THE EU MEMORY FRAMEWORK AND MEMORY POLITICS OF THE BALTIC STATES: FROM TRANSITIONAL TO TRANSNATIONAL MEMORY

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Abstract

This research investigates the role of the European Union in establishing a common European historical memory. It assumes the comparative dimension by taking the case of politics of memory in the Baltic states. By employing the concept of memory framework, it analyses the conceptual basis of the EU commemoration policy as well as presents the legal and infrastructural foundation of the Baltic states’ politics of memory. The research is dedicated to addressing the problem of East-West “memory gap”.

The received empirical evidence sets the memory of the Holocaust in the centre of the value framework of the European Union. The analysis of memory politics in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia illustrates that though these countries have established and actively promote nation-centred memory narratives, the European standard of memory politics based on the memory of Holocaust is not yet embraced by the countries. Instead, the Baltic countries use the narrative of “Soviet genocide” as a foundational element of ideological justification for politics of memory. The exposed outcomes of the Baltic memory politics, therefore, complicate the formation of transnational European memory.

**Keywords:** European Union, EU, Baltic states, Europeanization, politics of memory, memory framework.

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List of Abbreviations

CEE Central and Eastern Europe
CPPCG Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
EC European Commission
EICICH Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes Against Humanity
EIHM Estonian Institute of Historical Memory
EP European Parliament
ESCEPR Estonian State Commission on Examination of the Policies of Repression
EU European Union
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
GNP Gross National Product
KGB Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security)
MEP Member of European Parliament
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
UN United Nations
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WWII World War II
1. Introduction

Politics meets history in a quite ambiguous way; from the radical positivist perspective, politics is history that happens now; for a relativist, history seems like an autonomous set of memories influenced by certain political conditions. The more economically developed and culturally heterogeneous society is, the more complicated and multi-layered the processes taking place and arraying the matter within this society become. As a political project, the European Union offers an alternative view on past events which is different from the ones that have been presented before by states or international organizations. As the entity having a liberal democratic consensus, it opposes economic projects based on state-planned or hard state-regulated (corporatist) models of development, such as socialist or fascist ones. As an attempt to establish transnational democracy, it contradicts modern nation-state democracies. Finally, as a project to create a new identity, the European Union represents an alternative to the “dark totalitarian past” with its coercive measures to build communities. The EU also represents an alternative to the present attempts of several nations to construct nation-centric historical narratives adapted for current political needs.

In this regard, the EU enlargement and consequential Europeanization of member states’ political life provide an institutional opportunity for new members to raise their voices and include national historical experiences by bringing them up to the common discussion. National memories, performing as reasonable arguments pronounced by civil societies of member countries, can be comprehended and then included into the unified system of European memory. For example, according to Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action, it may be interpreted as a widespread effect of the lifeworld’s initiative (the member states’ memories) on the system (the EU) in order to advance towards a consensus based on the ‘unforced force” of the better argument. Generally speaking, the way of institutionalized and reasonable discussion may lead to the harmonisation of top-down and bottom-up activities in the sphere of EU memory and therefore contribute to the establishment of the European identity.

Following the Aleida Assmann’s reflection on the past as a factor "becoming increasingly important in the formation of [European] identity" and her definition of major

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requirements for collective identities as a "common goal for the future and common points of reference in the past"\(^2\), I would highlight the significant role of memory in construction of the images of the past. Thus, I would suggest recognizing two constituent aspects, or temporal dimensions of identity as a retrospective, based on collective memory, and prospective, scoping values and norms. Thereby, memory is an integral part of identity structure, and studying memory together with practical implicating of the received conclusions is necessary for scientific purposes.

Nevertheless, the current state of affairs in the EU is quite far from ideal, due to the economic recession and rise of political Euroscepticism. The EU crisis is usually associated with the crisis of European identity and lack of legitimacy for this ambitious project. Therefore, it is reasonable to examine academically the identity formation process in its retrospective and find out some vulnerable points in its historical development. For that reason, this study takes the EU collective historical memory as a matter of inquiry.

However, it was argued before that the nature of the EU memory is transnational. Among other things, it means that the EU collective memory "sets under an umbrella" the collective memories shared by its member states, hence we need to provide our research with an informative case. The proposed case is the memory politics of Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia). There are several reasons for this choice. First, the Baltic states present an example of relatively young nationhood and complicated statehood which have been under the oppression of foreign imperial powers for a long time. Second, they are "border cultures", and it makes cultural interaction more visible for a researcher. Third, they are former Soviet republics and they were also occupied by Nazi Germany during WWII, so they experienced the traumatic dictatorial rule, which imprinted on their national past. In addition, the Baltic states have the transition experience, not only in economy and politics but also in the sphere of national memory. This would be priceless in evaluating potential risks and opportunities for the post-Soviet Eastern Neighbourhood countries wishing to join the European Union such as Ukraine, Georgia, or Moldova.

The thesis is intended to demonstrate how the transition from an authoritarian regime to liberal democratic society affects the national memory and what kind of impact these transitional memories are making on the formation of the common European memory.

2. Research Question and Structure

This paper aims to investigate the role of the EU institutions in developing common memory politics and figure out to what extent the inclusion of Eastern European memories is compatible with the formation of common European memory by taking the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) as a case. In other words, the general question is whether the national memory narratives of the Baltic States integrate to the EU memory narrative without any or with some controversial circumstances.

This purpose can be efficiently achieved by reaching the following objectives:

- to study the EU memory framework and its main functions;
- to look into the process of construction of national memories in the Baltic States and provide an interpretative policy analysis of the countries’ memory politics;
- to examine how the Baltic States’ national memories are being included in the EU memory framework and figure out potential advantages and threats of this process.

The composition of the thesis is the following. After the theoretical introduction which includes theoretical and conceptual framework (Chapter 3), literature review (Chapter 4), method and sources (Chapter 5), as well as clarification of limitations (Chapter 6), I will describe the EU memory framework and define its key features (Chapter 7). In Chapter 8, I will analyse the memory frameworks of the Baltic states with a concentration on each country case; there I will also make analytical reflections on the impact of Europeanization on the politics of memory in the named countries. In conclusion, I will summarize my findings and point out the possible implications of the analyzed processes. After that, the thesis ends with a list of literature.

3. Theory and concepts

The theoretical framework of the thesis is based upon several below circumscribed concepts which are thematically related to the politics of memory.
3.1. Collective Memory

The scholarly attention to memory in its anthropological, not natural-scientific meaning\(^3\) originates from the Classical philosophy and traces back to Plato. While arguing on historical objectification he provides a distinction between internal and external forms of memory. The former one is based on the requirements of true immediate reminiscence whereas the latter one is referred to the outer expression by means of marks and imprints\(^4\). The study of memory in the context of history was undertaken mainly by the hermeneutic tradition in humanities which understood memory in its textual incarnations as an initial source of historical inquiry. However, a tendency to making memory a transcendental category by its extrication from the epistemological context was set by thinkers from phenomenology\(^5\). At the same time, the certainty of memory as an ontological subject attributed to the societally significant substance has later become obvious to some researchers, for example, Herbert Marcuse\(^6\). In order to conceptualize memory as a useful term for interpretation social and political processes, a more critical approach was required; at least, the memory should have gained social as well as cognitivist dimension.

Maurice Halbwachs, a French sociologist whose methodological background was shaped both by Durkheimian positivist and Bergson’s intuitivist traditions, was among the first who started speaking on memory as a subject of sociological theorization. Halbwachs argued that memory can take collective forms when shared by groups whose members may use images of the past to achieve certain aims. His concept of collective memory refers to "the creation of shared versions of the past, which results through interactions, communications, media and institutions within small social groups as well as large cultural communities"\(^7\). Therefore, collective memory was functionally defined as a result of group

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\(^3\) This remark is also made for allowing the author to stay distant to psychoanalytic and other psychological studies of memory by so to get concentrated on memory as a sociological matter.


\(^6\) Marcuse underlined the existence of explosive, conflict-generating capacity of memory, the understanding of which is important in the paper’s context, i.e. “Remembrance of the past may give rise to dangerous insights, and the established society seems to be apprehensive of the subversive contents of memory”.


\(^7\) Astrid Erll, Memory in Culture, translated by Sara B. Young (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 15.
rational activity with practical and material attribution. Collective memory was also described as a source of moral reflection that bridges together professional and mass historical consciousness.

Alongside with language and temporal, Halbwachs also recognized the spatial framework of collective memory. That point was later broadly discussed and supplemented by Pierre Nora, an author of the "lieux de mèmoire" (places of memory) concept, which strictly opposes memory with history by emphasizing the reconstructive, mediated origin of the latter and vivid, permanently changing behaviour of the former. Nevertheless, this kind of disidentification in grasping the meaning of memory yet does not allow us to get a substantial understanding of the phenomena.

In this regard, we should take into consideration the academic contribution of Jan Assmann, a German Egyptologist who modified Halbwachs' concept of collective memory by making it adapted for scientific purposes. He pointed out the impossibility of making a distinction between an individual and social memory arguing that any articulated and therefore overt memory is social. He broke up the concept of collective memory into two parts as "communicative" and "cultural" memory. The term "communicative memory" suggested by Assmann is a modified version of Halbwachs' term which contains a significant reference to communicative function actively performed by memory. From here the concept of "community of memory" as "group of individuals who each possess a unique personal memory but who also share certain memories, experienced as well as non-experienced" derives. Notably that the researcher's spouse Aleida Assmann characterizes

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the European Union as the developing community of memory attributed to future-looking points of unification.\footnote{Aleida Assmann, “Europe: A Community of Memory?” 11.}

The abovementioned speculations regarding what memory is incited me to synthesize them all in order to achieve a substantial, functional and comprehensive definition of the term. My effort can be summed up by the following formulation: memory, in its sociological meaning, is a \textit{set of imprints and aspirations towards the past, experienced and non-experienced, which assume societal value if shared by means of specific signs and symbols having a strong reference to bypast events}. To make it clear, the term "memory", as it is used in the work, has the following determinations.

First, it is a sociocultural (anthropological) dimension of memory. It means that it does not refer to psychoanalytic or biological notions of memory as a body function and a complex of cognitive abilities. Next, as it was clarified above, it is a collective, not individual, memory, so it is not related to the "inner self" identity\footnote{Jan Assmann, “Communicative and Cultural Memory,” 109.} but scopes the subject studied by Maurice Halbwachs instead. In addition, it is a historical memory, hence an object of memory (\textit{the memorized}) is the elements of historical consciousness. Last but not least, it is an institutionalized memory, therefore it gains a societal, national significance by means of being utilized by political and civil institutions as well as evaluated with the use of existing social norms.

However, the use of the term "collective memory" gains more analytical value if applied to such collective identities as nations. Certainly, there cannot be one and only representation of the past shared by all individuals and groups of the society, no matter what capacity of coercion power it is supported by. "Divisions... within a given political entity cannot easily be overcome and manifest themselves in the difficulty of finding commonly accepted landmarks in the past on which to build a universal "national memory"\footnote{European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies - Policy Department B, Structural and Cohesion Policies, Culture and Education. \textit{European Historical Memories: Policies, Challenges and Perspectives}. April 2015. Accessed March 9, 2019. \url{http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/540364/IPOL_STU(2015)540364_EN.pdf}, 9.}. It is correct to talk about a representation which dominates over a few or several other ones. In the context of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian politics of memory, national memory results
from an articulation of historical narratives dominating on a national level by means of public institutions.

Construction of national memory can also be associated but not confused with the concept of historical consciousness. Historical consciousness is referred to "a mental process which helps human beings orientate themselves in time by ascribing meaning to the past"\textsuperscript{16}. However, it is argued that historical consciousness is not analyzable\textsuperscript{17} and can be characterized only by means of its presenting features and functions. In this regard, European historical consciousness may be rather theoretically hypothesised as an outcome of the Europeanization process and formation of European collective historical memory than to perform as a term whereby we operate practically in our study of politics of memory in the EU.

Thus, after making the abovementioned reservations on the concept of collective memory, we will take all of them into account in order to avoid oversimplifying some of the possible contextualisations of this concept, i.e. national memory.

Also, under this term, I will understand narratives and discourses shaping the collective perception of the past. To put it simply, collective memory is a matter we deal with, and it can assume various forms, such as national, transnational, political\textsuperscript{18}, cultural etc. In the context of the present paper, collective memory will be used as primarily an instrumental concept, i.e. as an object of related politics or framework.

3.2. Politics of Memory

I prefer the short definition of politics of memory as \textbf{organisation of collective memory by actors of politics} for two reasons. First, I find the term "organisation" well-chosen there. The initial classical meaning of politics is the state’s activity, governance, or


\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, 45.

communication between people and their groups by means of state institutions, hence the primary function of politics is the organisation of social life. In addition, the cases in hand are either national politics of memory (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) or the same conducted by transnational units attributed with representative bodies (the EU). Second, it implies the multiplicity and heterogeneity of actors, which makes the term applicable to subnational and supranational as well as non-governmental structures. Nevertheless, the deeper characterization of politics of memory is required.

Again, there should be made several reservations. First of all, politics of memory should be distinguished from politics of history (Geschichtspolitik) as well as not be confused with narrower terms such as politicization of history and political use of history.

The term Geschichtspolitik emerged in the early 1980s FRG and came from the "moral and political turn" in West Germany’s attitude towards the Nazi past and the Second World War proposed by federal chancellor Helmut Kohl, whose ambiguous call to correct the image of Germany as "the only guilty country" which takes all amount of responsibility for WWII crimes, sparkled the famous extensive discussion in the German academia known as Historikerstreit19. As explained by a Russian researcher of politics of memory Alexey Miller, Geschichtspolitik, with its initial negative connotation is given by the opponents of this term (J. Habermas), is referred to "interpretation of history selected for political or party motives and attempts to convince the public of the correctness of such an interpretation"20. He also mentioned three main mechanisms of politics of memory used by post-Soviet policy-makers such as the establishment of institutes of national remembrance, the foundation of museums under the auspices of certain political forces, and adoption of so-called "memory laws"21, as exemplified by the Polish incarnation, polityka historyczna. Therefore, politics of history is a subcase of politics of memory, which is characterized by

19 Along the discussion, the point of historian Ernst Nolte, who described the rise of Nazism and anti-Semitism as a reasonable response to the Bolshevik threat, was wrangled by other historians and scientists (I.e. Habermas) protecting the narrative of the 60-70s. Historikerstreit has become a case for the right-wing anti-Marxist reaction in German historiography carried out by the elder generation of intellectuals and officials who made in so doing, according to Norbert Frei’s phrase, a ‘protracted political farewell’. Nevertheless, the discussion ended in favour of the left-wing scholars. See: Kristen Ghodsee, “A Tale of "Two Totalitarianisms": The Crisis of Capitalism and the Historical Memory of Communism,” History of the Present, no. 4 (2014): 118-120.


21 Ibid, 11.
a specific kind of agent (right-wing or "patriotic" networks) as well as a specific kind of ambience, usually with the traumatic or dictatorship past (Germany of the 1980s, former Soviet-bloc countries).

Next, the politicization of history scopes the plenitude of practices in academic or public life since by this term we mean the impact of political agenda on professional historians as well as the use of historical arguments by politicians. However, political (or political-pedagogical) use of history, which was theoretically recognized by Klas-Göran Karlsson, means "summoning history as an aid" by one side of political debate for the sake of achieving the moral ascendancy over the opponent. In this regard, political use of history can be placed as a special case of the politicization of history which, in turn, is immanent both to research and political process and hence still inextirpable.

Back to the politics of memory, I will give it a longer definition of an organized and institutionalized activity of actors of the political system for achieving goals and producing norms and values in the sphere of collective memory by means of both soft and hard mechanisms of power. I deliberately mentioned soft and hard mechanisms to highlight the versatile nature of this kind of politics combining, for instance, extended funding of academic studies devoted to specific topics with strict memory laws providing for the punishment of deprivation of liberty.

However, in the paper, I discuss the politics of memory negotiated and exerted on different levels, national and supranational, whereas the European Union is a strong case of transnational memory politics, therefore a slightly different interpretation for such case is required. In this respect, Aline Sierp and Jenny Würstenberg argue that the application of structures of knowledge about the national level of the politics of memory for the analysis of transnational level is often methodologically irrelevant. On the other hand, the format of the thesis does not demand a scrupulous network analysis similar to the ones conducted

\[22\] Ibid, 6-7.


by Elisabeth Kübler for the Council of Europe\textsuperscript{25} or by Aline Sierp for the EU institutions\textsuperscript{26}, therefore we will have to abstain from full-value use of two different approaches towards transnational and national politics of memory but nevertheless we will save up this methodological know-how to apply during further research work.

The last reservation to be made here will be on the articulations of the term. I have not encountered any more or less strict application rule on whether to choose the form "politics of memory" or "memory politics", therefore I will use both variants. Nevertheless, I will give some preference to the first one as more abundant in professional literature.

### 3. 3. Memory Framework

The study of empirical material which is predominantly textual in this thesis is impossible without the use of relevant concept able to take into account all the aforementioned theoretical premises. For analytical purposes, what we need is a concept which would address several research issues.

First of all, the concept should display the content of politics of memory by means of empirically observable elements. Secondly, it should scope the legal framework of such politics. Next, we need a concept that would have strong temporal representativeness allowing to follow the evolution of politics of memory and transformation of its certain components. Last but not least, since we deal with the two different types of polity, the term should definitely be applicable both to transnational (the EU) and national (the Baltic States) political processes.

The research literature contains some solutions to the question. For example, the term “the EU memory framework” offered by Ana Milošević and Helein Touquet means "the collection of policies, resolutions and decisions by the European Commission and the European Parliament that reflect and guide collective moral and political attitudes towards


\textsuperscript{26} Aline Sierp, *History, Memory and Trans-European Identity: Unifying Divisions* (New York: Routledge, 2014).
the past". I would take this definition as an example for the new one which will grasp other political structures.

Besides, the employment of the "framework" concept is fully justified in terms of methodological applicability. I understand a framework in the Durkheimian sense subsequently adopted to a study of collective memory by Maurice Halbwachs as a complex of socially approved reminiscences which binds memory. In the EU context, national memories get approved when "uploaded" to the framework by the institutions which represent the public opinion (the European Parliament). Indeed, the memory framework is aimed to form the identity’s collective memory. Collective identities portray the past by means of the memory framework as well as refer to its constituent parts in order to justify and/or undermine one or another initiative in the sphere of memory.

Thus, the term "memory framework" will assemble policies, resolutions, and decisions by the authorized political institutions that reflect and guide collective moral and political attitudes towards the past. Two italicized words refer to essential functions exercised by the framework. By the reflective function, various memories are being unified into one inclusive memory by their "uploading" to the higher level as well as moral and normative attitudes toward certain memory issues are being framed. The guiding function provides the procedural and axiological compliance of those attitudes with the public consensus. This paper is to a fair extent dedicated to the analysis of memory frameworks, its comparison, and capturing discrepancies in their elements.

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28 Durkheim shares the aprioristic point that frameworks configure the cognition process by defining forms for logical groupings of objects. See e.g. Susan Stedman Jones, “Forms of Thought and Forms of Society: Durkheim and the Question of the Categories,” Presses Universitaires de France, no. 2 (2012).


3. 4. Transitional Memory

The next concept we discuss is rather an assemblage of several other concepts which are well-elaborated and have considerable histories of academic use than a strict term resulting from a long and scrupulous inductive search. Moreover, this concept has to be approbated as an element of the theoretical framework in studies of memory politics in order to justify itself for future academic use. It has been mentioned in the context of collective memory studies at least in one monograph with a notion related to the Transitional period in the modern history of Spain (1978-1982)\(^1\). Another case of use was recorded in the context of the post-authoritarian process of "reconciliation" in Uruguay (after 1985)\(^2\). We see that the "transitional" determination has a firm reference to a specific period of national history which usually takes place following the end of dictatorial rule and can be characterized by social instability. Nevertheless, due to very episodic touching in the research literature, it could be assumed as a novation and treated with circumspection.

The concept of transitional memory is picked by me to characterise the nature and peculiarities of the development of memory politics in the Baltic countries since the restoration of independence. Indeed, the society in the process of transition from one ontological state to another perceives this process as well as the images related to the past states in a unique way. In the context of the post-Cold War history, whereas the "memory" is explained in previous sections, the attributive "transitional" demands clarification, which intuitively leads us to the terms "transition economy", "democratic transition" and "transitional justice". Transition economy refers to the transition from state-planned economy to a liberal market economy, which in Eastern European countries was fraught with painful and even destructive social consequences. The crucial political changes triggered by the demounting of the Soviet bloc in 1989-1991 launched there the process of "democratic transition" from authoritarian to the pluralist model of political decision making and from party-dominant to liberal state ideology. Nevertheless, these terms are extremely explanatory when it comes to describing the socio-political context of the problem announced in this thesis. The term "transitional justice" is rather closer to the

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politics of memory. According to the UN resolution, transitional justice is called to "ensure accountability, serve justice, provide remedies to victims, promote healing and reconciliation, establish independent oversight of the security system and restore confidence in the institutions of the State and promote the rule of law in accordance with international human rights law" and incorporates "the full range of judicial and non-judicial measures, including, among others, individual prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting of public employees and officials."\(^{33}\) Initially, as a concept related to international justice which refers to the universal normative framework of human rights law and a holistic approach towards determining the nature of the violations, transitional justice gained slightly different notions by being applied to the East European and particularly Baltic post-Cold War political reality. As Ruty G. Teitel argues, alongside with the "third wave of democratisation" which swept the named countries in the late 1980s, the local employment of mechanisms of transitional justice was associated with nation-building and considered as one of the ways to change the political identity\(^ {34}\). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume the significant role of instrumentalization of transitional justice in establishing and securing official history-political discourses determining the politics of memory in the Baltic states. In this regard, Marek Tamm used the term "transitional history" under which he meant the active institutionalisation of memory politics in the Eastern European countries and beyond\(^ {35}\).

Thus, the transitional memory, though without a strict substantial definition, can be characterized by several features. Tracing back to the radical commemoration initiatives of \textit{perestroika}\(^ {36}\), the transitional memory manifests the transitions: from socialist to nation-centred, even nationalist ideology; from state and party monopoly on historical narration towards the establishment of the liberal democratic model with "memory entrepreneurs" as actors; from Socialist collectivist axiology to Western value framework used as part of formation of attitudes towards the past.


\(^{36}\) The semantics of this Russian word also implies the meanings "transition, transformation".
3. 5. Europeanization

In this dissertation, the use of Europeanization as an explanatory concept is purposed to manifest to what extent the Baltic states have gone forward in developing their memory politics as EU members sharing the EU values and attitudes towards the past. Therefore, within the framework of this paper, we should determine whether Europeanization is being analysed as a part of the theoretical background of either social and political sciences (EU-isation) or humanities (cultural and identity dimension of Europeanization).

The political-scientific notion of the concept of Europeanization as EU-isation is well-elaborated by scholars, and the term lends itself to description and analytical treatment. Elisabeth Bomberg, John Petersen, and Alexander Stubb define it as "the process whereby national systems adapt to EU policies and integration more generally, while also shaping themselves the European Union." As we see, this notion is capable to methodologically interpret the inclusion of member states' national memories and take them into consideration at least as part of the EU cultural and symbolic policies. Moreover, as Olsen argued, "Europeanization is not limited to changes in political-administrative structures and policy content, but "European values and policy paradigms are also to some (varying) degree internalized at the domestic level, shaping discourses and identities".

Nevertheless, Klas-Göran Karlsson argues that the latter type of conceptualisation is justified from the point of historical logic as the essential part of the so-called "third wave of Europeanization" , which, unlike the first and second waves associated with economic and political integration, is marked by cultural integration. The content of this process includes linguistic homogenisation as well as embracement of the European knowledge, attitudes, and values by the new members. The process also aims to provide the European community enlarged by the new members with "a suitable cultural-symbolic foundation".

Therefore, Europeanization as a matter of humanities concerns the European identities and their formative factors such as factual historical circumstances, culture, literary texts, and

40 Ibid.
historical thinking\textsuperscript{41}. If we also follow this way, we actually use the paradigm of the "third way of Europeanization" as a background for theoretical development of the problem of how Eastern European countries address the hardships related to the transitional period in sphere of national memory. The "humanistic" concept of Europeanisation becomes even more valuable when it suggests contrasting the raising awareness of national history and identity on the national level of the European community with "construction and dissemination of the European [historical] canon"\textsuperscript{42} on its transnational level. Initially, the European historical canon was preset by the Holocaust which has become simultaneously a "founding myth" and basic value system for the EU\textsuperscript{43}, but after the accession of 2004 Eastern European post-socialist memories, with their inherent and acquired problems supplemented the shelve of European memories. However, those new memory narratives, unlike Western European ones, did not contain such crucial elements of memory of the Holocaust. This circumstance questioned the resilience of the European canon. The process of interaction between nationalisation of history and reinterpretation of European historical-cultural canon determines the content of Europeanisation, and thereby we will use it as a part of the theoretical framework of this thesis in the analysis of memory politics in the EU and the Baltic states.

4. Literature Review

The fact is that studies on the EU cultural and identity politics also scoping issues of collective memory are presented by a considerable number of volumes. Thus, the miscellany "The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe" edited by Richard Ned Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner, and Claudio Fogu investigates the historical preconditions of the European memory agenda formation by analysing cases of several major countries including those outside the Union\textsuperscript{44}. Another good example is the "European Identity" volume drawing attention to the problems of national symbolic politics and memories as

\textsuperscript{41} Karlsson, “The Uses of History and the Third Wave of Europeanization,” 40.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid, 41.
impeding factors for creating the European transnational identity. However, if the subject of EU as "realm of memory" or "community of memory" has gained a certain degree of scholarly development that expressed in numerous publications, we cannot say the same about the EU as an actor of transnational memory politics. As Sierp and Würstenberg point out, "research on transnational memory politics is nevertheless as yet in its infancy." To fulfil this gap, Sierp's monograph "History, Memory and Trans-European Identity: Unifying Divisions" come out in 2014 successfully attempted to conduct a comprehensive study of the EU as an agent of memory construction as well as to frame a methodology applicable for the analysis of politics of memory on the transnational level.

The process of Europeanization of memory politics in the former Soviet bloc countries was researched by a number of scholars who examined the problem at the angles of institutional, constructivist, critical theory, or other methodological views. For example, there are deep and illustrative case studies for Poland, Slovakia, Croatia, or Bulgaria. Besides, the transition processes which have been taking place in the development of the post-Cold War national memories in the CEE countries were broadly considered through the prism of a comparative perspective. Thus, qualitative and relative changes in memory politics as well as differences in the behaviour of these changes among countries, have become unveiled thanks to the studies referred to e.g. the Czech Republic

46 Aleida Assmann, «Europe: A Community of Memory?».
47 Sierp and Würstenberg, «Linking the Local and the Transnational: Rethinking Memory Politics in Europe,» 323.
48 Sierp, History, Memory and Trans-European Identity: Unifying Divisions.
52 Ghodsee, “A Tale of “Two Totalitarianisms”: The Crisis of Capitalism and the Historical Memory of Communism.”
and Slovakia\textsuperscript{53} or Croatia and Serbia\textsuperscript{54}. However, there were efforts to set more countries under examination as well as to advocate a theoretical assumption of the memory of Communism as an integral phenomenon. In this relation, Clarke's article provides a contrastive analysis of three models of post-Cold War national memory represented by Germany, Hungary, and the Baltic states\textsuperscript{55}. In the context of the latter ones, cross-national studies of collective memory (for example, "Taming Nationalism? Political Community Building in the Post-Soviet Baltic States" by Dovile Budryte\textsuperscript{56}) and certain analytical concentrations on Lithuania\textsuperscript{57}, Latvia\textsuperscript{58}, and Estonia\textsuperscript{59}, alike put the spotlight on contemporary challenges encountered by states during the transitional period and essentially contribute to studies of national memory politics.

Nevertheless, the aforementioned academic works do not completely cover the problem proposed in this thesis. The prior academic literature on the thesis problem though includes several remarkable works yet may be characterized as not sufficiently wide, so more empirical research as well as its proper theoretical processing is required. As a suggestion, a comparative EU-Baltic states analysis can be employed to measure the impact of Europeanization of the politics of memory in the Baltic states, and which is being attempted within this thesis.


\textsuperscript{54} Milošević and Touquet, «Unintended consequences: the EU memory framework and the politics of memory in Serbia and Croatia.»

\textsuperscript{55} David Clarke, «Communism and Memory Politics in the European Union,» Central Europe 1, no. 12 (2014).

\textsuperscript{56} Dovile Budryte, Taming Nationalism? Political Community Building in the Post-Soviet Baltic States (London: Routledge, 2005).


\textsuperscript{59} Tamm, “In search of lost time: memory politics in Estonia, 1991 – 2011.”
5. Method and Sources

As it was stated before, the key elements of EU memory framework as well as of the Baltic states' memory frameworks are legal acts adopted by respective authoritative power institutions, by that they are in the centre of analytical focus. At the same time, the normative and institutional dimensions of memory politics do always overlap, hence the activity of the most important institutions concerned with politics of memory should be also considered to the extent the chosen theoretical approach allows it to do. Therefore, in case of the EU, I use the documents listed in the memory framework composed by Ana Milošević and Heleen Touquet (see Table 1) ⁶⁰ whereas the research material on the memory politics of the Baltic states is broken up to two groups, legislature, and infrastructure, which are classified by the said attribute (see Table 2). Such tabular presentation should generally reflect the content and evolution of memory politics in the said countries. The documents will be retrieved either from the official websites or the official journals of the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian parliaments.

The thesis also makes heavy use of an extensive corpus of secondary sources since they are extremely helpful in providing theoretical clarifications on certain features of the studied problem. The research subject is complex and multidimensional and requires comprehensive knowledge of the historical and sociocultural background of the examined entities.

As the practice of the study of collective memory and memory politics demonstrates, an inquiry within these thematic directions can be conducted with various methodological tools depending on the nature of scope ⁶¹. Since the research examines normative documents, such as laws, declarations, resolutions, and speeches from the higher officials, as well as memory policies, both at national and European level, I will develop the proposed topic and process the gathered material through the use of document analysis. According to Glenn Bowen, document analysis involves three main stages of processing the text - skimming, reading, and interpretation; also, the conditions of objectivity and

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⁶⁰ Milošević and Touquet, «Unintended consequences: the EU memory framework and the politics of memory in Serbia and Croatia.»

⁶¹ Maurantionio, “The Politics of Memory.”
sensibility in analysing the information should be observed. Meanwhile, the inquiry of the EU and the Baltic states' memory frameworks represent themselves as case studies, and we should keep that in mind while analysing relevant primary and secondary sources. This circumstance intends a holistic comprehension of research material as well as the utilisation of heuristic practices where necessary.

6. Limitations

Here I specify main conditions under which the achievement of maximally objective and comprehensive expected research outcomes seems extremely difficult within this thesis. First of all, complex research of politics of memory exerted on national and transnational level of decision-making demands the employment of different types of methodological optics for each level. However, this limitation is mentioned above and can be overwhelmed by further research work in frames of other qualifying papers or research projects.

Next, due to physical limitations, the comparative dimension of the thesis provides less concentration on each country's case. Moreover, an emphasis on legal acts and institutions makes the used approach too normative, hence an empirical focus on agency and material related to the political process (political party programmes, statements of officials, motions and debates in the parliaments, civil initiatives) is also needed. One can suggest here to examine school textbooks and popular history texts playing a crucial role in constructing mass historical consciousness and imagination, as well as elements of the topographic environment.

One more limitation, which is of a methodological nature, derives from the previous one. Due to the short preparation term as well as to the restrictions set by the format of work, I was not able to analyze the political struggle and the role of polarised political forces in and out of the parliaments whereas such concentration is crucial in studying memory politics. Nonetheless, this could be implemented in my further academic contribution which would involve the broader scope of material and higher requirements to the proficiency of source analysis.

In addition, despite most of the analysed texts are available in English and Russian, the original versions in Lithuanian, Latvian, or Estonian cannot be critically examined by the author due to he does not have a command of these languages, thus a linguistic limitation takes place. This can be partly compensated by means of the use of translated copies retrieved from the respective sources.

7. Guiding the European Memory: the Legislative Role of the EU Institutions in Maintaining Memory Politics

7. 1. The Historical Background

As a heterogeneous entity with a complicated history of relations between constituent parts, the European Union has inherited from old Europe a scope of problems which are immanent to any large and ambitious political integration project. However, the integration process was launched in difficult economic conditions of post-war devastation and threat of mass unemployment, so united Europe from its dawn was devoted to combining free-market policies with influential social rhetoric. The contradiction between social and market has become obvious several times for the European integration history and its escalations were usually followed by economic crises. However, this permanent problem presented the European project with a challenge of whether to undertake active political measures in order to reform the free-market crisis economy or to stabilize the situation by developing a common ideological foundation with predominantly non-economic mechanisms of solidarity. The latter choice presupposed the formation of European identity linked to cultural, heritage, and value grounds.

The first attempt to signify the pillars of the new identity was made in the Declaration of European Identity (1973) which proclaimed "the unity of Nine" then the Union members and set the European identity into the global political context. It also stated "the dynamic nature of the construction of the United Europe". Nevertheless, this attempt was assumed

63 «Declaration on European Identity.» Bulletin of the European Communities (Office for official publications of the European Communities), no. 12 (December 1973).
as a "vague and full of diverging interpretations"\textsuperscript{64}, it turned to be quite illustrative as it underlined the compromise nature of the further formation of the European identity together with its culturalist agenda. In addition, the Declaration example demonstrates how the social issue was "bypassed" and emerged void was filled by the problem of identity. In this regard, the Maastricht Treaty extraction of "Economic" from the name of the European Community\textsuperscript{65} does not look like a decorative amendment but an indicator of a shift in symbolic policy.

The further enlargement of the EU to the North and especially to the East changed the situation with the axiological basement of the EU identity. In the crisis of 1970s, the market was a point to be dealt with and had primarily negative connotations, whereas in 1990s after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Iron Curtain the European model of market was perceived by former Soviet bloc states as an attractive prospect for national economic development, so the success-oriented political movements made the integration to the EU an essential part of their agenda. However, pro-EU feelings also referred to the other spheres. For instance, joining the Western institutions (NATO and EU) was the common point for most of the Baltic states’ political parties since it was supposed as the only factor providing real security\textsuperscript{66}. At the same time, the integration of the East brought about problems which were immanent to transitional societies into the European cultural context. The controversies of the "problematic past" as well as historical and memory discussions "reloaded" to the national level of memory called to life nationalist discourses and revisions with capacities able to hinder the promotion of common European identity by offering attractive alternatives for identity formation. The prominent examples of the anti-EU "political use of history" are presented in Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary, whose political elites actively promote national values as a means of mobilizing voters frustrated by the consequences of liberal market reforms\textsuperscript{67}. The part of the public following the nationalist value code, which is rather simplistic in terms of content, fears of the loss of not only identity and self-definition but also their unique historical memories.

\textsuperscript{64} Hagen Schulz-Forberg and Bo Stråth. The Political History of European Integration (New York: Routledge, 2010), 41.


This attaches extraordinary importance to the politics of memory, which usually operates by topics and symbols which are easy to instrumentalize for setting a value agenda and then using it for achieving political goals. It allows to bypass vulnerable points set by the economic and social issues and simultaneously satisfy other kinds of public needs. This feature is assumed to make the formation process of the European identity more stable and less vulnerable to the influence of negative factors.

7.2. The EU Memory Framework: Main Points, Development, Functions

Generally, any kind of policy which regulates cultural or memory issues is usually legally based on a solid set of common values. The EU politics of memory uses the complex of fundamental values declared in the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) as a point of normative reference. The humanist value-based politics of the European Union, therefore, extends to the sphere of the past with the purpose of legal assessment of this past. Georges Mink supposes that this intention to reassess the European history full of conflicts and crimes by imagining it as not a safe place is aimed to gain more attractiveness to the idea of the common European future. The EU institutions should play a significant role in assembling and conducting of the "European concert of memories".

From the previous studies of the EU role as an actor of memory politics (e.g., Clarke, Littoz-Monnet, Mälksoo, Milošević, Sierp) we can find that it performs on several

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68 "The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail". Treaty of Lisbon (2007). *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 306/11.


70 Clarke, «Communism and Memory Politics in the European Union.»


levels of decision-making. The practical side of memory politics includes various mechanisms of indirect influence such as encouraging and funding commemoration and research projects, building memorial infrastructure and museums etc. We can assume that the ongoing Europeanization of collective memory is also an outcome of the EU institutions development. The potential for integration currently "spills over" its former boundaries set by the horizons of the market and political cooperation. As argued above, in-depth and in-width integration processes, even conjugated with hindering circumstances, have led to a logical consequence of the necessity to create a new European identity as a legitimising basement for future promotion of united Europe. The question of the ontological basement for a new identity could be solved by establishing a distinct and well-elaborated policy stated in the European legislature. In terms of the constructivist approach, it meant the formation of norms which usually define identities and prescribe their behaviour. Henceforth, under the term of normalisation of European (collective) memory, I mean an EU institutions-based arrangement of concepts of the past shared by European actors to the form of norms of the European Union law.

Thus, the normalisation of European collective memory is being exerted by the European Parliament and partly by the European Commission, and formalized in the official documents and decisions authored by these institutions. Notably, the normalisation can include broader forms of political action as well as go beyond the boundaries of the EU, for example, involving associated countries. The term “the EU memory framework” offered by Ana Milošević and Helein Touquet means “the collection of policies, resolutions and decisions by the European Commission and the European Parliament (EP) that reflect and guide collective moral and political attitudes towards the past.” There is no ground to reject this definition as it both comprises various types of sources and refers to the relevant methodology.

73 Milošević and Touquet, «Unintended consequences: the EU memory framework and the politics of memory in Serbia and Croatia.»

74 Sierp, History, Memory and Trans-European Identity: Unifying Divisions.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU enlargement</th>
<th>Adoption date/Resolution</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foundation of the EU community</td>
<td>As an elected body, the Parliament began to draft proposals addressing the functioning of the EU only after 1979</td>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>Denmark 07/1987 Armenian Genocide</td>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>Denmark 10/1987 Le Pen and the Holocaust</td>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>Ireland 02/1993 Nazi concentration camps as historical monuments</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>07/1995 Holocaust Remembrance Day</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>12/1995 Resolution on the return of plundered property to Jewish communities</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>Greece 07/1998 Resolution on restitution of the possessions of Holocaust victims</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Spain 03/2000 Resolution on countering racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism in the candidate countries</td>
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<td>1986</td>
<td>Spain 06/2000 Declaration on the remembrance of the Holocaust</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>Portugal 05/2005 The future of Europe 60 years after the Second World War</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>Austria &amp; Finland 06/2005 Declaration on Srebrenica</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>Sweden 09/2005 Solidarność</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>Denmark 10/2006 50th anniversary of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and its historical meaning for Europe</td>
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<td>05/2007 On Estonia</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>Czech Republic 09/2008 Proclamation of 23 August as European Day of Remembrance for Victims of War and Tyranny</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>Estonia 10/2008 Stalinism and Nazism</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>Cyprus 01/2009 Declaration on Srebrenica</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>Latvia 11/2009 European Day of Reconciliation</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>Lithuania 11/2009 European Day of Reconciliation</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>Hungary 2010 European Commission: The memory of the crimes committed by totalitarian regimes in Europe</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>Malta 03/2013 Strengthening the fight against racism, xenophobia and hate crime</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>Slovakia 01/2015 Recognition by Turkey of the 1915 Armenian genocide</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>Bulgaria 04/2015 International Roma Day – anti-Gypsism in Europe and EU recognition of the Roma Memorial Day of the Roma genocide during WW II</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>Romania 04/2015 Armenian genocide 100th anniversary</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>Croatia 07/2015 Srebrenica commemoration</td>
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<td><strong>Table 1.</strong> The EU memory framework (Source: Milošević, Ana, and Heleen Touquet. «Unintended consequences: the EU memory framework and the politics of memory in Serbia and Croatia.» <em>Southeast European and Black Sea Studies</em>, no. 18(3) (2018): 382).</td>
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The network elements are EP and EC resolutions and declarations, whose motion is at the own initiative ground, and usually intended to influence on specific policy areas, such as foreign policy, or human right. As soon as the collective memory is a subject of specific kind of policy, it is often regulated by the Parliament’s "own-initiatives". The Written Declarations are similar mechanisms to raise issues, which are being adopted by a simple majority of MEP votes. As an actor of EU memory normalisation, the European Parliament is famous as a political forum, an arena for debates and a transparent platform.

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for the implementation of public initiatives\textsuperscript{78}. This advantage gains weight to the Parliament’s decisions, especially in the eyes of civic and non-governmental players.

Nevertheless, it has to be taken into account that the EP resolutions and decisions are not endowed with similar coercive powers as national laws. “Memory laws” are usually stricter than documents of the EU memory framework, hence we assume a different behaviour of interaction within the EU policy network and at the national level.

Besides the EP, other EU institutions are concerned with memory issues. In 2014, the Council adopted the Regulation setting up the "Europe for Citizens" funding programme for the period 2014-2020 presented by the Commission. The programme aims to "contribute to citizens' understanding of the Union, its history and diversity" and to "raise awareness of remembrance, the common history and values of the Union and the Union's aim, namely to promote peace, the values of the Union and the well-being of its peoples" under the scope of one of two strands, "European remembrance"\textsuperscript{79}.

Here we specify the main functions being accomplished by the EU memory framework:

- Standardising (setting a new standard of historical memory shared by the member states);
- Value-establishing (spreading the European values: human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights\textsuperscript{80});
- Influencing (exerting soft power in regard to member states and third countries)
- Integrating (bringing new elements of collective memory together and their re-evaluation on a European axiological basis).

In the history of the EU memory framework establishment, 1986 is marked as the year when the first element of this framework, the "Declaration against racism and xenophobia", was adopted. However, we can speak about significant institutional changes related to the inclusion of the memory of the Holocaust only after the end of the Cold War. After analysing the agenda and behaviour of the documents in the framework, we can notionally distinguish four main periods of development of the EU memory policy.

\textsuperscript{78} Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton. The European Parliament, 340.


During the *first period* (1986-1993), definition and introduction of genocide as a term in the context of commemoration took place. The adoption of the resolution on the Armenian genocide and the declaration on the Holocaust and Le Pen, an MEP and famous Holocaust denier, was the first measures actualizing the new politics of memory.

*The second period* (1993-2005), the development of Holocaust memory, the documents which provided the institutionalisation of the memory, as well as its legal confirmation, were adopted. Thus, the EP establishes the structure of memory institutions, such as remembrance days, concrete physical places of memory, and terms for restitution of the property alienated from the Holocaust victims\(^1\).

The key feature of the *third period* (2005-2010) was marked by the inclusion of national memory narratives of the Eastern European countries accessed to the EU. Emerged after the end of the Cold War, these memory narratives contained strong anti-Soviet components and shared liberal nationalist or nationalist ideological stances. In these years, the EU, following the Council of Europe (2006), characterized the political regime of the USSR and regimes of its satellites as totalitarian, putting it in the same line with Nazi and other fascist regimes, and pronounced its attitude towards as denunciating. The EP also declared two remembrance days for victims of Communist regimes, on August 23 and November 9. Simultaneously, the Prague Process, with its significant financial and academic support, was launched, initially as the Czech government’s own effort, but later supported by other major organisations including the EU. Nevertheless, "the uniqueness of the Holocaust" was acknowledged\(^2\), that created uncertainty of the EP position on Communist regimes either as "equally damned" as the Nazi regime or slightly different in terms of a number of victims or characteristics of committed crimes. One of the consequences of the eastward EU enlargement for the process of the European community of memory formation was, according to Wæhrens' assumption, the polarisation of the EP on memory issues and

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stirring up of the right-wing "memory lobby" backed by the Czech, Polish and especially by the Baltic players\textsuperscript{83}.

Finally, the current \textit{forth in succession period} (2010-present) might be characterized as the improvement of the previously created framework. As it is seen from the outcomes of its work made for the last nine years, the European Parliament has been concerned with the memory issues related to three problematic fields, the genocide in Srebrenica, the genocide of Roma, and the Armenian genocide. In addition, the institution has voiced frustration with the racism, xenophobia and hate crime and recommended restrictive measures pertaining to neo-Nazi and extreme-right groups.

7. 3. The Genocide and the Holocaust as Themes Shaping the Framework

As it was previously mentioned, the core object of historical memory in the EU memory framework is a genocide of European peoples which took place throughout the 20th century, and the Holocaust is a central focal point of the genocide problematics. This circumstance needs special clarification.

As is evident from the foregoing, the Holocaust has gained an outstandingly significant meaning within the European memory framework. The annihilation of about six million European Jews committed by the Nazi regime from the very beginning became a matter of scientific inquiry, thanks in large part to Raphael Lemkin’s efforts. The case of Holocaust was evaluated legally by the international community and formed the backbone of the legal concept of genocide, defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (CPPCG) in 1948 as "any of the... acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group"\textsuperscript{84}. Initially, the collective memory of Holocaust took up a cultural-critical assumption explained by Theodor Adorno as an extremely complicated catastrophic event caused by the crisis of


Western rationality and making impossible from the ethical point any aesthetic expression of the human mind\textsuperscript{85}. In the meantime, the after-war imperative "never again war" was also applied to the Holocaust which was rethought strictly as a negative event, a black side of the history which must never be repeated. However, the consideration of the Holocaust as a transcendental source of historical lessons played the key role in the process of crossing the borders of one nation’s historical consciousness and historical conscience and initiated transnational tendencies in the European memory sphere.

Karlsson noted that "the Holocaust since the 1980s gradually has moved into the very centre of the European historical culture(s)"\textsuperscript{86}. Nevertheless, it was not there before that moment for several reasons. First of all, the commemoration of the Holocaust during the first decades after the war remained at the national level, with later expansion to the United States of America. Alvin Rosenfeld points out that in frames of "Americanization" the Holocaust was perceived by the national historical culture in a more optimistic value-asserting way whereas the dark and frustrating aspects of the event were not well represented\textsuperscript{87}. Next, the "Universalization" and "Europeanization" of the Holocaust, which was well described e.g. by Ljiljana Radonic\textsuperscript{88}, takes place only in the 1990s, after the Iron Curtain fell down. While the EU created its own legal framework on the subject, the former Soviet bloc countries attempted to reshape their national historical narratives with the parallel inclusion of the Cold War memories which usually defined the Socialist regimes and Stalinism as its quintessence, as "equally evil" to Hitler. This peculiarity of the Eastern European historical attitude towards the 20th-century events then created the situation of "divided memory"\textsuperscript{89} still impeding the formation of European transnational memory and in a certain way performing as a subject of the present research.

Speaking on the transnational European impact of the Holocaust, it is worth to note that an interesting argument which was widely discussed by the researchers is that the Holocaust

\textsuperscript{86} Karlsson et al., Echoes of the Holocaust. Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe, 15.
\textsuperscript{87} Quoted in: Karlsson et al., Echoes of the Holocaust. Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe, 28.
\textsuperscript{88} Radonic, “Croatia – Exhibiting Memory and History at the “Shores of Europe,” 355-367.
is a "negative founding myth" of the new European community. It means that the aforementioned transcendentalizing of the Holocaust as a history-cultural phenomenon is needed in order to establish the conceptual basis for the new European identity. In other words, the Holocaust is not an illustration of atrocities but it has a wide row of functions of social and moral learning. For contemporary Europe, the process of common identity formation is followed by xenophobia and discrimination on racial and ethnic ground, so the memory of Holocaust, if employed as a counterargument in the struggle against extreme forms of nationalism, proves to be an efficient instrument to both gain legitimacy scores to the project of European identity and undermine the growing far-right and populist influence. In this way, the EU concern regarding the regulation on the memory of the Holocaust is well clear.

In the communication relationship, the collective memory of the Holocaust uses the specific system of cultural signs. This system includes recognizable and comprehensible symbols referring to the technology of mass extermination (e.g. Auschwitz, gas chambers), forced emplacement to unbearable conditions (Jewish ghettos) or reflections of the genocide, both made by the victims (the diary of Anna Frank) or those who are solidary with them (The Schindler's List by Steven Spielberg). However, the difference in reading the symbols is visible especially if considering the East-West perspective. For the Western European Holocaust cultural context, The Auschwitz concentration camp is the "place of memory" of highest significance whereas for the Eastern European case the Babiy Yar is such a place. The reason is that the in the East the Nazis exterminated Jews predominantly by firing squads; in addition, the anti-Jewish policy was tightly connected to the activity of the local collaborators. Thence the relation of the Holocaust and the local collaborationism with Hitler is more painfully perceived by the Eastern European publics and usually performs as a conflictogenic topic. One can put there the controversial cases of Edwabne in Poland, or the discussion sparked by Ruta Vanagaite and Efraim Zuroff's book Mūsiškiai ("Our People; Journey With an Enemy").

One more outstanding feature of the Holocaust memory is its integrative nature that allows grasping memories of different kind and epochs. That becomes real by means of the

language of cultural signs formed as a result of conceptualisation and promotion of the Holocaust as a history-cultural phenomenon. Levy and Sznaider characterize the Holocaust as a "container for the memory of various victims". In one of the previous works, they argued that "The Holocaust is no longer about the Jews being exterminated by the Germans. Rather, it is about human beings and the most extreme violation of their human rights". The Holocaust is, therefore, a symbol of any kind of state terrorism directed against one or another social identity.

In Milošević and Touquet's list scoping the EU memory framework we see ten documents which are thematically referred to the Holocaust; however, the last one was adopted in 2005. The Resolution on anti-Gypsyism which recognized the genocide of Roma people by the Nazi regime and called to establish the European Roma Holocaust Memorial Day (now August 2) could be an exception for the previous statement even though it is indirectly connected to the genocide of Jews.

As it is seen from the framework, the theme of the Holocaust has also become a negative point de repère for the European memory. Nonetheless, could the narrative of genocide and the Holocaust be assumed as a construction which shapes the EU memory framework and sets tonality for further decisions on this sphere? We see that in the 1990s the EU established the necessary institutional infrastructure assembling remembrance days, concrete physical places of memory, and laws on restitution. This infrastructure was further used in defining and declaring the EU position on the legacy of the Socialist rule and the mass murders during the Yugoslav wars. There is an obvious correlation between the discussions of the Holocaust and the promotion of the European identity and the collective historical memory. In addition, the EU as an actor of the politics of memory obtains very significant legal resources, therefore the EU memory framework, thanks to its component related to the Holocaust, is a useful tool in the struggle against hate crimes.

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93 Quoted in: Radonic, “Croatia – Exhibiting Memory and History at the “Shores of Europe”."
94 Milošević and Touquet, «Unintended consequences: the EU memory framework and the politics of memory in Serbia and Croatia.» 382.
8. The Memory Framework and Politics of Memory in the Baltic States: Similarities and Differences

The studies of national politics of memory, whether theoretical, comparative, or analytical ones, have remained dominant in the whole context of memory studies. The situation of, according to the Sierp and Wüstenberg’s assumption, "the often nation-centric nature of memory studies"⁹⁶, could be briefly explained by several major reasons. The behaviour of the Modern nation-states’ establishment presupposed the emergence of mass politics and issuing state regulation on the public sphere. Nation-states performed as a force setting the standard of commemoration which is called to affect all their citizens. Eric Hobsbawm defined the three key innovations embraced by the state: 1) the development of education as a secular equivalent of a church; 2) the invention of public ceremonies; 3) the mass production of public monuments. As a result of this first endeavour of memory politics, "state, nation and society converged"⁹⁷, which practically provided the dominance of state-centred historical narratives. However, besides the state monopoly over historical narration, the standardisation meant the spreading, by the state dictate, of certain structures of knowledge as well as a certain way of imagining the past by means of symbolic language. The Neo-Gramscian tradition describes such infiltration of structures of public consciousness as the establishment of hegemony by the ruling class (the bourgeoisie) over the society. From the Jürgen Habermas’ point of view, it is the colonization of the social lifeworld by the rationalist bureaucratic system whose effort to control over social consciousness also involves the collective memory.

Nevertheless, the efficiency of the nation-state in constructing unite historical narratives is obvious, no matter which theory is employed. The First World War showed that from now on states performing as a totality will involve into international wars all the social structures as one or other parts of the military production complex whereas the Second World War became, among all other, the war of ideologies. The ideologies gained supplementary significance during the Cold War. The power dictate on the sphere of memory increased because of the situation of block confrontation between the West and

the East, thus historical research and official as well as unofficial forms of commemoration stayed predominantly state-centric and ideology-driven. Meanwhile, the tendency of searching an alternative way of historical imagination was to a large extent represented by the postmodernist thought based on the destruction of belief in metanarratives, including ideologies and national historical mythologised constructions. This played a crucial role in turning to a more subject-oriented approach in analysing the sociocultural phenomena.

After the Cold War, the former Eastern bloc countries started to reassess their past and substitute previous official narratives by the new ones emphasizing the historical and cultural ties to Western Europe and condemning the despotic regimes, especially the Soviet regime. Notably, that, as Mink and Neumayer suppose, the wave of negativism towards the Socialist legacy produced a kind of "memory gap" between the two parts of Europe, which has not been overcome yet. Nonetheless, the two decades of 1990-2000s for the East European countries were marked by establishing official national memories capable to act as players in "memory games" on domestic and international arenas. That period of transition from "real socialism" in the economy, monopoly of the communist party structures in the political system and orientation on Moscow in the international strategy to liberal market, pluralism and integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures determined the transitional nature of those memories and politics of memory.

In this thesis, we will examine the national memory frameworks of the Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), both as a process in fieri and in the institutional aspect. There are several reasons for choosing these countries. Firstly, they all belong to one geographical and historical region which is due to the common historical fate. Secondly, the countries have a relatively short history of statehood. The conditional exception can be made in case of Lithuania, a successor of the medieval Grand Duchy of Lithuania founded in the mid-13th century, however, the modern Lithuanian state was declared in 1918, same with its other Baltic neighbours. The third circumstance, which is of higher importance in the context of the research, is that the Baltic countries were incorporated into the USSR in August 1940 and remained its parts as Soviet Socialist Republics until 1990-1991, interrupted by the Nazi occupation in 1941-1944.

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98 Georges Mink and Laure Neumayer, *History, Memory, and Politics in Central and Eastern Europe.*


Ibid, 1.
These peculiarities of the historical path were presented by the countries’ national historiographies, national authorities and international organisations as "the two occupations". The transitional politics of memory in the Baltic countries, therefore, attempted to overcome the consequences of the problematic past and at the same time construct the strong narratives of national history, with the respective implementation of the experience gained during the short pre-war period of independence. In order to characterize the role of memory of politics in the Baltic countries, we consider the historical background, analyse the memory frameworks as well as examine each country as a case of memory politics study.

8. 1. The Historical Background

In this descriptive part, we will see in brief how the Baltic States have been developing historically as well as define the political and cultural factors which influenced the nature of their memory politics the most. Here we pass over the details of the history before the 20th century and confine ourselves to a few general comments. The socio-economic development of the Baltic region was limited by the agrarian character of the economy. Despite the established authentic cultures, ethnolinguistically Finnish-Ugric in Estonia and Baltic in Lithuania and Latvia, the people of the region were strongly influenced by neighbouring countries. Thus, the Polish influence was especially meaningful on the Lithuanians whereas the impact of similar significance was made by Germans on Latvians and by Danish and Swedish people on Estonians. These foreign influences also predetermined the dominant religions which are Lutheranism in Latvia and Estonia but Catholicism in Lithuania. In 16th-18th centuries, starting with the struggle for the Livonian succession, the region becomes an arena for the great confrontation between the European powers (Sweden, Poland) and Russia, ended with the full incorporation of the Baltic territories into the Russian Empire in 1795. Notably that the movements for national liberation emerged in the context of the resistance to the Tsarist regime. The process of nation-state building thereby took place simultaneously with the struggle against the oppressive "Other" as well as with the revolutionary changes and ideological re-orientation of this "Other".
After gaining independence in 1918 and the following deoccupation from the German and Russian White and Red forces, the parliamentary democratic systems were established in all three countries. Nevertheless, if in the beginning, the political situation remained stable since guaranteed by the Versailles system and the Western support as part of the cordon sanitaire plan from one side and the arrangements of relations with Soviet Russia from another, the economic condition of the young republics remained poor. Thus, an American sociologist Michael Mann presents the data demonstrating that in 1929 the Lithuanian GNP per capita was 69 dollars, being the lowest in Europe; the similar indicators for Latvia and Estonia were 115 and 95 respectively. That way, the GNP of the Baltic republics was 5-9 times lower than the average European value (612 dollars)\(^{100}\). Obviously, the economic factor hindered the institutionalisation of the democratic process and at the same time demanded some kind of consolidated effort for modernisation and reaching the Western standard of life.

The relatively short democratic period finished in 1934 for Latvia and Estonia and yet in 1926 for Lithuania as a result of coup d'états undertaken by the military and police forces: the executives suspended the constitutions and banned the opposition. However, neither the pursuit of the state to rearrange the economic policy nor the diplomatic cooperation between the countries (the Baltic Entente) has finally provided the independence. The Secret Protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact signed on August 23, 1939, covered, among other, the Soviet interest in Latvia and Estonia (the question on Lithuania was "settled" later in the treaty of 28 September). With the military occupation in June and following annexation in August 1940, the first Soviet period of occupation started and lasted until June 1941 when Nazi Germany invaded the USSR and soon captured the territories of the former Baltic republics. During the Sovietisation of the Baltic countries, the authorities deported from around 38,700\(^{101}\) to 42,600\(^{102}\) people, mostly the former


militaries, policemen, intelligentsia, as well as their family members. After the war, the Soviet executives the Soviet authorities carried out the second mass deportation, which affected about 91,000 Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians\textsuperscript{103}.

The short but atrocious Nazi occupation (1941-1944) brought about the anti-Jew policy. The largest number of murdered Jews was in Lithuania (approx. 206,000), in Latvia about 90,000 Jewish people were killed. In Estonia, the Jewish community was not so significant (1,000), but nevertheless, it was totally exterminated, so the Nazi German press proclaimed the country as "free from Jews" (German: \textit{Judenfrei})\textsuperscript{104}. Moreover, the local infrastructure for mass murder was used for the extermination of up to 8500 foreign Jews. Overall, taking into account the presented data, we esteem the scale of the Holocaust in the Baltics as more than 300,000 victims. Meanwhile, it is underlined by many historians that the collaboration, voluntary and involuntary, of the local population with the Nazi occupational administration played a crucial role in the persecutions and executions of the Jews\textsuperscript{105}. Worth to note that in many cases the provisional and underground structures of power which had been struggling against the Soviet authorities were actively involved in the crimes of the Holocaust\textsuperscript{106}. The long and inglorious history of collaboration with the Nazis confuses the matters of moral make-up of the anti-Soviet resistance fighters who are respected and protected by the contemporary Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian officials. It also complicates the relations with Russia not only in the sphere of cultural interaction but also on other important political topics.

To sum up, we can estimate the complexity and discrepancy of the past the Baltic countries deal with. The formation of the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian political nations fell on the harsh confrontation in the region headed by the neighbouring larger powers then


\textsuperscript{105} Cristoph Dieckmann and Saulius Sužiedėlis, \textit{The Persecution and Mass Murder of Lithuanian Jews during Summer and Fall of 1941} (Vilnius: Margi Raštai, 2006), 174.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
supplemented by the Cold War ideological clash and the failed Soviet pursuit to establish a Soviet metanational identity as "a new historical community of people".107

Indeed, the points of departure for establishing the independent from Moscow forms of reassessment of the past and especially the recent dramatic events were the processes of perestroika and glasnost’ (openness, transparency) initiated by the Soviet officials in the mid-1980s. The emerged in that time mass organisations for national independence, such as the Popular Fronts in Estonia and Latvia, the Sajudis in Lithuania, actively used memory for mobilising citizens. Hence the independence movements in the Baltic countries attempted to legitimized their demands by means of the appeal of meaningful historical events and were well charged symbolically. As a bright example, we can take the famous Baltic Chain action held on the 23 August 1989 in remembrance of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Other resolute steps on the way to sovereignisation of memory politics were the laws on the rehabilitation of those repressed who could not be rehabilitated according to the Soviet laws (e.g. participants of the anti-Soviet resistance) adopted by the Supreme Councils, as yet Soviet parliaments of Baltic union republics.

After the return of independence in 1991, the Baltic countries declared the state continuity from 1940 by so repudiating the Soviet legacy and recognizing the past related to the USSR rule as "criminal". The neglection of Soviet ideals presupposed the return to pre-war models of identity building based on national values. At the same time, focus on accession into the European political structures, the EU and NATO, stimulated the Baltic elites to adopt the EU attitudes towards problematic points of the past like the legacy of the despotic regimes, the Nazi and the Soviet. However, the remarkable anti-Jewish activism of the local people during the Nazi occupation left traces on the legend of the anti-Communist "freedom fighters" and complicated the prospective "uploading" of the Baltic memory narratives to the transnational level which had already had the solid component of the Holocaust commemoration. All these conditions eventually made a significant impact on the forming and maintaining the politics of memory in the Baltic countries.


Table 2. The memory framework of the Baltic states.

The key decisions of the Baltic countries regarding historical memory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislature</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
<th>Estonia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 March 1995</td>
<td>On state support to the participants of armed resistance</td>
<td>On condemnation of the totalitarian Communist occupation regime implemented in Latvia by the USSR</td>
<td>Declaration on the Crimes of the Occupation Regimes in Estonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 January 1999</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Resolution on Ejecting a War of Independence Victory Column</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 June 2000</td>
<td>On compensation of damage resulting from the occupation by the USSR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June 2005</td>
<td>Resolution on commemoration of the 65th anniversary of the Soviet occupation of Lithuania and the first mass deportation of the residents of Lithuania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 March 2009</td>
<td>On Jonas Zemaitis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>On good will compensation for the immovable property of Jewish religious communities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 June 2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Infrastructure

| 1993 | Genocide and Resistance Research Centre* |

1993 | Museum of Occupation of Latvia Commission of the Historians of Latvia |
1998 | Commission for the Evaluation of Damage from Occupation Society on Research of the Occupation of Latvia |
2005-2009 | Centre of Documentation on Consequences of Totalitarianism |
2011 | |

*The Centre also supervises the Museum of Genocide and Resistance
8.2. Lithuania

As in the other Baltic states, in Lithuania, the restoration of independence in 1990 proceeded under the banners of de-Sovietisation and return to the initial roots of statehood whose history began in 1918. This perception and association of the USSR with Tsarist Russia based on the similarity of the imperial ambition and foreignism of the imperial centre to the country's national identity and values, as well as anti-Lithuanian cultural policies of the empire's officials. Like before, the country was liberated from the oppressive Empire in order to gain self-identification and pursue independent steps towards the European community. However, the set of strategies chosen by Lithuania in maintaining politics of memory should have included not only the ones oriented on Europe but also political and ethnic conciliation.

The Lithuanian memory framework includes eight key elements, one is a public speech and one is a resolution whereas the rest ones are national laws. We see that the major part of them is dedicated to overcoming the Soviet past. It covers the issues of restitution of property nationalized by the Soviet authorities, recognition of victims of the Soviet regime, the definition of status and condition of the participants in the anti-Soviet armed resistance as well as the national holidays and commemoration days. Primarily, we examine the meaning of the law on national holidays since its adoption and the further story of amendments can be demonstrative in terms of how the politics of memory has been developing and changing under the certain conditions. Possible to speak on the “holiday sub-framework” within the Lithuanian memory framework. The law was adopted on 25 October 1990, and the date of adoption symbolically resonates with the Day of October Revolution in Russia in the Julian calendar. The law was also marked as a turning point in the ideological transition from the Soviet to national Lithuanian memory institutions as it excluded traditional Soviet holidays like the Day of October Revolution and the Victory Day. At the same time, several Catholic religious holidays were proclaimed as official

108 Henceforward under the "statehood" I mean the modern Westphalian concept; the Lithuania's experience of medieval statehood is explained in the previous part. For more information on the modern attitude towards the Grand Duchy of Lithuania see, e.g., Egidijus Aleksandravičius, “A Lost Vision: The Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the Political Imagination of the 19th Century,” in Lithuanian Paths to Modernity, by Egidijus Aleksandravičius (Kaunas: Versus aureus, 2016), 25-38.

ones; in addition, the members of registered religious organisations were allowed to request up to four day-offs a year due to their canonical holidays\textsuperscript{110}. Another distinguishing characteristic of the law was the inclusion of historical commemoration days, for example, the Day of Battle of Grunwald (15 July), the days of commemoration of deportation victims (14.06) and the victims of Holocaust (23.09). Worth to note that the law was predominantly based on the “bottom-up” initiatives submitted by civic organisations and societies; this gave additional legitimacy scores to the republican liberation movement and the new Lithuanian authorities\textsuperscript{111}.

The Law on holidays was amended in 2004 due to the accession to the European Union and NATO, the “holiday sub-framework” was supplemented by the Day of NATO (29.03), the Day of the EU (1.05) and the Day of Europe (9.05)\textsuperscript{112}. Entering the European structures also required the modification of the memory framework, especially its part regarding the Holocaust. On the other hand, Lithuania’s accession to the EU together with the number of other former Soviet bloc countries stimulated the EU institutions to formulate the position on the Communist regimes on the consensual ground, so we can hardly say that the Europeanization of memory had a one-sided top-down effect\textsuperscript{113}.

Analysing the legal measures within the transitional justice on overwhelming the Soviet legacy, we focus on its four main directions: lustration of the ex-KGB employees, restitution of the alienated property, heroization of the anti-Soviet resistance and martyrisation of those who suffered from repressive actions of the Soviet officials. The documents referred to three latter directions are presented in the memory framework. The legislation on the restoration of immovable and some other property aimed to recognize the Soviet policy of nationalisation of property as illegal by so retrospectively depriving the Soviet regime of eligibility in civil matters. Another significant tendency was the glorification of the members of anti-Soviet resistance. Thus, “freedom fighters” as “participants in the resistance to the occupations of 1940-1990” enjoyed the state support


\textsuperscript{112} Ibid. 433.

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
and received state pensions. The resistance was legally justified because of the proclamation of the Soviet genocide of Lithuanian people, according to the law of 1992.\footnote{However, the law was later repealed and substituted by the respective amendments to the Criminal Code. See: Eva-Clarita Pettai and Vello Pettai. “Official Recognition of Victims,” in \textit{Transitional and Retrospective Justice in the Baltic States}, edited by Eva-Clarita Pettai and Vello Pettai (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).} As part of the state continuity policy, the Seimas attempted to establish the basement for a succession of the Lithuanian state towards the anti-Soviet resistance organisations. One of the steps forward this was the law of 1999 making the Declaration defending the sovereignty of Lithuania signed by the partisans in 1949 a legitimate document.\footnote{Dovilė Budrytė, “War memories and insecurities: the politics of memory in Lithuania,” \textit{Baltic Rim Economies}, 15 December 2017, accessed April 6, 2019, 23-24. \url{https://www.utu.fi/sites/default/files/media/drupal/BRE_4_2017.pdf}} The pursuit of the right-wing forces to recognize the Provisional Government, which headed the June Rebellion against the retreating Soviet troops in 1941 and in fact acted on Nazi Germany’s side, failed because of the disturbing wave in the society. In 2009, the parliament proclaimed Jonas Žemaitis as the fourth President of Lithuania, a leader of the Union of the Lithuanian Freedom Fighters which was captured and then executed by the Soviet security structures in 1954.\footnote{Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, “Declaration on the Recognition of Jonas Žemaitis as Head of State of Lithuania.” \url{https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/TAIS.339103?positionInSearchResults=0&searchModelUUID=42eff4cc-c766-4433-80cc-0bb412218ac3}} However, there is a correlation between the domination of the right-wing forces in the Seimas and the efforts on heroization of the freedom fighters.

The condemnation of the Soviet regime was utilized in international relations and particularly in relations with Russia. The Seimas Resolution "On commemoration of the 65th anniversary of the Soviet occupation of Lithuania and the first mass deportation of the residents of Lithuania" passed in 2005, contained an appeal addressed to the Russian Federation's officials to transfer the remains of Lithuanian anti-Soviet partisans, including Jonas Žemaitis' remains, to the homeland and disclose the KGB and other archival material related to the occupation period for investigation by the Lithuanian side. It also proposed to install "a monument to Lithuanian fighters for the freedom and independence of Lithuania" as well as to "build a Memorial to the Nation’s Struggle for Freedom and Suffered Losses
in the complex of the former KGB buildings” by 2009\textsuperscript{117} announced earlier as “the year of the Lithuania’s freedom fighters”\textsuperscript{118}.

Meanwhile, the memory of the Holocaust in the country with the largest number of Jewish victims among the Baltic region until 2004 was limited by several official acts of perpetuation. Besides the mentioned Day of the commemoration of victims of the Holocaust, in 1995 president of Lithuania Algirdas Brazauskas during his speech in the Israeli Knesset brought public apologies to the Jewish people for the Lithuanian participation in the Holocaust\textsuperscript{119}. However, the Europeanization of the Lithuanian memory turned out to be fruitful in developing the memory of the Holocaust. In this regard, for example, the law “On good will compensation for the immovable property of Jewish religious communities” was put into effect in 2011\textsuperscript{120}, which had a significant symbolic meaning.

Another positive effect from Europeanization was achieved in the sphere of Polish-Lithuanian relations which have been complicated throughout its history. The prospective accession of Lithuania to the EU pushed the country towards the development of the cooperation with the neighbour whereas in the sphere of common past the “relief strategy” as well as the strategy of amnesty and the positive use of the past were employed\textsuperscript{121}. It also made a constructive impact on bettering the condition of the Polish minority in Lithuania.


\textsuperscript{118} Budrytè, “War memories and insecurities: the politics of memory in Lithuania,” 23.


8.3. Latvia

Despite the search of the ideological leverage on the collective memory by the Latvian political elite should have accomplished the same strategic goals as those for the other Baltic republics (gaining historical legitimacy to the state, coercion of the Russian political and cultural influence as well as rapprochement with Europe), Latvia, like Estonia, was bound to factor in the vast Russian minority which reached the one third of the total population. The institution of non-citizenship for residents who arrived after 1940 has become the natural extension of the continuity policy and criminalization of the actions of the Soviet regime.

In Latvia, the axiological pillars of politics of memory are enshrined mainly in the three declarations of the Saeima (the Parliament), “On the occupation of Latvia”, “On Latvian legionnaires in World War II” and “On condemnation of the totalitarian Communist occupation regime implemented in Latvia by the USSR”, adopted in 1996, 1998 and 2005 respectively. The first one was adopted on 22 August 1996, on the eve of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact anniversary, and has become a common point of reference for the Latvian politics of memory. The declaration proclaimed the illegal status of incorporation of the country by the USSR and recognized the repressive policy maintained by the Soviet authorities as genocide: "the occupation regime destroyed innocent people, carried out mass deportations of the population and other repressions, ruthlessly punished those who armed or otherwise opposed the restoration of Latvia's independence"122. Among other crimes, the Soviet Union was accused of discharging to Latvia "hundreds of thousands" migrants with the purpose to "destroy the identity of the Latvian people". The document also manifested the significance of anti-Soviet resistance for preserving the national identity and final restoration of the country's independence123. Notably that the regime of National Socialist Germany, which was rather more atrocious to Latvia, though gains de

123 Ibid.
facto a status equal to the Soviet regime as a "totalitarian" one, is characterized by few lines of text\textsuperscript{124} not specifying the mass extermination of the Jewish population.

Back to the official attitude towards the anti-Soviet resistance, need to say that the Declaration "On Latvian legionnaires in World War II", the document expressing the position of the Latvian politicians on such sensitive issue as the nature of collaborationism with Nazi Germany, has become the most contradictory one in the memory framework of the state. This declaration was devoted to solving the tangles of controversies around the image of the Latvian Legion, a military formation of the German Waffen-SS consisted of predominantly ethnic Latvians. Again, the document condemned the "two totalitarian terrorist" regimes, but nevertheless pointed out that the crimes committed by the Nazi regime had a "smaller impact on Latvian citizens"\textsuperscript{125} by so recognizing the Soviets as "the worst out of two evils". In this regard, the Legionnaires' actions were fully justified from the legal point as the majority of them "were drafted into the Legion", besides "some Latvian citizens believed that by joining the Legion they were protecting themselves and their families against new mass repressions by the USSR". The soldiers of the Legion, the declaration says, "never took part in Hitler's punitive acts against peaceful inhabitants"\textsuperscript{126}, which disidentified them with the forces of the occupational regimes.

As it follows from the document, the Latvian legionnaires, similar as the Finnish army which fought on the Axis' side, were combating against the Soviet Union, "which was an aggressor in relation to Finland and Latvia", hence they cannot be considered as an enemy to the Western allies. This statement was devoted to emphasizing the pro-European orientation of the Legion and contained a reference to the countries demonstrating the high level of public consensus in attitude towards the problematic past (e.g. Finland).

Nonetheless, the equalization of the Soviet and Nazi regimes in the context of Latvian memory pursued different objectives, and strengthening the national identity by creating \textit{Gründungsmythos} about suffering and struggling for independence was only one of them.

\textsuperscript{124} Thus, the volume of text devoted to the Nazi occupation is five times less than the one to the Soviet occupation.


\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
Besides the domestic consolidation, primarily on an ethnic ground, the politics of memory in post-Soviet Latvia was aimed at promoting the pro-EU attitudes. This became more distinct on the eve to the EU accession in 2003 when the arguments to history and security were being actively used during the pre-referendum media campaign whereas the argumentation to economic issues was downplayed\textsuperscript{127}. After the accession to the Union, the Saeima attempted to secure its position on historical memory on the European level by adopting a new declaration concerning the legacy of the Soviet occupation past. The Declaration "On condemnation of the totalitarian Communist occupation regime implemented in Latvia by the USSR" contains a strong appeal to the European Communities to "establish an international commission for assessing the crimes of the USSR totalitarian communist regime" as well as to "support establishment of an international research institute to investigate the historical and legal aspects of the USSR totalitarian communist regime, summarize its findings and provide information to the international community"\textsuperscript{128}. There are several remarks to be made there. The same day, the European Parliament passed the resolution "On the 60th anniversary of the end of the Second World War in Europe on 8 May 1945", containing respective references to the Nazi regime as a "tyranny" and "paying special tribute" to the Soviet Union as an Ally power which contributed to the common victory. The MEPs also commemorated in particular "all victims of the Holocaust" and factually marked a distinction between the rather repressive Stalinist Soviet regime and the one after Stalin's death. However, none of these statements expressing the common EU point on the tragedy of WWII have been included in the Latvian memory framework.

Like it is in the other Baltic states, the case of Latvia demonstrates a well-established and supported by the higher authorities network of historical and commemorative institutions and organisations which provide the historical justification of the country's policy as well as control over "commanding heights" in the historical research on the most discussed issues. Here we analyse the infrastructure of such institutions and briefly characterize their places and significance in the context of memory politics. Perhaps the most influential is

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{127} Wezel, “The Unfinished Business of Perestroika: Latvia's Memory Politics and its Quest for Acknowledgment of Victimhood in Europe,” 574.}

the Commission of Historians of Latvia established in 1998, whose main objective is "investigating the nature and consequences for Latvians and Latvia of the two occupations." The historians of the Commission as president's appointees enjoyed numerous benefits and had a fame within the country as well as in the international academic circles, which made the Commission the most powerful institution of the Latvian politics of memory. Jukka Rislakki mentions that besides the historical research, the Commission's activity included "dispelling myths created by Nazi and Soviet propaganda," hence the Commission was endowed with some ideological functions. One of these functions was the elucidation of the events of the Latvian past to the Western public in order to raise the attractiveness of the state in the context of international relations. One of the four sub-commissions, "Holocaust in the Territory of Latvia during Nazi Occupation 1941-1945", initiated the wide-scope research endeavour on the local history of Holocaust, recognizing it as "the worst crime committed in Latvian territory in the twentieth century." The experience from the sub-commission's activity was further used in the development of Latvia's action on the Holocaust education, remembrance and research.

The Saeima's Declaration of 2005 provided a basis for establishment of "commission of experts to determine the number of victims of the USSR totalitarian communist regime, locate mass graves, compile all information about repressions and mass deportations, as well as to calculate the loss and damages inflicted by the said regime on Latvia and its population." Such commission was working in 2005-2009 and was closed due to financial difficulties related to the world economic crisis. Meanwhile, the crisis of 2008-2009 stimulated changes in Latvia's infrastructure on the politics of memory whose many institutions were transferred into the NGO sector.

8. 4. Estonia

As a case for politics of memory, Estonia appears as an environment combining various features presented by its Baltic neighbours. It has well-developed legal, research and commemorative institutions whereas the former ones include declarations, resolutions and laws adopted by the Riigikogu (the Parliament). Marek Tamm presented an extensive analysis of memory politics in Estonia by distinguishing its four dimensions, which are legal, institutional, commemorative, and monumental ones. His research examines memory politics as a complex process of dynamic changes in these dimensions. The evolution of politics, therefore, passes through the following periods. After the pre-independence formative period (1987-1990) when the main themes of national history are being framed by the professionals and public actors, the first period (1991-1994) creates a legal framework for reassessment the past events. The second period (1995-2000), with the continuing prevalence of the legal dimension, is marked by directing efforts towards the accession to the EU and NATO. During the third period (2001-2007), the "War of the Monuments" takes place. It expressed in the struggle between patriotic-nationalist and opposite, often Russian minority's forces for dominance in the symbolic sphere, which turned violent at the so-called "Bronze Night" - a series of riots caused by the replacement of the monument to the Soviet militaries, fallen in the liberation of Estonia from the Hitler's army. Last, the fourth period (2008-present) comprises the changes primarily on institutional and monumental levels\textsuperscript{133}. Thus, we see that the politics of memory in Estonia emerges from the similar late Soviet socio-political context of perestroika with its vigorous but, however, not usually successful attempts to "clean" the national memory from the Soviet contaminations and "tune it up" for the rapprochement with the West. Worth to emphasize the significance of ethnic context, similar to Latvia's due to having a vast Russian-speaking minority, and the fact that the institution of "non-residence" still exists and covers a tangible share of the population (5.9 per cent in 2017)\textsuperscript{134}.

In Estonia's memory framework we include five documents: three laws, two resolutions, and one declaration. Like Lithuania, the country has a "holiday sub-framework" within the

\textsuperscript{133} See: Tamm, "In search of lost time: memory politics in Estonia, 1991 – 2011."

\textsuperscript{134} Statistics Estonia. SD10: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS ACCORDING TO UN GOAL. 16.2. Share of persons with unspecified citizenship, %, accessed at pub.stat.ee/
memory framework. Notably that it contains three kinds of holidays, which demonstrates its complicated and elaborate nature.

The central document of the memory framework is the Declaration "On the crimes of the occupation regime in Estonia", adopted by the Riigikogu on 18 June 2002. This document's introduction was premised by the discussion in the Riigikogu on the theme of the 60th anniversary of June deportations exerted by the Soviet authorities in 1941. Though this commemorative initiative did not gain the majority's support, President Lennart Meri influenced its passing by his own statement. The title itself contains a strong reference to solely the Soviet regime as the word "regime" is used in a single form. Nonetheless, the regime of Nazi Germany is mentioned, thought contextually as the one which "have been denounced at an authoritative international level", unlike the Soviet regime committed "the equivalent crimes", which are (military) aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The content of the declaration has a number of similarities with the Declaration "On the occupation of Latvia" of 1996. Thus, both documents recognize an illegal status of the USSR intervention and further repressive actions of its executive, judicial and party institutions, with respective condemnation of the regime's crimes. In addition, both declarations refer to the threat to national identity constituted by the Soviet policies of cultural Russification and stimulation of migrant influx from the other union republics. However, the Riikogu declaration, unlike the Latvian document, is devoid of passages about the significance of anti-Soviet resistance but assumes the harmfulness of the Soviet acts of destruction of Estonian cultural heritage, "including monuments and printed matters" instead. Nevertheless, the exclusive liability of the court for the decision on the guilt for the crimes of the regime was stated as well as the legal principle of personal guilt was enshrined.

136 Ibid, 659.
Besides the programming documents of memory politics, Estonia boasts the sizeable and authoritative institutional network comprising juridical, research, and educational efforts to elaborate points of comprehension of the past and promote the Estonian national memory. Come in the heels of restoration of the independence, the Riigikogu invoked the Estonian State Commission on Examination of the Policies of Repression (ESCEPR), and also defined purposes for the new institution. The ESCEPR was purposed, according to Tamm, to analyse the Soviet and Nazi repressive policies, to investigate the crimes of genocide, to evaluate the degree of economic damage as well as to formulate the scientific assessment of the occupation's practices and consequences\(^{139}\). The ESCEPR's activity resulted in the famous *White Book*, also published in English\(^{140}\).

However, after the ESCEPR there appeared a need to make the Estonian past a shared heritage and a matter of research conducted by an international team of experts. The convocation of the new International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes Against Humanity (EICICH), on the contrary, was initiated by President Lennart Meri in 1998 and subsequently produced more resonance and, certainly, made a more international impact than the previous ESCEPR. The legal basis for the EICICH's activity was provided by the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, whose definitions of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide were used in theorizing the research. Tamm assumes that the EICICH had objective both at the international (to demonstrate the awareness of the totalitarian past) and domestic platforms (seeking for the consensus and satisfying the public demand in data regarding the occupation)\(^{141}\). In the meantime, Hevey notes that the EICICH was not authorised to exert juridical decisions and was not state-funded, so thereby it cannot be either considered as a "truth commission" or a tool of embracing the president's point and legitimising it by means of the scientific authority\(^{142}\).

The EICICH's work was continued in 2008 under the auspices of the Estonian Institute of Historical Memory, also established at the president's instigation. A "memory institute" in


its classical meaning, the EIHM has a membership of the European Union's Platform of European Memory and Conscience, which brings together memory institutions from both Eastern and Western parts of Europe. The Institute has a more national basement than the Commission it replaced and it legally bears on the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Positioning as a research and educational body of non-ideological and non-judiciary nature, it generally aims "to give the Estonian citizens a comprehensive and objective overview of the state of human rights in Estonia during the Soviet occupation". There is more to the EIHM's essential difference from the previous Estonian memory institutions: it provides a proper concentration on the Soviet period as well as deals with the later Soviet past whereas the Nazi occupation does not perform as a subject of historical inquiry at all. Conversely, the emphasis is set on figuring out scientifically, as President Toomas Hendrik Ilves said, "how and to what extent human rights were violated [in Soviet Estonia]." After being merged with the NGO Unitas Foundation in 2017, the EIHM absorbed the latter one's organisational and network resource as well as "inherited" its financial donors represented by European and public institutions and individuals.

As in the other countries of the Baltic Three, in Estonia museums are the second important memory institutions in comparison with the commissions and institutes initiated by the state. At the same time, worth to specify that, despite the fact above, the Estonian museums cannot be characterised as falling short to other East European ones of either impressiveness of exhibitions or quality of conceptual capacity.

8.5. The Impact of Europeanization on Politics of Memory in the Baltic Countries

After analysing the memory framework of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia with respective concentrations on its legal and institutional components, here we attempt to figure out to what extent the EU memory framework has affected the processes related to the development of memory politics in the said countries. Together with the very similar historical context and same nature of dramatic changes shared by the Baltic states which


145 Ibid: 661
were observed in the previous parts of the text, the analysis has affirmed the resemblance of the structural and functional sides of their politics of memory. The similarities of the Baltic memory frameworks can be specified in the following points:

1. High level of institutionalisation of politics of memory, defined by sufficient variety and legitimacy of those institutions. The memory frameworks grasp legal acts on key decisions on national memories, well-developed infrastructure including memory institutes, commissions engaging specialists in the respective spheres, and research societies. This feature can be partly explained through active involvement of the state and solid support from the Western countries;

2. Active use of parliaments in the capacity of institutions legitimising decisions in the field of memory politics. We have observed that national parliaments of the Baltic states often performed as launching platforms for key initiatives in the sphere of historical memory and particularly in proclamations of certain ideological attitudes towards past events. The national parliaments wield overwhelming legitimacy and representativeness resources which are rather larger than those the transnational European Parliament has. These kinds of resources were highly requested upon accomplishing the aim of accession into the Euro-Atlantic structures;

3. Hegemonisation of national, often nationalistic memory discourses. By this characteristic referring to neo-Gramscian scholarly tradition, I mean obtaining the dominant position by the liberal national, pro-European, nationalist memory discourses by taking control over the means of promotion, dissemination and inoculation of those, discourses. During perestroika and after the restoration of independence, the surge of nationalism driven by the right-wing parties’ activity has appeared as a natural consequence of the fall of Soviet ideological shackles, failure of the idea of metanational identity and the return of the process of the formation of national identity on ethnic rails. The hegemonisation has also come possible by means of state and civil support of the development of new national and historical narratives on the past adapted to the demands of the present. However, some manifestations of national memory politics in the Baltic
states, especially referring to the memory of the Holocaust, were being criticized by public intellectuals.\footnote{As an example we can set the well-known Seventy Years Declaration, composed by two academics Dovid Katz and Danny Ben-Moshe, released and presented at the EP in 2012. It categorically protested against the provisions of the Prague Declaration (2008) and as particular rejected "as unacceptable the glorification of Nazi Allies, and of Holocaust perpetrators and collaborators, including the Waffen SS in Estonia and Latvia, and the Lithuanian Activist Front in Lithuania". The Declaration was signed by 71 MEP. See: Seventy Years Declaration, 20 January 2012, accessed May 9, 2019. \url{http://defendinghistory.com/70-years-declaration/29230}.}

4. Unity of ideological attitudes. From the formal point, in legislative formulations and official rhetoric, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian politicians use the same ideologemes (genocide, occupation, totalitarian regimes) which exercise a function of "load-bearing structures" of maintained politics of memory. From the substantial point, the Baltic memory discourses usually share the liberal democratic value framework based on human rights paradigm in the assessment of the past. Thereto, memory discourses also use conceptual mechanisms of historical and value unity with Western Europe and solidarity with Eastern Europe.

5. Instrumentalisation of politics of memory in achieving goals in foreign relations as well as in domestic affairs. The former one is especially visible in the Baltic states' relations with Russia which is usually perceived as the natural and essential threat for their statehood and identity, therefore the Baltic-Russian relations were traditionally dominated by concerns of survival of the former side. The calls to Russia to recognize the crimes of "Soviet-Russian" occupation and genocide and the claims on "damage from Soviet occupation" has away back become constituent parts of the strategy of conflict being employed in relations with the Eastern neighbour, a USSR's successor state. Nevertheless, some initiatives on memory politics turn out to escalation of tensions on the domestic level and hinder the processes of integration and reaching the consensus on the issues of the past.

6. Well-developed forms of memory representation and a high level of memory culture. Under this characteristic, I mean the multiplicity of forms of collective memory displayed on the public space, the awareness to microhistory and biohistory in research work, as well as putting moral and humanistic aspects in the centre of an axiological framework on a reassessment of the past.
We should keep in mind that all abovementioned similarities are found in the dialectic interaction between each other. Upon this dialectic interaction, a complex picture of the Baltic states' politics of memory emerges and allows us to examine the memory framework of the said countries and the EU memory framework through the perspective of their bilateral relationship.

Thus, how can we estimate the impact of Europeanization on the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian politics of memory?

Undoubtedly, the accession of the Baltic states to the EU in 2004 has become an axial moment of their history which also split the national memory development process into two parts of "before" and "after". Thus, here we sum up the key features and outcomes of each period and figure out to what extent the European historical-cultural canon has been embraced in the Baltic national memories and, *vice versa*, how the European memory framework has been affected by the activity of the Baltic "memory entrepreneurs" on the transnational arena.

During the pre-accession period (1990-2004), the active formation of politics of memory took place. It was marked by the "nationalisation of memory" and crucial transition from the Soviet dominating historical narrative to national interpretations of history which traced back to the times of first independence. The legislative and institutional basis for maintaining national politics of memory was also created. The new-established Baltic governments were seeking sources of legitimisation and gaining accountability, so they attempted to synthesize liberal and ethnic-nationalist ideologies on the solid institutional basis. In addition, the "decolonization discourse" proclaiming an active overcoming of dictatorial past prevailed. In this respect, worth to note the "institutional boom" in the Baltic memory framework in the mid-1990s when the state "truth commissions", authorized to produce and legitimize the official views on the reassessment of Soviet period, were convoked. In Lithuania and Latvia, the museums popularly presenting these views were also opened during that period of time.\[^{147}\] All these endeavours were dictated by the necessity of being affirmed as full-value members of the European community.

\[^{147}\] In Estonia, the Museum of Occupations (Estonian: Okupatsioonide muuseum) was established later in 2003.
However, the post-accession period (2004-present) was followed by slightly different circumstances. The Baltic states joined the EU and NATO, by so successfully reaching the most important strategic goal of "the long 1990s" period\textsuperscript{148}, however, after the accession, the situation of teleological vacuum emerged, and the Baltic governments attempted to fill this vacuum by raising awareness to traditional nationalist agenda which was manifested in "condemning" declarations and resolutions in Lithuania and Latvia and changes in commemorative and monumental dimension of memory politics in Estonia. This, in turn, triggered some ontological discomfort in the Baltic states as actors of international relations\textsuperscript{149} and increased the civil confrontation on the domestic level. The former national dominants associated with the "return to Europe" were replaced by the new objectives related to the full embracement of the adopted values and memory standards as well as countering the foreign (Russian) political and cultural influence. Being the EU members, the Baltic states constantly had ambitions to influence the EU foreign policy, especially on Russia and the Eastern neighbourhood countries\textsuperscript{150}. Therefore, the negativist paradigm of identity, based on condemnation of Soviet occupation, was complemented by the idea of "boundary" Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian cultures as part of the European civilizational space which opposes the Russian "Other".

Through the analysis of empirical material, I pointed out some other essential qualities of the Europeanization of Baltic memories. We can observe the gradual transnationalization of the Baltic memory politics and its recognition on the EU level. The Baltic states approved themselves in the capacity of "memory entrepreneurs" able to pursue independent policies and express their demands on the European arena. Nevertheless, the most radical initiatives, such as those related to the "double genocide" inoculation are usually met by MEPs with discouragement and therefore get failed in the EP. Second, the integration of several Baltic structures into the EU memory infrastructure is evident. For example, the Baltic memory institutions performed as founding members of the Platform

\textsuperscript{148} Under this term, Tomas Sniegon means "a period which commenced with the radical political changes in Europe of 1989 and developed towards the Czech Republic’s and Slovakia’s entry into the European Union in 2004" (Sniegon, Vanished History. The Holocaust in Czech and Slovak Historical Culture, 1). I find this definition applicable to the Baltic states.


of European Memory and Conscience established in 2011 which unites memory institutions of Central and Eastern European as well as some other countries.\footnote{Platform of European Memory and Conscience - a brief history, 2009, accessed May 20, 2019. \url{http://www.memoryandconscience.eu/2011/08/17/new-webpage-test/}} Perhaps, the Platform's activity widens the "gap of memories" between the parts of Europe. Last but not least, the last decade is marked by gradual "reduction of state sector" in the infrastructure of memory politics due to the cuts of financing of memory institutions from the government. However, it frees the space for European and private concerned parties and persons, so cuts of expenses on cultural politics and research caused by the recession might open a window of opportunities for more Europeanization of the Baltic memories by means of non-governmental actors of memory politics.

9. Conclusion

Summing up the outcomes of the research, it is essential to note that this thesis has turned out to be rather a proposal for a future ambitious and broad project dedicated to the formation of European collective memory. This conclusion is inspired by the discovered extraordinary vastness of this subject which demands more scholarly attention. However, we have received three major outcomes from the conducted work proving our tiny contribution to elaborating the problem might be useful for that future research work.

Thus, we have figured out that the European Union has a multi-layered memory framework which provides a legal and conceptual basis for European politics of commemoration on the transnational level of decision-making. The European Parliament as an arena for member states' voices plays a crucial role in the formation of the memory framework. The EU politics of memory accomplishes several standardising, value-establishing, influencing and integrating functions towards the establishing of European identity. The Holocaust as an element of the European historical culture simultaneously performs as a "common place" of European memory, a "founding myth" of European identity as well as an essential concept which stands in the centre of European historical-cultural canon and therefore shapes the politics of memory in the EU in general.

Next, it has been demonstrated that the Baltic States as Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia maintain well-developed and institutionalized politics of memory. That is a natural
outcome of the transitional political development. The politics of memory is exerted on the basis of established memory framework which consists of two major elements as legislature and infrastructure. In this regard, the analysis of this framework has shown the considerable functional similarity of approach towards the historical past shared by three Baltic states. Thus, the politics of memory in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia is characterized by a high level of institutionalisation, comprehensive utilisation of parliaments in the capacity of institutions legitimising decisions in this field, hegemonisation of national memory discourses which usually gain an observable nationalist bias. Moreover, the three states demonstrate the resemblance of articulated ideological attitudes which have liberal nationalist and anti-Soviet orientation. The Soviet past, without distinction between the Stalin's and post-Stalin eras, is demonised, labelled as the period of oppression and genocide of the Baltic people as well as strongly associated with crimes against humanity. Also, politics of memory is widely used as an instrument which helps in achieving goals in foreign relations as well as in domestic affairs. In addition, the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian memory culture has reached a high level of developments and assembles a variety of forms of memory representation.

The impact of Europeanization on the Baltic politics of memory can be analysed upon emphasizing the pre-accession and post-accession periods which significantly differ from each other. During the first period, The Baltic countries radically rejected the Soviet dominating historical narrative and maintained the transition to national interpretations of history originating from the times of first independence (1918-1940). The pre-accession period was marked by the creation of the legislative and institutional foundation for national politics of memory. After the accession in 2004, some Baltic endeavours to get recognition of their national memories succeeded whereas the others were rejected. However, the eastward EU enlargement transfigured the EU memory politics which was manifested in the memory framework: the coherent EU policy of the Holocaust commemoration was changed by the trend on integration of the new members' memories. In the Baltic states, like in the other states joined the EU in 2004, the Holocaust has never been a part of national memory agenda since its place was reserved by the memory of Soviet repressions. The transnationalization of the Baltic transitional memories is hindered by the impact of this factor; nevertheless, the similarities of Eastern European historical experience provide the ground for the emergence of other formats of their cooperation within as well as beyond the EU.
In the end, after interpreting the outcomes of the EU transnational and the Baltic national politics of memory, a more general question arises, whether the transitional Baltic memory politics have come to the point of sublation by completing its transition process or it can still be described as transitional? In the sphere of politics of memory, are the Baltic states nowadays closer to the EU or to the ideological attitudes of the perestroika time? Perhaps the answer is trivial: the truth is somewhere in between. For Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, the essential part of work on Europeanization of national memories is undoubtedly behind. However, the uncompleted adoption of memory of the Holocaust, as well as the nationalist renditions which have strong positions in the academic and political field of discourse, are the main deterrents not only for further Europeanization on the national level but also for the development of common European memory.

10. Bibliography


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