argument – why it is important – and a proposal – how it should be done – conspiring to bring the nonsimultaneous in line with the simultaneity of modernity: “acceptera den föreliggande verkligheten – endast därigenom har vi utsikt att behärska den, att rå på den för att förändra den och skapa kultur som är ett smidigt redskap för livet.”

Contemporary, Swedish culture, it is argued, i.e. the sum of the six areas of modern life, including architecture, craftsmanship, and societal values, must be true to its time, that is to say: authentic. That being the reasoning of the book, I must now ignore its particularities and instead attack the concept of “Home”.

I would here like to recall the semantic field of the concept of “Home”, traced back to the Sattelzeit and including such notions as Family (defined by the Child, i.e. “blood-relations”), Privacy (defined in relation to the Public, the latter also being an aspect of “Home”, e.g. the salon), Intimacy (between those of the same, socio-economic class), Work (spatial antonym), Religion (or morality, a female sphere, gendered, also counter-conceptual to the Public market), Ownership (Private property), Comfort (ease, forgetfulness), Recreation (male dominance: the Public Man needing his Private rest), the Nation (spatial practice – e.g. household-work – nationalized), etc. Evidently, the six areas of modern life – work, home, children, recreation, religion, and societal concerns – correspond to the semantic field of “Home”. This is perhaps to be expected, the concepts of the Sattelzeit, their semantic fields

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394 In 1931, Gunnar Asplund, one of the authors of acceptera, published an article in which he justified the aesthetics of functionalism by referencing Spengler, Western, spatial perception striving towards the open and the infinite, i.e. the dissolution of the inside/outside-dichotomy. Of course, my own philosophical adventure does not fit neatly into Spengler’s theory of Western space. (Gunnar Asplund, “Vår arkitekttoniska rumsuppfattning”, Byggmästaren (1931): pp.203-210.).

395 Asplund, acceptera, p.198 (“accept the reality that exists – only in that way have we any prospect of mastering it.” (Modern Swedish Design, transl. Jones, p.338)).
intertwined, together forming a web of modern meaning, a framework for modernity not easily escaped from. “Home” being at the center of its argument, acceptera follows the threads of the conceptual web of modernity, ultimately confirming it, the concept of “Home”, in functionalist writings, therefore – and again – connoting the Family (nuclearized), Comfort (one chapter of the book is devoted to “hemtrevnad”, comfort-at-home), Recreation (now provided by TV and radio), Culture (“Homes” are “cultural environments”), Morality (or Religion), Ownership (think of the notion of “egna hem”), Privacy (isolation), Work (a division of labor, women working inside, men outside of home), Intimacy (as opposed to utility), the Nation (the relation between functionalism and nationalism should by now be clear). In acceptera, the semantic field of the concept of “Home” is identical to that of the bourgeoisie, just like the Myrdal-couple made use of a modern understanding of “Crisis” when delineating the housing-question (as did Joseph August Lux when describing the interior of German homes). What has changed, the authors say, albeit with words different than mine, are the elements of the semantic field of “Home”: the structures and habits of the family – its spatial practices defined by processes of modernization – are transforming, ultimately producing a “new human being” in dire need of a new home. “Genom det ökade antalet arbetare i varje familj, genom ungdomens större oberoende, genom den övriga levnadsstandards höjning förändras hemmets karaktär.”

The economy of the concept remaining intact, what is required is a transformation of the representational space of “Home”, i.e. its character and function. These requirements have not yet been accepted by the “masses” since “hemmet har sin stora moraliska uppgift vid sidan av den ekonomiska och biologiska, och genom att massan alltid har en konservativ

396 “individ har större möjligheter att hålla sitt hem intakt, dels ekonomiskt […] och dels funktionellt, det kan bli hem för vila och familjegänge.” (Asplund et al., acceptera, p.40). Transl.: “individuals have a greater change of keeping their homes intact, both economically […] and also functionally, as the home can be for rest and family life.” (Modern Swedish Design, transl. Jones, p.180).

397 See previous footnote, the quote not only invoking the family, but also rest, “vila”.


399 “hemmets huvudsakliga uppgift blir att vara en viloplats under natten och en plats, dit man kan draga sig tillbaka, när man önskar fullständig isolering.” (Asplund, acceptera, p.119). Transl.: “the main task of the home is to offer somewhere to rest during the night and a place to withdraw to when complete privacy is sought.” (Modern Swedish Design, transl. Jones, p.214).

400 “Hemmet är inte bara hem utan lika mycket en verkstad, där husmodern gör hushållsarbetet som ett hem fordrar.” (Gunnar Asplund et al., acceptera, p.41). Transl.: “The home is not only a home but just as much a workshop where the housewife does the housework that a home demands.” (Modern Swedish Design, transl. Jones, p.181).

401 “Vi behöver komma ifrån den krassa nytan, åtminstone när vi är i våra hem.” (Asplund, acceptera, p.119; from an imagined conversation with the “sceptic”). Transl.: “We need to get away from crude utility, at least in our homes.” (Modern Swedish Design, transl. Jones, p.259).

402 Asplund, acceptera, p.33 (“Through the increased number of workers in each family, through the greater independence of young people, through the rise in the standard of living in other respects, the character of our homes is being changed.” (Modern Swedish Design, transl. Jones, p.173)).
And so, on the one hand, according to the "masses", the representational space of functionalism is departing from the old concept of "Home", the consequence being a tension between the concept and its (new) representational space; on the other hand, according to the authors of acceptera, even though the semantic field – in name – remains identical (be it without intention), the transforming content of its elements (as in spatial practice) does not fit the old space of "Home", the latter not equipped to meet the conditions of modernity. The representational space of “Home” must change in so far as the spatial practices of modernity are changing; the concept of “Home” acts as a road-blocker, a thorn in the side, the authors of acceptera attempting to convince their audience that it is no longer applicable (and never was, since the home of the bourgeoisie, even though desirable, was only really lived by the bourgeoisie). The semantic field remaining the same, however, the functionalists preserved something by negating it, their departure from the concept of “Home” not being as radical as some people envisioned it: only by preserving what is negated, I recall, old social space can be overcome, the socio-spatiality implied, enacted in the tension between concept and representational space, therefore being a situation that I must later explore. Of course, the wording is here my own, informed by the theory of social space, acceptera never engaging with “Homes” on a conceptual level, and its authors never attempting a philosophically applicable definition of “Homes”. For the functionalists, characteristically enough, it was simply a matter of accepting reality as it was then given.

Before exploring the tension just noted, I must first delimit the changing spatial practices of modernity – the transforming elements of the semantic field of “Home” – as they are discussed in acceptera. In this book, albeit inexplicitly, these new practices, transformative processes of modern life, are perhaps best summarized in terms of four, interrelated dichotomies: first, the authors argue, the family is changing, many women now working outside of home (the functionalist architects cherished this fact by drawing – among other things – kitchens much smaller than had previously been the case), and children being more independent, the individual thus defining its interests independent from the family (as a collective); second, a new aesthetics is on the horizon (of expectations), signifying time itself, the “old” being in the way for the “new”, the dichotomy implied, that of “old-new”, having

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403 Asplund, acceptera, p.44 (“Since alongside their economic and biological roles homes have an important moral function, and as the vast majority of people always have a conservative attitude to all changes in moral concepts, the changes in human relationships in the home are equated with ‘the decay of home’.” (Modern Swedish Design, transl. Jones, p.184)).
both national and temporal meaning; third, and related to this, due to transformations in the relations of production and reproduction, “standardization” is turning into a necessity, wanted or not, producing discourse regarding the relation between individuality and collectivity, or that between the individual and the masses; fourth, and last, as per implication, the concepts of *privateness* and *publicness* are changing – a consolidation of the former, a dissolution of the latter. In the following, then, I argue that the authors of *acceptera* (and the Exhibition) viewed “Modernity” as a dissolution of (some of) the dichotomies here identified. The functions of “Home” thereby transforming, it was essential that housing followed, the Exhibition of 1930 being a contribution to the very debate of acceptance: “Men däremot inser inte många att som konsekvens av att hemmets funktioner ändrats också dess egen byggnad måste ändras.”

Sven Markelius, the architect, provides a perfect summary of what is here being said:

> Jämsides med den sociala förkjutning som gjort det billiga byggandet till en huvudpåga, ha vissa förändringar i individens ställning till familjen eller huset framträtt. Hemmet har som organisation småningom förändrats genom industrialiseringen […] Hemmets “självförsörjning” har efterträdd av gemensamhetsorganisationer, fabriker och anstalter, som absorberat hemmets olika arbetskrafter genom lockelser i form av ekonomiska fördelar eller ökad självständighet. Individens behov av oberoende även innanför hemmets väggar blir genom dessa förändrade förhållanden både en psykologisk och praktisk angelägenhet.

So how was the family changing, according to the writers of *acceptera*? Again, the family was defined in terms of conjugality and children, the servant, if afforded, not being considered a part of the “Family”: consequently, the family was still a “Family”, i.e. nuclearized, the functional differentiations of the bourgeoisie – children separated from their parents – being regarded as a fundamental, spatial requirement, and the raising of children being acknowledged as one of the most important aspects of modern life. Instead, what was changing was the spatial practices of the family, its habits and rhythms: *oikos* dissolved, and many women leaving home for work (the extent of this practice – at the time – should not be exaggerated, most women still working at home), home-life itself (“hemliv”) – understood as the spatial practice of the representational space of “Home” – was on the verge of transformation. Moreover, the adults

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404 Asplund, *acceptera*, p.46 (“But on the other hand not many realize that the ways homes are built must also change as a consequence of the changing functions of the home.” (*Modern Swedish Design*, transl. Jones, p.186)).


406 Asplund, *acceptera*, p.27.
working, and the new technologies of public entertainment drawing people away from home, household-work – the dusting, cleaning, and stroking of a field of care – required to be equalized, spread out among the members of the collective so as to make room for the habits of the individual: “Men även i andra avseenden lär nog hemmet i framtiden komma att kompletteras av kollektiva anläggningar av olika slag […] Helt eller delvis överflyttas där matlagning och även intagandet av måltiderna från de privata bostadsrummen till gemensamma lokaler […] hemmets huvudsakliga uppgift blir att vara en viloplats under natten och en plats, dit man kan draga sig tillbaka, när man önskar fullständig isolering.”

The functionalists imagined a future wherein people only slept at home, all other functions – eating, gathering, entertaining – being allocated elsewhere, the very concept of “Home”, since it is here no longer applicable (on the imagined future), therefore being replaced by the notion of “familjehotel”, i.e. family-hotels, a notion, furthermore, confirming the very distinction between “Homes” and “Hotels” (in other words, the semantic field inapplicable, “Homes” are replaced by the semantic field of “Hotels”, signifying movement, sleep, and limited time). Day-care centers, collectivized laundry-facilities, and communal rooms for eating: the sleeping future thus imagined, never confused – importantly – with the reality described (the intention was never to build a family-hotel, nor to make an argument in its favor), simultaneously reduced the concept of “Home” to its primary meaning and function, namely, sleep and rest, i.e. the privacy of the individual. Summarizing what have so far been said, the authors, most of them architects, identified the following two transformations of the habits of the family: women were expected to leave their confining roles at home, and the individual – “the new human being” – was expected to ask for more privacy.

So far, I have discussed expectations and not experiences. Maria Göransdotter, in her present-day article on the topic, in which she describes the relation between homes, functionalism, and the women of the 30s, an article not dissimilar from this one (its emphasis nevertheless not being the history of the concept of “Home”), argues that the authors of acceptera viewed women as carriers of modernity, their intimate knowledge of household-work – as opposed to the ignorance of men – acting as a segue into the overall rationalization of Swedish homes (just like the English, German, and American sciences of domesticity tried to

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407 Asplund, acceptera, pp.72–73 (“In other respects as well, in the future homes are likely to be supplemented by collective arrangements of various kinds […] Either entirely or in part, cooking and even eating is transferred from the private dwellings to communal rooms. […] the main task of the home is to offer somewhere to rest during the night and a place to withdraw to when complete privacy is sought.” (Modern Swedish Design, transl. Jones, p.212–214)).

408 Asplund, acceptera, p.57.
streamline efficiency by nationalizing it). Obviously, and I agree with Göransdotter’s analysis, such a view presupposes an understanding of “Home” as a representational space primarily denoting the spatial practices of women, the “new” concept of “Home” thereby preserving its “old”, gendered meaning and performance. On the level of experience, therefore, the functionalist writers did in fact identify work (i.e. household-work) to be one of the fundamental aspects of life at home, most women – at the time – still working as care-takers and as mothers; naturally, as will be discussed below, they planned their buildings accordingly, creating space for studying, sewing, and (hygienic) care-taking, the living-room, for example, being enlarged on the expense of less desirable rooms. Thereby affirming the gendered division of labor at home, the authors of acceptera simultaneously negated it, their expectations (a more equal division of labor) being different from what they experienced (paternalism): if women were viewed as carriers of modernity, that modernity, once instituted, was expected to transform the very roles of women, the representational space of “Home” being a sign (liberated or not) of its time. Of course, as a last reflection on this topic, one should not exaggerate the progressiveness offered by the functionalists: a more fluid understanding of gender was not even considered, women still being seen as motherly care-takers, and men, their home-work associated with studying and books (or book-keeping), still being seen as thinkers and providers. In sum, however, and regardless of the preceeding disclaimer, what was changing – according to the authors – was the division of labor at home, work (and entertainment) being allocated elsewhere, thus reinforcing the significance of Rest, Comfort, and Isolation, the three pillars of Swedish privacy: “I det föregående har vi framhållit huru hemmets roll numa in väsentliga avseenden är en annan än förr […] hemmet [har] sålunda till stor del förlorat sin betydelse som arbetsplats och även som en plats för samling och förövrelse.”

Housing, the authors argued, must nevertheless provide facilities for cooking and eating, the gathering of the family, even though a receding custom, still being of some importance (if not for moral reasons alone). I have already described the interplay between individuality and collectivity as one of the essences of modern life (according to the organizers of the Exhibition). Whereas individuality is here defined as the “self-hood” of a modern, Cartesian subject, a product of the Sattelzeit, collectivity instead has two interpretations: first,

410 Asplund, acceptera, p.58 (“We have maintained above that the role of the home now differs in essential respects from that of the past […] the home has largely lost its importance as a place of work and also as a place to gather and to entertain.” (Modern Swedish Design, transl. Jones, p.198)).
411 Ibid.
the collectivity of the family, belonging to the private order, and second, the collectivity of society in general, i.e. the “masses”. If acceptera addresses both interpretations of collectivity, concluding that homes must change because of a changing division of labor at home (said division being the interplay between the individual and the family), the Exhibition primarily addressed the second interpretation, producing standardized housing meant to bring the masses closer to home. Standardization was nevertheless viewed with suspicion, and for that reason, a large portion of acceptera is spent on justifying it.

The new architecture was not meant to satisfy the anachronistic desires of the wealthy few, but to provide quality-housing for the many, the “90-percent”, i.e. the people suffering under the injustices of the housing-market. The “We” and “I” of acceptera are referring not only to the fact that the book was written collectively, without any indications of who wrote what, but also referring – albeit indirectly – to the very people asking for better housing, the united chorus of the wandering masses. To afford such housing, the authors argue, standardization is necessary. But more than a necessity, standardization is authentic, i.e. true to the time lived, there being nothing wrong – aesthetically speaking – with standardization done correctly: “De skönhetsbegrepp som övergångstidens kultursträvan rört sig med hindrar oss i vår strävan att finna vår tids och våra omständigheters adekvata form, den hindrar vår spontana känsla för verkligheten.” 412 The concepts here invoked, those of “Beauty” and “Reality”, are opposed to a decorating habit – then common, even among the “masses” – obsessed with old, historical garniture, i.e. heavy draperies, tapestries, and furniture, mused in terms of an eclectic, obnoxious historicism. Sven Markelius, in an article published by one of the main newspapers of Stockholm, Dagens Nyheter, puts the dilemma in these terms: “En viss konservativ värdesättning av den gamla hantverkarkulturen har gjort att människor som inte ha råd att skaffa sig äkta saker föredra den banala efterbilden av denna förgångna kultur framför en god och enkel, modern produkt.” 413 Naturally, acceptera asked for simplicity, function, purity, serenity, and smoothness, i.e. the aesthetic parameters of modern transportation-technology (and/or urban movement). 414 The fear of standardization – the authors argue – is wrong-headed not only because it refuses to accept the aesthetic of the new, but also because it is premised on an ill-advised misunderstanding: against reason, people believed that standardization would mean a loss of personality, that standardization would eventually make all homes identical (and

412 Asplund, acceptera, p.141 (“The concept of beauty adopted by advocates of culture during the transitional period is now hindering us in our efforts to find appropriate forms for our age and our circumstances; it prevents our spontaneous sense of reality.” (Modern Swedish Design, transl. Jones, p.281)).
414 Asplund, acceptera, p.167.
therefore de-personalized). On the contrary, however, the argument of acceptera goes, due to the flexibility of the means of production, and due to the variability of the supply, instead of depersonalizing homes, standardization is a gateway into the very personality asked for (and, again, authenticity): “Möblerar vi vårt hem med de ting, vi verkligen behöver, blir urvalet ett uttryck för livet i hemmet såsom vi lever det. Så växer det personliga hemmet fram naturligt och äkta – lika fullt om också varje pjäs är en blygsam, opersonlig seriemöbel.”

The authenticity of functionalism (as an aesthetic principle), described in utilitarian, puritan, and positivist terms (the sign is reduced to the object, a chair expressing only what it is, a furniture for sitting), is not an enemy of the personal, but the (economic) condition of its possibility. Whereas “housing” will indeed be standardized, it is concluded, i.e. pre-fabricated and assembled on demand, “Homes” are made personal by the design-choices of its owner, the distinction between “hem” and “bostad” thus allowing the authors to counter one of the most ardent objections to functionalism – that of “a loss of personality”. The fear of standardization is thus misplaced but meaningful, the authors – in confirming the value of the question – recognizing the significance and need of individualism; the fear of standardization is a matter of the collective, of dissolving into the mass, of losing individuality, of misplacing humanity: “Hela min arbetsdag är jag en kugg i ett maskineri. När jag är hemma vill jag verkligen känna mig som människa!”

But standardization does not amount to a standardization of “Home” (tradition being the most ardent standardizer): instead, standardization brings to life what everyone is hoping for, the socio-economic possibility of personalizing one’s Self and Home.

Expanding on this argument, Uno Åhrén, in an article published by Svenska Slödföreningen, takes a (hopeless) stand against the individualism of Swedish inter-war society, unintentionally (perhaps) giving voice to a collectivism characteristic of its time:

Jag har också försökt visa att rädslan för personlighetens nivellering genom standardiseringen av bohaget vilar på en sammanblandning av vad som är verkligt värdefullt i en personlighet, det allmän-mänskliga, och vad som är av mindre vikt, det individuella särdraget. Det sistnämnda bör äga fullt tillräckliga möjligheter att prägla miljön genom hemmets detaljer utan att behöva angripa möblerna. Tvärtom är det en av vår tids stora etiska uppgifter att rensa upp i den överdrivna personlighetskult

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415 Asplund, acceptera, p.102 (“If we furnish our home with the things we really need, the selection will be an expression of the life in the home as we live it. In this way the personal home evolves naturally and authentically – just as much if each item is also one in a series of humble, impersonal manufactured pieces of furniture.” (Modern Swedish Design, transl. Jones, p.242)).

416 Asplund, acceptera, p.92 (“For the entire working day I am a cog in a machine. When I get home I want to feel like a real person.” (Modern Swedish Design, transl. Jones, p.231)).
Parenthetically, and leaving Stockholm, it must be noted that Swedish “housing-politics” had already experienced standardization, the so-called “egnahemsrörelsen” (“the home-owner-movement”) – non-governmental and philanthropic (importantly) – encouraging workers to accomplish better housing as early as the end of the nineteenth-century, this movement, more concerned with ownership (and loans) than the functionalist requirements of electricity and WC, introducing pre-fabricated and/or standardized housing to the needing “masses” (see, for example, the “egnahem”-neighborhood in Olovslund, image below); of course, as is most often the case, the philanthropy of “the home-owner-movement” had its ideological backdrop, the preservation of Swedishness (through social space, i.e. homes) being a question made important (psychologically and socially) by the mass-emigration to America.

Obviously, now continuing this survey, the “fear of standardization” went deeper than the desire for a personality, said fear also carrying contradictory feelings of belonging, of collectivity: what of “Swedishness”, of traditional craftsmanship, of belonging-as-a-Swede? Would this Swedish culture not be lost, melt into thin air, as did all things solid, including culture? A whole chapter is devoted to the question of “old” and “new”, the authors finding – against all odds – that functionalism is obedient to the Lutheran values of devoted pasts: “Vi håller icke på den formella traditionens eviga fortvaro, men på vår gamla tradition av rättframhet, måttfullhet och vänlighet, som vi gärna vill kalla svensk och som kan finna uttryck i vitt skilda former.” Consequently, the “Vasa-castle”, a medieval strong-hold, is described on functionalist terms, the authors taking a stand not against history proper, but against anachronistic, a-historical thinking, their most zealous enemy being that of national-romanticism (and neo-classicism), personified (perhaps) by the “inauthentic”, expensive historicism of the celebrated Stockholm city-hall (enthused by the towering success of the Copenhagen city-hall). National-romanticism, a politicized form of aesthetic thinking then rather common in Scandinavia (Jugend being more of a “continental” affair), often playing on the castle-like theme of a medieval past, invoking this past by promoting such building-

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419 Asplund, acceptera, p.175 (“We do not subscribe to the perpetual survival of traditional forms but to our old tradition of straightforwardness, moderation, and friendliness, which we would like to believe is Swedish and which can find expression in widely differing forms.” (Modern Swedish Design, transl. Jones, p.315)).
materials as wood and brick (as well as mythological accounts of the history of the nation, the medieval “founder” of Stockholm, Birger Jarl, being layed to rest—symbolically—at the city-hall of Stockholm), national-romanticism was replaced by the temporal tones of the Exhibition, oriented toward the future (progress) rather than the past (regress). For the functionalists, clearly, the nation was judged not according to its past, but according to its present and future: the “old” had to give way for the “new”, but only where the “old” had no use-value, no function, tradition being important only in so far as it was applicable on the times lived. Only the essence of the History of Sweden—the Lutheran values of the Swede, and the traditions on which progress could be built—survived in the linear forms of the functional stroke; by calling forth the fundamental values of a protestant Sweden, the authors of acceptera solved the tension between “old” and “new” by nationalizing it (on terms made clear by the narrative of the Exhibition), the Nation being a carrier of time, as was “Home”, itself a scene of the tension between “old” and “new”.

As argued, “Home” was—and is—the place of tradition, of the production of social relations of production and reproduction, including those of the division of labor at home. The representational space of “Home”—embodying the nationalized tension between “old” and “new”—thus spatialized the experiences of “old” things past, the “taking-care-of” of a field of care: furniture inherited from dead relatives, chinaware won in the lottery, pastness projected unto things made past, a rug on which the children had once been playing, textiles reminding the urban man of his rural upbringing. So, what about one’s own past, one’s memories, the tradition of one’s self, intertwined with those of Sweden? Would old, personal things not be lost in the speedy forms of a new architecture? Again, it was argued that the international style of functionalism, overwriting these memories by asking for new ones, negated the old, social space of “Home” by preserving its national undertones: in standardized textiles, true to the traditions of Swedish craftsmanship, or by providing a garden—outdoors—for each and everyone, Swedish people demanding authenticity both outside (“nature”) and inside (on the one hand, tradition, and on the other, modernized comfort). Given the importance of the housing-question, resolving the tension between “old” and “new” (by accepting the “new”) was a task that everyone had to face, the question of “Home”, already temporal, thus—if the authors were to decide—shifting its weight to future and expectation. If that was the task (and argument) offered by the functionalists, it should be noted that people did not find it easy: emotions evoked by spaces of old, emotions also battled by the indignation of the functionalists—trying to convince its audience that the “new” was as Swedish as the “old”, that progressiveness, negating the “old” by preserving its essence, was as Swedish as its royal past—these emotions are
perfectly captured by the following remark, left by Gustav Adolf Adolfsson (retired detective) in an interview made by the liberal newspaper Aftonbladet (I recall Walter Benjamin’s argument that the detective story emerged from the great battle between “Home”, “Time”, and the experience of “Modernity”): “Det är just inte funkis, det här, inte. Men mitt hem är gammalt och man vill ju inte gärna göra sig av med något av det gamla. Det bor minnen i varje sak.”

Standardization was a threat to tradition, identity, and personality, i.e. the collectivized belonging of an individualized personality, the authors of acceptera simply arguing that in the quest for decent housing, whereas some – inauthentic – things had to be left for dead, such as the salon, in the end, the most important values would be preserved, such as the Lutheran (Swedish/collective) reverence of (individual) personality and morality.

Before concluding my discussion on acceptera, I must first examine the last of the transformative processes of modern life (as discoursed therein), this process, that of a changing private/public-distinction, not being explicitly investigated by the functionalists here considered, but implied in what have so far been said. The salon of the nineteenth-century bourgeoisie, public and private, replicated by the poor, most homes in Stockholm dedicating a room to representative purposes, was finally eliminated by the functionalists, all public functions instead being relocated to restaurants, theaters, and government-buildings (et c.).

Besides reinforcing the position of “Privacy” (in the semantic field of “Home”), and besides strengthening the association between individuality and “Home”, the new, spatial requirements of functionalism, drawing a living-room where there was previously a salon, eliminated the very concept of “Public” from the semantic field in which it once played an important (be it paradoxical) role: as already concluded in my discussion on standardization, “Home”, as a space for the interplay between, on the one hand, individuality, and on the other, the “family-interpretation” of “collectivity”, became counter-conceptual to the “masses-interpretation” of “collectivity”, i.e. the public. Be that as it may, and Privacy reinforced, is it historically accurate to here speak of a “public sphere”? The public eliminated from “Home”, the insides of one’s self, is it accurate to speak of a public “mass”? The “masses” of liberal democracy, what was it? A mold to be formed by the authors of acceptera, as feared by the critics of standardization, or a rational public finally making its voices heard, as Habermas would have liked it? The question is: how did the public speak of itself? The answer is, but only in part: “Folkhemmet”, i.e. “the People´s Home”, summoned by the social-democratic prime-minister to be, Per Albin

420 Aftonbladet, October 7, 1933, p.4.
421 Asplund, acceptera, p.36.
Hansson (1885-1946), a concept collapsing the private (home) with that which is public (the people), anticipating the very function of the Exhibition, i.e. a public concern with the welfare of the private. I recall the philosophy of Myrdal and Key: a good society is built upon the well-faring of its people, and the well-faring of a people is a consequence of its environment, the latter, if it cannot be provided by the people itself (the notion of the people is here singularizing, as is the German Volk), being taken-care of by the good society that the people constitute. In acceptera, the “masses” does not constitute a “Public”, a rational space of the market-economy, but a collection of individuals needing to accept the reality of their bettering, i.e. a reality described by the authors of modernity. The talk of “public institutions” – theaters, restaurants, libraries, etc. – is not very clarifying, the definition of publicness, in acceptera, nevertheless oscillating between entertainment and social institutions: “På bägge dessa områden är förhållandet individ-samhälle radikalt förändrat mot förr. Man behöver inte heller här tala om de direkta konsekvenserna för byggnadsverksamheten i byggande av institutionsbyggnader utan den viktigaste är att det allmänna tar hand om en viss del av individens liv, som han förut fick svara för, eller som överhuvud inte existerade.”

Society, “det allmänna”, is meant to take care of the masses; the public is here not defined as the sum of private individuals (Habermas), but as the “taking-care-of” of the State (I recall that the “Public” was once defined in opposition to the State). The notion of Privacy, its psychological disorder being that of a fear of standardization, and its representational space being that of “Home”, is thus defined not against the public, eliminated from “Home”, but the State, the “taking-care-of” of the “People’s Home”. In other words, “Privacy” – as an element of the semantic field of “Home” – is opposed to the public privateness of the “People’s Home”, i.e. the Social sphere of Hanna Arendt. The public, finally, not eliminated from discourse, was simply redefined: as the state was grabbing hold of the private, “Privacy” became even more important, the “fear of standardization” thus amounting to a fear of “mass society”, i.e. the “Social”, the reverence of “Privacy” functioning as its paradoxical cause and effect.

The preceding discussion, which, to say the least, is highly hypothetical, will be expanded upon below, the concept of “Folkhemmet” not being as significant as I am here allowing it to be. It should also be noted that I have awarded a lot of discursive power to the authors of acceptera, that my conclusions are so far only referring to the authors of social space;

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422 Asplund, acceptera, p.40. (“In all of these areas the relationship of the individual to the state has changed radically compared with the past. There is no need here to discuss the direct consequences for the building industry in the erection of institutional buildings, but the most important thing is that society takes care of certain elements in the lives of individuals that were formerly their own responsibility or that did not exist at all.” (Modern Swedish Design, transl. Jones, p.180)).
regardless, as the futures of these pasts make true, the authors in question were correct in one of their predictions: Swedish society was transforming, the social-democracy later instituted – dominating Swedish politics from the 30s to the 80s – being rather successful in its reformatory agenda. In the context of this transformation, I identified four processes of modern life pertaining to conceptual change (by way of: spatial practice – representational space – concept): first, the changing habits of the family; second, a new aesthetics, signifying time itself, the “old” and “new”; third, processes of “standardization”, intensifying the tension between individuality and collectivity; and fourth, the rise of the social sphere. My reading of these “dichotomies” – as I called them – is simple: in acceptera (and the Exhibition), “Modernity” is made dependent on the dissolution of these dichotomies, both adults working outside of home (no division of labor between male, public work and female household-work), “old” values uniting with “new” space (as an “authenticity of the present”), the individual being inserted into a collective (as well as opposed to a collective, complicating matters greatly), and the public coinciding with the private. Before asking the readers of acceptera – as well as the visitors to the Exhibition – for an opinion on these dissolutions, I will first look at the representational space built, i.e. the semantic field of the “Homes” of the Exhibition.

4.1.2. The representational space of “Home”.

Unjustifiably so (I think), it could be objected: more than anything else, I have been referring to texts, i.e. the writings on social space; but how did that writing translate into perceiving and living, the spatial practices of representational space? As proposed, one of the virtues of my methodology consisted in bringing new sources into play, representations of space – archeological or figurative – not found in the conceptual history of Koselleck. Naturally, therefore, and perhaps long overdue, it is now time to present those sources (of social space), my preceding discussion, albeit inexplicitly, in large part resting on them, and the remainder of this paper being an analysis of their reception. For two, important reasons, however, my analysis of these sources will not be as extravagant as might have been expected: first, as mentioned, the social space of functionalism – as well as the general history of the representational space of “Home” – has already been referred to, the following “images” being nothing more than an illustration of what has already been argued; secondly, since this last part of my paper is not aiming for a definitive understanding of functionalist homes, nor a definitive understanding of concepts in social space, I must here leave my analysis as coherent (rather than broad) as possible, the purpose of the following – simple enough – being to illustrate my hypothetical reasoning with a case-study on social space. Moreover, the photos, plans, and
images here shown do not exhaust the rich and powerful history of “Home”; my hope is only that they are sufficient – as representations – in supporting and illustrating my arguments, that they are representative not only of their times, but also of their (social) spaces. Before “illustrating” my discussion on the Exhibition, however, i.e. in the pictorial manner indicated, it is probably even more illustrative to first provide some imagery from the “Homes” therein abandoned:

![Figure 3. James Holland, The Langford Family in their Drawing Room, 1841, oil on canvas, 59.5 x 82.5 cm. (Source: Berger Collection (Denver, Colorado), distributed under a CC-BY 2.0 license, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Langford_Family_in_their_Drawing_Room)_by_James_Holland_.RWS.jpg, accessed April 17, 2017).](image-url)


The floor-plan in figure 5, depicting a villa in Stockholm, late nineteenth-century, is self-evident enough: the drawing-room (“salong”) performing the role of a spatial protagonist (simply put, it is the largest room), the kitchen – the ardors of work, opposed to Male Rest – is separated from the assemblage of privatized rooms (upper floor), the differentiation planned
(and built) not only being functional, as perhaps the functionalists would have liked it, but also
gendered, generational, and class-based, the chambers of the servant (and those of the Child,
the great focalizer) being kept from the rest, as are the bathrooms, smelly places of intimate
corporeality, located next to the servants. Yet, despite the separation of private from public,
acted in the verticality of the two floors, the private is built upon the public (literally and
figuratively), i.e. the drawing-room, this room also – now explicitly – being the protagonist in
figure 3, a painting of the Langford family (English middle-class) painted by James Holland
(1799-1870) in 1841. This painting – and the same is true for the photograph in figure 4, meant
to illustrate the Swedish “reality” of the narrative of the English painting – is representative of
the semantic field of bourgeoisie-homes, a field – subsequently – against which the authors of
acceptera defined their social and aesthetic interests: on the left, a woman and her household,
her fine hands resting gently on the needlework, momentarily put to rest, tossed on the bluish
divan, a tool of comfort holding the skulking shadows of a box (that of Pandora?), a box full of
idle and private instruments, those of household-work, tossed on the divan, as if the wife and
mother, dressed in puritan stories of abstention and isolation, as if the wife had been
unpleasantly interrupted by the painter, hired by the man on the right, i.e. the public Man of the
private household, caring for his precious daughter, the innocent Child, herself interrupted in a
game of Motherhood (the dolls resting in her always-already caring arms), a Child perhaps
uncomfortable in the embrace of an embracing future; the man is not only caring, serious, and
protective, but also distanced from that caring, seriousness, and protection, his hands busy with
pergaments of abstraction, the surviving economy of oikos. Indeed, textual truths, mirroring
those of the motherly textile, resting as they are on a comfortable divan, occupies the right
corner of the painting, supporting the man – he is cut off by his own daughter – by way of
extension, as if these truths, technologies of information, besides extending his mind, also
extended his body, that of the public, rational figure. The instruments of the household are thus
gendered in their difference, textiles belonging to the Female sphere, and texts belonging to the
Male sphere: be that as it may, the hearth-like colors of the painting (as a painting) imply an
undisputable unity, the left side marrying the right, a marriage also consecrated by the dark-
light landscapes – referring not only to the notion of the “Family” (portraits), but also to the
painter himself, the creator and preserver of discourse – occupying the upper half of the glowing
red, echoed by the oriental rug on which the whole assemblage is resting in idle peace. Not only
nature is domesticated (the vase, the fruit, the wine), but history as well, the past (its civilization,
architecture) being framed on a red wall stopped short only by the draperies (as a border of two
worlds, like the blue divan, signifying rest and beauty, i.e. movement), heavy and colored by
the falling twilight, a dark, adventurous ocean, or a sleepy sky, the *mise-en-scène* of a well-adjusted domesticity; past thus domesticated, the dead are mixing with the living, but only to be separated from each other, the name of that separation being “Time” – as opposed to the cemetery at night, paintings on the wall do not allow the dead to speak; these paintings are instead reminders, the discourse being that of the remembering mind, not the mind remembered. In sum, then, these people are public, i.e. painted, the family being ready to receive (i.e. be painted) even in their most private moments: sewing, playing, and crafting with the marker. Importantly, however, since publicness is here an element of the private, there are no paradoxes, only unity: and so, if my reading of the painting is correct, then it gives voice not only to the semantic field of the concept of “Home”, but also to the semantic field of the representational space of “Home”, the unity implied, that of the drawing room, eventually being contested – for reasons elaborated upon above – by the functionalists and their future.

But how did that, functionalist future *look* like? Before answering this question by way of illustrating it, i.e. through photographs and plans from the housing-section of the Exhibition, it must be noted that the drawing-room of the Langford family – even though a middle-class phenomenon – was an exception and not the norm, most people in Stockholm (in the time-period studied) not having the luxury of affording such opaque reception-rooms.

*Figure 6. “Träkåk vid Linnégatan”, 1903 (Source: Guinchard: bostadsförhållanden i Stockholm 1903, distributed under a CC-BY 2.0 license, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tr%C3%A4k%C3%A4k%28%29_vid_Linnegatan_1903.jpg, accessed April 17, 2017).*
Figure 6. Peter Wide, “Färgare Wides kök, Brita Löfström t.h.”, 1895-1904 (Source: Fotosamlingen, Sundsvalls Museum (Sundsvall), distributed under a CC-BY 2.0 license, https://digitalmuseum.se/011014688970/fargare-wides-kok-brita-lofstrom-t-h-brita-lofstrom-var-trotjanarinna-pa?aq=time%3A%22%2Fa5205136-8c1a-4f52-904c-30521f10a37%2Fb9c176a8-7618-4623-a095-739e5545ce31%22+text%3A%22k%C3%B6k%22&i=1, accessed April 18, 2017).


Figure 6 shows a family in front of their waning home, a ramshackle of a building standing proud (or not so proud) in the middle of Stockholm (Linnégatan), an image not that bewildering in the shy, urban beginnings of the last, Swedish century. The chimney – vertically accentuated,
breaking the horizontal modesty of the crooked wood, indicating the domestic nature of the
structure, just like the mast once signaled the presence of a ship, bellying sails revolting against
the horizon – the chimney is perhaps similar to that in figure 7 (sensed but not seen), the kitchen
here portrayed (and “belonging” to a dyer by the name of Wide) representing the interior of a
rising smog; spacious and unhurried (a wooden, “non-functional”, and hefty chair is placed in
front of the “non-electrified” iron-stove), the kitchen, filled with polished instruments of copper
and porcelain (reachable only with a ladder, as are some of the paintings in figure 3 and 4), and
its residents (women) dressed in heavy shirtwaists and dusky blouses, the kitchen is a good
example of the social space of “old”, a space threatened by the “new” technologies of
domesticity, electrified living – as the future knows – eventually turning the semantic field of
its predecessor obsolete. Unreadable meanings of the past, historical curiosities appreciated
only in terms of their sentimentalized “coziness”. Figure 8, a photograph from the “egnahem”-
neighborhood in Olovslund (1928), referred to above, is meant as an illustration of the solutions
(to the housing-problem, sadly encapsulated in figure 6) offered by the “home-owner-
movement” in Sweden, these solutions including both standardization and a preservation of
what was then considered Swedish (wood, nature, and a color-code of red and white).
Evidently, the housing-situation was not only bad, but also addressed (philanthropically rather
than socially, the Social being a phenomenon awaiting the passion of the function), the
functionalists presenting their buildings on grounds already prepared. In some cases, as
evidenced by figure 6, the housing-question was a matter of life and death, the following
buildings – demonstrated at the Exhibition – functioning as studies in support of the necessities
of the former:
Figure 9. “Köket 45.3” (Source: Specialkatalog över bostadsavdelningen, p.165).

Figure 10. “Vardagsrummet 45.3” (Source: Specialkatalog över bostadsavdelningen, p.163).
Figure 11. Carl Hörvik, “Lägenhet 4” (Source: Specialkatalog över bostadsavdelningen, p.85).
Egna Hem 49

Arkitekt Sven Markelius, Stockholm
Behovstyp egna hem X
Hushållens storlek 3–4 personer
Byggnadskostnad 21.250 kr., tomtkostnad 4.200 kr. (se artikel sid. 51)

Figure 12. Sven Markelius, “Egna Hem 49” (Source: Specialkatalog över bostadsavdelningen, p.185).
What has changed, i.e. spatially? And what has not changed? Comparing the kitchens in figure 7 and figure 9, it is obvious that one of the major changes is technological in nature, that the new machines of everyday-living (e.g. the stove) allowed the functionalists to plan for smaller and more efficient kitchens, in turn allowing its residents to pursue more modern lives (and forcing the children to play elsewhere, away from their mothers, and away from the unhygienic air of cooking). In figure 12, a villa by Sven Markelius, meant for a “higher” “behovstyp” (meaning that the income of the household was at least sufferable), the dining-room is cut off from the kitchen by way off glazed doors, a solution to the problem of hygiene (and space) rather prominent in the housing exhibited at the Exhibition; evidently, this partition is a cost-effective re-production of the functional differentiations provided in the bourgeoisie-home of figure 5, the functionalists – as argued – continuing the Dutch, French, and English tradition of producing rooms (ontologies of space) in terms of function, a function, moreover, as is the case in figures 11 and 12, reduced to its modern meaning and authenticity – if, in bourgeoisie-homes, the entrance hall signified the border between privateness and publicness, then the same hall, translated to functionalist space, is instead reduced to its functional necessity, that of taking off the clothes (and, in Sweden, due to the unforgiving weather, the shoes). And so, the kitchen and hallway made smaller, for reasons of cost and fashion (i.e. spatial practice), the drawing-room...
was also replaced by a living-room, as is the case in figure 11 (and all functionalist homes), an apartment planned by Carl Hörvik and meant for one of the “lower” “behovstyper”. In Swedish, the word for living-room is “vardagsrum”, literally “everyday-room”, or “weekday-room”, a word perfectly encapsulating what was argued in acceptera: the family is changing, the individual becoming more independent, and the family now meeting only on conditions of everydayness (gathering, eating, “taking-care-of”), the notions of “Rest”, “Comfort”, and “Entertainment” being activities decided on by the individual exploring them. That is why, in figure 12, each and everyone is given “a room of one’s own” (the apartment in figure 11 is meant for a small household with a small income, and is therefore less “ideal” than the floor-plan in figure 12). At the same time, looking at these floor-plans, if the living-room is meant for the family (rather than the individual), one must not fail to notice the importance attributed to the notion of the “Family”, just like the drawing-room in figure 5, the most spacious room of the villa, reinforces the importance of the nineteenth-century practice of receiving. Compare figure 4 and figure 10: whereas the semantic field of the salon (paintings, tapestries, old, decorative furniture, etc.) is meant to represent wealth, class, style, and representative capability (i.e. social status), the semantic field of the living room, photographed in figure 10, has no representative meaning at all (except for the designers, exposing the difference between living and conceiving space), its semantic field being reduced to what is functional, i.e. transparent, feathery veils, allowing the sun to pierce – effortlessly – the large windows, thirsty for light, and a simple, functional rug on the standardized floor, paralleled by the bright walls, not smudged by heavy smells of floor-patterns or arabesques, and the modernized furniture, comfortable rather than decorative, as are the paintings on the untapestried walls, sitting low (reachable and thus exchangeable) rather than high (as in figure 4, the unreachability signifying tradition and conservatism), without frames even, as is the house itself, opening up towards nature, the outdoors, as the floor-plan in figure 12 is a perfect example of (there is a door from the bathroom leading to the patio). In other words, since the public – or representative – aspect of the drawing-room is nowhere to be found in the functionalist living-room, guests being received as private rather than public subjects, i.e. as “friends”, by looking at these images and floor-plans, it may be concluded that the family – even more so than before – was indeed an element of the concept of “Private”, that the “three pillars of privacy”, i.e. Rest, Comfort, and Isolation, were elements of a privateness in which the collective of the family was simultaneously included (via the semantic field of the living-room: gathering, playing, “taking-care-of”). By looking at floor-plans and photographs, the textual analysis of Koselleckian, conceptual history may thereby be supplemented, the notion of the “Family”, for example, as a
**fundamental** element of the *representational space* of “Home”, thus turning out to be a *fundamental* – rather than imposed, as the textual veneration of individualism sometimes implies, or as Uno Åhrén’s collectivism is taking a stand against – element of the functionalist *concept* of “Home”. Similarly, the thin distribution of representative items, as well as the lack of decoration, the primary elements – in the representational space of functionalism – instead being comfort, rest, and recreation (compare the arm-chair with the divan), emphasizes the importance of a conclusion previously drawn: in the functionalist space of “Home”, built in accordance with the semantic field of a re-imagined concept, the notion of “Comfort”, even though important for the bourgeoisie, in being expanded upon (by the functionalists), ultimately replaced the function of representative decoration, i.e. that of being public at home, thus making homes “more” private. In sum, then, by analyzing the economy of space, an economy of the semantic field of concepts may be outlined: and so, in the functionalist economy of the semantic field of “Home”, the elements of “Comfort”, “Family”, and “Privacy” – aspects of the “Private sphere” – are found in the very epicenter, the public reception-room not even being considered as an element of spatial reality.

As planners of the Social, however, the architects had to fit this, private sphere within a larger, urban system, figure 11 and figure 13 demonstrating the relation between a private space and its public setting (the collectivity of the “masses”). The row-houses are not at all isolated, and neither is the apartment, sharing the entrance hall with a mirror-image of itself: if the functionalists attempted to dissolve the distinction between outside and inside, in effect, by promoting the importance of the Private, and by concerning itself with the Private (as an institution of the Social sphere), ultimately, the functionalists only enlarged the distinction between exteriority (other, neighbor) and interiority (self, family), the former being defined as the opposite of the latter. In practice, perhaps, the socio-spatial consequence – of this interiority/exteriority-gulf – would be an expansion of suburban hedges, protecting the private from the gazes of the Social. On a less hypothetical note, if the significance of the *privateness* of the family was strengthened, the same is true for individualism, the row-houses in figure 13, for example, symbols of the worst kind of standardized living, here being drawn as if they in fact allowed for a personalization of “Home”, the outdoor furniture – and here follows my simple observation – clearly being differentiated from each other in terms of their geometry: one arrangement being circular, and the other rectangular. Of course, the furniture showcased, that of modern, comfortable steel, were always meant as a demonstration of the possibilities of personalization, the furniture of figure 10, for instance, even though incoherent (in material),
radiating comfort, affordability, and stylish simplicity, their simple forms, edgy yet soft, only “following function”.

What is missing from the floor-plans here presented, but what was fairly common in the Exhibition *en masse*, is the room called “arbetsrum”, i.e. “study-room”, a room meant for the household-work of paper and pen; “progressive” in certain areas of life, e.g. the question of social welfare, in other areas, the architects of the Exhibition instead reproduced the division of labor at home as it was discoursed in the painting of the Langford-family: whereas women – if having no job outside of home – are working in the kitchen, men, when home, returning from the jobs they are *supposed* to have, are instead spending their time in the “study-room”, a space reserved for desks, chairs, papers, pens, and book-shelves (and the occasional textile, of course, but only when the man is not present). In fact, the distinction between study-rooms and kitchens may be understood in terms of a distinction between the notions of “production” and “reproduction”, an analogy not that unreasonable if Irigaray’s argument – discussed in my methodological section – is once again considered: if women are often seen as containers of space, filled only with the virtues of reproduction, men are often seen as producers of space, their instruments of production being that of time and narrative, i.e. writing, just like the planners of the Exhibition constructed spaces hitherto unseen, spaces that the so-called “house-wives” would find reason to criticize (see below). In other words, the spatial code of the functionalist home (re-)produced (spatial) discourse preserving the performativity of gender as it had previously been lived (in the Langford-family, and in many other families), that living nevertheless finding new expressions in the functionalist *living-room*, women, if working outside of home, here finding – hopefully – new roles, and the spatial practices of the family being released from the publicness once required of them. In short, by preparing for a “new” way of life, preserving and negating the “old”, a life in which the individual and the family co-existed and thrived (again, individualism is a socialization-process, not a desire to be isolated), the functionalists managed to produce a new social space, a space also corresponding to the changing elements of a functionalist concept of “Home”; obviously, if these spaces were built on a scale larger than that of the Exhibition, covering not only the social space of Stockholm, but also the social space of Sweden, then the functionalist concept of “Home” would not only be abstract and functionalist, but concrete and Swedish, the social-democratic principle of socialization – I conclude – being a recognition of the intimate relation between concepts and space, i.e. the socio-spatiality of concepts. For what happens when a concept like “Home”

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423 See, for example, “Egna Hem 46”, *Specialkatalog över bostadsavdelningen*, p.168.
transforms? People still live in apartments and villas from the nineteenth-century, and the very space of reception is still being lived, albeit differently. But why differently, if the space is the same, which it of course isn’t (due to interior design, fashion)? Why are people not receiving public guests, and why are people of representation not leaving personalized (signed) cards to a stoic butler? The answer to these questions, which, socio-economically speaking, is perhaps obvious (in Sweden, today, servants are neither afforded nor socially accepted), also has a conceptual element: socio-spatial, concepts preserve and/or produce social spaces also producing and/or preserving concepts, the reception-room of a Georgian villa, for instance, its residents sensitive to a transforming concept, no longer requiring public, spatial practice, but instead withdrawing to a privatized comfort, i.e. the spatial practices of a modern living-room. But such, conceptual socialization inevitably takes some Time (a time not addressed in this paper), as the functionalist architects were the first to admit: “Trevnaden förlänas åt ett hem först och främst av dem som bor där […] De värdena skapas ej av arkitekten, teknikern eller konstnären, de skapas av tiden och oss själva genom de minnen vi förmår knyta till föremålen vi omgivit oss med medan vi levat och så småningom nötts samman med.”

I now return to the question of “individuality” and “collectivity”, but now from the perspective of the visitors of the Exhibition.

4.2 Reviewing space conceived: the question of living.

How did people react to the housing-section of the Exhibition? In favor, or against the representational space of functionalism? By looking at reviews and reports, not only from the mainstream press, but also from journals giving voice to less paradigmatic assessments, such as aforementioned Morgonbris, or Husmodern (“The Housewife”), I intend to solidify my understanding of the concept of “Home” as it was used in the context of the Exhibition: if the old concept of “Home” did not fit the new representational space of functionalism, then the ensuing tension would be expressed in the reviews of the Exhibition, such tension (amounting to a socio-spatiality of the concept) allowing me to elaborate on my understanding of the semantic fields of “Home”. Be that as it may, I will here keep my account as brief as possible,

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424 Asplund, acceptera, p.104. (“Comfort is something that a home acquires first and foremost from those who live in it […] These values are not created by architects, engineers, or artists; we ourselves and time create them through the memories we attach to the objects we have surrounded ourselves with during our lives and which have gradually become part of us.” (Modern Swedish Design, transl. Jones, p.243-244)).
the context already being outlined, and the critique – as a function of a concept already sketched – mostly confirming what has previously been concluded.

As expected, the reviews of the Exhibition were mixed, conservative voices feeling provoked, and more liberal voices having sensations of fresh, progressive air. In an early preview of the Exhibition, the following sentiment, found in *Svenska Dagbladet*, an otherwise conservative newspaper, expresses hope and expectation: “På heminredningens område tyckas vi här hemma vara lite efter – det blir kanske annorlunda sedan man fått se, vad utställningen bjuder – men några nyuppsatta hem, som vi ha sett, ha dock på ett mycket tilltalande sätt tillämpat funktionalistiska principer.”  

The art-historian Gotthard Johansson, also writing for *Svenska Dagbladet*, covering the Exhibition throughout its existence and later publishing a book on the very topic of functionalism (*Funktionalismen i verkligheten*, 1931), besides having mostly good things to say about the experiments of functionalism, even supports the far-fetched claim – made by the authors of *acceptera* – that functionalism, aesthetically speaking, is not breaking with the past, but preserving it, Johansson’s examples being the wooden panels, the ornaments in plaster, and the *portail en deux battant*. In the journal of *Svenska Slöjdföreningen*, i.e. the journal of one of the main organizers of the Exhibition, some of its members nevertheless not being all too happy with the functionalist embrace of standardization and industry (as an arts- and craft-movement, *Svenska Slöjdföreningen* was initially anti-industrial), Olof Thunström makes the following remark: “Det synes vara riktigt att slopa matsalen, som oftast blir ett paradrum, och få mera utrymme till vardagsrum. Sovavdelningen har i allmänet uppdelats i ett antal smårum, varigenom tidens krav på egna sovrum för de olika familjemedlemmarna kan tillfredsställas.”

Thunström commends the comfortable interiors as well as the smart use of “nature” (raw, untreated beams), his primary complaint instead being that the space is sometimes used badly, not allowing for enough privacy: “Gemensamma garage torde icke vara någon god anordning. Varje hem bör helst ha sitt eget garage, och avsaknaden av detta i utställningsvillorna är säkerligen ett misslag.” And despite the intentions of the architects, Thunström also complains about the bad lighting, his most devastating critique being that the functionalist rooms offer no “möbleringsbarhet”, i.e. “furnishability”, such deficiency – it seems – amounting to a depersonalization of “Home”.

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427 Thunström, “Egna hem på Stockholmsutställningen 1930”: p.4
428 Ibid., p.9.
429 Ibid., p.5.
With the word “möbleringsbarhet”, therefore, albeit implicitly, the dichotomy of standardization-individuality is summoned, a dichotomy that the authors of acceptera tried to dissolve by deliberating on the (often overlooked) flexibility of standardization and industry.

Disapproval and appraisal: the most unenthusiastic reviews were given by Carl Malmsten and Carl Laurin, writing for Svenska Dagbladet, these writers later being ridiculed for criticizing the size of the functionalist bathtub.430 In a style as eloquent as the ornamental architecture he is recalling, Carl Laurin concludes: “Trevnadens mäktiga gudom har blivit utsugen med sinnrik elektrisk dammsugare [...] De töckniga gudar, som vi strax före utställningen fingo veta, att vi ej skulle böja oss för: det nationella – för oss svenskheten -, traditionen, pieteten, hemtrevnaden och vad de nu heta, dessa makter, som kunna ge våra själar det, som vi innerst hungra och törsta efter, inför dessa gudar vill jag fortfarande icke betrakta och tacksamhet börja mig.”

The notion of comfort – and other, paradigmatic notions, Lutheranism, Swedishness – is here promoted to the level of divinity, just like John Ruskin, when describing the “temple of the hearth”, proclaims the existence of “Household Gods”, the divinities of old – as several remarks have made clear – thus reincarnating within the glowing, red walls of “Home”. Nonetheless, the question of Swedishness is often appealed to, albeit on terms less demanding than those of the divine.432 “Varför inte istället ta upp gamla svenska möbelstilar och göra våra hem till svenska hem? När vi nu äro nog lyckliga att ha en nationell stil.”

The journal from which I extracted the last quote is called Husmodern, “The Housewife”, a journal addressing the (obviously sizeable) population of Swedish housewives, most of its articles on the Exhibition – and they are not that many – invoking the notion of individuality: “Låt oss bara komma ihåg, att det viktigaste i ett hem är, att det är inrett med en individuell och personlig smak.”434 Personality is thus of undisputable significance: “Låt oss anse att ett personligt hem, är det bästa av allt, men även om det hemmet visserligen delvis består av möbler, så är det inte precis bokskåpet och skrivbordet, som gör det personligt. Det är främst allt ’det andra’, det är gardintyget [...] det är färgen på möbeltyget, det är möblernas inbördes placering”.435 The journal Husmodern, edited by Ebba Theorin (1930) – one of the

434 Ibid., p.43.
returning writers, Ida Norrby, was the director for the school of household economy (“fackskolan för Huslig ekonomi”; I recall my discussion on the science of domesticity) – the bulk of the journal’s articles being stories (periodical, short-stories), recipes, and reportages covering everything from child-care and housing to fashion and design, and some of its recurring headings being “Hygiene at Home” (“Hemmets hygien”) or “Home-care” (“Hemvård”), the journal Husmodern arranged for some of its readers to visit the Exhibition as a study-group, the experiences of these “housewives” again being mixed:

Naturligtvis förefaller mycket främmande […] men det är ju inte meningen, att vi skall taga efter det vi se, precis som vi se det här. Detta är ju en utställning med olika utställningsinteriörer och inte olika hem. Även om vi skulle köpa många av möblerna, skulle ju våra hem inte komma att likna dessa interiörer, vi skulle ju sätta in de möbler, vi köpte, bland dem vi redan ha, ja det kanske låter förmätet, men vi skulle ju småla om funktionalismen i vårt eget hems småldgegel.

“Home” is thus distinguished from the standardized interiors demonstrated, the concept of “Home”, unquestionably so (explaining why the authors of acceptera spent so much energy on the topic), being a matter of the personal, i.e. the temporal narrative of a personal melting pot. Indeed, apart from the criticism raised against the functionalist treatment of the Child, there being no safety in the functionalist home (the railing of the staircase was too allowing), and the children’s bedrooms positioned too far away from those of the parents, the main fear – as discoursed in Husmodern – was that of a de-personalization of “Home”: “Vad jag är rädd för är: att alla få lika.” This fear, which, as argued, had two sides (on the one hand, a fear of losing personality, and on the other, a fear of losing Swedishness), grabbed hold on the difference between “old” and “new”, one reportage in Husmodern thus covering the virtues of traditional craftsmanship, the production of textiles belonging to the domain of private, Swedish women (as opposed to male functionalism and the new industry).

Returning to the notion of privacy, in one newspaper, the liberal Aftonbladet, this notion is opposed to intimacy, the small apartments requiring of its residents an intimacy not desirable within the Swedish paradigm of privacy: “Arrangemanget förutsätter en grad av intimitet mellan hushållets samtliga medlemmar, som icke torde vara vanlig och som knappast

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436 e.g. Husmodern 22 (1930): p.54.
439 Ibid., p.51.
440 Ibid.
As argued, this does not make the family less important, “Privacy” and “Family” sitting side by side in the economy of the concept of “Private” (and thus “Home”), the living-room being as important – if not more – as the functional, privacy-oriented parting of individualized bed-rooms. Confirming this economy, Hans Wåhlin, the journalist just referred to, not-so-happy with the level of intimacy required by the functionalist home, makes an argument – but in another article – in favor of the significance of the family: “Hemmets uppgifter äro inte fyllda därmed att duss tekniska funktioner löpa oklanderligt; det skall först och främst vara den skyddade växtplatsen för alla goda krafter i människans och familjens liv. Tystnad och fred, när det behövs – och det behövs oftare än de flesta tro -, är icke mindre än mat och dryck, sömn och renlighet, ett behov som hemmet ska kunna tillfredsställa.”

Family (collectivity) and privacy (individuality), the third, fundamental element – of the concept of “Home” – being comfort. In an anonymous letter to Svenska Dagbladet, therefore, taking a stand against new, functionalist space, old values of comfort are being asked for: “Folk vill ha det ombonat och varmt, med mattor på golvet, gardiner och draperier, såväl när de äro hemma som när de sitta på restauranger.”

The functionalist lack of psychologically satisfactory conditions (of comfort) is also discussed in an article from Dagens Nyheter: “Den [functionalism] är kanske rent mekaniskt sett alldeles riktig, den vägrar bara att ta hänsyn psykologiska faktorer, den blir omänsklig därför att den enbart räknar med förnuftets, aldrig med känslans krav.”

In this, liberal newspaper, i.e. Dagens Nyheter, in an interview with “Miss Forssell”, the functionalist kitchen is both measured and rejected. Miss Forssell not only criticizes the refrigerator, much costlier than the pantry (due to the electricity used), and unnecessary in a cold country like Sweden, but also the system of ventilation, which, apparently, was bad compared to that of old kitchens. Miss Forssell proceeds by relating the individual, spatial practices of the kitchen (old and new) to society at large: “Köket är arbetsplatsen för husmodern eller hembiträdet, slutar fröken Forssell, och från kökets lilla värld regleras i stort sett människornas hälsotillstånd och påverkas hemmets ekonomi, båda faktorer som inverka på hela samhället. Sunda, väl inredda kök är helt enkelt en nationalekonomisk fråga av allra största betydelse.”

Again, the nation of Sweden – and its corresponding sentiments – finds its way into the very discourse of “Home”, a concept that – as an aspect of the process of politicization – has been both nationalized and democratized. Tor Hedberg,
writing for Dagens Nyheter, one of the journalists critical of both acceptera and the Exhibition, in asking for isolation and privacy (values of the conservative school), similarly makes references to the welfare of Sweden: “Alla ansträngningar att skapa billigare hem bör betraktas, men månne man icke förirra sig en smula från den enkla och naturliga om icke också alldeles raka vägen. Och det är hårt om den relativa billigheten endast skall kunna vinnas på utrymmets bekostnad. I vårt stora och glest befolkade land äro vi vana vid armbågsrum, och några av våra bästa nationella egenskaper sammanhänga nog med denna rymd- och frihetskänsla.”

I have already referred to Morgonbris, the journal of the social-democratic women’s movement, oriented towards internationalism and peace, its format being that of debate, of books, politics, the women’s movement, and the experiences of being a Swedish woman. Somewhat critical of the mainstream press, Morgonbris is supportive of the changing structure of the family as discussed by the authors of acceptera: “Nu fråga vi oss: är det värdigt vår rörelse och vår tid, att inom arbetarklassens organiserade elit, det medeltidsmässiga åskåningssättet fortfarande har hävd, att endast mannen skall vara intresserad av offentliga värv, men hans hustru vara analfabet för samma frågor?” As if it was written by the authors of acceptera (the review of this book is overwhelmingly positive), in the same article, it is asked of “each and every one” that “Det som höves var och en är att i sitt eget hem tillämpa den nya anda, som den nya tidens uppgifter kräva.”

Homes are private affairs (as opposed to Social affairs), and it is the duty of all home-owners to be true to the time lived; the Social not yet in place, and the public only starting to interfere with the private (e.g. the Exhibition, dissimilar from the philanthropy of the “home-owner-movement”), the veneration of the “Private”, evident in all sources so far discussed, still had a public (“offentlighet”) against which to define its interests. But that, same public was slowly being replaced by the State (previously opposed to the public), concerned with consumption, desire, and want (so-called “welfare”), and collapsing the private and public spheres (by making the “welfare” of the individual a matter of the State-as-Public). The Exhibition, in part founded by the government, turned out to be one of the manifestations of a strong State in the making, nationalism – uniting

448 Since its format is debate, the opinions expressed, more so than in Husmodern, reflect the author and not the journal; it is nevertheless feasible to assume that the contributors had an interest in both social-democracy and the women’s movement.
451 Ibid., p.10.
all interests, and dissolving all, social boundaries – being the sentiment allowing for such developments; of course, even though a secularized nation (in part), the Lutheran culture of Sweden, merging church with State (as opposed to Catholic countries), always made the latter particularly strong, one of the main virtues of Swedish mentality being conformism and/or compliance (what Scandinavians today call “the law of Jante”). Paradoxically, however, the worship of privateness (and conservative privacy) was both the cause and effect of the rise of the Social, the State wanting to make sure that all Swedes had a private sphere, in turn – since the instruments used were those of industry and planning – producing a fear of standardization, a fear that all individuality – the essence of the modern, private sphere – would be lost to the wavy abyss of the culture of the “masses”. The same tension – that of a rising, Social sphere – is evident in Morgonbris, some articles, like the one just quoted, noting the responsibility of the individual, and other articles, like the following one, arguing that the “reformation” of “Homes” must begin with top-down decision making: “Så vet jag, att reformationen av hemlivet kommer att möta kanske det starkaste motståndet hos just dem, som skulle få största fördel därav och som absolut måste vara med för att genomföra den, nämligen hos arbetarkvinnorna själva.”

The reformation of domesticity (“hemliv”) asked for is here two-sided: first, the author is asking for rational homes, i.e. a rational way of life, and second, if the rationality of home is realized, the author is hoping that women will be released from the shackles of household-work, thus allowing them to pursue a public (“offentligheten”, see the first quote of this paragraph) on the verge of transformation (for reasons of clarity, it must be said that I am here not arguing that women had anything in particular to do with “the rise of the Social”, that “rise” just being the politics of the day). Functionalist, collective housing is necessary, the author argues, since its rational organization, freeing up time, eventually will allow the individual to sprout: again, the private is defined against that which makes it possible on a larger, demographic scale, the relation between individuality and collectivity implied, i.e. the Social, being the same as for the authors of acceptera.

In Morgonbris, moreover, there are many examples of a ferocious condemnation of the “conservatism” of house-wives (e.g. Husmodern): “Den konservativaste och mest traditionsbundna sedvänjan, svårare än övriga att mer radikalt förändra är, som vi också alla känna till, hemmets gestaltning i såväl yttre som inre avseende”. The question of Home is

indeed important: “För de flesta kvinnor äro hem och hemliv detsamma som matlagning, diskning och rengöring. Och utan dessa attribut kunna de inte tänka sig existensen av hemliv [...] En omläggnings av våra levnadsvanor i det avseendet, möter nog också [...] största motståndet från dem som skulle ha den största förden därav, nämligen arbetarekvinnorna själva.”454 As expected, then, in Morgonbris, one often encounters the social-democratic principle of socialization, also one of the main tenets of the Social: “Ett illa komponerat hem återverka ofta på de människor, som bebo det [...] Att förhållandena i hemmet, de estetiska, de hygieniska, inverka på individerna torde vara ställt utom all diskussion. Hemkulturen utgör ett värde, som mer och mer kommitt att beaktas, kanske just emedan så mycket annat konkurrerar med hemmen om människorna.”455 In short, and as evidenced by the following remark, in Morgonbris, more often than not, the conceptual relation between individuality and collectivity is the same as that in acceptera: “Då signaturen, som husmor och mor, särskilt intresserar sig för kvinno- och uppfostringsfrågor skulle jag som socialdemokrat vilja framföra vikten av att den anda, som socialismen innebär, också kommer till uttryck i den personliga livsföringen inom det egna hemmet, för att bli en fast grund för den allmänna, som de unga måste från tidiga år insupa, för att det bärande i vår åskådning må kunna förverkligas.”456 Concluding my discussion on Morgonbris, therefore, it is not very surprising that the Exhibition therein received more praise than blame.457

As argued, “Time” is at the heart of the concept of “Home”, the tension between “old” and “new” temporalizing the very question of “Home”: “Där [Stockholm] ha vi till huvudsaklig del de gamla hemmen kvar, och de se väl mestadels ut som förr, med ett eller annat enstaka inslag av ny tid. Men de hem, som bildas i dag eller räkna sitt upphov från allra senaste år, dem finner man mest i de nybyggda husraderna.”458 The preceding quote is from an interview in Svenska Dagbladet, featuring the curator at Nordiska Kompaniet, one of the more luxurious malls in Stockholm, this curator confirming what was argued in acceptera, i.e. that the spatial practices of the family was changing: “De moderna unga hemmen äro ju inte hem i samma bemärkelse som vi äldre äro vana vid att betrakta dem. Både man och hustru äro vanligtvis ute i förvärvsarbete. Ofta äta de ute eller hämta kanske hem en färdiglagad

söndagsmiddag, som varms upp i kokvrån […] Och mellan arbetet och måltiderna komma nöjena. Så att i hemmet sover man egentligen bara.”

On the contrary, and confirming the sentiments in *Morgonbris*, the second interviewee, Harald Larsson, curator at one of the furniture-stores run by *H.S.B* (targeting the working-class), complains that “idealet för många enkla arbetande människor är ofta den rikes ‘salong’ med dess elegans”. By selling cheap and functional furniture, and by refusing to sell the old, heavy garniture asked for by the many, *H.S.B.* is attempting to change the general view on what is required of a home, a task, Larsson concludes, not that easy to fulfil: “Om det nu inte vore så här i världen, att allt vad som rör hemmet och dess förhållanden hör till det mest grundmurade och svårast rubbade, som man kan träffa på. Hemmets mark är inte vidare fruktbar för revolutionerande idéer, det är en gammal erfarenhet.”

Clearly, even if most people could not afford to support the semantic field of a bourgeois-home (see figure 3, 4, and 5), that home was still the desired norm, or the normative desire, functionalist homes therefore departing from a general understanding of the concept of “Home”, not just that of the bourgeoisie. Be that as it may, unmistakably so, the functionalist departure was not as radical as the more conservative journalists (Carl Malmsten, Carl Laurin, Tor Hedberg) perhaps would have liked it, the old semantic field of the concept in many ways remaining intact. But some elements were changing: the kitchen, producing new spatial practice, corresponding to a changing conception of the family, and the drawing-room (the representative room) being substituted with a living-room, again corresponding to a transforming family (as well as individuality), and the general look of things (furniture, paintings, rugs, walls, floors) corresponding to an acceptance of the new, of time itself, i.e. modernity. For that reason, some tension arose between the representational space of functionalism and the old concept of “Home”, a tension that was sometimes explained in terms of a tension between male planners and female household-workers: “När kvinnorna med egna händer verksamt bidrogo till hemmets uteande var detta hem ett enda sammets- och korsstygnsbetonat dammgömme, med mörka gardiner för att skydda för solen. Det är de funktionalistiska männen som röjt upp för solen och räjt undan de av små flitiga kvinnohänder tillknåpade prydnadskuddarna antimakasserna.”

Although the preceding quote is meant as sarcasm, one must here ask: who’s modernity was being constructed at the Exhibition? That of the male planners, or that of social-democracy (including the women’s movement), or that of the nation of Sweden? The whole matter is perfectly summarized in a debate both organized

459 Ibid.
460 Ibid.

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Jag har alltid beundrat allt det goda och riktiga Stockholmsutställningen förde med sig, inte minst för oss husmödrar […] Men jag kan inte hjälpa att jag tycker att den nya arkitekturen tagit alltför lite hänsyn till att det alltjämt finns husmödrar. Det är riktigt att det är en annan standard på hemmen i de nya ‘funkis’-husen än ide gamla husen, men nog är det mycket som vi skulle vilja ha annorlunda i de nya. Man har det intrylecket av den typiska moderna bostadsinredningen att den är uttänt med hänsyn till vad som i hemmet skall produceras och skötas, medan däremot synnerligen liten omsorg ägnas arbetets yrkesmässiga utförande. Den inredning som I sina huvuddrag blivit normaltyp är uttänt och skapad av män med föga begrepp om det husliga arbetet. Jag tror […] att männen själva inte av en eller annan anledning deltaga i det husliga arbetet som de stanna inför missförhållandena och försöka avhjälpa dem. Jag tror […] att de flesta kvinnor nu för tiden inte vilja gå i köket – och så har köket bara blivit en detalj i de nya hemmen. Jag tror att man misstår sig, det finns många kvinnor som trivas just i köket, som vill arbeta där och som gärna skulle vilja ha ett kök som vore stort att de kunde ha barnen kring sig därute […] Jag tror att det helt enkelt är nödvändigt att göra det för att bevara hemkänslan, ty denna är först och främst beroende på att hustrun trivs, som skall gå hela dagen i hemmet.462

Sven Wallander, as one of the male planners, in recognizing the validity of Holm’s rather complex criticism, answers the only way he can, i.e. by invoking the social-democratic principle of socialization, the kitchens being smaller not because of a lack of “male” understanding, but as a way of “forcing” the women out of the kitchen, in turn allowing them to achieve a “higher” standard of living. Of course, inadvertently, in answering Holm, Wallander gives away the asymmetrical relation between “male planners” and “female livers”, the question therefore remaining: who built what, and why? Metamorphosis, in abandoning one type of existence, is always unhappy.

In sum, it may be concluded that the rhetoric of acceptera, accepted by all sides of the mainstream press (perhaps thanks to the nationalist narrative), was not as popular among the conservative forces of society, including those of the working-class.

Regardless, and the reviews of the Exhibition being mixed (overall, positive), there seem to have emerged a consensus regarding the concept of “Home”, a consensus that the authors of *acceptera* tried to preserve, albeit with their transforming elements in mind (that being the point at which the authors instead produced space): privacy, personality, family, and comfort, undisputable doctrines of the concept of “Home”, nailed on the walls of the representational space of “Home”, old and new, heavy or light, gloomy or bright; whether a living-room or a dining-room, a painting or a photograph, a warm, comfortable hearth or an arm-chair from Bauhaus, the elements of privacy, comfort, and family – elements that were transforming, modernity being the name of this transformation – were both preserved and produced in the new social space of functionalism, forcing the critics to praise the preservation while blaming the production (the small kitchen, for example, or the lack of draperies, included in the old definition of privacy). If one accepted the arguments of *acceptera*, then it would not take much effort to accept the semantic field of the representational space of “Home”, “Modernity” and “Progress” – it was argued – therein resting on the horizons of expectation; if one denied the transformations of the concept of “Home”, a denial equal to a conservative counter-discourse on space, exemplified by Thora Holm, then it was not as easy to accept the new representational space of functionalism, creating a tension between new and old social space, or new and old concepts. And at the very center of this tension, finally, coloring the temporality of old and new, room was always made for the protagonist of said modernity, the subject of the question of production and preservation, namely: Sweden.

Next, before summarizing my findings (including those of the previous chapters), and before drawing any definitive conclusions, I will look at the concept of “Home” enlarged, i.e. uses of the concept not necessarily referring to the representational space of “Home”, the notion of “People’s Home”, discussed above, here perhaps being the most imperative of them all.

4.3 The People’s Home and the Home of the People: “belonging” and “Home”

As expected, one of the doctrines of conceptual history stating that elements of language survive the deadly course of Time, in the newspapers just referred to, I found remnants of pre-modern designations of the private sphere, word-use associated with less specific (i.e. modern) definitions of the representational space of “Home”: besides “bostad”, for example, a word that I related to the proto-germanic *Heim*, i.e. “where one sleeps”, I have found examples of uses of
the word “hearth” (“eldstad”), summoned for statistical purposes (just like in medieval France) rather than the artistic meaning assigned to it by Ruskin. As Nietzsche perhaps would have put it, the concept of “Home” has been rhetorically embellished and intensified, absorbing the poetic potential of the word “hearth”, only poetic when used in the context of the concept of “Home” (as is the case with Ruskin), such embellishment being trivialized – trivialization nevertheless not defeating the poetic, idiomatic embroidery of a word – by two of the weekly journals of inter-war Sweden, namely, *Hemmets Veckotidning* (“The Weekly Journal of Home”) and *Vårt Hem* (“Our Home”). In fact, the content of these, two journals, i.e. recipes and stories (novellas and periodicals, love-, adventure-, and detective-stories; the cliff-hanger-effect of the periodical is counter-conceptual to the horizons of expectations of the field of care of “Home”, making them a perfect match, just like today’s Netflix is only additive to the comfort of home), games (e.g. crosswords) and reportages (short and effective), the content of these, two journals perfectly encapsulates the content of the concept/representational space of “Home”: comfort, recreation, household-work (cooking), and detached entertainment (suspensions of disbelief, the heterotopia of “Home” allowing for all kinds of suspensions and fantasies), the advertisement of these journals – a commodification of the private sphere – similarly conforming to the semantic field of the concept (see figure 14). And so, elaborating on the metaphorical embellishment of “Home”, one of the returning writers of *Vårt Hem*, a certain “Fru Märta”, explicates the monadic structure of the journal as well as the concept: “Man har sagt, att hemmet är världen i förminskad upplaga”.  

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463 E.g. “10,000 nya eldstäder i Stadshagen”, *Aftonbladet*, October 29, 1930; or “boendetätet (antalet boende per 100 ’eldstäder’ – ’eldstad’ är den officiella statistikens uttryck, varmed menas rum eller kök)” (*Specifikatalog över bostadsavdelningen* (Stockholm: Utställningsförlaget, 1930), p.27); or *Stockholmsutställningen 1930 av konstindustri, konshantverk och hemslöjd, maj – september: officiell huvudkatalog*, p.160.

The embellishment of the concept of “Home” trivialized, the metaphorical leeway of the concept – and its associated counter-concepts – nevertheless remains intact: take the word “homeless” (“hemlös”), for example, one of those words “saying it all”, and in doing so, retaining its conceptual function, that of incorporating all the contexts of meaning in which the word is used (unlike the word “bostadslös”, i.e. “vagrant”). Consequently, the art-historian Gotthard Johansson, writing for Svenska Dagbladet, in a remark rather fitting to the purposes of this paper, denounces the eclectic, neo-classicist architecture of old, describing it as being *homeless in modernity*, a use of the word “hemlös” simultaneously incorporating all other instances of semantic vagrancy. In practice, this means – as I interpret Koselleck’s “Theory of Concepts” – that an explanation of the use of the concept is redundant, that the meaning of the concept is both self-evident and opaque. And so, architectural homelessness is no less self-explanatory than Sven Lidman’s account of the death of Hjalmar Bergman (one of Sweden’s most eminent writers), also found in Svenska Dagbladet, the famous, dying writer, lonely on a train in Germany, somewhere and going nowhere, *homeless* in a land of strangers (that is to say: abroad), and caught by an ailment of the heart (that is to say: a minor heart-attack), the famous writer thus finding his only rescue in the compartment next to him: upon hearing the language of his long-lost childhood, a group of jovial, engineering Swedes, travelling for purposes of business, Bergman abandons his abusing loneliness, seeking refuge in the only Home he ever had, Sweden, a home as compartmentalized as all homes must inevitably be.\footnote{Gotthard Johansson, “Hantverksreligion och maskindyrkan”, Svenska Dagbladet, October 31, 1931.} \footnote{Sven Lidman, Svenska Dagbladet, January 3, 1931.}
Metaphorically speaking, however, “homelessness” allows for more than just nationalization and/or spatiality: in a Heideggerian turn of phrase, Gustav Sandgren, writing for *Dagens Nyheter*, spiritualizing the concept of “Homelessness”, and condemning the effects of the Great War, finds reasons for describing the industrialized Man (in War and in Peace) as both homeless and alienated: “Läran om människans ’högre’ kall och de därav dikterade mål som kulturen strävade mot gjorde människan alltmera hemlös på jorden.”\(^467\) Feelings of “Home”, Sandgren argues, taking a stand against the abstract space (interiority disconnected form exteriority, see my discussion on “the spatiality of being”) of urban planners, can only be felt in connection to Mother Earth (Swedes seeing themselves as people of the outdoors). As the account of Bergman’s death makes quite literal, humanity is lost in homelessness, the essence of the former being realizable only in a state of belonging, i.e. “at Home”. “Home-as-belonging” – and “Homelessness-as-alienation” – is thus oscillating between three, interconnected levels: first, that of Humanity at large, second, that of the Nation, and third, that of the individual. The word “urhem” (“original home”, the point of all origins) refers to all these levels, the Nation (as in Olof Rudbeck’s *Atlantica*) being the “urhem” of race and culture, Africa or Nature (according to the science of the day, and today) being the “urhem” of humanity at large,\(^468\) and Self – contingent on the previous, two “urhemmen” – being the “urhem” of the individual. If one is deprived of one of these three levels, one is “homeless”, explaining why the literal meaning of this word, that of “being without a dwelling”, when used to describe such conditions, i.e. homelessness, is often implying more than those conditions: when homeless, it is habitually supposed, one is at the risk of losing Self, one´s humanity, all those strings attaching “Self” to “the machinery of the Nation”. Consequently, the State needs to take measures against its deserting subjects, the heterotopias of shelters and prisons functioning not only as institutions of welfare and punishment, but also as draperies covering that which should not be seen, the homeless “non-subjects” of an urbanized modernity. Indeed, on the contrary, being-at-home is not only a matter of identity, its spatial practices also functioning as *proofs* of identity, homelessness instead signaling the presence of “stranger-ness” and anomaly, i.e. the counter-discourse of an inhuman human: “Vad glädje skänkte rikedomen honom? Här var han som en främling, en hemlös.”\(^469\) Similarly, this analysis adds an extra dimension to the “fear of standardization”: if all homes were to be standardized, they would no longer be “Homes”, but

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\(^468\) E.g. “Graven i Hoggar, det brända Kartago och en danserska i Ultica. Arkeologen, greve de Prorok, om sin senaste märkliga expedition till Afrikas inre”, *Aftonbladet*, April 13, 1930.

“bostäder” (housing), bordering the very abyss of “homelessness”, i.e. a loss of Self (in the source-material here used, this loss is manifested in the discussion on de-personalization: as a loss of personality or as a loss of individuality).

“Urhem”, “hemland” (“home-country”), “hemkänsla” (“feelings of home”), “hemplängtan” (“home-sickness”), “hemtrevnad” (“comfort-at-home”), “höra hemma” (“feeling like home”), etc.: a list of the uses of the concept could here be made long, my primary concern – in this section – nevertheless not being list-making or linguistics, but the meaning of another use of the concept, namely, the notion of “Folkhemmet”, “The People’s Home”. As argued, the concept of “Home” – and the same is true for the discussion emerging from the Exhibition – oscillates between an individual and a collective meaning. On the individual level, as Hegel would have argued, there is an association between ownership (of a space called “home”) and Self, the psychological expression of which is a feeling of belonging: of course, since the space of “Home” – as a space meant for the production and reproduction of the social relations of production and reproduction – is socializing, “Children” growing up in a social setting called “the Family”, that Self is what the social context desires it to be, i.e. gendered and political. Similarly, on the collective level, the social space of the Nation, as one type of “Home”, equally socializing, is associated with a rougher form of belonging, that of belonging in one, homogenized culture, i.e. in the context of one’s Volk. The main sentiment of the concept of “Home” – a sentiment that allows it to be both politicized and democratized, i.e. used for purposes of politics and persuasion; indeed, as a metaphor both lived and perceived, the concept strikes at the very heart of the mentality of existentialism – the main sentiment of the concept of “Home” is thus “belonging”, i.e. to “feel at home” (“höra hemma”): in one’s Self, in one’s Time, and in the singular collective of the Nation. Moreover, I have already concluded that the concept of “Home” – when used to describe the representational space of “Home”, i.e. non-metaphorically, and as opposed to the word “bostad” – signifies a private experience of privacy and comfort, i.e. the private sphere of the family and its individuals. In short, then, the sentiment of belonging functions on a collective as well as an individual level, uniting both aspects of the concept here studied.

Evidently, the notion of “The People’s Home” has a complex, conceptual framework, the relation between individuality and collectivity existing at its core: in fact, this framework – called “Home” – seems to make the metaphor of “Folkhemmet” perfectly natural, the collapse of individuality (“hemmet”) and collectivity (“Folk”) therein manifest signifying the very essence of Swedish modernity (as the authors of acceptera argued, and as I am forced to conclude myself, at least in the context of the modern, Swedish concept of “Home”). And
so, the notion of “Folkhemmet”, grabbing hold of the privateness of the “Home” and the publicness of the “People”, the name of the grabber being that of “the State”, the notion of “Folkhemmet” is different from the notion of “home-country” in that its private meaning is disrupted but not dissolved (as in “home-country”), Per Albin Hansson – the main protagonist of the notion in question – making sure that elements of the meaning of “Home” endures (see quotes below); in other words, within the rhetorical folding of private and public, elements of both concepts survive, “the People’s Home” referring to a publicness in which all privates – together constituting the “people” – have a natural position, just like the status of the household-father (the state), even though in control of the domus (the nation), is dependent on the welfare and fulfilsments of the familia (the people). But I am now getting ahead of myself: in the context studied, how did people speak of “Folkhemmet”?

The significance of the notion of “Folkhemmet” should not be exaggerated. First, despite the narrative here presented, it must be noted that Per Albin Hansson was not the first, rhetorical figure to utilize the term, Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922), a conservative politician and writer, using it as early as 1912; second, and consequently, as argued by Hans Dahlqvist in his article on both conceptual history and the notion of “Folkhemmet”, this term had different meanings in different contexts, Kjellén’s use being oriented towards the cultural meaning of the Swedish “folk” (similar to the German Volkgemeinschaft, the history of which is much less benevolent than the history here sketched), and post-war (that is, post-WWII) use being oriented towards sentimentalism and remembering, Per Albin Hansson – as a prime-minister to be – instead using the notion on conditions of hope and expectation. Be that as it may, due to delimitations made in both time and space, I am here only interested in Hansson’s use of the notion of “Folkhemmet” (and its immediate reception), first demonstrated in a famous – if not notorious – speech given in 1928 to the second chamber of the Swedish parliament, a speech often referred to as “Folkhemstalet” (“The People’s Home”-speech). In this speech, Per Albin Hansson reminds his listeners that the notion he is about to introduce (as a form of political discourse) is in fact already in use: “Vid högtidliga och för övrigt ibland även vid vardagliga tillfällen tala vi gärna om samhället – staten, kommunen – såsom det för oss alla gemensamma hemmet, folkhemmet, medborgarhemmet.”471 Moreover, in clarifying the connotations of the notion of “Folkhemmet”, a clarification not only preserving some of the individualized

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elements of the concept of “Home” (see discussion above), but also articulating expectation and hope, Hansson declares:


The “People´s Home” is here defined as a society based not on privilege or class, but equality and empathy, i.e. “classlessness”, Hansson´s social-democratic principles taking a stand against the status quo-passiveness of the sitting, conservative government. But the dream of classlessness is here not the dream of a communist utopia: even though (partly) described in economic terms, Hansson´s main concern is social, i.e. the welfare of the people, allowing for – and perhaps made possible by – ownership and private property. Albeit implicitly, this point is re-iterated in an article from Dagens Nyheter: “Egnahemsrörelsen utgör ett led i tanken att skapa det stora folkhemmet genom att öka antalet självvägande jordbrukare.” Consequently, and Hansson envisioning a big, cozy, Swedish family, leftist newspapers viewed the notion of “Folkhemmet” with suspicion, as a pompous rhetoric both illusory, propagandistic, and hegemonic, just like Engels once argued that the concept of “Family” carries its unequal etymology: “Det gemensamma fosterlandet eller ′folkhemmet′, som termen nu lyder, är kulisser med vars hjälp lögnen om klassernas gemensamma intressen givits illusion av verklighet. Att fosterlandet endast är den för tillfället härskande klassens fosterland blir emellertid i allt större utsträckning klart för dem vilka inte får någon del av förplägnaden i ′folkhemmets′ gemensamhetshushåll.” In Hansson´s conception of “Folkhemmet”, classlessness is not an end in itself, but a condition necessary for realizing what in fact is an end in itself: a society in which no member has to suffer the injustices caused by the privilege of another, in which society – since some form of suffering is inevitable – takes care of all of its

472 Ibid., pp.19-20.
474 “Politisk neutralitet”, Norrskensflamman, May 20, 1930.
members, just like the modern, care-taking family, for reasons of empathy and fairness, knows no privilege nor conceit (in theory). In short, literally and figuratively, the People’s Home is a Home for the Swedish People, the synonym “medborgarhemmet” (“citizen’s home”) not really adding anything of interest to my conceptual analysis, “folk” being expendable whereas the word “hem” is not (the Germanic word “medborgare”, different from the more political “citizen”, is still more specified than the word “folk”, and thus less potent as a metaphor). “Folkhemmet” is described in terms of a Gemeinschaft, a common household (“gemensamhetshushåll”), not only uncovering the German etymology of the concept (and the chauvinistic meaning of the word “folk”), but also underlining the association with values found in the “Family”: “Den känsla av trygghet till existensen, som förvissningen om bistånd vid arbetslöshet, sjukdom och annan olycka samt på ålderdomen skänker, gör den enskilde mer medveten om sitt medborgarskap. Den alstrar också den samhörigheten med det allmänna, den hemkänsla, som är kännetecknande för en god demokrati.”

On the one hand, the “People’s Home” is a “taking-care-of” of its members, the pater familia hiding behind the (anonymous) primum movens of the State; on the other hand, a pater familia is not even conceptually possible without a familia, the family being a social unit in which all individuals are defining each other: “Den stora uppgiften för ärlig demokratisk politik är, såsom redan sagts, att göra vårt land till det goda medborgarhemmet, med tryggad existens för dem, som där bygga och bo, med allas samverkan för gemensamt bästa.” As argued, therefore, in Hansson’s use of the notion of “Folkhemmet”, the meaning of the concept of “Home” survives, albeit in a paradoxical fashion, the element of “Private” being utilized for describing something inherently “Public”, i.e. the welfare of the “masses”. But there are reasons for confusion here: not proposing a “private publicness”, which would amount to something like a bourgeoisie “Garden of Even”, an unrealizable utopia dreamed of by Habermas and in the salon (defined as “private people come together as a public”), not proposing a “private publicness”, Hansson is instead suggesting a “public privateness”, a State taking care of its lesser, individual “medborgare”. And so, if Hansson – for some, non-ideological reason – dreamed of the “private publicness” of a private market, a place of reason standing on the benevolence of the private individual, then he must have known that the “public privateness” of “Folkhemmet” – commencing with the strong, socializing State – was much more likely to be realized (realism being one of the virtues of social-democracy), or in other words: built.

475 Ibid., p.28.
476 Ibid., p.22.
Politically speaking, Hansson’s “People’s Home” should thus be positioned between the ownerless classlessness of communism and the private publicness of the capitalist bourgeoisie. Moreover, the foundation of this public-private family being “industrial democracy” (“industriell demokrati”), and the main priority being to reconcile “the general view of things” (“allmänandan”) with the interests of the individual, what is best for the collective also being what is best for the individual (it was argued), Hansson was – essentially – foregoing the arguments made in acceptera (and the Exhibition): indeed, looking back, in acceptera, the relation between industry, individuality, and collectivity articulated probably deserves the name of “Folkhemmet”, the main philosophy of which – of course – is socialization. Literally and figuratively, therefore, if Hansson is described as one of the authors of Swedish modernity, ultimately, the sum of these authors – including the planners of the Exhibition – argued that only a collective home could guarantee the home of the individual, the collection of these individual, functionalist homes – which are “good” – in turn constituting the “good” home of the collective.

The coziness implied by Hansson’s engineering narrative was nevertheless made fun of – and denied, as the “fear of standardization” makes evident – in leftist and liberal newspapers alike. Again, an article in Dagens Nyheter points out the developing difference between communism and social-democracy: “Medan hr Per Albin Hansson talar varma och ärliga ord om det för oss alla gemensamma svenska folkhemmet ryta och dundra Martin Tranmael och Osear Torp om utomparlamentariska massaktioner mot det genomruttna borgardömet.”

In Norrskensflamman, a socialist labor-union-newspaper later turning communist, the very institutions of “Folkhemmet” are satirized and ridiculed, the rural newspaper (from the stone-breaking north) not at all being happy with Hansson’s departure from the Marxist discourse on ownership: “Den som i dessa tider satts utanför den kapitalistiska produktionsapparaten och således blivit så avundsvärt lottad, att han kommit med i 5 Gustavssons ständigt arbetslösa sällskap, får även ett och annat tillfälle att göra bekantskap med ovannämnda förstklassiga institution i Folkhemmet Sverige, av sossar och övriga borgare beprisat och lovsjunget som ‘ frihetens stamort på jorden ’.” If the notion of “Folkhemmet” is summoned, it is with suspicion: “Så har arbetarna i Norrfjärden fått ytterligare ett exempel av hur pass stort värde den af sossarna så omskrutna kommunala självstyrelsen och andra förträffliga anordningar i folkhemmet är värda. Alla borgarnas åtgärder avser att vältra krisens

börder över på arbetarnas axlar. Så även i detta fall.” 479 In *Norrskensflamman*, then, the notion of “Folkhemmet”, inclusive of the forces of finance, is viewed as a betrayal of socialism. 480 An anonymous writer in *Dagens Nyheter* agrees with this sentiment: “Det nyktra svenska folkhemmet kan endast vinnas med arbetarklassen och måste vara ett hem där den känner sig trivas. Det förhåller sig i verkligheten så […] att det socialdemokratiska tankesättet har upptagit vissa mer allmängiltiga sidor av liberalismen, utan att därför ändra sin inställning på ett långt större mått än nu av gemensam hushållning.” 481

If the left viewed the term with doubt, as a betrayal of the socialism it was meant to support, the political right, here represented by the newspaper *Svenska Dagbladet*, is instead afraid of the standardization of individuality: “Förföljelser mot dem, som tänka självständigt, och bojkott mot dem, som handla självständigt, bli god ton i detta ’folkhem’.” 482 Again, therefore, the relation between individuality (personality) and collectivity (welfare) is at the epicenter of political discourse, the notion of “Folkhemmet”, in collapsing the concepts of “Private” and “Public”, not only functioning metaphorically as a compromise between “homes” and “people”, but also functioning as a political compromise between right and left. It would nevertheless be wrong to describe interwar-Sweden as a “folkhem”, just like it would be wrong to describe the architectural context of the Exhibition as “functionalist”: in both cases, i.e. Hansson’s speech and the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930, the “homes” referred to – as space and as concept – were rhetorical tools of persuasion and vision, the hope of this rhetoric of course being that the embellishment – the straight line of functionalism, the straightforwardness of Hansson – would convince its listeners of the righteousness of the functionalist “Homes”, i.e. “Folkhemmet”. I have already related the latter term with the “rise of the Social” (Arendt): if the “fear of standardization” was identical with – or parallel to – a reluctance in accepting this “rise”, and if privacy was therefore defined as the opposite of the collectivity of the Social (my account confirming that of Arendt), then the very concept of “Home”, signifying the private sphere, would – in some political camps – be conceptually opposed to the “People’s Home” (!), the housing of which was called “bostäder” and not “hem”. Again, however, Sweden had not yet evolved into a “folhem” (if it ever did), the context here studied, that of Stockholm in 1930, demonstrating several lines of thinking (conservative, liberal, socialist) fighting for discursive air. In other words, there were many contexts of meaning in which the

479 “Arbetslösheten”, *Norrskensflamman*, February 20, 1931.
480 “De är icke ett klassparti som strävar till socialismen utan ett reformparti som strävar till ’det goda folkhemmet’.” (“Folkhemmet eller socialismen”, *Norrskensflamman*, July 19, 1928.)
482 “Preludier”, *Svenska Dagbladet*, June 4, 1928.
concept of “Home” was used, the battle of political engineering taking place on the battlefield of “individuality-collectivity”, its paradoxical landscape allowing for many surprises, an enemy sharing the battle-line with an ally (“Folkhemmet” being criticized from all directions), or a retreating force suddenly breaking through, moved by their own, courageous sense of Self (the “housewives” raising their voices against the demolishing cannons of the urban planner, cannons also preparing the tattered ground for a new future).

But the combatants shared more than just a battlefield: in the democratized, ideologicized, politicized, and temporalized battle for “Home”, whether interpreted as collective or individual phenomena, the combatants also agreed upon the conceptual sentiments of “belonging” and “identity”, sentiments opposed to the inhuman quality of “homelessness”. Even if the sentiment of “belonging” required – and requires – more than just a space called “Home”, to “belong” at all, it was agreed upon, it was first necessary to own a “Home”, i.e. to “feel at Home” in one’s representational space. Did the representational space of functionalism – and the politics of Hansson’s “folkhem” – succeed in providing such feelings of “belonging” to the collective of the “masses”? Unfortunately, that is a question for another paper, my analysis of the concept of “Home” here reaching its bitter end. Since I have reached the end of my analysis of the concept of “Home”, it is also time to conclude this thesis, a summary of its findings (dispersed on a confusing number of pages), instead of being presented here, i.e. at the end of my analysis, being deferred to a concluding chapter, a chapter to which I now turn with the hope of opening towards more elaborate analyses.
5. Conclusion: futures of living pasts.

“Home is the Most Important Place in the World” – IKEA

“EMMA: It was never intended to be the same kind of home. Was it? Pause. You didn’t ever see it as a home, in any sense, did you? JERRY: No, I saw it as a flat . . . you know. EMMA: For fucking.” – Harold Pinter

“We can risk making statements of necessity insofar as we formulate them with reservations.” – Reinhart Koselleck

If someone re-asked the author – that is to say: me – what a “home” “is”, then that author would not be able to provide an answer, the foregoing chapters dealing not with the philosophical question of definition (nor phenomenology), as Gaston Bachelard did in his *The Poetics of Space*, but instead with the *history* of those definitions, socio-political and implicit rather than philosophical and explicit. Laced by a common thread, the subject-matter of this thesis – i.e. the conceptual history of “Home” – was divided into three, interrelated spaces, each “room” with a specific function and purpose, meaningless without the services provided by the other two. I asked: is it possible – and/or of academic value – to bolster the conceptual history of Koselleck with the analytical emphasis provided by the “spatial turn”?; as a concept with spatial associations, what is the history (or “histories”) of the concept of “Home”?; and finally, how was this, plural history translated into and contested by the socio-political, conceptual context of the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930? Whereas the first question offered a strenuous if not inconclusive task, and whereas the second question confirmed the expectations of conceptual history (those of the *Sattelzeit*), the last question, that of the “housing-problem” in interwar-Stockholm, raised problems regarding the very meaning of “Modernity”, this thesis – as one of its unintended intentions – therefore bordering the scholarship on “what it means to be modern”. Indeed, if my first question generated a spatiotemporal methodology (called the “socio-spatiality of concepts”), and if my second question generated a historical argument (the history of a modern embellishment of the word “home”), then my last question, building on the previous two, the architecture of my narrative being chronological in nature, generated an understanding of (Swedish) “Modernity” as both problem-oriented and self-conscious, propelled by a series of conflicts (conceptual and socio-political) embodied in a space – or

485 All modern stories, it seems, if they contain an adventurous element, which most stories do, define their journeys as a circle (most often hermeneutic, the point of the adventure being to “grow”, spiritually, emotionally, bodily), the beginning and end of which – of course – is “Home”, both metaphorically and literally.
several spaces – called “Home”. Concluding this thesis, therefore, in the following, besides connecting all the loose ends so far offered (separated from each other by the floor-plan of the text), I will summarize my findings, my hope here being to produce questions both answerable and deniable, the production of knowledge working the same way as that of social space: if something is overcome, including knowledge, then that something is both negated and preserved.

Rightly so, I believe, my hope being to have produced at least the “required” amount of knowledge and insight, most of this thesis was spent on the second and fourth chapter, the third chapter – historiographical more than anything else – serving the purpose of a “background”. Be that as it may, the historiographical content of this, third chapter allowed me to produce a historical hypothesis, a hypothesis, furthermore, confirming rather than negating the overall project of Koselleck: summarizing the chronological break therein proposed, in my third chapter, I argued that the semantic separation of Heim from Haus, not evident in early, vernacular forms, nor in Latin languages, came about in the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century cultures of comfort and privacy, escalating into the peculiar notion of “Domesticity” as it was expressed among the nineteenth-century, Victorian bourgeoisie, a notion dependent on but not synonymous with the less well-defined – more amorphous, ubiquitous – concept of “Home”. Since concepts are both equalizing (Nietzsche) and singularizing (Koselleck), eventually, the concept of “Home” subsumed all its contexts of meaning, referring to both a hut and a castle, a villa and an apartment, a bird-nest and a relationship to God (the “intimacy” of Protestantism, for example, or the “oneness” of pantheism). The amorphousness of the concept – following the Sattelzeit, in which “Home” became a platform for western, modern self-understanding – was a function of the elements of its semantic field, these elements – Privacy, Intimacy, the Public, Comfort, Labor, Sexuality, Family, Childhood, Conjugality, Technology, Houses, Apartments, Domesticity – characterizing the modern history of a westernized or Europeanized self-consciousness. Deprived of its economic function, and nurtured by its semantic field, the household of the bourgeoisie – now called “Home” – became a space of leisure and comfort, a private realm dedicated to the modern family, divided (spatially) along functional (and material-semiotic) lines. Whereas the “Public Man” was now Working “outside of Home”, i.e. in the privatized sphere of an economized Public, women and servants were still working at “Home”, although – conceptually speaking – household-work was not really spoken of as “Work”, “working-within-the-household” instead being reinterpreted – language here concealing the division of labor of gender – as “Private” “Domesticity”. Indeed, as I narrated this story, the private/public-
distinction turned out to be of outermost (conceptual) importance, the “distinction” – once ossifying into a hardboiled “separation” – extending “right through the home”.\textsuperscript{486} Politically \textit{and} socially, therefore, the private/public-separation of the modern bourgeoisie, dwelling on three levels of bourgeoisie-society (the political-, economic-, and private level), metamorphosed into Koselleckian, socio-political \textit{counter-concepts}, their counter-conceptual structure – as is true for most concepts – descending from the pre-modern, \textit{conceptual pair} of “Hellenes-Barbarian”, reinterpreted in the Enlightenment – or the \textit{Satellzeit} – as “Human-Nonhuman”: to be a public man of Athenian democracy (a Hellene) one also had to be a master of the private order, i.e. the \textit{oikos}, the public man of bourgeoisie-society – albeit \textit{defined} differently – similarly requiring an access to the private sphere (“Home” and/or the private market). Within this conceptual scheme, finally, I positioned the counter-concepts of “Homeowner-Homeless”, relating them to the conceptual pairs of “Human-Nonhuman” (or “Hellenes-Barbarian”): if no home, then no private sphere, and if no private sphere, then no access to the public sphere; recalling Hegel’s argument that property is necessary for a sense of Self (i.e. for being Human), and in all, academic honesty, do we not find something “barbaric” in the life lived on the urban street, in the \textit{state of being} – most often involuntary – called “homeless” and/or “nomadic”?\textsuperscript{486}

Moreover, the representational space of “Home” preserving the semantic field of its concept, e.g. through the private/public-distinction of the \textit{salon}, and the counter-conceptual structure of “Homeowner-Homeless” carrying a \textit{political-rhetorical potential}, ultimately, the concept of “Home” was \textit{temporalized} (the “past” residing in things, i.e. as a “field of care”, and the “future” residing in the “Child”, i.e. as a “body of care”), \textit{democratized} (the concept grew in social scope, the working-class desiring a concept that they had no spatial access to), \textit{politicized} (the concept became an effective slogan, e.g. the notion of “Folkhemmet”), and \textit{ideologized} (politically, socially, and philosophically, as a case for “Modernity”, as a science of domesticity, as a philosophical, “transcendental homelessness”). Reinforcing these, four processes of “Modernity”, “homelessness” became a great, personal threat, a deadening fear; and on the collective level, the “Nomad” – signifying a life without borders, the borders of discourse and homogenization – threatened the \textit{original home of modernity}, namely, the rising power of the Nation. Clearly, then, returning to the sub-national level, the social relations of production and re-production – i.e. the “Family” – were both preserved and produced in the representational space of “Home”, a space also preserved and produced by the socio-political

\textsuperscript{486} Habermas, \textit{The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere}, p.45.
distribution of the concept (i.e. through discourse). In the case of gender, age, and the distinction between “public” and “private” behavior, in my diachronic analysis, the socio-spatiality of the concept of “Home” turned out to be a one-to-one relation, the representational space of “Home” dividing its conceptual layout into sections – the kitchen, separated bedrooms, public and private rooms – mapping the spatial practice of its residents, thus – through spatial discourse – preserving the socio-spatial performativity of gender, generations, and public/private behavior. 487 If, in the private sphere, Women were conceived of as mothers, keepers, and care-takers, then Men, in the same sphere, were instead conceived of as public figures in the need of Rest and Comfort (secured by the Gods of Domesticity, the care-taking mother incarnating one of the moral and/or sexualized divinities). The division of labor implied – a division between “production” (working with the pen) and “reproduction” (working with the body) – had its parallel structure in the social space of the industry, a presence of the non-present (that is, a presence of the non-present in the private sphere, just like the private sphere was present and non-present in the social space of the industry) in which one set of bodies (“expenditures of energy”) dominated another.

As it inevitably must, however, society was transforming. Novel representations of space came into being, representations of space – enthused by a modern self-consciousness – “taking-care-of” the body of the worker, wanting to give it a new world. Naturally, I am here referring to the “rise of the Social”, to old, modern separations coinciding, transforming the vivacious relationship between “Public” and “Private” practices, collapsing its life-giving or life-threatening equations. Yet, as Lefebvre argued, and paradoxically so, because of the inconsistency with which language – representations of space – is applied on lived, spatial reality, its discursive hold on society, like most discourses, is bound to be replaced by yet another spatial code (or in this case: negated by an old spatial code). In other words, if the transforming Public – the “rise of the Social” – carried with it (and got carried by) a new set of representations of space (e.g. “functionalism”), then these representations were not received without opposition (an opposition spiritualized by the spatial practice of “old”, e.g. “domesticity”), in turn producing tension – i.e. between the public producers and the private preservers – that the emerging powerhouses needed to resolve (or destroy). As Lefebvre argued, in the disorder of social reality, the production of social space – as an overcoming – is both a negation and a preservation of that which is overcome, the abstract space of “modern

487 With Lefebvre’s words, the emerging, socio-spatial process (that is, one of them) takes the following form: conceived space (i.e. concepts) – representational space (i.e. home) – spatial practice (affirming or negating the concepts, thus breaking or restarting the cycle).
modernity” thus preserving the absolute spaces (e.g. churches, graveyards, homes) it was meant to negate. Looking for a moment of production, therefore, i.e. a moment of preserving negation, in my fourth chapter, I proceeded synchronically, “pausing history”, asking whether “mechanization, standardization, and industrialization” was a threat to “Domesticity” as it had heretofore been experienced? In short, I ventured into the context of the Stockholm Exhibition of 1930.

The Exhibition of 1930 was analyzed as an event, as a temporary moment of truth, as a moment, moreover, resting on the conceptual architecture of pre-existing structures, these structures in turn becoming a part of the event (as a repetition of itself, but in new clothing). Happening within rather than after these structures, the Exhibition, as an event, was not only demonstrating its (functionalist) buildings on the foundation of a series of European exhibitions on the same theme (a living graveyard), i.e. on a modernized desire for “Progress” and “Modernity”, but also demonstrating its buildings on the foundation of an emerging, conceptual economy (itself resting on the concept of “Home”): erected on the summer-islands of Djurgården, therefore, the Exhibition, as an event, a dialectic disruption of “yays” and “nays”, forcing the discourse of space into visibility, creating a space that is other, “as perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled”, the Exhibition, as an event, not only went looking for the spatiotemporal reality of a Swedish “Modernity”, but also proposed the nature of its production: standardization and simplification, straightness and straightforwardness, “form follows function”. By constructing “housing” capable of realizing the semantic field of the concept of “Home”, the organizers of the Exhibition had in mind the production of a modern, progressive Sweden, a “new”, Swedish silhouette aligning its belated clock-work with that of a global and/or European modernity.

So how did this, “new” space look like? With reason, functionalism – in the popular as well as the conceiving minds – being associated with notions of “speed” and “movement”, i.e. the circuits of urban modernity, and one-third of the Exhibition being devoted to advances in modernized transportation-technology, people asked: what of this “new, human being” (“ny människotyp”), is it Comfortable, or Rested, or Private, or is it forever inserted into a flowing landscape of ever increasing speed, of a “moving-from-here-to-there”, as if space no longer had any intrinsic, associable, absolute value (that of “Home”), or as if space was now measured only by the ticking of “Time”, e.g. the time it takes to go from A to B, or the time it takes to leave work, to leave something behind, the “Modern Man” being-a-being always-

already leaving something behind, i.e. “Home”? If my analysis is correct, the functionalists preserved much of the economy of the “old” concept of “Home”, the elements of “Comfort”, “Family”, and “Privacy” – aspects of the “Private sphere” – being built into the very epicenter of the functionalist, private universe: the living-room.489 I argued that the “new” “Home” of functionalism preserved the semantic field of the concept of “Home” – Comfort, Privacy, Family – by producing space indicative of the changing structure of its elements.490 Besides a comfortable, steel-worthy living-room (meant for “family” and “friends”), the functionalists produced (or imagined) smaller kitchens (corresponding to the changing structure of the “Family”, as did the living-room) as well as a “new” aesthetics, functional, efficient, and standardized, raising the question of the relation between “individuality” and “collectivity” (its bourgeoisie-incarnation – again – being that of a rigid distinction between “Public” and “Private”). Even if the semantic field of “Home” was not “radically” transformed, some of its elements were, the representational space of functionalism – and this is a point that deserves repeating – thus spatializing a set of transforming concepts (associated with the semantic field of “Home”): spatial practice (“modernity”) – concepts (language) – space: this is the order of the transformation identified, the conceptual space of functionalism (now closing the socio-spatial circle) mapping the spatial practice of its residents. And so, as happens in all transformative situations, the planners of the Exhibition wanted order: temporally speaking, the elements ordered were those of “past”, “present”, and “future”, the name of the order being that of “Sweden”; socio-politically speaking, the elements ordered were those of “individuality” and “collectivity”, the name of the order again being that of “Sweden”, a “good” society being possible only where its citizens were “healthy” (the so-called “philosophy of socialization”). This ordering differentiated between the elements ordered, the past being interpreted as something contested by the present, i.e. as something that had to be overcome. In sum, therefore, after identifying the transforming processes of modernity (I counted them to four, just like Koselleck did, albeit in a different setting and with different implications; the remaining two will be discussed below), the planners of the Exhibition attempted to master the horizon of expectations, to write “Sweden” into the discourse of “Modernity”, a writing only possible in

489 The restaurant Paradiset – constructed at the end of the Corso – instead functioning as the epicenter of the public, functionalist universe
490 One could perhaps summarize the history of European living-rooms in the following way: beginning as a Halle, a great Hall, the “room of reception” eventually turned into a “withdrawing-room”, a passive space later being endowed with values of activity, transforming into a “drawing-room”, the ensuing transmutation instead carrying the name of “living-room”, again taking on the passive appearance of a “withdrawing-room”
space, with the modernizing ink of “housing” and “industry”, space being the single method for 
domesticating time, i.e. the past, present, and future of a modern modernity.

Indeed, what was at stake was not a preservation of the Sattelzeit, but a new order, 
a modern modernity, a reality expected but not yet in place. To realize this “modern modernity”, 
then, i.e. the “Progress” of modern times, the Swedes needed to accept a list of (minor) 
“revolutions”: first, the changing habits of the family; second, the “temporal order” referred to 
above, a new aesthetics, signifying time itself, the “old” versus the “new”; third, the “socio-
political order”, processes of “standardization”, intensifying the tension between individuality 
and collectivity; and fourth, the rise of the social sphere. My reading of these “dichotomies” – 
as I called them – was simple: in acceptera (as well as within the spatial organization of the 
Exhibition), it was argued that “Modernity” (as a concept and as a space) was only possible 
where the four dichotomies dissolved, both adults being expected to work outside of “Home” 
(dissolving the division of labor at “Home”), “old” values merging with the authentic aesthetics 
of the “new” (producing an “authenticity of the present”, opposed to eclectic, nostalgic 
historicism), the individual being related to (rather than divorced from) its collective (producing 
a conceptual paradox, individualism being strengthened as an effect of its weakening), and the 
public (defined as the State, i.e. the Social) “taking-care-of” the private instead of being 
opposed to it. Since these “dichotomies” were vital to the age of “modern separations” (the 
sements of the Sattelzeit), discussed in my third chapter, there are reasons for speaking 
hypothetically of a second (Swedish?) Sattelzeit: i.e. a “modern modernity”. Naturally, 
however, and as a necessary disclaimer, many, “modern” dichotomies remained intact – e.g. 
that between “Men” and “Women”, or that between “Work” and “Home” – dichotomies that 
were vital to the functionalist, modernist project, “modern modernity” – I hypothesize – being 
very different in character from “postmodernity” (by preparing it?). Moreover, raising the 
question of a second Sattelzeit, I must ask: if it indeed “happened” (as a geological, socio-
political event), would it be promising to trace this, second Sattelzeit to the damaging effects of 
the “Great War”, here interpreted as a clash of the “age of modern separations”, just like the 
“Thirty-Years War” put doubt into the Christian system of belief, deadened by the destruction, 
pain, and suffering caused by a righteousness of warring religions?

If the question of a second Sattelzeit is even meaningful (analytically), I am not 
the historian to answer it; consequently, I must leave this question as a topic (or a point of 
invalidation) for another scholarly inquiry, my main concern – as noted – being the modern 
modernity of Swedish, interwar-society. And so, just like the functionalist buildings worked 
towards dissolving the opposition between “inside” and “outside”, constructing buildings in
which “nature” was always present, the “new” processes of “Modernity” – the four dissolutions discussed above – altered the face of (Swedish) “Modernity”, producing a “new” social space that Lefebvre analyzed in terms of “abstract space” (I am here getting ahead of myself, looking into the future I promised not to analyze; as most Swedish people know, however, “functionalism” turned out to be a very productive venture). Indeed, if I was performing the role of a Marxist dialectician, I would locate the “affirmation, negation, negation-of-the-negation”-scheme here, in the dissolution of old, architectural structures, the “public privateness” of the Social being a “negation-of-the-negation” of the Private “negation” (conservatism) of the Public “affirmation” (socialism). If the social space of modernity was transforming, then so were its concepts: “Problemet heter i våra dagar: kvantitet och kvalitet, massa och individ. Det är nödvändigt att söka lösa det även i byggnadskonsten och konstindustrin.”

The emphasis in this quote – an emphasis that is not my own – is remarkably telling.

So far, in this conclusion, I have been referring to the discourse of (male) planners, writers, and organizers, not the “general view of things”; indeed, in the words of my methodology, I am here speaking of conceived and not lived space. In my analysis, however, I concluded that the working-class of Swedish interwar-society was conservative if not traditionalist, desiring not the “new” or what was then considered “rational”, but what they never really had, i.e. a bourgeoisie “Home”. Individualism – “I want my home to be personal, to be private, to be me!” – flourished in this conservative context, complicating matters greatly: the dichotomy of “individuality-collectivity” was not only dissolving, but also strengthened, supported by – among many institutions – the tradition-seeking voices of Husmodern. It seemed to some as if the individuality of Sweden was at stake, a Nation of wood, brick, and Lutheran simplicity, losing its Self to the globalized alienation of a standardized schizophrenia. On the battlefield of “individuality-collectivity”, I discoursed, all things precious were being threatened, the functionalists trying to find the ultimate compromise, e.g. a “family-hotel”, its juvenile expression being that of a living-room (flanked by bed-rooms and study-rooms), i.e. a “private sphere” in a Social setting; the tension was great, as if two realities clashed, or as if two “Homes” were pitted against each other, one self-understanding thus battling the other. The functionalists – recognizing the nature of their context – did not deny the need of Self and individualism; the functionalists instead attempted to reconcile this individualism with the

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491 Asplund et al., acceptera (Stockholm: Tiden, facsimile, 1980 [1931]), p.3. (Transl.: “The problem in our times can be stated as: Quantity and quality, the mass and the individual. It is necessary to solve this problem in building-art and industrial art.” (Modern Swedish Design, transl. Jones, p.143.).)
needs of the collective, the philosophy of this reconciliation – in my analysis – carrying the name of “socialization”. In the end, all contestants shared the same goal, that of “Sweden”, the functionalists simply adding – to the project of national glory – the notions of “Modernity”, “Progress”, and “temporal authenticity” (these notions not being ends in themselves, but means to achieve a better Nation). The unity implied, that of a welfare in which both the individual and the collective flourished, had its metaphorical expression in the very concept (and representational space) contested: all parties wanted to “belong”, to “höra hemma”, i.e. to “feel at home” in the swirling time of a changing space. The sentiment of “Belonging” was analyzed on three levels – humanity at large, the Nation, and Self – corresponding to the spaces proposed: a new aesthetic, corresponding to the globalized time of human modernity, a functional, urban space, corresponding to the Nation (condensed into urbanity), and the individual home, ownership being vital for a sense of Self (it was argued). Again, however, all these levels were connected, ultimately dissolving their separation: row-houses and apartments, producing the paradox referred to above – if the functionalists attempted to dissolve the distinction between outside and inside, in effect, by promoting the importance of the Private, and by concerning itself with the Private (as an institution of the Social sphere), ultimately, the functionalists only enlarged the distinction between exteriority (other, neighbor) and interiority (self, family). Conservative voices were gathering, and as I analyzed the notion of “Folkhemmet”, curiously, it became counter-conceptual to one of its elements, namely, the privatized concept of “Home”.

Clearly, the people of Sweden feared a loss of personality, of losing their individuality to the collectivity of the “masses”. In other words, some people did not enjoy the proposal of letting go of the old, temporal layers of a bourgeoisie conception of “Home”: the geological sediments of a gendered division of labor, of old representations of the body, its spatial practices, mapped out on a field of modern representations, a place of representativeness, even the poor reserving a room for purposes of “visits”. Is it odd that people said “no”? Cleaning and stroking our places-in-becoming, the representational space of “Home” turns into an extension of ourselves, our bodies, thus shape-shifting into the only world we can “take-care-of”, control, a world radically different from the worlds of labor, commuting, and public transport: we are not only connected to our homes – in a sense, we are our homes, the ideology of the “new” thus threatening ourselves, our Self, i.e. a human personality projected on the old rug (inherited from a relative, dead but not forgotten), as if all items of past and future, preserved in the archive of an idealized personality, a messy book-shelf or a corner of shaming, as if all these temporal items, constituting a heterotopia of both time and space, experience and expectation, as if all these items were at the risk of being swept away by that horrible surface
called “new”. If the main sentiment of “Home” is “Belonging”, is it odd that some people resisted change? As a metaphor for belonging, the concept of “Home” unleashes an infinity of uses, a safeguarding of “Time”: love and warmth (a story told in the dim light of a settling hearth, the Night knocking on the door, but only to be scared away by voices of intimacy), safety and security, self and divinity; all the way through childhood to adulthood, “Home” is where “Home” is, a journey or a return, a departure (sad) or a break, the psychoanalytical question of the century being: “Were you deprived of the elements of the semantic field of ‘Home’, thus unable to produce a coherent Self, a balanced unity of divine, mental qualities?” At “Home”, traces of private life signify a stabilized temporality, moments of past and present safeguarded from the unexpectedness of the future. Seemingly, therefore (I hypothesize), as private space, “Home” functioned as a haven within the accelerating forces of modern temporality, as an island within the changing structures of past, present, and future, just like the planners themselves – the space of “Home” transposed on the very space of the Exhibition (i.e. Sweden) – attempted an ordering of the layers of Time (perhaps because of a sensation of temporal “homelessness”). In sum, then, the fear of “de-personalization” seems perfectly natural, the problem – as discoursed by the functionalists – being that many people in Stockholm were living under horrible housing-conditions, that the “old” “Home” longed for, produced in the age of modern separations, were as “standardized” as only concepts can be, the tension between “old” and “new” being a question of Time, of Time turning the “new” into “old” (today, for example, Swedish politicians speak of “Folkhemmet” – colored by glorious expectations – in terms of a lost past, as something we should go back to, not turn our backs on). The authors of the Exhibition – and the authors of Swedish, modern modernity – realized not only the ludicrousness of a standardized historicism, but also the depth of the housing-problem, their main objective thus being to achieve a temporal authenticity described in terms of the collective singulars of “Modernity” and “Progress”.

By preparing for a “new” way of life, preserving and negating the “old”, a life in which the individual and the family co-existed and thrived, the functionalists managed to produce a social space also corresponding to the changing elements of a functionalist concept of “Home” – Privacy, Personality, Family, and Comfort, undisputable doctrines of the concept

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492 The housing-problem was not only spoken of in Stockholm, but also in regard to the rural parts of Sweden, suppressed by the urban emphasis of the new Nation; in 1938, Ludvig “Lubbe” Nordström made a radio-reportage – ten episodes – on the conditions of housing in Sweden, travelling all the way from the south (Skåne) to the north (Norrbotten). The reportage, called “Lort-Sverige” (“Dirty Sweden”), caused a massive debate on the deficiencies of Swedish interwar-housing. (Ludvig Nordström, Lortsverige (Facsimile Sundsvall: Tidsspegeln, 1984)).
of “Home”. Similarly, as was made clear in my analysis of the Exhibition, a large portion of that analysis being spatially oriented, these “undisputable doctrines of the concept” rested on an organization of the economy equal to industrialism and capitalism, the great Mast, for example, constructed at the very center of the fairground (or narrative), not only naturalizing the mediation of capitalist meaning, but also glorifying the victorious path of industrial progress; like the Eiffel-tower of Paris, the advertising-mast was an iron-spectacle worthy of its day, crowned by a L-shaped wing – the main symbol of the Exhibition – signifying both progress and victory. Moreover, now returning to the conceptual level “of things”, I identified a semantic difference between “bostäder” (housing) and “hem” (homes), a difference exploited – rhetorically – by both nay-Sayers and yay-Sayers. The word “bostad” referring to a rhetoric of collectivity, and the concept of “Hem” referring to a rhetoric of individuality (not be confused with the notion of collective singular), the functionalists tried to balance the disagreeing account (by way of dissolution), building “bostäder” by providing “hem”. If “Home” is indicative of some of the elaborate, convoluted, and aural-visual worlds of pre-modernity, then “housing” is the modern, ocularcentric, opposite, translatable into numbers and figures, dimensionality and rationality; as implied, therefore, the distinction between “bostäder” and “hem” could (perhaps) serve the purpose of illuminating Lefebvre’s discussion on absolute and abstract space, the word “bostäder” being nothing but abstract and quantitative, referring to walls and roofs, the three dimensions of enclosing, the nature of that enclosing – the pre-modern poeticism of the absoluteness of “Home” – being unstated if not suppressed. When entering our childhood-home (if lucky enough to have such a thing), do we not feel the presence of the divinities of our childhood-fantasies? Do we not also feel the presence of our children’s fantasies, hidden under the Christmas-tree (although commodified, Gods are always Gods, the only Gods we have), or lurking in the shadows of the bed, great monsters of Old, the devils of our childhood-sleep? Importantly, I am here not arguing that the modern concept of “Home” is semantically overlapping the Proto-Germanic Heim (as an element of the vocabulary of absolute space). Inevitably, as Lefebvre himself would have to admit, the abstract space of modernity is not totalizing in its abstractions, absolute spaces always remaining (since overcoming is both a negation and a preservation of that which is overcome): as squares and homes, as graveyards and Nights, as places and fields-of-care. Social spaces survive where words are embellished, the concept of “Home” – which, conceptually speaking, in associating

493 If I am correct in my analysis, a more telling term for “Folkhemmet” – at the time – would be “Folkbostaden”, “The People’s Residence”.

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with a complex semantic field, is radically different from the semantics of the word *Heim*, the notions of Family, Comfort, and Privacy being specific, modern elements – perhaps owing its embellishment to the absolute quality of its social space, making it – as I argued – socio-spatial in structure, signifier, signified, and object coinciding. Perhaps the same is true for all *places* (here invoking the phenomenology of Tuan), all “fields of care”? The distinction between “absolute” and “abstract” space is not absolute itself, different social spaces penetrating each other, as are our experiences of these spaces, making the distinction less valuable as an *analytical* category. As a historical distinction, however, it may nevertheless be used for *illuminating* – again – the feelings evoked by “Home”: as an absolute space, referring to Ego, the *insides* of spatial experience and reality, opposed to the *outsides* of modern, abstract space, the “commuting to work” or “shopping groceries at the mall”, as an absolute space of both experience and expectation, filled with memory, planning, and well-spent time, should one analyze “Home” as a “fortress of pre-modern solitude”, standing lonely against the whirlwind of an advancing modernity, the riders of which – i.e. the urban planners of the State – are tearing apart the absoluteness of premodern spatial experience (“Maps as memorandum prescribing action”)?

It is easy – I think – to exaggerate the difference between “abstract” and “absolute” space; also, how does one determine the feelings and sentiments of a medieval serf? Would that serf – owned by a feudal master – not be disconnected from space, carried by a dream of the lingering freedom of Heaven? As argued, the planners of the Exhibition *did* take the old concept of “Home” into account, the most “abstract” notion proposed being that of a “family-hotel”; for that reason, it only seem accurate to apply the notion of “abstract” space on the level of functionalist expectation, an expectation most transparently expressed in the urban plans of the functionalist setting. Again, in these plans, as my analysis of the row-houses made evident, individuality is coalescing with collectivity, the *Gemeinschaft* thus implied, i.e. that of “Folkhemmet”, instead – and paradoxically – giving rise to an abstract *Gesellschaft*, a Social sphere opposed to the privacy of the inside of an individualized home. The abstract space of functionalism – as expectation – may thus be related to three, interconnected social spaces: Sweden, City, and Home. If anything, the abstract dimension of functionalism existed as a function of the interconnectedness of these spaces, the functionalists planning all aspects of spatial reality, mapping out the movement – by deciding the quality of movement, what movement “is better” – of the spatial practice of the Social subject. By planning for the

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494 de Certau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, p.120.
functional function of “Belonging” (“höra hemma”), and by totalizing space in the process, the city being divided into areas meant to cater all needs and fashions, including those of Work, functionalism was always at the risk of producing – initially – the opposite of “Belonging”, i.e. sentiments of “alienation” (or “homelessness”).

Obviously, however, since – me being the author of this thesis – it is also easy to exaggerate the difference between “Sattelzeit-modernity” and “modern modernity”, the latter resting on the geological formations of the former, it must be noted that the “spatial totalization” of functionalism had its fair share of prototypes, Haussmann and his European allies striating the city as early as the nineteenth-century, de-militarizing (or re-militarizing) the city into avenues and districts (residence, business, industry), and – before Haussmann – the ubiquitous militarization of the city – the function of interiorized safety, opposed to the exteriority of the embellished gate (literally and figuratively) – casting its urban shadow as far back (in time and space) as collective violence remembers. Recalling the language of my methodology, the functionalists were not the first (nor the last) to collectivize the semantic fields of social space, distributing meaning based on function (which is social and therefore historical), striating space – through connotative and denotative discourses – by mapping out the spatial practices of its traversal, a form of urban, abstract striation serving the purpose of reproducing the social relations of production and reproduction. Evidently, however, the functionalists were not only interested in urban, abstract space, but also – for good reasons – the interiority of “Home”, private space thus becoming a topic for urban, functionalist planning, leaving the arbitrary “freedom” of “fashion” behind; in the context of Swedish, social-democratic politics, I equated this interest with what I called “the philosophy of socialization”, a principle of welfare essential to the private/public-collapse of the emerging, Social sphere. The functionalists, producing discourse not only on the abstract surface of the urban street, but also within the confines of the most intimate experiences of spatial reality, i.e. “at Home”, thus dominated the bodies of an appropriated setting, such domination inevitably creating negations by the bodies dominated; the space of “Home” (mapping spatial practice), a bastion of absoluteness (supposedly) untouched by the markers of male, urban planners, and its main sentiment being that of “Belonging”, became a scene of tensions, of a battle between transforming times. These tensions were played out on the field of conceived, lived, and perceived social space, phenomenological moments of spatial experience situated in different temporal layers: if, on the level of conceived space, the functionalists were looking for the temporal layer of the “new”, an authenticity of “Modernity” and “Progress”, then they had to – partly – depart from the temporal layers of perceived and lived social space, these layers having more durability (and
less velocity) than those proposed by the functionalists. The semantic fields of “Home” thereby resting on different layers of “History” (conceived, perceived, and lived), “Space” and “Time” intermingled to produce a socio-spatiality of the concept of “Home”.

Finally, then, and as argued, the socio-spatiality of concepts – as a process – deserves a diachronic perspective, this thesis ending where it (perhaps) begins: to fully explore the relation between concepts and representational space, would it not make sense to visit the future here analyzed, the post-war homes of Sweden, including that of “Folkhemmet”? What happened to the functionalist “Home”? Was it negated, or appropriated, or tossed on the forgetful junkyard of a history in the making? What happened to “Folkhemmet”? Was it ever realized, as Per Albin Hansson – the prime-minister to be – dreamed of, or was it lost on the construction-site of yet another political apparition? A chapter on past futures would certainly make sense, the future of living pasts nevertheless constituting the topic for another project. In this thesis, I asked three questions concerning the relation between “concepts” and “space”, the concept of “Home” serving the purpose of a thematic intersection: instead of disclosing the history of “Home”, however, my hope was – besides that of providing a convincing argument in favor of the analytic importance of the relation between “concepts” and “space” – to disclose the complexity of that history, to provide a set of methodological questions – asked throughout the three, main chapters – productive for more detailed analysis. Are there reasons for speaking of a second Sattelzeit in contexts other than that of interwar-Sweden?; or should one look for a third, fourth, or fifth Sattelzeit, of a subset of “revolutions” within the overall framework of “Modernity”, changing the linguistic landscape of an accelerating space?; if so, and invoking the discussion in my second chapter, what about our experiences of “Time” and “Space”, of experience, expectation, belonging, and alienation: relative to a century ago, do we live “Time” differently, and do we live “Space” differently? Moreover, related to all these questions: what “is” “Modernity”, if it “is” at all? Without the know-how required for deliberating on such a question, I am nevertheless convinced that the answer has something to with both “concepts” and with “space”, that the concept of “Modernity”, whatever its (self-referring) meaning, and just like the concept of “Home”, is meaningless without a space to which it refers, a space in which “Modernity” is perceived, lived, and conceived, or practiced, built, and represented, concepts not only producing and preserving space, but space also producing and preserving concepts. And with that hypothetical opening, finally, I conclude the poking that composed this thesis.
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