The World's First Feminist Foreign Policy: Four Years Later

An evaluation of Sweden's feminist foreign policy 2014-2018

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Abstract

In addition to the abstract, the author must provide five keywords, words that relate to the central arguments and ideas dealt with in the paper. These words will then be put into the computer search system for course papers by the Department. It is therefore important that these key words give some idea of the general contents of the essay. In 2014 Sweden declared itself the first country in the world to launch a feminist foreign policy. It was four years ago and Sweden is now preparing for a new government, hence this thesis aims to evaluate what feminist foreign policy has meant for Sweden's 2014-2018 government. To answer the research question an evaluation of the government controlled agencies SIDA and the Armed forces together with Sweden's Foreign Minister Margot Wallström speeches held during this time and her twitter account has been conducted. The analysis indicates actions has been made to carry out the feminist foreign policy aims. The conclusion that can be drawn is that the Swedish government has been ambitious in its interests of conducting intersectional feminist foreign policy but besides from that not much information or practical considerations can be found showing how the feminist foreign policy is much different from previous foreign policy.

*Key words*: Feminist foreign policy, Evaluation, Margot Wallström, SIDA, Armed Forces

Words: 10 000
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1 Part one

1.1 Introduction

In the fall of 2014 the world got its very first feminist government. It was in October 2014 when Sweden claimed to be the first country in the world to launch a feminist foreign policy (Government, 2018). The launch of the policy was made in response to discrimination and systematic subordination that according the government effects countless of girls and women around the world (Government, 2018, p. 9). By applying a systematic gender equality perspective throughout the foreign policy the Swedish government aimed to change structures and enhance the visibility of women and girls as actors (Government, 2018, p. 9, 11). To that end, the Swedish government decided to introduce a method focusing on the three Rs (Rights, Representation and Resources) based on the fourth R (the Reality women live in) (Government, 2018, p. 11). The Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs Margot Wallström stated "Throughout the world, women are neglected in terms of resources, representation and rights. This is the simple reason why we are pursuing a feminist foreign policy - with full force, all around the world" (Government, 2018, p. 11).

In 2017 Swedish NGO CONCORD, together with 19 civil society organizations released a report which analyzed the implementation of Sweden's feminist foreign policy 2016-2017 (Concord, 2017, p. 3). The report highlighted a number of areas where the feminist foreign policy had led to the Government taking actions which lead to real differences for women's rights globally. CONCORD mentions Sweden’s development cooperation and humanitarian aid and peace and security policies as examples (CONCORD, 2017, p. 4-5). But it also highlights a number of areas where the feminist foreign policy had failed to live up to its own goals and ambitions, and even in some cases directly counteracted them. It critiques the
feminist foreign policy for failing to live up to their aims in concern to Sweden arms export and Sweden’s migration policies (CONCORD, 2017, p. 5).

The term of the Social democratic and Green Party Government from 2014 to 2018 has now ended. If and in what specific forms the feminist foreign policy will be renewed and developed is as of yet not certain. Hence, in the interest of understanding what this specific type of foreign policy has meant for Sweden and its external relations, it is of high interest to evaluate this policy. The direction of a specifically feminist foreign policy, in a country which is one of Europe's largest per capita donors of foreign aid, but at the same time also one of the continent’s largest per capita exporters of military hardware is of importance of for many, has to be evaluated (Standish, 2016).

1.2 Research question and structure of thesis

The promise of the first feminist government came four years ago, and Sweden is now in the process of changing government. Foreign Minister Margot Wallström and the Swedish government has had four years to implement its feminist foreign policy, thus, it is time now time for evaluating these past four years. Which motivates the research questions:

1. What has feminist foreign policy meant for the Swedish government 2014-2018 in terms of specific policy making?
2. To what extent has it actually been a new feminist foreign policy?

The thesis is structured into three chapters. The first part presents a more in depth background to the study by offering an introduction to the background of feminist foreign policy on an international level but also in terms of Sweden. This chapter ends with presenting prior research, in the interest of locating this thesis in contrast and relation to earlier academic contributions. The second part hosts the method and theory introductions. The third and final
chapter is devoted to the application of the theories on the material in the analysis section and continued with a discussion of the results.

1.3 Background

In October 2000 Resolution 1325 was adopted by the UN Security Council. The 1325 resolution is the first of its kind as it is the first formal and legal document from the Security Council to specifically mention the unique impact of conflict on women. It was also the first formal and legal document to require parties in a conflict to actively prevent violations of women's rights, to support women's participation in peace negotiations and post-conflict reconstruction and also to protect women and girls from sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflicts (UN Security Council, 2000). The resolution was intended to work as a strategic frame for the international society, to make it more effective and sustainable when implementing and conducting peace negotiations, peacekeeping and peacekeeping efforts, urban construction and promoting economic development (Egnell, 2016, p. 566). In the aftermath of the adoption of the Resolution 1325 there has been broad efforts to promote gender equality in the international arena. Embedded in these broader efforts are Sweden's public adoption of a feminist foreign policy which aims to become the "strongest voice of gender equality and full employment of human rights for all women and girls" (Aggestam & Bergman-Roasmond, 2016, p. 323).

Political scientists Aggestam and Bergman-Roasmond argue that Swedish foreign policy is strongly informed by Resolution 1325 as a normative framework for foreign and security policies. Even though Sweden's new feminist foreign policy is radical Sweden are not alone. Julie Bishop, Australia's first ever female foreign minister actively promoted and profiled the Resolution 1325 and its matters during her tenure (Aggestam & Bergman-Roasmond, 2016, p. 324). Former British foreign minister William Hague is another example, he managed to galvanize international attention to end sexual violence in conflict and Hillary Clinton who declared from the start her tenure as U.S Secretary of State that the U.S international development policy needs to further the development of women in developing countries. She
also framed the status of women as a matter of national security and played an extensive role in pushing for the endorsement of Security Council Resolution 1888 in 2009 focused on sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict (Aggestam & Bergman-Roasmond, 2016, p. 324-325).

Although already in the fall of 2000 then Swedish Prime minister Göran Persson declared himself as a feminist. At that time it was striking, as not many government leaders, if any, had made such a statement (Gemzöe, 2010, p. 11). Göran Persson’s declaration as a feminist is part of a feminist development in the Swedish politics. During the 1990s political parties to the left, middle and also some to the right declared themselves as feminists. The fact that the parties for the 2002 election fought over feminism and its tenor was a new phenomenon in Swedish politics at that time. Some scholars have even warned that this only will lead to a dilution of the concept of feminism and not lead to more radical feminist policies (ibid.). The culmination of the discussions on the concept of feminism in Swedish politics came during the election in 2014 where many of the Swedish parties declared themselves as feminist parties (SR, 2014).

And now also the Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström who has for a long time been an advocate for gender justice within the work of the United Nations as she has held a position of the first ever UN Special Representative on sexual violence in conflict has together with the Swedish coalition government (Social Democratic Party and the Green Party) declared 2015 a feminist foreign policy (Aggestam & Bergman-Roasmond, 2016, p. 324-325).

Political scientists Katarzyna Jezierska and Ann Towns has written an article on the place of gender equality in the “Progressive Sweden” brand, claiming that there is a picture around the world of Sweden as a progressive land. They argue that since the mid-1990s in conjunction with the 1995 EU membership and Sweden being ranked as the most gender equal state in the world according to the Gender-Related Development Index and Gender Empowerment Measure, even rewarded with as the most equal state at the 1995 UN women's conference in Beijing, Sweden has had gender equality as one of its pillars of the brand Sweden (Jezierska & Towns, 2018 p. 57-58). An illustration of the active work of framing
Sweden as progressive and gender equal since mid-1990s is the fact that prior to 1995 gender equality was only mentioned three times in the Swedish government foreign policy declarations. And since 1995 it has been mentioned and discussed in every such declaration (Jezierska & Towns, 2018 p. 58). Jezierska and Towns argues that there is a branding strategy of “firstness”. Sweden claims to be: first in the world to allow for the legal change of gender identity, first to replace maternity leave with parental leave, first to create a ban on spanking children and also the first country to pass a law to prohibit the purchase but not sale of sexual services (Jezierska & Towns, 2018, p. 59).

Research on the Swedish feminist foreign policies are limited. Evaluating research on the specific topic is non-existing. But there has been research conducted since the 1980s on the capacity for the libel state to contribute to feminist international politics (Duriesmith, 2018, p. 52). Feminist activists and scholars have for a long time demanded that states take women's equality seriously. At the same time, critics argue that the state is a patriarchal institution forged through a gendered history of men's domination in both the public and private space (Duriesmith, 2018, p. 51). Political scientist David Duriesmith argues that even when liberal state actors attempt to adopt the mantle of a feminist actor, they only risk to reifying the role of the masculine protector (Duriesmith, 2018, p. 52).

1.4 Sweden’s foreign policy

To answer the research question a further understanding of the particularities of foreign policy has to be established. The three general aims of when developing foreign policy is security, welfare and ideology, and to achieve high levels of these aims states use propaganda, diplomacy, financial means and military forces (Gustavsson, 2006, p. 255). Swedish foreign policy has for a long time been characterized by non-alignment, peaceful relations to neighboring countries and a deep commitment to collective security and international cooperation (idbi.) Since the entry into EU the Swedish foreign policy has been deeply rooted in the joint EU foreign and security politics (ibid.). What differentiates foreign policy from domestic policies is that foreign policy is created through different processes compared to domestic policies. The decision making process in foreign policy is much more secret and is
to a lesser extent subject to broad discussions and advocacy (Gustavsson, 2006, p. 257). This is due to three reasons, relevant for this thesis is fact that much foreign policy is created through words, for an example when a country expresses support, recognizes or condemns other actors it can have great consequences (ibid.). Accordingly, much emphasis of the thesis is put on speeches held by Wallström and including her twitter texts. Twitter, with its 140 character rule, is a good example of a format where one has to choose one words carefully. Relevant will also be to analyze what words the foreign minister does not use, and what she decides to not include in her speeches and twitter account.
2 Part two

Part two is devoted to method and theory. In the first section a presentation of evaluation as theory and method is given. It will then continue with a presentation of the second theory: feminism/intersectionality. A short presentation of the material used for the study and operationalization will conclude part two.

2.1 Evaluation as theory and method

To be able to answer the research questions a method and theory of evaluation is employed. Evaluations is common in education, research and development efforts in universities, public administration and both public and private sectors (Sandberg & Faugert, 2007, p. 13). The history of evaluation has roots that goes hundreds of years back, but the established research tradition of evaluation is relative new. The scientific method of evaluation has gone from being achievement focused with experimental methods with standardized data collection, large-size selections and mainly quantitative data in the 1950s to 1960. Today evaluation is characterized of a big diversity of different approaches, methods and analytical tools (Sandberg & Faugert, 2007, p. 14-15). Evaluation in Sweden is relatively new. The Swedish term for evaluation (utvärdering) did not exist before the 1970s, it wasn't until 1980/90s that the term increased its importance in the Swedish public sector (Sandberg & Faugert, 2007, p. 17). Since has the interest for evaluation studies in Sweden significantly increased. Two explanations presented by Sandberg and Faugert is foremost due to market liberalization. Since the 1990s many public services has become goal- and result oriented and evaluation has become a way to control that they still are doing their jobs. The second explanation is the public sectors ”expenditure crisis” which has contributed to an increase in evaluations specifically focused on the economical aspect such as productivity and cost efficacy (Sandberg & Faugert, 2007 p. 17-18).
Depending on the context the term, evaluation may mean different things, and drawn upon for various interests. For this thesis social scientists Bo Sandberg and Sven Faugert’s definition of evaluation will be used, defining it as "a systematic examination of an activities value and significance (En systematisk undersökning av en aktivitets värde och betydelse) (Sandberg & Faugert, 2007, p. 13). Compared to other definitions of evaluation theirs incorporates the word “systematic” to highlight that the evaluation has to be conducted in an organized and methodological manner. By this they argue that an evaluation should be executed and structured by applying scientific methods. In their definition they also include”activities” referring to specific actions such as projects, interventions, politics (ibid.). By value and significance they intend that the material has been systematically collected and should be valued against one or multiple criterias (Sandberg & Faugert, 2007, p. 14). These criterias are presented in the operationalization section below.

Furthermore, in evaluation research there is an important distinction to be made between formative evaluation and summative evaluation. Relevant for this research is summative evaluation, which aims to access and value a program or as in this case a policy in order to provide support for future decisions (Sandberg & Faugert, 2007, p. 19).

To the end of conducting systematic evaluation research, it is necessary to specify the evaluation model in order to structure data collection and analysis. An evaluation model is more than just a method and approach, it also entails the praxis, ideas, ideals in evaluation that gives spaces to both less accustomed and scientifically praised approaches (Sandberg & Faugert, 2007, p. 63-64). Thus, by using the concept of evaluation models one reflects the width of the perspectives and experiences within the evaluation field today (ibid.). There are several different evaluation models; result oriented evaluations, comparative evaluations, theory based evaluations and actor-focused evaluation models (Sandberg & Faugert, 2007, p. 65).The aim of the different evaluation models is not to perfectly comfort with reality but rather to create prerequisites and facilitate the evaluation process both in a methodological and pedagogical sense (ibid.).
The method used to answer the research questions will be inspired by one of the Sandberg and Faugert’s aim- and effect evaluation model, as it is a simple model where the aim is to evaluate if the outcome of a measure is consistent with their aim (Sandberg & Faugert, 2007, p. 67). As presented by Sandberg and Faugert, a basic aim- and effect evaluation should depart from predefined goals (often political) to then evaluate if the effects is consistent with the goals (ibid.). Based on their method, the first step to answer the research questions is, accordingly, to establish criterias based on the Swedish feminist foreign policy aims. The next step is to gather information on what processes and measures that has been taken to achieve the aims predefined. The third, and final, step is to determine if the outcome is consistent with the goals.

The chosen construction of method for this research will allow to regard what political scientist Evert Vedung defines as his theory on Implementers understanding, will and ability and his understanding of The Personal (Vedung, 2016, p. 83). Vedung argues that one important factor when evaluating implementations processes is the communication of words and their significance in the implementation of public policy. This is the case as words can be carefully sought out to be unclear or carefully sought out to be extra clear (ibid.). Vedung also argues that governance can get stronger impact when supported by entrepreneurs, enthusiasts or advocates with a strong passion in the movement the implementations regards (Vedung, 2016, p. 87). This understanding of the method of evaluation enables the answering of both research questions, and also to expand to consider the use of the term” the first feminist government”, including role of of Wallström as the Swedish Foreign minister.

Similar studies like this one has been performed earlier but on other policy areas, indicating the great value of the method. For instance, the method is similar to the one used by The Swedish National Audit Office; that is the agency responsible for overseeing the state finance through financial and performance-bases audits of state agencies, state-owned companies and foremost the government of Sweden (Om Riksrevisionen, 2018). One example is in its report Regeringens jämställdhetssatsning - tillfälligheter eller långsiktiga förbättringar from 2015, where the Agency uses a method of efficiency audit. The aim of the report is to evaluate if the
Swedish government's investment in equality in the years between 2007-2014 has been successful and sustainable (Riksrevisionen, 2015, p. 15-23).

2.2 Feminism

Evaluating Sweden's feminist foreign policy requires an understanding of what feminism is. A very basic definition of feminism, which more or less all types of feminism would agree on, is: a feminist is a person who believes that women are subordinated to men and thinks that this relationship should change (Gemzöe, 2010, p. 13). Usually one does not speak of a feminism, but multiple types of feminisms, such as liberal feminism, radical feminism, marxist/socialist feminism, intersectional feminism and so on (Gemzöe, 2010, p. 12). In the Handbook *Sweden's feminist foreign policy*, it is proclaimed that the Swedish feminist foreign policy is intersectional. It is then briefly defined as taking into account the fact that people have different living conditions, levels of influence and needs (Government, 2018, p. 11).

Intersectionality is often seen as a way of understanding and analyzing the complexitivity in the world. Intersectional feminists argue that when it comes to social inequality, people's lives and the organization of power in a given society are better understood as being shaped not only by a single axis of social division such as gender, class, ethnicity and so on, but by many axes that work together and influence each other (Hill-Collins & Bilge, 2016, p. 3). Moreover, intersectionality is often used as an analytical tool when it is recognized that one needs a better framework to grapple with the complex discrimination that exist in the world (Hill-Collins & Bilge, 2016, p. 25). Hence, intersectionality is often drawn upon as an analytical tool that can foster a better understanding of growing global inequalities, as economic inequality does not fall equality on everyone as the wealth gap is not only radicalized but also gendered (Hill-Collins & Bilge, 2016, p. 15). What is important in intersectional feminism, is being critical, seeing and understanding intersectionality as a form of critical inquiry, which requires self-reflexivity of thought, feeling and action about one's own practice (Hill-Collins & Bilge, 2016, p. 39-40).
Since the preparations for the 2001 United Nations World Conference against Racism (WCAR) in Durban, South Africa played an important role in intersectionalities dispersal in human rights venues (Hill Collins & Bilge, 2016, p. 89). Kimberlé Crenshaw, one of the founders of the academic concept of intersectionality, was invited to present a position paper and organize a training workshop for the Preparatory Committee in 2000. Since the 2000 Preparatory Committee and Crenshaw's contribution to it, the reference to intersectionality in the international arena became increasing common (idbi.).

2.3 The material

It is the Swedish government’s feminist policy that is the base for this evaluation, hence the majority of the material analyzed is produced by the Swedish government and the two government SIDA and the National Defense as the both are important institutions in the conduction of the feminist foreign policy. The material is gathered from official websites, and consists of speeches, budgets, orders and official documents proclaiming aims such as; Handbook: Sweden's feminist foreign policy, Foreign Affairs Action plan for Feminist Foreign Policy 2015-2018 and Sweden's foreign declarations between 2014-2018. These documents are produced by the government and as such are public, which makes much material easily available for evaluation. In addition, as most material is gathered from official websites, this makes it easy to conclude that they are correct, and hence contributing to a high validity for the study. Another part of the material analyzed is gathered from media such as speeches, twitter and debate articles held by for example Wallström. As much foreign policy is created through words analyzing speeches and tweets provides a deeper knowledge on how the feminist foreign policy has been conducted.

Finally, a third type of material has been chosen, which comes from critical voices outside the government. As the material chosen for this study, coming from the inside of the government, shows mainly what the government intended to communicate and what types of policy making activities it aimed for material from voices outside of the government is also included, in the interest of putting the official documents produced in external perspective.
2.4 Operationalization and analysis

To avoid measurement errors is it important to operationalize central concepts as the absence of systematic measurement errors will provide strong validity to the study, and the absence of unsystematic measurement errors is the definition of strong reliability (Teorell & Svensson, p. 55-57). To operationalize and measure the feminist foreign policy three criteria’s has been constructed, based upon the Swedish foreign ministries own definition on feminist foreign policy.

According to the Swedish Foreign Service its feminist foreign policy is represented in three criterias and is based on a fourth. “The implication is that the Swedish Foreign Service in all its parts shall strive to strengthen girls and women's Rights, Representation and Resources based on their Reality they live in”(Government, 2018, p. 11).”By “rights” the Service aims to promote all women's and girls’ full enjoyment of human rights, including by combating all forms of violence and discrimination that restrict their freedom of action” (Government, 2018, p. 13). Regarding “representation” the Service aims to promote women's participation and influence in decision making processes at all levels and in all areas. It also aims to seek dialogue with women representatives at all levels including civil society (ibid.). Finally, by “resources” the Service aims to work in the interest of ensuring that resources are allocated to promote gender equality and equal opportunities for women and girls to enjoy human rights. It also aims to promote targeted measures for different target groups (ibid.).

In order to implement these three R's the Swedish Foreign Service has drawn up an action plan that is to be updated annually, with six long-term external objectives (Government, 2018, p. 19). The six external objectives are:

1. Full enjoyment of human rights.
   The Swedish Foreign Service shall work for all women and girls full enjoyment of human rights in its multilateral, regional and bilateral work, within and through the EU. As gender discrimination and vulnerability is linked to other factors such as poverty, conflict, migration,
climate effects, ethnic origin, functional variations and sexual orientation or gender identity these variables shall also be considered (Government, 2018, p. 20).

2. Freedom from physical, psychological and sexual violence.
The Swedish Foreign Service argues that it strives for freedom from violence as it is a prerequisite for development (Government, 2018, p. 22).

3. Participation in preventing and resolving conflicts, and post-conflict peacebuilding.
In countries affected by conflict, women work for peace every day but often with no or little recognition. Inclusive peace processes are the most sustainable, even though much formal and international peace work today remains unequal (Government, 2018, p. 24).

4. Political participation and influence in all areas of society.
More equal representation benefits both society and individuals. The Swedish Foreign Service strives for more equal decision-making bodies as it are more active on gender equality issues and their agenda and resources allocation reflect more gouts and need within the society (Government, 2018, p. 25).

5. Economic rights and participation.
Female participation in the labor market increases women’s economic empowerment and increases economic growth at the societal level (Government, 2018, p. 27).

6. Sexual and reproductive health and rights.
The Swedish Foreign Service argues that sexual and reproductive health and rights are human rights, and as such are essential to women’s and girls’ health and living condition (Government, 2018, p. 28). Sexual and reproductive health rights include every individual’s obvious right to decide over his/her own body, but also has a direct bearing on everything from level of education to social economics (ibid.).
These six objectives form the basis for the Swedish Foreign Service, is expressing its feminist foreign policies, and hence is the ground for the criteria’s that this evaluation is guided by. Some aspects will be easier to measure and evaluate than others. As distribution of and priorities of funding is evaluated and contributes to clear and non-contradictable arguments. The same goes for the speeches held by Wallström and how much she does or does not mention their feminist foreign policies and how they will conduct and achieve equality. Unlike specific actions that is funded. It is not possible to evaluate or measure the difference in 2013 funding the possibility for 1000 girls to attend school with in 2015 the funding of 300 doctors education on sexual health. It's impossible to argue which is more feminist than the other.

In this thesis official handbooks produced by SIDA and the Armed Forces on the subject gender equality together, budgets from both agencies together with speeches held and tweets made by Wallström has been analyzed. They have been read, coded and quantified in relation to the operatalization above. To be able to draw conclusions on what is being said and what has been left out.

2.5 Limitations of the study

The evaluation covers the period of 2014-2018. The choice of period is based upon the time of the elected Social democratic and Green Party government Swedish government who declared themselves as the world's first feminist government.

The analysis is divided into four parts; SIDA, The Swedish Armed Forces, Margot Wallström and The implementation of feminist foreign policy. SIDA is a government led agency that works on behalf of the Swedish government and parliament to reduce poverty in the world. Together with other agencies it works to contribute to the implementation of Sweden's policies for a global development (SIDA 1, 2017). In the “Regleringsbrev” from 2013, 2014, 2015 the government has given the Swedish Armed Forces the task to prepare, implement and revise the gender mainstreaming action plan produced by the government (Försvarsmakten, 2015, p. 4). Hence, these two agencies are the relevant agencies to analyze in regards to the execution of the Swedish feminist foreign policies. The Swedish Armed Forces is just like
SIDA a body subject to the Swedish parliament and government, they are also just like SIDA funded by the Swedish government (Försvarsmakten 3, 2018).

Mentioned in part one of this study, in the construction of foreign policy words are of high importance such as in speeches and twitter. The section of Margot Wallström will hence be dedicated to discuss her important speeches she has held from 2014 up until 2018, and her Twitter feed, public spaces where her choice of words are carefully selected.
3 Part three

3.1 Analysis

The analysis is divided into four parts: SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency), Swedish Armed Forces, Margot Wallström and The implementation of the feminist foreign policy. These headliners all represent the three different pillars of the practice of Sweden's Feminist foreign policy. As the advancement of a distinctively feminist foreign policy is closely linked to Wallström, a top diplomat with past experiences as the UN special representative on sexual violence in conflict her role in the practice of the policy is important to study (Aggestam, Bergman-Rosamond & Kronsell, 2018, p. 2).

3.2 Implementation of the feminist foreign policy

The process of implementing the feminist foreign policy has been divided into four components: Leadership, ownership, guidance and support. Leadership shall include continuous references to the policy in speeches, articles, social media post and so on (Regeringskansliet, 2014, p. 31). Leadership shall also entail a clear priority of these matters during visits, trips and other contacts. Repeated messages to the Swedish Foreign Service management and also regional meetings, it shall also include frequent assignments to the Foreign Service on delivering messages and proposals (ibid.). Finally the component of leadership shall also include concreter decisions and initiatives (ibid.).

The second component of implementing feminist foreign policy regards ownership. The feminist foreign policy was first launched as a top-down decided policy, but has since then
been developed in consultation with the entire Swedish Foreign Service. Thus order for
departments and missions abroad to emphasize how important this working method is,
ownership has been transferred outside of the Swedish Foreign Service as an organization
(Regeringskansliet, 2014, p. 34).

Guidance is the third component of the implementation of Sweden's feminist foreign policy.
This component refers to gender equality issues to be integrated into ordinary systems,
processes and responsibility structures. In other words this means that the gender equality
perspective is to be incorporated into ongoing operations, and should not be seen or handled
as a parallel process (Regeringskansliet, 2014, p. 36). For example, this means that all
managers at the Foreign Affairs office has the responsibility for integrating a gender equality
perspective in the areas of responsibility including decision-making and resource allocation
processes (ibid.).

The final component in the implementation of the Swedish feminist foreign policy is Support.
Support in the form of a coordination team lead by the Ambassador for Gender Equality and
Coordinator of Feminist Foreign Policy. The coordination team has draws up the annual
Swedish Foreign Service action plan for the feminist foreign policy in coordination with other
sections of the Swedish Foreign Service (Regeringskansliet, 2014, p. 39-40). The team has
also produced a digital theme website on the policy where all employees can access fact
sheets, brochures, speeches, articles, good examples and PowerPoint presentations. These
have also been translated into English in order for locally employed staff being able to access
the information provided. This has led to several embassies and departments having carried
out their own in-depth studies and training, and having developed knowledge bases in regard
to the feminist foreign policy directives and formed gender equality libraries (ibid.). The
material produced by the coordination team, and the material produced by local embassies, is
only available within the Foreign relations intranet, and is thus not accessible for the public
view. This is unfortunate, as it would have provided a more in depth understanding of the
process of Sweden's implementation the feminist foreign policy. On the other hand, from
what can be understood from the handbook one could argue that extensive work has been
conducted to educate every instance that carries out Sweden's feminist foreign policy.
3.3 SIDA

SIDA’s work is regulated by the government’s Regleringsbrev, which announces SIDAs budget and aims. In each Regleringsbrev the government states specific assignments for the coming year, and a detailed budget (SIDA 3, 2018). In the Regleringsbrev from 2014 to 2018 these all state that there should be a focus upon global gender equality, without more detailed instructions. The only exception appears in the 2014 letter, when it provides an introduction to the new governments gender equality focus (Regeringen, 2014, p. 4; Regeringen, 2015, p. 2; Regeringen, 2016, p. 1, Regeringen, 2017, p. 1; Regeringen, 2018). However, the letters from 2014, 2017, and 2018 all mention specific targets for development. In the 2014 letter the specific target is set on Sexual and reproductive health and LGBT rights for people living in Africa south of Sahara (Regeringen, 2014, p. 3). In the 2017 letter it is specified that South Sudan should get extra support in their peace process and specifically to include more women in the process (Regeringen, 2017, p. 4). In the letter form 2018 it is stated that a specific mission of the year regarding gender equality is to arrange a Gender Equality Conference (Regeringen, 2018). None of the letters provide instructions on how to implement feminist policies, and do not contain the word feminist (Regeringen, 2014; Regeringen, 2015; Regeringen, 2016; Regeringen, 2017; Regeringen, 2018).

As a government led agency is required to conduct a yearly evaluation of its work and expenses. The 2017 annual report showed the development of funding for Global Gender Equality. In 2015 SIDA dedicated 2905 million Swedish kronor to Global Gender Equality, in 2016 3417 million and in 2017 4219 million Swedish kronor (SIDA 2, 2018, p. 111). Thus, the spending in this specific area continuously increased during this period. In addition, there is an increase in the total number of paid funds directly to the area of Global gender equality; from 8% in 2000 to 15 % 2014 and 20% in 2017. On the other hand the indirect funding support for Global Gender Equality was more or less stable, around 70% since 2000 (SIDA 2, 2018, p. 112, SIDA, 2015).

In general, by reading the annual reports form 2014 until 2018 one can notice an increase in focus on gender equality. In 2014 Gender Equality did not even have its own headline in the
annual reports, it was lumped together with human rights (SIDA, 2014). In contrast to the report from 2017 where there is a bigger emphasis put on Gender Equality and more attention directed to highlight the amount of funding directed to the Gender Equality cause (SIDA 2, 2018, p. 111). Moreover, every annual report opens with an introduction written by the Director General for SIDA. In the introductions between 2013 and 2016 the Director General did not mention gender equality or feminism as something that the agency has focused on, developed or been challenged by. Its focus has been set on poverty, natural disasters, reforge crisis and EBOLA (SIDA, 2014, p. 2-3; SIDA, 2015, p. 2-3; SIDA, 2016, p. 2-3). It was only with the introduction for the 2017 report that the Director General mentions its work for increasing Gender Equality (SIDA 2, 2018, p. 2-3).

On the other hand, to argue that SIDA did not have a gender perspective and not actively working for gender equality before Sweden's first feminist government, would not be fully correct. For instance, in the period of 2009 and 2013 SIDA contributed to 22 countries developing laws, law propositions and policies that resulted in higher gender equality; 8,3 million girls gaining access to education; 1 million women gained access to financial services, 12 million girls and boys gained access to sexual education; 1 million men gained access to education on gender equality, 230 000 persons within health and the legal sector accessed education on gender related violence; and finally 1500 organizations working for gender equality got financial support (SIDA, 2015, p. 62).

Also, since 2007 gender equality has been a thematic priority at SIDA. It argues that with higher gender equality there is less poverty, and for that purpose gender equality is a matter of everyone's equal rights (SIDA 3, 2016). With the world's first feminist government and its feminist foreign policies the change in SIDA’s work has been to conduct a program for greater gender equality integration for the period 2016-2018. The aim of the program is not to create something new, just to enhance the number of efforts and financial support to projects regarding gender equality (ibid.).

The above analysis of the Regleringsbrev and SIDA’s annual reports from the period of the Swedish feminist foreign policy during 2014-2018 shows that there has been an increase in
funding of gender equality programs and policies, but only in the funding directly targeting
gender equality. The analysis also shows that SIDA has made large contributions to the
increase of gender equality in the world before the feminist foreign policy. The
Regleringsbrev and evaluations merely focus on the resource pillar of the feminist foreign
policy which as stated above has gotten more attention with the new foreign policy, but is also
first and foremost a reinforcement of the work already conducted by SIDA since 2007.

3.4 Swedish armed forces

The Swedish Armed Forces is just like SIDA a body subject to the Swedish parliament and
government, which are like SIDA funded by the Swedish government (SIDA 3, 2018).
As a result of increased efforts by the Nordic governments in implementing UN Security
Council Resolution 1325, the Nordic Center of Gender in Military Operations (NCGM) was
launched in 2012. NCGM is a hub of knowledge on gender in military operation, guided by a
Steering Committee and co-located at the Swedish Armed Forces International Training
Centre (Swedish Armed Forces, 2018). Since 2012 the NCGM has arranged lectures and
seminars, and as recent as 18-19 June of 2018 it held seminars focusing implementation of a
gender perspective in military operations (Försvarsmakten, 2018). In addition to the NCGM, a
gender perspective is central for the armed forces external relations, for instance in Bamako in
Mali (Försvarsmakten 2, 2018).

In 2016 the Armed Forces published handbooks in how to implement a gender perspective in
both production of and execution of operations (Försvarsmakten, 2016, p. 5). But to credit this
fully to the Swedish feminist foreign policy is not correct. All these projects and inclusion of
gender perspectives in the work and operations of the Armed Forces are due to an adoption of
the 1325 Resolution, clearly stated in the handbooks and the Armed Forces action plan for
2015-2018 (Försvarsmakten, 2016; Försvarsmakten, 2015)

The Peter Hultquist, has spoken publicly about Sweden's focus on implementing a gender
perspective in its military forces, and the general need to incorporate women in its work. For
instance, n a follow-up to the UN-meeting “Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping” in 2015 Peter
Hultqvist stressed the importance of incorporating women in peacekeeping as stated in UN Security Resolution 1325 (Regeringskansliet 4, 2016). Furthermore, in a speech in 2016 Hultqvist stressed the importance of UN-Security Resolution 1325, as both a part of mission planning and of pre-deployment training (Regeringskansliet 3, 2016). Just as in the case of the Armed forces’ handbook, the reference to the work the Swedish Defense conducts regarding gender equality made by Hultqvist are all to the UN Security Resolution 1325 and not to the feminist foreign policy. Finally, there is no use of the word feminism/feminist.

3.5 Margot Wallström

In 2015 Wallström made the Swedish feminist foreign policy the main center of attention in big speeches such as ”Foreign Affairs Declarations”, ”Linjetalet” at Utrikespolitiska institutet. (Regeringskansliet, 2016, p. 25). However, since then the attention given publicly by Wallström to the feminist foreign policy has as both increased and decreased.

The Swedish foreign policy aim is yearly established in a “Foreign Affairs Declarations”, in a speech held by the Foreign Minister. In the 2015 version of this declaration, incidentally the first speech held by Wallström since the implementation of the feminist foreign policies of the government, she mentioned the feminist perspective y three times. In the coming years, in the recurring declaration of, 2016 and 2017, she briefly mentioned it once (Regeringskansliet, 2015, Regeringskansliet 2, 2016; Regeringskansliet, 2017). In her final speech from 2018, she once again put more focus on the feminist foreign policy and also motivated why it was implemented in the first place. Wallström declares “Throughout the world, women are neglected in terms of resources, representation and rights. This is the simple reason why we are pursuing a feminist foreign policy - with full force, around the world” (Regeringskansliet, 2018). “

The”Foreign Affairs Declarations”, speeches are held in Swedish and directed to a Swedish audience. These are complemented to Wallströms Twitter feed and her speeches in the UN Security council; of which the latter is more directed to an international audience. An analysis
of Wallström’s twitter feed from the date of launch of the Swedish feminist foreign policy in 2014 and up until December 2018, shows that there has been an increase in Wallström’s tweets on topics relating to gender equality and Sweden's feminist foreign policy. By the end of 2018 (28/12-19), Wallström has over 105 000 followers, influential people at different such levels of society fighting for gender equality such as Humayra Abedin, Zahra’ Langhi, Zara Larsson and foreign ministers from Island, Australia, Canada and Iran follow Wallström (Twitter, Wallstrom). On the other hand, Donald Trump, Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, Malala, Michelle Obama and the foreign ministers from Germany, Japan and United Kingdom are not following her (ibid.) Hence, one could argue that many influential people take part of Wallström’s tweets, but there are also a substantial part of very influential people who do not follow her. But it does not fully rule out the possibility of taking part of her tweets as she has an open account and one can still interact with her (ibid.).

In 2014, Wallström tweeted 25 times, of which 20 % regarded gender equality or the feminist foreign policy (Twitter, Wallstöm). The high percentage can be explained with the launch of the new policies. Wallström’s tweeting on gender equality and the policy decreased in 2015 to only 10% out of 132 tweets. In 2016 there was a slight increase to 11,7% of 205 tweets, with a slight decrease in 2017 to 11% out of 274 tweets (ibid.) In 2018 19,6% out of 254 tweets made by Wallström either regarded gender equality or the Swedish Feminist foreign policy (ibid.).

By analyzing Wallström’s twitter feed from 2014 to 2018 it is also noticeable that Wallström has barely mentioned the Swedish Feminist foreign policy, rather promoting Gender inequities in general. For example in 10 June 2017 she wrote: “Could not agree more. Women's rights are human rights, and should be at the core of foreign policy” (Twitter, Wallstrom). The top notation of mentions of the Swedish Feminist foreign policy occurred in relation to the launch in 2014, where 8% of Wallström’s tweets mentioned the policy (Twitter, Wallström). Compared to only 0, 07% of the tweets in 2015, 1, 4% of the tweets 2016, 2,9% of the tweets in 2017 and 1,5% of the tweets in 2018 (ibid.). In addition, Wallström did not often refer to herself as a feminist in her tweets. When she uses the word feminist it is in conjunction with her referencing the feminist foreign policy. The only exception occurring in
16 June 2018, when she wrote “RT if you’re a proud feminist like @UNSecurity-General @antonioguterres”! (Twitter, Wallstrom).

Regarding the focus of the three R's in the feminist foreign policy on twitter, Wallström at times stresses the representation pillar by congratulating females to new powerful positions or accomplishments. For instance, in October 25th 2018 Wallström tweeted: “My warmest congratulations to Mrs Sahle-Work Zewde, Ethiopia's newly elected and first female President” (Twitter, Wallström). However, in her Twitter she most commonly highlights the rights pillar by mentioning the effects of war on women, and by elevating international women's day march 8 and by commenting Sweden's participation in the UN HeforShe campaign and so on (ibid.). When analyzing her use of words it is equally important to discuss what she doesn't not mention, and in this case it's the third pillar Resources. It could be explained by the fact that finances might not be as crowd pleaser, or the fact that she might feel that she has no power in influencing how countries distribute their finances. This will be further discussed in the Discussion section of this study.

Between 2017 and 2018 Sweden was voted in as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (Regeringskansliet 2, 2018). Sweden stated that through a perspective of international law, human rights, gender equality and humanitarian view to take responsibility for the entire council's agenda (Regeringskansliet 3, 2018). In relation to the status Wallström stated that Sweden's priorities during these two years would regard: women, peace and security, children and armed conflict, climate, and also prevention (ibid.). To some extent these priorities and perspectives reflect the Swedish government’s feminist foreign policy, but it does not mention feminism as a perspective or method of its work.

In October 2017 Wallstöm held a speech at the UN Security related to the council debate on Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. In her speech Wallström criticizes the UN, and stresses that more has to be done in the interest of protection of and justice for women, especially the ones living in a context of war. At one point Wallström states that: “Oppression of women is a global disease. We see how women, all over the world, are systematically underrepresented in decision-making, how women receive fewer resources, and how women
lack fundamental rights in a number of areas” (Regeringskansliet, 2017). In this short section, in an early state of the speech, Wallström urged for more efforts put into the fundamental pillars of Sweden's feminist foreign policy: rights, representations and resources. In the speech she did not use the word feminist/feminism or the feminist foreign policy, but presented the core values of both the policy.

3.6 External Critique and Discussion

One conclusion that could be drawn from the analysis above, is that there has been some efforts made for the feminist foreign policy in budgeting and in words expressed in speeches and on Twitter messages’ mostly made by SIDA and Margot Wallström The Armed forces has mostly just continued their already extensive gender work. However, during the same period harsh critique has surfaced, suggesting that the government’s actions has not been particular, feminist, and in some cases even gone against its feminist values. In this section of the thesis some of the critique raised is discussed in conjunction with the result of the analysis. The discussion chapter is divided accordingly to Swedes own three pillars of its feminist foreign policy – Rights, Resources and Representation.

3.6.1 Rights

As mentioned above, one of the three pillars of Sweden's feminist foreign policy is termed Rights. As mentioned in the analysis section, Wallström is frequently speaking about women's rights in both her speeches in Sweden, on Twitter and in her speeches in the UN Security council. This may suggest that feminist foreign policy has been produced and conducted. At the same time, the Swedish 2014-2018 government also received a lot of criticism from NGO’s, especially for its firearm trade with undemocratic countries (Concord, 2017, p. 5; Hoti, Domeij, Löwegren, 2015). In 2016-2017 Sweden continued to sell munitions to both Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates even though they have conducted air attacks against Yemen (Concord, 2017, p. 5). These attacks has been labeled war crimes by human rights organizations, in addition to recognizing how these countries violate women’s and girls’ human rights (ibid.). As stated by Concord, t arms trade goes against what is stated in the Handbook for Sweden's feminist foreign policy. In the handbook it says that preventing risks
and threats is an important part of Sweden's security policy, which in turn is part of its foreign policy. It continues to stress the importance of peace as wars and crisis results in societies being shatters, families being split up and development coming to a halt, especially as its effects on women and girls are strong (Regeringskansliet, 2014, p. 63). The same type of criticism has also been directed towards Sweden's handling of the “migration crisis” in 2015. In 2016 Sweden made big alterations in their migration- and refugee policies, by introducing new much more restraint policies. Making it harder for refugees to come to Sweden for protection. Which had the biggest consequences on women and children (CONCORD, 2017, 5). 

In relation to this particular critique, Wallström defended Sweden's actions by stating that Sweden has the strongest regulatory legislation and that it also has a criteria of democracy for its firearm trade (SVT, 2018). In addition, she also at one point accused Saudi Arabia of being a dictatorship, and criticized its lack of human rights. Moreover, Wallström, also described Saudi Arabia as being the country to be the least feminist country as it violates women's rights (Stenquist, 2015).

In an evaluation video, retweeted by Wallström after Sweden's time in the UN Security council, she claims taking pride in its contribution for taking steps towards peace in Yemen even though Sweden has sold firearms to Saudi Arabia that later has been used against Yemen (Twitter, Wallström). The firearm trade with Saudi Arabia is also done despite that there is a strong agreement in academia and empirically that war has a strong effect on women (Röda Korset, 2018; CONCORD; 2017). As women today are increasingly being targeted during war it leads to increased insecurity, (Röda Korset, 2018). In wars women's and girls are more likely to be victims of sexual violence, trafficking, the impacts of bad sanitary and health possibilities (CONCORD, 2017, p. 27). According to CONCORD an increased spread of weapons constitutes a direct threat against women's security and prevents women from participating in the public space. It also contributes to an increased militarization of societies where traditional gender norms are reinforced and conciliated (CONCORD, 2017, p. 26). Even according to SIDA themselves women and girls are especially exposed in areas of war and conflict (SIDA, 2016, p. 28).
3.6.2 Resources

In relation to the first pillar of the feminist foreign policy, “resources”, the above analysis of the SIDA budget indicates that there has been an increase in funding directed to women and gender equality. In the budgets of this particular period SIDA differentiates between direct and indirect gender equality funding. The analysis also demonstrated an increase in the funding direct instead of indirect targeting gender equality and women. However, the analysis shows that the Swedish government has done extensive work promoting gender equality even prior to its implementation of the feminist foreign policy in 2014.

The situation in Sweden can be compared to the situation in Canada. In Canada the government has announced that within five years, 95% of its aid initiatives shall be dedicated to advancing gender equality (Thompson & Asquith, 2018). But Canada has received critique arguing that the fine print of the funding reveals that the primary aim of these aid projects would not necessarily be to advance gender equality but rather merely to affect it in some way (ibid.). The question to be asked is hence, as funding is such an explicit way to validate policy, has the funding actually increased or is it just a rearrangement of already existing funding? Has the funding just been renamed from previously indirect to now being framed as direct funding for advancing gender equality to be able to show concrete results from the new feminist foreign policy?

These are a challenging questions to answer without a direct insight into the exact budgeting process, which is not public. According to SIDAs most recent annual report it is highlighted that the funding where gender equality is the main target has increased from 18% in 2016 into 20% in 2017 (SIDA 2, 2018, p. 112). At the same time it recognizes that women's economic empowerment is a continued challenge due to conservative values, norms and laws (ibid.). Hence, the critique of Canada's feminist foreign policy applicable also to Sweden's?

When there is just a small increase in direct funding, together with the challenge of reaching the women, can SIDA argue that they have conducted feminist foreign policy? One could argue that the fact that there is an increase in funding, and not a decrease, is in line with the aim of conducting feminist foreign policy and is enough to qualify as such as it as actually conducting feminist foreign policy. But one could also argue, that by comparing the small
increase from previous years it is clear that the increase is not due to the new feminist policy and would have been made anyway. In the annual report from 2017 SIDA concludes that in its budget, 11% of the funding is either directly or indirectly devoted the work on gender equality or women, 20% of the funding is directly targeting women and gender equality and 69% of their funding affects women and gender equality indirectly (SIDA, 2018, p. 111). After four years of conducting foreign policy with the aim of being feminist, one could argue that the number of funding not at all targeting women and gender equality should be lower than 11% to be able to claim that its foreign policy is feminist especially when compared to their foreign policy before 2014.

3.6.3 Representation

Representation in the Swedish Foreign policy has two aspects: working for higher female representation in the world and the act of representation of Sweden as the first country with feminist foreign policy and the representation of the foreign policy itself.

Since Sweden introduced its feminist foreign policy in 2014, several other countries such as Canada has also implemented a feminist foreign policy. Since 2014 Australia's first female foreign minister, Julie Bishop, has spoken openly about making gender equality central to global peace and security (Thompson & Asquith, 2018). In 2018 the United Kingdom's Labour party adopted a feminist development policy plan (Tapply, 2018). Accordingly, it could be argued that by Sweden openly proclaiming itself as feminist, many others are following its lead, even though at first the first reactions ranged from giggling to outright hostility (Thompson & Asquith, 2018). As previously mentioned, the Swedish government also produced a handbook on how to conduct feminist foreign policy, not only as a guideline for itself but also for other countries to use and be inspired of. If this handbook has been read and drawn upon by other governments is still by and large unknown, but the very act of producing this handbook counts as a merit of the governmental interest for activating feminism as a field of policy making, also when it comes to foreign relations.

Regarding representation, an important aspect to consider is that Sweden in 2017-2019 has had a unique opportunity as it has been part of the UN Security Council. In the Security
Council Sweden has had power to act feminist and to let it influence its priorities and represent their feminist ambitions. Before entering the UN Security Council in 2017 Sweden proclaimed that gender equality was to be one out of four priorities. In line with this proclamation, Sweden has pushed in the UN Security Council for an increase in representatives from women's organizations that briefs the council (Regeringskansliet 4, 2018). Sweden has also contributed to ensuring gender balance among Council briefers for the first time, and actively contributed to the mentioning of women in almost all of the Councils statements on crisis situations, which previously only occurred in less than half of these statements (ibid.). For that reason, one could argue that Sweden has contributed to an increase of actual female representation around the world and also represented its feminist foreign policy to other states.

3.6.4 Reality

The Swedish feminist foreign policy is based upon three pillars: rights, resources and representation as mentioned before, but these three pillars are according to the Swedish government based on the Reality the women live in (Government, 2018, p. 11). The fourth R reality refers to the aim of conducting intersectional analysis on the implementation of foreign policy. As stated above, intersectionality is by the Swedish government defined as taking into account the fact that people have different living conditions, levels of influence and needs (Handbook, 2018, p. 11). The SIDA budget is divided into different continents/geographical areas which enables to direct funding specificity to the geographical area which entails different issues targeting women (SIDA 2, 2017) However , by examining the ministers at the department of foreign ministry Margot Wallström, Ann Linde and Isabella Lövin which are the responsible ministers, one could argue that it is very white. The intersectionality interest, then, is not really implemented at this particular level. These three ministers, are women, but with apparently solid Swedish ethnic backgrounds. The again, irrespective of “whiteness”, the mere fact they are women is arguably a strong objective when implementing feminist policies. From a feminist theory standpoint (which goes hand in hand with the perspective of intersectionality , it could be argued that as knowledge is socially situated, marginalized groups are also socially situated in ways that makes it more possible for them to be aware of
things related to being marginalized (reference). Thus, an intersectional critique could be the fact that there are only white, well-educated persons in charge of policies that will have an effect on many women all over the world living in very different realities. For example, in the feminist foreign policy handbook it is not specified in the 100 pages how to work to implement an intersectional perspective in practice. At one point, it is mentioned the intersectional work should include a need to consider factors other than gender, such as age, geographic domicile, socioeconomic status, gender identity and gender expression, sexual orientation, ethnic origin, functional variation, level of education, declarations of faith and religion (Government, 2018, p. 38). On the other hand one could anticipate that the people conducting the feminist foreign policy on more local levels can adapt the policy to include women in their reality that they live in in a more inclusive way that the macro level ambitions.

In sum, one may argue that the Swedish government has been ambitious in its interest of conducting intersectional feminist foreign policy. In the end, however, not much information or practical considerations can be found showing how the government meant that this new form of foreign policy actually could be conducted in an intersectional manner.

In the theme of reality a discussion initiated in the Background section of this thesis is whether or not it is possible to conduct a feminist foreign policy within a liberal state. Is it even considerable to claim Sweden as the first feminist country when it sells firearms to undemocratic countries? Or even claiming to aim for conducting intersectional feminist acts when intersectional feminism stems in black feminism and Sweden has shut their borders for immigrants. For future studies this could be an interesting discussion to further develop.
4 Part four

4.1 Conclusion

In an era of Trump a self-proclamation of being a feminist country is groundbreaking and new. At the same time this policy is embedded in the broader global efforts to promote gender equality in the international area. Which is something that has been involved since the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325. In this thesis by using a method of evaluation an evaluation has been conducted of Sweden's feminist foreign policy to answer the research questions:

1. What has feminist foreign policy meant for the Swedish government 2014-2018 in terms of specific policy making?
2. To what extent has it actually been a new feminist foreign policy?

The analysis indicates actions has been made to carry out the feminist foreign policy aims. There has been an increase in funding directed to women and gender equality, and Wallström has in the form of words conducted feminist foreign policy in here speeches and on twitter. The Armed forces are also putting in extensive work for gender equality.

The analysis showed that Sweden has for a long time had gender equality as a priority in their policies, and in the last four years with the new foreign policy a bigger emphasis has been put on women and gender equality. Which has been shown in the SIDA budget, and in speeches held by Wallström. The conclusion is that the Swedish government has been ambitious in its interests of conducting intersectional feminist foreign policy but besides from that not much information or practical considerations can be found showing how the feminist foreign policy is much different from previous foreign policy especially regarding the changes at the Armed Forces. But if the Swedish feminist foreign policy is to be credible Sweden cant with military export support societies that systematically counteract the values of the feminist foreign policy represents.
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