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# Mapping the Unknown Terrain

## -Party Policy Mapping in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes

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## Abstract

Oppositional pre-electoral coalition formation has, in a number of recent studies, been proven to have an important effect on the prospects for liberalizing electoral outcomes in authoritarian elections. Despite this recent recognition of oppositional coalitions as a trigger for democratization, almost nothing is known about when these coalitions are formed. An important explanation for the lack of cross-national large-N studies on this issue is the lack of sufficient data on party policy positions, among parties operating within these authoritarian systems. Policy differences between oppositional parties have been hypothesized to have a negative effect on the prospects for coalitions in the more studied Western democratic systems. In order to perform an exhaustive investigation of the prospects for oppositional coalitions in authoritarian elections, sufficient data on party policy differences would therefore be necessary.

In this paper different strategies for party policy mapping is presented and assessed as methods for approximating policy distance between parties in authoritarian regimes. It is argued that a voter-based policy mapping (VPM) approach is the best strategy for this task, when considering both feasibility and validity aspects. In the later part of this paper an empirical comparison is performed between approximations made by VPM and the widely used Manifesto Research Group (MRG), using data for parties that contested post-communist authoritarian elections in the period 1990-2004. The comparison shows a significant correlation between the data produced with these two different strategies. Moreover, more qualitative comparisons of widely divergent cases in the VPM and MRG data, and a comparison with expert-survey data suggest that the VPM data is at least as reliable as the MRG data, in this particular context.

**Keywords:** Policy-mapping, elections, authoritarianism, Manifesto Research Group, expert surveys, Voter-based policy mapping

## Introduction

Since the 1970's and onward the world has seen a rapid growth in the number of electoral authoritarian regimes. This trend, which culminated at the end of the Cold War, has made electoral authoritarianism the beyond comparison most important version of authoritarianism of our time (see Huntington 1991; Hadenius and Teorell 2007). It is therefore not surprising that these states, that combine autocratic governance with formally democratic procedures, are attracting an increased amount of attention from democratization scholars and democracy promoting practitioners alike.

There has recently been a vivid debate among scholars of democratization about the importance of elections within the authoritarian context (e.g. Brownlee 2007; Lindberg 2006; Teorell and Hadenius 2009). Even though the general effect of elections is still debated, it is possible to conclude that specific elections within this context has had genuinely positive effects for democratization in certain cases. Authoritarian regimes are usually able to keep the electoral arena under control, but occasionally the unusual does happen and the opposition manage to secure electoral victories even under these unfavourable conditions. This was for instance the case in the 2000 Serbian election. At this instance an 18-party oppositional coalition under the name Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) supported by both central oppositional leaders, Zoran Djindjić and Vojislav Kostunica decided to run on a common platform in order to put an end to the despotic rule of Slobodan Milosevic. In the same year but on a different continent, Abdoulaye Wade won the Senegalese presidential election against the long time authoritarian ruler Abdou Diouf. Yet another African authoritarian dominant party had to acknowledge itself defeated in 2002, when Mwai Kibaki of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) accomplished a historic victory against Uhuru Kenyatta of the Kenyan African Union (KANU). An impressive accomplishment given that KANU had been in power since independence in 1963.

All these three mentioned cases have one thing in common. They are all instances when oppositional cohesion had, at least seemingly, a decisive impact on the electoral result and enabled an oppositional victory. Oppositional cohesion is a factor that has been increasingly recognized as an important factor contributing to the likelihood of oppositional electoral success in authoritarian elections (e.g. Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Howard and Roessler 2006, Magaloni and Poiré 2004; Wahman 2009). In the unequal electoral authoritarian contest

oppositional disunity between rival oppositional parties might be devastating for the prospects of an electoral victory. When resources are short and voters reluctant to vote for an alternative with small prospects of electoral success, oppositional disunity might be one additional disadvantage for the opposition. When oppositional parties do however agree to run a coordinated election campaign through a unified pre-electoral oppositional coalition, they usually pose a more serious threat to the incumbent regime. Despite this acknowledgement of the importance of oppositional unity almost nothing is known about when these pre-electoral coalitions are formed.

The only publicized study on this topic is, to my knowledge, written by van de Walle (2006). His main argument is that oppositional parties are more prone to form coalitions when there seem to be a realistic chance of an oppositional victory. Other possible explanations that are mentioned are political institutions, history and culture, ethnic pluralism, socioeconomic development and international factors. For those familiar with the vast literature on coalition formation in the pre-dominantly Western democratic context, this list of potential explanatory variables is rather unexpected. Most of the factors mentioned are rarely emphasized within the democratic context. Socioeconomic development and international factors are almost absent in this literature. History and culture (Bäck 2003; Lupia and Strøm 2008) and ethnic pluralism (Cox 1997) has received some but limited attention. Institutional factors are however a very prominent explanatory variable also in the democratic context (e.g. Bergman 1993; Duverger 1954; Diemeier 2006; Müller et al 2008). The most noteworthy aspect of the listed explanatory variables is however the absence of wide policy differences among oppositional parties as a potential explanation for the lack of oppositional unity.

Policy compatibility between parties has since the early 1970's been a central aspect for understanding why certain parties join into government coalition or why specific government coalitions are pre-maturely dissolved (e.g. Axelrod 1970; De Swaan 1973; Laver and Shepsle 1996). When Golder (2006) made her seminal work on pre-electoral coalition formation in democratic contexts the importance of policy compatibility was once again emphasized. Still, in van de Walle's work on pre-electoral coalition formation in authoritarian contexts policy compatibility is not even mentioned.

It is often said that party systems in electoral authoritarian regimes are less ideological. Many authors have instead stressed the high degree of personalism or the importance of ethnic or

regional identities as the divider between different political parties (e.g. Hagopian et al 2007; Mainwaring 1998; van de Walle 2003). This is of course an important potential objection against the importance of party policy orientation for coalition formation in authoritarian regimes. It seems reasonable that ideology becomes increasingly important for strategic decisions made by parties and political candidates once the party system gets institutionalized and develops deeper roots within civil society. But even though party policies are less important in electoral authoritarian regimes, should it really be perceived as totally irrelevant? After all this aspect has proven to have a high success rate in the traditional literature on this subject (Bäck 2003). This would at least justify an emirical assessment of this argument also in the authoritarian context.

One important explanation for the lack of empirical research on pre-electoral coalition formation in authoritarian elections and especially concerning the importance of oppositional policy compatibility might be the almost total lack of data on policy orientation for parties in electoral authoritarian contexts. Lack of data is however not a problem in the Western democratic context. In this context sophisticated data on party policy orientation has been developed from the usage of expert surveys (e.g. Mair and Castles 1997; McDonald and Mendes 2001; Huber and Ingelhart 1995), surveys among politicians (e.g. Bäck 2003; Mair 2001) or textual analysis of party declarations (Budge and Bara 2001; Laver and Garry 2000).

In this paper I will explore the prospects for conducting a policy mapping among electoral authoritarian parties suitable for large-N research on the formation of pre-electoral oppositional coalitions. I will firstly make an inventory of different approaches to party policy mapping. In this inventory I will focus on the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches and also make an assessment of the feasibility in implementing these different strategies within a project with limited resources investigating coalition formation in the electoral authoritarian context. I will argue that an approach based on a voter-based policy mapping (VPM) is the most valid and feasible approach for this kind of research project. In order to assess this strategy parties in post-communist authoritarian contexts during the time-period 1990-2004 will be ideologically approximated using a VPM method. This specific context is chosen since this is the only one where alternative data is available. This alternative data, provided by the Manifesto Research Group (MRG), will be compared to the data produced by the VPM approach.

## Methods for policy mapping

During the last decade a number of larger comparative projects has been undertaken with the aim to map the policy orientation of the main political parties in different political systems, especially within Western Europe, North America and other “Western countries”. Just recently has the coverage of some of these policy mappings extended beyond this initial context and some of the more recent mappings also include some of the post-communist countries. But still it is evident that there is not enough available data to conduct the kind of study that I am aiming for. In this section I will mention some of the more prominent projects that has been undertaken to gather data about parties’ policy orientations and also discuss three different policy mapping methods; textual analysis of party declarations, expert surveys and mass surveys. The pros and cons of the different strategies will briefly be discussed from a methodological and feasibility point of view. Before this discussion of the actual methods, a brief summery of the theoretical debate between advocates of the proximity and directional theories of voting will be done. This theoretical discussion has clear implications on the methodological issues concerned with policy mapping and a brief discussion of this debate is therefore necessary.

## Proximity and directional models of voter behaviour

Since the beginning of the 1990’s there has been an intense debate among political scientists, about how voters evaluate parties’ or candidates’ policy orientations when deciding how to vote. In a highly influential article Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989) introduced the directional theory of issue voting as a reaction against what they called the “paradigm of the proximity model of voting”.

The proximity model of voting had been used in most seminal work of voter behaviour (e.g. Davis et al 1970; Downs 1957). The basic idea with the proximity model of voting is that preferences are located within a policy space. The policy space is understood as a continuum where voters, candidates and parties adopt a position. After comparing his/her own policy position with that of the existing parties/candidates the voter will vote for the one closest to his/her own position.



Advocates of the directional model of voting oppose the proximity model out of two reasons; (i) They do not believe that voters have specific policy preferences along a set of issue continua. On the contrary, voters tend to see issues and policy positions as dichotomous choices. This implicates that they, at best, decide to be for or against a certain policy. (ii) All parties are not evaluated by the same issue criteria. Parties emphasize certain parts of their overall political program in order to attract voters. In this theory of voting a voter will reward parties that intensively advocate a certain policy that he/she feels strongly about<sup>1</sup>. Intensity in this theory should not primarily be perceived as a position on the left and right scale, where parties can be placed more or less far away from the centre. Instead, the intensity of a party's policy position is determined by the salience it puts on this certain issue. Since policy positions should be regarded as dichotomous rather than placed on a continuum, the determinant of intensity is hence how much the party emphasize its opinion on a certain issue. The mathematical representation of utility for the directional model of voting is illustrated below:

$$U_{ij} = \sum_k I_{ik} * I_{jk} - P_{ij} \quad (1)$$

This formula represents the utility for voter *i* when voting for party *j*. In this model  $I_{ik}$  represents the position of voter *i* and  $I_{jk}$  represent the position of party *j*. If voter *i* would be completely neutral on a certain issue,  $I_{ik}$  would equal zero. If voter *i* would however lean to the right the sign of  $I_{ik}$  would be positive or negative if *i* would lean to the left on this issue. The magnitude of  $I_{jk}$  and  $I_{ik}$  represents the intensity level. The formula  $\sum_k I_{ik} * I_{jk}$  does accordingly represent the sum of all values of each of the issues and  $P_{ij}$  represents a penalty imposed on party *j* if voter *i* perceive it as to extremist. The penalty is affected at a certain threshold, but until this level  $P_{ij}$  always equals zero. The implication of this formula is that if voter *i* is at the right side of the political spectrum on a certain issue voter *i* will get an increasing utility from voting for party *j* as the intensity of the policy position of party *j* increases. This is true as long as party *j* do not reach the threshold for political extremism, after which the utility for voting for party *j* will decrease. Hence, it will be beneficial for parties to adopt the most intense policies on issues where the electorate have intense opinions (MacDonald et al 1991). If voter *i* for example is sympathetic toward free market policies

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<sup>1</sup> This is true as long as the party do not go to extremes when advocating a certain policy. If the party is perceived as extremist this will harm their electoral performance.

(with an intensity of +4) and get to choose between party A which is also pro-market (intensity +4) and party B who is even more pro-market (intensity +6), voter i would get a higher utility from voting for B, providing that i do not perceive B as extremist. From a proximity view this might seem surprising, given that A actually places equal importance to this certain issue as i.

Immediately after its introduction, the directional theory got a huge impact on how research on voting behaviour was conducted. However, in more recent years a number of scholars have started to question the superiority of directional theory. Krämer (1994) has argued that there is a large mathematical similarity between the proximity and directional model. Other authors have empirically shown results where the proximity approach performs better than the directional (e.g. Krämer and Rattinger 1997; Merrill 1995; Westholm 1997). Some scholars have even suggested that the empirical advantage of the two respective theories is dependent on what issue that is examined. Claassen (2009) conducted an experimental study where participants got to choose between fictive candidates, based on their opinion on two issues; military expenditure and abortion. The results showed that the proximity model of voting performed better in predicting how the respondents choose candidates based on the military expenditure issue. The directional model did however perform better when the abortion issue was considered.

As has been illustrated in this section the proximity and directional model have rather different views on voter behaviour. When mapping policy positions among parties and voters the debate between these two theories of voting will become relevant and as will be illustrated below it has practical consequences for the choice of method for approximating ideological orientation.

## Textual Analysis

A number of different projects have been undertaken with the aim to map party policy orientations on the basis of party manifestos. The most widely used and acknowledged source for party policy data is the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) data (Budget et al 2001). Textual analysis of party policy positions is not synonymous with the approach applied by the MRG, but due to the dominance of this certain data source this section will foremost focus on the specific method used by MRG when approximating party policy positions. Since MRG

data is not available for most countries within the context of interest it is not a possible choice to use the MRG data for the entire intended population. The discussion below should however be seen as a general assessment of textual analysis as a possible strategy for policy mapping in this context, where MRG will serve as a model for how textual analysis can be applied. Moreover, I find it important to explain how the MRG data is created since it will be used in order to compare the empirical findings of the VPM approach in a later stage of this article.

The MRG data utilize qualitative textual analysis of party declarations in order to map policies of different parties on a number of different issues. Originally the MRG data only included 25 countries (all OECD with the exception of Israel). In an extended version of the data Klingemann et al (2006) extends the population to include as much as 51 different countries, including most post-communist countries.

In the MRG data and most other textual analyses party manifestos are at the centre stage of the analysis. The premise for this coding is that party manifestos reflect “real” party policies and that it is better to actually observe the actual statements made by the parties than to rely on others’ judgements of party positions. In the MRG data the relative importance of different issues, such as policies favouring free enterprise, environmental protection or increased military expenditures are recorded. These differences are measured by reporting the percentage of the manifesto devoted to a certain theme. This interpretation of the policy space draws heavily on the salience theory, where it is theorised that the emphasis of a certain issue is actually more important than the actual policy on an issue (Budge and Farlie 1983). An extreme right party might for instance not have more extreme policies on immigration than some of the more established party. The almost total focus on this issue from the extreme rightist party will however make them appear as substantially more anti-immigration than the mainstream party.

In regard to the discussion about the proximity and directional theory of the policy space, the MRG’s theoretical basis has more in common with the directional theory than it has with the proximity theory. The party policy position in MRG is derived from the salience attached to different issues in the parties’ manifestos. Take for example an issue like welfare state expenditure. In order to approximate a party’s position on this issue, the MRG data calculates how many percent of the sentences in the manifesto that is devoted to advocating an increase of the welfare state. The percentage of the sentences in the manifesto that is devoted to a

decreased welfare state is then subtracted and a score is extracted. The score on the welfare state issue could hence theoretically vary from -100 to +100. The implication of this coding is that an extreme libertarian party which favours the total dismantling of the welfare state in one sentence in its manifesto would get a more moderate score than a mainstream right-wing party that repeatedly advocates a smaller decrease in the size of the welfare state.

The MRG data acknowledges a multidimensional policy space and as mentioned the policies of the parties are reported on several different issues. However, MRG do provide an overall assessment of the parties' placement on the left-right continuum. This score is produced by recognizing certain policy positions that is associated with the left and certain that is associated with the right. By calculating the percentage of the program manifesto devoted to right-wing policies and then subtracting the percentage of the manifesto that is devoted to left-wing policies a score between -100 and +100 is obtained. Even though the MRG data with its emphasize on salience rather than policy position has much in common with the directional theory, this method for placing parties on a policy continuum distances this method somewhat from directional theory in its clearest form. This method for obtaining the left and right placement of parties has both its strengths and weaknesses. Whether the strengths outweigh the weaknesses is very much depending on what the application of the data is. Since the left-right coding is based on clear transferable indicators it makes it possible to make a more subjective comparison of parties across countries. The problem with this method is however that the left and right concepts do not travel very well across contexts. Most of us would agree that there is certain values that is intensively associated with the left or the right of the political scale. Take for instance issues concerning taxation, the welfare state, free trade or labour relations. Other issues not concerned with these socio-economic matters are however harder to attach to the left or right side of the political continuum universally. In the MRG data internationalism is for instance a value associated with the left. For readers familiar with Scandinavian politics this might seem confusing. Traditionally, many issues concerned with international cooperation have been more associated with the right than the left. Conservative and liberal parties in the Scandinavian countries were early advocates of international cooperation projects, such as the EU, the common European currency and the NATO. More left-wing parties have however generally been more sceptical toward these projects. The implication of this "travelling problem" is hence that the MRG data could be less sufficient in approximating the policy distance between certain parties within a specific party system, than other approaches to policy mapping (Keman 2007). Since, the aim with this article is to

explore different policy mapping techniques that could be used for coalition research, the internal comparability of party policy positions is vital. Coalition theory suggests that parties would be more prone to cooperation with other parties that are located closely to their own party ideologically. It is therefore important for the method to grasp how the policy distance between two specific parties are perceived within the specific context. It would be possible to circumvent the “travelling problem” with the textual approach if the researcher is sensitive to contextual matters and sort appropriate values to the left respective right side depending on the national context. This strategy does however require a contextual knowledge of every context where manifestos are analyzed. Therefore, such a strategy is obviously not realistic in a smaller project without access to country specialists in all relevant countries.

There are many obvious perks with using the kind of qualitative coded textual analysis which MRG has come to represent. First of all it makes it possible to code historical policy positions of parties, as long as there are available party manifestos. Another advantage with this approach is also that it is based on actual policy propositions of the party rather than more abstract qualitative interpretations.

Despite the popularity of the MRG data and the advantages mentioned above, critics have mentioned a number of shortcomings of this data. The first and most obvious objection is that party manifestos might not be a very good reflection of “real” party policies. These manifestos might not be that elaborate and be prone against emphasizing some issues that would be expected to gain votes for the party. In this view, party manifestos can be perceived as “advertisement”, where policy positions might be exaggerated in order to distinguish the party from its opponents (Ray 2007: 179).

The most important objection for making this kind of policy mapping in the electoral authoritarian context is however that it is simply not a feasible strategy within a project with limited resources. The MRG has access to a large number of experts with cultural and linguistic understanding for every context where policies are coded. Moreover, even with the right resources party manifestos of an adequate size might not exist in many authoritarian contexts. One additional problem is to acquire enough knowledge about all individual contexts in order to single out the most important policy dimensions in the individual contexts. The MRG data has certain flexibility on this issue but when it comes to the overall left-right dimension the same aspect are used in all investigated countries

Another version of textual analysis is the increasingly popular computer-assisted content analysis of election programs (Budge and Bara 2001; Gary 2001; Laver and Gary 2000). In this approach a more conventional quantitative content analysis is used. The advocates of this approach argue that it is preferable to the more qualitative textual analysis of MRG, since it circumvents the potential problem of biased qualitative coding. Moreover, the efficiency of the computer based approach is that it enables the analysis of a broader material than official party manifestos. If the analysis also incorporates texts like speeches from MPs, policy propositions and content from the media, the analysis will not make the false assumption of parties as unitary actors. If the analysis also incorporates texts derived from for example backbencher MPs, it will gain richness and recognize a broader picture about the party's policy position (Kaiser 2006; Laver and Gary 2000). The computer based approach is in many ways more efficient than the more qualitative textual analysis but it is still not a viable option for this study. It requires access to a broad set of texts and language skills in order to make sufficient coding schemes.

## Expert surveys

Beside the textual analysis, expert surveys are probably the most widely used approach to party policy mapping (e.g. Huber and Inglehart 1995; Laver 2001; Mair 2001). In this approach policy positions are approximated simply by asking country experts to place the parties within a certain political system about the ideological position of parties within that system. On what basis the parties are evaluated does of course vary between studies and experts. This unclarity might obviously be a possible validity problem. Some surveys give explicit instructions for the experts on what aspects to base their judgements. Mair (2001) does for instance instruct experts to regard past coalition behaviour, party programmes and ideology when putting their judgements. From a validity point of view it is preferable to give clear instructions to the experts to mitigate the potential problem of disparate coding criteria. Some instructions, such as previous coalition behaviour might however be a problem for certain kinds of usage of the data. For researchers, as myself, who are interested in coalition formation it obviously becomes tautological to consider previous coalition behaviour as an essential indicator of party ideology. When doing so it is already presupposed that ideological compatibility is an essential factor affecting coalition formation behaviour.

In relation to the proximity and directional theory it is possible to design an expert survey accordance with both theories. The key decision in regard to this issue is whether to ask experts to place the parties on a policy continuum (either on specific issues or on an aggregated left-right scale) or whether to just ask experts to provide information on parties' opinion on certain issues and to what extent they emphasize these opinions.

In relation to the textual analysis approach many of that methods strengths are the weaknesses of the expert survey and vice versa. When the "travelling problem" is concerned the expert survey strategy is more sensitive to the contextual meaning of concepts such as left and right. On the other hand it lacks the intersubjectivity of the textual analysis.

From a feasibility point of view this would be a more realistic approach to the mapping of parties in electoral authoritarian regimes. However, it still requires an essential amount of time and effort to get an adequate number of respondents. It is usually not enough to use one or a few expert judgements for every country included into the population. This strategy would require several experts for every country for cross-validation. More importantly, it would not be possible to go back in time and code policy positions retrospectively, which would limit the population of the study. It is possible to assume a certain degree of stability in policy positions over time, but one should be careful of using too much of retrospective codings. To ask experts about previous policy positions would not be a good strategy. If an expert believes that a party has shifted policies since an earlier election it is likely that the respondent will exaggerate the movement on the policy scale.

### Voter based policy mapping (VPM)

I will in this article argue that a voter based policy mapping (VPM) approach is the most realistic approach to policy mapping in the electoral authoritarian context. It is probably not the most valid approach and I will illustrate certain problems associated with it. However, I will argue that it is adequately valid as long as one is wary about some of its shortcomings.

When using VPM the researcher utilize the ideological self-placement of voters as a proxy for the policy positions of the parties within each party system. The idea is that voters in general vote for the party closest to their own policy position and hence the aggregated position of a party's voters would approximate the ideological position of that specific party. Practically,

this implicates that the researcher extracts the mean policy score from all the voters in a survey who associate themselves with a certain party and then use this mean as an approximation of the specific party's policy position. Since both the World Values Survey and the Latinobarometer have this kind of information in a high number of electoral authoritarian countries from the early 1990's and onward, there is a substantial amount of data to map party policies on the basis of voter self-positioning. This makes this approach relatively feasible in comparison to the previously mentioned methods.

Since researchers interested in party policy positions in the Western democratic context has access to sophisticated data from projects such as MRG, this approach to policy mapping is not that common in more recent research. Before the data situation improved this technique was however used also in the western democratic context. Both Gilljam and Oscarsson (1996) and Knutsen (1998) have used VPM in order to study ideological polarization in the Nordic and the Western European context. Similarly, Hix and Lord (1997) studied the pro and anti-EU policies of European parties using this technique.

It is important to note that a VPM approach to policy mapping will, in similar to other policy mapping methods, not give an exact account of a party's "real" policy position. The results subtracted from the mapping should instead be perceived as a proxy. There are a number of objections against the idea that there should be a one-to-one relationship between the policy position of a party and that of its voters. The first relevant critique can be derived from the already mentioned directional theory. The idea of approximating party policy positions with those of its supporters are that voters vote for the alternative closest to themselves politically. In accordance with the directional theory there is no policy continuum but rather a number of dichotomous issues where voters prefer the political alternative that places most salience on the issues they feel strongly about. However, in relation to the proximity theory the VPM method would be a good approximation of party policy orientation. It is true that the most convinced advocates of the directional theory would probably not accept this method for policy mapping. As empirical research on voter behaviour has however shown, there is reason to believe that the directional theory is not superior to the classical proximity theory when it comes to predicting actual voter behaviour (e.g. Krämer and Rattinger 1997; Merrill 1995; Westholm 1997). The proximity model is of course not flawless and some of the concerns that are mentioned in the directional criticism against the theory are absolutely valid. However, as other models the proximity model do not claim to be a perfect reproduction of the



phenomenon it tries to explain. On an aggregate, I do however believe that voters are prone to choose the party that is closest to themselves ideologically. This implicates that if party A (left leaning), B (centrally orientated) and C (right leaning) are the main contenders in a national election, it would be fair to assume that on average the voters voting for A would be more left leaning than the voters voting for B and C. Similarly, on average the voters voting for C would be more right leaning than the once voting for A and B. This does not implicate that all individual voters will vote for the alternatives that are in fact closest to him/herself (e.g. because of strategic voting or lack of information), but on average A would not have more right leaning supporters than B.

A possible problem would be that the VPM approach would tend to overestimate the ideological extremism of the parties located furthest from the political centre. Take a system consisting of four relatively moderate parties located on the left-right scale, party A (mainstream left), party B (left of centre), party C (right of centre) and D (mainstream right). If voter R who is an extreme rightist and voter L who is an extreme leftist would have to make a choice between these political options, voter R would vote for D and voter L would vote for A, even though they are far to centrist according to their political preferences. If there are many voters with extremist political positions party A and D would get a mean value on the left-right score that is significantly more to the left (in case of party A) or significantly more to the right (in case of party D) than the actual party's policy position. The consequence would be that party B and C would appear to have more in common than party A and B and party C and D respectively. This might be a potential problem and it will therefore be especially interesting to compare the VPM ratings of the most extreme parties in each party system with the scores provided by the MRG data.

Previously, I was critical against the notion of universally transferable definitions of the left and right dimensions that is assumed in the MRG data. This problem is partly solved when turning to the VPM approach. When voters are asked to place themselves on the left and right continuum they would naturally interpret this question from a contextual perspective. Very few voters would try to interpret this question from a universalistic perspective and try to place themselves ideologically in relation to how a foreigner would perceive their ideological position. Instead, most voters would probably relate their own political position to what they perceive to be the political centre in their particular party system. This is desirable if the aim of the mapping is to detect (as it is in this study) internal policy differences. If the aim is to

make comparison between party systems it would however be less desirable. Some voters would possibly even try to place the party they vote for on the political continuum and then equate their own policy position with that of its most favoured party. One potential problem with this approach is however that the ratings on the scale are somewhat arbitrary. When an expert is asked to place all parties on a political scale he/she is able to rank the parties and make sure that they are placed on the “right” side of each other. This is however not possible when an individual voter is asked to place his/her own ideological position. On a scale from 1-10, what is for instance the difference between a seven and an eight? This problem would however be less stressing as the number of respondents answering that they would vote for a certain party increases. Also, one should be wary about making too much out of small differences in mean policy orientation between voters of two certain parties. However when there is a significant difference in the policy orientation between two parties there are reasons to believe that there is a difference in the policy orientation between the two particular parties.

### Empirical comparison of VPM and MRG data

In this empirical part of the paper a comparison will be performed between the data that I have generated using VPM and the data that is provided by MRG. It is important to emphasize that the MRG data is in no way a representation of the “real” policy position of the parties included into the population, against which my approximation can be judged. As noted above there are important objections against the validity of the MRG data. However, if the results generated by these two different methods would be far to disparate there would be reasons to be sceptical about the validity of one or both of the mapping methods. Bollen (1989) argues that this is an important test to assess the validity of a certain or a full set of different indicators. He argues that this validity, which he labels convergent validity, can illustrate whether the methodological and theoretical differences between different measurement strategies have important empirical consequences. If this is the case it would be wise to go back and thoroughly evaluate the theoretical and methodological assumptions made by the respective methods.

It is also important to emphasize that a full or close to full correlation between the VPM data and the MRG data is not expected. As noted earlier there are theoretical differences in these two approaches. Most importantly the MRG data aims to measure the individual parties’ policy position against a universal interpretation of the left and right concepts, while the VPM

approach is more interested in internal policy differences independent from any “true” meaning of right and left.

A number of comparisons between VPM and the MRG approach have already been undertaken. In some cases it has been done in order to assess the merits of these two methods (e.g. Ray 2007). It has however been more common to make such a comparison in order to compare the ideological preference of parties and their voters (e.g. Klingemann 1995 and Klingemann et al 2006). Interestingly all these studies have shown a significant correlation between these measures. Moreover, Adams et al (2004) has shown that shifts in voter’s political orientation are often followed by a shift in the ideological content of party manifestos. These previous studies make it probable that there will be a significant correlation between these two measures. It is however important to make this comparison in the electoral authoritarian context. If voters would be less ideological when choosing how to vote or if party manifestos are less clear ideologically this might decrease the convergence of these measures.

In this article I have chosen to do a simple comparison between the left-right placements of the parties according to that of the MRG. It is however possible to also use other dimensions in order to assess the ideological differences between the parties. The obvious difficulty with doing so is however, as already discussed, that the relevant policy dimensions are shifting between different contexts. One dimension that should however be relatively persistent within the electoral authoritarian context is the pro- or anti-democratic position of the various parties. In this analysis I have chosen not to include this dimension. It is however possible that I will increase the complexity of the analysis by including this dimension in later work on this topic.

## The population

The policy mapping undertaken in this study should be considered as some kind of pilot-study. The aim is to extend the population further if the approach is successful. Even though the VPM approach to policy mapping is considerably more time efficient than other strategies, it still consumes a certain amount of time to gather the data that is needed. It is therefore necessary to limit the population in this paper. Since party policy positions are coded by the MRG for most countries in the post-communist context since 1990 and onwards

this population enables a comparison. At a later stage the aim is to include all electoral-authoritarian countries where there is accessible mass survey data. At this stage the size of this population is unknown, but with access to the Latinobarometro and World Values Survey a preliminary appreciation is that the total population should be approximately 100 elections in 44 different countries. In this first study only parliamentary elections will be included. The aim is to also include presidential elections in later policy mappings.

The policy mapping will be done at the year of each election. The reason for solely focusing on election years is twofold. Firstly, since the policy mapping will be used in order to study pre-electoral coalition formation the relevant years will be the ones where elections were held. Secondly, the MRG only reports policy positions during election years. It is important to remark that the kind of global surveys that is used in this study is usually not conducted on a yearly basis (with the exception of the countries that are included into the Latinobarometro). It is reasonable to assume a certain stability among political parties in their policy positions. It is however hard to decide how long time lag that can be acceptable. In the empirical test I will therefore observe how much the discrepancy between MRG and VPM increases when the time lag is extended.<sup>2</sup>

A central question is of course which countries that should be categorized as electoral authoritarian. A number of scholars have provided different definitions and operationalizations of this concept. Without going too deep into this utterly complex discussion, I will use the operationalization for the closely related concept of “authoritarian limited multiparty system” provided by Hadenius and Teorell (2007). In this operationalization all regimes who arranged recurrent elections where at least one true oppositional candidate was allowed to participate but where the combined Freedom House and Polity index do not exceed 7.5 on a 10 point scale<sup>3</sup> is counted as electoral authoritarian.

Finally, one important aspect that has to be discussed in relation to the population is whether the post-communist countries are an adequate context to try the VPM approach. Since the aim is to extend the use of VPM to other contexts in other parts of the world there are reasons to

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<sup>2</sup> The largest time difference between survey and election is seven years. This is the case of Albania 1991. In this case the closest survey was undertaken in 1998.

<sup>3</sup> In this version Polity and the Freedom House Civil liberties and Political Rights score are inverted into one unified index, ranging from 0-10.

evaluate whether the VPM approach would be a better method for policy mapping in this context than in other.

The post-communist party system was often described as weak after the political liberalization that followed the end of the Cold War. Kitschelt et al (1999) summarized much of the earlier work on post-communist party systems into one common theoretical view of these systems labelled “the tabula rasa theory”. In this theory the cultural and socio-economical prospects for establishing a strong party system in these contexts are extremely unfavourable. The relative lack of socio-economic classes and class relations makes a Western European-styled party system organized around economic interests unlikely (Ost 1993). Moreover, the scepticism against organized political parties, that was inherited from the communist era makes people reluctant to join or identify themselves with political parties (Scöpflin 1991: 239). Kitschelt et al (1999) is however critical against this bleak vision of the prospects for party-system institutionalization in the post-communist context. The authors argue that many of the empirical arguments held by the “tabula-rasa theorists” are in fact disputable.

It is inevitable true that there is a wide difference in party-system institutionalization within the post-communist context, even among the countries that are still considered as electoral authoritarian. Some systems, like for instance Russia and Belarus are obviously personalistic to its nature and have a system where many representatives run as independents or have a weak attachment to a political party. Other systems, like the ones located on the Balkans have stronger party-systems and more ideological parties. On this point the post-communist context have many similarities with other areas of the world, such as the South-East Asia or Latin America (Mainwaring 1999 and Stockton 2001). The noteworthy exception might be Africa, which is often said to be especially prone to ethnic, local or personalistic politics, as opposed to an ideologically orientated political system (e.g. Manning 2005; Widner 1997). There are however little cross-cultural empirical evidence suggesting that there is a fundamental difference on this aspect between these different areas. Moreover, it is not central whether the political system is ideological or not. A non-ideological party system would probably not show any significance for ideological party distance in regard to pre-electoral coalition building, but this would be a result as interesting as any other. A problem for the VPM is however if voters are not able to locate themselves politically. In further studies it would therefore be interesting to regard the difference in this ability between different contexts.

In terms of time-coverage all electoral authoritarian elections in the post-communist context from 1990-2004 will be included. The restriction in time is a consequence of data availability. In regard to the post-communist context this is however a rather suitable time frame, given that it corresponds well with the initial liberalization of the post-communist political systems.

To sum up, in this study all political parties that received representation<sup>4</sup> in the national parliament of an electoral authoritarian post-communist country<sup>5</sup> will be included. This leaves the population with 224 parties<sup>6</sup>, 161 of these have both an available VPM and a MRG scores. The parties are distributed across 27 elections in 13 different countries.<sup>7</sup>

## Empirical comparison

This section aims at making an empirical comparison between the data of MRG and the data received by using the VPM approach. Previous studies have shown a significant empirical correlation between different approaches to policy mapping, including VPM and MRG (Ray 2006). These studies have however not been concentrated to the post-communist electoral authoritarian context. Before going into the results of this empirical comparison it might be necessary to remind that the MRG score can theoretically vary between -100 and +100, while the VPM method has a possible range between 0 and 10. In order to create a fully comparable measure I have also created a transformed MRG measure, also ranging from 0-10. This measure will be applied when needed.

## Basic comparison between VPM and MRG

Generally, in this text when talking about correlation this will refer to the general correlation of the policy scores provided by MRG and VPM. The actual scores will be important in future

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<sup>4</sup> No parties will be deliberately excluded from the population. In some cases data on partisans' ideological orientation is however not available in the World Values Survey.

<sup>5</sup> Three countries, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are however not included to the population. These cases are not included into any edition of the World Values Survey and there is accordingly no data on voters' political orientation.

<sup>6</sup> This figure does not represent unique parties but one party can be observed at several elections.

<sup>7</sup> A full list of elections and countries is provided in the appendix.

studies on this topic in order to describe the ideological distance between different parties. Another relevant measure for correlation is that of the correlation between the VPM and MRG method in terms of party ranking on the left-right scale. Ranking will be relevant when deciding which parties that would be more likely to form coalitions. Below these two different correlations are displayed.

Table 1: Basic correlations between VPM and MRG

Category	Correlation
Overall policy score correlation	.414***
Party ranking correlation	.580***

\*Significant at the .05 level \*\* Significant at the .01 level \*\*\*Significant at the .001 level  
Note: Displays correlation between MRG and VPM

As illustrated above there is a significant correlation both in policy score and in ranking. Another important measure of correlation is within country correlation. Looking only at the mean within country correlation<sup>8</sup> this is somewhat lower than the overall correlation, although still strong ( $r=.3350$ ). The lower within country correlation mean could be expected given that the mean might be highly affected by cases with a small number of parties. This is for instance the case in the case of Azerbaijan where the correlation is -1 (the only case with a negative correlation), since the two coded parties are ranked contradictorily on the left-right scale in the two measures. In other cases, like Macedonia ( $r=.0096$ ) and Russia ( $r=.1564$ ) there is however a remarkably low degree of correlation despite a relative high number of observed parties. It would not be fair to conclude that the low correlation in these two cases is a result of shortcomings in the VPM method. However, the fact that the correlation between the two measures are lower in some cases than in other could sometimes be explained by the inability for voters to comprehend and apply the left-right terminology<sup>9</sup>. In a later application

<sup>8</sup> I.e. if the correlation is measured for every country individually and then summarized by a mean within country correlation. Individual country correlations are found in table 5 in the appendix.

<sup>9</sup> In the case of Russia this might be an explanation to the low correlation. Specialists on Russian politics have discussed the confusion around the right and left concepts in the early post-Soviet era. What is normally perceived as leftist policies in a Western political context was sometimes considered as rightist and vice versa in this context (Geoffrey; Whitefield 1999).

of the VPM approach, within a study on coalition formation, it would therefore be interesting to see whether the explanatory power of policy distance is smaller in party systems where many voters are unsuccessful in stating their own position on the left-right scale.

There is no significant difference between the two measures in regard to mean left-right score in the population. The VPM method's mean left-right score (5.36) is slightly more to the right than the score of the transformed MRG measure (5.31). However, as might be expected, there is a larger recorded policy position difference within countries when using the VPM approach. The mean standard deviation of within case<sup>10</sup> party policy positions is 1.03 with the VPM approach, compared to .696 in the transformed MRG data. This difference is statistically significant. This is an advantage with the VPM approach. A possible problem with MRG is that it might underestimate the policy distance between parties within the separate party systems. If there is a relative consensus regarding some specific policy issues in a political system that might result in a relatively narrow policy difference, if the universalistic approach of the MRG is applied. These "consensus issues" might however not be relevant in order to distinguish parties from each other in that specific context. In regard to the planned application of the policy mapping more clearly distinguished party positions is desirable, since this will make it easier to test the hypothesis of policy distance and coalition formation.

In the previous text it was suggested that it might be especially problematic to approximate the policy positions of the parties most to the right and to the left in the political system, with the VPM method. Since these parties would attract voters that are more extreme than the party's own policy position, it might result in a score that exaggerates the extremism of these parties. The empirical analysis does however not suggest that this is a critical objection. The correlation between VPM and MRG among the most extreme parties are somewhat smaller ( $r=.386$ )<sup>11</sup> than the overall correlation, but still significant. Two other reliability concerns were also raised in the previous text concerning the VPM approach. These two concerns related to the potential problem of parties with very few recorded voters and cases where there is a longer distance between the actual election year and the year in which the mass surveys were conducted. But as the table below illustrates, there is no general trend against a lower correlation, between the VPM and the MRG data, as the distance between survey and election

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<sup>10</sup> Every country being one separate case

<sup>11</sup> See appendix table 6.



increases. Similarly, the correlation between VPM and MRG does not decrease as the number of respondents/party decreases. Even though the highest correlation is attained when only taking elections into account where there is less than two years between survey and election, there is actually a higher correlation when all elections are included than if setting a four-year distance limit to the population. In regard to the other aspect, that of parties with a low number of respondents, the correlation is surprisingly higher when putting no restriction to the number of respondents, than if such a restriction is set.

Table 2: Investigation of possible reliability cancers

Years of difference	Correlation	Observations	Number of respondents/party	Correlation	Observation
<2 years	.4541***	60	<100	.3043**	58
<4 years	.3694***	102	<50	.2490**	84
<6 years	.3928***	147	<20	.3546***	130
<8 years	.4139***	161	No restriction	.4139***	161

\*Significant at the .05 level \*\* Significant at the .01 level \*\*\*Significant at the .001 level

## Comparison with Expert surveys

In the previous inventory of policy mapping methods, expert-surveys were mentioned as one of the most widely used methods for policy mapping. Unfortunately, these surveys are rarely conducted outside the traditional Western democratic contexts. There is however one exception. In a recent study based on expert surveys, Benoit and Laver (2006) extended the traditional population and also included most Eastern European countries. Seven of the countries that have been investigated in this paper are also included into the data of Benoit and Laver (B&L). This is unfortunately too few to make a comprehensive comparison between B&L, MRG and VPM. However, B&L is a good reference for cross validation, and below I will investigate how well this measure is correlated with the previously investigated methods. A problem with expert surveys is that they are normally not performed at multiple instances, in contrast to MRG and VPM. This is also the case with B&L that was conducted during one wave in 2002-2003. In similar to the problem with a long distance between survey and election year it could be problematic to assume consistency in policy preferences over longer

time periods. There is no obvious solution to this problem, but I have decided to use the data provided from B&L for elections that are held less than eight years from when the survey was conducted. This threshold corresponds to the longest recorded time difference accepted in VPM and implicates that all elections held in 1996 or later in the available countries will be included into the analysis. The figure below shows the results.

Table 3: Comparison VPM MRG and B&L

		B&L	VPM	MRG
Albania	VPM	.861*** (29)		
	MRG		.617***(21)	
	B&L			.587*(14)
Macedonia	VPM	.682* (12)		
	MRG		.010 (15)	
	B&L			-0.031 (10)
Croatia	VPM	.667 (7)		
	MRG		.563 (7)	
	B&L			.081 (6)
Russia	VPM	1.0 *** (2)		
	MRG		-.788(3)	
	B&L			-1.0 (2)
Ukraine	VPM	.971(3)		
	MRG		.164(8)	
	B&L			.004(3)
Romania	VPM	.660 (3)		
	MRG		-.428(5)	
	B&L			1.0 (3)
Serbia	VPM	.845 (3)		
	MRG		.906 (3)	
	B&L			.992 (3)
Mean within country correlation (in above mentioned cases)	VPM	.812		
	MRG		.149	
	B&L			.233
Overall correlation (all available parties)	VPM	.686 *** (42)		
	MRG		.414*** (130)	
	B&L			.310* (42)

\*Significant at the .05 level \*\* Significant at the .01 level \*\*\*Significant at the .001 level

Note: The category overall correlation represents the entire dataset, even cases where data from B&L is not available.

As noted in the table above, both the overall correlation and the mean within correlation is higher between B&L and VPM than it is both between B&L and MRG and VPM and MRG in these cases. This might be expected given that the theoretical basis for expert surveys and VPM has much in common. This is an encouraging result in respect to the reliability of the VPM approach. Even though B&L is not an “objective source of truth” against which it is possible to assess the merits of the VPM approach, the very high within case and overall correlation between VPM and B&L suggests that it would not make a big difference empirically whether one choose to use VPM or B&L. Also note that the cases where there were available data from B&L were cases where the within country correlation between VPM and MRG is lower than in the entire population.

### Most divergent cases

In some cases there are substantial differences in the scores provided by the MRG data and the VPM method. In order to see if there is any systematic bias in the VPM method it is interesting to examine these cases more thoroughly. Below, the five cases are displayed where the largest difference between MRG and the VPM method exists:

Table 4: List of most divergent cases

Country	Party Name	Election year	VPM score	MRG score	Difference
Russia	Communist Party (KPRF)	1999	4.24	7.28	3.04
Albania	Democratic Party (PDSH)	1996	7.09	4.34	2.75
Romania	Democratic Convention (CDR)	1996	6.08	3.56	2.52
Russia	Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)	1993	5.29	7.78	2.49
Albania	Socialist Party of Albania (PSS)	2001	3.06	5.03	1.97

Note: The MRG code represents the transformed MRG scale. Similarly the difference value represents the difference in VPM score and transformed MRG score.

In all cases but one, that of the Russian Liberal Democratic Party, the difference between the VPM and the MRG method is a difference of kind rather than degree. That is when one of the

measures places the party to the left of centre the other places it to the right or vice versa. The largest difference is recorded when mapping the Russian Communist Party (KPRF) in the 1999 election. According to the score given by the MRG, the KPRF should be considered a party far to the right on the political scale. Actually, the rightist score of KPRF is only exceeded by five other parties<sup>12</sup> within the data. This is a rather surprising score and even though the VPM score suggest that the KPRF is a left of centre rather than an extremist left party, it would be more according to expectation if the MRG placed the party to the left of centre. If I compare the scores given by MRG and VPM with that of the Expert Surveys of Benoit and Laver (2006)<sup>13</sup> these authors actually code the KPRF even further to the left than the VPM. With a score of 4.84 (on a scale from 1-20), Benoit and Laver consider it as one of the most leftist parties in the entire dataset. Similarly, in the other two cases where comparison with Benoit and Laver is possible, the expert surveys are more coherent with the scores recorded by the VPM method than with the MRG. This adheres to the Democratic Party of Albania (PDSH), which is coded as rather rightist by the VPM but clearly to the left by MRG, Benoit and Laver positions the party as right of centre with a score of 13.26. On the same note the Socialist Party of Albania (PSS) is coded as leftist by VPM and Benoit and Laver (score 7.53), but as slightly right of the centre by MRG.

In two cases, that of the Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR) and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), a comparison with Benoit and Laver is not possible. The claims about the policy position of the LDPR, by the VPM and MRG method is rather difficult to evaluate, since both sources considers the party to be right of centre. It is however likely that this party, headed by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, is more correctly pictured by the MRG score from a qualitative perspective. It is usually considered as Right-wing populist in essence but tries to be considered as more mainstream by using words such as “democratic” and “liberal” in its party name (Kipp 1994). In regard to the CDR, the score of the VPM approach is however more in line with the general perception. The CDR was generally considered to be a right of centre political alternative in opposition to the leftist Party of Social Democracy (PDSR) (e.g. Keesing’s Record of World Events 1996: 41376).

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<sup>12</sup> The Albanian Movement of Legality Party in 2001 (7.80), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia in 1993 (7.78), the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in 1999 (7.37), the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in 1995 (7.37) and the Fatherland-All Russia Party in 1999 (7.35).

<sup>13</sup> Although gathered in 2002-2003.

This implicates that in four out of five of the most divergent cases the common understanding of party positions could be described as more in favour of the VPM approach than the MRG. This is not enough proof to suggest that the degree of validity in VPM is higher than in MRG. It does however suggest that the VPM approach is not more prone than the MRG approach to make approximations of party policy positions that is far away from the general perception of the “real” positions of the parties. The evaluation of these most divergent cases in this section has much in common with an expert survey approach to policy mapping.<sup>14</sup> As noted earlier there are important points of criticism against this approach to policy mapping, but I believe that this method is a good point of reference when comparing the conflicting results of the two other methods.

## Conclusion

In this paper I have discussed the strengths and shortcomings of different methods of party policy mapping. The aim has been to investigate the merits of these different methods in relation to a project studying the formation of pre-electoral coalitions in electoral authoritarian regimes. I have through this paper argued for a Voter-based Policy Mapping (VPM) strategy. This method utilizes voters’ ideological self-placement for assessing the policy position of the parties they vote for. The arguments for choosing this strategy rather than other methods, such as expert-surveys and textual analysis, have been based both on feasibility and theoretical reasoning.

In a later part of this paper an empirical comparison between foremost the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) data and data extracted with the VPM approach was conducted. The population for this comparison was made up by electoral authoritarian elections held in the post-communist context during the time frame 1990-2004. The results from this analysis were encouraging from the perspective of the VPM approach. Not only was a significant correlation between the MRG and VPM data illustrated, but additional comparison also showed a very high correlation between the VPM data and data extracted from expert surveys. Moreover, an analysis of the cases where the coding of VPM and MRG was most divergent showed that most of the codings made by the VPM approach would seem more reasonable from a qualitative point of view.

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<sup>14</sup> That is relying on either the expert surveys provided by Benoit and Laver (2006) or on qualitative assessments of party positions within the academic literature.

I believe that this paper has shown the potentials of applying a VPM method in order to map the policy positions of parties in authoritarian elections. VPM does of course have its shortcomings, in similar with other approximation methods. I do however believe that this paper has illustrated that this method is valid and reliable enough to utilize in a study on coalition formation. My expectations are that such a study would be able to contribute with important knowledge to the democratization research and with the utilization of VPM such a project would be feasible and methodologically sound.

## Appendix 1: Additional tables

Table 5: Within country correlation

Country	Correlation
Albania	.5906*** (26)
Armenia	.6666 (6)
Azerbaijan	-1.00 (2)
Belarus	1.00 (2)
Croatia	.5790* (15)
Georgia	.3699 (6)
Kyrgyz Republic	No MRG data
Macedonia	.0996 (13)
Romania	.3943 (16)
Russia	.1564 (9)
Serbia	.9059 (3)
Slovakia	.4590 (7)
Ukraine	.4662* (23)
Mean	.3350

\*Significant at the .05 level \*\* Significant at the .01 level \*\*\*Significant at the .001 level

Note: N within brackets.

Table 6: Correlation for extreme parties

Category	Correlation
Most extreme parties	.385*(41)
Overall	.414 *** (130)

\*Significant at the .05 level \*\* Significant at the .01 level \*\*\*Significant at the .001 level

Note: The category “Most extreme parties” represents all parties furthest to the left or right based on their VPM scores. In cases where more than one party have equally extreme scores, all these parties are coded as the most extreme. Number of observations within brackets.

## Appendix 2: Population in empirical comparison

Country	Elections
Albania	1991, 1992, 1996, 1997 and 2001
Armenia	1999 and 2003

Azerbaijan	1995
Belarus	1995
Croatia	1995 and 2000
Georgia	1999
Kyrgyz Republic	2000
Macedonia	1994, 1998 and 2002
Romania	1990 and 1992
Russia	1993 and 1999
Serbia	2000
Slovakia	1994
Ukraine	1994, 1998 and 2002

Note: No MRG data is available for Kyrgyz Republic



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