State Terrorism in practice

The Guatemalan coup d’état in 1954

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Abstract

This thesis challenges the idea that terrorism is only used by non-state actors. I argue states can and have used terrorism on multiple occasions because terrorism is simply a strategy of violence and can thus be used by anyone. Terrorisms most important feature is therefore not who the actor is, but what the aim of the violence is meant to accomplish. Terrorism is used to alter the behaviour of a group of people different than the one directly targeted. State terrorism serves the same purpose, there are only some minor differences because here the focus is on the state as perpetrator.

In this paper I show not only that many definitions of terrorism aren’t actor-focused and thus don’t exclude the state as an actor, but also that state terrorism isn’t a completely foreign concept even though it’s seen as controversial. Through a theory elaborating case study I created a theoretical framework on state terrorism by using pre-existing definitions. This theoretical framework then helped me conclude the US involvement in the Guatemalan coup d’état in 1954 - where the CIA actively supported the rebel forces - is indeed a case of state terrorism.

Key words: Terrorism, State Terrorism, Guatemala, Coup d’état, Theory Elaboration.

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1 Introduction

Indifference is the worst enemy of human rights. Today, perhaps more than ever, the world needs an immense humanitarian upsurge if it is to resist violence and the abuse of power – a form of madness known to be contagious. (ICIHI 1986: 93)

Indifference has plagued the field of peace and conflict studies in regards of the study of state terrorism. This indifference is exemplary in the clear absence of research about the subject (Blakeley 2007: 228-229). Instead, the field of terrorism studies is dominated by Orthodox Terrorism Studies (OTS), which focuses on “[…] the activities of illiberal non-state actors against the liberal democratic states in the North” (Blakeley 2007: 228).

However, in the rare cases where state terrorism is researched, it tends to focus exclusively on the violence perpetrated by the so-called rouge states\(^1\) against its own citizens or their sponsorship of terrorists (Blakeley 2007: 233, Blakeley & Raphael 2016: 166). Liberal democratic states in the North \(^2\) are therefore often overlooked when talking about terrorism. However, northern liberal democracies, specifically the US have under many years extensively used repression to achieve foreign policy objectives; repression which some would label terrorism (Blakeley & Raphael 2016: 166, Blum 2003). This was the case of the US involvement in Latin America during the Cold War when the US extensively supported - both military and economically - dictatorships because they served to further and protect foreign interest of the US (Blakeley & Raphael 2016: 159; Blakeley 2007: 232; Blum 2003). Yet, research analyzing US interventions in relation to the concept terrorism is scarce and hard to find; and consequently, research about state terrorism focused on northern liberal democracies is unusual and somewhat seen as controversial (Blakeley 2007: 229).

\(^1\) A nation or state regarded as breaking international law and posing a threat to the security of other nations (Lexico).

\(^2\) States that tend to identify themselves with each other based on similar political systems, in which it is claimed that the rights of the individual are upheld within a democratic system, and where economics are based on free market principles (Blakeley 2009b: 2).
1.1 Purpose & Research Question

The purpose of this study is to examine the concept of *state terrorism* and develop a theoretical framework on it, this way providing the basis for new analysis. That way fueling a scholarly conversation seeking to challenge preconceived ideas on what constitutes *terrorism*. This will not only help develop the concept of *state terrorism* by studying its characteristics, but also help advance terrorism studies in general (Blakeley & Raphael 2016: 167). Furthermore, this thesis intents to analyze if there are in fact cases of *state terrorism* performed by northern liberal democratic states, and if that is the case encourage discussions on the illegitimacy of those actions. The aim is therefore to highlight the importance of critically analyzing different types of state violence and challenging preconceived assumptions in the area of Peace- and Conflict Studies to be able to ask broader questions about the subject and its implications, such as *terrorism* being exclusively an instrument of non-state actors. What is expected from this study is to expand the scope of terrorism studies and thus analyze acts that are currently seen as legitimate, leading to the challenging of the status quo and creating a demand for self-evaluation within the field (Jackson et al. 2011: 182).

As outlined above, Latin America has been a victim of state repression for many years, some in which the US was actively a supporter of the regimes responsible for countless human rights abuses (Blakeley 2007: 232). It is therefore my wish to bring some light to that crude part of the Latin American history. The case of the coup d’état in Guatemala 1954 serves therefore as a perfect object for the analysis of the relation between terrorism and the state. This study aims therefore at contributing academically in two ways, empirically and theoretically. The empirical contribution is meant to bring some light to the events of the coup in Guatemala; and the second contribution aims at providing a better theoretical understanding of *state terrorism*, building a theoretical framework as the basis for future research on the subject.

The research will focus on two questions. One being entirely theoretical in nature and the other empirical, which are:

*What is state terrorism and how can it be understood theoretically?*

and

*Is the US involvement in the Guatemalan coup d’état 1954 a case of it?*
2 Previous Research

2.1 Early research

State terrorism as earlier mentioned has been a highly neglected area of terrorism studies (Jackson et al. 2011: 175). However, some scholars have still managed to developed research in the field.

Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman are in many ways the two scholars that opened the discussion about state terrorism in the academic world. With their book *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism* (1979) they outlined the long history of US repression in different regions, such as Latin America, by imposing oppressive and terrorist regimes to serve the interest of the state and private actors in the US (Chomsky & Herman 1979: 1). Thus, they argue the US attitude towards freedom and democracy is merely propagandistic and is directly opposed to their actual foreign policy. Their work also highlights the violation by the US of the UN charter, Geneva accords, Hague Convention etc. during the Vietnam War 1949-1975 (Chomsky & Herman 1979: 2-4, 10). They later describe how official violence (state violence), like the one used in Vietnam as befoerementioned, is seen merely as retaliation or protective reaction, ignoring altogether the term terrorism and the fact that this type of violence is far more destructive in scale than the violence that does get categorized as terrorism. This only helps to further obscure and justify the oppressive structures the US has supported and/or imposed abroad (Chomsky & Herman 1979: 6, 12, 17). Some terror strategies by US client states include torture and political assassination to discourage opposition (Chomsky & Herman 1979: 10).

The works concluding argument is that the creation and support - be it by training programs or suppling military material – by the US of terror-prone client states negates the US claim of simply being an innocent and concerned bystander, as the case in Guatemala indicates. What really determines US foreign policy is financial interest, more specifically concern about the investment climate, but also the need to create and maintain the dependability of military client states (Chomsky & Herman 1979: 17, 32-33).

Another important work in the study of state terrorism is *The State as Terrorist: Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression* (1984) edited by Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez. Here it is once again emphasized that works on the
study of terrorism in relation to state violence are scarce – both in scope and analytical depth – in comparison to works on insurgent and anti-state terrorism (Stohl & Lopez 1984: 3-4). Therefore, they argue state terrorism as study object requires contribution in theory building and analysis. Stohl and Lopez acknowledge those scholars that criticize focus on state terrorism, because it is biased and not compatible with actual political events (1984: 3-4). However, Stohl and Lopez argue there exists substantial and irrefutable evidence in political history that state terror occurs/ has occurred. The focus of the book is to examine the states use of different types of violence – repression, terrorism – because of international and domestic interests. They are careful to highlight state terrorism as systematic and not a deviant case, making it something vital to study (Stohl & Lopez 1984: 3-4).

The importance of differentiating between different types of violence to better understand state terrorism is also emphasized by the authors. Oppression, repression and terrorism are the three types of violence that get defined in the book. (Stohl & Lopez 1984: 7-9). Stohl later classifies state terrorism in three different categories: Coercive diplomacy, Overt behavior and Surrogate Terrorism. Later he gives examples of this phenomenon both internationally and domestically and concludes that state terrorism is far more influential in international politics than insurgent terrorism (Stohl & Lopez 1984: 9, Stohl 1984: 53, 44-50).

A few years later Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez edited another book by the name Terrible Beyond Endurance? The Foreign Policy of State Terrorism (1988). Its most fundamental contribution to the field is its identification of five different forms of state terrorism as foreign policy actions. These are: Coercive Terrorist Diplomacy, Clandestine State Terrorism, State-Sponsored Terrorism, Surrogate Terrorism and State Acquiescence to Terrorism (Stohl & Lopez 1988: 4-5). The later part of the book is regionally based and explores historical moments of state terrorism. The last part of the work focuses on examining the role of international law against state terrorism. In short, the book addresses different types, causes and consequences of state terrorism, laying the foundation for further research (Stohl & Lopez 1988: 6-8).

Another scholar active in the field of state terrorism is Alexander George who among other things edited and authored a chapter in Western State Terrorism in 1991. The different writings in the work argue that terrorism is viewed as primarily targeting the west and used by fanatical groups supported in varying degrees by unlawful states. Instead it claims that the US and its allies are the major supporters and perpetrators of terrorism in the world (George 1991: 1-2).

Noam Chomsky contributes to the book Western State Terrorism (1991) by examining and displaying both a literal and propagandistic approach to the study of terrorism. Highlighting different cases of terrorist incidents in the 1980s in Central America and other regions by the US. Edward S. Herman and Gerry O’Sullivan focus instead on what they call “The Western model and semantics of terrorism”, a
model that downplays and sometimes all together hides the crucial role western governments take in terroristic incidents internationally. They argue that the model is served by different actors, from the media, to experts, government spokesperson and research institutes (George 1991: 6). Richard Falk intends to explain the different factors - both cultural and historical - that made terrorism into a feasible and regular foreign policy instrument used by the United States (George 1991: 6); and Michael McClintock analyses the roots of state terrorism in the military counterinsurgency doctrines in the US since the Kennedy administration (George 1991: 6-7).

2.2 Recent research

In 2001 the rise of the academic field of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS) encouraged further research about state terrorism. Since then state terrorism has enjoyed more scholarly interest and thus become more accepted, albeit still highly neglected in terrorism studies (Jackson 2016: 1-3).

Frederick H. Gareau published in 2004 the book titled *State Terrorism and the United States: From Counterinsurgency to the war on Terrorism*. The overarching focus of the work is the US support of *state terrorism* during the Cold War and the War on Terror in different regions of the world. His book seeks to ultimately “[…] help break the silence that surrounds Washington’s support for state terrorists during the Cold War, a support which continues during the present war on terrorism” (Gareau 2004: 21). He also concludes that 95 percent of the crimes committed during the guerilla wars in El Salvador and Guatemala were perpetrated by the state itself, an example he argues makes the case for state terrorism being far more brutal in scope than the violence perpetrated by guerrillas (Gareau 2004: 217). It is also confirmed through the study that the US aided governments militarily when being fully aware of their human rights violations (Gareau 2004: 218).

More recent research include works of Ruth Blakeley as *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South* (2009) where she accounts for the different, contending definitions of state terrorism (even those that don’t accept the state as an actor of terrorism) and argues for the application of a definition based on four key elements that will be further explained in section 4.2.2 (Blakeley 2009b: 29-31).

Furthermore, Blakeley highlights the development of *state terrorism* from the colonial era to the 21st century by showing the similar foreign policy objectives in the different eras. Under colonialism she argues the main objectives were to maintain power economically, militarily, ideologically and politically and to expand the territory; now however, northern powers no longer seek to expand their territory, but still want to maintain their power position in the world (Blakeley
Blakeley also provides us with a conceptualization of state terrorism in relation to other forms of violence used by states, such as repression, pointing out how terrorism, as opposed to other types of violence, doesn’t aim at hurting the primary victim, but at terrorizing the observers of the violence. She also shows that current definitions of terrorism don’t explicitly exclude the state as an actor of terror (Blakeley 2009b: 21).

Besides this she explains how state terrorism can be perpetrated both domestically and abroad in two different ways: limited state terrorism and generalized, governance or wholesale terrorism (Blakeley 2009b: 21). One example of limited forms of terrorism are the cover CIA-operations to assassinate Fidel Castro (Blakeley 2009b: 22-23). As for generalized state terrorism Blakeley outlines the US strategic bombardment of Korea during the 1960s (Blakeley 2009b: 22).

Furthermore, she examines shifts in the foreign policy strategies of the United States and its allies after the Cold War. She argues they have moved from a strategy of coercion to one of legitimation to obtain their foreign policy objectives. This is done through the establishment of specific organs funded by the United States to promote neoliberalism in the south; however, some cases of coercion still appear (Blakeley 2009b: 23). Blakeley also discusses the US use of state terrorism in the War on Terror. She mentions the detention facilities of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay and explores the use of torture in the facilities in relation to the concept of state terrorism (Blakeley 2009b: 23).
3 Methodology

In this chapter I will outline the method of this paper and describe why it’s suited to answer the two research questions. Later I will discuss the selection of the case for the study. After this, background information concerning the case will be presented to put the study in a historical context. Lastly, I will define and discuss the choice of material that will be used in the study.

3.1 Research Design and Method

3.1.1 Theory Elaborating Case Study

To be able to answer the empirical questions of this thesis I will carry out a theory elaborating case study. The reason for this methodological choice is that case studies are suited for in depth analysis of specific historical events, providing this study with the possibility of a thorough description of the chosen case and allowing me to apply the theoretical framework of state terrorism (George & Bennett 2005: 5). Theory elaboration is suited for this study because it aims to make theoretical advancements, which is exactly what this study aims to achieve by providing a better understanding of state terrorism (Fisher & Aguinis 2017: 458).

Theory elaboration is “[…] the process of conceptualization and executing empirical research using preexisting conceptual ideas or a preliminary model as a basis for developing new theoretical insights by contrasting, specifying, or structuring theoretical constructs and relations to account for and explain empirical observations” (Fisher & Aguinis 2017: 441). This means it differs both from theory developing enterprises and theory testing ones. Theory elaboration is instead aimed at phenomenon where the existing theory isn’t sufficient to explain it. Because state terrorism is a highly controversial and fairly ignored subject in peace and conflict studies there has been a lack of theorization regarding the topic, resulting in insufficient, inadequate and highly unaccepted theories.

Theory elaboration can thus contribute to the enhancement of theory in a number of different ways, however in this study the focus will be on its ability to enhance
construct validity, and construct scope (i.e. to improve the grasp of the scope so that it accurately reflects the phenomenon in question) (Fisher & Aguinis 2017: 444).

There are however limitations to theory elaboration. One of them is that the strength of the already established theory (or theories) affects the consequent intent at a further elaboration. Meaning, if there isn’t a good foundation for theory elaboration, the consequent intent to go through with it will ultimately be hopeless (Fisher & Aguinis 2017: 458). For my study I argue that if I can establish a solid base for the concept of terrorism the subsequent elaboration of it towards state terrorism is possible and the study’s internal validity and reliability will be higher. However, it is worth mentioning that the extent to which this study’s result can be replicated is difficult to predict. This has to do with the fact that this study is in its core interpretivist and thus leaves a lot of room for the author to make conclusions depending on the interpretation given to the data. Nevertheless, the study aims at being as thorough and objective as possible so that similar results can be obtained by others trying to replicate it.

3.2 Case selection – Guatemala coup d’état 1954

The reason for the selection of the Guatemala coup d’état 1954 is its representation of a critical case of state terrorism as a most-likely case; in this way trying to verify the theory (Esaiasson et al. 2017: 161-163).

3.2.1 Historical background

Jacob Arbenz became Guatemala’s president the 12th of November 1950. The main reason for his victory was his proposed reforms aimed at improving work conditions and heightening the life standard of the people, mainly poor and peasants (Valdés-Ugalde 1999:144).

A major player in the economic and political arena of Guatemala was the American company United Fruit Company (UFC) (Valdés-Ugalde 1999: 149-150, 158-162). The UFC saw a major threat with Arbenz take of power in Guatemala because of his proposed reforms. This led to a big propaganda campaign being started by the UFC in the US stating the danger of the communist inspired government of Arbenz. This claim was however not true (Valdés-Ugalde 1999:159). The real concern of the American government and the UFC was, among other things, the expropriation of thousands of acres of UFC-owned land in Guatemala (Herman 1982: 35-36).

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3 A theoretical construct is a hypothetical phenomenon, in this case – state terrorism (Fisher & Aguini 2017: 444)
The 18th of June 1954 began the attack against Arbenz government. Arbenz eventually stepped down from power when the military no longer supported him. Instead one of the leaders of the rebel forces, Castillo Armas, took power of the country with support from the US (Blum 1998: 106-108; Herman & O’Sullivan 1998: 19).

3.3 Material

For this study I have used a fair amount of theoretical literature on both terrorism, state terrorism and critical terrorism studies to further extend the knowledge on the two first-mentioned terms and form a comprehensible idea of what state terrorism constitutes. To gather information about the historic event in question I have chosen to use both theoretical and descriptive literature as is Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II (1998) by William Blum. The material used for the development of this thesis is therefore in its entirety secondary data.
4 Developing a theoretical framework: State Terrorism

In order to go through with this study, it’s essential to create a theoretical framework on the concept state terrorism to analyze the data with. In this chapter I will therefore begin by giving a historical and theoretical account of the concept terrorism. Afterwards, I will dive into the academic discussion on state terrorism and attempt to outline a clear definition that will guide the construction of the theoretical framework later in the study. In the last part of this chapter and following from the definition created, key factors defining state terrorism will be identified and consequently operationalized.

4.1 Terrorism

4.1.1 Historical overview

Historically the term terrorism goes back to the French revolution, where it was used to describe state violence against dissidents (Halliday 2002: 72; Jackson et al. 2011: 1, 104-5, 176). However, it was only in the 1960s and early 1970s that it became an important category when discussing political violence (Jackson et al. 2011: 100). During the Cold War in the 1960s the term terrorism began to be used by western states to describe left-wing guerrillas and other similar groups to undermine and delegitimize their actions and goals. With the term being more widely employed, scholars began taking an interest in it with the purpose of developing counter-terrorism measures (Jackson et al. 2011: 10-11). After the events of 9/11 the field became more popular with scholars, which led to numerous papers being written on the subject with the purpose of better understanding the phenomena to be able to prevent events as 9/11 from happening again. However, there was still little research that diverged from mainstream ideas, like its actor-based definition (Jackson 2011 et al.: 1, 10, 100, 176).
4.1.2 Definitional problems

Defining *terrorism* has and continues to be a very challenging procedure (Parker 2014: 383-386), an example of this is the UN General Assembly’s inability to agree on a resolution that defines *terrorism* (Parker 2014: 383, Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 81).

The reason it is so difficult to define terrorism has to do with the fact that words and their definitions are not neutral reflections of reality. Meaning, words act as lenses from which we try to understand and describe a given reality (Jackson et al. 2011: 114). Terrorism in this sense is difficult to define because it reflects different values and ideas depending on who is doing the defining. For example, definitions produced by political elites tend to over-generalize to give authorities the possibility of applying the term on a variety of different actors and circumstances (Badey 1998).

Academic definitions on *terrorism* can be separated between subjectivist approaches and objectivist approaches. The difference lies in the fact that some scholars see the term being already so engulfed in political and media discourse that even trying to define it is hopeless, these are the scholars who believe in the terms basic subjectivist nature (Bryan et al. 2011, Shanahan 2016: 104). For example, Schmid argues there is no “instinct essence” to the term, but that it is ultimately a purely social-construct and thus shapes itself to suit the interest of those defining it (Schmid 2011: 40). Another scholar with similar views is Witbeck who writes “Perhaps the only honest and globally workable definition of terrorism is an explicitly subjective one – violence I don’t support” (2004).

Scholars who instead take the objectivist approach argue *terrorism* is a real bounded phenomenon that can be clearly defined (Ganor 2002: 288). The problem with this approach to *terrorism* is that it ignores how the term itself “[...] represents one of indefinitely many ways of imposing order on aspects of our experience”, hence being fundamentally a social construct ontologically tied to human ideas of the world (Shanahan 2016: 104). Words and labels are therefore subjective and political because they limit us from understanding phenomena in different ways and because they lead to real consequences socially, as is *terrorism* being viewed as something inherently evil (Jackson et al. 2011: 114). The objectivist approach thus ignores the appropriation of the term by governments to describe their opponents to delegitimize and vilify their actions and consequently ignores the complex relation between words and the creation of meaning (Shanahan 2016: 104). For this reason, neither the completely subjectivists nor the purely objectivists approaches are practical, instead a definition of terrorism should aim at situating itself somewhat in the middle ground of those two approaches.

Shanahan for example argues the term *terrorism* encompasses some objective features in the world even if it also is a social construct highly moldable to whoever uses it. He explains that just as a kilometer is a social construct for humans to
understand distance, so is terrorism; for example, the distance from Paris to London is 343,93 km, this is a fact even though *kilometer* is a socially constructed term (Shanahan 2016: 104-105).

4.1.3 Academic definitions

In 1998 Boaz Ganor defined *terrorism* as “[...] the intentional use of, or threat to use violence against civilians or civilian targets, in order to attain political aims (Ganor 1998). Jonathan Barker presented a very similar definition, it being that *terrorism* is violence, threatened or employed against civilian targets for political reasons (Barker 2003: 23). Jackson et al. described *terrorist violence* in a similar way but added a layer to it by pointing out it is also a form of political communication or symbolic action with the aim of transmitting a message to a different audience than its direct victim. Therefore, it is better understood as means to an end, instead of an end in itself (Jackson et al. 2011: 119). Wardlaw’s definition is very similar to Jackson et al. definition, but this one highlights the fact that *terrorism* is used for or in opposition to an established authority, with the aim of creating extreme anxiety and/or fear in a group larger than the immediate victim with the purpose of coercing the targeted group into acceding to their political demands (Wardlaw 1982: xx).

Parker defined *terrorism* in similar ways: intentional violence towards non-combatants, perpetrated generally by subnational groups or individuals (however Parker argues that if the state purposefully harms civilians and spreads fear then it should be labeled *terrorism*), meant to attract attention and trigger panic in a larger public than the direct victim(s) to achieve some goal. Parker argued the goal is usually political *but also* ideological or religious (Parker 2014: 381–383).

Schmid and Jongman (1988: 28) defined *terrorism* much more specifically:

“*Terrorism*” is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human targets are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorists (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion or propaganda is primarily sought.

Their definition is however criticized by some scholars because it is over-complex and thus almost unusable (Jackson et al. 2011: 101, 104; Badey 1998).

Another definition comes from Eugen Victor Walter who defined *terrorism* as composing of three key characteristics. The first is threatened or perpetrated violence directed at some victim; the second is the violent act is intended to induce
terror in some witness who is generally distinct from the victim, which makes the victim instrumental; the third requires the actor to intend or expect the terrorized witness to alter their behaviour (Walter 1969). Michael Stohl argues terrorism is “[T]he purposeful act or threat of violence to create fear and/or compliant behaviour in a victim and/or audience of the act or threat”, making his definitions very similar to Walters (Stohl & Lopez 1984: 43-44).

Finally, Shanahan instead attempts to define terrorism through the most common themes featured in contending definitions. After having identified these themes Shanahan proceeds to evaluate whether they should be rejected, retained, or reformulated as part of the definition. The themes retained are:
- Harm and threat of harm (Shanahan 2016: 106-107)
- Strategically indiscriminate targeting of the target group (meaning it doesn’t discriminate among individuals within the targeted group), including symbolic targeting intended to show the public no place is safe (Shanahan 2010, Shanahan 2016: 107)
- Advantageous psychological effects on others (inducement of fear, revulsion, disgust, moral outrage, desire for revenge or satisfaction) (Rapin 2009, Shanahan 2016: 107-108)
- Influencing others behavior in an advantageous way (Shanahan 2016: 108)

His concluding definition reads (Shanahan 2016:110):

“Terrorism” is the strategically indiscriminate harming or threat of harming members of a target group in order to influence the psychological states of an audience group in ways the perpetrators anticipate may be beneficial to the advancement of their agenda.

In conclusion there are a few themes or elements, most of the above-mentioned definitions have in common. First, they all seem to agree violence or threat of violence is a requisite for terrorism, secondly many definitions explicitly or indirectly highlight how terrorism is meant to cause some sort of reaction in an audience other than the direct victim, a good way of describing this is to think about terrorism as a means to an end, and not an end in itself.

However, there are also some differences between the definitions, the first is about the nature of the “goal” or “objective” of terrorism. Some definitions point to it being only political (Ganor 1998; Barker 2003: 23; Jackson et al. 2011: 119; Wardlaw 1982: xx), while others open up for the possibility of it having some other motives, for example religious or ideological ones (Parker 2014: 383; Schmid & Jongman 1988: 28), and finally there are those definitions that don’t specify the goal and instead emphasize the coercing nature of terrorism (Walter 1969; Shanahan 2016: 110).
4.2 State Terrorism

4.2.1 Historical overview

During periods of state consolidation in Europe and around the world political elites used terrorism to forcibly incorporate different regions and people into a single state, as was the case in the French Revolution. Later, empires and states employed terrorism again to bring stability in the period of imperial expansion (Perude 1989; Barker 2002: 61-64; Thorup 2010: 115-118; Jackson et al 2011: 183). Imperial powers used varying forms of violence around the world, for example in South America, to subdue and control indigenous populations, clear land for settlers and force natives into slavery. Some of the terroristic violence used by the imperial powers were hanging people in public places, amputating hands, whipping and imprisoning people among many other things. These types of punishment were often used to communicate to the rest of the subjected people that they should not oppose imperial control (Jackson et al. 2011: 183; Campbell 1998; Barker 2002: 61).

Later in the early twentieth century fascism rose in several countries, then the so called “terror states” used the power of the state to terrorize its own and other populations abroad in their quest for territorial expansion, as is the example of Nazi-Germany (O’Kane 1996, Johnson 2000, McLoughlin & McDermont 2002, Jackson et al. 2011: 183). Following this, communist-totalitarian states began emerging as the Soviet Union, using terror as a means of regime consolidation and to enforce their political agenda (Chandler 2000, Jackson et al 2011: 184). Terror was later adopted by right-wing, populist and post-colonial states in an attempt to suppress opposition and maintain power, for example the apartheid regime of South Africa (Barker 2002).

In the 1970s and 1980s human rights organizations documented many cases of human rights abuses in regimes in South America and Asia among others, fitting the description of terrorism, such as: forced disappearances, torture, extra-judicial murder, imprisonment and politicide. The US had often supported or assisted the regimes using terror for reasons relating to the Cold War proxy wars. In the height of the war western states engaged directly in, and/or sponsored acts of terrorism in pro-/counter-insurgency campaigns in Latin America, Vietnam etc. (Chomsky & Herman 1979; Jackson et al 2011: 184-185).

Contemporary state terrorism manifests however in practices such as extraordinary rendition, torture, target killings, death squads, support for warlords and private militias, and the global war on terror (Foot 2005; S. Grey 2006; Blakeley 2009b: 35-36; Jackson et al. 2011: 186).
4.2.2 States as perpetrators of terrorism

There are two leading opinions on state terrorism as a concept. There are those who dismiss the term completely and those that stress the importance of analyzing the state as an active actor of terrorism.

The dismissal of the concept tends to focus on the legitimacy the state as an entity has over the monopoly of violence and power. From this perspective a state’s actions – violent or not – can’t be classified as terrorism since the very existence of the state is based on the monopoly of power. Terrorism by the state is therefore not possible because the state has legitimate power on violence. The difference between the two types of violence is that terrorism in effect violates already established community rules, but state violence is legitimate thanks to the state’s monopoly of power. Thinkers from this perspective include Laqueur and Bruce Hoffman among others (Laqueur 1986: 89, Laqueur 2003: 237, Hoffman 1998: 34, Blakeley 2009b: 26-28). Bittner also agrees with them and argues that “States do not use terrorist means – mind you, not thanks to their virtue, but thanks to [the] concept: state terrorism is, on my understanding of the words, a square circle” (Bittner 2005: 207).

Countering the critics of the term state terrorism Blakeley remarks that states, just as individuals break laws and norms of conduct when it comes to political violence. Monopoly of power can therefore not be a justification for excluding states from terrorism studies (Blakeley 2009b: 27-28). It is also interesting and important to highlight that during early years of the term terrorism in the French revolution it was used to describe a form of state repression against its own citizens (Stohl & Lopez 1984: 3, Jackson 2011: 1), meaning it was from the beginning tied directly to the state. Furthermore actor-based definitions tend to ignore the fact that all state violence isn’t legitimate, like torture (Jackson et al 2011: 177-179).

Non-state terrorism and state terrorism can be understood similarly as a strategy of political violence which seeks to send a message to an audience other/larger than the directly targeted group, with the intent of influencing their behaviour (Jackson et al 2011: 178, see section 4.1.3). This means that contrary to the popular belief that terrorism is primarily a “weapon of the weak”, terrorism has historically been used by powerful actors such as states in a far more extensive way than weak actors like terrorist groups (Jackson et al 2011: 188-189; Ramsbotham et al. 2011: 81-82). State terrorism can thus be understood as intentionally using or threatening to use violence by state agents or state proxies against people to intimidate or frighten a larger audience (Jackson et al. 2009: 3).

More specifically we can use Blakeley’s definition to get a more in depth understanding of the concept (Blakeley 2009a: 15):

[...] (a) there must be a deliberate act of violence against individuals that the state has a duty to protect, or a threat of such an act if a climate of fear has already been established through preceding acts of state violence; (b) the act must be perpetrated by actors on behalf of or in conjunction with the state, including
Violent actions used as state terrorism include: the use of bombs on airlines or in public places, political murder, kidnapping, enforced disappearances, torture and other similar actions (Jackson et al 2011: 177). State terrorism occurs depending on the military, economic and diplomatic support, tactical approval and the calculated indifference from influential, international actors. State elites will therefore calculate if the potential benefits of utilizing state terrorism outweigh its cost (Jackson et al 2011: 192, 194). State terrorism can be used to serve both conservative and revolutionary goals. More concretely the aims of state terrorism include (Jackson et al. 2011: 191):

- Isolating, demoralizing, and terrorizing, individuals and groups who voice opposition under colonialism, dictatorship, military occupation or post-revolutionary rule; rendering social movements impotent; attempting to gain psychological advantage over an adversary in counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, war or interstate rivalry; securing access to resources; maintaining economic privilege or the enforcement of labor flows, punishment, revenge and the restoration of national pride; population expulsion and ethnic cleansing; and the intimidation or deterrence of foreign adversaries.

Intended effects of state terrorism include: the achievement of specific political or political-economic (as opposed to private or criminal) goals, such as undermining political opposition to the government, establishing a new political program, protecting a set of economic arrangements, influencing the politics of another state; maintaining power economically, politically, militarily and ideologically (Jackson et al 2011: 177, Blakeley 2009b: 22).

The actors involved in state terrorism can be divided into three categories. Those acting officially as representatives of the state, those acting unofficially (but still tactically approved) on behalf of the state and private non-state actors acting on behalf of the state or with its approval tactically or explicitly. The official actors are groups or individuals such as: military or security personnel, police, intelligence services, prison officers and other state employees. The unofficial actors include among others: off-duty police and military personnel. The non-state actors include: private military companies or private security companies; private militias, death squads, vigilantes, lone assassins, para-military organizations, gangs, mobs, non-state terrorist groups and other informal actors (Jackson et al 2011: 189).
4.2.3 Categories of State Terrorism

State terrorism can be divided into many different categories based on the factor one choses to focus on (Jackson et al 2011: 189). One way of categorizing state terrorism is to divide it into limited state terrorism, meaning one-off operations designed to instill fear in a specific target audience, instead of a more general population; and generalized/governance-based/wholesale state terrorism where a states aims to intimidate an entire society, large sectors of society or another state over a prolonged period of time (Blakeley 2009b: 45, Chomsky 1991).

Limited state terrorism involves in theory the same actions as those perpetrated by non-state terrorist groups, such as: civilian-directed bombings, assassinations (attempts to) and kidnappings, torture, disappearances or direct involvement in or sponsorship of acts of non-state terrorism (Jackson et al 2011: 189, Blakeley 2009b: 35, 45). In some circumstances limited state terrorism can even include coercive diplomacy, meaning threatened or actual military actions against the enemy state, with the purpose of achieving a political goal (Stohl 1988: 174-175). Actors who use limited state terrorism include political opponents within the state and outside states seeking to alter politics within a foreign sovereign state. An example of this are the multiple failed assassination attempts at Fidel Castro by the CIA (Blakeley 2009b: 45).

Wholesale/generalized state terrorism is perpetrated by several different actors functioning collectively to coerce and intimidate a larger population (Duvall & Stohl 1988, Chomsky 1991). This kind of state terrorism includes actions such as: aerial bombardment, acts of war that violate the Geneva Conventions, illegal targeting of civilians, extra-judicial killings and political assassination, kidnapping, extraordinary rendition, enforced disappearances and detention, pogroms and mass killings, torture and prisoner abuse (degrading or humiliating treatment), mass rape and sexual violence, indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations during war or counter-insurgency, using civilians as human shields during military operations, harsh and politicized forms of counter-terrorism, the deliberate and exemplary destruction of people’s livelihoods during counter-insurgency operations, collective punishments and revenge attacks, and the construction of punitive and brutal forms of incarcerations. These actions may be undertaken directly by state agents or indirectly through proxy actors (Jackson et al 2011: 190, Blakeley 2009b: 35, 47).

For both wholesale/generalized and limited state terrorism there are different levels of state involvement. Meaning that the state can be the main perpetrator and send for example its own armed forces or secret services; or it can choose to sponsor the terrorist acts domestically by providing support for paramilitary or other groups (Martin 2003:81-11; Stohl 2006: 7, Blakeley 2009b: 35). State terrorism can also be categorized into that which is conducted internally and that which is conducted externally. Internally to maintain order and quell political opposition, and externally
to achieve specific foreign policy objectives through limited or generalized campaigns of terror (Blakeley 2009b: 35).

Another way of categorizing the concept is to divide it into direct and indirect; domestic and international; and overt and covert (Martin 2003, Stohl 2005). Direct state terrorism entails the use of violence by official agents representing the state; indirect state terrorism refers instead to the sponsorship of different groups, who act as proxy, such as death squads, private individuals, other states or non-states terrorist groups, to commit the violence (Stohl 2005). Domestic state terrorism is used inside the territory of a state against internal opponents; and international state terrorism is employed outside the borders of the state, against state or non-state opponents (Jackson et al. 2011: 190-191).

Overt state terrorism is used when the perpetrator wants the targets to know who they are. Overt state terrorism includes coercive diplomacy, terror bombing, or the widespread and official use of torture. Covert state terrorism occurs when a regime doesn’t want a specific actor(s) (for example international human rights monitors) to know about its terrorist tactics, for this type of state terrorism secret-directed death squads or other proxy groups might be employed (Jackson et al 2011: 190-191).

Michael Stohl identified three different categories constituting state terrorism, some of which have been mentioned earlier in this paper. Stohls categories are: coercive diplomacy, covert behaviour and surrogate terrorism (Stohl & Lopez 1984: 43-44). He later developed further the categories into five different ones: Coercive Terrorist Diplomacy, Clandestine State Terrorism, State-Sponsored Terrorism, Surrogate Terrorism and State Acquiescence to Terrorism (Stohl & Lopez 1988: 4-5).

Coercive Terrorist Diplomacy’s objective is to make noncompliance with a special demand so difficult that the party is forced to comply. This kind of state terrorism is overt behaviour because both parties are aware of the situation. Clandestine State Terrorism involves the participation of state agents in terrorist acts domestically and/or abroad against another nation-state. This type of action is classified as covert behavior (Stohl & Lopez 1984: 43-44; Stohl & Lopez 1988: 4-5). State Sponsored Terrorism encompasses the use of states or private groups to undertake terrorist acts on behalf of the sponsoring state to achieve foreign policy objectives, situating it in the covert behaviour category. This kind of state terrorism include bombing campaigns and/or assassinations to directly intimidate government officials, or even the participation in attempted coups d’état abroad with the aim of changing leadership in the government. It can also include joint operations, military training, financing, equipping and directing terrorist groups; providing political, ideological or diplomatic support or ignoring the groups terrorist activities. This kind of state terrorism can be economically effective because the sponsoring government doesn’t have to directly engage in the terrorist acts (Stohl & Lopez 1988: 4-5, Parker 2014: 384, Martin 2003, Byman 2005). Surrogate Terrorism is the assistance to other states or groups to continue or carry out terrorist acts nationally or abroad.
Surrogate terrorism tends to empower already existing groups. State Acquiescence to Terrorism is carried out by third parties who the interested state neither supports nor condemns explicitly because those acts in some way serve the interests of the state (Stohl & Lopez 1988: 4-5; Stohl 2005).

4.3 Operationalization of Key Factors

In this section I will first outline some key factors of state terrorism based on the information from section 4.2. Afterward I will discuss and analyze the main key factors identified and operationalize them. To operationalize a concept or indicator is to move from the abstract and theoretical world to the more tangible reality with the aim of making a concept or variable easier to understand and measure in the real world (Halperin & Heath 2017: 169-170).

Based on the definitions on state terrorism provided in the previous section there are four main factors that are central to categorizing an action as state terrorism. The first important element outlined is the actor(s) perpetrating state terrorism; the second factors is the method(s) used by these actors when perpetrating state terrorism; the third factor are the targets (both the direct targets and the “audience”) of state terrorism; the fourth factor is the objective(s) intended to be achieved by engaging in state terrorism (see section 4.2.2 & 4.2.3).

4.3.1 Actors

There are broadly two types of state terrorism actors: state agents and state proxies. State agents are all the official state actors, for example military personnel, security personnel, police, intelligence services, prison officers and other official state employees. However, state agents can also refer to unofficial state actors, meaning those who are employees tactically in an unofficial matter; these unofficial state agents can for example be off-duty police or off-duty military personal (see section 4.2.2-4.2.3)

State proxies refers instead to those actors who are not directly a part of the perpetrating state. This includes private non-state actors and foreign state actors. Private non-state actors are for example private militias, private security companies or terrorist groups. Foreign state-actors refers to foreign states and their respective agents aided by the original (sponsoring) state. Thus, foreign state-agents include both official and unofficial (foreign)state-actors (see section 4.2.2 & 4.2.3).
### Table 1: Actors of State Terrorism - defining variables & operational definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Actors of State Terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variables</td>
<td>State Agents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State proxies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational definitions</strong></td>
<td>Official state-actors: military personnel, security personnel, police, intelligence services, prison officers and other state-employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unofficial state-actors: Off-duty police, Off-duty military personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private non-state agents: Insurgent groups, Paramilitary groups, Private militias, Private security companies, Terrorist groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign state-agents: Official state-actors, Unofficial state-actors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: see section 4.2.2 & 4.2.3*

#### 4.3.2 Objectives

State terrorism objective(s) are *politically* and/or *economically* based. *Political objectives* can include quelling of political opposition, protecting current political systems, influencing the politics of other states or increasing national security. *Economic objectives* center around maintaining or improving economic status (see section 4.2.2 & 4.2.3).

### Table 2: Objectives of State Terrorism – variables & operational definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Objectives of State Terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variables</td>
<td>Economic objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational definitions</strong></td>
<td>Maintain or improve economic status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quell political opposition, Protect current political systems, Influence the politics of other states, Increase/maintain national security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: see section 4.2.2 & 4.2.3*
4.3.3 Methods

The methods used when perpetrating state terrorism can be divided into two categories, *legitimate methods* and *illegitimate methods*. Legitimate are those including all type of official state action, meaning methods the state would publicly stand behind. Legitimate methods can thus be military action such as aerial bombardment of enemy armed forces or coercive diplomacy. Illegitimate methods refer to those methods the perpetrating state would likely negate to be complicit of. Examples of this type of method are: Civilian targeting, assassination, kidnapping, disappearances, torture, extraordinary rendition, sexual violence, degrading/humiliating treatment of prisoners, terror bombings (or other similar terror-inducing strategies), aid or support of groups or countries utilizing terrorism e.g. military support, diplomatic support or ideological support (see section 4.2.2 & 4.2.3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Methods of State Terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variables</td>
<td><em>Illegitimate methods</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational definitions</strong></td>
<td>Civilian targeting, Assassination, Kidnapping, Disappearances, Torture, Extraordinary rendition, Sexual violence, Degrading/humiliating treatment of prisoners, Terror bombings (or other similar terror-inducing strategies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aid/support to groups/countries employing terrorism:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Military support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Diplomatic support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Ideological support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military action, Coercive diplomacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: see section 4.2.2 & 4.2.3*

4.3.4 Targets

There is one very important thing to remember when talking about the targets of state terrorism. Namely that state terrorism targets two different objectives. The first objective(s) is thus the direct victim(s) of the violence or threat of violence. The second objective is however the main objective, because it’s their behaviour the violence seeks to alter. Thus, the second objective is some audience witnessing the violence against the direct victims (see section 4.2.2 & 4.2.3).
The targets outlined in the table below are the direct victims and first objectives of state terrorism, but it is important to remember that these only count as targets of state terrorism if the intention when hurting these victims is to alter another group's behaviour (e.g. by working as a terror/fear-inducing mechanism). The direct victims can be described as illegitimate because of their nature. Illegitimate targets include thus civilians/non-combatants, civilian infrastructure, disarmed enemy forces and prisoners. However, the direct target/victim of the attacks must serve as a terror/fear-inducing mechanism. Simply put, the actor(s) of state terrorism must aim to attack two targets, but only one in a direct matter (with violence or threat of violence), the other in a more psychological matter to alter its behaviour in some way beneficial to the actor(s) (see section 4.2.2 & 4.2.3).

Table 4: Target of State Terrorism – variables and operational definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Targets of State Terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variables</td>
<td>Illegitimate targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational definitions</td>
<td>Civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-combatants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disarmed enemy forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prisoners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civilian infrastructure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: see section 4.2.2 & 4.2.3
5 Analysis

In this chapter I will lead a theory-orientated discussion and analysis on the event of the Guatemalan coup d’état in 1954 following the four key factors outlines in the previous chapter.

5.1 Guatemala coup d’état 1954

5.1.1 Actors

The coup was foremost planned and financed by the US, more specifically the CIA. Thus, the actors involved in the coup d’état were mainly CIA agents. For example, CIA airplanes dropped pamphlets with misinformation trying to win the war psychologically but also engaged in a broad bombing campaign in the country, targeting both military and civilian targets (Blum 1998: 104, Gareau 219).

On the ground, however, were Guatemalan exiles and mercenaries both from the US and Central America. These were trained in a CIA-controlled airbase in Nicaragua and led by Castillo Armas. Other actors central to the take of power were unhappy, right-orientated Guatemalan military officials, whom the CIA had contacted before the coup (Blum 1998: 104).

Another actor involved heavily not just in the Guatemalan economic system, but in the push to overthrow the government in Guatemala, was the United Fruit Company (UFC). The company not only pressured The American government to act against the Arbenz government because of his agrarian reforms, but also sponsored part of the operation by providing 64 000 dollars in cash to achieve that end (Blum 1998: 104).

In conclusion there were four main actors involved in the coup: the CIA, the Guatemalan exiles and American/Central America mercenaries, the unhappy and right-orientated Guatemalan military officials, and the UFC. The CIA falls under the category of state agents and subsequently intelligence services because it is an official US state agency (CIA). Guatemalan exiles and mercenaries fall under the category of state proxies, as paramilitary groups or other similar non-state groups
because these were financed, trained and assembled by the US (Blum 1998: 104-105). The UFC is the only actor of the above mentioned that doesn’t fit into the operational definition of state terrorism-actors because it is neither a state actor nor a state proxy, but instead a private actor (see Table 1).

5.1.2 Objectives

Before the events in Guatemala leading to the overthrow of president Arbenz the American government had on multiple occasions accused the government of Arbenz of being communist. The official reason for the US involvement became thus the communist threat in Guatemala. However, there was another reason behind the intervention, namely the economic interest of the United Fruit Company in Guatemala. When Arbenz became president, he changed the political and economic landscape of the country, improving workers rights and introducing agrarian reforms aimed at redistributing land to the Guatemalan peasants. This meant to some extent the expropriation of land from the UFC (approximately 40 percent of the land owned by the company) (Blakeley 2009b: 92). This led the company to demand action from Washington to stop the reforms and thus, secure stability in the country for the continued blossoming of their economic gains (Blakeley 2009b: 92).

There were, as it appears from the literature, two main objectives to accomplish when planning and executing the coup d’état in 1954. The first one was to stop the communist regime of Arbenz and in that way protect the security and ideology of the US from the communist threat in the continent, making it a political objective. The second one was to stop the reforms of president Arbenz and thus protect the economic interests of the United Fruit Company (and subsequently the US) in Guatemala. This was a purely economic objective (see Table 2).

5.1.3 Methods

Among the methods used in the coup, CIA-planes flying over the country dropped pamphlets with ultimatums to president Arbenz, demanding him to step down from power and threatening with bombarding several cities if he didn’t (Blum 1998: 106). Another method used during the coup was the broadcasting of a pre-recorded aerial attack through large speakers in the embassy of the US; with the aim of frightening the civilian population into demanding their president’s withdrawal from power (Blum 1998: 105). Radio channels were also used to spread false information about the progress of the CIA-directed forces on the ground, reporting about their fast advances and vast popularity in the country, to make, not only the public, but the Guatemalan military believe the war could not be won and subsequently force Arbenz to step down from power to end the war. In the air, CIA-planes attacked different targets, both military and civilian infrastructure, such as the international airport, houses next to military barracks or ammunition storages (Blum 1998: 104-108).
The dropping of pamphlets with threats and ultimatums, the broadcasting of pre-recorded aerial attacks and false information about the situation on the ground are clear examples of terror-inducing strategies and thus also of illegitimate methods. Furthermore, the aerial attacks on the international airport and the houses constitute clear examples of illegitimate methods because it targeted civilian infrastructure (see Table 3).

5.1.4 Targets

Among the targets of the aerial attacks by American airplanes were military barracks, ammunition storages, state-owned radio stations, oil tanks, the national palace, houses, one school, ports and the international airport (Blum 1998: 105-109).

The military barracks and the ammunition storages are clear examples of legitimate targets. The national palace is however harder to categorize because it is neither completely civilian- nor military infrastructure. The same problem applies to the state-owned radio stations. With regards to the state-owned radio stations, I argue whether it is to be considered civilian or military depends entirely on the kind of information broadcasted through them. If the information was of military nature then one can argue they can be categorized as legitimate targets; however, if these weren’t militarily connected then I believe it is logical to conclude they were part of the civilian infrastructure. The attacks to the ports, the international airport, houses and the school fall however under the category of illegal methods, seeing as those targets constitute civilian infrastructure (see Table 4).
6 Conclusions

In this last chapter it is essential to go back and revise the purpose and research question of this study. The purpose was to gain a better understanding of the concept state terrorism in both a theoretical and an empirical way by concluding if the events of the Guatemalan coup d’état in 1954 could be classified as state terrorism.

State terrorism is better understood as simply a type of terrorism, however with some differences but in nature the same: a strategy used to alter the behaviour of a different and often larger victim than the direct victim of the violence (e.g. by terrorizing/frightening them). This feature is what differentiates this type of violence from other types and thus is the most important feature to remember about state terrorism (terrorism) (see section 4.2).

The important differentiating features of state terrorism have to do with the actors perpetrating it, the objectives behind the actions, the methods used and the targets of it. The actors of state terrorism are state agents or state proxies, e.g. military or sponsored terrorist groups. The objectives are state-centered economic or political ones. The methods are similar to the ones for terrorism, however one important difference is the scope and scale of the methods, meaning the state can e.g. torture many more individuals than a non-state terrorist organization can; the second difference has to do with the methods available to the state, such as aerial bombardments or any other military attack, methods that are not available to a non-state terrorist group. The targets are – as for terrorism – of illegitimate nature, meaning: non-combatants/civilians, disarmed enemy forces, civilian infrastructure and prisoners (see section 4.3).

Furthermore I argue elements/factors characteristic of state terrorism were certainly present in the Guatemalan coup d’état 1954, like state agents and state proxies; illegal methods and targets; and political and economic objectives aimed at altering the behaviour of a greater number of people than those directly affected by the violence or threat of violence (see section 5.1, Table 1-4). For these reasons my conclusion is that the American involvement in the Guatemalan coup d’état 1954 represents a case of state terrorism.

Methodologically I can conclude by saying that theory elaborating was well suited for the task outlined in chapter 2. However, a more typological approach would have been better suited to understand and conceptualize state terrorism (George & Bennett 2005: 235-237). By employing a method driven by typology theory, the categorization of the different components to state terrorism could have been
identified more comprehensible and thus provided a better understanding of the phenomenon.

Future research on the topic of state terrorism is desperately needed, especially such research that challenges the status of contemporary interventions (e.g. the war on terror). It is also important to keep pushing the topic of state terrorism and continue further with more research about it theoretically. Another important topic that needs to be investigated is responsibility and accountability; meaning who should bear the responsibility for perpetrating state terrorism and what legal measures should be taken against the individual(s).
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