Democratic Breakthrough or Authoritarian Legitimization?- A comparative study of democratic electoral outcomes in electoral authoritarian regimes
(2009) University of Connecticut Conference on Democracy and Democratization- Abstract
- Scholars studying international democratization have recently shown a
greater interest in how elections in authoritarian contexts per se, could
function as leverages for democratic improvement. This study contributes to
this knowledge by asking; when do elections in electoral authoritarian
regimes result in democratic consequences?
Recognizing that elections can be a tool for democratic breakthrough as
well as authoritarian legitimization, this study tries to avoid an obviously
democratic bias and seeks the causes for both democratic improvements and
erosion in connection with elections. To perform this task, the study utilizes
a quantitative method... (More) - Scholars studying international democratization have recently shown a
greater interest in how elections in authoritarian contexts per se, could
function as leverages for democratic improvement. This study contributes to
this knowledge by asking; when do elections in electoral authoritarian
regimes result in democratic consequences?
Recognizing that elections can be a tool for democratic breakthrough as
well as authoritarian legitimization, this study tries to avoid an obviously
democratic bias and seeks the causes for both democratic improvements and
erosion in connection with elections. To perform this task, the study utilizes
a quantitative method with a global population of 252 non-founding
authoritarian elections, in the period 1973-2004. This is a population
significantly larger than earlier studies on this subject.
The main argument of this article is that structural conditions have been
overlooked in earlier studies within this field. Even though it is true that the
more actor-centered factors such as the presence of oppositional coalitions
and the number of popular demonstrations have a significant effect on both
a country’s democratic electoral outcome (DEO) and on the probability of
an oppositional victory, actors are affected by structures.
The dependence on foreign trade but foremost short-term economic growth
is demonstrated to have a direct respectively indirect effect on the DEO.
Economic stability seems to contribute to authoritarian stability in regard to
elections in authoritarian contexts. Economic crisis, on the other hand,
increases the probability of oppositional coalitions and popular
demonstrations, which in their turn increases the probability of a positive
DEO. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1303483
- author
- Wahman, Michael LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2009
- type
- Contribution to conference
- publication status
- unpublished
- subject
- keywords
- trade, oppositional coalitions, comparative, authoritarianism, demonstrations, democracy, elections, economic growth
- conference name
- University of Connecticut Conference on Democracy and Democratization
- conference dates
- 2009-02-27
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- d23c9150-286e-45b2-9ab3-c351a08b02c8 (old id 1303483)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-04 14:13:15
- date last changed
- 2018-11-21 21:19:01
@misc{d23c9150-286e-45b2-9ab3-c351a08b02c8,
abstract = {{Scholars studying international democratization have recently shown a <br/><br>
greater interest in how elections in authoritarian contexts per se, could <br/><br>
function as leverages for democratic improvement. This study contributes to <br/><br>
this knowledge by asking; when do elections in electoral authoritarian <br/><br>
regimes result in democratic consequences? <br/><br>
Recognizing that elections can be a tool for democratic breakthrough as <br/><br>
well as authoritarian legitimization, this study tries to avoid an obviously <br/><br>
democratic bias and seeks the causes for both democratic improvements and <br/><br>
erosion in connection with elections. To perform this task, the study utilizes <br/><br>
a quantitative method with a global population of 252 non-founding <br/><br>
authoritarian elections, in the period 1973-2004. This is a population <br/><br>
significantly larger than earlier studies on this subject. <br/><br>
The main argument of this article is that structural conditions have been <br/><br>
overlooked in earlier studies within this field. Even though it is true that the <br/><br>
more actor-centered factors such as the presence of oppositional coalitions <br/><br>
and the number of popular demonstrations have a significant effect on both <br/><br>
a country’s democratic electoral outcome (DEO) and on the probability of <br/><br>
an oppositional victory, actors are affected by structures. <br/><br>
The dependence on foreign trade but foremost short-term economic growth <br/><br>
is demonstrated to have a direct respectively indirect effect on the DEO. <br/><br>
Economic stability seems to contribute to authoritarian stability in regard to <br/><br>
elections in authoritarian contexts. Economic crisis, on the other hand, <br/><br>
increases the probability of oppositional coalitions and popular <br/><br>
demonstrations, which in their turn increases the probability of a positive <br/><br>
DEO.}},
author = {{Wahman, Michael}},
keywords = {{trade; oppositional coalitions; comparative; authoritarianism; demonstrations; democracy; elections; economic growth}},
language = {{eng}},
title = {{Democratic Breakthrough or Authoritarian Legitimization?- A comparative study of democratic electoral outcomes in electoral authoritarian regimes}},
year = {{2009}},
}