The Stories of Cologne

Governing Emotions in Strange Encounters

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Abstract

The sexual assaults reported on New Year’s Eve 2015 in Cologne and the reactions towards it have changed political and public opinion on the issues of migration, gender equality, and sexual violence in Germany. Based on theories from postcolonial studies, feminist studies, security studies, approaches on collective trauma, and emotion studies this thesis analyzes ‘Cologne’ as a trauma which has enabled the affective construction of racialized and gendered subject positions. This thesis aim is to illustrate how the governing of emotions in events of trauma is used to secure borders, identities, and bodies. A discourse and narrative analysis of German parliamentary debates on Cologne reveals the production of narratives of crisis through the attachment of emotions to different objects or bodies. The narrative of crisis presumes the existence of a normalcy that has to be re-established and measures to restore normalcy- that is in the case of Cologne the securitization of migration politics. A range of existing competing narratives show the complexity of how politics of emotions function as a tool to securitize national borders, identities and bodies.

Keywords:
Politics of emotions, migration, national identity, gender equality, Germany

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1 Introduction

‘Cologne’ has been described as the “night that changed everything” (Hark, 2017, p. 35). The event that Cologne refers to is most commonly described as the New Year’s Eve 2015 in Cologne when men committed sexual assaults against women who were celebrating the beginning of the new year. The reported assaults quickly came to be known as “the terror of Cologne” and “became a site for white-nationalist gender and sexual politics” (Boulila & Carri, 2017, p. 287). Cologne was framed as an attack on the nation in which the white German woman’s body represented the nation who was being violated by racialized invaders (Boulila & Carri, 2017, p. 288).

The sexual violence reported at the Cologne train station and the reactions towards it have to be placed within the perceived ‘European crisis’, triggered by the current refugee influx (Weber, 2016, p. 68). The increase in refugees in 2014 in Germany was accompanied by the establishment of the right-radical group Pegida (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the West) and its anti-racist counter-movements. Counter demonstrations to Pegida’s attention-grabbing Monday Demonstrations often exceeded them in participant numbers. These contestations reflect the diverging discourses on “how to talk about refugees, a ‘welcome culture’, Germany’s historical responsibility, and Islam’s place in Europe today” (Weber, 2016, p. 72). On September 24th 2017, almost two years after Cologne, the right-wing party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative for Germany), which is known for racist anti-immigration views, surged a historic result, making it the first right-wing party to be represented in the German Bundestag (parliament) since 1945. AfD is thought to be the party most aligned with the positions and rhetoric of Pegida and is
currently the third strongest party in Germany (Ma, 2017; Weber, 2016, p. 76). This is part of a larger trend in Europe where far-right parties are gaining power and influence (Kinnvall, 2014). Departing from an understanding of the local as “constitutively global” (Nagar, Lawson, McDowell, & Hanson, 2009, p. 265) this trend has to be located in global capitalist processes which mediate social relations “through the simultaneous operation of gendered, sexualized, and racialized hierarchies” (Nagar et al., 2009, p. 276).

Cologne triggered a racist security discourse enabling demands such as the closure of German borders, faster deportations, and a limit on refugee numbers to be uttered by politicians across the political spectrum (Boulila & Carri, 2017; Hark, 2017). It also triggered the amendment of the rape law. The new legislation was linked to immigration law with a conviction of sexual assault leading to deportation (Boulila & Carri, 2017, p. 286). In Germany, where conservative discourses often link feminism to the ‘extremist gender ideology’ (Boulila & Carri, 2017, p. 290), gender equality was suddenly perceived as integral to German society (Boulila & Carri, 2017, p. 286). Anti-racist feminist voices, who called out the new-born anti-sexism as a product of racism, were declared extremists and the real enemies of gender equality in Germany (Boulila & Carri, 2017, p. 289).

According to different scholars, Cologne has arguably been a watershed and nodal point regarding political and public opinion on the issues of migration and asylum, but also sexual violence and gender (cf. Boulila & Carri, 2017; Dietze, 2016; Hark, 2017). The debate on Cologne has included stories about crime, national security, terror threat, moral, and the linkage of religion, violence, gender, and feminism. Cologne has exacerbated a division of “us” versus “them” and intensified the institutionalization of racism in Germany. However, this transformation is accompanied by anti-racist feminist

The event of Cologne has to be placed within different approaches towards identity formation in a globalized world. According to Arnett (2002), globalization has psychological consequences for issues of identity, in particular “globalization results in transformations in identity, that is, how people think about themselves in relation to the social environment” (Arnett, 2002, p. 777). According to Anthony Giddens (1991), dis-embedding mechanisms can lead to the dissolution or transformation of tradition and the less tradition provides for stability in people’s lives, the more people will have to negotiate lifestyles among various options. Others have argued, that there is no necessary link between globalization, understood in the sense of travel, migration and movement, and the destabilization of identity. Sara Ahmed argues for instance, that migration can challenge identity, but may also allow the establishment of a “new globalised identity in which the world becomes home” (Ahmed, 2000, p. 86). Assuming that migration only results in the destabilization of identity, “conceals the complex and contingent social relationships of antagonism which grant some subjects the ability to move freely at the expense of others” (Ahmed, 2000, p. 86).

I build my arguments in this thesis on an understanding of identity as neither fixed, nor given. On the contrary: identities are the result of a continuous negotiation process and are “verbs”, rather than “nouns” (Kahani-Hopkins & Hopkins, 2002, p. 289; Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2011, p. 7). The construction of identities has to be understood in the context of “collective struggles over power, knowledge and discourse” (Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2011, p. 5), in which the self emerges in a “dialogical process of interaction between self and other” (Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2011, p. 8). This dialogical process is part of group-making practices in which
identities are both outcomes and key-determinants (Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2011, p. 6). These group identities, the collective “we” are produced socially, always in relation to a “them” (Brassett & Bulley, 2007, p. 10) and are embedded in social dynamics since the self is in a reciprocal relationship to society (Stets & Burke, 2003, p. 1).

Emotions are a central part in the constitution of identity, since bodies and (collective) identities are constructed through the repetition of narratives that “stick” emotions to some bodies while they “slide” over others (Ahmed, 2014). Narratives are used by people in order to make sense of themselves and their position in the world (Andrews, Kinnvall, & Monroe, 2015). Powerful narratives, also called “master narratives” (Andrews et al., 2015; Somers, 1992, 1994) are narratives that most people’s life is bound to, such as religion, whiteness, gender, and nationhood, and which often seem naturalized (Andrews et al., 2015; Seshadri-Crooks, 2000; Somers, 1994).

Since these narratives provide powerful sources for the formation of collective identities such as nations, they have to be analyzed with attention to global processes reproducing racialized, sexualized, and gendered hierarchies. Nagar et al. stress the importance of a feminist approach to analyzing global processes, which includes a focus on power relations and interdependencies, a suspicion towards binaries, and the ambition to “comprehend the cultural construction of difference and boundaries” (Nagar et al., 2009, p. 259). According to Manuela Boatcă, cultural differences are built around the “theorisation of Occidental superiority over the rest of the world and the uniqueness of the Western experience (…)” (Boatcă, 2015, p. 15). ‘Western values’, such as freedom, peace, prosperity, solidarity, equality, and justice, are thus often posed as specific Western achievements of modernity. This erases the role of colonial spaces as ‘laboratories’ of
this modernity and ignores the West’s responsibility in (re-)producing inequalities to being with (Boatcă, 2015, p. 230).

The naturalized narratives that identity formation is linked to, are thus involved in the erasure of historical interdependencies between world regions which have translated to processes of inequality. This accounts particularly for the construction of national identities, since they are always “produced and reproduced in relation to a racialized/ethnicised conception of the national subject and citizen” (Westwood & Phizacklea, 2000, p. 7). However, Westwood and Phizacklea emphasize the importance of recognizing the “unfinished and discontinuous nature of both the migratory process and the making of national identities and nations” (Westwood & Phizacklea, 2000, p. 7).

I will analyze Cologne in this thesis as a traumatic event in which different emotions circulate and stick to specific bodies. In this way, I will look at the performativity of emotions, that is, the affective construction of different subject positions. Further I will examine how a German national identity is produced and secured in the discourse surrounding Cologne through emotional governance and the use of narratives.

1.1 Purpose, Aim and Research Questions

In this thesis I am contributing to existing scholarship that challenges the notion that emotions in global politics are only connected to populist parties or extremist political actors (cf. Demertzis, 2006). This also applies to the tendency to view racism and sexism in Germany as something extraordinary, something that only exists in the margins of society. Through analyzing how emotions work in the debate on Cologne I intend to reveal how
emotions are interwoven with racism and sexism, which is not expelled to the margins but exists in every aspect of society. Furthermore, I illustrate how the governing of emotions in events of trauma can be used to reify and secure national borders, (national) identities and bodies. At the same time, I complicate the typical stories about ‘us versus them’ through showing how the narratives and emotions, constructing different subject positions, are unstable and open to change, hence producing different subject positions. Leaning heavily on Ahmed’s conceptualization of emotions (in particular love, hate, shame, fear, pain, and disgust) and strange encounters, I will focus on the following research questions:

*How can the politics of emotions function as a tool to securitize national borders, identities and bodies?*

By regarding Cologne as trauma I will look at the particularity of the encounter:

*Which subject positions are produced?*

*Which narratives are created or reinscribed through the memorialization process of trauma?*

### 1.2 Structure of the Thesis

In order to answer the above stated research questions and to look at the connection of emotions, bodies, identities and mobility, I will draw on theories from postcolonial studies, migration studies, feminist studies, critical race theory, security studies, approaches on collective trauma, and emotion studies. In the beginning, I will introduce my
theoretical framework through presenting a postcolonial understanding of systems of organizing difference, such as gender and race in global politics (chapter 2.1). This will be followed by a short introduction to the workings of racism and sexism in Germany, and how this can sustain what is called “German exceptionalism” (chapter 2.2). From there I will introduce the role of emotions in global politics, in particular how emotions constitute identity and how they work performatively (chapter 2.3 & 2.3.1). In chapter 2.3.2 I present my main theoretical framework ‘politics of emotions’ that is Ahmed’s conceptualization of specific emotions, in particular love, hate, shame fear, pain, and disgust. This chapter will lead to the role of security in (collective) identity construction, how this is connected to events of trauma and how Cologne can be understood as a ‘strange encounter’. Thereafter I introduce my methodology which is a combination of narrative and discourse analysis. Having described the limitations of this thesis and explained my choice of material, I will present my analysis of the workings of the aforementioned emotions in the Cologne debates and how they are connected to narratives (chapter 4). Concluding I will discuss my findings and how Cologne exemplifies the historicity of strange encounters in Germany (chapter 5).
2 Theoretical Framework

2.1 Race: A System of Organizing Difference

The concept of race is central to my analysis of the Cologne debates, since it is intrinsic to the constitution of European nations and their identities. According to Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks (2000), race is a system of organizing human difference which sustains racialized and gendered hierarchies.

Mainstream political science or sociology tends to under-theorize gender and to obscure the centrality of racisms (Lewis, 2013; Mulinari & Neergaard, 2014, p. 44; Seshadri-Crooks, 2000). Mulinari and Neergard (2014) emphasize in their article about the racist party Sweden Democrats that the word “racism” is often ignored by researchers and replaced by less threatening terms such as xenophobia, or anti-migration. A similar point is made by Gail Lewis (2013, p. 878) who underlines that despite a wealth of evidence, the relevance of race as an analytic and legitimate term of critical research has been ignored across Europe, particularly in German-speaking and Scandinavian states. Even though elite and popular discourses across Europe are drenched in processes of racialization, there is a refusal of belief in the relevance and virulence of the “social relations of race as a pan-European phenomenon, with a corresponding displacement of its relevance to a series of ’elsewheres’” (Lewis, 2013, p. 870). The widespread position among European feminist scholars that race is without analytical relevance in Europe, and something that is unspeakable, is described by Lewis as “an act of epistemological and social erasure - erasure both of contemporary realities of intersectional
subjects [...] and of the history of racial categories and racializing processes across the whole of Europe” (Lewis, 2013, p. 887).

According to Lewis, racialization in Europe is “alive and well” (Lewis, 2013, p. 876) and a process that is inseparable from discourses of gender and sexuality. This racialization is both based on old ideas about race as biological characteristics and new beliefs about culture as the indicator of difference (Lewis, 2013, p. 876). Mulinari and Neergard conceptualize these processes as ‘cultural racism’, in order to emphasize how “ethnicity, culture, and religion are used in a racializing manner that often recreates the content of biological racism through different words” (Mulinari & Neergaard, 2014, p. 45).¹ The power and pertinence of processes of racialization, racism, and their entanglement with discourses of gender and sexuality, derives from “the historical sediments of colonial modernity that was so central to the formation of Europe as an idea and a collective identity” (Lewis, 2013, p. 878).

Race, Seshadri-Crooks argues, “is distinctive as belief structure and evokes powerful and very particular investments in its subjects” (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000, p. 4). It is a system of categorization and organizing difference with whiteness as master signifier. Whiteness can be understood as “a signifying chain that through a process of inclusions as exclusions constitutes a pattern for organizing human difference” (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000, p. 3) and which provides subjects with certain symbolic positions. Race identity promises the sense of exceptionality and uniqueness and establishes differential relations between the races in order to allow for claims on power and domination (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000, p. 7). According to Seshadri-

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¹ The shift from biological to cultural racism/ or neo-racism has been well theorized, for instance by Etienne Balibar (E. Balibar, 1991).
Crooks, whiteness promises a wholeness which can never be reached, nor fulfilled. A similar account is offered by Ehlers (2012) who argues that whiteness as a subject-position only exists as an “idealized image without intrinsic content” (Ehlers, 2012, p. 88 original emphasis). This image is impossible to fully inhabit, yet, the subject seeks exhaustively to acquire it. The attempt to inhabit this ideal image is the “embodied recitation of signifiers that project a particular body image” (Ehlers, 2012, p. 89) the effect of which is identity. Ehlers argues, that in order to sustain the subjectivating norms of hegemonic white masculinity, there are various techniques of power and regulatory efforts to maintain its ‘sanctity and cultural freight’ (Ehlers, 2012, p. 104). For instance hegemonic white masculinity is “reasserted and augmented through the exposure of infractions and the expropriation of the undesirable/failed subject” (Ehlers, 2012, p. 104).

The prohibition of racism in modern civil society is part of how the system of “desiring whiteness” perpetuates itself. It is interlinked with the arrest of the “analysis of race at the point where one discerns and marks its historical effects” (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000, p. 9) which contributes to the reproduction of the very power relations which the prohibition of racism intends to oppose. Seshadri-Crooks (2000, p. 4) argues, that there is an intensification of racial identification and discourse which is however paralleled by the insistence of scientists and anthropologists that race is scientifically untenable.

For race identity, the encounter with its own historicity inevitably produces anxiety since it must “seem more than its historical and cultural origin in order to aim at being” (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000, p. 8). Hence, race anchors itself through visibility in a sense that race is understood as something that is supposedly inscribed on one’s body, something that cannot be changed. Visibility is therefore central to the symbolic order of racial difference since it “maintains a bulwark against historicity and historicization of race” (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000,
p. 8). However, what is specific to whiteness is its *in-visibility*. According to Ahmed (2004, p. 1), “it has become commonplace for whiteness to be represented as invisible, as the unseen or the unmarked, as a non-colour, the absent presence or hidden referent, against which all other colours are measured as forms of deviance”. The invisibility occurs however only from a white perspective. From a non-white perspective whiteness works as racial privilege which has effects “on the bodies of those who are recognized as black” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 2). This privilege together with the disavowal of race is then what accounts for the “resilience and endurability of race as a structure” (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000, p. 9). What is more, race is today strongly reified as a factor of cultural identity (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000, p. 12) and is linked to a powerful notion of heritability through its visuality (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000, p. 17). Race’s ability to “combine with narratives of the family and kinship in order to appear as a factor of inheritance” is what lends it its emotional force of an ‘ethnos’ (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000, p. 17).

The denial of the historicity of race and its pertinence and closeness to notions of family and inheritance is deeply intertwined with the disavowal of the legacy of European colonialism and its dis/continuities of power which much postcolonial criticism accounts for (cf. Kinnvall, 2016). Postcolonial theory is concerned with the legacy of imperialism in the formation of identity and the “sociopolitical construction and consolidation of white masculinity as normative and the subsequent racialization and sexualization of colonized peoples” (Kinnvall, 2016, p. 155). It also exposes “how power inscribes itself onto the body and space of its Others” (Kinnvall, 2016, p. 159). One of the theoretical contribution of postcolonial scholars is that “the colonial project was not external to the constitution of the modernity of European nations: rather, the identity of these nations became
predicated on their relationship to the colonised others” (Ahmed, 2000, p. 10 original emphasis).

2.2 Setting the Context: “German Exceptionalism”

In Germany, there is a strong refusal to see race as an important category for antiracist analysis and politics. In 2008 and 2010 German policy makers demanded to ban the term race from the constitution (Barskanmaz, 2011), e.g. in Article 3 Section 3 of the German Constitution, where it says:

“No person shall be favored or disfavored because of sex, parentage, race, language, homeland and origin, faith, or religious or political opinions. No person shall be disfavored because of disability” (Art. 3 (3))

The ban of the term race from the German constitution is connected to a debate representing a “post-categorical” approach, which equates race with racism and states that we have to go beyond the category race or even reject it in order to not reinforce this category and thus racism (Barskanmaz, 2018). However, according to Ahmed it is not race that produces racism, but racism that perpetuates race. It produces race “as if it was a property of bodies (biological essentialism) or cultures (cultural essentialism)” (Ahmed, 2004, p. 48). And since we live in a deeply racist world, it does not make sense to simply go beyond race. As this will not mean going beyond racism. Cengiz Barskanmaz calls this understanding of race as ‘only doing bad things’ and the following systematic avoidance of the term race for ‘racial deadlock’ (Barskanmaz, 2018). In Germany, the disavowal of the term race is strongly connected to what Barskanmaz calls
‘German Exceptionalism’, that is the hegemonic idea that through Germany’s “exceptional past” today the ‘German context’ needs to be viewed as exceptional (Barskanmaz, 2018). This means, that because of the Holocaust, ‘German racism’ and therefore the German term *Rasse* (race) is thought of as a “vicious exceptional phenomenon that is incomparable of any other racial formation” (Barskanmaz, 2018) and considered being a thing of Germany’s Nazi-past (Barskanmaz, 2011, p. 388). The tendency to view German racism as something very specific and incomparable to other forms of racism implies denying Germany’s own implicity and entanglement in transnational dimensions of racism, such as in Germany or Europe very prominent anti-Muslim discourses (Barskanmaz, 2011, p. 387). What Fatima El-Tayeb calls ‘racial amnesia’, and which signifies the repetitive ‘forgetting’ of the existence of racialized groups in Germany, is produced through precisely this tendency of denying the relevance of race today (El-Tayeb, 2016, p. 15).

Additionally, viewing German racism as something exceptional belittles other racist contexts. Instead of using the term race, or even racism, less historically charged terms such as ‘xenophobia’, or ‘hostility towards foreigners’ are used in most German discourses. These terms are problematic in the way that they presuppose two dichotomous groups: ‘foreigners’ and ‘Germans’ and ignore how these groups are socially constructed. It also ignores how these terms only apply to some bodies, that is to say those who are recognized as racialized others. A white US American would have a different relation to these categories than for instance an Afro-German. (Barskanmaz, 2008, p. 297)

Racisms are naturally always gendered and differentiated by class. The German Exceptionalism includes, similar to the so called “Nordic Exceptionalism” (cf Keskinen, Tuori, Irni, & Mulinari, 2009), the notion of gender equality in marking its uniqueness. Gender equality
in the Nordic countries, is part of the narrative of their uniqueness and exceptionality and is tightly linked to notions of “‘bad patriarchies’ located in distant places and in racialised bodies” (Keskinen et al., 2009, p. 24). In post-war Germany, the women’s rights movement and the LGBTQIA+ movement were intimately connected to the historical revision and critique of the country’s Nazi past. The entanglement of anti-fascism with these movements lent this nexus a certain exceptionalism that initially demanded a strong campaign against racism and sexism, which according to Gabriele Dietze however didn’t lead to strong results (Dietze, 2016, p. 94). Instead, the discussion turned towards what Sara Farris (2017) has called “femonationalism”, that is the (sometimes involuntary) alliance of racist, nationalist, and islamophobic politics with feminist positions. In this way, gender equality, as well as LGBTQIA+ rights are portrayed as something intrinsic to the German identity and marks its difference to various “others” (Dietze, 2016, p. 95).

2.3 Understanding Emotions

Since I will base my analysis on the parliamentary debates in Germany, my focus will be on how elites represent emotions, how they react to and make use of emotions, and which narratives they draw upon. In order to do this, this chapter aims at first giving an overview on different understandings of what emotions are (2.3) -

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2 LGBTQIA+ is an extension of LGBT: Abbreviation for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender. An umbrella term that is often used to refer to the community as a whole. LGBTQIA+ is used to intentionally include and raise awareness of Queer, Intersex and Asexual as well as myriad other communities under the umbrella (LGBTQIA Resource Center, 2018).

3 „Homonationalism“, derived from the concept of femonationalism, describes the association of LGBTQIA+ rights with nationalist and racist discourses (cf. Bracke, 2012; El-Tayeb, 2012; Petzen, 2012).
here I will lay open how emotions are relationally constituted through language, and how they are central to sustaining power and the governing of bodies. Then, I will explain what they do (2.3.1), by showing how emotions work *performatively* through shaping the surfaces of individual and collective bodies. Finally, I will turn to what different shapes emotions can take (2.3.2), which I will present through Ahmed’s analysis of love, hate, shame, pain, disgust, and fear.

Emotions are “social, cultural and political constructs” (Flam & King, 2005, p. 19), which is why their effect is culturally specific. They involve evaluative judgments which draw on cultural knowledge (Fattah & Fierke, 2009). Emotions are thus linked to cultural habits of thinking and feeling, ‘cultural meaning systems’ (Kusenbach & Loseke, 2013, p. 23). These include emotional codes, which are ideas about which “emotions are appropriate to feel when, where, and toward whom or what as well as how emotion should be outwardly expressed” (Loseke, 2009, pp. 498–499). Examples of these emotion codes include for instance, sympathy, fear, or love (Kusenbach & Loseke, 2013, p. 24). However, since emotion codes are elements of culture, their contents are neither fixed, nor agreed upon. Instead there are multiple competing variants of codes which are continually subject to modification and contention (Loseke, 2009, p. 501).

Loseke (2009, p. 499) argues that emotions cannot be viewed as something distinct from cognition, but must be viewed as interwoven and as social, cultural, and political, as well as subjective and biological constructs. Experience of emotion requires cognitive evaluation which in turn requires language (Fattah & Fierke, 2009; Loseke, 2009). Since language is a social construct, the experience of emotion is socially formed by the “impersonal archipelagos of meaning […] shared in common” (Zerubavel, 1996, p. 428, in: Loseke 2009, p.500). Emotions are thus inherently relational, since they are always expressed in relation to others (Fattah & Fierke, 2009, p. 70).
Ongoing collective emotions and their expression may come to take a central place in the language and practices of a culture and thus result in political action. According to Karin Fierke, the “question is how experiences are given emotional meaning and how this meaning legitimized certain forms of action, and thereby shapes future interactions” (Fattah & Fierke, 2009, p. 70). Since language is central to the circulation and constitution of emotions it is important to highlight its productive power, namely the active construction of identities, self-perceptions, social relations, and emotions (Solomon, 2017, p. 497). Language and emotion should be viewed as mutually overlapping in order to “more fully understand how some discourses become powerful symbolic sites of emotional investment on the part of audiences” (Solomon, 2017, p. 497). A historicization of the emotionally productive power of discourses would help to understand “how communities govern certain modes of affective expression as legitimate while simultaneously delegitimizing others, and how these may shift over time” (Solomon, 2017, p. 500). This is based on the assumption that socially acceptable feelings about events or political phenomena change over time and that these feelings either reinforce or transform current constellations of power (Hutchison & Bleiker, 2017, p. 502).

Accordingly, the emotional effects of discourse influences state behavior and other collective actors. Despite Andrew Ross’s critique of making distinctions between elites and the mass, it yet seems necessary in order to examine the governing of emotions and the management of bodies in Western societies. ‘Emotional governance’ can here be understood as the way in which political actors are reading, responding to, and shaping “current feelings that seem to be out there” (Kinnvall, 2017, p. 103).

Through an understanding of emotion as socially generated and transmitted, it is possible to diminish worries concerning a
misapplication of psychological characteristics, such as emotions, to corporate actors such as states (Ross, 2014, p. 7). Thus, the question of whether states or communities have emotion is being rephrased to how emotion constitutes community. Notions of identity are the prior condition for emotional responses, since most emotions spring from shared understandings of who we are, who the other is, and they arise in a context of interaction (Fierke, 2014, p. 566). Social emotions, thus pertain less to a particular body, but more to a specific identity which is constructed and articulated through discourse (Wolf, 2017, p. 492). Accordingly, groups can experience shared emotions when their members share a collective identity and united understanding of a situation or event. Through the institutionalization of such ideas, collectives stimulate their members to feel in a comparable way. Consequently, “even states may stimulate, represent, and embody collective emotions” (Wolf, 2017, p. 492).

Even though emotions are a crucial dimension of identity, not all forms and instances of collective emotion need to correspond to an established cultural identity. Rather than emerging from distinct cultural identities, collective emotions may spring from lived social interactions. This does not deny that some patterns of emotions can strengthen cultural identities, nor that shared emotions exist among populations who strongly identify with a group identity. However, “in a world of unconscious, overlapping, and sometimes fleeting emotional responses, such connections should not be assumed in advance” (Ross, 2014, p. 8).

Representations of emotions, whether it be through political speeches or media images, are “the mechanisms through which individual emotions acquire a collective dimension and, in turn, shape social and political processes” (Hutchison & Bleiker, 2017, p. 502). Rather than a recent phenomenon on the political scene, emotions are thus central to politics itself (Cossarini, 2014, p. 295). The widespread
assumption that elites are somehow above the influence of emotions is, as mentioned earlier, challenged by Andrew Ross (2014). According to him, a strict separation between elites and ordinary people conceals reciprocal sensitivities and situations where elites are part of emotion-evoking situations. Instead, cultural and political elites such as state officials and decision-makers are deeply involved in emotional interactions, that is, they are “inspired, shaped, and legitimized by social displays and exchanges of emotion” (Ross, 2014, p. 6). Elites react to problems that are laden with emotional significance and their communication is received by various audiences responding to narratives, symbols and other signals they make use of.

Simon Koschut argues that emotions can be seen as an “important link between discursively constructed identities of subjects, on the one hand, and the power exerted through discourses, on the other hand” (Koschut et al., 2017, p. 486). Fierke follows this note, drawing on Michel Foucault’s idea on how power shapes and disciplines the body. According to Foucault the management of bodies and their disciplining is an essential characteristic of Western societies (Foucault & Sheridan, 2011, in: Fierke 2013, p.21). Following this argument sovereign power can thus be understood as being more than simply superiority over territory and the law. Rather, sovereign power needs to be understood as the ability “to draw lines that distinguish different types of subjectivity, determining their place inside or outside community, and thus whether they possess political rights” (Fierke, 2013, p. 21). Since emotions shape bodies and surfaces (Ahmed, 2014) the relation between emotion and the governing of bodies is highly relevant when analyzing the governing of emotions and bodies.
2.3.1 The Performativity of Emotions

According to Fierke (2013, pp. 21–22), a new understanding of the body has developed in social sciences, with the different approaches being linked within three points of agreement: first, bodies are understood as products of culture and society; second, they are the targets of political control and management; third, while being products of the society, bodies also shape and create meaning by acting within and upon their environment. The body is also an important site for understanding the relation between race, gender, and globalization since the body is constituted “as a multidimensional and complex object of political struggle- a ‘cultural battleground’ on which a wide array of issues are fought out” (Nagar et al., 2009, p. 268). With regard to Cologne, the gendered and racialized body can be seen as a site where (global and local) issues of race, identity, gender, culture, nationhood, religion, and security are disputed. Carolin Schurr (2013, p. 114) argues, that a performative understanding of emotions helps to link emotions to specific places, histories and (collective) bodies, as well as facilitates the understanding of emotions as expressed through both body and speech acts. She claims that the emotional dimension of institutionalized politics is one site of “political struggles where political communities are generated through emotional performances” (Schurr, 2013, p. 115). The formation of these political communities, or even political identities is based on emotional othering creating antagonistic relations between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Schurr, 2013, p. 115).

As Ahmed shows in her performative approach, emotions are not simply side effects of identity formation processes, but are instead a central element in the production of political identities. Drawing heavily on Judith Butler’s theory on the performativity of gender, Ahmed’s approach can be located in post-structural and queer feminist
theories seeking to deconstruct different naturalized aspects of identity such as gender, race, and ethnicity (Laketa, 2018, p. 180). Butler’s account of performativity understands subjects and collectives as performatively constituted through iterative speech and body acts (Butler, 2004, p. 198) that is “identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results” (Butler, 2006, p. 34). Bridging the gap between Butler’s notion of performativity and theories on emotions, Ahmed conceptualizes emotionalized othering processes through showing how emotions align with bodies, and how these emotions stick to certain bodies and places through the repetition of narratives. She shows for instance through the figure of the ‘asylum seeker’ how emotions circulate and stick to certain surfaces. She suggest that the ‘asylum-seeker’ is such a ‘sticky surface’, with emotions such as fear, denigration, and feelings of invasion tightly attached to the figure (cf. Wetherell, 2012, p. 157).

Ahmed has developed a model of sociality of emotions through which she examines how emotions shape the ‘surfaces’ of both individual and collective bodies. Her work is based on an analysis of texts circulating in the public domain, “which work by aligning subjects with collectives by attributing ‘others’ as the ‘source’ of our feelings” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 1). What she describes as ‘emotionality of text’ is the way “different ‘figures’ get stuck together, and how sticking is dependent on past histories of association that often ‘work’ through concealment” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 13). Linking back to Seshadri-Crook’s analysis of race, I argue that the anxiety produced through encountering the historicity of race leads to the said ‘concealment’ of past association. In this way, racialized subjects are aligned with certain emotions, thus embedded in a certain historicity, which the (white) body/subject fears to historicize since it would disrupt the organization of difference.
Emotions play a significant role in the construction of the “white subject as sovereign in the nation” and thus the alignment of a ‘you’ (or a ‘we’, a group of subjects) with the body of the nation (Ahmed, 2014, p. 1). It is emotional investment that binds subjects to identities, collectives, and particular narratives (Solomon, 2017, p. 499). Through looking at emotions it becomes possible to examine why subjects become invested in structures such as nations and how the alignment with these structures shape individual and collective bodies. According to Ahmed, the analysis of emotions reveals how power shapes both the surface of bodies as well as worlds. Emotions, Ahmed writes, offer a script: “you become the ‘you’ if you accept the invitation to align yourself with the nation, and against those others who threaten to take the nation away” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 12). Hence, the individual subject emerges “through its very alignment with the collective” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 71). For instance, by constructing the nation as a subject who feels, the nation is established as shared ‘object of feeling’ through the ‘orientation’ that is directed towards it. In this way, emotions become performative and include ‘speech acts’ which are based on past histories, simultaneously as they create effects (Ahmed, 2014, p. 13).

Emotions are deeply involved with the sustainment of social hierarchies in the way that they become attributes of bodies and thus transforming hierarchies into bodily traits (Ahmed, 2014, p. 4). Consequently, power relations are integral to understanding emotions (Lutz & Abu-Lughod, 1990). In order to understand these processes, it is necessary to examine how emotions work to ‘make’ and ‘shape’ bodies through the repetitions of actions over time, which involve orientations towards and away from others. Looking at emotions in this way reveals how every action is a reaction, in so far as our doings are formed by the contact we have with others (Ahmed, 2014, p. 4).
According to Ahmed, emotions are always ‘about’ something, in the sense that they imply a direction or orientation towards an object (whereby the objects can be imaginative). Thus, emotions include “a stance on the world, or a way of apprehending the world” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 7). Cossarini (2014, p. 293) argues thus that people expressing emotions about politics fill the political world with meaning. Encounters then, or contacts, are formed by cultural histories and memories of contact, which shape the impression of the encounter, an impression, “that is felt on the surface of the skin” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 7). This means, that an encounter, or being affected by something, includes both bodily feelings, as well as it involves thought and evaluation.

Similar to Loseke’s (2009) comprehension of emotions, Ahmed’s model of ‘sociality of emotions’ understands emotions as social and cultural practices, in which emotions are neither residing in the individual nor the social. Instead, they “produce the surfaces and boundaries that allow the individual and the social to be delineated as if they are objects” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 10). The ‘I’, as well as the ‘we’ are created by, or take the shape of, contact with objects and others. Thus, the surfaces of collective and individual bodies are shaped through the impressions left by others (Ahmed, 2014, p. 10).

Ahmed provides an analysis of ‘affective economies’, meaning that “feelings do not reside in subjects or objects, but are produced as effects of circulation” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 8). Since Ahmed argues that “shared feelings are not about feeling the same feeling” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 10).

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4 In emotion or affective studies the distinction between “emotion” and “affect” is both ambiguous and contested. A common distinction relates affect to the body, the within, while emotion is related to subjectivity and cognition. Ahmed herself has argued that this distinction can be helpful in some instances, but she also criticizes a generalization of this (Schmitz & Ahmed, 2014). In this thesis, I don’t think that a separation of affect and emotion is very helpful, since my understanding of emotion as performative transgresses this distinction. Therefore I will sometimes use these concepts interchangeably.
she suggests, that it is not emotions which circulate, rather it is the objects of emotions who move, “become sticky, or saturated with affect, as sites of personal and social tension” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 11). This circulation of objects includes the transfiguration of others into objects of feeling (Ahmed, 2014, p. 11).

While Ahmed emphasizes the importance of relationality, context, and repetitive practice in her conceptualization of emotions, she has been criticized for, paradoxically, decontextualizing emotion through focusing on specific identifiable emotions in her analysis (Laketa, 2018, p. 182; Wetherell, 2012). For this thesis however, Ahmed’s focus on specific emotions such as love, hate, shame, fear, pain, and disgust provides a helpful framework of analysis which I will apply to the German debate on Cologne.

2.3.2 The Politics of Emotions

Collective emotions such as love for the nation, hate, fear, or disgust for the stranger other are central in the constitution and consolidation of (collective) identities (Hark, 2017, p. 53). One of the most powerful emotions connected to (national) identities is arguably that of love. As Benedict Anderson has written; “nations inspire love, and often profoundly self-sacrificing love” (Anderson, 1991, p. 141). Love, is narrated as the emotion that makes collectives seek to defend the nation against others, who become the object and origin of hate (Ahmed, 2014, pp. 122–123). Through love, an ideal image of a self is established and this idea can be a “we”, a self that belongs to a community (Ahmed, 2014, p. 106). Ahmed describes identification (with the nation) as a form of loving, as loving in the sense of ‘towardsness’. It encompasses the wish to become the other, which is the object of love and an idealized image. In this way, “identification expands the space of the subject: it is a form of love that tells the
subject what it could become in the intensity of its direction towards another” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 126 original emphasis).

The other, can however never be reached, thus connecting the love for the other with the feeling of loss. Often in nationalist discourses the nation as the object of love has been taken away and must be retrieved. The racialized others then become the obstacle for the white subject to overcome, in order to retrieve the nation as a loved object (Ahmed, 2014, p. 131). Imagined nations are deeply gendered, and women often have the role of “symbolic border guards and as embodiments of the collectivity, while at the same time being its cultural reproducers” (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p. 23). Therefore, the ‘native’ female body plays an important part in nationalist discourses as site for the cultural and biological reproduction of the nation.

In discourses of multiculturalism however, the racialized other is included in the image of the nation, in order to allow the subjects who identify with the nation to see themselves as a “good or tolerant subject” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 131). The nationalist or racist becomes here another ‘other’, who does not reflect back the tolerant image the nation has of itself, and thus becomes together with the ‘unassimilable, thus unlovable migrant’ a breach in the ideal image of the nation (Ahmed, 2014, p. 134). Becoming part of the nation requires for the migrant however not to fully give up their identity, rather a specific form of hybridity as reflection of the multicultural national identity is demanded (Ahmed, 2014, p. 134). This hybridity symbols the love for difference, and a failure to comply, both of the

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5Hybridity is an important and contested concept in postcolonial literature. According to Homi Bhabha, one of the most prominent authors on hybridity, “colonial subjectivity must be seen as a hybrid character revealing the possibility of undermining colonial authority, because it enables a form of subversion that turns the discursive dominance into ground of intervention” (Bhabha, 1984, p. 125). This concept has to some extent served as critique to Edward Said’s (1979) understanding of the colonial discourse producing rather fixed positions of the ‘West’ and its colonial (oriental) ‘Other’.
racialized other and the white nationalist other, is then perceived as a failure to love the nation (Ahmed, 2014, p. 137). This failure becomes the “explanation for the failure of multiculturalism to deliver the national ideal” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 139).

The failure to fulfill or approximate the ideal can produce shame. Individuals can become implicated in national shame insofar as they align themselves with the nation and national shame is then transformed to individual shame (Ahmed, 2014, p. 102). According to Ahmed, shame is necessarily connected to love, since “what is exposed in shame is the failure of love, as a failure that in turn exposes or shows our love” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 106). Different than with the feeling of disgust, where the “bad” feeling is expelled and stuck to the body of others, shame is attributed to oneself, thus leaving the subject with nowhere to turn (Ahmed, 2014, p. 106).

Feelings of disgust and pain have in common that they are felt as intrusion, as an unwanted transgression of the (subjective) border (Ahmed, 2014). Ahmed, drawing on Kristeva’s concept of abjection and in line with Tyler’s ‘social abjection’, describes the process of abjection as a form of “vomiting, as an attempt to expel something whose proximity is felt to be threatening and contaminating” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 94). On the collective level, the shared condemnation of a disgusting object signifies the disgust that is felt through the “penetration of the world by that which is deemed sickening” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 96).

In this vein, pain is similarly felt as the unwanted and hurtful contact or penetration of something external. Thus, pain involves the transgression of borders which Ahmed describes as that which visibilizes these borders in the first place. The violation of borders then creates the urge to expel the pain or the (sometimes imaginary) object that we locate as the cause of it (Ahmed, 2014, p. 27). According to Ahmed, the sensation of pain is commonly symbolized
through ‘the wound’, which works as “a trace of where the surface of another entity (however imaginary) has impressed upon the body, an impression that is felt and seen as the violence of negation” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 27).

The feeling of pain is also involved in how bodies occupy space and time. It establishes borders between subjects and moves bodies towards or away from each other. Through pain, the limits of the body are felt, since pain, as the intensification of a sensation makes body-parts visible which are otherwise forgotten (Ahmed, 2014, p. 26). How pain feels is an effect of past impression, moreover, “pain is not simply an effect of a history of harm; it is the bodily life of that history” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 32).

In the politics of fear and hate the object of love has a central place, since “turning away from the object of fear also involves turning towards the object of love, who becomes a defense against the death that is apparently threatened by the object of fear” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 68). The object of love is according to Ahmed also partly involved in the production of anxiety, since anxiety comes from “a love that can be taken away, as the taking away of that which secures the subject’s relation to the world” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 67). The anxiety about the possibility of the loss of love is transferred onto objects of fear, which are read as dangers that could be avoided, and as hindrances to the fulfilment of love itself (Ahmed, 2014, p. 67).

Ahmed examines the “relationship between fear and the alignment of bodily and social space” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 64) and the role of fear in sustaining power structures, in particular how narratives of crisis can preserve existing social norms (Ahmed, 2014, p. 64). She reveals how fear is attributed to the bodies of others and how fear confines the mobility of some, while extending the mobility of others. Fear does not necessarily include the defense of already existing borders, instead, fear establishes those borders by creating objects from which
the subject can flee (Ahmed, 2014, p. 67). These borders, both of individuals and nations, are continuously being made and undone (Tyler, 2013, p. 46).

However, fear does not only affect the border between the self and the other, but in addition “the relation between the objects that are feared (rather than simply the relation between the subject and its objects) is shaped by histories that “stick”, making some objects more than others seem fearsome” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 67). The ‘objects’ of fear are shaped by the approval of narratives about what should not and what should be feared and about who the appropriate object is. Ahmed refers to the work of Elizabeth Stanko (1990) to show how the politics of fear is interlinked with the politics of mobility: according to Stanko, women’s mobility in public areas is restricted through narratives of female vulnerability. These narratives imply that women should either stay at home, or be on guard when accessing public spaces (Ahmed, 2014, p. 69). Therefore, the mobility of some bodies is linked to the restriction of the mobility of other bodies (Ahmed, 2014, p. 70). Another example of how emotions are connected to the mobility of bodies is given by Caroline Schurr who describes how indigenous people may avoid “contact with racist white bodies by staying away from urban centers” (Schurr, 2013, p. 116).

According to Ahmed, fear is not simply concerned with the security of “‘me’, but also ‘us’, or ‘what is’ or ‘life as we know it’, or even ‘life itself’” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 64). Hence, fear works by constructing others as “fearsome insofar as they threaten to take the self in” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 64). Fear, Ahmed writes, functions not only through the bodies, but also works “on the bodies of those who are transformed into its subjects, as well as its objects” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 62).

The centrality of race in the construction of subjectivities and the circulation of emotions is much apparent in Ahmed’s work. Having as
example a racialized encounter of a white child and a black man, Ahmed shows how fear is interlinked with past histories of association which makes possible the construction of the white body as distinct from the black body in the present. Thus, fear established distances between bodies and establishes the “apartness” of white bodies (Ahmed, 2014, p. 63). Distances can however only be established through the existence of relationships of proximity. As Ahmed exemplifies through the figure of the stranger for instance, the stranger as subject of fear only comes into being through its proximity to places that are imagined without its existence. A language of fear produces the intensification of ‘threats’, meaning the intensification of the distinction between those who are ‘threatened’ and those who are threatening (Ahmed, 2014, p. 72). However, collective emotions, here particularly fear, are always open to contestation and destabilization (Van Rythoven, 2015, p. 464).

Intimately connected to narratives of threat is the emotion of hate, since it is “involved in the very negotiation of boundaries between selves and others, and between communities, where ‘others’ are brought into the sphere of my or our existence as a threat” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 72). Hate cannot be connected to one figure, but instead creates the “outline of different figures or objects of hate, a creation that crucially aligns the figures together, and constitutes them as a ‘common threat’” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 72). The impossibility of reducing hate to only one figure allows for the circulation of hate, “working to differentiate some others from others, a differentiation that is never ‘over’, as it awaits others who have not yet arrived” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 47).

Fear and anxiety “create the effect of borders, and the effect of that which we are not” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 72). The transgression of these borders is necessary in order to secure them as borders, which means that something must first be viewed as being insecure to allow for its
securitization. Being more specific, the notion of a crisis in security justifies new forms of security, surveillance, and border policing (Ahmed, 2014, p. 76). Narratives of crisis are for instance used within politics to legitimate a ‘return’ to values or tradition that are said to be under threat, that is to “produce the moral and political justification for maintaining ‘what is’ (taken for granted or granted) in the name of future survival” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 77; cf. Kinnvall, 2017, p. 91). Often, the announcement of a crisis is connected to a fact, figure, or event, which is read and transformed into “a fetish object that then acquires a life of its own” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 72).

A crisis is discursively not necessarily only linked to threatening external others, but to claims about “internal forms of weakness, such as secularization, multiculturalism and the decline of social and familial ties” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 72). However, “these various others come to embody the failure of the norm to take form; it is the proximity of such other bodies that ‘causes’ the fear that forms of civilization (the family, the community, the nation, the international civil society) have degenerated” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 72). It is these others who are assigned blame for pre-existing weaknesses in order to dispel some of the social anxiety attached to this danger (Combes, 2017, p. 130).

2.4 Securitizing Identity

The process of securitization, most prominently theorized by the so-called Copenhagen School, involves the identification of a security issue, which constitutes a “speech act” in which an issue is portrayed as presenting an existential threat to a defined referent object (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998, pp. 26–32). This concept has been further developed by Barry Buzan, including exceptional measures or/and
emergency actions as part of the securitization process, meaning that the issue or “threat” is moved from the realm of politics to the realm of security (Dannreuther, 2013, p. 57).

According to Karin M Fierke the “political landscape comes to be defined by the question ‘Security for whom?’” (Fierke, 2013, p. 23). On this note, Jef Huysmans indicates that issues of security not only order social life in a certain way, but provide “a space within which a political community can represent and affirm itself” (Huysmans, 1998, p. 238). This is possible through threat construction and the externalization of fear which moderates a level of uncertainty (Huysmans, 1998, p. 235). Since a perception of threat can open up space for stabilizing a political identity, the lack of it (a threat) can destabilize or damage this identity.

According to Huysmans, security, as an ordering activity which arranges social relations in a specific way, is what a state’s legitimacy rests upon. Providing order, in an ontological sense6, is a crucial function of a state. Since strangers articulate ambivalence and uncertainty, they pose a challenge to the possibility of ordering itself (Huysmans, 1998, pp. 241–242). Constructing strangers as enemies is thus a way to reduce ambiguities and eliminate a threat. Huysmans argues, that this opens a way for “looking at the significance of the securitization of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers” (Huysmans, 1998, p. 242).

Combes (2017) uses Huysman’s figure of the stranger to deconstruct the distinction between self/other and friend/enemy, since much of IR literature tends to reify the subject positions of self/other

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6 Huysmans describes ontological security as the fixing of social relations into a symbolic and institutional order (Huysmans, 1998, p. 242). There is a great amount of literature discussing the relation of ontological security, globalization, and the securitization of subjectivity (see for instance (Kinnvall & Mitzen, 2017)). However this will not be included in this thesis.
into an either/or proposition (Combes, 2017, p. 128). She argues, that the stranger as the unknowable subject “becomes a discursive site of identity/security negotiation for the Self” (Combes, 2017, p. 129). Ahmed problematizes the assumption that the stranger is unrecognizable and unknowable (Ahmed, 2000). She argues that “strangers are not simply those who are not known in the dwelling, but those who are, in their very proximity, already recognized as not belonging, as being out of place” (Ahmed, 2000, p. 21 original emphasis). This means that the stranger only comes into existence in its proximity to spaces or places that are imaged without its existence. However, Ahmed agrees that the figure of the stranger is central to identity construction: “it is the recognition of others that is central to the constitution of the subject. […] The subject is not, then, simply differentiated from (its) other, but comes into being by learning how to differentiate between others” (Ahmed, 2000, p. 24). The emotions evoked through such encounters, such as fear, love, hate, and disgust, “provide powerful and rich sites for problematizing questions of nationality and nationhood and the systems of exclusion that adhere and cohere” (Ombagi, 2016, p. 148). Especially since the figure of the stranger is constructed “as a way of containing that which the nation is not, and hence as a way of allowing the nation to be” (Ahmed, 2000, p. 97). Ahmed argues against theorizing the stranger as “simply anybody whom we do not know” (Ahmed, 2000, p. 21 original emphasis), since it conceals differences within particular communities where “others are designated as stranger than other others” (Ahmed, 2000, p. 6 original emphasis).

The figure of the stranger is also involved in the experience of anxiety. This feeling, as Ahmed writes, results from the possibility of loss of the object of love, which implies the loss of a secure sense of being in the world. The displacement of anxiety onto objects of fear which Ahmed mentions, is similar to what Huysmans describes as
turning the stranger into an enemy and thus producing a threat which can be eliminated. The turning towards the object of love, can then be understood as an attempt to secure a stable relation to the world and thus to stabilize one’s sense of self. However, even if fear allows for turning towards the object of love and turning towards a sense of being at home, there remains a distance that can never be abolished and the possibility of loss stays ever open (Ahmed, 2014, p. 68).

Placing Seshadri-Crooks concept of race within theorizations on (collective) identity formation and securitization, the anxiety resulting from encountering the historicity of race reveals yet another part of identity that needs to be securitized. Especially if globalization is viewed as a process enhancing “disembedding mechanisms” which disrupt, or weaken the consolidation of white masculinity as normative (and with this I understand white masculinity as signifier of categorization which include racialization and sexualization processes), then the securitization of racialized identities seems to be a comprehensible reaction.

However, despite a growing interest in the role of emotions in international politics, the link between emotion and securitization is still undertheorized (Van Rythoven, 2015, p. 458). In the light of this, Van Rythoven (2015) emphasizes the centrality of emotions in threat construction and the importance of examining how securitizing speech acts evoke emotional responses. Van Rythoven argues that securitizing moves succeed by evoking “culturally specific fears whose emergences hinges upon the appraisal of recognizable memories, identities, images metaphors, and other tropes to construct a plausible, yet anxiety inducing, future” (Van Rythoven, 2015, p. 466). Recognizing the centrality of emotions in securitization studies would open up for including the role of other emotions than fear, other threat images, the role of gender and embodiment in threat
construction, or the role of emotions in forming communities (Van Rythoven, 2015, p. 470).

2.4.1 Strange Encounters

Cologne can be critically analyzed through Ahmed’s concepts of ‘stranger fetishism’ and the circulation of emotions (Ahmed, 2000, 2014). Cologne can further be understood as a strange encounter and a traumatic event.

According to Ahmed, the nation is “defined against others who are recognised, or known again, as strange and hence strangers” (Ahmed, 2000, p. 97). However, the nation is not simply created against the threatening stranger who is already recognized as being out of place. Instead, Ahmed argues, that (national) identity is established through the differentiation between others and other others. These others are constructed through “differentiating ‘others’ into familiar (assimilable, touchable) and strange (unassimilable, untouchable)” (Ahmed, 2000, p. 100). Ahmed (2000, p. 112) offers a critique of multiculturalism, by showing how the stranger appears as two figures: as representing the ‘outside’ of the national we, and as being incorporated as difference, in order to allow the nation to imagine itself as heterogeneous.

To avoid the reproduction of ‘stranger fetishism’, which results from cutting off figures from their histories of determination and differentiation, and thus giving them a life of their own, Ahmed introduces ‘particularity’ as an approach (Ahmed, 2000, p. 31). This particularity is directed to modes of encountering others, which “names the meetings and encounters that produce or flesh out others, and hence differentiates others from other others” (Ahmed, 2000, p. 144). Thus, we should look at how differences ascribed to the figure of others (such as race and gender), are not something a figure ‘has’, but are “determined at the level of the encounter, insofar as the
immediacy of the face to face is affected by broader social processes, that also operate elsewhere, and in other times, rather than simply in the present (though this is where they may be presented or faced)” (Ahmed, 2000, p. 145). We could therefore look at the historicity of the *strange encounter* Cologne, how it has been made possible, but also at what might possibly follow, at the future the encounter enables.

Despite various different approaches to, and conceptualization of, *trauma* many scholars agree on the relevance of analyzing trauma as a powerful social and political phenomenon, which influences both local, national, as well as global levels of politics (cf. Bell, 2006; Edkins, 2003; Fierke, 2004; Hutchison, 2010; Kinnvall, 2012). Jenny Edkins (2003) shows for instance, how the state can use the memorialization process of trauma to establish meaning and fix the state’s discursive authority over the narrated national history.

What is interesting in understanding Cologne as a traumatic event is the collectivizing potential of representing trauma: “singular events of trauma can be represented in ways that shift them from the realm of the individual to that of a collective” (Hutchison, 2010, pp. 65–66). This means, that traumatic events can produce collective and widely shared meanings which in turn can strengthen political identity and community. They can have impact far into the future through inhabiting societal memories and forming political relations for generations (Hutchison, 2010, p. 81). Trauma is often described as the experience of something so disturbing that it ruptures the “linear narratives through which we experience the everyday” (Hutchison, 2010, p. 67) and thus leaves the humans affected by it with a sense of insecurity and vulnerability. The trauma establishes a new reality in which the traumatized, which can be those directly affected by the traumatic event, as well as distant witnesses, are both feeling destabilized in their sense of self and “continually fearful of others and vigilant for the threat to occur” (Fierke, 2004, p. 477). These
fearful others are crucial to the (new) identity formation. On this note, Julia Kristeva (1991) coined the term *abjection*, describing how this other has been part of the self and has been made an abject through a subjective split. Abjection can be caused by a disruption of identity, such as a traumatic event “and becomes a major ingredient of collective identity formation when the familiar stranger is recognized as a threat” (Kinnvall, 2012, p. 272). This paves the way for political response that creates contexts in which antagonistic security policies and modes of governance prevail (Hutchison, 2010, p. 66). Imogen Tyler (2013) uses Kristeva’s concept of abjection in order to reconceptualize it with help of post-colonial, feminist and critical theory. What Tyler calls *social abjection* is a theory of subjugation and resistance, a cultural political economy of disgust and a mode of governmentality which glues together society and state through forms of “inclusive excluding” (Tyler, 2013, p. 13). Minoritized population are imagined as abjects and hence scapegoated, hypervisibilized, or invisibilized by state actors as well as non-state actors such as media and the public, in order to control, discipline, stigmatize, or censure these groups (Tyler, 2013).
Within the social sciences there has been a recent increase in different approaches theorizing the link between discourse and emotion. Despite differing in various aspects, the approaches share an emphasis on the emotional underpinnings of discourses (Koschut et al., 2017, p. 482). One of the biggest challenges of emotion research is that “due to their subjective nature, we have neither direct access to the emotional states and intentions nor can we retrieve the emotional reception and experience of agents” (Koschut et al., 2017, p. 485). This problem can be solved by relocating the analytical focus to the representational and intersubjective articulation of emotions and how they are communicated within social spheres.

One approach to analyze these representations, and thus the emotional meanings linked to them, is via their explication in discourse or narratives (Koschut et al., 2017, p. 485). Discourse analysis and narrative analysis have emerged as wide and heterogeneous fields of analysis. They are to some extent differing from each other, yet they are partly overlapping, which makes it sometimes difficult to neatly separate them (Livholts & Tamboukou, 2015, p. 3). In this thesis I will use a combination of both in order to highlight what is included in the debate, what is being left unsaid, and how it is told. In the following chapter I will give an introduction to the interrelation of emotion research and narrative analysis and how I plan to combine these two methods. This will be followed by an outline of the limits of this analysis. Finally, I will present the material that the analysis is based on.
3.1 Combining Discourse and Narrative Analysis

In order to more easily analyze the emotions attached to the narratives circulating in the debate, I will follow a more structural understanding of narratives, where the distinction is made between what is told (story), and how it is told (discourse) (Livholts & Tamboukou, 2015, p. 41).

There is an increasing focus on how policy-making processes involve narratives or stories, “defining the problem, the cause of the problem, and the need for particular kinds of policy” (Kusenbach & Loseke, 2013, p. 26). Narratives are crucial to the human experience and are emotionally structured, at the same time as the nature of emotions is narrative (Kleres, 2011, pp. 183–185). In particular this means “that emotions are embedded in narratives and are in fact socially learned through narratives or rather, stories” (Kleres, 2011, p. 185).

However, the “subjective representations of these elements, their significance, are highly contingent” (Kleres, 2011, p. 186) and understanding present emotional experience is dependent on understanding the narrative past (Kleres, 2011, p. 186). Narratives can thus never be singular readings of an event, but must be understood as “narrative networks”, which give meaning to events and experiences. What Margaret R. Somers terms ‘narrativity’ is the understanding that events only ever can be read in temporal and spatial relation to other events. What is more, the core characteristic of narratives is that they only gain meaning through ‘emplotment’, that is by “connecting (however unstably) parts to a constructed configuration or a social network of relationships (however incoherent or unrealizable) composed of symbolic, institutional, and material practices” (Somers, 1994, p. 616 original emphasis).
Understanding identity in this way, as “narrative identity” (Somers, 1992), implies that identity formation takes place within overlapping and contested networks of relations among people and institutions (Somers, 1992, p. 609). Identity is thus shaped by various overlapping narrative networks, such as gender, class, and race. These socially circulating narratives can encompass sets of expectations and moral judgements about the world, which can transmit to large audiences and thus become resources for actors to make sense of self and others (Kusenbach & Loseke, 2013, p. 23). These narratives describe types of people and proscribe relationships among them; they “form the background of thinking and filter perceptions in daily life” (Kusenbach & Loseke, 2013, p. 25).

Loseke claims that the most powerful narratives, or those deemed most believable by a vast, heterogeneous audience, are those encompassing the “most widely and deeply held symbolic and emotion codes” (Kusenbach & Loseke, 2013, p. 25). They are also narratives who “provide paradigmatic truths, i.e. when they become perceived as natural, essential, and given” (Andrews et al., 2015, p. 143). Andrews et al. (2015) refer to what has been termed by Jacques Lacan (1988) as “master signifiers” and which describes “those signifiers to which a subject’s identity is most intimately bound” (Andrews et al., 2015, p. 143). These master signifiers are powerful narratives such as nationhood, religion, culture, gender, and whiteness, and are arguably important regarding identity formation.

Since I intend to look at how emotions work in constructing the different subjectivities in the debate on Cologne, these narratives provide an orientation for which themes to look for in the material and how emotions are employed there.

The concept of discourse provides helpful opportunities to understand and analyze the politics of emotions, since emotions are socially embedded and constituted through discourse (Hutchison &
Bleiker, 2017, p. 501). Emotion discourse, is speech that appears to have “some affective content or effect” (Lutz & Abu-Lughod, 1990, p. 10). The production of emotional meaning in discourse enters into wider spheres of power and violence (Loseke, 2009, p. 516) and studying the language of emotion and the production of social meaning can help understanding “the ways in which specific emotional configurations inform the discursive construction and negotiation of self-identities, social relationships, and moral sensibilities” (Katriel, 2015, p. 58). Emotions are a crucial component of persuasive communication in mass media, science, politics as well as other sectors of social live and successful emotional persuasion is dependent on having ‘cultural resonance’. Employing emotion codes that are deeply embraced and agreed upon in a society, will most probably provide a powerful emotional frame (Loseke, 2009, pp. 516–517).

Building on Ahmed’s conceptualization of emotions, I will complement her reading by using Koschut et al.’s (2017) approaches of emotional othering, intertextuality of emotions, and performativity of emotions. Emotional othering encompasses examining “the way emotional expressions refer to the other in discourses” through analyzing “the construction of chains of connotations between words or pairs of concepts and their emotional meaning, which are often reproduced via polarizing speech acts” (Koschut et al., 2017, p. 484). Contextualization of emotions in terms of othering further encompasses the tracing of emotional reactions within specific cases, as well as “reconstructing the emotionally performative effects of how such discourses gain currency and power with particular audiences” (Solomon, 2017, p. 500). The intertextuality of emotions emphasizes the “interconnection and cross-links between different texts in shaping authority and constructing identities” (Koschut et al., 2017, p. 485). The intertextual dimension of emotions contains also how these
emotions are represented and communicated (Hutchison & Bleiker, 2017, p. 502). The performativity of emotions “involves the activation of chains and motives of speech acts using the deliberate emotional construction of subjects” (Koschut et al., 2017, p. 485).

To analyze what is being told I will draw upon Somers’ concept of ‘emplotment’, which emphasizes the importance of looking at how narratives must be understood as overlapping and contested networks. This means that the stories told have to be read in relation to other competing, complementing, or overlapping experiences and events. I will use Koschut et al.’s concepts for contextualizing emotions in discourse, in particular emotional othering, performativity of emotions, and intertextuality of emotions to illustrate how the stories are told, that is which emotion codes are employed and how they work (performatively).

This means that besides looking at what is being told in the Bundestags-debates, I will also examine how emotional expressions are used and how they refer to subjects. That is, I will analyze the construction of chains of connotations between words and concepts and their emotional meaning. I will also analyze how these emotions construct subjects in different texts (speeches). Ahmed’s theorization on the emotions of fear, love, hate, pain, disgust, and shame will provide an orientation for which emotion codes to look for and how these emotion codes work. In order to do so, I need to contextualize the emotional expressions, meaning that I need to look both at the historicity of the particular emotion expressed and at the particularity of the emotional encounter.
3.2 Decolonizing Knowledge and its Limits

Feminist and postcolonial scholarship stresses the importance of acknowledging the ‘situatedness’ of knowledge (Haraway, 1988), meaning that my location as researcher emerges “as a result of geopolitical, economic and social relations, privilege and power” (Livholts & Tamboukou, 2015, p. 137). Mona Livholts and Maria Tamboukou emphasize the need to “de-colonise knowledge by addressing questions of location in regard to the discursive silence of privilege” (Livholts & Tamboukou, 2015, p. 139 original emphasis).

An example of the discursive silence of privilege is for instance what I have earlier referred to as the ‘invisibility of whiteness’ and the notion of the white body, or here researcher, as being ‘unmarked’. It describes the discursive power to remain invisible, which is connected to having control over which bodies are visualized in discourses, which stories are told, and what remains untold, unvoiced, or in the sense of Spivak (1995) ‘unheard’. Mohanty’s (2003) well-known criticism of white Western feminism addresses precisely this notion of ‘unmarkedness’ of the researcher:

“The claim to a lack of identity or positionality is itself based on privilege, on a refusal to accept responsibility for one’s own implication in actual historical or social relations, on a denial that positionalities exist or that they matter, the denial of one’s own personal history and the claim to a total separation from it” (Mohanty, 2003, p. 102)

Not only is this thesis marked and limited by my own situatedness in geopolitical power relations, moreover, “what is or has been narrated can […] be taken as a discursive event that actualises only a
limited set of lines of thought, which however keep making connections with a myriad other possibilities for life to be expressed” (Livholts & Tamboukou, 2015, p. 94). This means that my analysis will only include a fracture of the discourses and narratives that are ‘out there’. Livholts and Tamboukou (2015, p. 94) argue that the unsaid, these other possibilities of narratives and meaning, can work as forces that are potential diversions, discontinuities, or unexpected changes in a sequential flow. Hence, I will not only look at what is being told, but will, through contextualizing the narratives employed, also try include what is left out in the stories told in the debates.

Since I will only be looking at the discourses and narratives circulating in the German parliamentary debates, the voices heard will mostly be those of white men and women. This means that most of the subject positions produced in these discourses are not heard themselves in my analysis. I won’t be able to include the voices of those who were attacked in the New Year’s night of 2015 in Cologne, nor will I look at the perspective of the different “others” produced in the discourse. However, a deconstructive analysis always opens up the possibility for challenging dominant and naturalized stories and thus offers space for change. Since I will look at how whiteness operates as a system of organizing difference, I need to clarify that I am writing from the position of being white. This means that what I will make visible in the analysis, may be less apparent to me than to non-white people (cf. Ahmed, 2004). Having to translate the German debate on Cologne to English means that the results are influenced by my own interpretation of how to best translate the discussions. Sometimes this might lead to a slight distortion of the original meaning. However, I will do my best to preserve the original meaning in the translation.
3.3 Empirical Material

The material used in this analysis consists of minutes of plenary proceedings discussing the events on New Year’s in Cologne and its consequences. Included are the first discussions on Cologne after New Year’s Eve, but even recent debates. This makes it possible to see how Cologne has been memorialized and what political consequences have resulted from the discussion. In the newest plenary proceedings the racist party AfD is also represented, which both works as an indicator for how the political landscape has changed since New Year’s 2015, and makes it possible to examine how the inclusion of AfD in the discussion might influence the debate. In order to contextualize the discussions better, I have also included some petitions and other parliament documents that where mentioned in the debates. Additionally, I included extracts from party manifestos and other speeches that seemed relevant.

The homepage of the German Bundestag provides the possibility to use a key-word search on all the parliament documents published in a specific timeframe. The earliest material is from the 13th of January 2016 (when Cologne was discussed for the first time) and the most recent is from 1st of March 2018. The key words I used were “Cologne” and “New Year’s (Eve)”, which resulted in a range of relevant minutes, petitions, and other parliamentary documents. The attacks in Cologne were mentioned in 26 documents over the course of time, the shortest consisting of 8 pages, while the longest document contained 470 written pages. Even though my material is rather limited due to the fact that I only look at the discourse within the parliament, it still provides me with a sufficient ground for analysis. All the material used is listed in the bibliography. The specific dates can be found in the bibliography and in the annex.
4 Analysis - Feeling the Nation

In the following analysis I discuss how different emotions circulate in the debate and how they work to constitute identities. This draws heavily upon Ahmed’s theorizing on the role of emotions in constructing (collective) identities and how she conceptualizes love, hate, shame, fear, pain, and disgust. In each chapter I present quotes from the parliamentary discussions to illustrate which emotions and narratives I have found. Since narratives are neither mutually exclusive, nor uncontested, I expect to find several different overlapping and/or competing narratives, producing different emotions and subjects. I will begin with the feeling of love in order to present the idealized images of Germany surfacing in the debates. These images will be further complicated throughout the analysis through the feelings of hate (4.2), shame (4.3), fear, (4.4), and disgust and pain (4.5).

4.1 Love for the Nation

“Madam President! Dear Ladies and Gentlemen! People from 194 nations live in Germany. We have long been a country of immigration, a country of cultural diversity, and that’s a good thing - not only since the large influx of refugees in recent months. The fact that we are also internationally perceived as cosmopolitan and hospitable is a great asset - a very valuable asset” Elfi Scho-Antwerpes (SPD ‘plenary protocol 18/153’, 2016, p. 15098 D)

The introduction to the speech by Elfi Scho-Antwerpes is one of the competing narratives constructing an unreachable idealized image
of Germany, which however is contested in itself. The narrative upheld by Scho-Antwerpes paints a picture of a tolerant and multicultural Germany and I argue that it quite evidently signifies the love for the tolerant multicultural nation that Germany seeks to represent. In particular in 2015, the term ‘Willkommenskultur’ ('welcoming culture’) was on everybody’s lips, referring to Germany’s attitude towards incoming refugees. While this concept symbolizes the welcoming of refugees as love for difference, it is based on forms of exclusion and inclusion that reproduce global inequalities (Westwood & Phizacklea, 2000). I think that the idea of being a tolerant and open nation risks reinforcing the notion of the modern and superior Occident, concealing colonial legacies, and reproducing the misrepresentation of the dynamics of imperialism and colonialism. These are bound to the structural entanglements of power between world regions from the past until today (Boatcă, 2015). The love expressed for the German values of hospitality and cultural diversity, and the will to include the ‘newcomers’ into this already existing nation and set of values, fails to make room for “commitments and practices [that] can imagine immigrants and refugees as not mere objects, but co-architects of new worlds” (Weber, 2016, pp. 80–81). This is connected to El-Tayeb’s concept of racial amnesia, and the embodiment of impossibility by racialized groups in Europe/Germany. On this note, Beverly Weber writes: “Syrian refugees, for example, who arrive in order to claim their right to be free of the violence they face in Syria, are simultaneously hypervisible-discussed as masses of non-European bodies, often masculinized- and invisible, as humans claiming the very human rights by which Europe often defines itself” (Weber, 2016, p. 72). This hypervisibility of masculinized and racialized ‘non-European bodies’ is additionally linked to religion. The next statements reveal the boundaries of the nation, especially in relation to religion:
“If culturally mixed couples are presented in the media, our culture must endure that and it can do it. […] We can see […] in the course of the refugee influx young men from Islam-influenced cultures meeting young German women. So what?” Anita Schäfer (CDU/CSU ‘plenary protocol 19/7’, 2018, p. 594 B)

"Our own Christian-Jewish identity must remain strong. This means that we first have to take care of ourselves; for we can only confidently confront Muslims when we have our own strong identity" Marian Wendt (CDU/CSU ‘plenary protocol 19/7’, 2018, p. 601 B)

The first statement expresses that ‘culturally mixed couples’ are tolerated in Germany, yet it is something the German culture must ‘endure’. The expression ‘to endure something’ reminds me of suffering and of tolerating pain. In this way, the utterance evokes both the image of distinct cultures, here the Islam-influenced cultures mixing with the ‘German’ culture, and of pain that is caused by the encounter, yet this pain is tolerated. The image of the tolerant, multicultural nation is produced through inclusive exclusion: Young men from Islam-influenced cultures meet young German women. Islam is here tolerated, yet excluded, since this statement implies that young German women cannot be Muslims.

The second statement defines even more concrete which religion is included in a German identity, and it demarcates which religion is seen as intrusive. In the debates on Cologne the ‘threatening others’ are connected to Islam, in contrast to Christianity. No other religions are brought into the discussion. It is Christianity that either has to be defended against Islam, or has to coexist with it. Throughout the debate, Islam-influenced cultures are discursively linked to
“patriarchal societies like India or Morocco” (Katrin Göring-Eckardt (Alliance 90/The Greens ‘plenary protocol 18/148’, 2016, p. 14576 B)) which are threatening the German values of equality and freedom, embodied by the ‘influx’ of young male refugees: “Our way of life, which includes equal rights for men and women […] is not self-evident in all countries and cultures of the world” (Dr. Ole Schröder (CDU/CSU ‘plenary protocol 18/158’, 2016, p. 15467 B)).

However, this narrative is not exclusively linked to the rhetoric of CDU and AfD, but can be found in speeches by the SPD, as well as the Alliance 90/The Greens. These threatening others are differentiated from the “innocent refugees” who have to be protected from being seen as criminals (Heiko Maas (SPD ‘plenary protocol 18/148’, 2016, p. 14576)). In other words, everyone who keeps refugees ‘particularly close to their heart’ needs to make this distinction (Katrin Göring-Eckardt (Alliance 90/The Greens ‘plenary protocol 18/148’, 2016, p. 14576 B)). This is a narrative that frames Germany as a multicultural nation, where an identity is constructed through the differentiation between stranger others (the foreign criminals) and familiar others (the innocent refugee, the integrated foreigner, the one with ‘migrant background’ etc.). This narrative is however contested in several ways, the most prominent being the AfD with their nationalistic rhetoric.

Nonetheless, the CDU also engages in this narrative. According to Marian Wendt: “Of course: Multikulti [Multiculturalism] has failed” (CDU/CSU ‘plenary protocol 19/7’, 2018, p. 601 C). Interestingly, it is in the same parliamentary session that two different CDU members on the one hand frame multiculturalism as failed, while on the other hand express tolerance towards other cultures (see quotation above). This shows once again how narratives are continuously renegotiated and contested. A competing narrative follows below:
“What we now have is, unfortunately, a law that largely reflects the political understanding of white old men; because it is obviously not possible for the CDU to protect sexual self-determination without at the same time turning criminal law upside down and extending deportation law. […] You enable the debate about anchoring sexual self-determination to be overshadowed by other debates, and that's bitter and disgusting” Halina Wawzyniak (The Left ‘plenary protocol 18/183’, 2016, p. 18005)

The Left constantly contests the narrative of a tolerant and gender equal nation through repeatedly pointing out the increase of racism and hate crime in Germany and through recurrently reminding that patriarchy and sexism is not part of a specific culture, but is part of every culture: “Sexism is not imported from abroad, but unfortunately integral to our society” (Katja Kipping (The Left ‘plenary protocol 18/148’, 2016, p. 14573 B)). The Party further stresses the importance of combatting domestic violence and everyday sexism. According to Katja Kipping: “obviously also the German violent partners must be integrated” (The Left ‘plenary protocol 18/148’, 2016, p. 14573 C). A sentence that appears to me to mock the prominent claim that refugees need to be integrated into a gender equal Germany.

The quote above is the only incident where race is mentioned and it attaches sexual- and immigration politics of ‘old white men’ to feelings of bitterness and disgust. It speaks of a feeling of loss connected to the Left Party’s imagined nation. Bitterness can, according to the German dictionary Duden (2018), be an expression of pain and disgust. Pain can according to Ahmed be experienced through the loss of the ideal nation and this loss can be caused by someone or something who then becomes the object of hate and disgust. Having this in mind, the quote above becomes an expression
of disgust directed towards the ‘old white men’ who do not reflect the idealized image of the multicultural nation. Hence they are causing the pain felt by the Left Party since they are responsible for the loss of the imagined nation. The closeness of these different emotions found in one statement shows both how emotions are always relational, but also how different objects/subjects, such as the nation or a political party, circulate in the discussion and are constructed through the attachment of different emotions.

4.2 The Circulation of Hate

Hate cannot be connected to one figure, but creates the “outline of figures or objects of hate, a creation that crucially aligns the figures together, and constitutes them as a ‘common threat’” (Ahmed, 2014). Most of the anger uttered in the discussion is directed towards the sexual offenders, the “criminal” foreigners, and the racists. Even though most of the anger expressed in the Bundestag debates is attached to perpetrators of violence, there is one subject who surfaces through the circulation of hate, who differs from the ‘racialized strangers’.

This subject appears foremost in conservative discourses (cf. Boulila & Carri, 2017), yet surfaces also in the Bundestag debates. In particular the speech by Sylvia Pantel (CDU/CSU) narrates a story about the enemy within. Her speech is a response to a petition submitted by the Left Party, which formulates a national initiative against sexism in Germany. This action plan (“show sexism the red card”) includes inter alia measures of gender-sensitive pedagogy, measures in the field of media representation, measures against sexism at the workplace, measures to strengthen and expand the General
Equal Treatment Act (GETA) and measures in the field of violence against women (‘printed matter 18/8723’, 2016).

Pantel starts her speech with saying that she had gotten really angry while reading the petition (‘plenary protocol 18/179’, 2016, p. 17656 B). According to her, the petition (which was submitted as a response to Cologne) trivializes the suffering felt by victims of sexualized violence in order to promote a certain (leftist gender) ideology through their proposed ‘re-education plan’. In addition, the petition pays attention to the racist agitation and stigmatization of Muslims following New Year’s 2015, which according to Pantel relativizes the sexual violence committed. From her point of view, the petition is all about “ideology, paternalism, and re-education” (‘plenary protocol 18/179’, 2016, p. 17657 C), when it should be about the real problem:

“It was not German young men, it was young men from North Africa, most of whom were false refugees in Germany. Of course, that does not mean that all men from North Africa are rapists, diggers or thieves. Nobody says that either. But we have to call a spade a spade and differentiate” (‘plenary protocol 18/179’, 2016, p. 17656 C)

By ‘not calling a spade a spade’ and instead promoting a specific ideology, Pantel accuses the Left Party of deviating from the real problem, thus posing a threat, or at least a hindrance to achieving a ‘better life for the people in our country’ (‘plenary protocol 18/179’, 2016, p. 17657 C). She continues her speech with criticizing the

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7 Original phrase: “Aber wir müssen die Dinge beim Namen nennen und differenzieren”, which more directly translates to “but we have to call things by their name and differentiate”. 
petition and ideological ‘re-education tools’, such as “grammatically totally messed up gender-neutral language” and worthless gender-sensitive meetings, and condemns the spending of money on the Left Party’s “ideological demands” (‘plenary protocol 18/179’, 2016, p. 17657). She ends her speech with saying that there shouldn’t be any more money spend on “absurd gender-mainstreaming projects” and that “we should show such petitions the red card” (‘plenary protocol 18/179’, 2016, p. 17657 D). Instead, money should be spend on solving the ‘real problem’, that is to say the persecution of offenders.

Her speech ties in to the already existing conservative narrative, in which the Left Party together with anti-racist feminism poses a threat to German gender equality (cf. Boulila & Carri, 2017; Hark, 2017). Within this narrative the refusal to acknowledge that Cologne is a result of ‘too liberal immigration polices’ is argued to be both concealing the real problem (too liberal immigration policies) and playing into the hands of racist extremist such as Pegida and AfD (Boulila & Carri, 2017, p. 289).

Pantel argues, that the petition bemoans sexism and “sees it in every corner of our society” (‘plenary protocol 18/179’, 2016, p. 17657 A). This phrase evokes the impression that sexism is something that is not everywhere in Germany, but that this is only an illusion by the Left Party. Instead, sexism and violence against women exists in foreign countries (she lists Nigeria, Syria, East Anatolia, and Yemen) and “we must be careful to not import these issues into our country” (‘plenary protocol 18/179’, 2016, p. 17656 D).

Even if Sylvia Pantel’s speech might not contain very strong expressions of hate, I do think that hate is the most prominent emotion in her talk. Besides, I want to follow Ahmed’s note that it is important to challenge the narrative that sees hate as something solely linked to extremists, since it “saves the ‘ordinary nation’, or ‘ordinary subjects’, from any responsibility for its violence” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 56). In
circulations of hate, the presence of the other is perceived as threat to the object of love, which is addressed by Pantel in the following sentences:

“What bothers me is that in the middle of Germany, in the middle of the pulsating center of a city that today stands for joie de vivre, freedom and Rhenish liberalism, women were groped, robbed and raped. It bothers me that policemen were helpless and overwhelmed when groups of North African men […] humiliated young women” (‘plenary protocol 18/179’, 2016, p. 17656 C)

The cited statement by Pantel follows her allegation that the Left Party is distorting facts when they claim that Cologne has resulted in racist hate speech and the stigmatization of Muslims (‘plenary protocol 18/179’, 2016, p. 17656 C). Furthermore, she aligns the humiliated women with Cologne, the pulsating city in the middle of Germany, which creates the impression that it was not ‘merely’ women who were attacked, but it was an attack on the German values of joie de vivre, freedom and liberalism. The bodies of these women hence become the body of the nation, which is under threat by the proximity of the other. These values mentioned by Pantel, which may signify aspects of the German identity, are framed as the object of love which needs to be defended against various figures of hate. Ahmed argues that the emotion of hate works to bring to life the ordinary subject through depicting the ordinary as being in crisis and through framing the ordinary person as the ‘real’ victim (Ahmed, 2014, p. 43). According to her, the very proximity of others already represents a crime against the ordinary (person or place) which is under threat. The ‘real’ victims here, are thus ordinary (white) Germans who want to enjoy the spirit of the city of Cologne and embrace the ‘values’ of the country. In Pantel’s argumentation it is not
the racialized German, who has been exposed to increased racism, hate, violence, and stigmatization after Cologne (Boulila & Carri, 2017), who is the victim. This is merely a “distorted fact” presented by the Left Party (‘plenary protocol 18/179’, 2016, p. 17656 C).

Hate operates in different ways which is why the intensity of the hate expressed towards the Cologne-offenders, varies in comparison to the Left Party. Hate is involved in the creation of communities, in the sense that it aligns the white body with the white nation, and the racialized body with a ‘community of strangers’ (Ahmed, 2014, p. 53). However, in Pantel’s speech the ‘we’ is not only created through the alignment of the white body with the nation, but also through its differentiation from the Left Party. Looking at the histories of association revealed in this encounter, the CDU has previously referred to the Left Party as utterly extremist party (Grindel, 2010) and the criticism of the ‘leftist ideology’ reminds, as already mentioned, of the Christian-fundamentalist and conservative ‘anti-gender’ discourse.

In 2013/2014 the originally right-wing term ‘genderism’ was adopted into the societal debate on gender relations. Arguments, initially brought forward through right-wing ideology, can now be found in debates on gender, sexuality and family policy. These arguments are built on the fear that the heterosexual nuclear family is threatened through gender mainstreaming and gender studies (Gäbelein, 2016, p. 2). While these arguments are explicitly addressed in AfD’s manifesto, where it is for instance argued that ‘gender-ideology’ is anti-constitutional since it aims at abolishing the ‘traditional family model’ (AfD, 2017), the closeness to these arguments in Pantel’s speech are apparent. It is apparent to the extent that the Left Party deliberately notes this similarity. A member of the Left Party shouts at the end of Patel’s speech: “Best regards from AfD!” (‘plenary protocol 18/179’, 2016, p. 17658 A).
4.3 Shame for the Nation

Repeatedly speeches held by members of AfD are disturbed through outbursts expressing embarrassment. For instance, Martin Reichhardt’s statement that a gender neutral grammar and a women’s quota won’t stop the ‘islamist-motivated violence’ against women in Germany, is countered by Ulli Nissen (SPD) “This is nonsense (…)! You ought to be ashamed of yourself!” and Michel Brandt (The Left) “This is so embarrassing! For God’s sake!” (‘plenary protocol 19/7’, 2018, p. 597 A). While the first expression puts the focus on the AfD as emotional subject, the latter expression reveals the speaker’s own emotions. It expresses the embarrassment, as well as the anger (for God’s sake!) felt in this encounter.

Following Ahmed’s conceptualization, the experience of shame always implies a connection between that what is thought to ‘provoke’ the shame and the person feeling ashamed. In experiences of shame, Ahmed argues, the feeling is attributed to oneself rather than to the other. However, shame can only be elicited through somebody or something that has provoked desire or even love (Ahmed, 2014, p. 105). We are only ashamed of others who ‘matter’ to us.

I do not want to argue that the expression of shame towards AfD’s utterances by members of other parties implies a desire or love for the racist party. Yet, I do think that the feeling of shame can be linked to the failure of fulfilling the (national) ideal self. In this sense, shame reveals not only the alignment of the subject experiencing shame with the nation, but outlines how the ideal nation is imagined and in which way it is failing this image. What is different here, in regard to for instance expressions of disgust or hate towards AfD, is that the party is not merely recognized as an abject other, but as part of the nation. Only through recognizing that the AfD, or in broader terms, racism, is
part of the nation and thus part of the collective ‘we’, it becomes possible to experience feelings of shame.

It is not surprising that shame is expressed by a member of the Left party, since they are one of the parties who are invested in building a nation that is based on cultural diversity (The Left, 2017), that is a ‘multicultural nation’. As argued in chapter 2.4.1, the ‘multicultural nation’ builds its image on the inclusion of the racialized other, which allows the subjects who identify with the nation to see themselves as ‘good’. The racism expressed by the AfD (or even their mere existence) signifies thus a breach in the ideal image of the nation and becomes the explanation for the failure of multiculturalism to produce the national ideal (cf. Ahmed, 2014, p. 134).

The closeness of the expression of shame (this is so embarrassing!) to the expression of anger or frustration (for God’s sake!) illustrates the relationality of emotions and how it is the objects of feelings who move and become ‘sticky’, and drenched in affect, as locales of personal and social tension. The AfD is here such a ‘sticky’ object, whose surface is shaped by the impressions left by others. Ahmed writes on the feeling of hate: “Bodies surface by ‘feeling’ of others as the cause of injury or as a form of intrusion” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 48). What is more, the characteristic of hate is its difficulty of location. It is an emotion that circulates and induces a sense of threat, but one “that cannot be simply located or found” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 48).

Both characteristics of hate (the impossibility of reducing hate to a particular body, and the feeling of injury) are helpful to understand how the AfD surfaces as part of the nation, as well as its breach, and as the cause of injury. Even though AfD is included as difference (the tolerant multicultural nation), they are as breach of the same image felt as threat and intrusion, as an object of hate. The declaration of
hate for the other, is according to Ahmed at the same time a declaration of love for the self and the community made up of other ‘me’s’ (Ahmed, 2014, p. 52). Hence, the expression of shame (the failure of fulfilling the national ideal image) is followed by the expression of anger which transforms the feeling of shame for the nation into the feeling of love for the nation through expelling the ‘cause of injury’ (here the AfD). This discursive move shows how the borders and boundaries between self and others, between nation and strangers, are continuously (sometimes unconsciously) being remade and renegotiated.

Another example of the feeling of shame connected to the national imaginary can be found in the earlier debates after Cologne, when AfD was not in the Bundestag yet:

“[…] I was impressed by a young man who obviously came out of a mosque and who, asked about […] his opinion on Cologne, said three words: “I am ashamed”. I’m ashamed too, by some things I read on social networks. I’m ashamed when Germans carry gallows or a guillotine on demonstrations. That's not our Germany, that's the past and not Germany in 2016!” Thomas Strobl (CDU/CSU ‘plenary protocol 18/148’, 2016, p. 14578 A)

Different boundaries and subjects come into being in this statement. First of all, Thomas Strobl clearly aligns himself with the nation and points out what is not part of it (that’s not our Germany). The things Strobl refers to, what he reads on social networks and the demonstration, are part of an increase in nationalist and racist (verbal and physical) violence after the New Year’s Eve 2015 and have been mentioned quite frequently throughout the debate on Cologne. While he seems to feel ashamed for the increase in openly expressed racism and hate, he does not express shame towards the events in Cologne.
Instead, he is ‘impressed’ by the young men, who he obviously reads as Muslim, for conveying that he feels ashamed.

Several different subjects emerge in this encounter, all attached to different emotions. If Strobl feels ashamed for racism, then he makes it sound as if the young Muslim must accordingly feel ashamed for the events in Cologne, that is, sexual violence. By aligning himself with the ‘breaches’ of the ideal German nation (that is racism), he aligns the young men with that which is *not* part of the nation. This encounter illustrates how the nation becomes defined through the differentiation between others and other others; between familiar others and stranger others. The young man who made an impression on Strobl is constructed as a familiar, thus touchable or assimilable other and can be loved as difference in a multicultural nation. However, Strobl’s alignment of the man with the events in Cologne and the emphasis on his alleged religion links him clearly to the stranger other, which is the racialized and gendered Muslim refugee. According to Strobl, these “criminal foreigners and asylum seekers” (‘plenary protocol 18/148’, 2016, p. 14578 C) have to be expelled from the country. Having said that, it comes with no surprise that the first legislative change after Cologne resulted in a tightening of the right of residence. While the familiar other (the young man) can be loved as difference, the stranger other is drenched in emotions such as fear, hate, and disgust.

The other subject position emerging in this encounter is the racist familiar other. Even though unwanted, this subject surfaces in a twofold process of inclusive exclusion. First, this subject is made part of the national identity through the feeling of shame. The expression of shame reveals that the subject is included in the national imaginary, though as breach. Second, the racist comes into being as a ‘living thing of the past’: even though Strobl does not explicitly mention Nazi-Germany, referring to racist extremism as ‘the past’ certainly
invokes this specific part of German history. In this way, the subject is included as something that no longer ought to belong to Germany, yet it does.

4.4 Fear, Security, and Mobility

Ulle Schauws (Alliance 90/The Greens) held a speech in a debate on the topic “strengthen freedom and equality of women - Basic Law instead of parallel society” (‘plenary protocol 19/7’, 2018, p. 585 B) initiated and formulated by the AfD:

“Let me say one thing clearly: we do not accept it anywhere when a climate of threat to women arises. The public space belongs to all of us. To be able to stay free and self-determined without fear, everywhere, must remain our premise.” Ulle Schauws (‘plenary protocol 19/7’, 2018, p. 593 A)\(^8\)

This statement shows quite clearly how fear and mobility are interlinked and is an example of Stanko’s observation on how women’s mobility in public areas is restricted through narratives of threat and vulnerability (Stanko, 1990). What I think is interesting here is the temporal dimension: “We do not accept it (...) when a climate of threat to women arises” and “to be able to stay free (...) without fear (...) must remain our premise”. Through painting a fearful, threatening, possibly unfree future, Schauws constructs a Germany where women currently can be “free and self-determined

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\(^8\) I have to note that this discussion also concerned the murder of a young girl by a refugee who was a minor. However, throughout this discussion Cologne or simply ‘the night of New Year’s Eve’ is recurrently referred to by all parties.
without fear”. According to Ahmed, “the object that we fear (…) impresses upon us in the present, as an anticipated pain in the future” (Ahmed, 2014, p. 65) and the impressions in the present are dependent on past histories of association. This is a theme that is quite prominent throughout the debate. Recurrently speakers in the Bundestag refer to a peaceful, safe, or gender equal past, which is threatened in the present and must be protected from future pain. It sustains the notion of a crisis and thus validates the attempt to restore ‘normalcy’. According to Ahmed, the various feared others are embodying the failure of normalcy to prevail, and are seen as the ‘cause’ of internal weaknesses, such as -in the case of Cologne- sexism and racism. The causes are both linked to ‘foreign others’, as well as ‘leftist feminists’ which I will explain more thoroughly in the section on disgust and pain.

At several instances throughout the debate, Cologne is referred to as traumatic event (cf. ‘plenary protocol 18/158’, 2016; ‘plenary protocol 18/183’, 2016), and it is repeatedly mentioned in connection to the 2016 Berlin attack\(^9\). All of this supports my argument that Cologne can be read as a trauma, where contesting national narratives are deployed by members of parliament in an attempt to establish meaning through the memorialization process. The rupture caused by this trauma allows for claims to define and (re-)establish normalcy, while its representation in the Bundestag discussions shifts shared meanings from the individual level to the collective. The alleged causes for the traumatic event can be governed as the abject, and that what is perceived as injured or insecure can become securitized. The policy changes deriving from the Cologne debates are mostly linked to

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\(^9\) In December 2016, a truck was deliberately driven into a Christmas market in Berlin leaving 12 people dead. The driver of the truck was thought to be linked to ISIL (Schneider, 2017).
immigration law. In this way, the mobility of specific bodies is interlinked with the politics of fear. What is more, the linking of immigration law to the new rape law, with a conviction of sexual assault leading to deportation, supports Ahmed’s argument that the mobility of some bodies implies the restriction of mobility for other bodies.

4.5 Disgust and Pain - Abjection and Intrusion

Disgust and pain share the feeling of transgressiveness and the urge to expel something unwanted from the body. Martin Reichhard, member of the AfD party, notices in his talk that the mentioning of Islamist-motivated violence against women is creating a specific atmosphere in the Bundestag, which according to him proves that this is a painful issue to talk about. Here it is interesting to look at the German phrase he uses for ‘bringing up a painful issue’, which directly translates to “to put a finger in the wound”. Receiving applause by his fellow party members, Reichhard is confronted with Ulli Nissen’s (SPD) outbreak: “You are the wound!” (‘plenary protocol 19/7’, 2018, p. 596 D).

Locating this exchange of words in Germany’s history, taking into account how this dialogue develops further, and connecting it to Ahmed’s conceptualization of the sensation of pain, opens up for a lot of thoughts. It signifies two competing narratives about how a German identity should be defined. Starting with the narrative deployed by the AfD, the ‘wound’ that Reichhard is talking about can be interpreted as symbol for the injury of the nation. Something external has transgressed the nation’s borders which now causes pain and calls for the expelling of the object.
Following Ahmed’s thinking that pain can make visible certain parts of the body, which sometimes are invisible when focusing on other parts, the discourse following Cologne highlights specific ‘parts’ of the nation which earlier were invisible, or at least not as visible as after the event. In particular, the importance of gender equality as part of a German identity, as well as the existence of racialized others, can be viewed as “the effected zones of the body [which] become enlarged and magnified in the body image” (Grosz, 1994, p. 76). These effected zones may also include an impression of how they are located in time and space. It is this particularity of the wound that is interesting to look at and which is defined differently depending on who is speaking.

Reichhard continues his speech by pointing out how the reason for violence against women is connected to mass immigration from regions where women’s rights are not valued. How said mass immigration can be illustrated through a wound being inflicted on the national body might be quite obvious and is common to nationalist rhetoric. According to Ahmed, narratives of injury are often used within national discourses where the white male subject has been injured or hurt by opening up the nation. Since the wound has been caused by opening up the nation to others, there are people responsible for the border transgression. Reichhard accuses ‘leftist chief-ideologists’, ‘gender equality ideologists’, and ‘pseudo-feminists’ of being responsible for the “destruction of women’s rights in Germany” (‘plenary protocol 19/7’, 2018, p. 597). What is more, the ‘false tolerance’ shown towards these ‘others’ is trivializing the violence committed against women and putting shame on its victims (‘plenary protocol 19/7’, 2018, p. 597). According to Reichhard, everyone in parliament, besides his party colleagues, is betraying women’s rights.

Several conclusions can be drawn from these arguments. The German nation is imagined as already equal, however, several others
are threatening this equality. Not only are foreigners bringing violence against women into the nation, but they receive help by the ‘traitors’ of the German nation and values, that is the leftist and feminist members of parliament. Thus, they are actively taking part in the destruction of core rights to the German constitution.

The phrase “putting a finger in the wound” contains an additional meaning: it hints at bringing up a subject that is hurtful and that therefore nobody wants to talk about. Reichhard’s intention is probably not a deconstructive discussion about race, but he brings into focus that there is a ‘taboo’ that no one talks about.

Reichhard’s speech receives a lot of interruptions and hecklings by members of different parties, such as for instance the already quoted outcry that AfD (or Reichhard himself) is ‘the wound’. I will interpret this interruption as being directed at the party and not solely at Reichhard himself. Hence, I will now turn to the competing narrative produced in this discussion.

Framing AfD as the wound inflicted on the German body, produces an imagined Germany that is free from racist right-wing parties, or even racism itself. The strong reactions continuously provoked by the speeches held by the AfD, can arguably be said to signify the pain felt as the bodily life of a history of harm. I intend to connect this pain to the history of racism in Germany, most intensely associated with the Holocaust. In this way, the wound in form of the AfD as racist and nationalist party is felt as an effect of past impressions of pain. What is more, since the injury draws attention to the wounded body part, I argue that it makes visible not only the current wound, but also the ‘scars’. It reminds of the ever existent presence of racism in Germany, be it through concrete past ‘wounds’, such as the horrors of Nazi-Germany, the attacks on refugee housings as for instance in Rostock-Lichtenhagen in the 90s, racist murders
committed by the far-right German terrorist group NSU (National Socialist Underground), or the current increase in racist hate crime.

I will conclude this chapter with an example of how disgust circulates within the parliamentary debates, since the feeling of disgust shares its ‘transgressiveness’ with pain. In the same parliamentary session as cited above, Anita Schäfer (CDU/CSU) refers to a debate on the German ‘Leitkultur’, initiated by former CDU chairmen Friedrich Merz, to remind about the ‘German culture’ that the party has defined as consisting of i.a. patriotism, Christian heritage, and social traditions which include the shaking of hands between man and women and the rejection of the burqa (FAZ, 2017). This statement is interesting in itself, however, I want to focus on the reaction it provoked. Referring to former chairmen Merz, Dr. Alexander Gauland (AfD) yelled: “You froze him out! - this was when we still voted for the CDU!” (‘plenary protocol 19/7’, 2018, p. 592 D). The German word he used for freezing out is “rausekeln”, which describes the process of disgusting someone to the extent that this person leaves, or moves somewhere else. AfD members recurrently mention that it is due to the CDU’s change in policy and values that their own party came into existence. Abjection captures the notion that the expelled has been part of the body previously and is revolting now and I think it is useful for analyzing the creation and establishment of the AfD in Germany.
5 Concluding Remarks: Producing a Post-racial, Post-feminist Germany

The aim of this thesis has been to reveal how emotions are interwoven with racism and sexism and that these forms of discrimination are very present in the German Bundestag. Furthermore, my intent has been to illustrate how the governing of emotions in events of trauma can be used to secure borders, identities, and bodies, but also to show how these processes are always contested and open to challenges.

In the debates following Cologne, national identity has been constantly renegotiated and some parts reified. While there are some overarching narratives that associate Germaneness with post-feminism (that is gender equality), post-racism, heteronormativity, and Christianity, there are also contesting and competing narratives that circulate. The production of German identities is based on the differentiation between different subject positions that are produced in the debate. The differentiation is established through the alignment of emotions with certain bodies, which turns social hierarchies into bodily traits. I think that in particular my analysis of fear has shown how the attachment of emotions to different objects or bodies (the nation, the refugee, the ‘German’ woman, etc.) produces a narrative of crisis. This allows for formulating both a normalcy that has to be re-established (a post-feminist and post-racist Germany), the crisis and its causes (the weakening of these values through strangers), and measures to restore normalcy- that is in the case of Cologne the securitization of migration politics.

There is a tendency of ‘stranger fetishism’ which means that the subject positions that are produced in the debates are cut off from their specific history and become a ‘thing of their own’. What becomes
apparent in the discussion on Cologne is that the fetishizing of strangers or others is a symptom of what El-Tayeb (2016) calls ‘racial amnesia’. Her concept describes the repetitive process of the “first encounter with the stranger” which is connected to the continuous dialectic of racist moral panic and the repression of the historical presence of racialized others in Europe and particularly in Germany (El-Tayeb, 2016, p. 15). The racialized others are, according to El-Tayeb, “eternal newcomers, forever suspended in time, forever ‘just arriving,’ defined by a static foreignness overriding both individual experience and historical facts” (El-Tayeb, 2011, p. xxv). The dialectic of amnesia and memory is traceable in the discussions surrounding Cologne, since Cologne is a nodal point where amnesia meets memory. It is primarily in connection to a crisis that racialized others become visible, since they are either “assimilated” thus invisible, or become apparent as a stranger (El-Tayeb, 2016, p. 15).

The arguments used in the Cologne debate work once again through the externalization of racism and racialized groups from a German identity. Through this, the German identity is anew reconstructed as foremost heteronormative, white, and Christian and the “refugee crisis” which the debate on Cologne ties in to, is seen as a new crisis, ignoring that the debate is based on old, but forgotten, arguments.

The memorialization of Cologne as a trauma is thus based on the ‘active’ amnesia of past traumas reestablishing a white, Christian (gender equal) German identity. Tying back to Ahmed’s discussion on stranger fetishism, the discussion on Cologne shows both narratives of partial assimilation and incorporation of various others, but also narratives of partial expulsion, defining the limits of what the nation ‘can be’ (cf. Ahmed, 2000, p. 106). Nevertheless, even if certain familiar others are recognized and accepted as assimilable, they still are defined against the image of the German nation which is built on a
“fictive ethnicity” which is consequently (un)marked as white, heterosexual, and Christian.

Since national identity is continuously renegotiated, these processes of inclusion as exclusion which Ahmed describes can be placed within the dialectic of racial amnesia and memory, where the racialized others become visible in the process of exclusion and are made invisible and forgotten in the process of assimilation. Even though the reoccurring invisibility of racialized others claimed by El-Tayeb may somewhat contradict Ahmed’s idea that these others are incorporated as familiar strangers, I think that both conceptions can be useful for understanding Cologne. Since there are always competing narratives forming nationhood, Cologne shows that there are narratives deployed that use multiculturalism as aspect of the German national identity, but they are yet always contested through the definition of German culture and values that are related to the aforementioned fictive ethnicity. This erases the history of the existence of race and racism in Germany and thus the existence of racialized groups.

Continuing the discussion on whiteness as a master signifier and as invisible system organizing racial difference, I think it is interesting to see that the German word for race “Rasse” is not mentioned once. Its replacement with ‘ethnicity’ and ‘migrant background’ is symptomatic for the way Germany is incapable of seeing color. A party member of the Alliance 90/The Greens mentions the section of the German constitution which I have previously referred to: “No person shall be favored or disfavored because of sex, parentage, race, [...]” (Art. 3 (3)). However, instead of using the term race, she replaces it with ethnicity (Alliance 90/The Greens ‘plenary protocol 19/7’, 2018, p. 592 B). This is a strong discursive move, eradicating race from the discussions and reproducing a white national identity. Even though the Christian and gender equal German identity is
challenged by foremost the Left Party and the Alliance 90/the Greens, the whiteness of this identity remains unchallenged through the lack of a discussion about race.

A further indicator of Germany being colorblind is when the AfD is being accused of wanting to “institutionalize racism and to make it a political principle” (Alliance 90/The Greens ‘plenary protocol 19/17’, 2018, p. 1411 C). Racism, so the speaker continues, is simply not compatible with the German constitution. This argument supports the idea that Germany is free from institutional or structural racism.

I want to specifically highlight a change that has occurred over the time of the debate, regarding CDU’s stance on gender equality in Germany and their relation to the AfD. By comparing the statements by both parties analyzed in chapter 4.2 (hate) and chapter 4.5 (disgust and pain) it is being revealed how the emotion of hate expressed by the CDU has been transferred from the Left-wing anti-racist feminists to the AfD. The AfD has become the enemy within, however from their point of view it is still the ‘leftist chief-ideologists’, ‘gender equality ideologists’, and ‘pseudo-feminists’ who are responsible for the erosion of women’s rights in Germany. One may argue, that the AfD has replaced the CDU’s position on these issues, which allows for these political claims to still circulate in the discussion, while the CDU can move more towards the middle of the political spectrum.

Analyzing Cologne as an encounter reveals not only the histories that are associated with the different subjects surfacing, but it also makes spaces for imagining a future. The externalization and erasure of race in the dominant discourse is always open to challenges and an inclusion of (in the parliament) unheard voices would be an interesting opportunity for further research. Since the case of Cologne simply functions as an example for showing how emotions work in constituting (collective) identities, it would also be possible to lift the research to a pan-European level. The contestation of these hegemonic
(national) narratives is conceptualized by Fatima El-Tayeb through the “queering of and destabilizing the exclusionary fictive European ethnicity” (El-Tayeb, 2011, p. xiii). This queering of ethnicity describes the practice of “embodying an identity that is declared impossible even though lived by millions” (El-Tayeb, 2011, p. 167). The queering of ethnicity thus disrupts the idea that the appearance of racialized others is an anomaly and challenges the German amnesia that denies its minorities a past. Taylor’s concept of social abjection can be useful here to grasp both the modes of subjugation and the forms of resistance brought forward by it. While the racialized other is in a reoccurring traumatic subjective split of the nation turned from the familiar other to the stranger other, these processes are met by forms of resistance i.e. through the ‘queering of ethnicity’ (El-Tayeb, 2011, p. 167). It is the embodiment of impossible subject positions and the hybridization of identities that challenge racial amnesia.

The impossibility of location described by El-Tayeb, and the invisibility or hypervisibility of certain groups, becomes apparent when looking at the subject positions missing from the debate. For one thing, the queer body is completely missing from the discussion. This is not surprising since the construction of nations is built on heterosexism (cf. Ahmed, 2000, 2014; Yuval-Davis, 1997). According to Eddie Ombagi, “the queer body is a figure of the stranger, or the alien for and in the nation state. The nation is imagined as a heterosexual family, so those who are queer threaten the coherence and stability of the nation as community” (Ombagi, 2016, p. 148). In particular Muslim queers are embodying an impossibility, since

10 El-Tayeb builds here on Etienne Balibar’s concept of „fictive Ethnicity” which emphasises the constructedness of nations and their proclaimed ethnicity (É. Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991).
“queer Muslims, if such an identity can be envisioned at all, occupy a place close to that assigned to Muslimas, i.e. they are perceived as being too oppressed and alienated from their own needs to speak up as long as they still identify with Islam. It is only when they can make the step into western modernity – a step that necessarily requires the break with, the coming out of the Muslim community -that they can claim an individualized identity as feminist or queer, usually by expressing gratitude for being saved by their ‘host society’” (El-Tayeb, 2012, p. 80).

I added this quote of Fatima El-Tayeb to show the power of narratives in invisibilizing certain subjects in the nation, but also to remind of that it is the same author who stresses the importance of ‘queering ethnicity’. With this I want to conclude that my analysis not only shows the pertinence of racism and sexism in the discussions on Cologne, that is in the German society, but also reveals the unceasing resistance that these narratives face and which opens up a future where ethnicity can be queered.
6 References


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Appendix

Documents included in the analysis (not all included in the body text)

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