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Vagueness and Goodness Simpliciter

Andersson, Henrik LU (2016) In Ratio 29(4). p.378-394
Abstract

Recently a lot has been written on the topic of value incomparability. While there is disagreement on how we are to understand incomparability, most seem to accept Ruth Chang's claim that all comparisons must proceed in some specific respect. Call this the Requirement for Specification. Interestingly, even though most seem to accept this requirement, next to nothing has been written on it. In this paper I focus on the requirement and discuss two different but related topics. First, an important observation is made: as it turns out, the requirement plays an important explanatory role for the thesis that incomparability is to be understood in terms of vagueness. Second, I consider what is entailed by the Requirement for Specification.... (More)

Recently a lot has been written on the topic of value incomparability. While there is disagreement on how we are to understand incomparability, most seem to accept Ruth Chang's claim that all comparisons must proceed in some specific respect. Call this the Requirement for Specification. Interestingly, even though most seem to accept this requirement, next to nothing has been written on it. In this paper I focus on the requirement and discuss two different but related topics. First, an important observation is made: as it turns out, the requirement plays an important explanatory role for the thesis that incomparability is to be understood in terms of vagueness. Second, I consider what is entailed by the Requirement for Specification. There is a general worry that the requirement entails that there is no such thing as goodness simpliciter. The line of thought is that if we always must specify in which way something is e.g., better than something else, then perhaps things cannot be better simpliciter. And if there is no such thing as betterness-simpliciter, then can there be such a thing as goodness simpliciter? Finally, I consider how an answer to this question affects the view that incomparability is vagueness.

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Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
Ratio
volume
29
issue
4
pages
17 pages
publisher
Wiley-Blackwell
external identifiers
  • wos:000387580200003
  • scopus:84995467658
ISSN
0034-0006
DOI
10.1111/rati.12142
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
085e0a96-013a-45c4-93c2-25577d075675
date added to LUP
2016-12-02 07:30:25
date last changed
2024-01-04 17:39:00
@article{085e0a96-013a-45c4-93c2-25577d075675,
  abstract     = {{<p>Recently a lot has been written on the topic of value incomparability. While there is disagreement on how we are to understand incomparability, most seem to accept Ruth Chang's claim that all comparisons must proceed in some specific respect. Call this the Requirement for Specification. Interestingly, even though most seem to accept this requirement, next to nothing has been written on it. In this paper I focus on the requirement and discuss two different but related topics. First, an important observation is made: as it turns out, the requirement plays an important explanatory role for the thesis that incomparability is to be understood in terms of vagueness. Second, I consider what is entailed by the Requirement for Specification. There is a general worry that the requirement entails that there is no such thing as goodness simpliciter. The line of thought is that if we always must specify in which way something is e.g., better than something else, then perhaps things cannot be better simpliciter. And if there is no such thing as betterness-simpliciter, then can there be such a thing as goodness simpliciter? Finally, I consider how an answer to this question affects the view that incomparability is vagueness.</p>}},
  author       = {{Andersson, Henrik}},
  issn         = {{0034-0006}},
  language     = {{eng}},
  month        = {{12}},
  number       = {{4}},
  pages        = {{378--394}},
  publisher    = {{Wiley-Blackwell}},
  series       = {{Ratio}},
  title        = {{Vagueness and Goodness Simpliciter}},
  url          = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/rati.12142}},
  doi          = {{10.1111/rati.12142}},
  volume       = {{29}},
  year         = {{2016}},
}