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To act as a Union

Explaining the development of the EU's collective foreign policy

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TO ACT AS A UNION

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Explaining the Development of the EU's Collective Foreign Policy

Maria Strömvik



LUND
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Lund Political Studies 142
Department of Political Science

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

THIS STUDY SETS OUT TO EXPLAIN the emergence of an unusual phenomenon in international politics – the successive development of a collective foreign policy – by investigating the evolution of the European Union's common foreign and security policy. Two snapshot pictures, separated by exactly thirty years in time, will serve as a starting point.

* * *

On November 19, 1970 in Munich, the six foreign ministers from the European Community member states formally met for the first time to discuss foreign policy matters within the framework of European Political Cooperation (EPC). Foreign policy, in this context, referred to political attitudes and activities towards states or issues outside the geographical area covered by the European Community. It was a very limited and informal arrangement, without a treaty base and without any form of compliance mechanisms. The meeting in Munich was the first of what was hoped to become a habit; to meet twice a year with a view to discussing certain foreign policy issues, possibly harmonise the member states' views, and when feasible to undertake common action. Institutionalising cooperation in foreign policy matters, without specifying in advance the content or the boundaries of the cooperation, was however an extremely sensitive venture. The idea of a collective foreign policy raised numerous questions about sovereignty, traditional diplomacy and international status and

prestige. The idea was in fact so sensitive that the EPC framework was most notable for what could not be done. There were to be no formal links with the European Community, and no association with the EC Commission. The foreign ministers were not to meet in Brussels, but in the member state holding the presidency. There was to be no permanent budget and no permanent secretariat, only a Political Committee consisting of the political directors from the member states' foreign ministries. When expressing common viewpoints, the group of states was not referred to as the EC but as the Six. There was no mention of the words security or defence – these issues were strictly off the agenda. Two foreign policy topics were discussed at this first EPC meeting, the Middle East and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Precisely thirty years later, on November 20, 2000, the now fifteen European Union foreign ministers, together with the fifteen defence ministers, met in Brussels to discuss the member states' troop contributions to a European Union military force. They did so within the framework of the successor to the EPC – the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) – which now constitutes the so called second pillar of the European Union. Within this framework, the EU foreign ministers meet at least once a month, most of the time in Brussels, and discuss “all areas of foreign and security policy [...] including the progressive framing of a common defence policy.”¹ When defence issues are under discussion, defence ministers also often participate. The foreign ministers are assisted by the Council Secretariat in Brussels, which is headed by a secretary general who also acts as a foreign policy spokesperson for the Union. The Commission participates fully in the work, and the regular administrative costs for the cooperation are now covered by the Community budget. When declaring viewpoints or pursuing common action, ministers do so in the name of the European Union. The issues covered by the CFSP now range across most geographical and thematic areas of world politics, and the EU regularly address questions as diverse as

¹ Treaty on European Union, Art. 11 and 17.

foreign aid, political and economic sanctions, humanitarian intervention, and arms control.

* * *

Why is it that currently twenty-five European states – some of which are among the oldest nation states in the world – increasingly choose to forgo individual status and prestige on the international scene, in favour of acting collectively towards the rest of the world? Seeing that this type of international cooperation is a rare occurrence (to say the least) in international politics, this question is in itself quite intriguing. The question is however even more intriguing if one considers some of the circumstances surrounding this development. It is, for instance, a fact that some of the participants were for a long time very reluctant about the development of an external political and security dimension for the European Community. It is also a fact that all members have had the formal right to veto all successive treaty changes and, in general, also every single day-to-day decision. Furthermore, it is also a fact that, contrary to for instance the satellite states of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, this collective endeavour has not been imposed on the others by one specifically powerful state. We are, in other words, witnessing a group of sovereign, democratic, and sometimes reluctant states, who nonetheless more and more often act collectively as a Union.

This study is motivated by these observations, and aims first of all at providing explanations for the development of the EU's collective foreign policy. More specifically, this study will examine three different ways to account for the successive evolution of the CFSP, in order to provide a picture of the most important driving-forces at work in this process. In so doing, however, something of a more general theoretical by-product will also unfold along the way. Because the explanations covered here have rarely been systematically tested on cooperation in foreign policy matters, certain (often implicit) aspects of the theoretical frameworks will have to be carefully considered. This study therefore also aims to demonstrate how the

various explanations need to be calibrated and fine-tuned in order even to be capable of generating fruitful propositions about both foreign policy cooperation in general, and *successively increasing* foreign policy cooperation in particular.

For reasons to be further elaborated below, it is also necessary briefly to specify at the very outset what this study *does not* set out to do. By focusing on the development of the EU's foreign policy cooperation *per se*, the question of "success" in terms of foreign policy *impact* on the external environment, is not a matter of immediate concern in this study. Whereas questions about the successes and failures of the CFSP are among the most interesting ones within this field of study, they require different theoretical approaches and different methodological considerations than the non-evaluative approach chosen here.²

A related issue, which is likewise not in focus here, is the question of why the EU members often fail to act collectively. The question of why states fail to cooperate has been dealt with extensively in international relations theory, and the question of why the EU often fails to present a unified stance toward the rest of the world has received ample space in the CFSP literature. The conclusions from these studies (whether theoretical or empirical) almost always relate to concepts such as incompatible interests, the importance of sovereignty, and, in particular in the empirical accounts, a lack of political will. It is, in other words, not particularly difficult to provide answers as to why the EU members often fail to act collectively. The question of why they increasingly succeed to act in unison in international politics has no such obvious and uncontested answers, and is therefore the far more intriguing.

It is also important to note that this is not a study of regional, or European, security. Since the end of the Cold War, interest in (macro)regions and regional security provision has grown dramati-

² For a nuanced treatment of the topic of "CFSP success", see Jørgensen 1998, and for a study on EU foreign policy impact, see Ginsberg 2001.

cally.³ These studies focus on security *among and between* states within various regions, in the same sense that Karl Deutsch and others studied “security communities” several decades ago.⁴ This study, on the contrary, focuses exclusively on how a group of states increasingly attempts collectively to affect the security situation *outside* their own geographical boundaries. The CFSP has no geographical limits and, in fact, it is only security *within* the EU that is normally not placed on the Council’s CFSP-agenda.

Finally, it should be noted that this study aims neither at capturing as far as possible all the complexities of the EU’s collective foreign policy, nor at providing detailed descriptions of real-life events. Detailed and excellent empirical (and non-theoretical) studies of the development of the EU’s collective foreign policy already exist, and to that genre, this study has little to offer.⁵ This study rather sets out to be systematic and detailed in its search for explanations for the overall development of the CFSP over time.

WHY STUDY COLLECTIVE FOREIGN POLICY?

Questions about influence and power – whether related primarily to states, other actors, or to ideational flows – constitute the heart of the international relations discipline. When a large group of wealthy states increasingly behaves as a collective actor rather than as individual states, new questions about influence and power also start to surface. Those questions relate both to the participating states and to the functioning of (and effects on) the international system.

For instance, for any student of international relations who wish to analyse the foreign policy of any of *the participating states*, the analysis can no longer be made without also touching upon the EU’s

³ See for instance Job 1992; Miller 1995; Lake & Morgan 1997; Sperling & Kirchner 1997; Adler & Barnett 1998; McKenzie & Loedel 1998; Bronstone 2000; Hettne et al. 2000; and Väyrynen 2000.

⁴ For instance Deutsch 1957.

⁵ Three particularly detailed and thorough studies of this kind are Duke 2000, and Nuttall 1992 and 2000.

collective foreign policy.⁶ Irrespective of how far-reaching we believe that the effects of the CFSP have been for the individual states, it is no longer tenable to assume that it has had no effect whatsoever. As early as 1981 Douglas Hurd, later the British Foreign Secretary, commented that “in some areas of diplomacy our policy is formed wholly within a European context; and in no area is the European influence completely absent.”⁷ In other words, how the EU member states think about their own ways to power and influence is no doubt affected by their participation in a collective foreign policy. Therefore, when analysing the external relations of any EU member, the “European dimension” must by necessity also be included.

For those who rather analyse the *structure of the international system*, the EU’s collective stance towards the outside world may also start raising new questions and reinterpretations of the current form of the international structure. Students of international systems, who often focus on for instance the size and number of great powers, empires and regional blocs, and their effects on the stability and functioning of the international system, may perhaps in not too distant a future have to take seriously the emergence of a new superpower of sorts. The fact that the EU does not fit into our typical concept of superpower, will also further spur research and debates over what constitutes power in international politics and how actors in a globalised world can influence their environment.⁸ In essence, this development raises questions about what kind of unit the EU is developing into, and how this development is related to possible changes in the form and characteristics of the international system.⁹

Related, but on a more normative note, for those interested in the global *spreading of new norms and values*, the development of the

⁶ For recent coverage of this claim, see for instance Manners & Whitman 2000; Tonra 2001; and Rieker 2004.

⁷ Hurd 1994, p. 421.

⁸ For a related argument, see Moravcsik 2002. See also Laffan et al. 2000; and Rosecrance 1998.

⁹ However, as Ben Rosamond (2000, p. 175) has pointed out, so far “the literature on EU external relations has been conspicuously cautious about possible transformations of the international system.”

EU into a serious international actor may also prove to have wide-ranging consequences in the future.¹⁰ The evolution of a second great power in the international system, with a mission to spread some of its own guiding norms – such as liberal democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms – to other corners of the world, will mean a possibility to affect the agenda-setting and discourse at the global level. Furthermore, on the occasions when the two biggest economies in the world, the EU and the US, are in agreement over policies to pursue, they have tremendous power to influence the outcomes of international negotiations and agreements also on “political” issues.

Most of these questions will not be immediately covered by this study, but they should be seen as something of a motivation and a frame for the more limited inquiries presented here. To explain why the EU is developing into a new actor on the international scene is in itself one important building-block in the way we think about both present and future international relations. We still know too little about the forces behind this development. The point of departure for this study is that whereas existing studies of the CFSP have often been weak in systematically relating this development to general international relations theory, the reverse is also the case. Scholars primarily interested in international relations theory have rarely, if ever, tested or refined their theories by learning from the case of the EU’s collective foreign policy. This study will merge these two fields, and should be seen as making thereby a contribution to both the study of the empirical phenomenon of the EU’s collective foreign policy and to the theoretical debate over forces behind developing cooperative arrangements between states.

EXISTING STUDIES OF EU FOREIGN POLICY

In existing studies of the EU’s collective foreign policy, views differ enormously on its very nature, its significance, the reasons behind it,

¹⁰ For three recent contributions to this field, see Manners 2002; Björkdahl 2005; and Elgström 2005.

and its efficacy. Furthermore, when reading the CFSP-literature, one easily gets the impression that the phenomenon of a collective foreign policy is so unusual that it eludes classification or categorisation into established political science vocabulary, and that it therefore also eludes traditional political science theory.

The elusive phenomenon?

Judging from the existing body of CFSP literature, conceptualising the second pillar cooperation is no straight-forward task. Neil Winn and Christopher Lord have even noted that the “study of the CFSP is one of those unusual areas of academic enquiry in which the ‘what question’ is analytically more demanding than the ‘why question.’”¹¹

The CFSP does not fit neatly into either of the two common conceptions of cooperation in the security policy sphere. It is not intuitively placed in the category of military *alliances*, which are created with a view to combining the military strength of the participants in relation to some normally pre-identified enemy, as was the case with for instance the formation of NATO. Nor is it an institution for *security management*, designed to manage conflict *among* the members, such as for instance the UN or the OSCE.¹² Cooperation among a group of states on *external* security management thus even seems to raise difficulties in naming the phenomenon. The CFSP has therefore been assigned various labels, by both practitioners and scholars, such as collective diplomacy, alliance diplomacy, multilateral diplomacy, supranational diplomacy, and of course the official EU label of common foreign and security policy.¹³ These various labels are not only a matter of semantics, but are also a testimony to the problems of describing the nature of the phenomenon itself.

One problem is related to the question of whether a typically state-centric concept such as foreign policy can be attached to units other than states. The reluctance among analysts to assign to the

¹¹ Winn & Lord 2001, p. 48.

¹² For a discussion of this typology, see Wallander et al. 1999, p. 1.

¹³ Pijpers 1990; Weiler & Wessels 1988, p. 257; Hill & Wallace 1996, p. 7; Ifestos 1987.

phenomenon the epithet of *foreign policy* seems to depend on the commonly held view that there is very little of a full-fledged “EU foreign policy” of the type that would be expected from a typical nation state.¹⁴ Giving it names which include the word diplomacy is thus often, at least implicitly, a suggestion that the CFSP is little more than typical diplomatic relations between states. Thereby, most often these labels reflect a tendency to connect evaluative aspects to the CFSP, such as a judgement over the efficiency, or the possibility, or even desirability, for the cooperation to succeed. There has, in other words, often been an unfortunate tendency to conflate “foreign policy” with “effective influence on world politics”, and this has arguably been particularly unhelpful for the study of the CFSP.¹⁵

We need, however, to keep in mind that questions of *policy efficiency* are not necessarily the same as questions about the *existence or not of some policy activities* in the first place. The American foreign policy towards Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s was clearly not very efficient, but it is not sustainable to argue that there were no activities in the first place. Nor are questions of policy efficiency always related to the possession of certain *policy instruments* (such as an army), as some CFSP scholars tend to imply.¹⁶ The particular need for various instruments must clearly be assumed to be related to whatever issue any particular policy is set to address.¹⁷ Few would for instance argue that the EU’s attempts to encourage liberal market reforms in Poland in the 1990s were hampered by the lack of an EU army. In other words, a clearer definition of what is actually being studied is a prerequisite for an informed analysis.

A second problem is linked to one of the most commonly discussed epistemological questions in research on the European Union in general. Is the EU to be considered a case *sui generis* or can it be thought of as one case among a class of similar phenomena? This

¹⁴ See for instance Long 1997, p. 190; Spence & Spence 1998, p. 51; Rosecrance 1998, p. 15; Zielonka 1998a, p. 1; and Gordon 1997/98, p. 75.

¹⁵ Cf. Smith, H. 2002, p. 7.

¹⁶ See for instance Long 1997, p. 189; and Kagan 2003.

¹⁷ See for instance Knudsen 1979. Cf. Sjursen 1998, p. 95.

study tends to side with the latter. As James Caporaso has pointed out, few “things resist being described in one way or the other, depending on the level of generalization used.”¹⁸ Whereas the development of the European Union’s collective foreign policy is indeed a very unusual phenomenon in international politics – arguably even a unique case – this fact does not automatically lead to the conclusion that conceptualising it as a general phenomenon is not possible. The development of the CFSP might very well be both constrained and driven by the same types of forces as other, similar, phenomena. And, even if we do not witness any comparable cases today, it is difficult to rule out the possibility that they might materialise tomorrow.

Therefore, at the most general level, the CFSP will here be thought of as a case of cooperation among states on external security management. References in this study to the EU’s collective foreign policy, or to the EPC/CFSP, are thus intended to be understood in that sense. However, the focus here is not on the phenomenon as we witness it today, but on the explanations for the EU members’ *increasing* pursuit of a common foreign and security policy over time. Hence, to be more precise, the phenomenon under study here is rather the gradual evolution of cooperation among states on external security management.

The elusive theory?

Existing studies of the CFSP also display very differing views on *whether* and *how* political science theory can be related to it. A quick survey of the exponentially growing body of literature on the EU’s foreign policy actually reveals some quite surprising findings. First of all, there was for a long time a very clear “theoretical deficit” in the CFSP literature.¹⁹ One analyst, in a survey of studies of EU foreign policy up until a decade ago, pointed out that this body of literature

¹⁸ Caporaso 1997.

¹⁹ This “complaint” is found for instance in Sjöstedt 1977, p. 5; Weiler & Wessels 1988, p. 229; Holland 1991a, p. 5; Rummel 1994, p. 117; Larsen 1999; Smith M.E. 2004, p. 3.

consisted mainly of empirical policy-studies and displayed a remarkably low interest in theoretical issues.²⁰ Since then, however, a number of studies on the CFSP with theoretical connections have started to surface,²¹ although the main trend is still of a more non-theoretical nature.²²

A second, and maybe even more surprising feature of this field of study, is that if CFSP-analysts have shown little interest in theory, the “opposite” is also the case. Scholars concerned primarily with international relations theory have rarely touched upon the subject of the CFSP.²³ As Reinhard Rummel concluded, “the theory of international relations is not very rich on the explanation of collective foreign policy.”²⁴ This observation also seems true for the EU in general; students interested primarily in international relations-theory have rarely included the EU in comparative case studies.²⁵ As Thomas Diez and Richard Whitman have furthermore pointed out, when attempts to apply international relations theory on issues related to the EU have been undertaken, those contributions have seldom received much attention within the international relations community.²⁶

²⁰ Jørgensen 1993, p. 221; cf. Hill & Wallace 1996, p. 2. This claim has been recurrent throughout the history of the EPC/CFSP. In 1988, two other students of the EPC commented that the academic community had been unable to relate EPC “into any meaningful system theory, integration theory or international relations theory let alone create a new EPC general theory” (Weiler & Wessels 1988, p. 229). Early exceptions were some of the contributions in Holland 1991a.

²¹ For instance, the contributions to Carlsnaes & Smith (eds) 1994; Larsen 1999; Lucarelli 2000; Winn & Lord 2001; the contributions to Carlsnaes et al. (eds) 2004; Smith M.E. 2004; and the contributions to Tonra & Christiansen (eds) 2004a.

²² This claim is for instance repeated by Tonra & Christiansen (2004b, p. 4), who argue that “the field of study in EPC/CFSP has been dominated by empirical accounts,” and only infrequently been “grounded in an explicit theoretical framework.”

²³ One telling example, researching “security institutions over time and space” by including the WEU but not the CFSP, is Haftendorn et al. 1999.

²⁴ Rummel 1994, p.117.

²⁵ Tallberg 2001; Caporaso 1997. The exception being the early integration theorists, among whom for instance Karl Deutsch, Ernst Haas, Philippe Schmitter and Joseph Nye made considerable efforts to compare European integration with similar efforts in other regions (for a discussion, see Caporaso 1997 and Marks 1997).

²⁶ Diez & Whitman 2000.

A third point related to this area of study is that those concerned with “integration theories”, that is, the whole sub-set of theoretical literature on (mainly) European integration, have almost exclusively confined themselves to “Community studies” and rarely addressed the EU’s foreign policy cooperation.²⁷ For instance, Andrew Moravcsik’s influential work on intergovernmentalism and European integration, aims explicitly at explaining “why sovereign governments in Europe have chosen repeatedly to coordinate their *core economic policies*.”²⁸ For today’s proponents of a renewed neo-functionalism, with their heavy focus on the influence of transnational and supranational institutions, the CFSP with its intergovernmental framework seems to have little to offer. With few exceptions, these theorists have altogether excluded the CFSP when refining their theories.²⁹ Even the debate on whether international relations theories can fruitfully be used in accounting for certain dimensions of the European Union has been, almost without exceptions, a debate about the possibilities of international relations theories as applied to first-pillar issues.³⁰

Generally, there seems to be two broad “excuses” for this gap between theory and the CFSP. The first one is, again, the *sui generis* argument and the belief that traditional theories can not in a satisfactory way handle the European Union’s international role. Roy Ginsberg, for instance, has argued that “[j]oint foreign policy behaviour of a group of states is so unorthodox in international relations that it defies traditional political science theory.”³¹ A similar claim has been made by Panayiotis Ifestos, who argues that “the

²⁷ Larsen 1999.

²⁸ Moravcsik 1998, p. 1 (emphasis added).

²⁹ Two interesting and convincing contributions on the relevance of neo-functionalism (or renewed versions of it) for the study of the CFSP have however been provided by Michael E. Smith 1998; and Jacob Øhrgaard 1997. One contribution on the non-relevance of neo-functionalism has been provided by Philip Gordon (1997/98) who concludes that there is little proof that any of the neo-functional predictions on integration will ever materialise regarding foreign and security policy.

³⁰ Two notable exceptions are Jørgensen 1993; and Hurrell & Menon 1996.

³¹ Ginsberg 1989, p. 9. For recent contributions to this debate, see for instance Laffan et al. 2000.

analysis of the European Community in its external dimension is [...] difficult, because of the unique nature and character of the European regional organisations.”³² Jakob Øhrgaard furthermore suggests that the CFSP displays even more of a *sui generis* problem than does the EU in general:

not only is the CFSP a unique form of *international* cooperation, it is also a unique form of *European* cooperation. While it may therefore fit uneasily into traditional European integration theory because it is *too unique*, it fits equally uneasily into traditional European integration theory because it is *not as unique* as the Community.³³

Christopher Hill, also evoking the *sui generis* argument, has suggested that “it is possible to argue that the experience of ‘European foreign policy’ over the last 20 years or so has been so unique that the search for one theory to explain its evolution is doomed to fail and that we must fall back on history.”³⁴

The other excuse is rather related to the complexity of international relations theory. Richard Whitman, for instance, proposes that the preference for empirical over theory-oriented CFSP studies is attributable to an unwillingness among analysts to engage in a debate over which theory to use. The safe harbour of empirical case studies, he suggests, “offers a tranquil resting place away from the shifting currents of theory (that have recently been whipped up into a raging storm by post-modern and post-structuralist discourses).”³⁵ Joseph Weiler and Wolfgang Wessels also put forward a similar thought, arguing that the theoretical debate became too complicated in the 1970s.³⁶ The result has become a large body of CFSP literature which often does not relate to the rest of the political science debates. Knud Erik Jørgensen even speaks of a “strategy of *ad hoc*’ery and intuitive speculation” seemingly guiding many of the CFSP ana-

³² Ifestos 1987, p. 25.

³³ Øhrgaard 2004, p. 27.

³⁴ Hill 1993, p. 307. Of lately, however, Christopher Hill’s opinion seems to have changed, and he now argues that scholars interested in international relations theory are “criminally negligent” if they overlook EU foreign policy (Hill 2005).

³⁵ Whitman 1998a, p. 5.

³⁶ Weiler & Wessels 1988, p. 231.

lysts.³⁷ It is thus quite significant that two of the most quoted “theoretical concepts” in the CFSP literature – the EU’s “self-styled logic”³⁸ and “the capability–expectations gap”³⁹ – have never been explicitly related to general international relations theory.

At the same time, there are of course notable exceptions. Broadly speaking, two different perspectives have been applied by a few analysts to explain and understand various aspects of the phenomenon. Alfred Pijpers, for instance, has employed a realist framework to account for the “vicissitudes of the EPC,” a perspective also shared by both Panos Tsakaloyannis and Robert Art.⁴⁰ They all share the view that the EU member states’ possibilities to act collectively in foreign policy affairs are primarily a function of the power realities in world politics. The explanations are thus focused on tensions between the superpowers during the Cold War, US attitudes towards security provision in Europe, and concerns for checks and balances among the larger Western European states. However, these studies have had a strong predisposition towards explaining why action *eludes* the EU members, and have thus not provided any explicit propositions regarding the successive *development* of the CFSP.

Others, constituting a larger and more disparate group, have argued that the CFSP is better explained by integration logic or at least by the institutionalisation of the cooperation. This group of scholars generally propose that either refined versions of neo-functionalist theory or one or the other version of “institutionalist theory” better account for the development of the EU’s foreign policy. One special branch of this camp is made up of those arguing – explicitly or implicitly – that there is something specifically European about the European states, in that they seem to be “Europeanised” by interacting with each other on foreign policy matters.⁴¹ Within this disparate group, the explanations for the development of the CFSP are

³⁷ Jørgensen 1993, p. 211; cf. Moravcsik 1998, p. 17.

³⁸ Ginsberg 1989.

³⁹ Hill 1993.

⁴⁰ Pijpers 1990 and 1991; Tsakaloyannis 1991; and Art 1996.

⁴¹ See for instance Ekengren 1996; Tonra 2001; Winn 2003; and Rieker 2003.

best thought of either in terms of spill-over from the economic cooperation or, more commonly, by socialisation and learning among the participating foreign policy elites.⁴² With the recent explosion of constructivist literature on the EU, a number of attempts to account for the development of the CFSP from this perspective have also surfaced during the last few years.⁴³ These studies often closely resemble some of the neo-functional treatments of the CFSP, insofar as they too focus on the socialisation and learning aspects of integration. Lumped together, however, these studies have generally tended to treat such concepts as either-or phenomena. Few have attempted to specify when, or under what conditions, these phenomena have occurred, and thus have had little to offer to the theoretical debate on *when* we should expect foreign policy cooperation to intensify. They have, furthermore, rarely been carried out in a systematic manner. As one analyst puts it, they

have been conducted in a 'single shot' fashion and more often than not they focus on case studies of selected policies or institutional aspects. We are thus far from having reached a critical mass of applications and thus are unable to fully assess the potentials of each theory.⁴⁴

These studies have in effect, while constituting highly interesting case studies in their own right, not been systematically tested against alternative explanations and subjected to the long-term empirical development of the CFSP. They have thereby not generated any certain findings and clear-cut arguments about *when* and *why* we should expect the CFSP to develop at certain times, but rather served to propose possible lines of inquiry.⁴⁵

This present study will provide a few such arguments. Having maintained above that the CFSP can be conceived of as a case of

⁴² See for instance Øhrgaard 1997; Jørgensen 1997; Tonra 1997; M. E. Smith 1998 and 2004; Winn & Lord 2001.

⁴³ See for instance Jørgensen 1997; Glarbo 1999; Larsen 1999; Bretherton & Vogler 1999; Smith, M. 2003; Aggestam 2004; Sedelmeier 2004.

⁴⁴ Jørgensen 2004, p. 14.

⁴⁵ Among the very few exceptions to date are Ginsberg 1989, and Smith, M. E. 2004.

cooperation among states, this study also starts out with the assumption that international relations theory might well be capable of explaining it. Contrary to some popular claims, it is thus assumed, as Andrew Moravcsik has so pointedly put it, that the EU member states are indeed “normal.”⁴⁶ That also means that international relations theory might even learn a few lessons from the CFSP.

The elusive debate?

If the few realist accounts of the CFSP focus solely on factors exogenous to the integration process, the institutionalist/neo-functionalist type of explanation focuses entirely on factors related to the institution and the integration dynamics between the member states and rarely addresses the possible importance of the outside environment. Within the latter category, furthermore, some tend to emphasise the occurrence of socialisation as a result of the cooperation, whereas others have argued that such trends are invisible in the CFSP area. It is therefore maybe most of all surprising that there has been no debate whatsoever between competing explanations.

Two slightly different reasons seem to account for the absence of debate in CFSP-studies. First, and to quote Jørgensen again, the theoretical considerations in treatments of the CFSP often only seem to “serve as alibis to the essential, perceived as description.”⁴⁷ Therefore, whereas these studies have contributed to the field by providing a tremendous amount of highly interesting descriptions of various aspects of the CFSP, they have rarely contributed to or encouraged any serious theoretical debate. Secondly, the theory-informed studies of the CFSP have furthermore often been attempts at simultaneously explaining aspects of the CFSP by a combination of a whole battery of different, and sometimes contradictory, theoretical perspectives.⁴⁸ Alfred Pijpers argues that “right from the beginning ‘dispersed eclecticism’ has been characteristic of the theoretical handling of

⁴⁶ Moravcsik 1998, pp. 4f.

⁴⁷ Jørgensen 1993, p. 211.

⁴⁸ See for instance Weiler & Wessels 1988; Ginsberg 1989; and Pfetsch 1994.

EPC.”⁴⁹ Although these studies often come close to “explaining everything,” they have not seriously contributed to the theoretical debate. They have arguably rather been part of the problem. As Jørgensen claims, if “the recipe consists of a little neofunctionalism, some realism and 500 grammes of public choice, problems lie ahead, and the theoretical innovation of EC studies has not been improved but blocked.”⁵⁰

The result has therefore been that the CFSP literature contains quite a number of partial and possible ideas about the development of the CFSP. One might even argue that if combined, these studies rather over-explain the phenomenon as such, while at the same time we are left with no suggestions as to the relative importance of the various explanations. It is not uncommon among CFSP-analysts to conclude, as Knud Erik Jørgensen does, that it is fruitful to “regard the CFSP as the outcome of a historical process in which actors, institutions, and developments in the international and European system have mingled in often unpredictable ways.”⁵¹ Hopefully, this study may at least contribute to the beginning of a theoretically informed debate among analysts of the EU’s collective foreign policy. Maybe all these intermingled processes are not always so unpredictable after all?

THE REST OF THIS STUDY

With these reflections in mind, this study will proceed in several steps. First, the research design, along with a number of methodological and theoretical matters, is outlined in more detail in chapter two. It is argued that our search for explanations may fruitfully take advantage of the fact that the EPC/CFSP has changed stepwise over time. With the aim of being able to compare possible explanations, three different hypotheses on *when* we should expect such changes to occur are extracted from various international relations theories.

⁴⁹ Pijpers 1991, p. 14.

⁵⁰ Jørgensen 1993, p. 213.

⁵¹ Ibid. 2002, p. 212.

Then, in chapter three, a picture is painted of the historical development of the EPC/CFSP between 1970 and 1999. By analysing the contents of all EPC/CFSP statements, declarations, common positions and joint actions during this time, it is shown how, and when in time, the EPC and later the CFSP has changed along a few dimensions: *frequency*, *geographical breadth*, *thematic breadth*, and *depth* in terms of foreign policy instruments used.

The following three chapters are devoted to spelling out in more detail, and subsequently testing, the three hypotheses. In chapter four, the proposition that successive institutional changes should have intermittently pushed the EU's collective foreign policy to new levels is scrutinised. Contrary to expectations, however, it is shown how the correlation seems to be almost the opposite. The institutions are rather locking in or consolidating the new levels of EPC/CFSP, which must have been set off by other forces. In chapter five, the proposition is explored that an important such force ought to have been changing threats in the outside environment. This argument, however, turns out to show very little resemblance to the sequences of events as they have unfolded over the thirty-year period under study. Therefore, in chapter six, a third proposition is examined; that such a driving force could rather have been the EU members' inherent wish to balance the global influence of the United States. It is shown how the implications of this balance-of-influence thesis – that transatlantic disputes ought to lead to more CFSP – are indeed also distinguishable when looking at the empirical development.

Summarising these findings in chapter seven, this study finally proceeds in chapter eight to verify some of the conclusions by investigating in more detail the events during a new period of transatlantic disagreements: the months surrounding the Iraq war in 2003. Thereby, something of a diachronic test, in a very loose sense of the word, serves to end this study. Also this last step shows, again, how the EU members' "lust for international influence" turns out to generate quite predictable processes at times.

CHAPTER TWO

Analysing a Moving Target

ANYONE WHO ASKS QUESTIONS about the evolution of the European Union's common foreign and security policy, also reveals a somewhat contentious assumption: that there has indeed been a development (or change, or evolution)¹ worthy of some attention. This is a contested view, and therefore not a self-evident point of entry. Many argue instead that the CFSP is, as one scholar puts it, "a misnomer" and "an acronym without empirical content."² It is sometimes held to be "neither *common*, nor *foreign*, nor dealing with *security*, nor can be called a *policy*," to use the words of two other CFSP analysts.³ According to yet another member of this group of "sceptics," the CFSP suffers from a long list of weaknesses that can not be fixed:

The Union is either unable to formulate its policies or unable to implement policies already adopted. Sometimes procedural and institutional difficulties are at the core of CFSP failures. At other times the Union is simply faced with member states' reluctance to have any common policy whatsoever. Reforms to the initial structure of the CFSP could help fortify some of its weaknesses, but as the 1997 Amsterdam European Council demonstrated, the Union is incapable of reforming itself.⁴

¹ These concepts are generally used interchangeably throughout this study.

² Rosecrance 1998, p. 15.

³ Rummel & Wiedermann 1998, p. 53.

⁴ Zielonka 1998b, pp. 3f.

This “story of impotence that has historically plagued Europe,” as two other scholars claim, was for instance characteristically repeated in the events surrounding the Iraq war in 2003.⁵ Highlighting the Unions’ inability to provide a common policy in relation to the US policy towards Iraq, and alluding to H. C. Andersen’s tale about *The Emperor’s New Clothes*, one student of the CFSP concludes that “the Emperor is not only naked but suffers from severe delusions.”⁶ The final verdict, according to many of the sceptics, is clear: there is “also little hope that this will ever change and yet the show goes on.”⁷

In other words, according to this interpretation it would be futile to ask questions about the evolution of the CFSP. The answer is pre-determined: there is no evolving CFSP to be studied. As argued in chapter one, however, these studies often suffer from an analytical conflation of the concepts of foreign policy *activity* and foreign policy *success*. Furthermore, they often stem from studying one particular event, at one particular point in time, and normally an event chosen precisely because of the failure of the EU members to agree. They are, in short, often biased towards describing and analysing failure.⁸

The opposite view is however also represented among students of the CFSP. This group of analysts take stock instead of what they see as an “extraordinary *historical evolution*”⁹ that has taken place since the initiation of EPC in 1970, and tend to highlight an “impressive achievement” in the CFSP-area and a development which has had “pervasive effects on its member governments.”¹⁰ They see an emerging “European instinct for joint action,”¹¹ and find the development “rather breathtaking” when considering the divergent

⁵ Chari & Cavatorta 2003, p. 25.

⁶ Sangiovanni 2003, p. 194. Yet another CFSP analyst gives an alternative take on H.C. Andersen’s tale, by arguing that there simply “is no emperor. The European Union is a clothes-horse” (Holm 2001, p. 291).

⁷ Rummel & Wiedermann 1998, p. 53.

⁸ See for instance Gow 1997, Zielonka 1998b, and Chari & Cavatorta 2003, who all build their analyses on CFSP “failures.”

⁹ Peterson 1998, p. 16 (emphasis in original).

¹⁰ Smith, M. E. 1998, pp. 304f.

¹¹ *The Economist*, September 22, 1990.

national interests involved in the process.¹² They conclude, contrary to the sceptics, that “foreign policy has been one of the areas in which European integration has made the most dynamic advances.”¹³ Neither this group, nor the sceptics, have however tried to picture changes in the EPC/CFSP consistently over time. Both use, so to speak, hunches as their point of departure rather than a systematic description of the object under study. There is simply no commonly agreed or accepted yardstick that can be used for measuring a possible evolution of the EPC/CFSP, let alone use as a point of departure for examining the reasons behind its development.

The research design presented in the following allows us to show first *how* the CFSP has developed over time, and then to identify the most important explanation(s) as to *why* this development has taken place. The overall idea is first to describe the changes in the EPC/CFSP, in order to find a way of identifying *certain periods* when the Union’s collective foreign policy has been intensifying. Subsequently, we should pose the question what types of events should have preceded these changes, and thereby contrast these periods with a set of hypotheses derived from competing theoretical explanations. This is done in the hope of being able to distinguish one or more phenomena which repeatedly tend to precede the periods of changing EU foreign policy.

The preliminary conclusions, which are drawn from studying the overall development of EPC/CFSP over a period of thirty years (between 1970 and 1999), are finally tested in a more detailed fashion against yet another period in time in order to increase further the certainty of the findings. The merits of this research design is that more than one instance of “an evolving CFSP” can be identified, which allows for cross-temporal comparisons for each possible explanation, and for two slightly different methods to be used in the search for explanations. The result should be findings which are more reliable than those provided by single case studies of a particular event or a particular period. By choosing this research design, the

¹² Ginsberg 1989, p. 181.

¹³ Tonra & Christiansen 2004, p. 1.

fact that the EU is in many ways a “moving target,” which is often pointed out as a problem or particular challenge when studying the Union,¹⁴ is turned into a possible analytical advantage. The rest of this chapter is devoted to a discussion about these and other methodological and theoretical choices underpinning this study.

HOW TO DESCRIBE THE EVOLVING CFSP?

As King, Keohane and Verba have pointed out, “it is hard to develop explanations before we know something about the world and what needs to be explained on the basis of what characteristics.”¹⁵ In other words, the first question to be addressed is: how do we know if we are dealing with an evolving EU foreign policy cooperation, and how do we go about describing it?

Defining the EU's collective foreign policy

Analysts in many academic disciplines who seek to describe changes in cooperation patterns (as well as change or evolution in relation to many other societal phenomena), often structure their accounts along some form of “critical thresholds,” for instance in the form of history-making events, revolutionary decisions, or tangible institutional or organisational changes.¹⁶ This approach often reflects or coincides with a view of changing cooperation as a phenomenon *proceeding step-wise at specific points in time*. In the literature on the European Union in general, this view of changing cooperation is both debated and contested. Whereas some argue that the general European integration process has indeed taken place as a sequence of “big

¹⁴ See for instance Patten 2003; and Jönsson et al. 2000, p. 127.

¹⁵ King et al. 1994, p. 34.

¹⁶ Eckstein 1982, p. 465; cf. Hall & Taylor 1996, p. 942. See for instance Crawford & Lenway 1985, p. 379, and Young 1999, pp. 141ff., who speaks of “discontinuous jumps.” In the Marxist tradition, the occurrence of revolutions and qualitative leaps signals similar views on development. In historical institutionalism, the concepts of “critical junctures” and “punctuated equilibria” represent yet another related way of describing development (see for instance Krasner 1984, pp. 240ff.).

bangs,”¹⁷ others argue rather that integration is *proceeding gradually and continuously* as “political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their national loyalties, expectations, and political activities to a new and larger center.”¹⁸

At least implicitly, both these views can also be found in the narrower CFSP-literature, although “step-wise” changes are clearly the commonest way to describe development. Several CFSP analysts have for instance described the development of EPC/CFSP in terms of moves between plateaux, new stages, or successive touchstones.¹⁹ Many who describe the evolution of the CFSP tend furthermore to equate *changes in the CFSP* with *tangible institutional changes*.²⁰ The CFSP is thereby largely equated with its organisational set-up, and consequently (although implicitly) defined in terms of institutions and procedures rather than policy.

Curiously, such an institutional definition raises few eye-brows when made in relation to the EU, but would arguably have been highly contested and most certainly ridiculed if made in relation to, say, American or French foreign policy. While there may be several motives behind such a definition of the CFSP, among which is an obvious educational dimension, it is of no analytical use for this study. This study will rather seek to define the development of the EPC/CFSP in terms of quantitative and qualitative changes in the *contents* of the Union’s foreign *policy* over time, and thereby borrow

¹⁷ A typical example of this view being Moravcsik 1998, p. 2. The idea that important treaty changes or other history-making decisions mark the steps of integration is also implicit in many accounts of European integration. Just to give a couple of examples, Sonia Mazey (1996, p. 25) speaks of “key turning points” in the process of European integration, and Stephen George and Ian Bache (2000, pp. 45–139) divide the periods in the history of the EU according to treaty changes and other important decisions such as the Luxembourg compromise.

¹⁸ Haas 1961, pp. 366f.

¹⁹ Regelsberger 1988, pp. 16ff.; Schoutete 1986, p. 49; and Rummel 1992, p. 267 respectively.

²⁰ See for instance Gianni Bonvicini (1998, pp. 63ff.), who equates the development of the EPC/CFSP with “new procedures and new organs.” Hazel Smith (2002, Chapter 3) similarly describes the development of EU foreign policy in terms of institutional changes, broadly speaking, and Karen Smith (2003, pp. 37–47) describes the development of the CFSP largely in terms of treaty changes.

the definition of foreign policy from the general foreign policy analysis literature.

Two broad and general ways of conceptualising foreign policy have developed in the academic literature.²¹ One is to define foreign policy in terms of a *programme*, or objectives, by seeing it as:

a set of goals, directives, or intentions, formulated by persons in official or authoritative positions, directed at some actor or condition in the environment beyond the sovereign nation state, for the purpose of affecting the target in the manner desired by the policy-makers.²²

This definition however carries with it at least one drawback for the study of a collective foreign policy. While individuals or even governments may well be analysed as if they are fully capable of rational goal-seeking behaviour, it is more questionable to what extent a collectivity of states should be assumed to have such a collective capacity. A compromise reached within a group of at least nominally equal actors need not necessarily represent a course of action that would serve the precise goal of any of the participating actors, nor those of the collectivity.²³ It may rather be a compromise on which all can agree but at the same time a compromise which may lack a clear goal. Such policies can no doubt always be motivated *post hoc* as perfectly rational goal-seeking behaviour – and in many situations it both can and should be analysed as such – but taking such motivations at face value involves an unnecessary uncertainty for the analyst. By studying the changes in the collectively stated goals, we would not necessarily produce a very “true” picture of the changing CFSP.

This study will therefore make use of the second broad way of conceptualising foreign policy, which is rather to define it in terms of

²¹ Goldman 1986, p. 25.

²² Cohen & Harris 1975 as quoted in Gustavsson 1998, p. 22.

²³ Cf. Hermann 1978, pp. 30f. This point is often made in relation to policy at the national level, but is arguably more valid for policies emanating from a group of states, where there is not one but several ultimate decision-makers.

behaviour.²⁴ Using the definition proposed by Charles Hermann, an instance of behaviour will be thought of as a “discrete purposeful action,” and can be “viewed as the observable artefact of a political level decision.”²⁵ By combining this definition with the same “addressee” as in the definition above, and adapting it to the possibility of more than one nation state participating, this study will conceive of “foreign policy” as:

activities decided on by persons in official or authoritative positions, directed at some actor or condition in the environment beyond the sovereign nation state(s), for the purpose of affecting the target in the manner desired by the policy-makers.

This study thereby focuses on how and why the Union’s *observable collective foreign policy behaviour* has changed over time.

Not all of the EU’s external activities, however, will be seen to fall within this conception of foreign policy. The Union is constantly carrying out a multitude of collective activities, aimed at the outside world, in a wide array of policy areas – ranging from narrow and detailed technical trading standards to broad issues of sustainable development – which it does not itself label “foreign policy.” In EU terminology, such policies rather fall under the wider term “external relations”, among which the CFSP may be seen as one particular issue area.²⁶ The CFSP area has no formal pre-defined borders, and generally comprises whatever the EU members collectively define as foreign, security or defence policy. This distinction, however artificial for an outside observer and generally quite irrelevant in terms of what the EU is accomplishing in the rest of the world, will also be used throughout this study. The EU’s collective foreign policy will

²⁴ Some scholars prefer not to make a distinction at all, and rather incorporate both the programmatic ideas and the actual behaviour in their definitions of “foreign policy”. See for instance Holsti 1995, p. 83.

²⁵ Hermann 1978, p. 34. Cf. discussion in King et al. 1994, p. 41.

²⁶ The non-CFSP external relations are generally carried out using different policy-making procedures and different modes of implementation compared to the policy area explicitly termed the common foreign and security policy.

thus be seen as the *observable foreign policy behaviour emanating from the EU's second pillar framework*.

Operationalising the changing EPC/CFSP

Even with this narrow definition, a systematic search for change in the content of EU foreign policy is not a straightforward task. Just as for any state's foreign policy, there is no all-inclusive documentation or manageable records covering all the activities undertaken by the EU in the foreign policy area over time. There are simply no easy ways to produce an exact and objective description of the development over time. However, as Giovanni Sartori's ideal "conscious thinker" would advise, even without a thermometer, one can "say a great deal simply by saying hot and cold, warmer and cooler."²⁷ Even if we cannot provide a true or exact picture, we may nonetheless say something – in relative terms – about the changes over time. The closest we can get is arguably by finding an indicator of when there has been some type of change in the EU's collective foreign policy.

Following the example set by Esko Antola,²⁸ and later followed by Alfred Pijpers²⁹ as well as Gerald Schneider and Claudia Seybold,³⁰ the approach chosen here is to use *the contents of the declarations and press statements* issued through the second pillar framework as an indicator of changes in the EPC/CFSP. Statements and declarations have, since the birth of the EPC in the 1970s, been used by the EU to present "the European view" to the international public. They often contain only the EU's official "comments" and standpoints on world affairs, but are also used when declaring that the EU will take action in relation to for instance a state, a group of states, or any type of event. Therefore, as Reinhardt Rummel has pointed out, these statements are not necessarily individual isolated measures, but

²⁷ Sartori 1970, p. 1033.

²⁸ Antola 1986, p. 54.

²⁹ Pijpers 1988, p. 154.

³⁰ Schneider & Seybold 1997.

rather one element in a sequence of actions. They serve to encourage specific activities and political trends in the diplomatic arena [...], or they are intended to give warnings to third countries [...]. Punitive or coercive measures like sanctions and embargoes [...] are communicated via public declarations.³¹

The contents of the statements and declarations should therefore, for want of a better indicator, constitute at least something of a minimum picture of the EU's foreign policy.

There are, nowadays, in general three types of declarations (those issued by the Presidency, by the EU, or by the European Council), all published in the form of press statements by the Council's press service. The *declarations issued by the Presidency* are by now the most frequent ones. They are initiated by the Presidency (or by another member state or the Commission), and normally circulated to all member states' capitals via the so called *coreu*-system.³² They may also be circulated in for instance a relevant CFSP working group or in the Political and Security Committee. They generally require the acceptance of all member states.³³ The *EU declarations* are normally decided at the monthly Council meetings (currently the General Affairs and External Relations Council), and issued in connection to the meetings. The *Declarations by the European Council* are, in a similar way, normally issued in connection with the summits between the heads of state or government. The EU declarations and the declarations by the European Council are generally prepared in the same way as the declarations by the Presidency.³⁴

Since 1993, the Maastricht Treaty has also provided for two specific types of decisions within the second pillar, so called *common positions* and *joint actions*. There is no absolute and clear-cut line between the two, and both types of decisions normally require a

³¹ Rummel 1988, pp. 120f.

³² An electronic network directly connecting all member states' Ministries for Foreign Affairs (and also including the Commission).

³³ In exceptional cases, where time does not even allow for consultations via the *coreu*-system, the Presidency may issue a CFSP declaration at its own discretion.

³⁴ Government Offices of Sweden 2003, pp. 15f.

unanimous decision by the Council.³⁵ In general, however, the common positions are more of a framework agreement, often specifying activities that the member states undertake to implement, than the more specific joint actions.³⁶ When searching for change in the EPC/CFSP, all three types of declarations plus (from 1993 onward) the common positions and joint actions will be used in this study.

The issuing of declarations, common positions and joint actions (all generally referred to as statements below for the sake of simplicity) may be seen as the EU's most accessible and continuous form of what K. J. Holsti calls a foreign policy act, which is

basically a form of communication intended to change or sustain the attitudes and behavior of those upon whom the acting government is dependent for achieving its own goals. It can also be viewed as a 'signal' sent by one actor to influence the receiver's image of the sender."³⁷

The changes in frequency and in the content of the statements can therefore indicate changes in both the levels and substance of foreign policy activities over time. By analysing the content of all statements from the start of EPC in 1970 and thirty years onward (until the end of 1999), and categorising it along a few different dimensions to portray changes in *frequency*, *breadth* (geographic and thematic) and *depth* (types of instruments used) of the EPC/CFSP, an indicative picture can be provided of when in time the bigger changes have taken place.

The statements used in this study have been collected from four different sources. For the years 1970 to 1984, all EPC statements

³⁵ Gradually, since 1993, the adoption of common positions and joint actions by the use of qualified majority voting under certain conditions have been provided for in the Treaty on European Union (*Maastricht Treaty* article J.3.2, later amended in the *Amsterdam Treaty* article 23.2, subsequently amended again in the *Nice Treaty* article 23.2, and foreseen – pending ratification – to change further in the *Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe*, article III-300). However, decisions within the CFSP framework are rarely, if ever, put to a vote.

³⁶ Both common positions and joint actions are published in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

³⁷ Holsti 1995, p. 117.

published in the EC's monthly publication *Bulletin of the European Communities* were used.³⁸ For the years 1985 to 1989 the statements were collected from the *European Political Cooperation Bulletin*, published by the European University Institute in Florence, and for the years 1990 to 1998 the electronic sequel to that publication, the *European Foreign Policy Bulletin* provided the material. For the year 1999, the EU Council's web-site was used to collect the statements.

From these sources, which are in general highly reliable, all available statements, declarations, joint actions and common positions have been used. One special type of statements has however been excluded. It is the type of statements that only served to communicate that non-EU members (normally EFTA members and/or states that aspire to EU membership) have aligned themselves with a previous CFSP statement.³⁹ All in all, this material amounts to some 1,900 documents, which means that if a handful of statements are missing (either missing in the sources or just not found by the author of this study) the findings should not be substantially affected.

In general, the contents of the statements was also relatively straight-forward to categorise. Those few statements that presented a slight difficulty for the coding process were the ones that supposedly signalled a protest against *one specific state*, but without naming that particular state. For example, when the European Council in 1980 generally called upon the signatories of the Helsinki Final Act (the CSCE) to abide by the principles in that act with regard to Poland

³⁸ The reports from the EPC meetings from this period in time (1970 to 1985), published in the *Bulletin of the European Communities*, are sometimes not entirely clear on whether a statement is more of a conclusion from the meeting or meant as an official statement. Due to the way they were published, however, such "statements" have been included in this study.

³⁹ During 1998 only, almost 1/3 of the documents (55 out of 192) stated, in addition to the "CFSP message," that for instance countries like Norway, Iceland, and/or many Central and Eastern European states, aligned themselves with the EU view. In addition to these documents, the EU issued 19 statements that contained no "CFSP message" but only served to communicate that one or more non-EU members aligned themselves with some *previous* CFSP statement. It is this latter category that has been excluded from this study.

and the Polish people,⁴⁰ it was clearly not a message to all the CSCE members but very specifically directed towards Moscow despite the fact that the Soviet Union was never mentioned. As far as possible, such statements have been categorised according to their presumed “real,” as opposed to the openly stated, recipient. However, without contextual knowledge about every single statement, the odd statement may inadvertently have been categorised as not aiming at one specific state. Again, however, the total number of statements is large enough for such possible mistakes to not affect the overall conclusions in any substantial way.

A description of the sub-categories used, and the resulting picture of the changes in the EPC/CFSP is presented in chapter three. This picture then serves as the basis for the ensuing analyses of possible explanations.

What is left out?

As with all analytical choices, this way of operationalising change in the EPC/CFSP also entails leaving out some other elements from the analysis. By choosing this way to identify the periods when the EU’s collective foreign policy has changed, there are also certain aspects of the “totality” of EU foreign policy that by necessity recede into the background of the study.

First of all, one important part of EU foreign policy that cannot be captured by this method consists of the “non-observable” behaviour: the messages that the EU conveys to third parties through a number of channels not open to the public eye. Through regular meetings with third parties at various levels, and through *demarches* in third states’ capitals, the Union regularly and continuously conducts diplomacy that could never be captured over a long time and over the full range of issues by an outside observer (nor, arguably, by inside participants for a study over such a long time). This part of EU foreign policy must therefore, by necessity, be left out of a study of this kind. Secondly, only a very limited part of the activities

⁴⁰ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 12–1980, point 1.1.14.

that the EU pursues in various international fora, such as the United Nations and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), are reflected in the EPC/CFSP-statements. Thirdly, even if disregarding the whole field of EU external relations pursued primarily by the EU Commission and related primarily to the policy areas in the EU's first pillar, there are also quite a number of activities undertaken by the Commission that clearly are politically motivated and not primarily a logical result of the internal market.⁴¹ These activities also receive little attention with the method chosen here.⁴² Fourth, one of the more continuous forms of EU communication on foreign policy matters today are the statements from the EU's High Representative for the CFSP. These have been issued since the end of 1999, and now constitute an important part of the CFSP activities. However, these statements are left out of the analysis here, as they are – relatively speaking – a novel part of the CFSP and simply did not exist during the period covered in the main part of this study.

Another type of limitation – inherent in this way of picturing the development over time – is there is little possibility of distinguishing between “important” and “unimportant” statements and declarations. Whereas some EU activities may have been relatively easy to agree on, others may have required months or even years to materialise as a common activity because of for instance a highly controversial or politically sensitive content. Statements and declarations of the latter type are of course, in an EU perspective, greater achievements than the former.

These omissions and limitations are in one sense regrettable, but the value of being able to outline, *systematically* and over time, the content of what the EU members have agreed to be the issues worth communicating to the public and the outside world should outweigh the drawbacks from not covering all aspects of EU foreign policy.

⁴¹ See for instance Smith, M. E. 1998, p. 326.

⁴² Although, policy measures such as economic sanctions that are carried out by the Commission for CFSP reasons are generally mentioned in CFSP statements and therefore included in this study.

With such a picture – although in many ways a minimalist one – we are subsequently able to compare, over time, a few plausible explanations as to why the EU members increasingly pursue a collective foreign policy.

HOW TO EXPLAIN THE EVOLVING CFSP?

To explain an event – in this case the development of a collective foreign policy – is to give an account of why it happened.⁴³ Obviously, there is a multitude of factors affecting every individual EU foreign policy activity ever undertaken, and many would argue that the search for any one “explanation” to the successive development of the CFSP is almost by necessity destined to fail.

This study is not governed by so pessimistic a view. The research design is built on the assumption that some explanations – when looking at the overall trends over time – may prove to be more convincing than others, and this study sets out to identify them. As described in the following, three different “main suggestions” are extracted from international relations theory, and tested against the picture of the evolving EPC/CFSP over a thirty-year period. Finally, the findings are tried out on a new and more detailed case, spanning over a three-hundred-day period in 2002-2003. In other words, the ambition in this study is not to try to explain any *individual* foreign policy decision taken by the EU. The ambition is to simplify a complex reality, in order to say a few very general things about the most important forces behind the evolving common foreign and security policy.

Simplifying a complex reality

First of all, however, a short detour has to be made. Particularly over the last decade or so, the very idea of simplifying and attempting to find overall explanations to social science phenomena has been under heavy attack. Some analysts have even added an ethnocentric dimen-

⁴³ Elster 1989, p. 3.

sion to this critique, arguing that the American way of searching “for ‘theoretical generalisations of global reach’ are increasingly inappropriate” when studying the EU member states, and claim that there is a “more appropriate approach primarily informed by more recent European thinking.”⁴⁴

These are difficult arguments to sustain, even though they seem to represent mainstream thinking in many (European) academic environments. This way of criticising studies that set out to explain and generalise findings of social phenomena has also been quite unhelpful for the development of new knowledge. As one scholar has put it, this debate has often generated abstract discussions and speculations expending “a great deal of time, effort and space that might have been devoted to the elaboration of concrete concepts, theories, hypotheses, and methods.”⁴⁵ This debate also, at least partly, consists of broad philosophical meta-theoretical differences which can never be “solved” or reconciled, and which remain far outside the scope of this study. Indeed, one might well argue that such questions fall well outside the scope of any political science study. This debate in itself has nonetheless and quite regrettably become something of a reference point within (European) political science today, and scholars are – sometimes willingly and sometimes unwillingly – compartmentalised according to their real or perceived belonging to one or the other side in this debate. Therefore, a brief but compulsory confession of scientific faith, or meta-theoretical belief, is unfortunately called for before embarking on the essential.

Many analysts would quite correctly, like Robert Keohane, claim that cooperation between states:

is elusive enough, and its sources are sufficiently multi-faceted and intertwined, that it constitutes a difficult subject to study. It is particularly hard, perhaps impossible, to investigate with scientific rigor.

⁴⁴ Manners & Whitman 2000, pp. 4f. See also for instance Waever 1994, pp. 249f.; Diez 1999; and Hill 2005, p. 12. See also the contributions in the special issue of *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol 6, No 4, as well as the “European” reply in the following issue.

⁴⁵ Moravcsik 1999, p. 697.

No sensible person would choose it as a topic of investigation on the grounds that its puzzles could readily be ‘solved’.⁴⁶

However, while all agree with the basic proposition behind this statement – the world is undoubtedly a complex place – researchers part ways when it comes to spelling out the *consequences* for their academic possibilities.

Some see the existence of a truly complex world as a reason for not even attempting to search for explanations, or causal relationships, in general. One may, as this argument goes, at best *understand* some particular social event or process, but one can never aspire to *explain* the same events by searching for general laws governing social affairs.⁴⁷ Many analysts of social phenomena therefore often shy away from a language involving the use of words such as variables, causality, and explanations. Rather, the proponents of this view often advocate the value of, for instance, detailed case-studies and “thick description” of sequences of events. Some would even claim that the best we can do is to provide narratives or resort to story-telling.⁴⁸

Others, however, argue that complexity is no reason to refrain from attempting to distinguish important from less important. They do so while acknowledging the need for realistic expectations of the kind of findings anyone can expect. They generally accept that what will be found is a mix of various explanations, that might interact in complex ways and that are both difficult and highly problematic to distinguish and place into separate categories.⁴⁹ But they generally assume that a search for relatively simple models clearly has an analytical value. It may, as one scholar has put it, “isolate tendencies, propensities and mechanisms and show that they have implications for behavior that are often surprising and counterintuitive.”⁵⁰ To

⁴⁶ Keohane 1984, p. 10.

⁴⁷ For a thorough discussion of these two approaches to international relations, see for instance Hollis & Smith 1990.

⁴⁸ See for instance Alvesson & Skjöldberg 1994, in particular the many examples given in chapter 6.

⁴⁹ Cf. Young 1999, p. 154.

⁵⁰ Elster 1989, p. 9.

succeed in distinguishing a few highly important factors behind a social event or process, is furthermore of tremendous value when one subsequently wants to proceed by adding new knowledge to the phenomenon under study. To quote Keohane again: by “seeing how well a simple model accounts for behavior, we understand better the value of introducing more variables and greater complexity into the analysis.”⁵¹

At least one part of the debate seems to rest on somewhat exaggerated and sometimes fictitious differences over the issue of ‘simplification.’ The disagreements are exaggerated because to a large extent, and insofar as any study has even a remote ambition to evaluate processes or events in a systematic manner (something which most studies in social sciences claim to have), the differences between the two approaches are minor and related to style rather than being fundamental differences in their approach to science. Both involve choices and simplifications in the research process, and “the difference between the amount of complexity in the world and that in the thickest of descriptions is still vastly larger than the difference between the thickest of descriptions and the most abstract quantitative or formal analysis.”⁵² In short, they both deal with ways of simplifying an immensely complex reality.

Therefore, the statement that the world is a complex place should not deter us from attempts at causal inferences and the search for parsimonious explanations. Seeking to analyse the main forces (or sources, or triggers, or mechanisms, or any other similar concept that one may prefer) behind successively changing cooperative outcomes is not analogous to believing that it is in any way possible to find one true and sole explanation. However, by simplifying reality and seeking to distinguish important from less important in relation to the object under study, we may advance knowledge and say at least something provisional about the relative explanatory power of various theories.

⁵¹ Keohane 1982, p. 328, cf. Ostrom 1998, p. 14.

⁵² King et al. 1994, p. 4 and 43.

Thus, this study sets out to engage in an *a priori* theoretical reasoning, which in turn allows us to extract specific proposals or hypotheses, which can subsequently be compared with sequences of empirical events.⁵³ This method of competitive theory testing, or disconfirmation, allows for empirical investigations that can suggest whether observed state behaviour supports the expectations derived from various theoretical approaches.⁵⁴ This method may also, as Robert Keohane has noted, help “us to reinterpret previously observed patterns of behavior as well as suggesting new questions about behavior or distinctions that have been ignored: it has the potential of ‘discovering new facts.’”⁵⁵

The theoretical base-line

Not all theories of international relations easily lend themselves to comparisons, combinations or mergers, and even fewer lend themselves to competitive theory testing. Unless the aim is to engage in deep philosophy of science discussions, at least one minimum requirement exists; the theories need to be founded in the same meta-theoretical framework.

In this study, the competing propositions about why the EPC/CFSP has developed over time all rest on the assumption that states can be analysed as if they are capable of making at least fairly conscious choices, and that the strategies chosen can, within limits, be seen as the result of rational calculations by their leaders.⁵⁶ This “soft rationalism” includes a large proportion of contemporary international relations theories, although it is increasingly being contested by alternative ways of simplifying reality, often by various theoretical constructs with the prefix *post* attached to their labels. These alternative theories will not be further discussed here, as they

⁵³ Cf. Keohane 1982, p. 328; and Moravcsik 1999.

⁵⁴ Cf. Grieco 1990, p. 11.

⁵⁵ Keohane 1982, p. 328.

⁵⁶ Cf. Wallander et al., 1999, p. 5; and Lake & Powell 1999, pp. 6f.

have generally no capacity (nor any aspirations) to generate falsifiable hypotheses.

With the rationality assumption as a base, another two general assumptions can also be added for anyone who wishes to formulate propositions about cooperation between states. First, we can assume that states are able to formulate *preferences* regarding their preferred outcomes as well as regarding their preferred means of achieving these outcomes.⁵⁷ It seems that when contrasting different theoretical explanations, much may be gained from keeping the two types of preferences separate from each other to the extent possible. We may even, perhaps a little boldly but for the sake of making certain theories communicate better with one another, equate “preferences regarding outcomes” with national *interests*, and “preferences regarding actions” with a state’s preferred *strategies* or *policies*. Secondly, being rational actors, each with its own interests and preferred strategies, states must also be assumed to condition their behaviour on the expected behaviour of others. As Duncan Snidal has put it, “no state can choose its best strategy or attain its best outcome independent of choices made by others.”⁵⁸ In order to agree on any type of collective activity, states have to *interact strategically* with each other.

Thereby, if we *observe a collective decision* to cooperate, we can consequently assume that the actors (i) had overlapping interests and/or preferred strategies, and (ii) found a way to identify them and agree on a collective activity.⁵⁹ This is, in a nutshell, the common ground, or base-line, for many current theories of international politics.⁶⁰ This very general framework, which is illustrated in figure

⁵⁷ Some argue that preferences should be divided into two separate types – preferences regarding outcomes and preferences regarding actions – others do not attempt to make a distinction between the two (see for instance Powell 1994, p. 318 and Hix 1999, p. 12 respectively).

⁵⁸ Snidal 1986, p. 39.

⁵⁹ Robert Keohane (1984, p. 78) makes the same point for international regimes, arguing that ultimately they “depend on the existence of patterns of common or complementary interests that are perceived or capable of being perceived by political actors.”

⁶⁰ Cf. Lake & Powell 1999, p. 6.

1, is however devoid of specifications (such as: what are those interests and strategies, how are they formed, can they be altered?) and can therefore not immediately be used to generate any meaningful hypotheses about why a particular cooperative venture should develop over time. The advantage, however, of clearly spelling out this very basic framework is that while it represents agreement among theories in its empty form, it also helps clarify how various theories differ in their propositions about evolving cooperation. It allows for, as Miles Kahler has recommended, emphasising the research problem over the labels, and thereby permitting “explanatory power rather than theoretical polemic to decide the contest.”⁶¹




Figure 1. The “empty” framework of international cooperation

In effect, if we observe changes over time in the collective decisions to cooperate, this framework gives us a common reference point when discussing various theories’ answers to *why* we see such a change. Depending on theories asked, we would need to add various arrows, maybe even more boxes, and most certainly several feed-back loops, but they would all accept one thing: somewhere in the chain of events a change in the cooperative outcome would have been preceded by a change in the strategic interaction between the cooperating

⁶¹ Kahler 1998, p. 922.

states, and/or a change in the participants' preferred strategies, and/or a change in their interests.

Within this framework, current international relations theory immediately offers two broad and different – but not necessarily mutually exclusive – explanations as to why we would see the cooperative outcomes change over time. One would suggest that such change could have been preceded by the setting up of (or, a change in) formal institutions prescribing the rules for the participants' interaction. The other would rather suggest that the change would have been induced by events outside the cooperative venture. In both cases, such changes might have affected the interests, and/or the preferred strategies, and/or the interaction, depending on which theory we would consult. As discussed in the following, the first explanation can – for the purposes of this study – be treated as one proposition despite its rich and diverging family of theories, while the second explanation will generate two quite different propositions which need to be tried out separately.

Changing institutions as a driving force?

The role played by international institutions has been at the centre of much of the international relations debate(s) in recent decades.⁶² While some argue that institutions have – at the most – a very marginal effect on state behaviour, others see them as one of the most important determinants of state behaviour. Most of the debates have therefore focused either on the dichotomous question of *whether* institutions matter or not, or on the more complex question of *how* institutions matter. In connection with the second question, some scholars have also devoted time to discussions about why regimes or

⁶² There is no unanimous answer to the question of what exactly constitutes an “international institution”, and the relationship between “institution”, “regime” and “organisation” has been treated quite differently by different scholars. In this study, the main focus will be on the formal aspects of institutions, and thereby the definition chosen is the one provided by Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, who see institutions as “explicit arrangements, negotiated among international actors, that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behavior” (Koremenos et al. 2001, p. 762).

institutions may change over time.⁶³ Considerably less energy, however, has been spent on the question about the *effects* of institutional changes.⁶⁴

Among those who believe that “institutions matter,” there are also various strands, often portrayed as separate and irreconcilable perspectives. In many ways they do however display considerably more similarities than differences. Although often put forward in different terminology, most institutionalist accounts share the claim that institutions may help overcome impediments to international cooperation. Most accounts are also similar, although sometimes implicit, in their propositions about what mechanisms institutions may provide and how these mechanisms would, in turn, affect state behaviour. They vary more, however, in their interpretations of the underlying reasons behind these behavioural changes and thereby sometimes also of the long-term effects of institutions. This latter issue is however of little importance when asking the more immediate questions about how institutional changes may affect the possibilities to arrive at a cooperative outcome.

Irrespective of the diverging basic assumptions about how states’ interests and strategies are formed, and what more precisely these interests and strategies consist of, most institutionalist scholars would agree on the existence of at least four institutional mechanisms that may affect the way states behave.⁶⁵ First, institutions may change the availability of *information* to the participants.⁶⁶ Secondly, institutions may also affect the opportunities for *communication* between the participants.⁶⁷ Thirdly, opportunities for *bargaining and negotiation* between the members are also increased by the setting up of institu-

⁶³ For a recent contribution, see Holsti 2004.

⁶⁴ Keohane & Martin 1995, p. 50; Martin & Simmons 1998, p. 746.

⁶⁵ Although not everyone would use the term “mechanism” to describe this aspect of institutions.

⁶⁶ Keohane 1989, p. 2.

⁶⁷ Jönsson 1990, pp. 1–5.

tions.⁶⁸ Fourthly, institutions may also change the opportunities to *monitor* and secure others' honouring of the agreements.⁶⁹

Therefore, any type of institutional change which would generate a change in any of these four mechanisms, could be assumed also to change the interaction between the participants and thereby also the probability of a cooperative outcome. But why? The main-stream rational choice institutionalism would say that all the above mechanisms can reduce both transaction *costs* and *uncertainty*, and thereby change the *incentives* facing states in their choice about whether to cooperate or not.⁷⁰ In other words, state interests are perceived to be formed exogenously to the cooperation, but the "rules of the game", and thereby state strategies, can be altered by the creation of institutions.⁷¹ Thereby, the value added from institutions is that they help states realise mutual interests by facilitating cooperation. That answer is however not so different from those proposed by scholars who for instance advocate a focus on communication and learning. As Christer Jönsson has argued, it is not necessary to view rationalist and cognitive schools as mutually exclusive,⁷² and as Miles Kahler more recently has pointed out, "rationalist accounts can and do incorporate social content."⁷³

For instance, Barry Weingast has argued that ideas that have become institutionalised may serve as *shared belief systems*. Thereby, the *ideas* expressed in institutional rules may well provide guidance, particularly in uncertain situations when states face an unfamiliar choice situation.⁷⁴ In this capacity, as two other rationalist scholars have pointed out, institutions can "effectively increase path depend-

⁶⁸ Keohane 1989, p. 2.

⁶⁹ Chayes & Chayes 1993; Tallberg 1999, pp. 60ff.

⁷⁰ See for instance Keohane 1989, pp. 166ff.; Wallander 1992, pp. 50ff.; Martin & Simmons 1998, pp. 744ff.; and Koremenos et al. 2001, pp. 765f.

⁷¹ Snidal 1986, p. 40.

⁷² Jönsson 1993, p. 203.

⁷³ Kahler 1998, p. 923.

⁷⁴ Weingast 1995, pp. 460f.

ence.”⁷⁵ The basic idea behind this claim is that the choices made when setting up an institution will subsequently influence future choices by constraining the courses of action.⁷⁶ Similar reasoning has also been proposed by Geoffrey Garret and Barry Weingast, when developing Thomas Schelling’s conception of ideas as *focal points*.⁷⁷ Once ideas become institutionalised in the form of rules, they may serve as road maps or even become internalised in the form of causal beliefs (about means-end relationships) and thereby affect state behaviour.⁷⁸ Furthermore, the interactions generated by institutions may also serve to change the participants’ understanding of the cooperative arrangement, and thereby change their calculations about the desirability or value of the institution.⁷⁹

There are also analysts who propose that we may take this reasoning one step further. The emergence of new causal beliefs may even alter the very formulation of states’ interests, or at least actors’ understanding of their interests.⁸⁰ Therefore, as Robert Keohane has argued, “international institutions have constitutive as well as regulative aspects: they help define how interests are defined and how actions are interpreted.”⁸¹ Because states do not constantly reassess their basic interests and preferences, the new habits acquired may furthermore last for quite some time even if underlying changes in power or interests take place.⁸² International institutions may thus, according to these analysts, at some point begin to constitute part of states’ interests rather than providing only a means to problem solving in order to meet other interests.

⁷⁵ Martin & Simmons 1998, p. 746. Thereby, one of the similarities between many rationalist and more historically oriented institutionalist scholars is also highlighted.

⁷⁶ Peters, B. G. 1999, p. 63.

⁷⁷ Garret & Weingast 1993, p. 176; and Schelling 1960/80, pp. 110f.

⁷⁸ Goldstein & Keohane 1993, p. 3 and 12; cf. Peters, I. 1999, pp. 196f.; and Martin & Simmons 1998, p. 747.

⁷⁹ Aggarwal 1998, p. 24; Jupille & Caporaso 1999, p. 432.

⁸⁰ Haas 1982, p. 241; Keohane & Hoffmann 1990, p. 297; Goldstein & Keohane 1993, p. 16; Keohane & Nye 1993, p. 4; Peters, I. 1999, p. 197.

⁸¹ Keohane 1989, p. 6.

⁸² Krasner 1982b, p. 502.

In other words, we should assume that changes in institutions, at a minimum, may change the interaction between the participants, quite likely also the preferred strategies, and at a maximum even the very interests of the participants. In all three cases, changes in institutions may be assumed to affect the levels or intensity of the cooperative outcomes. In chapter four, various types of institutional changes that have been undertaken between 1970 and 1999 will therefore be identified, and contrasted against the successive development of the EPC/CFSP. The institutional changes are detected and identified by use of the official documents and treaties regulating the cooperation, although in some instances this material has been supplemented by a few secondary sources.

Changing threats as a driving force?

Those who doubt whether institutions have any significant effects on state behaviour would rather suggest another place to look for the sources of changing cooperation patterns. Even those who do believe that institutions matter would actually agree. There may be external events that affect the cooperation irrespective of a particular institutional set-up. And, one of the most intuitive places to look for propositions of that type would be among scholars writing within the realist tradition.⁸³

Realists are, quite (in)famously, not optimists about the possibilities for states to cooperate. The well-known assumptions underlying most realist analyses lead to the propositions that states are predisposed toward conflict and competition, and that international institutions have only marginal possibilities to mitigate these effects of anarchy.⁸⁴ Conflict, not cooperation, is something of a default situation in international politics. Nonetheless, states are sometimes

⁸³ As one student of international relations has pointed out, even “writers who are concerned principally with international institutions and rules, or analysts in the Marxist tradition, make use of some Realist premises” (Keohane 1989, p. 35). Cf. Jervis 1999, pp. 44f.

⁸⁴ Grieco 1990, p. 4.

found to cooperate, and mainstream realist frameworks offer two possible ways to account for this rare event.

One proposition, well-known to students of international politics, is that cooperation may be *imposed by one participating and specifically powerful actor*, or, as one analyst puts it, that “the formation of international regimes normally depends on hegemony.”⁸⁵ This is obviously not a possible explanation for the increasingly active cooperation within the CFSP, and this ‘hegemonic stability thesis’ will therefore not be discussed further here. The other proposition, which is more interesting for the purpose of this study, is that states may choose to cooperate as a strategy to *balance one specifically powerful actor*. As one leading proponent of this theory puts it, “overwhelming power repels and leads others to balance against it.”⁸⁶

This way of interpreting the ‘balance of power thesis’ requires a few clarifications before it can be used to generate falsifiable hypotheses.⁸⁷ The concept of balancing is quite simply used here as a synonym for *an attempt to alter the balance between one’s own power relative to someone else’s power*. In this respect, “balancing” is seen as a strategy that may be chosen by one actor alone or collectively by a number of actors. The concept of power is however somewhat more problematic. Provided that this “realist” proposition about cooperation has any explanatory value for the CFSP, what type of power it is that we should expect the EU to balance? Depending on how we define power in this context, we will also arrive at very different expectations about when the EU’s foreign policy cooperation should intensify.

⁸⁵ Keohane 1984, p. 31. See Krasner 1976, pp. 322ff., for an account of how the “hegemonic stability thesis” may account for cooperation in the field of international political economy. See Bull 1971, p. 144, for a similar argument related to cooperation in the security policy field, within for instance NATO. Bull argued that since the US “enjoys a position of leadership or primacy, certain conflicts within this alliance are kept within bounds or prevented from reaching the surface of conscious political activity.”

⁸⁶ Waltz 2000, p. 28.

⁸⁷ For two accounts of the many and various uses of the balance-of-power concept, see Haas 1953 and Sheehan 1996.

We may arguably gain conceptual and analytical clarity by comparing the three overarching ways to conceive of power in international politics which have been proposed by Jeffrey Hart. He argues that power can be thought of in three different ways: as power over resources, power over another actor, or power over events and outcomes.⁸⁸ To ascribe an actor power in accordance with its *power over resources* or *capabilities* is probably one of the most common usages of the concept of power in traditional international relations literature.⁸⁹ For instance, Kenneth Waltz argues that the most powerful states are those that score highest “on all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.”⁹⁰ Within this conception of power, capabilities are thus normally interpreted as material (and sometimes also non-material) assets, although views often differ on which types of resources are the most important ones.⁹¹ More often than not, however, military power is seen as the most important asset.⁹²

To balance such power, then, would primarily involve attempts at increasing one’s own material assets, measured against someone else’s assets. *Cooperation as a balancing strategy* would, consequently, primarily be about collective attempts at increasing certain material assets. Therefore, if it had been this type of power – and this type only – that states were assumed to balance (which is indeed the idea put forward by for instance Waltz), a collective foreign policy would clearly not be the most obvious response. Within this interpretation of the balance-of-power thesis, it would in fact be easier to see for instance the EU’s common commercial policy or even the Lisbon

⁸⁸ Hart 1976.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 289; Goldmann 1979, p. 15; Jönsson 1979, p. 64. Many also make interesting and highly relevant distinctions between resources and capabilities, but in the context of this study such distinctions are not of immediate importance.

⁹⁰ Waltz 1979, p. 131.

⁹¹ For just a small sample of different interpretations, see for instance Morgenthau 1948/1993, ch. 9; Bull 1977/1995, ch. 9; Gilpin 1981; Rosecrance 1986; Nye 1990; Rosecrance 1999; and Mearsheimer 2001.

⁹² For a number of examples, see Rothgeb 1993, pp. 7f.

process as a balancing strategy than the CFSP. The pooling of military resources, which has been discussed over the last few years within the EU, might arguably fit this picture, but was clearly not a part of the EPC/CFSP during the main period under study here. Therefore, this conception of power is not of particular interest to this study.

The second way to conceive of power is probably the most familiar one in other areas of political science than international relations, and requires an explicit relationship between two or more actors. In Robert Dahl's well-known formulation, "*A* has power over *B* to the extent that he can get *B* to do something that *B* would not otherwise do."⁹³ In this conception, actor *A* has *power over* actor *B* in some particular respect, which also requires *power to* bring about the desired act from *B*.⁹⁴ This conception of power is not entirely absent in international relations writings, and is reflected for instance in Samuel Huntington's definition of power in international politics as "the ability of one actor, usually but not always a government, to influence the behavior of others, who may or may not be governments."⁹⁵

Most typical, although with additional specifications, this is also the view of power that is reflected in the so called balance-of-threat thesis. The proponents of this thesis argue that rising or overwhelming material power alone is not enough of a threat to trigger a balancing behaviour. Power capabilities will not trigger a balancing behaviour unless they are also offensive, and unless the unit which possesses them is perceived to be aggressive or expansionist.⁹⁶ In short, the balancing is undertaken in relation not only towards a specific actor, but towards a threatening one at that.

Such balancing is often assumed to be carried out by military means, but Stephen Walt also detects a second possibility – that such

⁹³ Dahl, 1957, pp. 202f.

⁹⁴ Cf. Goldmann 1978, p. 74.

⁹⁵ Huntington 1993b, p. 68.

⁹⁶ Walt 1987, p. 22, 26, 149, 169.

balancing may instead be “conducted by political means.”⁹⁷ Consequently, *cooperation as a balancing strategy* may, in this interpretation, materialise in the form of a military or political alliance directed against a threatening enemy.⁹⁸ In line with this reasoning, we should expect the attempts at balancing to be particularly intense during periods when this foreign power behaves particularly threateningly. Put in a different terminology, a change in the threat may make states reinterpret the ordering of their preferred strategies, so that the choice to cooperate is placed higher up on the list.

In chapter five it is argued that we may well try out this hypothesis by studying the behaviour of the Soviet Union during the Cold War and Russia after the Cold War, and contrast it with the changes in the EPC/CFSP. The material used to determine when the USSR/Russia has behaved more or less “threateningly,” consists almost entirely of secondary sources. In order to increase the certainty with which we may trust the secondary sources, more than one source has generally been used as far as possible when describing the various periods.

Changing desire for global influence as a driving force?

This leaves us with the third conception of power – the *power over events* and outcomes. Jeffrey Hart advocates this view of power as the most fruitful in the analysis of international relations, because “unless the actors regard control over other actors or resources as valuable in themselves, then the ability to control actors and resources will be considered secondary to the ability to control events.”⁹⁹ Here, the power of A is thus not “measured” as A’s capacity to get B to do something B would otherwise not have done, but rather as A’s ability to influence events in its own external environment. There is no specific B in this definition of power. Power in this conception is, as Kjell Goldmann has put it “an actor’s

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 21.

⁹⁹ Hart 1976, p. 297.

ability to get what it wants,” or, as John Rothgeb has very similarly put it, “the actor’s simple ability to control and to obtain what it wants.”¹⁰⁰

This way of conceiving of power is occasionally found in international relations writings. For instance, James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul define a great power as a country “possessing the will and the capability to alter events throughout the international system.”¹⁰¹ In this respect, power may be seen to equal what some have rather termed influence. Karl Deutsch’s argument that power may be thought of as “a symbol of the ability to change the distribution of results” is for instance quite similar to Paul Light’s definition of influence as “the ability to change outcomes from what they would have been.”¹⁰² This conception of power also fits well with Fareed Zakaria’s preferred assumption that states, rather than necessarily striving to maximise power in a materialist sense, are inclined to seek to maximise influence.¹⁰³ A state’s desire for influence may then, to use Kjell Goldmann’s distinctions again, be directed either towards *all the other actors in the system* (that is, A may aspire to influence B, C, D, E and so on), or towards the environment or the *system in itself*.¹⁰⁴ For the purposes of this study, both will be assumed to be part of states’ wishes.

It seems, however, that this view of power has rarely, if ever, been explicitly used by analysts interested in the balance-of-power thesis. The balancing behaviour should, with this conception of power, equal attempts at increasing one’s own ability to influence

¹⁰⁰ Goldmann 1978, p. 72, and Rothgeb 1993, p. 22, respectively.

¹⁰¹ Goldgeier & McFaul 1992, p. 467.

¹⁰² Deutsch 1968, p. 41, and Light 1983/84, p. 620, respectively. Others, however, have suggested a different use of the concept of influence, as a “lighter” version of power, so that the exercise of power is seen as something involving force or the threat thereof, while the exercise of influence only involves non-coercive means (see for instance Wolfers 1962, pp. 103f., and Ito 2001, p. 7439). No such distinction is however intended here.

¹⁰³ Zakaria 1992, p. 194.

¹⁰⁴ Goldmann 1978, p. 78. Cf. Rothgeb 1993, p. 22, who also point out that most of the time “controlling the behavior of other actors goes a very long way toward manipulating the environment.”

international events, in relation to the actor in the system that has the greatest ability to influence such events. This is thus where B comes in. It is not primarily A's ability to influence B that should be seen to constitute the balancing behaviour, but rather A's ability to influence events that B also wants to influence. Consequently, *cooperation as a balancing strategy* should be interpreted as an attempt to increase – in relation to the most influential actor – the collective ability to influence events and outcomes.¹⁰⁵

In chapter six, it is argued that this alternative interpretation of the balance of power thesis leads to the testable proposition that the intensity of the EPC/CFSP should be at its highest when the EU members' desire for influence over events in their outside environments is at its strongest. This desire should be the strongest felt when the most influential actor – interpreted here as the United States – pursues policies that some or all of the cooperating states disagree with. Thus, if the balance-of-influence thesis has any explanatory value, we should expect to observe changes in the EU's collective foreign policy following periods when the preferred European and US strategies, presumably primarily towards events in the rest of the world, have differed considerably. These occasions should serve as impulses toward increased cooperation, by boosting the political will to exert European influence over international events. These periods are identified, in chapter six, by the use of mostly secondary sources. Just as in the previous chapter, more than one source has generally been used as far as possible when describing the various periods.

Correlation, causation, and comparison

Having compared the three hypotheses against the empirical development between 1970 and 1999, we are able to determine whether there has been a correlation between the proposed explanations and

¹⁰⁵ This possible logic behind cooperation fits nicely with John Ikenberry's (1986, pp. 61f.) observation that states "are most likely to seek international regime arrangements when they cannot control their environments effectively."

the changes in the EPC/CFSP. If the same type of event occurs a number of times – in this case several distinct periods of increasing foreign policy cooperation between the EU members – and if the same account of why it happened seems to apply to every single occasion, we may even begin to feel more certain that a reliable explanation has been found. Before such a conclusion can be drawn there are, however, a few questions which must be carefully considered.

Even if we find that “when A occurs, then B will follow” in a thousand carefully studied cases, and even if we have never been able to identify a single case when B did not follow A, how do we know that “A causes B” to happen? Maybe there is a third, but unidentified, C that always causes both A and B to happen? Or, maybe A causes C, and C in turn causes B?

The answer is of course that we do not know. Correlation certainly does not mean causation, and in social sciences we can rarely ever know for sure whether two events merely coincide or if one actually caused the other. But, to the extent that a plausible *relationship* between two variables can be established, we at least have grounds for discussing whether one may have caused the other. We may begin to assume causality when (1) we can establish that one event tends to *precede* the other (i.e. the time dimension and the sequence of events must be present in the analysis), (2) when we have ruled out alternative causes, and (3) when we can present a plausible idea as to why one variable would cause the other.¹⁰⁶

In other words, talking about causality in social sciences is to a large extent to talk about probability in relation to other competing explanations. As one international relations scholar has put it, “[w]hen we say that an event was caused by another, we don’t mean that we can observe such causality, but that we can establish the likelihood of one over the other.”¹⁰⁷ The aim of the competitive theory testing undertaken in this study is precisely that: to establish which one is the most likely explanation. The method chosen here is

¹⁰⁶ See for instance Shively 1990, ch. 6; and Yin 1984, p. 113.

¹⁰⁷ Matlary 1997, p. 205.

thus not to engage in any formal hypothesis-testing by using very strict falsifying criteria, but rather to search for probabilities in a qualitative sense of the word.

The certainty of the findings is increased by the choice to describe the dependent variable as series of successive changes. By identifying periods during which the CFSP is changing in one or the other respect, and subsequently contrasting three different explanations, this study provides us, in a sense, with more than one case. If a case study at all, such an approach is rather something of a “developmental case study” and should rather be perceived as comparative in nature.¹⁰⁸ Temporal comparisons, of several cases of changes in the CFSP, will provide a more rigorous ground for the conclusions that will be drawn in the end.¹⁰⁹

Corroborating the main findings

Having studied the development of the EPC/CFSP between 1970 and 1999, and compared the three different explanations, we may thus draw a number of conclusions about what types of events tend to precede changes in the EU’s collective foreign policy. Having spelled out these conclusions in chapter seven, we also end up with a proposition about when new developments in the CFSP should be expected.

One such new period did occur during the course of this study, and thus provided something of a first test case of the findings. Therefore, having drawn conclusions from the long-term study over a thirty year period, a closer and more detailed exploration of the events between November 2002 and September 2003 serves as an end to this study. For analytical purposes, this final period is treated somewhat differently from the previous periods. In order to illustrate not only the possible correlation between the explanatory factors and the CFSP, but also provide something of a peek into the “black box”, the focus in chapter eight is placed on a detailed account of a number

¹⁰⁸ Bartolini 1993, pp. 140f.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Pollack 1997.

of ongoing political processes at the time. That way we may verify – perhaps as far as can possibly be done – how the processes work or are set in motion when the CFSP is taking new steps forward.

As this study does not include a description of the changes in the CFSP from the year 2000 onwards, any possible changes in the CFSP during this last period cannot be detected by a comparison to the previous years. Instead, a more qualitative judgement is made about what the possible changes were, although in many ways these assessments are generally inspired by the indicators from the previous parts of the study.

How far can the conclusions travel?

A final methodological issue, which is only implicitly raised by this study, relates to how far the theoretical findings can travel to foreign policy cooperation between other groupings of states. The generalisations from this study relate exclusively to the case of the EU's collective foreign policy, but this does not mean that the findings need to be irrelevant to other groups of states that aspire to the same type of cooperation. At a minimum, this study provides ground for future comparative (cross-case) studies involving other similar cooperative arrangements. Finding such similar cases, however, is not an obvious task, as continuous foreign policy cooperation between a group of states is a rare empirical phenomenon.¹¹⁰

The exclusive focus in this study on the changes in cooperation *after* an initial agreement to cooperate has been reached, means that several possible fundamental enabling factors, without which there might have been no such decision in the first place, are not discussed in this study. In the case of the EU, these may well be related to widely different factors, most of which can only be speculated on here. One such enabling factor is most certainly an already high degree of economic integration, and thereby also an unusually high

¹¹⁰ Possibly, the foreign policy cooperation between the CARICOM (Caribbean Community) member states could be seen as another case, and maybe also the foreign policy cooperation within the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council).

degree of both communication, interdependence and supranational institutions between the participants.¹¹¹ Another such factor is possibly a strong belief in the inferiority of the alternatives to cooperation, such as a conviction that unless cooperation can be secured there may well be a return to the opposite extreme – serious conflict and war. A third possible factor is probably a high degree of legitimacy for the cooperative venture, for instance in the form of a general belief in the desirability to affect the outside environment. It is highly possible that without these and other basic conditions, the idea of foreign policy cooperation would never have surfaced in the first place. It is also possible that without some of these EU-specific enabling conditions, the cooperation would not have continued to develop once in place. This is something that needs to be carefully considered if attempting to predict the development for other groups of states by using the findings from this study.

However, these specifics of the EU do not rule out the possibilities for future comparisons. On the contrary, it is not until comparisons with other groups of states have been made that we can say with certainty whether any of those enabling factors actually were important for the subsequent development, or if the factors analysed in this study suffice to explain the development in other cases too. Allowing for both types of factors to vary across cases, would give us valuable opportunities to analyse the importance of exactly these aspects.¹¹² Not until then will we reach some degree of certainty about the possible “uniqueness” and the particulars of the EU’s collective foreign policy.

Even if one believes that there is a current scarcity (or even complete lack) of comparable phenomena, this situation might very well change in the future. As ASEAN, Mercosur and other groups of states increasingly start to act collectively in regard to problems outside their own geographical boundaries, comparisons will seem

¹¹¹ Although the possibility that the EPC would have developed even without the European Community’s common market has been entertained by for instance Charles Pentland (quoted in Ifestos 1987, pp. 25f.).

¹¹² Cf. discussion in Tallberg 1999, p. 271.

more obvious and possibly even more rewarding than today's analyses. Many contemporary analysts do see a clear trend in the proliferation of regional arrangements and international institutions.¹¹³ Therefore, it is plausible to assume that studies on the European Union, including studies of the EU's common foreign and security policy, can indeed generate important lessons and results for students of other forms or places of international cooperation and integration. As one student of the EU has noted, "the EU provides the best laboratory for studying theoretical issues only just emerging elsewhere."¹¹⁴

¹¹³ See for instance Mansfield & Milner 1997.

¹¹⁴ Moravcsik 1997, p. 4.

CHAPTER THREE

Thirty Years of Collective Foreign Policy

THE EUROPEAN UNION IS CONTINUOUSLY carrying out a multitude of activities related to issues of international peace and security. In this chapter, a picture of the evolution of these activities will be drawn up. In order to portray these changes, the statements and declarations issued continuously by the EU since the birth of EPC in 1970, as well as the common positions and joint actions decided upon within the second pillar framework since the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in November 1993, have been used as an indicator.¹ The last year covered in this chapter is 1999, which allows for a systematic study of the changes during a period of thirty years. In the process of describing the development of the EPC/CFSP, a few existing misconceptions about these trends can also be identified and addressed.

The statements have been categorised along four dimensions, to indicate changes in frequency, breadth (both geographic and thematic) and depth (types of activities undertaken) of the EPC/CFSP over time. Changes in *frequency* have been measured on an annual basis in terms of the *number of times the EU officially decides to address foreign policy topics* by issuing a statement/declaration or deciding on a common position or joint action. Changes in the

¹ For the sake of simplicity, these types of documents will generally (unless referring to a specific document) be called statements in the following when referring to the totality of the material.

breadth of foreign policy activities have been measured in terms of *contents of the declarations*, categorised along both geographical and thematic lines, to account for changes in the geographical reach and the array of thematic issues addressed. Changes in *depth* are perhaps the most difficult to pinpoint. They are related to the means whereby the EU pursues its collective foreign policy, and have therefore been pictured by the successive introduction and increasing use of *various EU foreign policy instruments*.

The changes within these four dimensions are interesting both in their own right and in relation to each other. They are, therefore, in the end not collapsed into one single measure of “changing CFSP,” but rather kept separately in order to hold the dependent variable as open as possible for the subsequent analysis.


CHANGES IN FREQUENCY

Looking, first of all, at the overall picture of EU foreign policy activities since the birth of EPC in 1970, we find a picture of some dramatic changes in terms of frequency (see figure 1). However, it was not until 1979 that any remarkable changes took place. Having issued not more than eight statements annually on world affairs between 1970 and 1978, the number rose to fifteen in 1979 and had more than doubled again by 1982 when a total of thirty-one statements were issued. Thus, the period between 1979 and 1982 (and those two years) was the first period in which some substantial changes occurred in frequency.

After a drop in the number of statements the following year, there was a second period of marked increase during 1984 and 1985. In 1985, the EC members issued forty-nine statements, averaging almost one statement a week. Having remained on a relatively similar level in the two following years, the number of statements again almost doubled between 1987 and 1989. This period thereby constitutes a third period of change, one in which the number of statements rose to almost hundred a year. Staying at a similar level in

1990, another increase came in 1991, during which the Twelve issued 142 statements.²

Figure 1. Number of EPC/CFSP statements issued 1970–1999



The year 1991 was thereby a fourth period in which a marked increase took place. After a drop in 1992, the following three years showed a slow “recovery” up to the 1991 level, and not until 1998 did any new significant changes take place. The year 1998 alone saw an increase of statements to a level almost touching two hundred,³ thereby constituting a fifth period of changes in frequency.⁴

² Compared to only four years earlier, this constitutes an increase of over two hundred percent.

³ The number of statements in 1998 actually exceeded two hundred, but with the statements excluded from these data (those that only state that a number of another associated states support a previous statement, position or action taken) the total was 192.

⁴ One could of course suspect, as Michael E. Smith (2004, p. 53) has pointed out, that this measure of changing EPC/CFSP is at least in part merely a function of an increase in events to comment in general, and thereby possibly a very weak indicator of a change in the volume of foreign policy cooperation. While this factor cannot be

CHANGES IN BREADTH

The changes in frequency, however, tell only a very partial story. Many have pointed out that it seems that even if the EU has become more active in the foreign policy area over time, the (new) activities are mainly related to an increasing tendency to issue declaratory statements in relation to some specific, and often nearby, areas.⁵ For instance, Schneider and Seybold point to the possibility that the increase in statements in the beginning of the 1990s might to a large extent be explained by considerably more statements issued in relation to former Yugoslavia.⁶ This assumption fits well into the long-held view among CFSP-analysts that the CFSP is mainly reactive and responds to crises rather than continuously focusing on preventing them in the first place.⁷

Taken together, these commonly held views have led two other analysts to comment that the “CFSP is likely to remain limited to some non-vital sectors of co-operation or ‘low intensity’ crisis management in nearby regions.”⁸ These views can, however, at least partly be questioned by looking at the successively broadening scope of the EPC/CFSP.

An expanding geographical reach?

A closer look at the number of states the EU addresses every year, and their geographical reach, shows that the view that the CFSP is mainly focused on nearby regions is not necessarily accurate. The

altogether ruled out, a brief comparison with one indicator, although admittedly not an ideal one, of security policy related events throughout this period suggests that this is not the primary explanation. By comparing the changes in the number of EPC/CFSP statements with the changes in the number of ongoing conflicts around the world, we may rule out any strong correlation between the two. For instance, in Gleditsch et al. (2001, appendix III) three periods of an increase in the number of ongoing conflicts can be distinguished. They only very partly “match” the five periods of an increase in the number of EPC/CFSP statements identified above.

⁵ See for instance Ifestos 1987, p. 585; and Spence & Spence 1998, p. 51.

⁶ Schneider & Seybold 1997, p. 381.


⁷ See for instance Allen 1978, p. 139; and Whitman 1998b, p. 3.

⁸ Gourlay & Remacle 1998, p. 90.

geographical reach of EPC/CFSP has gradually extended, and one way of picturing these changes is simply to look at the number of different states addressed each year.

As shown in figure 2, the overall increases in the number of states addressed in the EPC/CFSP statements from 1970 up to 1999 are quite dramatic.⁹ These increases furthermore follow to a large extent the pattern of the number of statements.

Figure 2. Number of statements and number of states directly addressed 1970-1999




This suggests that the increases in the number of statements are not primarily due to more statements aimed at a few states, but rather signals an expanding geographic reach of the CFSP. However, whereas the total number of statements coincides quite closely with the number of states addressed up until 1978, the former clearly exceeds the latter from 1979 onwards (with the exception of 1983).

⁹ Omitted here are all statements that either do not refer to any state at all, or those that refer to a more general geographic region, such as the Arab world or Central America, without any explicit references to one or more name-given states.

This is partially due to the increasing tendency to address certain states repeatedly during specific crises (such as former Yugoslavia) but also partially due to an increasing tendency to address either groups of states involved in other regional arrangements (OAU, ASEAN etc) or general topics not explicitly aiming at one specific state (terrorism, disarmament, the United Nations etc).

In relation to this measure, we may also pin-point the periods during which there are larger numbers of new states *addressed for the first time ever* in a statement.¹⁰ In figure 3, the number of new states addressed every year (that is, states that had never been mentioned in a statement up until that particular year) is presented.

Figure 3. New states addressed in EPC/CFSP statements annually



When combining these two measures, 1979 again stands out as the first noteworthy period. The geographical focus up until then had been limited to (European) East-West relations, Cyprus, the Middle

¹⁰ This measure does not necessarily correspond perfectly with the first time these states were ever discussed or even interacted with by the EPC framework. Policies may obviously have been carried out without actually showing in a statement. This measure does, however, give an overall and general picture of when in time the geographical reach of the EPC seems to have expanded.

East (and Arab world), and Southern Africa. Having, in 1978, addressed only three states (Israel, Namibia and the Soviet Union), the Nine for the first time issued declarations on, among others, China, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Nicaragua in 1979. The geographical focus thereby expanded to include both Asia and Latin America.

A second period of increases came in 1981, when the number of states addressed doubled, from six to twelve, and Spain, Poland, Chad and Libya received official EPC attention in statements for the first time. In terms of the numbers of states addressed, the period between 1984 and 1986 also showed some increases, but these were not primarily related to any substantial number of new states. Some notable “newcomers,” though, were located both in Latin America (Bolivia, El Salvador and Costa Rica), Africa (Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau), and in Asia (Philippines, Sri Lanka and – although not a state proper – Hong Kong).

Another step came in 1988, when the number of different states addressed, as well as the number of new states addressed, both increased substantially. In terms of new states, the increases had already begun in 1987, a year in which the total number of states addressed decreased from the previous year. As a measure of geographical expansion for EPC attention, however, both these years may well be considered a period of change. Again, both Asia (India, North Korea, South Korea, Burma), Africa (among others Ethiopia, Somalia, Algeria and Morocco), and Latin America (Paraguay, Panama, Guatemala, Honduras and Haiti) were represented.

The next period of significant changes started in 1990 and continued until 1993. During this period, the number of states addressed more than doubled, from twenty-eight different states in 1989 to sixty different states in 1993. The number of new states addressed also increased quite dramatically, peaking in 1992 when seventeen new states received attention in EPC statements for the first time. About half of these seventeen were newly independent states in Central and Eastern Europe, such as Moldova, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and the four former Yugoslav republics Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. However, the increase was not

only a result of a proliferation of new states; other new states in 1992 included (among others) Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela and Cuba. The increases in 1993 are even less to be explained by the emergence of new independent states seeing that only four (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Kazakhstan) out of thirteen new "addressees" fall into this category.


Whereas the following year, 1994, contains no significant changes, the period between 1995 and 1997 again showed some advance. In both 1995 and 1996 the number of new states addressed was still high (ten and eight respectively), and whereas the number of states addressed remained a little below the 1993 level in those two years, a further increase came in 1997. By this time, the EU annually addressed just under seventy different states, a level that stayed the same in the following two years. The fact that the number of new states decreased over the last few years of this study is however quite natural. By 1999, the EPC/CFSP statements had, over the years, addressed some 140 states, covering all continents. Considering that the Union itself consisted of fifteen member states, this left only some thirty to forty states in the world that the EU had never specifically mentioned in the EPC/CFSP statements. Simply put, there were not that many more new states to add.

A third, although more difficult, measure of geographical reach can also provide some additional information in terms of attention paid by the EU towards different geographical regions. The statements have been categorised into the following regions: the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs); the Soviet Union and later Russia and the other former Soviet republics; the Middle East and the Arab world; Africa; Asia; North America; Latin America; and "other."

As pictured in figure 4, the geographical attention has both changed and expanded over the years. The diagram shows some surprising and some not so surprising trends. First, and somewhat contrary to many scholarly CFSP accounts of recent years, the increased focus on Central and Eastern Europe, which clearly took off in 1989 has not (in terms of statements) meant less attention for

other regions. Since 1989, Africa has been the continent attracting the largest number of statements, and it was not until 1995 that the CEECs ended up in a seemingly unthreatened second place.¹¹ One of the more interesting findings is that Asia is the region in third place, and has been since 1997.

Figure 4. Geographical regions in EPC/CFSP statements¹²



Less surprising, at least to any CFSP analyst, are the absences. Whereas the transatlantic trade relations are in general quite intense, and whereas the EU and the US often and regularly hold high-level meetings, North America has not been the addressee of many EPC/CFSP statements. This is also the case for Australia and New

¹¹ If the CEEC category and the former Soviet republics category were to be combined, this geographical region would, during certain years, have attracted more statements in total than Africa.

¹² In this figure, some of the statements excluded in figures 2 and 3 (those that refer to a region rather than an individual state) are included again. For the sake of a clearer overview, however, the statements aimed at no specific region and those few aimed at other regions are not presented in figure 4.

Zealand, as well as Norway, Iceland and Switzerland, none of which had ever been the addressee of a statement during the period of this study.

Therefore, although it was clearly an increased focus on the CEECs that accounted for parts of the increasing number of statements during the 1990s, the geographical reach has nonetheless increased over time. And, the claim that the EU is almost exclusively focusing its attention on nearby regions is in fact wrong.¹³

An expanding thematic coverage?

The changes in thematic coverage are not easily displayed in graphic form, and any specific steps in time are furthermore not as obvious as in the frequency and the geographical dimensions. Contrary to the geographical dimension, the data also heavily depend on the way in which the categorisation into different types of themes has been specified. This dimension of expanding CFSP-output therefore calls for more caution in interpretation than the others. Furthermore, most foreign policy issues are of course complicated and interrelated, and are therefore difficult to separate into narrow categories.

Nonetheless, an attempt is made here to discern a few different areas that at least to some extent can be distinguished from each other. The statements have been categorised into the following themes:

- Armed conflicts
- Democracy, human rights, the rule of law
- Press freedom, media situation
- UN, CSCE/OSCE, other international organisations
- Terrorism
- Disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation
- Refugees

¹³ Supposedly, this claim (about the exclusive EU focus on its nearby eastern region) builds on the fact that the Central and Eastern European states, including the Balkans, received most economic aid from the EU compared to any other region (Cooper, 2004). This, of course, is another possible way of “measuring” attention than the one chosen here.

- Decolonisation
- Hostage taking, prisoners of war
- Cold war, East-West relations
- Self-determination, state formation, secession
- Transatlantic relations
- International criminal activities
- Natural disasters
- Minority issues
- Preventive diplomacy
- Partnership agreements and cooperation agreements
- Not known
- Other

The coding of the statements was done by allowing for the possibility of several issue areas, or categories of issues, to be present in each statement, instead of making an attempt to decide which area was the most important or immediate for the EU in any given case. Some statements have therefore been listed as containing more than one category. A selection of these categories are presented in figure 5.


When looking at the overall distribution of different themes in the statements, two stand out as the by far most common ones. The first theme is the *armed conflict* category; statements that refer either to the outbreak of armed conflicts, ongoing armed conflicts or possible ends to armed conflicts (such as cease-fires, peace talks and peace agreements). The second theme is the *democracy, human rights and rule of law* category; statements referring either to progress or to the lack of progress in these areas.

Apart from the war and peace category, which has prevailed in the statements from the start, it is possible to distinguish a few periods in which at least partly new issues appear. The first period was between 1974 and 1976. During this time *democracy* was first introduced in a statement on restoration of political freedom and the democratisation process in Greece; *refugee issues* were first mentioned in relation to the conflict in Cyprus; the issue of *self-determination, independence and state formation* was mentioned for the first time in

a statement on Angola's imminent independence in 1975; and *terrorism* (including hostage-taking) appeared for the first time in a "declaration on terrorism" in 1976.

The next time a new theme appeared was in 1981, when *disarmament* was addressed for the first time in a statement on the opening of negotiations between the US and the Soviet Union on mutual reduction of intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Another novelty was introduced in 1986, when the EPC statements for the first time included the theme of *international criminal activities*, by addressing the need for strengthened international collaboration regarding the production of, and traffic in, drugs.

Figure 5. (Selected) themes appearing in statements



In 1990 and 1991, another two new themes were added to the *acquis*. One was the mentioning of *natural disasters*, by addressing the 1990 earthquake in Iran, and the second was the explicit mentioning of *minority issues* in a 1991 statement on the situation in Iraq for the Kurds and the Shiites.

From 1989 onwards, the diversity of issues addressed clearly started to increase, as shown by the line representing “other” issues in figure 5. Many of these could, technically speaking, have been categorised as part of other existing categories, but in many ways they differ from previous more general statements and have therefore here been added as separate categories and collapsed into the “other” category.

This category contains various issues such as the EU’s explicit call for *mine-clearing* activities as a part of peace-building processes, addressed for the first time in 1995 in relation to Angola and to the Balkans. During this period, the statements also started to include occasional specific references to *gender equality* (first time in 1996 in a statement on Afghanistan), and references to the importance of *liberal economic policies* and private sector investment (in 1995 in a statement on Ethiopia). Finally, in 1999, the EU also started to comment on other and considerably more detailed issues, such as unfair lengths of *prison sentences*. The first statement of this kind expressed concern about a court case in Malaysia, in which the former Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim was sentenced to six years in prison after what the EU perceived to be doubtful proceedings at the trial (and therefore too long a sentence).

Another notable example of an increasing tendency to “fine-tune” the statements, and address very specific issues, is shown by the increase in CFSP statements from 1996 onwards that directly – and sometimes exclusively – addressed specific parts of the media situation and *freedom of the press* in certain countries.¹⁴ The first statement of this kind came in 1996, expressing grave concern about the “loss of independence of TV station Studio B in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”¹⁵ Another “novelty” during this period, although placed within the human rights category, was a more

¹⁴ The media situation is of course, in a sense, part of the wider *Democracy, human rights and rule of law* category, but the details in statements directed only at specific press or media issues show a marked change from the previous practice of addressing virtually only the way in which elections were carried out.

¹⁵ *European Foreign Policy Bulletin*, doc. 96/056.

focused introduction of statements touching on the abandonment, or at least the establishment of a moratorium, of capital punishment. The EU had for a long time commented on, and condemned, specific executions in many states, but it seems that from 1995 onwards the Union also commented on the use of the death penalty in many states without referring to specific individuals.

Thus, the picture of the evolution of these various themes is one of increasing detail in the types of issues involved, although most themes are part and parcel of a comprehensive approach to security management in the outside environment. The EU clearly has, over the last thirty years, developed from exclusively addressing threats to peace and stability in the form of armed conflicts or the Cold War situation, to routinely address much more detailed and specific security related issues around the world.

CHANGES IN DEPTH

One of the most common assessments of the CFSP, and one which can not be refuted by the above picture, is that “its policies are basically declaratory.”¹⁶ Schneider and Seybold, for instance, hold that the increase in intensity of issued statements is to a large extent only a result of “a growing importance of rhetoric” and conclude that it “seems as if the gradual institutionalisation of political cooperation has contributed to a proliferation of low-key decisions.”¹⁷ Spence and Spence make the same judgement, arguing that despite “enhanced activity, it remains the case that the policy output of CFSP is not fundamentally different from EPC. Political declarations are still the main vehicle.”¹⁸ Jan Zielonka has also expressed the same opinion, claiming that “the relationship between (hyper)activity and output is pretty disappointing” and concludes that the “overall picture seem to be clear: CFSP is in a state of paralysis!”¹⁹

¹⁶ Zielonka 1998b, p. 8.

¹⁷ Schneider & Seybold 1997, p. 381.

¹⁸ Spence & Spence 1998, p. 51.

¹⁹ Zielonka 1998b, pp. 4f.

Looking, however, at how many statements actually contain references to *some sort of collective activities*, in addition to voicing an opinion, reveals that also in terms of the use of various foreign policy instruments there have certainly been some changes over time. By 1999, the EU was almost routinely using most types of instruments normally associated with traditional nation states' foreign policies.

Such EU instruments generally fall into one of two broad categories: *diplomatic* (such as diplomatic sanctions, visa restrictions, or sending peace envoys, fact-finding missions, or election observers) or *economic* (such as trade embargoes and boycotts, quota reductions or increases, raised or lowered tariffs, granting or withholding economic aid).²⁰ Arguably, there are at least two other types of instruments that could, in theory, also have been included: *propaganda* instruments as well as *civilian and military crisis management* instruments.²¹ The former is however of relatively little relevance (so far) when studying the CFSP, and the latter has only been an EU instrument in practice since the year 2003 and therefore falls outside the period covered in this chapter.²²

²⁰ Some tend to use the concept of "CFSP instrument" somewhat differently. It is not uncommon to describe the EU's foreign policy instruments in terms of the various *forms* of decisions used in the second pillar, and therefore to claim that the typical CFSP instruments are for example "common strategies", "joint actions" and "common positions" (see for instance Soetendorp 1999, pp. 77f.). These different mechanisms are however not instruments but different *forms* of decisions about which EU instruments to use in relation to any specific foreign policy issue (Smith, K. 1998, p. 68). Others, like Michael E. Smith (2004, p. 53), make no distinction between the decision-making forms and the actual instruments.


²¹ Cf. Smith, K. 1998, pp. 68–75.

²² Others have suggested other categorisations of foreign policy instruments, where for instance "criticism" has been seen as one specific type of instrument (see Stenelo 1984, pp. 14f. and Jerneck 1990, pp. 135f.), but no such distinctions are made here. Yet another categorisation is provided by Brian White (2001, p. 80), who suggests that *political*, *economic*, and *political and economic* diplomacy constitute the three EPC instruments.

Viewpoints and the active use of instruments

Just as with the number of issued statements in general, there was quite a long period after the birth of the EPC in which no substantial changes in the actions undertaken are visible in the statements (see Figure 6). Between 1970 and 1981, there was never a year in which more than five statements either referred to some action undertaken within EPC or threatened/promised some future action.

Figure 6. References to actions (diplomatic and economic) in statements



In 1982, however, there were thirteen such statements. Two of the international events that year that certainly caught the attention of most states, including “the Ten,” were the imposition of martial law in Poland and Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland Islands. Both these events were met with more than “empty” statements within the EPC, and sanctions were imposed both against Poland/Soviet Union and Argentina. But the activities in 1982 also included other events, such as a high level visit to Turkey to impress “upon the Turkish Government the serious concern of the Ten with regard to human

rights in Turkey.”²³ The EC also took action after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, *inter alia* by distributing emergency aid to refugees and at the same time refusing to sign the second EC-Israeli Financial Protocol and postponing a planned meeting of the Joint EC-Israeli Cooperation Council.²⁴

In 1989 there was a further rise in the number of statements containing actions, but only in comparison to the low levels during the two preceding years. Among other things, the Twelve imposed certain sanctions on China after the Tiananmen Square events, and also imposed sanctions on Iran following the officially pronounced threats against author Salman Rushdie. Another event that made the Twelve act was the situation in Romania, which led the Twelve to state that due to the poor human rights situation, their diplomatic missions were boycotting the Fourteenth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party in November that year and they also suspended negotiations on an economic cooperation agreement. Furthermore, the annulment of the elections in Panama in 1989, and the subsequent failure of the OAS to find a solution, prompted the Twelve, among other things, to suspend all high level contacts with the Noriega regime and promise strengthened relations with the opposition.²⁵ However, up until the beginning of the 1990s it is quite a correct observation that the proliferation of statements was not accompanied by an equal change in “actions”.

Not until 1991 did the volume of statements which contained references to actions, or threats/promises thereof, reach a new *plateau*. Three major events in 1991 which received active EPC attention, were Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the outbreak of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia, and the *coup d’état* in the Soviet Union when President Gorbachev was removed from office. In all these cases some forms of sanctions were introduced. But, the EPC measures also included attempts to use carrots in the form of, for instance, promises of increased aid and more favourable trade agreements. In the case of

²³ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 3–1982, point 1.3.6.

²⁴ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 3–1982, point 1.3.6.

²⁵ *European Foreign Policy Bulletin*, doc. 89/219.

Iraq, the Twelve also managed to contribute to the over-all settlement by being the body proposing the “safe-havens,” later set up by the UN Security Council, for the Kurds in northern Iraq.²⁶ It is also noteworthy that the press statement following the extraordinary European Council meeting on Iraq on April 8, explicitly mentioned contacts with the Western European Union (WEU) for the first time in an EPC statement.²⁷ In relation to Yugoslavia a couple of other, clearly novel (to the EC) types of action, were undertaken. One was the dispatch of the Troika to negotiate a cease-fire on a mandate of the rest of the member states. This constituted the first time the Troika not only *represented* the Twelve, but also *negotiated* on their behalf. Another was the setting up of an unarmed European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), which was the first time the EC deployed “forces” identifiable as its own.²⁸

Other areas where the Twelve took action in 1991 were for instance the Baltic states (recognition), Burma (suspension of non-humanitarian development aid programmes), Haiti (suspension of all economic assistance), Vietnam (initiative for a re-integration programme for refugees), and Cambodia (economic and financial assistance, and resumption of diplomatic relations). On a more general level, one of the questions with which the Twelve struggled at this time was the issue of recognition of new states, and by the end of 1991 they issued common ‘guidelines on the recognition of new states in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union.’²⁹

The next period in which the use of various foreign policy instruments increased quite dramatically was 1994–1996, during which the number of statements referring to active policy measures more than doubled compared to 1993 (whereas the statements containing

²⁶ *European Foreign Policy Bulletin*, doc. 91/096; Nuttall 2000, pp. 145ff.; Keatinge 1997, pp. 279f.

²⁷ *European Foreign Policy Bulletin*, doc. 91/098.

²⁸ *European Foreign Policy Bulletin*, doc. 91/203; Nuttall 2000, pp. 200ff. In a speech in 2001, Commissioner Chris Patten identified this period as “the first time that the European Union tried to do more than simply ‘express its concern’ at events” (Patten 2001).

²⁹ *European Foreign Policy Bulletin*, doc. 91/464

no further action showed no increase over this period). It should be noted though that part of this increase is constituted by repeated common positions and joint actions in which often only minor changes take place. For instance, a few joint actions on the control of exports of dual-use goods only update the list of included goods, and others only extend the time for which a joint action should be undertaken. In total, approximately fifteen percent of the statements containing active policy measures seem to fall within this category during 1994 to 1996.

This does however not mean that there were not other changes taking place at this time. During this period various activities in relation to the Balkans made up part of the increase, as did the EU's efforts in the Great Lakes Region in Africa. A couple of policy measures that "proliferated" during this period were the institutionalisation of appointing special representatives (envoys) with a mandate in relation to particular geographical areas, and the practice of actively supporting other international organisations (either by funding specific activities undertaken by other organisations or by organising those activities).

For instance, the EU funded parts of the Organisation for African Unity's observer missions in Burundi in 1995, and assumed responsibility for co-ordinating the international operation for observing the elections to the Palestinian Council the same year. Election monitoring in general became increasingly common during this period, as the EU sent monitors to for instance Mozambique, Ghana, Zaire, Russia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. During this period, the EU also funded and participated in UN-led mine-clearing operations in Angola and in former Yugoslavia. The Union also participated in, and helped fund, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). The Union furthermore adopted a general policy of not signing new trade agreements with third states unless a conditionality mechanism was included in the agreement, allowing its suspension on human rights grounds.

The last period of increased action came in 1998 and 1999. By 1999, more than half the statements contained references to various actions, either promised/threatened or actually undertaken. Part of this increase is again constituted by renewals and minor changes to existing common positions and joint actions, but in general terms the actions became both more comprehensive (i.e. involving numerous different activities aimed at a specific area or problem) and more diverse (i.e. new types of actions).

One example of the more comprehensive, or inclusive, preventive peace-building measures during this period was the successive initiatives for south-eastern Europe. These initiatives had in fact started in 1996 with the initiation of the so called Royaumont Process for stability and good neighbourly relations in South-East Europe.³⁰ A strong focus was placed on bringing together civil society groups of various ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds, in the following fields: civil society cooperation/NGOs, interethnic dialogue, inter-parliamentary cooperation, education, women's organizations cooperation, media, local government, social and civil dialogue. In 1999, the EU's policies toward the area expanded with the initiation of a stabilisation and association process, and later the same year with the EU initiative for a stability pact for south-eastern Europe.³¹ This initiative included EU financial support and provision of advisors/experts in a number of civil society related projects, such as: a "Women's Dialogue for the promotion of stability, human rights and sustainable peace in south-eastern Europe"; a Network for Democracy, Human Rights and the Protection of Persons belonging to Ethnic and Religious Minorities in south-eastern Europe; a central and south-eastern Europe Municipalities Network; and a peace centre in Vukovar.


Another example of activity during this period was the support and partial financing of the UN led programme 'weapons in exchange for development' in Albania, intended to "convince the

³⁰ The aim of the Royaumont process was to support the implementation of the Dayton peace agreements.

³¹ EU Council Common Position 1999/345/CFSP.

population to voluntarily turn in their private weapons while offering as an incentive the reconstruction of roads, installation of telephone lines and supply of vehicles.”³² A third example was the joint action establishing a European Union Cooperation Programme for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in the Russian Federation.³³ This programme aimed, among other things, at establishing a chemical weapons pilot destruction plant in Russia, and providing experimental studies on plutonium transport, storage and disposition. Furthermore, in Kosovo, the European Union assumed responsibility for economic reconstruction, rehabilitation and development in connection with the setting up of UNMIK (the United Nations Mission in Kosovo).

Figure 7. References to diplomatic vs. economic actions



The Union’s peace-building measures were however not only aimed at Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics, but

³² Council Decision 1999/320/CFSP.

³³ Council Joint Action 1999/878/CFSP.

also toward more distant places. The Union participated in peace talks in Colombia, and supported regional and sub-regional organisations in the Great Lakes region in Africa. In the latter case, this also involved sending experts and focusing particularly on “the areas of exchange of information, weapons collection and demobilization programmes, measures to enhance cooperation among customs, intelligence and other law enforcement agencies.”³⁴ Activities to help fund the combat of the accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons in Mozambique were also undertaken.

Other activities during 1998 and 1999 included the banning of flights to Yugoslavia and Afghanistan (in the latter case flights carried out by aircraft owned, leased or operated by or on behalf of the Taliban were banned), and attempts at delaying both India’s and Pakistan’s eligibility for GSP preferences following the nuclear tests carried out by these states.

On a related note, it may also be added that the references to the use of diplomatic and economic measures³⁵ were quite evenly divided up until 1995, when the references to diplomatic actions continued to increase whereas the references to economic action remained basically at the same level (see figure 7). In sum, the types of actions undertaken by the Union has clearly become increasingly diversified and complex over time. It is therefore no longer tenable to claim that the CFSP is mainly declaratory.

THE RESULTING PICTURE

From the above, it is clear that there has indeed been an evolution in the EPC/CFSP over time. We may, furthermore, distinguish periods when the development seems to have been unusually intense, in terms of frequency and/or in one or several more qualitative ways.

³⁴ *European Foreign Policy Bulletin*, doc. 99/107.

³⁵ For discussions of the EU’s use of diplomatic and economic measures, see for instance Holland 1991b; Bonvicini 1988; and Smith K. 1998.

There is only one year, 1991, in which all four dimensions changed at the same time. If looking at the periods during which at least three of the four categories changed, there are another two periods that are distinguishable. The first was in 1981, when the frequency of issued statements, the geographic spread, and the thematic coverage by the Ten all increased. The second was between 1995 and 1996, when again both the geographic and the thematic coverage increased, this time in combination with a more frequent use of various foreign policy instruments. We thus have a picture of three periods during which the CFSP seems to have changed quite substantially – 1981, 1991, and 1995–1996.

To this can be added the periods in which at least two of the dimensions changed, and we have an additional five periods: (i) 1979, during which both the frequency and the geography dimensions changed; (ii) 1982, during which the frequency of statements and frequency of use of instruments increased; (iii) 1984–1986, during which the geographical expansion continued, and the first two years also the frequency of the statements and the last year the thematic coverage increased; (iv) 1988–1990, during which the first year saw an increase in frequency and geography, the second year an increase in frequency and use of instruments, and the third year an increase in the two measures of widening CFSP; (v) and last, 1998 to 1999, during which first the frequency of statements and the frequency of use of instruments, and then the thematic coverage accounted for the change.

This picture of the evolving EPC/CFSP will, throughout the rest of this study, be contrasted against three competing explanations of *why* we have witnessed this development. A first explanation is tried out in chapter four, where this development will be contrasted against the institutional changes that were undertaken during this time. Has there been, as many institutionalist scholars would argue, an intensification of the EPC or CFSP after the successive alterations in the institutional framework? In chapter five a second explanation, inspired by many realist scholars, is investigated. To what extent can this development of the EPC/CFSP rather be accounted for by

changes in the treats facing the member states? A third explanation is explored in chapter six. Inspired by some alternative, and often unpronounced, realist assumptions, this development is contrasted against externally induced but recurrent realisations among the members that they wish to enhance their global influence over issues related to security policy.

CHAPTER FOUR

Changing the Rules of the Game?

THE CLAIM THAT INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS might enhance the possibilities for states to cooperate is not particularly controversial, although constantly debated among students of international politics. To the extent that we believe that “institutions matter,” the idea that a *change* in the institutional set-up may also enhance the possibilities for cooperation is equally intuitive although it has received less attention by the same students.¹ In this chapter, this latter proposition is outlined and tried out against the evolution of the EPC/CFSP. The overall expectation, as raised by proponents of “institutionalist theory,” is that “if institutions matter, we still should at least be able to observe a general intensification and expansion of EU foreign policy cooperation as its institutional mechanisms expand and stabilize.”²

The general idea is thus quite simple. If you change the rules of the game, the participants’ behaviour will also change. The analytical task, however, is considerably more challenging. The problem emanates at least partly from the difficulty of distinguishing which *types* of institutional changes we should search for. How can institutional content be categorised in a way that allows for comparisons over time or across cases? Part of the analytical task is also to handle the theoretically challenging question of *why* we should expect one or other institutional change to generate more collective activities. Although typologies of institutional change have rarely been sug-

¹ Keohane & Martin 1995, p. 50; Martin & Simmons 1998, p. 746.

² Smith, M.E. 2004, p. 37.

gested, it is nonetheless possible to build on the few notable exceptions found in the literature.

THREE TYPES OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

Among those who have attempted to specify different types of institutional (or regime) contents, certain similarities can be found despite differing terminology. Although with various emphasis and clarity, three dimensions of an institutional arrangement can be found in the literature on international institutions. They will, in the following, be labelled *principles*, *substance*, and *procedures*. Changes in these three institutional dimensions ought to alter state behaviour, and with the help of the mechanisms by which institutions are generally assumed to matter (improving the availability of information, increasing the possibilities for communication, bargaining, and monitoring), we can specify more clearly a few propositions about which changes should matter, and why.

Changing principles

The first dimension, often referred to as either the principles, nature, or direction of a regime, consists of the overarching principles which guide or motivate the formal organisation of an institution, as expressed in agreements, treaties, or conventions.³ The “beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude,”⁴ the collective goals,⁵ or the objects promoted⁶ by the institution may all be considered to belong to this first dimension, which in the following will be referred to as the *principles* of the institution.⁷

³ See for instance Krasner 1982a, p. 186; Keohane 1984, p. 58; Zacher 1987, p. 197; and Young 1989, pp. 24f.

⁴ Krasner 1982a, p. 186.

⁵ Young 1989, pp. 24f.

⁶ Vinod Aggarwal's expression, quoted in Zacher 1987, p. 178.

⁷ See also Haas E. 1991, p. 73, for a similar distinction. Although some students of regimes go as far as to argue that a change in the overarching principles should not be considered a change within an existing regime, but rather a change from one regime to another (see for instance Krasner 1982a, pp. 187f.), this distinction will not be main-

The principles, just as the substantive and procedural rules as described below, imply obligations for the participating states irrespective of the possibilities to ensure compliance.⁸ The obligations implied in the principles, however, are considerably vaguer and less tangible than they are in the substantive and procedural dimension. Therefore, it is difficult to specify exactly what types of change in the guiding principles should generate behavioural change among the participants, but at least three such changes may be envisaged. The principles may change to include more specified views and beliefs about the cause-effect relationships motivating the cooperation; to state additional reasons for the cooperation; or, finally, to express stronger formulations on the need for the cooperation.

In a strict rationalist terminology, any of these changes would be a signal that the participating states had found it in their interest to make such changes. Thus, it could be assumed that even if the substance and procedures are not altered states might, as a result of a change in the principles, be prepared to change their behaviour in order to comply with the new rules. In a more relaxed rationalist terminology, it be assumed that these changes might possibly also change state behaviour for the reason that such changes in principles would make it easier for participants to exert peer pressure on other participants who do not intend to respect the agreements. States could, for fear of being retaliated against at some later stage, or for fear of acquiring a bad reputation, increasingly abide within the rules if the other participants obtain increased verbal possibilities of legitimate complaint about non-compliance.

Furthermore, in an even “deeper” conception of institutional effects, changes in the principles could both be a testimony to already changed beliefs among decision-making elites and generate new such changes. A change in the expressed principles may gradually perme-

tained here. It is simply too problematic to define how far-reaching a change in the overarching principles needs to be in order to be considered serious enough to have altered the motivation behind the cooperation (cf. Simmons & Martin 2002, p. 194).

⁸ Keohane 1984, p. 59.

ate into the language and beliefs of national administrations and thereby gradually change the very conceptions of state interests and thus also state behaviour. In sum, and irrespective of institutionalist perspective, they all seem to propose that *a change in the stated principles (by making them more specific, adding new principles, or including stronger formulations), should lead to increased collective activities by the participating states.*

Changing substance

Students of international regimes also distinguish a second institutional dimension, often referred to as the *substance* of an institution.⁹ If consulting the works of these scholars, we may define the substance in terms of three different sub-categories.

Both Mark Zacher and Peter Haas include, first of all, the *scope* of the injunctions covered by the regime, that is, how many aspects of an issue-area are covered by the rules.¹⁰ We should thus assume that changes in the scope of the rules, so that the cooperative arrangement includes a wider array of issues, should make possible an increase in policy outcomes. This ought to be the case not only because of the self-evident reason – that policy activities in the new areas could be added to the previous activities – but also because the institution's capacity to facilitate negotiations and bargaining could be augmented by a widened scope. A wider array of potential issues could allow for new combinations of interests and thus new coalitions among the participants.¹¹ Thereby, the possibilities for issue-linkages and package deals should increase, which in turn could either break previous deadlocks or provide for discussions on issues previously assumed to be insoluble on the collective level, and consequently generate greater possibilities for collective decisions.

⁹ See for instance Young 1980, pp. 332ff.

¹⁰ Zacher 1987, p. 177; Haas P. 1993, p. 175.

¹¹ Cf. Axelrod & Keohane 1986, pp. 239ff.

Oran Young, among others, has pointed to a second aspect of institutional substance; the degree of restrictiveness of the rules.¹² Zacher, and also Keohane, have rather used the term *specificity* of the regime to denote this second sub-category.¹³ Changes in the specificity of the rules, towards stronger formulations on the commitments, obligations and appropriate behaviour for the participants, could thus also be assumed to affect the collective outcomes. For the same reasons as those connected with change in the over-arching principles, that is, by possibly improving compliance with the rules, we could assume that more specific rules about the obligations could generate an increased preparedness to cooperate. In addition, a change towards more specific rules could also be assumed to serve as an increase in information for the participants. With more specific rules, states could change their strategies as they may be increasingly ready to trust the other participants. Thereby, they may also be more prepared to accept compromises that do not entail an instantaneous return, and the diffuse reciprocity among the participants may increase.

A third sub-category, also proposed by Zacher among others as part of the substantive dimension of institutions, can be termed the *legal weight*.¹⁴ Haas has instead used the term strength to denote the same category, while Young calls it formalisation.¹⁵ Legro also speaks of a similar category when using the concept of concordance.¹⁶ For all of them, this sub-category refers to the degree to which the rules are expressed in formal agreements, treaties, or conventions as well as the stringency of the demands on states to comply. Propositions about the effects of changes in the arrangements' legal weight are also difficult to spell out. If a change in the legal weight involve greater

¹² Haas P. 1993, p. 175; Young 1989, pp. 23f.

¹³ Zacher 1987, p. 177; Keohane 1989, p. 5; see also Haas P. 1993, p. 175. In a slightly different setting, discussing norm robustness, Jeffrey Legro (1997, p. 34) also settles for *specificity* as one category, referring to how well the rules are defined. He also adds the aspect of how well the rules are understood.

¹⁴ Zacher 1987, p. 177.

¹⁵ Haas P. 1993, p. 175; Young 1989, pp. 23f.

¹⁶ Legro 1997, p. 35.

formal possibilities to sanction defectors, so that defection becomes financially more costly, this may naturally affect compliance. If, on the other hand, as in most international cooperation, a supranational enforcement capacity is not set up, the effects of other changes in legal weight are difficult to predict. As Oran Young has pointed out, no automatic correlation between changes in legal weight and changes in the collective outcome should be assumed.¹⁷ However, irrespective of the possibilities to sanction defectors, the stronger the legal framework is, the greater the possibilities for participants to make references to the agreement when someone is perceived to break the rules. Therefore, a change towards a stronger legal arrangement could make states comply to a higher degree for fear of damage to their reputation and lost future possibilities for beneficial trade-offs.

Students of regimes and institutions have also suggested several other aspects which may possibly belong to the substantial dimension, but for the most part they refer to changes in state behaviour and acceptance of the rules, rather than the rules per se.¹⁸ By including behavioural and cognitive changes in the definition of an institution we preclude, however, the possibility to analyse whether institutions do indeed have these effects on the participating states. Therefore, such aspects will be omitted here. In sum, we therefore arrive at the proposition that *a change in the substance of an institution (by widening the scope of the rules, increasing the specificity of the rules, or strengthening the legal weight of the rules) should lead to increased or intensified collective activities.*

Changing procedures

The third, *procedural*, dimension refers in the words of Oran Young to the recognised arrangements for resolving situations requiring

¹⁷ Young 1989, p. 24.

¹⁸ For instance, Zacher (1987, p. 177) mentions the extent of states' compliance with the rules, and Keohane (1989, p. 4) mentions the degree to which expectations are shared by the participants.

collective choices.¹⁹ This dimension includes the secondary rules, or the “rules about the rules” of the institution.

The most obvious sub-category is the *decision-making procedures*, including agenda-setting power and the extent to which individual states or small groups of states can block the decisions.²⁰ Changes in the decision-making procedures, towards fewer possibilities for individual states to block the decisions, ought to affect the dynamics of the collective interest formulation.²¹ The rather self-evident reason is the possibility to override some of the conflicting interests, thereby facilitating a decision. Such changes may also induce participants, notably those whose interests risk being overridden, to reformulate their strategies insofar as they would prefer to have a say in the decision rather than to be completely ignored.²² Thereby, the participants may become more willing to accept compromises, which in turn may also “give rise to new coalitions and previously suppressed expressions of interest, leading to unprecedented policy outcomes.”²³

A second sub-category is rather related to the autonomy, or *centralisation*, of the institution, and refers to the degree of delegation of planning, preparation and decision-making to bodies that are part of the international institution.²⁴ Also a change in the degree of centralisation and responsibilities of the institutional bodies may be assumed to influence the collective outcomes. For instance, the more autonomy granted to supranational bodies, the more prone they should be to start formulating their own interest. Thereby, these bodies may also increasingly attempt to affect the process with

¹⁹ Young 1980, p. 336.

²⁰ Garrett & Tsebelis 1996, p. 270; Zacher 1987, p. 177; Golub 1999, pp. 743ff.

²¹ See for instance Golub 1999.

²² For an example, see Peterson & Bomberg 1999, p. 54.

²³ Martin & Simmons 1998, pp. 75of. Part of the reason may also be that changes toward for instance qualified majority voting may also be assumed to affect the decision-making speed (see Golub 1999, p. 759).

²⁴ Koremenos et al. 2001, p. 771; cf. Keohane 1989, p. 5, although in Keohane's definition the autonomy refers only to the capacity of the institution to alter its own rules.

manipulative strategies of their own, both in the agenda-setting phase and in the implementation phase.²⁵

This, in turn, may affect the decision-making process in several ways. Increased autonomy in terms of granting a new body the right of initiative may for instance affect the content of the policies. This should be particularly likely if the institutional body is also (at least partly) responsible for the implementation, in which case this body ought to have superior knowledge of possible instruments and thereby of implementation solutions. Expanding the size of the institutional bodies may also affect the collective outcomes. An increase in bureaucratic capacity may for instance result in a higher degree of common collection of information, continuity in the deliberations, as well as facilitating negotiations. It may also lead to an increased capacity for the institutional body to serve as an institutional memory. The possibility to communicate and negotiate continuously at several levels and provide the negotiations with previous insights, which might otherwise have been lost with changing governments in the member states, may thus serve to facilitate decision-making.

Furthermore, and although more often implied than explicitly spelled out by students of international institutions, changes in the *frequency of interactions* should also be an important sub-category of the procedural dimension. Arguably, this category should be suggested both by scholars who focus on the possibilities of institutions to generate increased learning and trust among the participants, as well as the scholars who focus more on strategic choices. More frequent meetings should for instance result in increased information, and thereby better knowledge and understanding about the fellow participants.²⁶ More frequent interactions could also lead to increased opportunities for trade-offs between the participants in the

²⁵ Tallberg 2000, p. 849.

²⁶ Axelrod and Keohane (1986, p. 247) for instance point out that one of the biggest obstacles to cooperation between states is the fact that “[l]eaders of one state live far away from leaders of other states. They are far away not only in space, but also in their cognitive frameworks; their tacit assumptions differ about what is important, what needs to be done, and who bears the responsibility for change.”

negotiations, and may also affect the probability both of actual decisions being taken and of participants complying with the rules. Some institutionalists would supposedly also add that the more interaction, the more chances for socialisation, and in the end the more chances for converging national interests.²⁷ Again, the reasons may either be a reinterpretation of desirable strategies by the participants, or a gradually changing conception about what constitutes their interests in the first place. In either case, however, we end up with the proposition that *a change in the institutional procedures (by reducing the veto power, by increasing centralisation, or by increasing the frequency of interactions) should lead to altered or intensified collective activities.*

The empirical predictions

Contrasting these types of institutional changes against the development of the EU's collective foreign policy should thus reveal at least an indication about the importance of such changes. Judging from the few existing studies of the institutional effects on the EPC/CFSP – of which only one²⁸ covers a long period of time such as the one used in this study – we should expect to find a linkage. In fact, many students of the EU's foreign policy have argued, at one point or another, that changes in one, two or all three of the above dimensions have served to generate increasing amounts or qualitatively improved common activities.

Although not using the same terminology as the one used here, Wolfgang Wessels has for instance proposed that the changes in the institutional principles of the EPC, which were introduced in the Single European Act (SEA) also “created a climate conducive to

²⁷ This ought to be an argument which would particularly suit at least some scholars who label themselves “constructivists.” Not all, however, agree on the basic premises of that argument. Samuel Huntington, for instance, uses this precise category – the frequency of interaction – as one of the phenomena leading rather to a realisation of differences and ultimately maybe even towards a clash of civilisations (Huntington 1993a, p. 25f.).

²⁸ Smith, M.E. 2004.

participating in EPC in a cooperative and supportive manner. This spirit also had the positive effect of encouraging Greece to play a much more constructive role during its second Presidency in 1988 than it had in its first.”²⁹ Elfriede Regelsberger has similarly suggested that the broader motivation behind the inclusion of EPC in the SEA – the promotion of the process towards a European Union – was the only change of real value for the collective foreign policy.³⁰

Focusing rather on the substantive changes, Michael E. Smith has also proposed that the specificity of the rules of the EPC played an important role, as “states became less inclined to opt-out as rules were codified.”³¹ Speculating about the effects of the widening scope of the CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty, notably by linking foreign and defence policy, Roy Ginsburg also argued in the mid-1990s that these changes meant that the CFSP had “the potential to be a major qualitative improvement over its predecessor” with “the capacity to go beyond EPC’s declaratory diplomacy.”³² Such predictions could not be made without an underlying assumption that substantive changes in the institutional set-up would affect the cooperative outcomes.

Writing about procedural changes, Pedro Sanchez da Costa Pereira has highlighted the effects of even small initiatives to centralise parts of the policy-making process, by studying the effects of the EPC Secretariat which was established in the SEA. The Secretariat was “contributing its wealth of experience of political cooperation, to guide procedures along accepted paths, thereby ensuring that ‘traditions’ are respected.”³³ His conclusion, that the effect was a more efficient EPC, is also shared by Michael E. Smith who argues that “the secretariat did engage in some limited conceptual work, such as drafting texts and preparing speeches for the Presidency. [...] and it

²⁹ Wessels 1991, pp. 151f.

³⁰ Regelsberger 1988, p. 29.

³¹ Smith, M. E. 1998, p. 317.

³² Ginsberg 1997, p. 16.

³³ Sanchez da Costa Pereira 1988, p. 94.

became important as an institutional memory for EPC”.³⁴ Similarly, Winn and Lord argue that the function of external representation, which was early on given to the Presidency, also proved to play a dynamic role in the shaping of EPC.³⁵ The same theoretical argument, that centralisation may lead to increased cooperation is also shared by Gianni Bonvicini, who argues that this tendency was also clear as the Commission was given an increased role in the EPC framework. The Commission’s ability to contribute, he claims, “to the achievement of common foreign policy positions was highly significant even from the beginning.”³⁶ Clearly, we have grounds to believe that also procedural changes should have an effect on the EPC/CFSP.

These and similar claims about the links between institutional changes and changes in the EPC/CFSP have however never been systematically studied over time.³⁷ In the following, a comparison is made between on the one hand the successive institutional changes and, on the other hand, the possibly ensuing changes in the policy outcomes as we would expect to see them. It will simply be assumed, based on the above propositions and by unashamedly black-boxing parts of the process, that if all, or at least most, occasions of institutional change precede changes in the EU’s collective activities, we can at least for the moment assume that the “institutionalists” are generally quite right. Provided that such a link can be established, we should perhaps even be able to say something about the relative importance of the various propositions outlined above.

³⁴ Smith, M. E. 1998, p. 329. Not all CFSP analysts share this view, however. Dehousse and Weiler (1991, p. 126) argue instead that the Secretariat “has not been put in a position to play a dynamic role of its own.”

³⁵ Winn & Lord 2001, p. 25.

³⁶ Bonvicini 1988, p. 62. Also Michael Smith (1998, p. 84) shares the view that ‘institutional activism’ from the Commission has been an important driving force also for the CFSP at times. The Commission may also have played something of a more *indirect* role by for instance warning incoming EU members of the necessity of accepting to the *acquis politique* (see for instance Lindahl 1995, p. 174).

³⁷ While Michael E. Smith (2004) has carried out a highly interesting, detailed and valuable study asking many similar questions, he chose not to portray the changing EPC/CFSP in a way that allowed for systematic comparisons over time.

This method also raises the question of how much time, following an institutional change, we should allow before concluding that it did not have any particularly visible effects on the policy outcomes. Any answer to that question will obviously be arbitrary, and depend in part on the theoretical expectations, but in general it is assumed here that we should see the changes within a relatively short period in time. As Wolfgang Wessels has argued, a two-year period should perhaps be considered something of a maximum time-lag.³⁸ As a rule of thumb, such a time-frame will also generally guide the conclusions in the following, with the general assumption that we may well expect most institutional changes to generate considerably more immediate results than that.

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE EPC/CFSP

Since the setting up of EPC in 1970, and up until 1999 as the Amsterdam Treaty entered into force, there were at least six occasions when the EPC/CFSP institutions changed. These changes are described below, and subsequently contrasted with the changes in the EPC/CFSP as they were described in chapter three.

The Luxembourg report

Having previously tried, and failed, to initiate formal cooperation in the field of foreign policy, the six EC members' Heads of state or government had in 1969 instructed their foreign ministers to propose a way forward in this area. The resulting report, generally known as the Luxembourg report, was presented in the autumn of 1970 and became the starting point for European Political Cooperation.

The language used in the report to describe the overarching *principles* of EPC was centred around two motivations for the cooperation; the need for political unification among the members, and

³⁸ Wessels 1991, p. 149.

Europe's growing responsibilities in the rest of the world.³⁹ Foreign policy cooperation was thus explicitly proposed as a means towards a more unified Europe. As the report stated, the foreign ministers were "convinced that progress here would be calculated to promote the development of the Communities and give Europeans a keener awareness of their common responsibility."⁴⁰ The second motivation was expressed in terms of an obligation. The report spoke of a Europe "conscious of the responsibilities incumbent on it by reason of its economic development, industrial power and standard of living" and of a Europe that "must prepare itself to discharge the imperative world duties entailed by its greater cohesion and increasing role."⁴¹ As for what these responsibilities and world duties comprised, the report only contained a reference to the belief that a united Europe "is indispensable if a mainspring of development, progress and culture, world equilibrium and peace is to be preserved."⁴²

In terms of the *substantial* dimension, the stated scope was from the outset quite broad. The issues covered by the EPC could be "all major questions of foreign policy" and all members were "free to propose any subjects" they wished to bring up for consultation.⁴³ The only specific foreign policy issue mentioned was the intention of Europe to "step up its endeavours on behalf of the developing countries with a view to setting international relations on a basis of trust."⁴⁴ In terms of the specificity of the provisions and their legal weight, however, the report contained no guidelines whatsoever. The stated objectives were to "ensure greater mutual understanding with

³⁹ Throughout the report, "Europe" seems to be used for the most part as a synonym for "the EC members." Therefore the quotes should supposedly not be taken to denote hopes for a "unified Europe" between East and West, but rather hopes for political unification among the EC member states. When referring also to Eastern Europe, the report speaks of "the Entire European continent" (point 1.3).

⁴⁰ *The Luxembourg Report*, point 1.10.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, point 1.4 and 1.9.

⁴² *Ibid.*, point 1.3.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, point 2.IV.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, point 1.4.

respect to the major issues of international politics” and to increase the solidarity among the members “by working for a harmonization of views, concertation of attitudes and joint action when it appears feasible and desirable.”⁴⁵ There were no references to how binding these objectives were, and the report in itself, informal as it was, carried no legal weight. The only mention of obligations to the EPC “objectives and machinery” was made with reference to the ongoing first enlargement, with the report stating that the applicants “will have to adhere to them when they join the Communities.”⁴⁶

Similarly, the *procedural* provisions were few and quite vague. It was stated that the foreign ministers were to meet every six months, normally in the state holding the Presidency. If the ministers so wished, they could substitute their meeting for a conference of heads of state or government.⁴⁷ There were no provisions for a formal decision-making procedure, which meant a *de facto* veto-right for all participants. The ministerial meetings were to be prepared by a Political Committee which was to meet at least four times a year, and consist of the heads of the political departments of the member states’ foreign ministries. The Committee was also allowed to set up working groups and ask advice on specific problems from panels of experts if it so wished.⁴⁸ In other words, there was no common institutional body with any degree of autonomy. Furthermore, the links to the supranational Community institutions – the Commission and the Parliament – were almost non-existent. The Commission would be consulted if the activities of the European Community would be affected by the work in EPC, and the Parliament would be allowed to “discuss” EPC questions with the ministers and the Political Committee during informal meetings every six months.⁴⁹

How, then, did this new institutional set-up affect the possibilities for the Six to cooperate and come up with common activities in

⁴⁵ Ibid., point 2.I.

⁴⁶ Ibid., point 4.I.

⁴⁷ Ibid., point 2.II.

⁴⁸ Ibid., point 2.III.

⁴⁹ Ibid., point 2.V and 2.VI.

the foreign policy field? As was seen in chapter three, the amount of activities within EPC was rather limited the first few years, and very few topics were taken up for discussion within the framework of political cooperation. Some were however quite notable, such as the concerted views on the upcoming Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).⁵⁰ In other words, in comparison with the complete absence of activities before EPC was set up, there was obviously some quite immediate effect resulting from the initiation of a formal institutional framework. However, the more interesting question is to what extent subsequent changes in the institutional set-up seem to have affected the EPC activities.

The Copenhagen report

In mid-1973, the foreign ministers produced a second report, “on methods of improving political co-operation,” which became known as the Copenhagen Report. The stated *principles* of the formal cooperation remained the same as in the Luxembourg report, although one aspect was added; the importance of the establishment of a Europe with a “position in the world as a distinct entity,” with a view to positioning the Nine in “international negotiations which are likely to have a decisive influence on the international equilibrium and on the future of the European Community.”⁵¹ In other words, in addition to the two previously stated motives of helping in the European unification process and taking on the responsibility which had followed their economic might, the Nine now also acknowledged their wish to have a collective say in international matters close to their own heart.

In the *substantive* dimension, the scope was still spoken of as “all important foreign policy questions” but this time with one specification. The report stated that “the subjects dealt with must concern European interests whether in Europe itself or elsewhere where the

⁵⁰ See for instance Wallace & Allen 1977, pp. 232f.; and Nuttall 1992, pp. 56f.

⁵¹ *The Copenhagen Report*, part 1.

adoption of a common position is necessary or desirable.”⁵² There was however no mentioning of what these interests were more precisely. On the one hand, this addition could be said to narrow down the more general formulation from the Luxembourg Report. On the other hand, it introduced (at least implicitly) the idea that “Europe” as a collective body may very well have interests in other parts of the world. This however does not in itself mean that the scope of the cooperation increased, and, if anything, the scope was rather marginally narrowed. In terms of specificity of the rules, at least one change took place. In the report, the ministers agreed that on foreign policy questions that were subject to deliberations within the EPC framework, “each State undertakes as a general rule not to take up final positions without prior consultation with its partners within the framework of the political cooperation machinery.”⁵³ The report also stated that member states’ permanent representatives in international organisations should “regularly consider matters together” and “seek common positions in regard to important questions dealt with by those organizations.”⁵⁴ Thus, although still without any legal weight, the report did increase the specific guidelines for expected behaviour.

The *procedural* dimension was also subject to certain changes, at least regarding the frequency and depth of the interactions. Actually, the report noted that several procedural changes had already taken place in practice, and the formal changes in the Copenhagen Report mainly codified these new practices. For instance, instead of the two foreseen meetings the foreign ministers had met four times during 1972, and the four annual meetings envisaged for the Political Committee had in practice extended to nine such meetings.⁵⁵ Thus, the Copenhagen report changed the provisions, prescribing that ministers should meet twice every six months and that the Political Committee should meet “as frequently as the intensification of the

⁵² Ibid., point 2.II.

⁵³ Ibid., point 2.II.

⁵⁴ Ibid., point 2.7.

⁵⁵ Ibid., Annex, point 2.

work requires.”⁵⁶ A “Group of Correspondents” (from the member states’ foreign ministries), already mentioned as a possibility in the Luxembourg Report, was formally established to prepare the work for the Political Committee, and was also “entrusted with the task of following the implementation of political cooperation.”⁵⁷ Furthermore, the report noted that it had proved useful to associate embassies in third countries (and permanent representatives’ offices in major international organisations) in the EPC work. Hopes were expressed that these embassies and representations would start to “put forward in an appropriate form those aspects that they consider of interest for this work” and seek out possibilities for common positions in international organisations.⁵⁸

Another novelty, also changing the nature of the interactions, was the agreement to establish a communications system in order to facilitate contacts between the foreign ministries.⁵⁹ This communications network (*coreu*) was set up later the same year, and enabled enciphered confidential messages to be distributed instantaneously to all EPC capitals.⁶⁰ The fact the *coreu* system allowed for direct communication between the foreign ministries without passing through the embassies was in many ways a dramatic departure from old diplomatic practices.⁶¹ However, provisions for formal EPC decision-making procedures were still absent, and the relations with the Commission were unchanged. Concerning the Parliament, the six-monthly meetings were extended to two occasions every six months, but the Parliament still had no formal role in the EPC.

In sum, the Copenhagen Report widened the guiding principles, slightly increased the specificity of the rules, and increased both the frequency and depth of the interactions. The immediate effects on the collective activities, however, were few. There was a very slight increase in the number of statements issued in 1974 and 1975, but

⁵⁶ Ibid., points 2.1 and 2.2.

⁵⁷ Ibid., point 2.3.

⁵⁸ Ibid., point 2.7.

⁵⁹ Ibid., point 2.9.

⁶⁰ Nuttall 1992, p. 23.

⁶¹ A special thanks to Sir David Ratford for pointing this out.

these years were followed by three years of even fewer statements than in 1973. Compared to 1973, however, there was a temporary change during 1974 in the ratio between statements only declaring viewpoints and statements also referring to actions undertaken, but this ratio was lowered again the following years.

The only visible change in the EPC activities during the period following the Copenhagen report was the themes or issues addressed in the statements. Several new topics were addressed for the first time between 1974 and 1976, such as the importance of democratic development, refugee issues, rights to self-determination, and terrorism. Considering that the scope had not been widened in the Copenhagen report, these changes can at least not be directly linked to that aspect of the institutional change. The creation of the *coreu*-system, through which some four thousand telegrams were issued already during its first year in use,⁶² might rather have been part of the explanation. Civil servants from the member states' governments have testified that the intensified communication may certainly have contributed to identifying common ground. In an interview, one civil servant has argued that:

if everyday you see Coreus coming in from different countries, and 80 per cent of the Coreus with what you would entirely agree with, it is a constant reaffirmation that there is a certain European approach which really does have something in common. It strengthens realisation of what is common between us, and then we can narrow down the areas of difficulty and focus on those. Not necessarily overcome them, but at least we have a better chance to see what is common and what is not.⁶³

It thus seems plausible that even if the Copenhagen Report in itself did little to change the behaviour of the participating states, the creation of the *coreu*-system might have had some impact on the possibility to identify common interests. It might serve at least as a partial explanation for the fact that new topics were addressed during the years following the Copenhagen report.

⁶² Regelsberger 1988, p. 11.

⁶³ Quoted in Ekengren 2002, p. 79.

The London report

In October 1981, in London, a third report on EPC was endorsed by the foreign ministers. The principles, or the motivations of the cooperation, were largely unchanged. The relationship, expressed in the previous reports of EPC being a means toward increased integration was however stated in reverse terms in the London Report. Now, the ministers stated that “further European integration [...] will be beneficial to a more effective coordination in the field of foreign policy.”⁶⁴ However, the report also stated that the development of the EPC had “contributed to the ultimate objective of European union” so this aspect of the principles was not removed from the rhetoric. Otherwise, the motivation was still expressed in terms of hopes of the Ten to play “a role in the world appropriate to their combined influence.”⁶⁵

In terms of substance, the scope of the cooperation was slightly increased. Up until this point, the words “security policy” had been kept strictly off the agenda, due primarily to Danish and Irish objections, but in the London report the tortuous phrase “foreign policy questions bearing on the political aspects of security” was introduced. Thereby, foreign policy bordering on security was formally allowed into the EPC framework, although definitions of either concept were still absent. The specificity of the rules also increased slightly. It was emphasised that the members had a commitment to consult each other not only “on all important questions of foreign policy which are of concern to the Ten as a whole” but also ahead of “important international conferences” covering matters having previously been subject to EPC discussions. Furthermore, the members undertook to give “due prominence” to their common positions “by means of appropriate references in national statements on foreign policy questions.” Two other specifications were also added. It was stated that the aspirations of the Ten were not merely to react to events but also increasingly to shape them, and that the

⁶⁴ *The London Report*, preamble.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

objective was increasingly to carry out joint actions in addition to stating common attitudes.⁶⁶

Among the procedures, a few novelties were also introduced. There was still no mentioning of formal decision-making rules, but the report specified a distinction between “formal meetings” of the foreign ministers and informal “Gymnich-type meetings.”⁶⁷ The latter was however a practice that had started already in 1974.⁶⁸ A specific crisis procedure was also introduced, which opened the possibility for the Political Committee or the foreign ministers to “convene within forty-eight hours at the request of three Member States.”⁶⁹

Another change, related to the degree of centralisation, was the increase in delegation of tasks to the Presidency, and the strengthening of its administrative capacity. Up until this point, the only formal role of the Presidency had been to chair the EPC meetings. Informally, the Presidency had however also been given the possibility to “hold consultations on behalf of the Nine” if the other eight had given their authorisation.⁷⁰ In the London report it was however explicitly made clear that the “Presidency may meet individual representatives of third countries in order to discuss certain matters of particular interest to the country in question” and that in doing so it might be accompanied by the preceding and the incoming presidencies (thereby introducing the so called Troika formula). The Presidency was also given the mandate to respond to requests for contacts with groups of states in “organizations with which the Ten maintain special links.”⁷¹ In order to handle the increasing workload and to improve the continuity of the work, the Presidency was to be assisted by “a small team of officials seconded from preceding and

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid., point 1.

⁶⁸ Nuttall 1992, p. 91.

⁶⁹ *The London Report*, point 13.

⁷⁰ Nuttall 1992, p. 91.

⁷¹ *The London Report*, point 7.

succeeding presidencies,” and was also allowed to delegate certain tasks to the other two Troika members.⁷²

The relations with the Community institutions were also strengthened to a certain degree. The contacts with the Parliament now also included the right of the MEPs to ask questions on political cooperation and “informal meetings between ministers and the leaders of the different political groups.” The ministers also envisaged “the possibility of more frequent reference to resolutions adopted by the Parliament in the deliberations, communiqués and declarations of the Ten.”⁷³ The EC Commission was given an augmented status, and would be “fully associated with political cooperation, at all levels.”⁷⁴ What this meant more precisely was not specified in the report, and the Political Committee was given the task to work out the details. Later in 1981, it was decided that, among other things, the Commission would join the *coreu* telex network, and two years later it was agreed that the Commission would be part of the Troika activities.⁷⁵

In sum, the London Report slightly increased both the scope of the cooperation and the specificity of the rules, and allowed for a relatively more active involvement by the Commission. It also gave the Presidency a wider mandate and reinforced its administrative resources. Again, however, the results in the collective outcome were quite meagre. The number of statements issued in 1982 increased compared to previous years, as did the proportion of statements containing references to activities undertaken by the Ten. However, this increased activity slowed down considerably the following year, when the number of statements issued was again down below the 1979 level and the proportion of statements containing references to activities also decreased considerably. The widened scope, to include also certain security policy issues, seems to have had few immediate

⁷² Ibid., point 10. An informal practice of seconding national officials to help the incoming Presidency with the transition had existed since 1977 (Smith, M. E. 1998, p. 328).

⁷³ *The London Report*, point 11.

⁷⁴ Ibid., point 12.

⁷⁵ Nuttall 1988, pp. 105f.; and Nuttall 1992, p. 24.

effects, although it should be noted that the issue of disarmament received the first official mentioning within the EPC context just a few weeks after the London Report.

Although it might be plausible to assume that the changes in the London Report resulted in certain immediate changes in the behaviour of the participants, the picture looks somewhat different if looking at the policy outcomes also a few years before the London Report. Between 1979 and 1982, the number of statements had risen every year, and thus the changes in the London Report can not explain the changes that took place the years before its creation. It therefore seems more likely that the London report at most reinforced an already ongoing trend that had been set off by other factors than institutional reforms.

Solemn Declaration on European Union

In June 1983, the European Council issued the “Solemn Declaration on European Union.” The initiative had initially been launched by Germany in the hope of making progress in a gradual merging of the European Communities and EPC. Germany had hoped for a Draft European Act in the form of a treaty or similar legal form, but the opposition was strong and the result was thus a “solemn declaration” carrying no legal weight.⁷⁶ It did however contain a few very modest changes in the provisions for political cooperation, although it is doubtful whether the declaration should really be considered an institutional change.⁷⁷

The stated principles for the cooperation remained unchanged, but both the substantive and the procedural dimension were subject to minor changes. The substantive area covered by EPC was now further extended in scope, to include – in addition to foreign policy – not only political but also “economic aspects of security.”⁷⁸ This

⁷⁶ Nuttall 1992, pp. 186ff.

⁷⁷ Most CFSP-analysts seem to omit the solemn declaration when enumerating successive institutional changes in the history of EPC/CFSP.

⁷⁸ *Solemn Declaration on European Union*, point 1.4.2.

formulation was however still very controversial, and Denmark expressed its reservation in a footnote to the report. The specificity of the rules was also somewhat increased, as the declaration included the specific mention of certain desirable objectives for EPC; namely “a common analysis and concerted action to deal with international problems of law and order, serious acts of violence, organized international crime and international lawlessness generally.”⁷⁹ Furthermore, although the formulations can be interpreted as aiming at the situation within and among the member states rather than at the outside world, the declaration also mentioned the members’ determination:

to work together to promote democracy on the basis of the fundamental rights recognized in the constitutions and laws of the Member States, in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and the European Social Charter, notably freedom, equality and social justice.⁸⁰

Thus, as part of formulating what exactly constituted the “European idea,” the importance of democracy had been spelled out also in connection with formulations on the need for political cooperation.

In the procedural dimension, there were still no provisions for formal decision-making procedures. The Solemn declaration did however for the first time contain references to the European Council and its role in issuing guidelines for the political cooperation.⁸¹ This opportunity had existed since the forming of the European Council in 1974, but it had rarely been exploited in practice.⁸² The declaration also emphasised the need for “greater coherence and close coordination between the existing structures of the European Communities and European Political Cooperation at all levels” and the Council of Ministers was given the right to deal with both Commu-

⁷⁹ Ibid., point 1.4.3.

⁸⁰ Ibid., preamble.

⁸¹ Ibid., point 2.1.2.

⁸² Nuttall 1992, p. 14.

nity and EPC matters.⁸³ In practice, however, the Council meetings and the EPC ministerial meetings were not regularly combined until the end of the 1980s.⁸⁴ The role of the Presidency was also covered by the declaration, but rather in the form of plans for future increases in the powers of the chair than in any immediate innovations. The declaration simply promised work towards “strengthening the Presidency’s powers of initiative, of coordination and of representation in relations with third countries.”⁸⁵

While these were very limited changes in the institutional arrangements, the Solemn Declaration was actually followed by two years of quite tangible changes in the EPC activities. Both in 1984 and 1985, there was a considerable rise in the volume of statements issued, and also a rise in the proportion of statements containing references to activities undertaken in the EPC framework. However, the widened scope, now allowing for discussions on economic aspects of security, did not lead to any noticeable changes in security-related issues being taken up for discussion.⁸⁶ What was noticeable following the Solemn Declaration, nonetheless, was the increased tendency to include issues of democracy in the statements. A possible link between the formulation of what constitutes a “European identity” and the contents of the policies could thus be assumed to show in these coinciding events.

Single European Act

In February 1986, the Single European Act (SEA) was signed by the EC member states, and it entered into force in July 1987. It contained, for the first time in a Community legal document, provisions also for EPC, thereby making political cooperation a treaty-based

⁸³ *Solemn Declaration on European Union*, point 2 and 2.2.1. This, too, was however a possibility that had in fact been open to the participants since the Paris Summit in 1974. In January 1980, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the foreign ministers had also for the first time used that possibility (Nuttall 1992, pp. 154f.; 254).

⁸⁴ Nuttall 1992, p. 190.

⁸⁵ *Solemn Declaration on European Union*, point 2.2.3.

⁸⁶ Nuttall 1992, p. 190.

mechanism.⁸⁷ While it was still called political cooperation, rather than a “common foreign policy” which some had suggested, the term “European foreign policy” was introduced into the treaty.⁸⁸ In order to keep EPC still separate from the supranational Community institutions, however, the EPC provisions were stated under a separate title (Title III) to which the Community provisions and procedures did not apply. The stated motivations behind the cooperation were still the same as in the previous reports, and thus the SEA contained no novelties in this respect.

In the substantive dimension however, several changes took place. The scope was slightly increased from the previous formulation of “all important foreign policy matters of interest to the Ten as a whole” to “any foreign policy matters of general interest.”⁸⁹ It was also envisaged that the scope of EPC should be extended in another respect, to include cooperation in third countries. A separate ministerial decision in which more specific guidelines for the cooperation under Title III were issued, stated for instance that the “member states shall examine the possibility of providing help and assistance in third countries to nationals of Member States which have no representation there.”⁹⁰

The specificity of the rules also increased slightly, now including a stated commitment from the participating states to take “full account of the positions of the other partners” and to have the common positions “constitute a point of reference” for their national policies. The signatories also stated their commitment to “endeavour to avoid any action or position which impairs their effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations or within international organizations.”⁹¹

⁸⁷ See for instance Koutrakos 2001, p. 12.

⁸⁸ *Single European Act*, Title III, art 30.21. See also Dehousse & Weiler 1991, p. 126; and Wessels 1991, p. 145.

⁸⁹ *The London Report*, preamble, and the *Single European Act*, Title III, art 30.2, respectively.

⁹⁰ Ministerial Decision (1986), point II.4.

⁹¹ *Single European Act*, Title III, art. 30.2(c) and (d).

The main novelty, as some argue, was perhaps the very fact that the EPC gained legal status by the inclusion in the SEA.⁹² As the first occasion on which EPC was mentioned in a legal document this certainly increased the legal weight of the commitments.⁹³ In the words of two observers, the inclusion of EPC in the SEA represented “a formal ‘legalisation’ of a process which was not hitherto regarded as legally binding.”⁹⁴ It has been argued that in a legal view, on the one hand, these vague commitments entailed “an obligation to act in good faith, which is a recognised concept of international law.”⁹⁵ On the other hand, the SEA still contained no provisions whatsoever for securing compliance with the rules, and, as Simon Nuttall puts it, the fact remained that “the commitment, unusually in a legal document, was to *endeavour*, but not necessarily to *succeed*.”⁹⁶

As for the procedural dimension, it has been argued that the SEA “merely codified existing procedures.”⁹⁷ However, at least two changes, one more noteworthy than the other, took place. The first, and minor one, was related to the decision-making procedures. For the first time the consensus rule, which had been implicit throughout the history of EPC, was explicitly mentioned in the SEA, but only in passing, in the statement that “the High Contracting Parties shall, as far as possible, refrain from impeding the formation of a consensus and the joint action this could produce.”⁹⁸ It is doubtful, however, whether this should be considered a change in the decision-making procedures seeing that it did not formally change the consensus rule.

⁹² Ifestos 1987, p. 358; Dehousse & Weiler 1991, p. 121. The question whether this also made the EPC legally binding was debated at the time. The Irish Supreme Court, even though internally divided on the issue, concluded that the inclusion of EPC in the SEA did indeed make it legally binding and therefore required a constitutional change before Irish ratification of the SEA (Keatinge 1996, p. 212).

⁹³ Koutrakos 2001, p. 14; cf. Wessels 1991, p. 148.

⁹⁴ Dehousse & Weiler 1991, p. 121.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

⁹⁶ Nuttall 1992, p. 253 (emphasis added).

⁹⁷ Pijpers 1991, p. 30.

⁹⁸ *Single European Act*, Title III, art. 30.3(c).

Related rather to the centralisation of the cooperation, an EPC Secretariat was established in Brussels, in order to “assist the Presidency in preparing and implementing the activities of European Political Cooperation and in administrative matters.”⁹⁹ More precisely, the Secretariat was among other things to “assist the Presidency in the organization of European Political Cooperation meetings, including the preparation and circulation of documents and the drawing up of minutes” and to “assist the Presidency where appropriate, in contacts with third countries.” The Secretariat was also given the task to assist “the Presidency in ensuring the continuity of European Political Co-operation and its consistency with Community positions.”¹⁰⁰ The Secretariat was to consist of seconded national diplomats on a rotating principle, with participants from the state holding the Presidency plus from the two preceding and the two incoming presidencies (an enlarged Troika principle).¹⁰¹ In other words, the establishment of the Secretariat did not in any substantive way change the autonomy aspect of EPC, but it did provide the cooperation with at least an embryonic common institutional body, not the least since this was the first time the archives of EPC documents were gathered and kept in one place. The secretariat did not formally exist until the SEA came into force in July 1987, but had begun to take up its duties already during 1986 and was in full operation by January 1987.¹⁰²

In sum, the SEA produced no changes in the guiding principles, and only very minor changes in the scope and specificity of the rules.¹⁰³ For the most part, the provisions were simply a codification of existing rules, which at the same time meant that there was a change in the legal weight of the rules. In terms of procedures, the centralisation aspect (the setting up of the Secretariat) was clearly the

⁹⁹ Ibid., art. 30.10(g).

¹⁰⁰ Decision Adopted by the Foreign Ministers 28 February 1986, reprinted in Pijpers et al. 1988.

¹⁰¹ Nuttall 1992, p. 255.

¹⁰² Sanchez da Costa Pereira 1988, p. 85 and 98; Nuttall 1992, p. 257.

¹⁰³ Cf. Tsakaloyannis 1991, p. 41.

most important change.¹⁰⁴ Despite these rather modest changes, the years following the entering into force of the SEA saw a dramatic increase in the collective policies. The number of statements issued almost doubled between 1987 and 1989 and the geographic coverage, the variety of topics covered, and the use of various foreign policy instruments all also increased. It thus seems as if a change in the legal weight and/or in the co-ordinating and administrative capacity of the institution did facilitate the collective outcome. At a minimum, this tentative conclusion can not be dismissed unless other and more plausible changes also took place at the same time, something to which we shall return to in chapter six.

The Maastricht Treaty

If the institutional changes up until this point had in many ways been minor and very gradual, the changes that took place with the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in November 1993 were more far-reaching. The European Political Cooperation changed to become the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the principles, substance and procedures of the cooperation were all expanded or altered.

In the preamble, the TEU stated that the CFSP was meant to reinforce “the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and the world.” Under Title V and the heading *Provisions on a common foreign and security policy*, these objectives were further specified, to include the safeguarding of “the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union,” the strengthening of “the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways,” and the preservation of peace and strengthening of international security.¹⁰⁵ The principles

¹⁰⁴ And a controversial innovation that had taken years of intense debate (Smith, M.E. 1998, p. 328).

¹⁰⁵ TEU, Art. J.I.2. In the Amsterdam Treaty the numbering of the articles changed. The references given in this section of the chapter are thus to the original numbering in the TEU, whereas in the next section the new (and today’s legally correct) numbering will be used.

were thus in a sense both more clearly stated than before and more all-inclusive than in previous texts. At the same time, parts of the motivating principles that had previously been frequently mentioned were omitted from the TEU. The idea of a collective foreign policy serving the purpose of furthering European integration was no longer mentioned, nor were there any references to the “responsibilities” of Europe and its “world duties.”

In the substantive dimension, both the scope and the specificity of the rules were changed. The collective foreign policy was now said to cover “all areas of foreign and security policy” and in addition, the TEU stated that this should also include “the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.”¹⁰⁶ Thus, the previous specifications of what aspects of security (political and economic) it was permissible to discuss in the EPC framework had now been replaced not only with an all-including concept of foreign and security policy but also with an explicit goal of admitting the defence dimension into the new CFSP framework. The TEU also provided for the possibility to use the Western European Union (WEU) for the elaboration and implementation of “decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications.”¹⁰⁷

Furthermore, the specificity of the rules changed considerably. Whereas the previous language had frequently made reference to the term “endeavour”, the firmer “shall” was used constantly in the TEU. For instance, article J.1.4. states that the

Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations.

In general, the TEU also contained more detailed descriptions of when and how the cooperation was to be conducted, and also speci-

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., Art. J.1.1 and J.4.1.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., Art. J.4.2.

fied that the collective foreign policy could take the form of either common positions or joint actions.¹⁰⁸ The form of the joint actions was also made considerably more specific than before. The TEU stated that

Whenever the Council decides on the principle of joint action, it shall lay down the specific scope, the Union's general and specific objectives in carrying out such action, if necessary its duration, and the means, procedures and conditions for its implementation.¹⁰⁹

The TEU also, contrary to previous texts, specified the possible content of the common policies. The collective foreign policy was to aim to promote of international cooperation and to “develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”¹¹⁰

The question of increases in legal weight is difficult when comparing the TEU to the SEA. In a sense, the whole “pillar construction” was invented in order not to bring issues such as the CFSP within the legal framework of the European Community. The construction allowed for a single institutional framework while not granting any formal powers for the European Court of Justice or the European Parliament within the second pillar. Therefore, the legal weight of the totality of CFSP-*provisions* in the TEU was not really altered compared to the SEA; the CFSP remained a treaty-based intergovernmental cooperation and thereby binding in the same sense as other international law. However, some of the CFSP-*decisions* could arguably be considered more legally binding following the TEU. It was decided that the common positions and joint actions, despite their unclear legal status, were to be considered similar to EC legislation and published in the Official Journal.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., Art. J.2 and J.3.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., Art. J.3.1.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., Art. J.1.2.

¹¹¹ This was decided following an opinion of the Council Secretariat's legal service, whose participation in the Council meetings was also a novelty introduced with the reforms in the TEU (Nuttall 2000, p. 275; Smith, M.E. 2001, p. 96).

In the procedural dimension, the TEU also contained quite a few changes. The decision-making procedure was still to be based on unanimity as the general rule, but the TEU also allowed for certain decisions to be made with qualified majority voting (QMV). The weighting of the votes should be the same as in the first pillar and, for the then twelve members, a qualified majority decision required at least fifty-four votes in favour, cast by at least eight members.¹¹² The QMV rule however applied in general only to procedural questions, but could also apply to implementation of joint actions *if* the Council first had agreed unanimously to do so.¹¹³ In other words, a (very limited) possibility for common action despite a small blocking majority was introduced. In a declaration attached to the TEU, it was furthermore stated that the “Member States will, to the extent possible, avoid preventing a unanimous decision where a qualified majority exists in favour of that decision.”

The centralisation aspects of the cooperation were also slightly altered, especially concerning the participation of the Commission. In addition to its previous full association with political cooperation, the TEU also explicitly allowed the Commission “to be fully associated” with the Troika work.¹¹⁴ The formal provisions thereby codified the practice of Commission participation in the external representation of the Union also in matters related to the second pillar.¹¹⁵ More importantly, the Commission was also given the right of initiative alongside the member states, and became partly responsible for keeping the Parliament informed “of the development of the Union’s foreign and security policy.”¹¹⁶ The Commission was, furthermore, given the right, equal to the member states, to request emergency meetings according to the crisis procedure.¹¹⁷

¹¹² TEU, Art. J.3.3.

¹¹³ Ibid., Art. J.3.2.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., Art. J.5.3.

¹¹⁵ In practice, the Commission had however often participated in the Troika missions since 1983 (Nuttall 1988, p. 107).

¹¹⁶ TEU, Art. J.8.3 and J.7.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., Art. J.8.4. Following these changes, the Commission was also internally reorganised in regard to its external services (Cameron 1998, pp. 62f).

Another change that may be seen as a centralising tendency, was the closing down of the old EPC Secretariat and an expansion of the Council Secretariat to cover also CFSP issues.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, and as a result of 'the single institutional framework,' COREPER was now formally also to participate in the preparation of foreign and security policy issues ahead of the Council meetings.

Apart from the Commission, the roles of the other supranational institutions were largely unaltered, with one slight exception. Whereas the European Court of Justice still had no jurisdiction over matters related to the second pillar, and whereas the European Parliament was still only consulted in these matters, the financing aspects of the CFSP nonetheless allowed for an increased role for the Parliament. In the TEU, the previous principle of *ad hoc* financing of the EPC activities was partly abandoned, and the administrative costs for the CFSP were included in the regular Community budget. The operational costs were to be either charged to the EC budget or to the member states, subject to Council decision on a case-by-case basis.¹¹⁹ The allocation of funding for the CFSP in the Community budget also meant a possibility for the European Parliament to have a say in the way those funds were being used.¹²⁰

In sum, the Maastricht Treaty widened the principles guiding the CFSP, by adding more motivations for the cooperation, and expanding the scope of the cooperation. The specificity of the rules clearly increased, and the possibility for individual states to bloc the decisions was slightly reduced although not taken away entirely. Both the size and the involvement of the institutional bodies also increased. Interestingly, however, the year following the biggest institutional changes in EPC/CFSP history contained virtually no changes in the collective outcomes. The number of statements issued rose marginally, but after the previous drop in 1992 and a standstill the

¹¹⁸ In practice, however, the two secretariats had worked closely together also previous to this change (Sherrington 2000, p. 37).

¹¹⁹ TEU, Art. J.11.2.

¹²⁰ The Parliament was quite quickly able to amend the budget in a way that would allow it maximal influence over these CFSP allocations (Monar 1997, pp. 63f.).

following year, it had still in 1994 not even reached the 1991 level. The increases in geographic scope between 1991 and 1993 virtually ceased, and there were no noticeable immediate novelties in the themes addressed within the new CFSP framework. The only real change visible in 1994 was a slight increase in the number of statements containing references to actions undertaken by the EU, in particular those related to economic measures. It thus seems as if these institutional changes had few immediate effects on the collective foreign policy. The closer involvement by the Commission might certainly have contributed to the increase in references to economic actions, but otherwise the immediate signs of institutional effects were virtually absent.

Furthermore, the quite substantial changes of the collective foreign policy which had taken place in 1991 were arguably not an effect even of the early deliberations on the Maastricht Treaty, and thus remain unaccounted for. However, it should also be noted here that the following two years, 1995 and 1996, certainly constituted one of the more dynamic periods for EPC/CFSP. This might certainly not have been the case unless this period had been preceded by such far-reaching institutional changes. But, unless quite a long time-lag should also be assumed between institutional reforms and changing policy output, the changes in policy in 1995 and 1996 should supposedly not be viewed as an immediate result of institutional changes, at least not if more compelling explanations can be found.

The Amsterdam Treaty

In October 1997, in Amsterdam, a revised version of the Treaty on European Union was signed. After the ratification process, it entered into force in May 1999. The provisions guiding the CFSP were again changed in several ways. The only dimension remaining largely unaltered was the general principles, or the motivations, of the CFSP. With the addition that the common foreign and security policy should now also safeguard the *integrity* of the Union in

accordance with the UN Charter,¹²¹ the stated motives were the same as in the TEU. The exact meaning of the phrase “integrity of the Union” was however not defined, and the significance of the addition has remained unclear.¹²²

In the substantive dimension, first of all the scope of the rules changed. What had previously been referred to as the “eventual framing of a common defence policy” was now rather referred to as an ongoing “progressive framing of a common defence policy.”¹²³ The role of the WEU was further specified, and a future “possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union” was mentioned. The possibility for cooperation in the field of armaments was also mentioned for the first time in the CFSP provisions. Thereby, the scope of the cooperation had again formally widened, to allow for deliberations in the areas of foreign, security, and defence policy, including a future common defence, “should the European Council so decide.”¹²⁴ The Amsterdam Treaty also specified that the tasks for the common defence policy should “include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”¹²⁵

Moreover, an aim to further increase the interactions between diplomatic and consular missions in third countries and international conferences, and also the representations to international organisations, was expressed in the Amsterdam Treaty. The new formulation called for their cooperation “in ensuring that the common positions and joint actions adopted by the Council are complied with and implemented.” It was also stated that they should step up their cooperation by exchanging information and carrying out

¹²¹ TEU, Art. 11.1.

¹²² Some analysts have suggested that it refers to the territorial integrity of the Union (Koutrakos 2001, p. 26).

¹²³ TEU, Art. 17.1.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ TEU, Art. 17.2. These so called “Petersberg tasks” were in effect copied from the WEU, where they had been formulated as a new *raison d’être* for the organisation in 1992.

joint assessments.”¹²⁶ Furthermore, they should protect, on the same conditions as their own nationals, “every citizen of the Union” in the territory of a third country, should the citizen’s own member state not be represented.¹²⁷

The specificity of the rules also increased. In addition to the previous two forms of decisions – joint actions and common positions – a third form, common strategies, was added. Common strategies were introduced as a new type of wide framework decisions, and were to be formulated by the European Council “in areas where the Member States have important interests in common.”¹²⁸ Relatively to the wording in the Maastricht Treaty, the joint actions and common positions were also given clearer definitions. Joint actions were to be adopted with a view to “address specific situations where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required” and common positions were to “define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature.”¹²⁹

In terms of the legal weight of the provisions, nothing substantial changed with the Amsterdam Treaty. At the margin, however, one noteworthy addition to previous treaties was the introduction of the right of the Union to conclude agreements with third parties on matters relating to the CFSP. Whereas this addition did not give the Union a formal legal personality, it allowed for the Presidency to negotiate international agreements on a mandate from a unanimous Council. The formulations in article 24 were however not clear on whether it would be the Union or the member states that would become party to the agreement.¹³⁰

¹²⁶ Ibid., Art. 20. Joint reports from ambassadors of the EU members were already a frequent practice. Even in the EPC days, joint reports had often been prepared, at a time when it “was not called for or even desired by EC states” (Smith, M. E. 1998, p. 314).

¹²⁷ TEU, Art. 20, and TEC, Art. 20.

¹²⁸ Ibid., Art. 13.2.

¹²⁹ Ibid., Art. 14.1 and 15.

¹³⁰ Koutrakos (2001, p. 32) argues that the “difficulty in providing a definite answer to the whether the European Union possesses objective international legal personality relies to a certain extent on the fact that the notion of international legal personality

In the procedural dimension, several changes took place. The decision-making rules were altered to allow for qualified majority voting in all decisions regarding the *implementation* of already adopted joint actions and common positions, and also when *adopting* joint actions and common positions if these decisions were taken on the basis of a common strategy. It was also determined that the weighting of the votes should be the same as in the first pillar. Procedural questions became subject to a simple majority rule, based only on the number of members. Furthermore, for all other issues (for instance the adoption of joint actions and common positions unrelated to common strategies) that still require a unanimous vote, the possibility of a “constructive abstention” was introduced. A member state may, according to this procedure, abstain from voting and thereby allow the rest to adopt a decision. The abstainee must then accept that the decision commits the Union, but the former need not participate actively in applying the decision. However, it was also stated that the abstainee nonetheless “shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action.” If members representing more than one third of the weighted votes should abstain, the decision would not be taken.¹³¹

As for centralisation, the Amsterdam treaty certainly generated some changes. First, a High Representative for the CFSP, who was to be the same person as the Secretary-General of the Council, was given the task to assist the Council in CFSP matters, “in particular through contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and [...] through conducting political dialogue with third parties.” The last task was however specified to take place only “when appropriate” and only when “acting on behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency.”¹³² Secondly, a new Policy Unit, placed in the Council Secretariat, was to assist the High Representative. The Policy Unit was *inter alia* given the tasks to

and the legal capacities it entails are understood in the context of sovereign states or international organisations.”

¹³¹ TEU, Art. 23.

¹³² TEU, Art. 26.

provide assessments of the Union's foreign and security policy interests, provide early warning of potential crises, and produce policy options papers as a contribution to policy formulation in the Council.¹³³ Thirdly, the format of the Troika also changed with the Amsterdam Treaty to include, in addition to the Presidency, the Commission and the High Representative.¹³⁴ Thus, the troika format, having originally consisted of three member states, was thereby changed to include only one member state and two more permanent and Brussels-based representatives. Fourthly, the Commission's involvement in the second pillar increased further, as it was given the formal right to submit "any appropriate proposals relating to the common foreign and security policy to ensure the implementation of a joint action," should the Council so request.¹³⁵

In sum then, the principles remained basically unaltered whereas the scope widened to include not just hopes for future possibilities of a defence dimension but actual provisions for it. The specificity of the rules increased, whereas the legal weight remained unaltered. The (formal) possibility to veto decisions decreased somewhat, and the possibility for the group to agree on matters requiring unanimous decisions increased with the introduction of constructive abstention. The creation of the High Representative and the Policy Unit, as well as the continued increase in involvement by the Commission, further strengthened the positions of the permanent Brussels-based bodies. It was however not until May 1999 that the new treaty entered into force, and it was not until November 1999 that the former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana was appointed the first High Representative for the CFSP.

For this reason, the measure of the CFSP contents that was provided in chapter three and which only includes the year 1999 is not wholly capable of revealing the possible effects. Interestingly, however, the biggest changes in the policy output for a long time seem to have taken place just before and around the entry into force of the

¹³³ Ibid., 6. *Declaration on the establishment of a policy planning and early warning unit.*

¹³⁴ Ibid., Art. 18.4.

¹³⁵ Ibid., Art. 14.4.

new treaty in 1998–1999. The number of statements issued reached a new high in 1998, and the share of these statements containing references to actions also increased considerably, in particular in 1999. The variety of topics and the amount of detail covered by the statements also increased quite substantially in 1998 and 1999. Although these trends may perhaps have continued into the new millennium, it seems nonetheless as if we were again witnessing a period during which the changes in CFSP preceded, rather than followed, the institutional changes.

The overall estimation: almost a reversal of arrows?


Having portrayed the institutional development between 1970 and 1999, it seems thus as if the successive institutional changes have generated very few immediate effects on the policy emanating from the EPC and later CFSP framework. At a very minimum, we may conclude that it seems far-fetched to assume that the main explanation for the successive development of the EPC/CFSP has been successively changed institutional arrangements. On a number of occasions, it seems rather that institutional changes have *followed* changes in the EPC/CFSP than the other way around. This would lead us to believe that there may well be other recurrent stimuli that have set off the ‘jumps’ in the EPC/CFSP.

Having said that, the trends outlined above can certainly not lead us to abandon altogether the possible importance of various institutional arrangements. First of all, a couple of quite specific and quite plausible links were identified. One was related to changes in the expressly stated scope of the cooperation, which seems to have generated a widened thematic content of the statements on a few occasions. Another one was related to the centralisation of the cooperation, as the gradually increased involvement by the Commission also seems to have had a possible effect on the use of certain foreign policy instruments.

Secondly, if we for a moment look at the possible longer term effects rather than just the few years that immediately follow an institutional change, we may find that particularly the changes

towards increased centralisation may have had some visible effects after all.

Figure 8. Trends in number of EPC/CFSP statements issued



If we were to draw a few straight lines through at least one of the diagrams from chapter three, we would have grounds to propose the possibility of such a link. For instance, if looking at the longer term changes in the frequency of the statements, we may conclude that the start of the steepest rise, from 1988 approximately, followed the entry into force of the Single European Act. As the two biggest changes in the Single European Act were the “legalisation” of the cooperation and a centralisation by the creation of an EPC Secretariat, one or both of these changes may well have had a tangible longer-term effect on the foreign policy cooperation. The most likely of the two, however, is the creation of the Secretariat. While the legalisation aspect could well be assumed to push the cooperative outcomes up one notch, it would be more difficult to explain why this one-off event would keep on generating an increase in the cooperation year after year on a long-

term basis. Delegating certain tasks and responsibilities to a central body, on the other hand, is precisely the type of institutional change that could well generate this type of effect. As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, the creation of a centralised body may result in a new and quite active – even if highly informal – player with its own strategies and possibilities to affect the process. Furthermore, throughout the period after 1988, new centralising changes took place in connection with the following treaty revisions, which may help in accounting for the generally steeper increase in EPC/CFSP activities after the SEA.

Thirdly, another reflection that may be made from the above account of institutional changes is that the “levels” of foreign policy cooperation rarely take any serious down-turns. Seeing that the institutions have often changed following increases in the foreign policy cooperation, and that the levels of cooperation rarely drop to any considerable degree, the institutions may well have had something of a conserving effect on the *acquis politique*. This gives us grounds to highlight the possible locking-in function of institutions, and we can assume that institutions account for the fact that the EPC and later the CFSP has never been a policy area of true failure in the sense that “nothing at all happened” during a shorter or longer period in time. While there have indeed been recurrent CFSP crises, in the form of a complete inability on the part of the EU members to agree on certain specific foreign policy issues, the participants have however usually maintained a business-as-usual attitude as regards other ongoing policy issues within the second pillar.

In sum, it seems plausible that the institutions have not only *facilitated the possibility* to act in common, but that they have also served to lock in existing levels of cooperation. However, the way the institutions have functioned in the EU’s second pillar does not seem to account to any large extent for the successive increases in cooperation. The institutions may have enabled and facilitated them, but did not cause them. We should thus, in the next chapter, turn to the inquiry about the role played by external events.

CHAPTER FIVE

Balancing a Common Enemy?

SOMEWHAT SCEPTICAL OF THE OVERARCHING role of institutions, many of those who study the EU's common foreign and security policy have suggested that maybe institutions play only a secondary role for the collective outcomes. Roy Ginsberg, for instance, has argued that the "political will to make CFSP happen cannot be legislated", and that "external stimuli have always played a large role in the EU's development as an international actor."¹ But what kinds of external stimuli is it that we should search for?

It is an intuitively appealing thought – and a theoretically well-known proposition – that a group of states which have established cooperation on international security management should intensify their efforts during periods when security seems particularly threatened by actors or events in the outside environment. If there is a change in a perceived threat, the will to cooperate should also change. Several scholars argue in favour of this view, based on the proposal that cooperation in security affairs – rare as it is – may notably be established as a result of an identified common threat.

In this chapter, the possibility of this idea to account for at least parts of the development of the CFSP will be examined. If the development of the EU's collective foreign policy is primarily to be interpreted as a result of a perceived necessity to act together in view of common threats, the occurrence and the contents of the common policies should be found to co-vary with the seriousness of the threat. These propositions are examined here by contrasting the

¹ Ginsberg 1997, pp. 14f.

changes in Soviet and later Russian foreign policy against the development of the CFSP as described in the previous chapter.

CHANGING THREATS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

It is quite common, in particular among realist-inspired scholars, to view cooperation between states as a possible *balancing behaviour*. When, as John Ikenberry puts it, “powerful states emerge, secondary states will seek protection in countervailing coalitions of weaker states.”² The proposition stems from an ambiguous and vague theory – but at the same time one of the most central ideas in history – of a general principle of balance of power in the international system.³

Treated as a systemic grand theory, applicable to the study of long-term changes in the structure of world system(s), the balance-of-power thesis in its traditional realist shapes has often proven a forceful and convincing contribution to the academic debate.⁴ Treated, however, as a strategic theory applicable to individual and time-limited analyses of particular state choices, the balance-of-power explanation to international cooperation is not in itself specific enough to generate testable propositions about the causes behind increased cooperation. Without a number of specifications, it is not altogether clear what type of “power” any group of cooperating states should have attempted to balance against.

The general balance-of-threat argument

One well-known way of specifying the balance-of-power-thesis begins with the assumption that states – as a result of the anarchical international system – constantly need to seek security, and may well

² Ikenberry 2002, p. 8.

³ See for instance Haas 1953; Sheehan 1996.

⁴ See for instance Morgenthau 1948/1993; Waltz 1979.

see increased power as a means towards increased security.⁵ Cooperating with others is one such way towards increasing one's power.

With this assumption, however, rising or overwhelming power alone is not necessarily enough of a threat to trigger a balancing behaviour in the form of cooperation among a group of states. If security is a state's most important interest, the rising power must also be seen as a threat to that security. As argued in chapter two, one state's increase in power capabilities need therefore not trigger a balancing behaviour unless they are offensive, and unless the unit which possesses them is perceived to be aggressive or expansionist. Such balancing may be carried out by military or political means.⁶ States, in short, may well be assumed to seek political alliances "against the foreign power that poses the greatest threat."⁷

Consulting the works of the advocates of this proposition, we may also obtain an indication of which "power" we should assume poses the biggest threat. Whether a major power is perceived to constitute a threat or not is at least to a certain degree dependent on its *behaviour*.⁸ A quite common definition of the threat concept is that a state constitutes a threat when it gives "evidence of pursuing or contemplating expansionist foreign policy objectives".⁹ The degree of threat posed by a major power is thus often operationalised in terms of its tendencies to rely on either offensive or defensive strategies.¹⁰

But other components may also be taken into account. For instance, the degree of a state's possession of resources (e.g. population, industrial and military capability, and technological prowess) affects the *aggregate power* it can wield, and may thereby constitute another

⁵ Waltz 1979, p. 126; cf. Glaser 1994/95, p. 71. Other realists, however, rather believe that states seek to maximise power as a goal in its own right, something which actually generates a hypothesis quite different from the one discussed in this chapter.

⁶ Walt 1987, p. 22, 26, 149, 169.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁸ Mastanduno 1997, p. 60.

⁹ George 1988, p. 657; cf. Walt 1987, pp. 25f.

¹⁰ Related arguments are sometimes proposed by scholars making distinctions between *revisionist* and *status quo* powers. For contributions to this debate, see for instance Schweller 1996 and Mastanduno 1997. Charles Kupchan (1998) adds *benign states* as a third category.

component of the perceived threat it may pose to others. Related, a state with great offensive power – the ability to threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of another state at an acceptable cost – or at least a capacity quickly to convert its aggregate power to *offensive capacities*, may provoke a balancing behaviour. Furthermore, because the ability to project power often declines with distance, *geographic proximity* may also add to the picture.¹¹ A large neighbouring state, rich in resources and offensive capabilities, and with perceived offensive strategies, should thus constitute at least a potential threat against which other states may wish to balance.

Consequently, these assumptions also provide propositions about when there may be a change in the perceived level of threat facing a balancing group of states. A change in the behaviour, or in the perceived intentions, of a major power might lead to reinterpretations among the cooperating states about their continued need for cooperation. Such a change need not necessarily be directed *against* the cooperating states. It may be enough that the cooperating states interpret such a change as a change also for their own security. Likewise, a change in the major power's resources, its offensive capabilities, or its geographical proximity, may affect the perceived need for balancing. In other words, as the threat perceptions of the major foe vary, we should also assume that the degree of cooperation should change.

Furthermore, the changing levels of cooperation ought to take place without considerable time-lags. Because the ever-present security dilemma affects the cooperating states, so the argument goes, such cooperation will always be unstable and inevitably vary over time. The anarchic world system does not make cooperation impossible, but “any cooperation that does emerge under these conditions is expected to be tenuous, unstable, and limited to issues of peripheral importance.”¹² When cooperation has been initiated for balancing reasons, enmity and friendship are always temporary features.¹³

¹¹ Walt 1987, pp. 22ff.

¹² Weber 1990, p. 58.

¹³ Little 1989, p. 91; cf. Stein 1990, p. 6.

As one scholar puts it, when “a reasonable expectation of an external threat is absent, states need not, and usually do not, engage in balancing behaviour.”¹⁴ Therefore, *as the perceived threat rises, so should the efforts to cooperate, and as the threat diminishes (or becomes less pronounced) so should the interest in pursuing the cooperation.*¹⁵

The balancing-the-USSR argument

This is indeed also a line of thought that has been entertained in various accounts of the EPC/CFSP development. First of all, some scholars have argued, based a somewhat broader conception of threat, that the “fortunes of European Political Cooperation (EPC), since its inception in the early 1970s, have been inextricably linked with the vagaries of the international environment, in particular the twists and turns in the relations between the superpowers.”¹⁶ For instance, two observers, having measured the impact of tensions between the US and the Soviet Union on the EPC, hold that “a growing level of conflict in US-USSR relations is accompanied by an increasing likelihood that the EU reacts forcefully.”¹⁷

These arguments, however, are embedded in the more general assumption that the EC members at the time were highly dependent on the US for their own security. As Robert Kagan puts it, “both sides of the Atlantic clearly relied on their pooled military power to deter any possible Soviet attack, no matter how remote the chances of such an attack might seem.”¹⁸ Supposedly we should therefore assume that, according to these arguments, the most immediate threats were either constituted by the periods of a worsening US-USSR relationship, or by the behaviour from the Soviet side of the relationship.

¹⁴ Schweller 1996, p. 100.

¹⁵ Walt 1992, p. 451.

¹⁶ Tsakaloyannis 1991, p. 36; cf. Smith, M.E. 2004, p. 34.

¹⁷ Schneider & Seybold 1997, p. 384. For an opposing view, see Risse-Kappen 1994, pp. 54f.

¹⁸ Kagan 2003, p. 29.

Other observers, however, are more explicit in pointing to the Soviet threat in itself as a main explanatory factor behind the development of the EPC/CFSP. When accounting for flourishing relations between the EC states during the Cold War, John Mearsheimer claims that a “powerful and potentially dangerous Soviet Union forced the Western democracies to band together to meet the common threat.”¹⁹

Others have extended this argument to cover also the period after the Cold War, but differ in their interpretation of whether Russia has continued to play the role of a potential threat to its European neighbours. Richard Rosecrance, for instance, implies that the Soviet threat was the main rationale behind the creation of the EPC, and argues that with “the end of the Cold War, it is even less probable that a common foreign policy consensus will be forged. There is no major foe to the East which forces European states to concert and reach agreement.”²⁰ Philip Gordon similarly points out that “the end of the Cold War has taken away one of the most compelling forces behind the need for a common security policy. Without a common enemy and the simplicity of the two-bloc system of the Cold War, security interests are potentially more differentiated than in the past.”²¹

However, some proponents of this view also argue that the relations with today’s Russia are still an important determinant of cohesion between the EU members. In general, the instability of any previously totalitarian power during a phase of transition to democracy is often claimed to constitute a serious threat to its neighbours.²² And there is, argues Michael Emerson, little doubt that Russia still “sees its intercontinental territorial dimensions, massive nuclear military arsenal and energy resources as props for a large international role.”²³ He points out that the Russian nuclear ballistic missile

¹⁹ Mearsheimer 1990, pp. 46f.; cf. Schneider & Seybold 1997, p. 380.

²⁰ Rosecrance 1998, p. 15; cf. Mearsheimer 1990, pp. 46f.

²¹ Gordon 1997/98, p. 98.

²² McFaul 1997/98, p. 5.

²³ Emerson 2001, p. 6.

arsenal is still about ten times that of France and the UK combined, and concludes that this “nuclear weaponry may be largely irrelevant and therefore useless in the context of any foreseeable European scenario, except that it appears to continue to exercise some psychological influence on foreign policy-makers.”²⁴ Stanley Hoffmann believes that in the coming years, a “more assertive Russia might push the members of the EU into a more active co-ordination of their approaches to Moscow.”²⁵ However, neither of these studies attempted to study systematically, over a longer period in time, the links between changing USSR/Russian behaviour and changing foreign policy cooperation between the EU members.

The expected empirical development

With these theoretical and empirical propositions, we should assume that one possibility to account – at least partly – for the development of the EPC/CFSP is constituted by changes in the major threats that have faced the member states over time. During the Cold War, the changing regional and global policies of the Soviet Union, and/or changes in its resources, should have been one important determinant of the level of cooperation. For instance, during periods of a more offensive Soviet foreign policy, the EC states should have been particularly active in their foreign policy cooperation. Similarly, the periods with a less assertive Soviet Union should have lessened the interest in a collective foreign policy.

With the demise of the Soviet Union in the beginning of the 1990s, and with Russia taking the place of the closest major power, we should expect one of two somewhat different outcomes. We should either assume, as Rosecrance and others do, that with the disappearance of the major threat we should observe a less active collective foreign policy after the Cold War. This of course we may rule out already at the outset, according to the findings in chapter three. Or, we may assume that Russia has, at least to some extent,

²⁴ Emerson 2001, p. 2.

²⁵ Hoffmann 2000, p. 196.

taken over the role of the Soviet Union and continues to pose a perceived potential threat. In this case, Russia ought to have continued to affect the foreign policy cooperation in the same way as the Soviet Union is assumed to have done during the Cold War.

Furthermore, with the fourth enlargement of the EU in 1995, the geographical distance to Russia diminished. The accession of Finland to the EU brought with it a long border to its major eastern neighbour. To the extent that post-Cold War Russia ought still to be a major factor in forging a common foreign policy, the change in geographical proximity to the Union could also be assumed to have augmented the willingness to cooperate in foreign affairs during the second half of the 1990s. The viability of the balance-of-threat-thesis as an explanation for the development of EPC/CFSP, should thus be dependent on the possibility to observe the occurrence of at least some of these expected trends.

THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND RUSSIA

The initiation of EPC in 1970 took place in an international climate of a beginning détente between the superpowers. US-Soviet Union relations seemed set to thaw despite the previous Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, which was followed by the Brezhnev doctrine that “promised” other Warsaw-pact countries similar assistance in the event of future crises and thereby unsettled many states in Eastern Europe.²⁶ A strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union had developed by 1970, and arms reduction negotiations were conducted between the two. The first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement was concluded in 1972, and plans for a SALT II immediately followed. Relations between the superpowers improved further as the Vietnam war was ending.

The birth of the EPC thus took place, on the one hand, in the wake of a slowly improving international climate with slightly less strained relations between the superpowers. On the other hand, it

²⁶ Hoffmann 1987, pp. 24f.; Calvocoressi 1991, p. 43, 250.

also followed a shift towards increasingly offensive tendencies of the Soviet Union. However, as shown in the following, the subsequent twists and turns in Soviet, and later Russian, foreign policy show little correlation with the successive development of the EPC/CFSP.

Missiles in Europe and global power projection 1975–1978

During the second half of the 1970s, a new period of visibly more expansionist Soviet foreign policy started. In 1975, the Soviet plans for deploying new technologically advanced missiles (MIRVs) in Eastern Europe became apparent. This deployment would greatly enhance the Soviet military effectiveness in terms of reachable targets. Around the same time, the Soviet wish to establish a presence in other parts of the world became increasingly pronounced. The Soviet Union's assistance to "national liberation movements" in for instance Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and South Yemen, together with support for the Vietnamese interventions in Laos and Cambodia, constituted a series of moves that signalled greater involvement in the international system.²⁷ This also included a rapid expansion in Soviet programmes for power projection in remote areas, in particular in Africa.²⁸ During this period, the Soviet Union also surpassed the United States in terms of weapons export quantities. The largest buyers were Syria, Libya, Iraq, India and Vietnam.²⁹

In 1976 the USSR also started its deployment of the new SS-20 missiles, capable of reaching Western Europe, which considerably strengthened the Soviet position in Europe.³⁰ This move increased the concerns in Western Europe, partly because the deployment seemed to take place without consideration of the effects it might have on the Cold War climate, and partly because of a perceived US indifference in relation to these events.³¹ Following a debate within

²⁷ Holloway 1982, p. 39, 59; Hoffmann 1987, p. 25; Nygren 1987, pp. 73f.; Calvocoressi 1991, pp. 46f.

²⁸ Semmel 1982, p. 275; Rice 1986, p. 132.

²⁹ Lundestad 1991, p. 130.

³⁰ Hiester 1991, p. 35; Joffe 1987, p. 77.

³¹ Haslam 1991, p. 489.

the Atlantic Alliance, first initiated by German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1977, NATO decided in 1979 to counter the Soviet move by proceeding with the deployment of American cruise and Pershing-2 missiles in Western Europe.³²

This period of increased Soviet assertiveness seems however to have had little if any immediate effect on the foreign policy cooperation between the EC states during the same time. Contrary to expectations from the “EPC as a reaction to threat thesis”, EPC activities in general diminished rather than increased between 1976 and 1978, both when considering the number of statements and their contents.

Furthermore, during this period only one declaration, in 1978, was directed directly towards the Soviet Union.³³ However, the declaration dealt neither with the issue of nuclear weapons, nor with the more active Soviet attempts at global power projection. It contained severe criticism of the arrest and sentencing of several Soviet citizens who had been engaged in monitoring the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act. According to the Soviet Union, these individuals belonged to a dissident group and had been engaged in “anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda,” a crime for which the former chairman of the Helsinki Group was sentenced to seven years in a hard-labour camp, to be followed by five years in internal exile.³⁴ The EPC declaration was hence rather a call for respect of human rights, than any immediate reaction to a more assertive Soviet Union. It did indeed contain references to the importance of détente but, explicitly, it did so only by pointing out that the Soviet treatment of the Helsinki Watch Groups was a breach of the agreements made in the CSCE-framework and thereby jeopardised détente.

In 1979, however, the number of EPC statements showed an increase in general, and their geographical reach expanded to include both Asia and Central America. Seeing that the thesis of “EPC as a reaction to threat” would indicate the likelihood of a swift response to

³² Holloway 1982, p. 41; Haslam 1991, p. 490.

³³ *Bulletin of the European Communities* 5–1978, p. 63.

³⁴ *Keesing's Record of World Events* (web-edition), July 1978.

increases in a perceived threat, the time-lag between events in 1975/76 and an intensified cooperation within EPC in 1979 seems quite long. This period of a more offensive Soviet foreign policy thus showed no immediate signs of having had any significant effects on the EPC.

The intervention in Afghanistan 1979–1980

The military intervention in Afghanistan was perhaps the ultimate example of the more assertive Soviet foreign policy during the second half of the 1970s.³⁵ Following several weeks of Soviet troop activities and military build-up along the Afghan border, the Soviet Union undertook a massive air-lift into Kabul on December 26, 1979. Western observers estimated the presence of some 50,000 troops along the Soviet-Afghan border. For the first time since 1948, the USSR intervened directly in a sovereign state outside its acknowledged “sphere of influence.”³⁶

The US, having already repeatedly voiced concerns during the previous weeks, reacted immediately by issuing a strong protest to the Soviet Union on the same day. It accused the Soviet Union of causing a threat to a region of great instability, and condemned the “blatant military interference in the internal affairs of an independent sovereign state.”³⁷ According to *Pravda*, however, the USSR had only responded to an “insistent request from the Afghan government and sent a limited contingent which would be withdrawn as soon as the factors precipitating this action were no longer present.”³⁸ Individually, the EC member states also voiced concerns, but they failed in their attempts to achieve swift agreement on a common EPC statement. They were also unable to reach consensus on whether to follow the American example and withdraw their ambassadors from Moscow.³⁹

³⁵ Lundestad 1991, p. 134.

³⁶ Bowker & Williams 1988, p. 235.

³⁷ *Keesing's Record of World Events* (web-edition), May 1980.

³⁸ Quoted in Bowker & Williams 1988, p. 234.

³⁹ Nuttall 1992, pp. 154f.

Instead it was the EC Commission that acted first. On January 9, the EC Commission provisionally withdrew the EC's food aid programme for Afghanistan, and it was not until January 15 that the member states managed to produce a first collective political statement on the Soviet invasion.⁴⁰ The statement concluded that the Soviet explanations to justify the actions were "unacceptable" and that the intervention constituted a "flagrant interference in the internal affairs of a non-aligned country" and "a threat to peace, security and stability in the region." Meeting as the Council the same day,⁴¹ the EC foreign ministers also confirmed the cancellation of the Community Food Aid Programme, and gave an assurance that Community agricultural deliveries to the Soviet Union would not replace the deliveries withheld by the US.⁴² Although the collective reaction from the EC members was not as immediate and as firm as that of the US (see more on this in the next chapter), this event nonetheless placed strains on the relations between the Western European states and the USSR.⁴³

As for any visible effects on the EPC, this period is at best inconclusive. The number of EPC statements in general increased slightly in 1980, and several of them were directed immediately at the Soviet Union and voiced concern over the situation in Afghanistan. Contrary to previous years, several statements also contained references to various actions undertaken collectively by the EC members, but only one of these statements (the January statement cited above) dealt with the Soviet/Afghanistan situation. Whereas the Soviet invasion clearly provoked the EC members to act at least partly in unison in relation to Afghanistan, it would be difficult to argue that it had any substantial effects on the collective foreign policy on a more general level.

⁴⁰ Nuttall 1992, pp. 154f.; for an in depth study of the EC and EPC reactions to these events, see Herolf 2004, pp. 111ff.

⁴¹ The foreign ministers were prevented from discussing EPC matters when they met as the General Affairs Council.

⁴² *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 1-1980, pp. 7f.

⁴³ Holloway 1982, p. 40.

Caution and hesitation 1981

A turn in the international role of the Soviet Union seemed to come about in 1981. The political unrest in Poland, which in 1980 resulted in the resignation of the Gierek government, was a serious concern for the USSR. Soviet hints about a possible intervention spurred fears among the EC members about a possible repetition of Prague 1968.⁴⁴ In December 1980, the nine heads of state or government issued a thinly veiled warning to the USSR, reminding that the signatories to the Helsinki Final Act had undertaken to “refrain from any direct or indirect, individual or collective intervention in internal or external affairs which fall within the national competence of another signatory State regardless of their mutual relations.”⁴⁵ Any other attitude, they continued, “would have very serious consequences for the future of international relations in Europe and throughout the world.”⁴⁶

The unrest in Poland did not subside after the election in February 1981 of General Jaruzelsky, who later that year and after pressure from the Soviet Union declared martial law in order to put an end to the protests from the trade unions and the church.⁴⁷ The fact that a government had been overturned was indeed an unusual event in communist Europe, and it seems that at least twice during this period (in December 1980 and in March 1981) the Soviet Union considered intervening militarily.⁴⁸ Nonetheless, and despite close contacts with the leadership in Poland, the USSR refrained from further military action, something which signalled both caution and hesitation from Moscow.⁴⁹ These signals were probably reinforced by the fact that between 1976 and 1982 military procurement in the

⁴⁴ Allin 1994, p. 168; Calvocoressi 1991, pp. 146ff.

⁴⁵ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 12-1980, point 1.1.14.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Hulett 1982, p. 227; Calvocoressi 1991, p. 147.

⁴⁸ Holloway 1982, p. 52.

⁴⁹ Mendl 1984, pp. 98f.; Calvocoressi 1991, pp. 148f.

Soviet Union had stagnated due to a worsening economic performance.⁵⁰

The EPC activities in general during this period, however, showed no sign of a lessened interest in foreign policy cooperation among the EC members. Contrary to the expectations from the balance-of-threat-thesis, the EPC activities increased substantially, as described in chapter three. Whereas the Soviet response to the events in Poland signalled a relative reluctance to intervene militarily in Eastern Europe, compared to 1956 and 1968, and whereas the Soviet economy and defence procurement rate was taking a down-turn, the number of statements issued in the EPC framework increased between 1981 and 1982. Furthermore, in 1982 more than forty percent of the statements contained references to some form of action. Several statements continued to address Soviet policy in relation to both Afghanistan and Poland. The statements related to Poland also repeatedly referred to the EC activities undertaken in relation to both the Soviet Union (sanctions, among other things) and Poland (economic support). The proposition that a decreased threat from a major power should be reflected in diminished cohesiveness among the cooperating states can thus not be substantiated by this period.

Disarmament and withdrawal 1986–1991

During the years that followed, the deteriorating economic situation in the USSR became increasingly obvious, which made possible the appointment in 1985 of reform-minded Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Communist Party, on a platform of major economic reform. From this time onward, Soviet foreign policy shifted towards a considerably less assertive tone.

In February 1986, Gorbachev formally broke with the Brezhnev doctrine and announced that the maintenance of Soviet security was “a political task” to be resolved “only through political means.”⁵¹ Gorbachev also initiated more far-reaching work on disarmament

⁵⁰ Haslam 1991, p. 490.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 491.

than any previous Soviet leader.⁵² For instance, the INF treaty between the US and the USSR was signed in December 1987, and provided *inter alia* for the destruction of all Soviet intermediate and medium-range missiles.⁵³ In 1988 the Soviet Union also decided to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, and announced unilateral conventional force cuts in Europe. These moves signalled a definite change of strategy from an offensive to a defensive military role in Europe.⁵⁴

The dramatic events in Central and Eastern Europe in the autumn of 1989 were also followed by a series of changes in the Soviet Union. By late 1990, the USSR and Russia started to pursue parallel foreign policies. Russia established a diplomatic service independent of the Soviet Union, and began to formulate a foreign policy that sometimes diverged from the Soviet Union's policy. In 1991, the Soviet foreign ministry began to wither away. The Soviet Union also started to withdraw parts of its international presence. For instance, the Soviet training brigade was withdrawn from Cuba, and the arms sales to Afghanistan ceased.⁵⁵

When, in December 1991, the Ukrainians voted for independence, any prospects of a future for the USSR were terminated. By the end of the month, the Soviet diplomatic service had been placed under Russian control, and the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Russia instead sought international recognition for its new status as the successor state to the USSR, and thereby inherited the responsibility for international treaties and obligations that had previously belonged to the Soviet Union.⁵⁶ The same year, the Warsaw Pact also ceased to exist.

As described in chapter three, the period between 1988 and 1991 constitute one of the most dynamic periods of EPC development. Although the year 1987 saw a slight decrease in the number of

⁵² Jönsson 1992, p. 25.

⁵³ Hiester 1991, p. 38; Haslam 1991, p. 491.

⁵⁴ Herrmann 1991, pp. 220ff.; Allen 1992, p. 123; Allen 1997, p. 221.

⁵⁵ Sakwa 1996, pp. 276f.

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 277f.

statements issued in the EPC framework, it saw an increase in statements directed at states that had never before received any collective attention from the EC members. The following years during this period saw quite dramatic increases in both the frequency of EPC statements in general and the number of new states addressed. Not until 1991, however, were these increases followed by any substantial changes in the number of statements containing references to further activities (either threatened/promised or undertaken).

This again goes against the proposition that a *diminishing* threat from a major state should weaken the will to pursue a collective foreign policy. With the definition of “changing threats” as presented above, this period therefore gives no support to the balance-of-threat-thesis.⁵⁷

Cheerleader to the West 1992–1993

Having lost its ability for global power projection, the new Russian foreign policy turned markedly pro-Western and aimed at showing a constructive role towards the West in international politics.⁵⁸ The Cold War was definitely over.

The new Yeltsin government seemed intent on removing much of the “burden of the past” and was both accommodating and supportive of Western governments’ views and initiatives.⁵⁹ Two of the most telling examples were Russia’s acceptance of the UN sanctions against Yugoslavia in 1992, despite its self-proclaimed status as Serbia’s historical protector, and its support for the deployment of the UN peace-keeping missions in Croatia and Bosnia.⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Were we, however, to add the threats emanating from the uncertainty related to a possibly failing state, this period may obviously be interpreted as a period of an increasing threat from the east of the EC. In that case, the intensified activities within the EPC framework could arguably have co-varied with a changing threat at this time.

⁵⁸ Kozhemiakin 1997, p. 63; Gow 1997, p. 186.

⁵⁹ Bazhanov 1997/98, pp. 16f.

⁶⁰ Gow 1997, p. 194; Kozhemiakin 1997, p. 64.

Russian ties with former friends of the Soviet Union around the world, on the contrary, became increasingly strained. The relations with the remaining Communist regimes (North Korea, China, Vietnam and Cuba) were reduced, and other former clients of the Soviet Union were also alienated.⁶¹ The far-reaching global aspirations of the USSR were, in other words, gone in the immediate post-Soviet period, and substituted with a cooperative attitude towards the West.⁶² Thus, Russian foreign policy during this period was guided by the complete opposite of an expansive or threatening policy.

In the EPC framework, this period would best be described as a stand-still with no dramatic changes taking place in the number of statements issued. The only dimension of the EPC that continued to increase during this period was the number of new states addressed. This was, as shown in chapter three, at least partly a result of the proliferation of newly independent states in Central and Eastern Europe, such as Moldova, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and the four former Yugoslav republics Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. The, at times, innovative EPC initiatives in relation to the Balkan conflicts during this time constituted individual novelties in the collective foreign policy, but can clearly not be attributed to a currently increased threat from Russia during the time.

Thus, the Soviet-threat-as-glue hypothesis, again, can not be substantiated during this period. With the Soviet threat virtually extinguished, and replaced with a smaller and openly pro-Western successor state, the rationale behind the EPC, according to this proposition should have weakened and the collective foreign policy activities should have diminished. Furthermore, to the extent that it would have been the Cold War in itself that had forced the EC members to concert on foreign policy matters, as some have claimed, this period should equally have shown a down-grading of the EPC.

⁶¹ Bazhanov 1997/98, p. 17.

⁶² Sakwa 1996, p. 278; Gow 1997, p. 186.

Concern over “near abroad” and Yugoslavia 1993–1995

As early as 1993, however, Russian policy started to shift towards a somewhat more assertive voice in international politics, in particular in relation to many of the former Soviet republics (the “near abroad”) but also in its relations with the Western states over the policies towards former Yugoslavia. Involvement and/or outright Russian interventions also took place in relation to Georgia over joining the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Ukraine over the Black Sea fleet and the Crimean peninsula, and Moldova and the Baltic states over Russian minorities.⁶³ Direct Russian involvement was also at least alleged in the overthrow of the Azerbaijani president in 1993, as well as in the subsequent undermining of the new president as his views differed from Moscow’s over the exploitation of Caspian Sea oil. Russia also sought to gain international recognition of the CIS as a regional and international organisation, and Foreign Minister Kozyrev even went so far as to refer to the former Soviet republics as a *de facto* Russian dominion.⁶⁴ Furthermore, in November 1993, Russia adopted a new military doctrine that set out rules for the army’s involvement in the “near abroad.” The doctrine also abandoned the previous Soviet policy of never being the first country to use nuclear weapons.⁶⁵

The tone in Russian foreign policy also changed somewhat in relation to the United States. For instance, in November 1994, after disagreements over policies towards Yugoslavia, Russia refused to sign already agreed documents concerning NATO’s Partnership for Peace initiative.⁶⁶ Russia also again voiced objections against the NATO decision to threaten the Bosnian Serbs with air strikes in early 1995.⁶⁷ During the same period, however, Russia concluded agreements with Estonia and Latvia on the withdrawal of troops from

⁶³ Bazhanov 1997/98, p. 22; Allen 1997, p. 232; Kozhemiakin 1997, pp. 70ff; Gow 1997, pp. 192ff.

⁶⁴ Kozhemiakin 1997/98, pp. 71f.; Allen 1997, pp. 232f.

⁶⁵ Webber 1996, p. 159; *Economist*, November 13, 1993.

⁶⁶ Sakwa 1996, p. 280.

⁶⁷ Owen 1995, pp. 264ff.

the territories of the two former Soviet republics.⁶⁸ In the end, Russian relations with the West were not severely damaged and by 1997 Russian cooperation with NATO was institutionalised in the *Founding Act on Mutual Relations*, and a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council was established.⁶⁹

A somewhat different change also took place during this period. With the fourth enlargement of the EU in January 1995, the geographical distance between the Union and Russia diminished. The Finnish accession to the Union gave the EU a new, two thousand kilometres long, border with Russia. The border even contained a latent border conflict between Finland and Russia over the Karelia area.⁷⁰

This period, of both increased Russian assertiveness and a change in geographic proximity to the EU, was followed in 1995–1996 by an increase in EPC/CFSP activities in general, as described in chapter three. This increased activity also included a more active common policy towards Russia. It included *inter alia* the signing of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia already in mid-1994, and the adoption of a European Union Action Plan for Russia in 1996. In the Action Plan, the EU members expressed a commitment “to establishing a substantial partnership with Russia in order to promote the democratic and economic reform process, to enhance respect for human rights, to consolidate peace, stability and security in order to avoid new conflict lines in Europe and to achieve the full integration of Russia into the community of free and democratic nations.”⁷¹ The Plan contained numerous initiatives (new and old) which the EU pledged to continue, including the areas of disarmament, arms export controls, conflict prevention, the role of the OSCE in Chechnya, retraining of demobilised Soviet army personnel, and increased EU-Russia cooperation with a view to prevent and suppress illegal traffic in nuclear material, just to

⁶⁸ Kozhemiakin 1997, p. 64.

⁶⁹ Duke 2000, p. 155.

⁷⁰ Prozorov 2004.

⁷¹ *European Foreign Policy Bulletin*, doc. 96/143.

mention a few. The EU activities in regard to Russia constituted however only a very small portion of the total CFSP activities. Nonetheless, this period constitutes one of the few periods during which the proposition about a major threatening state as a force behind increased collective foreign policy cannot be refuted.

NATO enlargement and the Kosovo controversy 1998–1999

In 1998 and 1999, Russian rhetoric again took on a more assertive tone in relation to two distinct events: NATO enlargement and NATO's military intervention in Kosovo. In connection with the Alliance's decision to welcome the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary into the club, the political language used by Moscow was quite severe. It seems however that the rhetoric far surpassed the concrete steps that Russia took to counter the decision.⁷² A more tense situation developed however after NATO's plans and subsequent decision to use force in response to the conflict in Kosovo, as Russia blocked a UN Security Council resolution to that effect.⁷³ Nonetheless, Russia did not, despite allusions to that effect, provide Milosevic with air-defence systems or in any other way break the arms embargo imposed by the UN against Yugoslavia.⁷⁴

The boldest Russian move during the Kosovo war took place after the air strikes, and in connection with the deployment of the NATO-led Kosovo peace-keeping force (KFOR). In an attempt to secure a substantive role for Russia in the discussions on the future of Kosovo – including a separate Russian zone in the UN-led administrative mission in post-war Kosovo – Russian peace-keepers stationed in Bosnia were ordered to relocate and in effect “occupy” Pristina's airport ahead of the arrival of the KFOR troops. They refused to leave despite NATO's demands, but later had to ask KFOR troops to deliver basic supplies such as water. Despite having resulted in a considerably cooler relationship between Russia and the

⁷² Art 1998, p. 387.

⁷³ *Economist*, October 10, 1998; Mandelbaum 1999, p. 7.

⁷⁴ *Economist*, March 20, 1999; *Economist*, March 27, 1999.

West, the discussions on how to secure peace in Kosovo went on, and eventually a Russian contingent was placed under the KFOR structure.⁷⁵

This last period clearly coincided with greater cohesiveness in the EU's collective foreign policy. During 1998, the number of CFSP statements issued again increased, only to take a slight downturn in 1999. The content of the statements, in terms of actions undertaken, increased substantially, as did the details and variety of the thematic coverage. Though few statements were concerned with Russia, two of them did, however, signal a wish to deepen security-related cooperation between the EU and Russia. The first was the adoption of the Union's common strategy on Russia. It was the first common strategy ever adopted by the EU, and it spelled out the EU's objectives for its partnership with Russia, the means whereby the EU planned to implement the strategy, and specific policy areas which the EU prioritised in this work.⁷⁶ The second notable CFSP activity this year in relation to Russia was the Joint Action on a cooperation programme on non-proliferation and disarmament in Russia.⁷⁷

The viability of the balance-of-threat thesis

In sum then, the changes in EPC and CFSP activities rarely, if ever, coincided with any visible changes in the expansionist or offensive tendencies of the Soviet Union or later, changes in Russian foreign policy. The argument that the EPC developed primarily due to the threat facing the EC member states during the Cold War seems to have little support in the actual policy development. It is even harder to sustain for the period after the Cold War, as it would be difficult (although supposedly not impossible) to underpin the argument that Russia by the end of the 1990s would have posed more of a

⁷⁵ Mandelbaum 1999, p. 7; *Economist*, June 19, 1999.

⁷⁶ *European Foreign Policy Bulletin*, doc. 99/104.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, doc. 99/266.

threat to the EU members that did the USSR during at least parts of the Cold War.⁷⁸

Only twice – in connection with the Balkan wars in the mid-1990s and the Kosovo crisis in 1998–99 – did changes in the CFSP clearly coincide with changes towards a more assertive or expansionist Russian foreign policy. Interestingly, however, the changes in the CFSP that were constituted by a step-up in the policy towards Russia were primarily aimed at *increased cooperation* with the eastern neighbour. This is clearly not a policy development that would have been predicted by the balance-of-threat thesis, and is not a policy development that resembles any type of classic balancing behaviour. These specific changes in the CFSP are rather examples of a policy to diminish the potential threat from Russia, by tying it into new arrangements and agreements that would be both politically and economically costly for Russia to abandon.⁷⁹ Much EU attention has been directed at the political instability in Russia, and the fate of the Russian nuclear arsenal, but the reaction has not in any visible way been to “balance” the threat but rather to try and abate it at the source.

The balance-of-threat hypothesis can thus not, and certainly not by itself, satisfactorily explain the growth of the EPC/CFSP since its inception in 1970. The findings in this chapter rather suggest that the link between threats from a major state and foreign policy cooperation, if there is one at all, is more likely the opposite of the balance-of-threat-thesis. During periods with a lesser threat from the Soviet Union and later Russia, the EU members have often also stepped up their foreign policy cooperation. As will be shown in the next chapter, however, these events are most likely nothing but coinciding trends without any causal links. There may well be far better explanations available.

⁷⁸ The most important question related to this possible uncertainty is obviously whether the EU members *perceived* Russia during the 1990s as a greater threat than that posed by the Soviet Union in the previous decades. At any rate, judging from the Swedish defence planning, it seems as if that has certainly not been the case (see for instance Bengtsson & Ericson 2001, pp. 189f.).

⁷⁹ Cf. Hoffmann 1995/1991, p. 283.

CHAPTER SIX

Balancing Global Influence?

THE MOST ELEGANT AND TIME-HONOURED theory of international order, as one prominent American scholar quite correctly points out, is that “order is the result of balancing by states under conditions of anarchy to counter opposing power concentrations or threats.”¹ In the previous chapter, however, it was demonstrated that this theory of international order could not serve to explain why a group of European states increasingly act collectively on issues related to international security management. At least, one might add, the theory was not particularly helpful in our case if “opposing power concentrations or threats” were interpreted to mean an actor or power seen as a threat by the cooperating states. But, what if we were instead to interpret an “opposing power concentration” as being the power with the greatest influence in the international system?²

THE DESIRE FOR GLOBAL INFLUENCE

As discussed in chapter two, the balance of power thesis may in fact generate three different propositions about what type of power a

¹ Ikenberry 2002, p. 3.

² In a sense, it would perhaps be more correct to say that this alternative interpretation of the balance of power thesis rests on equating the “opposing power concentration” with the power that possesses the degree of influence that the cooperating states would wish to have. Seeing, however, that the case under study here consists of EU members that – contrary to many other states in the international system – have no hesitation about wanting to affect events and situations around the world, we may from the outset speak of the “opposing power concentration” as the actor with the greatest global influence.

group of states should be assumed to balance. The first one, the balancing-military-assets-thesis was discarded immediately, and the second one, the balancing-a-common-threat-thesis, was found quite irrelevant in the previous chapter. We are thus left with the third of Jeffrey Hart's proposed conceptions of power: the ability to influence events. Also when conceiving of power as the ability to influence international events, we may again use a number of mostly realist assumptions that will generate an alternative proposition about when cooperation on international security management should increase as a result of external events.

An overlooked balance-of-influence argument

The first assumption, then, would be that states are influence-maximisers. Secondly, we should continue to assume that cooperation on international security management can be seen by states as one possible balancing strategy. However, and contrary to the balance-of-threat thesis, the balancing behaviour would be assumed to be undertaken not in relation to a particularly threatening actor but *in relation to the most influential actor in the system*. Thirdly, also by analogy with the reasoning on why states form military alliances, we may assume that states' attitudes towards institutionalised cooperation as a balancing strategy will depend on how they perceive the optimal balance between *influence gains* from collective action and *autonomy losses* resulting from the same action.³

Cooperation should then take place only if the perceived benefits of doing so are greater than the costs. As long as there is no strongly perceived need to balance influence, the autonomy losses may often outweigh the influence gains from collective action, thereby accounting in part for the rare occurrence of institutionalised cooperation in the "high politics" field.⁴ We may however also assume that when

³ Cf. Snyder 1997, pp. 43f.

⁴ This argument is analogous to that of Morgenthau (1948/1993, p. 197), who argued that a "nation will shun alliances if it believes that it is strong enough to hold its own unaided or that the burden of the commitments resulting from the alliance is likely to outweigh the advantages to be expected."

the need for international influence seems particularly high, the perceived gains from collective action should outweigh the autonomy losses. Such a need for increased international influence should be most acutely felt during times when the most influential actor pursues policies that the potentially balancing states disagree with, thereby highlighting the need for collective action in order to increase influence.

In other words, these assumptions also lead to a proposition about when we should expect variation in the perceived need for cooperation. The perceived gains from cooperation should be most visible during times when the most influential actor pursues policies that some or all of the potentially balancing states disagree with. Thus, diverging views between the cooperating group and the most influential actor over international security management should induce intensified cooperation. And, conversely, if the most influential actor(s) pursue international strategies that are perfectly in line with the preferences of the balancing states, the perceived need to cooperate should be at a stand-still or perhaps even decrease. The need to influence international events should, simply put, be smaller if an influential actor takes care of the business in a way that the cooperating group approves of.

In sum, we arrive at the proposition that the balancing is undertaken in relation to the influence of other actors in the international system, and that *foreign policy cooperation should, in particular, develop or intensify after periods of disagreements with the most influential actor over how to manage international events that are of some importance to both parties.*

Contrary to the balance-of-threat-thesis, as discussed in the previous chapter, this line of reasoning should hold even if the cooperating group does not in any immediate way perceive major actor(s) to constitute a threat to their own security. Disagreements over security related issues may equally materialise among the closest of allies.⁵ This balance-of-influence-thesis, as we might call it, should thereby even hold equally well in relation to the conditions within a group of

⁵ Cf. discussion in Jönsson 1979, p. 73; Wallander 1992, p. 50.

states that are closely tied together in collective security arrangements. By analogy with the balance-of-threat thesis, the need to balance should be most strongly felt in relation to the most influential actor, even if that actor happens to be a major ally and friend. During the period analysed in this study, the globally most influential actor has been the US.⁶

The empirical balancing-the-US-influence argument...

The relationship between the EC/EU and the United States, throughout the post-war period, has been a paradoxical one. On the one hand, the relations have rested on a complex and interdependent relationship, founded on a very wide set of shared values and purposes. On the other hand, the relations have also been marked by competition, disagreement and crises over both the nature of the relationship itself and over policies towards other parts of the world.⁷

The view that EPC was initiated – at least in part – in order to influence international events is hardly controversial. The suggestion, however, that EPC and its successor CFSP might have continued to develop primarily as a result of a generally perceived wish to balance American influence on international affairs is more rarely found in the academic empirical literature. There are however some analysts who have pointed out a possible link between the two on some specific occasions. For instance, and although referring primarily to military matters and the Western European Union (WEU), Simon Duke has argued that during the EPC years, a series of disputes between the US and its allies “encouraged greater exploration of European security co-operation.”⁸ John Peterson and Elizabeth Bomberg have argued that during the early years, “EPC became a form of self-defence to try to ensure that the Community’s preferences were not discounted, or even ignored [by the Nixon admini-

⁶ Although arguably with some competition, at times, from the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

⁷ Smith, M. 1978, pp. 26f.; Haass 1999, p. 1.

⁸ Duke 2000, p. 73.

stration].”⁹ Writing more specifically on the effects of the strained transatlantic (and intra-European) relations after the Yom Kippur War and the oil crisis, Christopher Hill argued in 1978 that “the growing consensus on the need for a common European foreign policy of some kind testifies to the surviving desire to play an important role in world affairs, if not as individual middle-rank states, then as a collectivity.”¹⁰

Taking a broader sweep, David Allen and Michael Smith wrote a few years later that in “their reactions to Camp David, to the Iranian revolution, to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to the events in Poland and to the question of economic sanctions, the Europeans did indeed begin to build common postures [...] around their mutual differences with the United States.”¹¹ Almost two decades on, after the transatlantic (and intra-European) rows over how to handle Iraq in 2003, Frasier Cameron pointed out that the “EU has often moved ahead in the past after such situations.”¹²

A slightly different version of this thesis has also sometimes been put forward by scholars who argue that the EU members sometimes have stepped up their cooperation on foreign policy during periods when the US was either showing little interest in exerting its international influence over issues that were important to the EU members or was swiftly changing strategies on international issues. One observer has for instance noted that the EC members were able to act in concert within the context of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) mainly because “the United States displayed a general disinterest in the CSCE process during its initial phase.”¹³ Another EPC-analyst has argued that the EPC was “subtly counterbalancing occasional abrupt fluctuations in American foreign policy.”¹⁴ Writing specifically about common defence policies among the European states and the American mili-

⁹ Peterson & Bomberg 1999, p. 229.

¹⁰ Hill 1978, p. 13.

¹¹ Allen & Smith 1984, p. 189.

¹² Cameron 2003.

¹³ Tsakaloyannis 1991, p. 37.; cf. Nuttall 1992, p. 57.

¹⁴ Pijpers 1991, p. 27. For a similar argument, see Featherstone & Ginsberg, 1996, p. 85.

tary presence in Europe, Michael Howard has also observed that: “the fear of abandonment by the United States, whether at the whim of an irresponsible president or by the votes of an understandably resentful and parsimonious Congress, is a very effective incentive in hastening such integration.”¹⁵ Neither of these scholars has however tested these arguments in a more systematic manner over time.

Judging from both these empirical observations and from the balance-of-influence thesis as presented above, it is not so far-fetched to ask whether we may perhaps see, throughout the history of the EPC/CFSP, changes in the collective foreign policy following periods when the preferred European and American strategies, primarily towards events in the rest of the world, have differed considerably.¹⁶ These events should serve as impulses toward increased cooperation by boosting the political will to attempt to exert European influence over international events.

... and its opponents

More often, however, CFSP-analysts tend to argue in favour of a reverse relationship, or at least a caveat in the above, by focusing primarily on the heavy European dependence on US security guarantees. By assuming that EPC could never have been initiated without the basic security provided by the American military presence in Europe and the mutual defence guarantees of the Atlantic alliance, many argue that a collective European voice in international affairs will only be possible as long as the transatlantic link is alive and

¹⁵ Howard 1987/88, p. 482.

¹⁶ It is however also possible that we should expect changes in the CFSP during or after shifts in the US strategies towards *European security*. Periods of diminished American interest towards European security affairs should be assumed to generate increased cooperation, as such a situation too would signify differing preferences over strategies between the EU members (or maybe even more correctly European members of both NATO and the EU) and the US, at least as long as the Europeans want to keep the American security guarantees. Such periods should be interpreted, by most or all EU members, as events that highlight the need for cooperation. Thereby, the political will to formulate collective positions and activities should increase.

healthy.¹⁷ There will furthermore, according to this view, constantly be EU members that value the transatlantic relationship over a collective EU stance on foreign affairs.¹⁸ The result during the Cold War, as William Wallace has argued, was that a common EPC line was rarely sustained for very long if the US was of another opinion:

The dependence of West European states on American military commitment, during the cold war, limited the attractions of this balancing strategy to other states, the German government most of all. Over Middle East policy, in 1973-4 and again in 1981, European governments deliberately diverged from the line set by American leadership, provoking sharp transatlantic disagreements and a retreat from the autonomous approaches briefly adopted.¹⁹

According to this view, many EU members should, in particular, show less interest in a collective foreign policy if/when they fear a reduction in US attention to European security. That is, if the US reduces its interest in influencing events *in the European continent*, including its willingness to provide a military presence, cooperation between the EC/EU members should become more difficult to sustain. This proposition has for instance been advanced by Joseph Joffe, who claims that cooperation was made possible and easy under *Pax Americana*. The situation, he argues, would however be entirely different were the US to withdraw from Europe:

The habits of cooperation would not be unlearned, but its practice would once again be soured by the logic of relative gain. [...] Pressures for self-sufficiency would mount, inevitably leading nations to contribute less to the “collective good” of security rather than more. [...] Facing a new demand curve for security, individual West European states would not necessarily engage in communal production but might scour the market for substitutes.²⁰

¹⁷ See for instance Kupchan 1998, p. 43; cf. Mearsheimer 1990, pp. 47f.

¹⁸ See for instance Art 1996; and Gordon 1997/98.

¹⁹ Wallace 2002.

²⁰ Joffe 1987, p. 188. For similar arguments related to the EC/EU, see for instance Waltz 1979, pp. 70f.; and Art 1996, p. 36. For an opposite argument, i.e. that the fundamental rationale for European integration was security concerns between the members, but

In other words, and to put it rather bluntly, according to these observers the global influence of the US should rather make it quite difficult to forge a collective foreign policy among the EU member states. Instead of being a driving force behind the development of the CFSP, the US, in this view, is rather a dividing force and thereby one of the reasons behind the CFSP failures. Allen and Smith have for instance identified the “special relationship” between the UK and the US as a “sticking-point” in the development of the CFSP.²¹ In a similar vein, two other observers argue that “the attitude taken by the US towards the EU as a whole helps explain why the latter has been unsuccessful in attaining the position of significant international actor.”²² These observations, which in some ways run counter to the examples quoted above, should further highlight the value of systematically testing the viability of the balance-of-influence thesis.

THE HISTORY OF TRANSATLANTIC DISUNITY

In other words, can the successive development of the EPC/CFSP possibly be linked to periods of transatlantic disunity? Answering that question requires an account of the history of transatlantic quarrels since 1970, and a comparison with the stepwise development of the CFSP. Therefore, and for reasons of theory testing, the following is in no way a picture of EU-US relations on security policy issues in general, but rather a very selective story, consisting only of the bits and pieces of transatlantic history that cover the occasions of disunity.²³ Each “period of disunity” is first described generally, and subsequently contrasted with the changes in the EPC/CFSP as described in chapter three. Sometimes, the periods have not been

that an increased unilateralist stance from the US nonetheless would lead to increased cooperation between the Europeans, see Heurlin 1992, p. 80.

²¹ Allen & Smith 1991, p. 105.

²² Chari & Cavatorta 2003, p. 26.

²³ Therefore, while the following account may inadvertently give the impression that the EU-US relations have been plagued by constant disunity over the last decades, no such message is intended. If anything, Alyson Bailes’ (2003) suggestion of an “apparently Panglossian thesis of a US/European love-hate-love cycle” should in many ways better reflect the view on transatlantic relations underpinning this chapter.

very far apart in time, and on at least one occasion even difficult to separate from one another. When such periods have nonetheless been portrayed as separate below, this choice has rested upon the judgement that the previously contentious issues have fallen into the background while others have instead surfaced.

Neglected and quarrelling over the Middle East 1972–1974

By the beginning of the 1970s, and in the international climate of détente, relations between the United States and the EC were not characterised by any serious disagreements.²⁴ One issue that had raised concerns in Western Europe at the turn of the decade was the uncertainty about the continued American military presence in Europe. Burdened by its huge military expenditures abroad, the US Congress sought in 1969, and again in 1971, to reduce significantly the US military presence in Europe. Both times the Administration resisted the legislation. The second time, however, the defeat of the Congress nonetheless resulted in stronger pressure on the European allies to assume a greater role in the burden-sharing of the defence costs.²⁵

By 1972, however, a period of gradually more strained relations started to emerge. Whereas the SALT I treaty between the US and USSR had formalised détente and signalled improved relations between the superpowers, it had also been agreed without the inclusion of other NATO members, even the two European nuclear powers France and the UK. For the EC members, this seemed to signal that the Nixon administration saw relations with the Soviet Union as taking precedence over relations within the alliance.²⁶ This was a feeling that lingered on during the following year.

Between the EC members, a belief that political integration was on the move had started to sink in. In October 1972, at the Paris summit of EC Heads of State or Government, the EC members

²⁴ Joffe 1987, p. 12.

²⁵ Duncombe 2001; Nuttall 1992, p. 82.

²⁶ Hiester 1991, pp. 32f.

declared their aim of “transforming before the end of the present decade the whole complex of their relations into a European Union.”²⁷ The decision to enlarge the Community had already been made, and the EC members were themselves surprised over their successful collective approach to the Helsinki Conference (which was later to turn into the CSCE).²⁸ In the midst of this optimism, the US decided to call for a new “Atlantic Charter,” which was to contain a transatlantic “agenda for the future” on economics, diplomacy, and defence. The call was issued by Henry Kissinger in April 1973, in a speech that proclaimed 1973 a “Year of Europe.”²⁹

However, that speech was not well received in Western Europe. Kissinger suggested in it that the US had *global* interests and responsibilities, whereas the EC only had *regional* ones, something which according to one observer “hurt the pride not only of the traditional Nation States, but also of the nascent European political persona.”³⁰ Kissinger also stated that “[d]iplomacy is the subject of frequent consultations but is essentially being conducted by traditional nation-states.”³¹

In an apparent reaction to both the call for the Charter and the American attitude to the EC members’ growing aspirations for a collective political voice in international affairs, the EC members set out to elaborate a “Declaration on European Identity.”³² The Declaration, it was stated, would “enable them to achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place they occupy in world affairs.”³³ It contained an admission, or an explanation, that the:

²⁷ Quoted in Nuttall 1992, p. 83.

²⁸ Wallace & Allen 1977, p. 233.

²⁹ Kissinger 1973.

³⁰ Nuttall 1992, p. 86; cf. Gardner 1997, pp. 4f.

³¹ Kissinger 1973.

³² Nuttall 1992, pp. 88f. As one observer puts it, it was “almost a cultural shock to the American administration when, in 1973, the Nine sent the Danish Foreign Minister to represent them at the opening of the negotiations with Henry Kissinger” (Rummel 1988, p. 137).

³³ The Declaration on European Identity is published in *Bulletin of the European Communities* 12–1979.

present international problems are difficult for any of the Nine to solve alone. International developments and the growing concentration of power and responsibility in the hands of a very small number of great powers mean that Europe must unite and speak increasingly with a single voice if it wants to make itself heard and play its proper role in the world.

It was a signal that the EC too had global interests, and was seemingly a direct reply to Kissinger's speech. The declaration listed the EC's accomplishments and aspirations throughout the international system. It spoke, for instance, of the EC's interest in preserving the historic links with the Middle East, a policy for development aid in a world-wide scale, a balanced world economic system, contributing to cooperation with the USSR, the relations with China, the relations with other Asian states, the traditional bonds with Latin America, and of the EC members' contribution to international progress by adopting common positions in for instance the UN. Maybe most importantly, it stated that the close ties with the US did "not conflict with the determination of the Nine to establish themselves as a distinct and original entity." It also stated that cooperation should be developed with the US "on the *basis of equality* and in a spirit of friendship (emphasis added)."

To a large extent, the worsening relations across the Atlantic stemmed from disagreements over how to handle issues related to the Middle East conflict. The diverging views over strategies towards the Palestinian question had already begun to surface in 1971, but the October war in 1973 made matters worse. The EC members had a view of the events that was fundamentally different from that of the United States. The latter, fearing a Soviet intervention, was perceived by the Europeans as being obsessed with the Soviet threat. Nor did the Europeans share the wholehearted American support for Israel.³⁴ The EC members (including the UK) even denied the Americans use of NATO military bases for airlifting war material to Israel. Instead, the US had to conclude an agreement with Portugal on the

³⁴ Allen & Smith 1984, p. 188; Joffe 1987, p. xii; Peterson 1996, pp. 38f.; Bronstone 1997, p. 74.

use of the Azores Islands as a logistics centre.³⁵ As one analyst wrote, the October war “helped to restore faith in the possibilities of a united Europe,” and consultations “on all levels, particularly between British and French officials, acquired new impetus.”³⁶

Meeting in Brussels in November the same year, the EC foreign ministers issued a “Declaration by the Nine on the Situation in the Middle East.”³⁷ The declaration countered the American diplomatic efforts in almost every respect. It led the Israelis to express both “dismay” and “surprise,” and Kissinger privately to express “disgust” with the Europeans.³⁸ The declaration mentioned for the first time “the legitimate rights of the Palestinians,” and also called for the peace negotiations to be placed “in the framework of the United Nations.” The latter was a response to the US who had, together with the USSR and the parties to the conflict but with the exclusion of the EC members, convened the Geneva conference in order to find a solution to the conflict.

A month later, as Kissinger was intensely pursuing his “shuttle diplomacy” with a view to finding a solution within the Geneva conference, the EC Heads of State and Government met in Copenhagen. The summit received an unexpected visit by a delegation of Arab foreign ministers, who had been encouraged by the support in the EPC declaration a month earlier. They proposed the initiation of a Euro-Arab dialogue, and demanded an immediate reply. Taken by surprise, the EC states cautiously signalled a positive response, while anticipating American reactions. The news was not cordially received by Kissinger who, as two experts have put it, was “driven to near distraction” when learning about the announcement.³⁹ This event further exacerbated American irritation over the Europeans’ meddling in affairs where they could not themselves contribute constructively.⁴⁰

³⁵ Calvocoressi 1991, p. 60; *MERIP Reports* No 22, Nov. 1973, p. 24; Sus 1974, pp. 73f.

³⁶ Sus 1974, p. 69 and 74.

³⁷ *Bulletin of the European Communities*, 10–1973, p. 106.

³⁸ Sus 1974, p. 77 and 80; Nuttall 1992, p. 95.

³⁹ Allen & Smith 1984, p. 189; see also Nuttall 1992, pp. 96ff.

⁴⁰ Allen & Smith 1984, p. 189.

The nine EC members thus disagreed with the US not only over how to handle the war, but also over relations with the oil-producing Arab states, over energy policy, and over nuclear non-proliferation which became an increasingly politicised issue in connection with the discussions on alternative sources of energy in the wake of the oil crisis, all of which in turn raised great suspicion and irritation in Washington.⁴¹ In the spring of 1974 President Nixon even accused the EC members of “ganging up” on the United States.⁴² Kissinger later commented that it dawned upon the Americans that a “Europe reasserting its personality was bound to seek to redress the balance of influence with the United States.”⁴³ After a tacit agreement at an informal ministerial meeting at the Schloss Gymnich outside Bonn, in April 1974,⁴⁴ the Nine pledged to inform and consult the US on EPC matters, with a “pragmatic approach” and upon agreement between themselves. This decision put an end to the openly hostile relations between Nixon and the EC members.⁴⁵

This period, with an “atmosphere of recriminations and suspicions”⁴⁶ between the EC members and the US, thus displayed several transatlantic disagreements over international security management. However, as was seen in chapter three, no substantial quantitative changes took place in the EPC framework during this period. But considering the fact that the EPC had only very recently been initiated, it produced a somewhat surprising amount of unity with both the Middle East declarations and the Declaration on European Identity. The former was called the “first major common political European move” by French newspapers,⁴⁷ and the latter may even be seen as the first stumbling attempt to formulate a collective view on the group’s global interests and strategies.

⁴¹ Regelsberger 1990, p. 58; Lieber 1983, p. 169; Kahler 1983, p. 276; Ifestos 1987, p. 422.

⁴² Smith, M. 1978, p. 27.

⁴³ Kissinger 1982, p. 579.

⁴⁴ This was the first of what soon became the regular Gymnich meetings (see chapter four).

⁴⁵ Allen & Smith 1984, p. 189; Regelsberger 1988, p. 15; Nuttall 1992, pp. 90f.

⁴⁶ Smith M. 1978, p. 27.

⁴⁷ *Sus* 1974, p. 76.

There was also, during this period, a slight increase in the number of statements issued in general, and in fact all the statements issued in 1974, although admittedly very few, contained references to actions undertaken by the Nine/EC. Thus the balance-of-influence-thesis is at least not contradicted for this period. It is also noteworthy that the years *following* this period (1976–1978) were characterised by an absence of any serious transatlantic foreign policy differences, and also by a stand-still, or even a reduction in EPC activity.

An abundance of crises 1978–1982

Relations between the EC and US improved somewhat during the Ford administration. Among other things, formal and regular consultations (twice a year) between the US president and the head of state or government of the EC Presidency were initiated in 1976.⁴⁸ Transatlantic relations improved further, at least initially, with the election of President Carter the following year. Carter seemed committed to mend transatlantic relations, and in 1978 became the first ever US president to pay an official visit to the EC Commission in Brussels.⁴⁹ However, the European worries about being neglected in relation to the SALT II treaty, as mentioned above, soon turned to worries about Carter's increasingly confrontational stance against the Soviet Union. This resulted in growing scepticism about US determination to cultivate détente, and generated a somewhat more positive tone in the European support for SALT II.⁵⁰

During 1979 transatlantic relations took a turn for the worse.⁵¹ The first event in a series of overlapping crises was the quarrels in 1978 over the American development, and planned deployment in West Germany, of enhanced radiation warheads (ERWs), the so called "neutron bomb".⁵² During the same period, the US brokered the Camp David accords, and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty,

⁴⁸ Gardner 1997, p. 9.

⁴⁹ Peterson 1996, p. 40; Kahler 1983, p. 277; Gardner 1997, p. 5.

⁵⁰ Hiester 1991, p. 33; Kahler 1983, p. 277.

⁵¹ Joffe 1987, p. 77; Gardner 1997, p. 5.

⁵² Lundestad 1991, p. 211; Joffe 1987, p. 73.

matters that were viewed with concern in Europe, where it was feared they would preclude rather than promote a comprehensive solution to the situation in the Middle East.⁵³ Subsequently, the deterioration in the relations between the superpowers in 1979 was followed by a number of new disagreements between the United States and its European partners. Two observers even speak about the “emergence of a transatlantic conflict syndrome” during this time.⁵⁴

In November 1979, in the wake of the Shah’s flight from Iran, the American embassy in Teheran was invaded and the embassy staff was taken hostage.⁵⁵ The United States immediately reacted by imposing an embargo on Iranian oil, and freezing Iranian assets in the US. The EC members were also quick to react, this time in unison. As Douglas Hurd later noted:

The Ten were among the first to make their views plain. They did this in a series of interviews where all of the Heads of Mission of Community countries met senior Iranian Ministers and officials with the Presidency acting as the principal spokesman for the Ten. In the chaos of the early days following the seizure of the American embassy – when the British embassy also was temporarily in the hands of the students – the Ten were able to speak more plainly together than if they had been acting as individuals. [...] Later the attractive force of the Ten proved such that the Japanese ambassador used to join their consultations and demarches.⁵⁶

The EC members were however considerably more reluctant to impose sanctions, despite strong American pressure, fearing that such actions would only weaken the position of the moderates in Iran and possibly reinforce the links between Moscow and Teheran. Despite verbally condemning the hostage taking, it took some four months before the EC finally gave in to US pressure on the issue of sanctions. They did so after the US had made it clear that it would otherwise consider military action to free the hostages. By the begin-

⁵³ Artner 1980, p. 421.

⁵⁴ Kahler & Link 1996, p. 86.

⁵⁵ Calvocoressi 1991, pp. 355f.

⁵⁶ Hurd 1981, p. 385.

ning of April 1980, the Nine issued a threat of sanctions to Teheran, and began the preparations. On April 22, the nine foreign ministers again discussed the issue in the margins of a Council meeting in Luxembourg. The White House signalled satisfaction and the delay of any military action until the summer. The Nine were taken as much by surprise as the rest of the world when President Carter just two days later nonetheless ordered a military hostage-rescue operation. The operation failed to release the hostages, and eight Americans were killed. Despite the resulting strain in transatlantic relations, the nine foreign ministers decided in May 1980 to impose the sanctions against Iran.⁵⁷

The hostage-taking in Teheran was followed only weeks later by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. The Carter administration reacted sharply, by immediately imposing economic sanctions and by voicing a proposal for a boycott of the Moscow Olympics. SALT II was also put on ice, and Carter proposed large increases in the defence budget.⁵⁸ America's European allies did not, however, completely share Washington's reading of the situation and were somewhat surprised at the harsh American reaction.⁵⁹ Concerned first and foremost with détente on the European continent, the Europeans preferred to define the invasion as a North-South issue. Internally somewhat divided, but united in their general doubt about the efficiency of sanctions and worried about the effects on détente, the European response was therefore less dramatic. Whereas the EC members collectively gave verbal support for the American measures, the Europeans were less keen on imposing sanctions of their own. Their immediate reaction was to withdraw the Community food aid programme for Afghanistan, and to distribute emergency aid to the Afghan refugees. The EC members also implemented measures to prevent undercutting the US sanctions on

⁵⁷ Nuttall 1992, pp. 168ff; Calvocoressi 1991, pp. 356f.

⁵⁸ Kahler 1983, p. 278; Bowker & Williams 1988, pp. 234f.; Martin 1992, p. 191; Lundestad 1991, p. 140.

⁵⁹ Calleo 1987, pp. 68f.; cf. Hulett 1982, p. 228.

grains exports to the USSR.⁶⁰ A few months later, again after strong American pressure, the Europeans also agreed to a “no exceptions” policy on high-technology exports to the Soviet Union.⁶¹

The disagreements over strategies in relation to events both in Iran and in Afghanistan, in combination with disagreements over nuclear strategy, created what some have even termed a crisis in transatlantic relations.⁶² The strains between the European allies and the Carter administration increased further during the summer of 1980 when the EC issued its “Venice declaration”, proposing a different solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict than that advocated by the US in the Camp David peace process. At the end of Carter’s presidency, transatlantic relations in general, and relations between Carter and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in particular, were severely strained.⁶³

Furthermore, the growing unrest in Poland in 1980–1981, which coincided with the election of Ronald Reagan in the US, did nothing to improve relations across the Atlantic. The European and the American responses to the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981 were at variance with one another and showed, again, fundamental differences in the reading of the situation. When General Jaruzelsky, pressured by the USSR, proclaimed martial law in Poland in December 1981, the immediate American reaction was to announce sanctions against the Polish government, followed by sanctions directed also against the Soviet Union. The US took the view that sanctions would serve several purposes, one of which would be to reduce the Soviet resources available for military spending. The United States also pressed the West Europeans to follow suit, but while condemning in strong diplomatic language the imposition of martial law and warning against an open Soviet intervention, the Europeans did not in any substantial way give in to

⁶⁰ Burt 1980, pp. 110f.; Nuttall 1992, pp. 154ff; Joffe 1987, p. 3; Kahler 1983, p. 278.

⁶¹ Martin 1992, pp. 194ff.

⁶² Kahler 1983, p. 279.

⁶³ Ibid.; Allen & Smith 1990, p. 231; Gardner 1997, p. 5.; Calleo 1987, p. 70; Mendl 1984, pp. 65f.

American wishes. The EC members, although also internally divided, were doubtful about the effects of sanctions and instead emphasised the positive results of economic interdependence and continued trade. The collective measures taken by the EC states were limited to certain quota reductions on imports from the Soviet Union. The EC members refused to put blame on the Polish government, and never contemplated any Community sanctions against Poland. The Polish example, according to the European view, showed that détente had indeed generated positive effects and had restrained the Soviet Union in its response to the events in Poland.⁶⁴

The EC-US debate over sanctions against the Soviet Union was however also closely tied to another transatlantic disagreement that had already contributed to the strained relations during the last years of the Carter administration – Western Europe's participation in the Siberian natural gas pipeline project. The pipeline, built to transport natural gas from Siberia to Western Europe, was to be finished in the mid-1980s and intended to provide ten Western European states with natural gas from the Soviet Union. The project was largely financed by EC members (by credits granted to the Soviet Union) and relied heavily on Western technology.⁶⁵

One part of the American sanctions against the USSR consisted of an export ban on components for the gas turbine compressors built by Western European companies and due for further export to the Soviet Union for the construction of the gas pipeline.⁶⁶ A French firm, capable of producing the same components (under licence from General Electric) nonetheless continued to provide the pipeline project with the compressors. West Germany also granted the Soviet Union over \$500 million in new credits, and was contemplating full financing of the pipeline. By the summer of 1982, this led to an extension of the American embargo to include component manufacturers that were subsidiaries or licensees of American firms. The

⁶⁴ Hulett 1982, pp. 228f.; Lieber 1983, p. 176; Kahler 1983, pp. 289f.; Hoffmann 1987, p. 26; Nuttall 1992, pp. 200ff.

⁶⁵ Calvocoressi 1991, pp. 50f.; Kahler 1983, pp. 291ff.

⁶⁶ Kahler 1983, p. 293; Calvocoressi 1991, pp. 50f.

foreign ministers of the EC reacted in unison and disputed the decision. They also encouraged their firms to disobey what they perceived to be dubious extraterritorial legislation. In response, the US imposed new direct sanctions on the European firms that continued to deliver components to the pipeline project. Instead of a trade war with the Soviet Union, there seemed to be one developing between the US and the EC.⁶⁷ Henry Kissinger called it a crisis that was “more genuinely, objectively, serious than ever.”⁶⁸

What already looked like a looming “outright rupture in the transatlantic relations”⁶⁹ seemed to worsen further in June 1982 when Israel invaded Lebanon. The EC members, using for the first time the new crisis mechanism introduced into the EPC framework the previous year, were swift in producing a collective stance despite internal divisions. They agreed to distribute emergency aid to the refugees in Lebanon, refused to sign the second EC-Israeli Financial Protocol, and postponed a planned meeting of the Joint EC-Israeli Cooperation Council.⁷⁰ They were however not able to keep up the momentum or to propose any further constructive solutions. France wanted to extend the EPC position, to recognise the PLO as an “essential interlocutor” and to mention the Palestinians’ rights to a state structure of their choice, but did not receive enough support from the other members. Instead, together with Egypt, France attempted to move things forward in the UN Security Council. A French-Egyptian draft Security Council resolution, aimed at renewing the Middle East peace process and re-emphasising the role of the Palestinians, was however vetoed by the United States.⁷¹

Both the disagreements over the pipeline project and the Middle East found (at least temporary) solutions in late 1982. The dispute over the pipeline ended in November, as a deal was struck to the effect that the American sanctions against European firms would end

⁶⁷ Lieber 1983, pp. 176ff; Kahler 1983, pp. 293–299; Allen 2002, p. 40; Kahler & Link 1996, p. 87.

⁶⁸ Kissinger 1982, p. 585.

⁶⁹ Peterson 1996, p. 41.

⁷⁰ *Bulletin of the European Communities* 3–1982, point 1.3.6.

⁷¹ Nuttall 1992, pp. 218ff.; Kahler 1983, pp. 299f.

and the US would not oppose the completion of the pipeline in return for a promise by the West Europeans to refrain from new high technology agreements with the Soviet Union. The disagreements over the Middle East ended more as a result of lack of internal European agreement, in combination with the inclusion of France and Italy in the Lebanese peace-keeping force.⁷²

Thus, by the end of 1982 the transatlantic disagreements seemed temporarily in abeyance. The Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands in April 1982 had not caused any serious quarrels across the Atlantic. The EC members reacted in unison by imposing sanctions against Argentina and the EC Commission issued a statement condemning the aggression "against a British territory linked to the European Community."⁷³ The US subsequently supported and followed suit with sanctions against Argentina. The US and its NATO allies also seemed generally in agreement during the following year over the ongoing processes within NATO.⁷⁴

During this period, between 1979 and 1982, there was also, for the first time in the history of EPC, a considerable rise in the number of statements issued in general. To a large extent, the increase was accounted for by collective statements on the very issues described above, in particular the conflicts in the Middle East. But especially in 1981, both new states and new issues, not always related to the above transatlantic quarrels, also made their way into EPC statements. By 1982, the proportion of statements containing references to activities undertaken also increased considerably compared to previous years. Thus, this period of sometimes severely strained relations between the EC members and the US, primarily over security provision outside their own geographical boundaries, did indeed coincide with the first step of significant change in the contents of the EPC on a general level. It is noteworthy that the Falkland Islands crisis, which is so far the only military invasion that an EU member has been subject to since the inception of the EPC, was one of the few interna-

⁷² Kahler 1983, pp. 293ff; Lieber 1983, pp. 176ff; Nuttall 1992, pp. 218ff.

⁷³ *Bulletin of the European Communities* 4-82, point 1.1.6.

⁷⁴ Calleo 1987, p. 73; Nuttall 1992, pp. 207f.; Peterson 1996, p. 40.

tional events that did not cause any serious disagreements between the US and the EC members.

Could, then, the changes in EPC activities during this period not equally well have been a reaction to the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan rather than the transatlantic quarrels during this period? Arguably not, because if we study the changes in greater detail, we will notice that between 1979 and 1982, it was the year 1980 (i.e. the year immediately following the invasion) that showed the least change. Also, as noted in chapter five, that explanation would not adequately account for the notable changes in EPC during 1979.

Star Wars, Libya, and Central America 1983–1986

Between 1983 and 1986, however, transatlantic relations again became increasingly strained. Two of the issues causing renewed tensions were the American plans for a Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), and the American policy towards Libya. The initial announcement, by the Reagan administration in 1983, about the plans for the SDI came without any prior consultations with the European allies.⁷⁵ It signalled again a unilateral turn in American foreign policy. To the Europeans, the decision seemed to undermine one of the central NATO doctrines – the avoidance of war by nuclear deterrent – and would instead provide the US with a protective shield against a nuclear attack. It also raised questions about future reliance on US commitments to European security. If the initiative were to be countered by the Soviet Union, the prospective battlefield between the superpowers would most certainly be in Europe, where great offensive military power was projected but where relatively little defensive power would exist compared to the shielded superpowers.⁷⁶ The Europeans, however, could not reach an agreement over a common attitude towards the SDI initiative, which was formally

⁷⁵ Berkhof 1987, p. 205; Kahler & Link 1996, p. 87.

⁷⁶ Duke 2000, p. 73; Rummel 1990a, p. 8; Hiester 1991, p. 34; Joffe 1987, p. xiv; Allen & Smith 1990, p. 228; Kahler & Link 1996, p. 88.

launched in 1985, and eventually Germany and the UK ended up participating in the initiative.⁷⁷

The simultaneous developments in northern Africa put further strains on the transatlantic relationship. In 1983, Libya had threatened to march into Egypt, and the same year, first Libyan and then French troops had entered Chad. The US saw the Libyan actions as a new Cold War challenge, and sent AWACS intelligence aircraft to Egypt and offered to support the French militarily in Chad. France, however, saw the American Cold War rhetoric as unhelpful and feared it would only aggravate the conflict. Nonetheless, American ships and aircraft were sent to the coast outside Libya, which only served to raise several European voices over the American tendency to oversimplify and place third world conflicts into the familiar pattern of Cold War thinking.⁷⁸

By the mid-1980s, a large increase in international terrorism was also linked to *inter alia* Libya. In 1985, the airports in Rome and Vienna were hit by terrorist attacks, and evidence pointed to Libyan involvement. The Reagan administration sought to get the Western Europeans to agree on sanctions, again threatening to use force in Libya should the EC fail to comply, but the latter refused. The EC even refused to name Libya as responsible for international terrorism, and the only action taken by the EC members were increased security measures (including airport security and visa policies) and the setting up of a new working group on international terrorism in Brussels. Early in 1986, Reagan announced new sanctions against Libya but excluded subsidiaries of American firms, in order to avoid renewed European complaints over extraterritorial legislation.⁷⁹

In April 1986, a bomb exploded in a night club in West Berlin, killing and injuring American servicemen who frequented the club. The perpetrators were Palestinians, but said to have links with Libyan officials in East Germany.⁸⁰ The US reacted with a bombing

⁷⁷ Nuttall 1992, pp. 196f.

⁷⁸ Calleo 1987, p. 80; Calvocoressi 1991, p. 491.

⁷⁹ Rose 1999, p. 143; Nuttall 1992, p. 303; Allen & Smith 1990, pp. 233f.

⁸⁰ Calvocoressi 1991, p. 133; Rose 1999, p. 144.

raid against several Libyan targets, including Colonel Qaddafi's residence. The Reagan administration first termed the strikes "retaliation", but later rephrased the language to claim, instead, "self-defence" according to article 51 of the UN Charter. Whereas the UK provided indirect military support for the operation, by allowing American use of British airports, the Europeans in general were not in agreement with Reagan over the legality or appropriateness of the air strikes.⁸¹ Many EC members even denied the Americans use of their air space for the operation. In connection with the American air strikes, however, the EC members imposed certain diplomatic sanctions on Libya and also banned arms sales to the country.⁸² In response to Libyan threats against individual EC member states, they declared that any such acts of violence would bring forth "an appropriate response on the part of the Twelve."⁸³ These steps by the EC encouraged President Reagan, who again sought to persuade the Europeans to adopt a new set of sanctions, but with no result.⁸⁴

During 1986, European scepticism over US foreign policy increased further. For instance, the US decided to renew its stocks of chemical weapons, and signalled a halt in its compliance with the unratified SALT II treaty. In June 1986, the Twelve agreed that they needed to strengthen the political dialogue with the US, and by September they had agreed to confirm formally the already existing practice of having every Presidency's foreign minister visit Washington. They also agreed that the twelve embassies in Washington should hold regular contacts with the host government. Only weeks later, however, the US again managed to upset the Europeans as Reagan and Gorbachev met in Reykjavik in October 1986. Again, it seemed that decisions about future security provision in Europe were taken without the involvement of the Western European states.⁸⁵ In addition, the discussions held during the Reykjavik summit seemed

⁸¹ Steinberg & Spiegel 1987, p. 40; Calvocoressi 1991, pp. 13f.; Joffe 1987, p. xii.

⁸² Winnerstig 2000, p. 121; Rose 1999, p. 144, 155.

⁸³ Quote in Hill 1988, p. 176.

⁸⁴ Rose 1999, p. 144.

⁸⁵ Schlesinger 1987, p. 431; Howard 1987/88, pp. 479f.; Nuttall 1992, p. 198; Rummel 1990b, p. 183; Allen & Smith 1990, p. 229.

to signal a serious risk of decoupling US and West European security strategies and to leave the Europeans more open to security threats from Soviet conventional forces. These risks, in combination with the fact that the Europeans had not been consulted beforehand, led to what some have termed a “full-blown Atlantic crisis”.⁸⁶

Despite being united in their worries, the EC members were prevented from discussing defence issues in the EPC framework. Eventually UK Prime Minister Thatcher took on the task (on behalf of some of the European allies) of visiting President Reagan to elicit an explanation and discuss “the way forward on arms control after Reykjavik”.⁸⁷ The Reykjavik meeting however also had another effect; by raising new worries about the American commitment to European security, it contributed strongly to the (re)emergence of the discussions about a European pillar within Nato, built around a distinct European security and defence identity (ESDI). Steps were soon taken to revive the dormant WEU as a forum for such discussions.⁸⁸

During the mid-1980s, however, developments elsewhere also added to transatlantic tensions. One such area was Central America. The EC’s involvement in the peace process started in 1984, when the EC foreign ministers met with the Contadora Group and the Central American republics in San José in Costa Rica to discuss peace initiatives.⁸⁹ The foreign ministers from the two EC applicant states, Spain and Portugal, also participated. The United States, on the other hand, was not invited and the EC’s peace proposals included among other things the removal of foreign advisers from Central America and the cessation of external provision of arms.⁹⁰ The signal was an implicit response to the American support of, *inter alia*, the contras

⁸⁶ Allen & Smith 1990, p. 229; cf. Howard 1987/88, p. 479.

⁸⁷ Nuttall 1992, p. 198; Howard 1987/88, p. 480.

⁸⁸ Howard 1987/88, p. 482; Duke 2000, pp. 72ff.

⁸⁹ The Contadora group consisted of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela. In 1986, it merged with the former Lima Group (Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay) to become the Rio Group. It was later joined by Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Costa Rica, making the Rio Group the major, although still informal, Latin American group for political co-ordination (Piening 1997:124, 129).

⁹⁰ Smith, H. 1995, pp. 78f.; Piening 1997, pp. 125f.; Allen & Smith 1990, p. 235.

in Nicaragua. By doing this, according to two observers, “the Europeans put themselves into direct confrontation with US policies.”⁹¹

The American reaction was hostile, and Washington embarked on open attempts to exclude Nicaragua from participating in the ministerial meeting with the EC. The US Secretary of State, George Schultz, also sent what was perceived as an insulting letter to each of the EC foreign ministers, urging them not to support the Sandinistas. The President of the EC Council, French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson, responded: “What business does Reagan have in any of this? As far as I know, he is neither a member of the EEC nor of the Contadora group nor of the Central American nations.”⁹² However, contrary to the controversy over sanctions in relation to Poland a couple of years earlier, the United States chose not to pursue the matter further.⁹³

Another contentious issue during this period was the unexpected American intervention in Grenada on October 25, 1983. Only a few days ahead of the invasion, Washington had still not informed the Europeans about the plan, something which was perceived by diplomats in London as a “slap in the face.” Prime Minister Thatcher had even telephoned Reagan and asked for information, but concluded that “he was not forthcoming on American plans.” She wrote to him on the eve of the invasion, saying she was “deeply disturbed” and asked him to reconsider his plans.⁹⁴ Two days after the invasion, Claude Cheysson openly condemned not only the invasion as such, but also the lack of prior consultation on the behalf of the US. Due to a Greek refusal, the issue was however never put on the formal EPC agenda. Later, the UK tried to raise the issue informally within NATO instead, but the US dismissed the idea on the grounds that Grenada was geographically out of area.⁹⁵

⁹¹ Allen & Smith 1990, p. 235; cf. Smith, H. 1995, pp. 79f.

⁹² Quoted in Smith, H. 1995, p. 79.

⁹³ Allen & Smith 1990, p. 235; Nuttall 1992, p. 230.

⁹⁴ Winn 1996, pp. 145f.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 144ff.

In sum, this was a period when, as one historian has put it, America's European allies had "found themselves relegated virtually to satellite status, their value judged according to their 'loyalty,' and their loyalty assessed by their readiness to accede unquestioningly to American demands."⁹⁶ Again, just as during the first years of the 1980s, this period coincided with generally more active foreign policy cooperation between the EC members. In terms of the EPC statements, the period between 1984 and 1986 marked the second period of increased activities stemming from the foreign policy cooperation. This is the more remarkable when considering that the EC members were severely divided over internal EC policies at the time, and even refrained for several months from passing any declarations in the name of the Heads of State and Government.⁹⁷ In 1985 and 1986, following what has been called a period when "the US began to challenge the Soviet Union [...] in a manner unprecedented since the early Cold War,"⁹⁸ the number of EPC statements grew larger than ever before.

Contrary to the previous periods described above, the increasing number of statements during this time is however not primarily explained by a focus on the events during which the EC members and the US openly disagreed. As shown in chapter three, the statements during this time testify to a growing global focus, with Latin America, Africa and Asia receiving more collective attention from the EC members than ever before. The number of statements containing references to specific activities undertaken by the EC also increased compared to 1983. As for the thematic cover of the statements, there was a sharp rise in the number of statements containing references to the importance of democracy and human rights. Thus, this period of diverging transatlantic views on international politics again coincided with increased activity within the EPC framework.

⁹⁶ Howard 1987/88, p. 490.

⁹⁷ Regelsberger 1988, p. 8.

⁹⁸ Gaddis 1997, p. 292.

The shadow of Reykjavik and a lonely superpower 1987–1992

The rest of the 1980s were not characterised by any new serious and openly voiced security-related quarrels across the Atlantic. Nonetheless, the distrust of US foreign policy in other parts of the world, and the uncertainty in Europe over the American commitment to European security, increased further during the last year of the second Reagan administration. One observer even claims that “the year 1987 saw relations between the governments of the United States and its European allies reach a nadir for which it would be difficult to find an equal – the Suez crisis of 1956 excepted – during the whole of the postwar period.”⁹⁹

One matter that seriously damaged the Europeans’ views of US foreign policy in 1987 was the unfolding revelations, starting in November 1986, about the Iran-Contra scandal. The Europeans, having for a long time been pressured by the US on both a strict policy of no ransom money to terrorists in hostage situations, and on sanctions against Iran, were shocked to learn about both the arms transfers to Iran and the connected deals to free American hostages in Lebanon. The subsequent revelations that payments from the arms deals had been transferred to support the contras in Nicaragua – another issue over which the US and the Europeans had for years held diverging views (see above), further outraged the European governments. But even more than the content of the Iran-Contra package, as one analyst has put it, the wide-spread alarm in Europe stemmed from “the fact that it existed at all, the kind of people responsible for it, and the light it shed on the nature of Mr. Reagan’s presidency.”¹⁰⁰ The credibility of American foreign policy in general was seriously damaged.

A huge American budget deficit at the time, in combination with the resumed détente and the effects it had on various disarmament initiatives, also made the European allies increasingly worried about the commitment of the US to keep their conventional forces in

⁹⁹ Howard 1987/88, p. 479.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 484.

Europe.¹⁰¹ In late 1987, American rhetoric over defence cooperation in Europe changed. President Reagan quite unexpectedly expressed unusually strong support for West Europe's attempts to come up with a common European voice in the transatlantic security discussions, and also expressed support for the construction of a European pillar within NATO. He also expressed hopes of an Atlantic alliance "among equals", which on the one hand was what the European allies had long asked for, but which could also be interpreted as part of a trend of the Americans' wish to reduce their military presence in Europe. The Americans furthermore asked the EC members to accept regular contacts with Washington at the EPC working group level, but this request was turned down by the Twelve.¹⁰²

In late 1988, the Western European uncertainty about US defence commitment in Europe was further reinforced when the Soviet Union announced, by the end of the year, plans for substantial reductions of its forces and the withdrawal of parts of its military presence in Central and Eastern Europe. A Soviet withdrawal raised fears among many EC members over renewed discussions in Washington about burden-sharing within the alliance and the rationale behind a continued American participation in security provision in Europe.¹⁰³

When George Bush took office in early 1989, the American rhetoric on West European security changed further. Compared to Reagan, Bush was considerably more prepared to talk about the EC and US as "partners." It seems however as if the US over the coming years was increasingly unsure about its policy towards West European security. During the spring and summer of 1989, Bush signalled a continued commitment and determination to maintain an American presence in Europe.¹⁰⁴ Following the dramatic events in Eastern Europe in late 1989, the Bush administration recognised the EC's leading role in the reform process, and also welcomed German

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 482.

¹⁰² Sloan 1990, pp. 291f.; Nuttall 1992, p. 285.

¹⁰³ Sloan 1990, p. 288.

¹⁰⁴ Nuttall 2000, pp. 56–59.

unification, provided that it would “occur in the context of Germany’s continued commitment to NATO and to an increasingly integrated European Community.”¹⁰⁵ Not long thereafter, however, as the EC members were discussing the introduction of issues of defence policy into the new Treaty on European Union, the European capitals received a letter, drawn up by the State Department, warning against building up a European defence identity within the EU and containing implicit treats about force withdrawal from the US side.¹⁰⁶ Thus, the period surrounding the end of the Cold War was clearly marked by an increased uncertainty in Europe over the continued role of the US in the European security structure.¹⁰⁷ Between 1987 and 1992, however, there were no serious open transatlantic disagreements about international events. Even the eruption of the Balkan wars generated few disagreements in the first years.

The initial US policy over the accelerating conflicts in Yugoslavia during 1990 and 1991 signalled US reliance on, and acceptance of, a leadership role for the EC states. The Bush administration was hesitant over the United States’ new role as a sole superpower, and after the Gulf War the Americans were wary of the risk of setting a new precedent for the US role as a “world policeman” and reluctant to advocate a military intervention in the Balkans.¹⁰⁸ Early in the Balkan conflicts, the EC also started to pursue some policies that were novel to the EPC framework. The first was the decision in 1991 to send the Troika to negotiate a cease-fire. This was the first time the Troika not only *represented* the Twelve, but also *negotiated* on their behalf. Another was the setting up of an unarmed European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), which represented the first time that uniformed personnel were sent out in the name of the EC.¹⁰⁹ Discussions between the EC members, furthermore, also bordered on military issues, despite the treaty’s exclusion of such

¹⁰⁵ Secretary of State James Baker, quoted in Nuttall 2000, p. 63; Lundestad 1998, p. 112.

¹⁰⁶ Rees 1998, p. 22.

¹⁰⁷ Hoffmann 2000, p. 191.

¹⁰⁸ Edwards 1997, pp. 174f.; Gow 1997, pp. 202ff; Hallenberg 1995, p. 59.

¹⁰⁹ Nuttall 2000, pp. 200ff.

issues. During one of the many Troika visits to Yugoslavia, Dutch Foreign Minister Van Den Broek even seems to have used the threat that the EU might ask the WEU to send “something like a peace force to the country.”¹¹⁰ At one point, the Twelve also asked the WEU to look into the possibilities of such a mission to Eastern Croatia.¹¹¹

In sum, the European Union had in general seemed in agreement with the US over international security provision immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and has sometimes been described as a cheerleader to the US during the Gulf War.¹¹² This period can thus be characterised as starting with a serious blow to the credibility of US foreign policy, and throughout being a time of unusually high uncertainty over US foreign and security policy intentions, rather than displaying open disagreements over policies in other parts of the world.

Again, this period (which is actually in some ways difficult to separate from the previous one) coincides with quite substantial changes in the EPC statements. Between 1987 and 1988, the number of statements issued rose, with the largest increase up to that point in EPC history, and continued to rise every year up until 1992, when the upward trend was temporarily broken. The number of new states addressed also increased considerably, as did the variety of issues covered by the statements. As was shown in chapter three, the large number of new states addressed for the first time during this period is only partly explained by the proliferation of newly independent former USSR states. Even more than for any of the previous periods, these changes were generally not directly connected with specific policy differences between the EC members and the US. There was clearly an increasing tendency to address events and issues wherever they appeared.

In 1989, and again in 1991, the number of statements with reference to specific actions undertaken also markedly increased. In 1991, for the first time, there was also a considerable gap between the

¹¹⁰ Edwards 1997, p. 185.

¹¹¹ Jopp 1997, p. 155.

¹¹² Kemp 1997, p. 101; Keatinge 1997, p. 279; Haass 1997, p. 66.

number of references to various diplomatic activities and economic activities. Whereas the statements mentioning economic measures increased slightly, the number of statements referring to diplomatic activities almost tripled between 1990 and 1991. Thus, this period of distrust in US foreign policy in general, combined with genuine uncertainty over future US policies towards European security provision in particular, coincided with the most dramatic increases in activities in the EPC framework up until this point.

The second half of this period also coincided, of course, with the end of the Cold War and thus with one of the most dramatic changes in the international system since the Second World War. However, the fact that the changes in the EPC started as early as 1988 suggests that the end of the Cold War is presumably not the primary explanation although we cannot rule out its effects during the following years. It is in any case debatable whether we should even assume that large-scale systemic changes should generate such immediate changes as those seen here.

Disagreeing over Yugoslavia 1993–1995

Along with the intensification of the conflict in Bosnia, US and EU opinions over strategies also started to diverge. Between 1993 and 1995 the transatlantic relations were marked by a series of disagreements over policies in relation to former Yugoslavia. The relations sometimes seemed cooler than they had been in decades. One analyst has termed this period a “break-point” in the Europeanist challenge to NATO, and another points out that the Yugoslav conflict “caused some extremely bitter Europe-United States recriminations.”¹¹³

With the new Clinton administration in 1993, the US increasingly tended to define the conflict in Bosnia as one with a clear aggressor (Serbia) against another state (Bosnia), whereas the EU tended to emphasise that the conflicts were more complex than that.¹¹⁴ Many Europeans also feared that the new American presi-

¹¹³ Moens 1993, p. 567 and Edwards 1997, p. 180 respectively.

¹¹⁴ Gow 1997, p. 212.

dent, having won the election on a strong platform on domestic policies, might reject much of his predecessor's transatlantic focus.¹¹⁵

The Clinton administration soon found itself disagreeing with the Western European states over what strategies to pursue in relation to the conflict in Bosnia. First, disagreements over the so called Vance-Owen plan in February 1993 resulted in what one observer has described as the worst condition in US-European relations since the Suez crisis of the 1950s.¹¹⁶ Then, in an attempt to avoid the engagement of ground troops, President Clinton and Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, tried during the spring of 1993 to persuade their European partners to go along with a 'lift and strike' policy against former Yugoslavia. It involved a limited lifting of the arms embargo to allow for arms import by the Bosnian authorities, and limited air-strikes to deter Serb aggression during the transitional period. Getting no European support, in part due to European fears of possible retaliation against their own UN troops already on the ground, the plans for lifting the arms embargo were put on hold temporarily and did not reach the forefront of the debate again until August 1994.¹¹⁷

At the NATO summit in January 1994, the Clinton administration showed a renewed interest in the Atlantic Alliance and a determination to maintain the US presence in Europe. Shortly thereafter, however, the US began to signal a more unilateralist stance in relation to the Bosnian conflict, and President Clinton again threatened to abandon the arms embargo. This led to renewed tensions in transatlantic relations, and the situation at the end of 1994 and beginning of 1995 has been described as a new low, "with the NATO alliance in serious danger of irreparable damage over conflicting European and American approaches to the conflict in the Yugoslav successor states."¹¹⁸ After an increasingly active role played by the US during 1995, and an increasing agreement within the so called Contact

¹¹⁵ Allen 2002, p. 42; Lundestad 1998, p. 117.

¹¹⁶ Gow 1997, p. 245; cf. Lundestad 1998, p. 122.

¹¹⁷ Edwards 1997, p. 181; Allen 2002, pp. 42f.; Gow 1997, pp. 212ff.; Rees 1998, p. 23.

¹¹⁸ Allen 2002, p. 42; cf. Krenzler 1998, p. 14.

Group over how to pursue the international peace efforts in Bosnia (including the use of NATO air strikes), the Dayton peace agreement was signed in November 1995. This event marked a temporary end to the transatlantic disagreements over the Balkans.

During this period, there was again a visible increase in foreign policy activities in general, stemming from what had by now turned into the second pillar of the EU. In 1994 and 1995, the amount of statements issued grew, although only to reach the 1991 level. In 1996 the number of statements reached a new high. As portrayed in chapter three, a number of activities in relation to the conflict in the Balkans accounts for part of the increase, but so did also for instance the EU's efforts towards the Great Lakes Region in Africa. Also, other parts of Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America received increased attention, despite any serious policy differences between the EU and the US in those particular areas at the time.

During this period, the contents of the statements also became considerably more detailed, and the proportion of statements referring to activities undertaken by the EU increased considerably compared to the immediate post-Cold War period. For instance, the tendency to dispatch "EU personnel," whether in the form of for instance election monitors or so called special representatives, increased considerably during the mid-1990s. Thereby, also this period of quite serious transatlantic disagreements over security provision coincided with substantial changes in the CFSP – although not exclusively, or even primarily, related to the very issues over which EU and US strategy preferences varied.

Extraterritorial legislation and unruly states 1996–1999

In the spring and summer of 1996, serious transatlantic differences arose again, this time over the contentious issues of US extraterritorial legislation and how to handle states that were either assumed to sponsor terrorism or in other ways caused international concern.

The disagreement started over the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (the so called Helms-Burton Act). The Helms-Burton Act had been passed by Congress and signed by President

Clinton in response to the shooting down of two American civilian aircraft (owned by Cuban exiles) in international air space outside Havana in February 1996. The Act aimed at discouraging foreign investment in Cuba, *inter alia* by allowing for lawsuits against non-US firms investing in previously US-owned properties in Cuba and by denying visas to executives of such firms.¹¹⁹ The issue of extraterritorial legislation again came to the fore, and while the EU condemned the criminal act perpetrated by Castro, the Union also voiced loud criticism of the Helms-Burton Act. The EU, according to one observer, “showed a remarkable consensus of opposition” and “revealed impressive unity.”¹²⁰

The disunity between the EU and the US over how to deal with “rogue states” and international terrorism increased further with the signing into law of the similar Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (the d’Amato Act) in August 1996. The d’Amato Act contained similar provisions for extraterritorial imposition of US law as did the Helms-Burton Act, and aimed at blocking new investments in Libya and Iran.¹²¹ In the following discussions within the EU, several counter measures were openly discussed. These included trade sanctions against the US, a regulation preventing European firms to comply with the US legislation, stricter visa regulations for executives of US firms, and steps towards a dispute settlement panel in the WTO.¹²² Eventually, an EC regulation making it illegal for EU companies to comply with the US laws was decided upon, and the EU also threatened to challenge the legality in the WTO. These commonly voiced European concerns, however, fell on deaf American ears, and the discussions between the EU and the US stalled. The disagreement became even more acute when, in the autumn of 1997 French, Russian and Malaysian firms announced a \$2 billion investment deal in Iran.¹²³

¹¹⁹ Gardner 1997, pp. 92f.; Roy 1999, pp. 30f.

¹²⁰ Roy 1999, p. 33.

¹²¹ Rose 1999.

¹²² Gardner 1997, p. 95.

¹²³ Rose 1999, pp. 153f.

The transatlantic tensions did not subside until a (temporary) compromise deal was reached in the spring of 1998. It included a US promise not to enforce parts of the law on European companies in return for firmer EU control regarding the export of weapons technology to Iran and closer EU-US cooperation with regard to Cuba. It also involved a promise from the EU not to pursue the matter further in the WTO.¹²⁴ The agreement, however, was an uneasy compromise and rested on congressional cooperation, something that could not be taken for granted in the long run.¹²⁵ In 1999, threats again arose from the EU (driven primarily by Spain) to take the US to the WTO over Washington's threats against a Spanish hotel group investing in Cuba.¹²⁶

The disagreement over the d'Amato Act in particular was only one aspect of a wider disagreement over how to handle relations with Iran. The EU and the US had no problems agreeing on how to define the underlying complex of problems in relation to Iran. Concerns were shared over Iran's support for terrorism, its stand on Israel, its suspected programme for weapons of mass destruction and its disregard for human rights.¹²⁷ The disagreement, again, was rather on how to deal with these problems.¹²⁸ In a sense, the diverging European and American policies had already been visible during the previous years. In 1993, the Clinton administration had announced the abandonment of the previous American policy of reliance on a regional balance of power in the Persian Gulf region and aimed instead at a policy of "dual containment" of Iran and Iraq. The US was to build up a considerable military presence in surrounding friendly states and thereby contain both Iran and Iraq.¹²⁹ This dual containment policy was announced only months after the EC had, in December 1992, announced its wish to pursue a "critical dialogue" with Iran in order to keep channels open, hoping to exert

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 154.; Roy 1999, pp. 29f.

¹²⁵ Roy 1999, p. 30.

¹²⁶ Marks 2002, p. 139.

¹²⁷ Kemp 1999, p. 49.

¹²⁸ Hoffmann 2000, p. 194.

¹²⁹ Lake 1994.

at least some degree of influence on the moderates in Teheran. President Clinton nonetheless tried to persuade the Europeans to impose sanctions against Iran, but was met with a firm no.¹³⁰

American attitudes towards Iran further hardened in 1995 when, among other things, it became known that Russia and Iran had finalised a nuclear reactor deal.¹³¹ The US imposed new unilateral sanctions against Iran, banning all trade with and investment in the country, something that further increased the tensions between the EU and the US.¹³² The EU instead continued to advocate the critical-dialogue track until, in April 1997, a German court found Iranian authorities responsible for the killing of three Kurdish opposition members in a restaurant in Berlin. The European Union immediately called for a halt to any dialogue and the member states withdrew their ambassadors from Teheran.¹³³ This event raised hopes in the US for a change of opinion in the European capitals with regard to sanctions. However, the election not long after these events of reform-minded Mohammad Khatami as President changed the situation. The EU resumed its relations with Iran, under the new concept of “constructive dialogue.” Not until the agreement in 1998 between the EU and the US over the issue of extraterritorial legislation did US and EU disagreements over Iran recede.¹³⁴

By this time however, the Balkans had once again become the focal point in transatlantic relations. When the conflict in Kosovo deteriorated during the autumn of 1998, discussions resumed over the possibilities of a military intervention. It became clear that Russia and China would veto a Security Council resolution to that effect, and discussions turned to the possibilities of NATO undertaking such an operation in spite of these objections. Somewhat surprisingly, and despite occasional dissension over the forms of intervention (ground troops or not) in Yugoslavia, the allies from both sides

¹³⁰ Kemp 1997, p. 117; Kemp 1999, p. 54.

¹³¹ Kemp 1999, p. 54.

¹³² Ibid., pp. 54f.

¹³³ Reissner 2000, p. 34.

¹³⁴ Reissner 2000, pp. 34f.

of the Atlantic were at least on the surface united in their support of the NATO-led air campaign in the spring of 1999. The European lessons learned, however, were that their defence organisations only had very limited possibilities for power projection and deployment of forces outside their own borders. The continued heavy reliance on the US for any large scale military operations was keenly felt, and gave rise to renewed debates in Europe over the desirability of some form of autonomous European defence capability.¹³⁵

This last period likewise coincided with new all-time highs in the CFSP output. In 1996 the number of statements issued was the highest ever up to that date, and a new record was again set in 1998. During this period, the CFSP statements also grew considerably more detailed than ever before. The proportion of statements mentioning activities undertaken by the EU increased quite dramatically in 1999, in particular the statements containing references to various sorts of political measures. As discussed in more detail in chapter three, only part of this increase is accounted for by the Kosovo crisis, whereas for instance an ever growing collective interest in various parts of Africa also took place during this period. As for Iran, Libya and Cuba, these states seem to have continued to attract EU attention, but not to any significantly higher degree than previous years. In sum, it seems as if this period again, and just like the previous ones, shows a relationship between transatlantic disagreements and intensified CFSP activities.

The viability of the balance-of-influence thesis

Thus, during or shortly after all the periods of transatlantic tensions identified here, the foreign policy cooperation intensified between the EU members. The only possible exception was the 1972–1974 period. Not even during that period, however, did the EPC activities decrease following a transatlantic controversy, which in effect means that this explanation is the only one for which we cannot find one

¹³⁵ Rodman 1999; Hoffmann 2000, pp. 194f.; and Gow 2002, 218–226.

single case (period) which directly contradicts the expectations generated by the balance-of-influence thesis.¹³⁶

Among the explanations tested in this study, the balance-of-influence thesis demonstrably has a great deal to offer. It seems quite certain that the most forceful factor in explaining the successive “jumps” of the EPC/CFSP, has been a periodically highlighted realisation among the members – set off by intermittent transatlantic disagreements over security management – that more efforts were needed in order to increase the European influence over international affairs. Or, in the more theoretically informed terminology, that transatlantic disagreements have repeatedly altered the states’ perceived optimal balance between influence gains from collective action and autonomy losses resulting from cooperating with others.

Despite, or maybe because of, this almost “perfect match” – unusual as those are in political science – this explanation cannot stand on its own feet. When looking at the evolution over time, the EPC and then the CFSP have generally kept on developing, while it would be very difficult (although perhaps not impossible) to argue that transatlantic security policy relations across the Atlantic have kept deteriorating at the same pace. On average, these relations have arguably remained very amicable. Therefore, while capably explaining the “ups” in the EU’s foreign policy cooperation, this theory cannot explain why the EPC/CFSP has not demonstrated any corresponding “downs” *between* the periods of transatlantic disagreements. Following each “up,” there must be other factors explaining why there is no subsequent “slipping back” in the levels of cooperation. In the next chapter, the link between the findings in this chapter and the institutionalist ones from chapter four will thus be discussed, among other things.

¹³⁶ It may be debatable to what extent the years surrounding the end of the Cold War fit perfectly into the definition of a “transatlantic disagreement,” although it has been assumed here that they do so to a certain degree. However, even if we were to disregard this period altogether, this would not change the conclusions from this chapter, that all periods of transatlantic disagreements have been followed by “more EPC/CFSP.” It would only give us one period of changing EPC/CFSP for which we have not found a general explanation in this study.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Summing Up the Picture

THIS STUDY SET OUT TO EXPLAIN the successive development of the EU's collective foreign policy. By studying the sequences of events over a thirty-year period, an answer has also begun to materialise in the previous chapters. It is now possible to sum up the main findings and to reflect briefly on some of the implications. These findings will eventually be put to a test in the next chapter, in the form of a more in-depth investigation of events during a considerably shorter and more recent period in time.

THE EU'S COLLECTIVE FOREIGN POLICY

The conclusions that may be drawn from the previous chapters are of two different but connected kinds. The first, discussed in this section, relates to the EPC/CFSP and the *empirical explanation(s)* for its development over time. The second relates rather to the *capacity of the theoretical frameworks* to explain the EU's successively evolving collective foreign policy. While these are in a sense two sides of the same coin, they will nonetheless to a certain extent be discussed separately here, as they may perhaps appeal to two different audiences.

The empirical conclusions

Bearing in mind the uncertainties that are always present in a study of this kind, we may now, with a relatively speaking high degree of confidence, conclude that there has been at least one recurrent trend

in the development of the EU's collective foreign policy. The EU's foreign policy cooperation has intensified during (or quite soon after) transatlantic disagreements over international security management.

This conclusion goes against the common perception, discussed in the beginning of chapter six, that the problems experienced by the EU members in reaching agreement on foreign policy matters are at their greatest when serious differences with the US are involved. However, at least one of the reasons behind this perception has also become visible in this study; the new or intensified CFSP activities have often not been directly related to the contentious issues in themselves. Instead, they have frequently been constituted by new policy initiatives in areas that are only partly related or even unrelated. That is, even on those occasions when the EU members cannot agree on a common stance in relation to the one contentious issue, they seem simultaneously to be unusually able to agree on other foreign policy issues. Many observers have presumably failed to spot this relationship because they have focused predominantly on the contentious issues themselves. It is, generally, the "hot issue" that attracts most of the attention from media and CFSP-analysts alike.

However, while recurrent transatlantic diplomatic quarrels have served to highlight the need for intensified EU foreign policy cooperation, and thereby driven the EPC and later the CFSP towards new levels, this observation does not explain why the EU's collective foreign policy has rarely taken any serious downturns. The image of the EPC/CFSP over time does not at all resemble an oscillating curve, but rather a flight of stairs; the new levels of cooperation generally stick once they have been established. This observation, as was shown in chapter four, leads to a second conclusion about the EU's foreign policy cooperation; the successively changing institutions have served to lock in the new levels of cooperation and made it easier to intensify the cooperation further on the next occasion of transatlantic disputes.

A third observation, also related to the institutional development but more difficult to express with the same certainty, is related to the increased speed in the development of the EPC/CFSP which began

in 1988. From that year on, it seems that the EPC/CFSP was generally developing at a quicker pace than during the previous decade and a half, and it is quite possible – this study can at least offer no better explanation – that this is to some extent a reflection of the previous year’s creation of a centralised EPC body in the form of a small Secretariat. At a minimum, the Secretariat has served as a lubricant in the EPC machinery, and this same role was assumed by the Council Secretariat when the Maastricht treaty entered into force in 1993. At a maximum, the Council Secretariat may even have gradually begun to serve as an additional CFSP member at times. In any case, of all the institutional changes it seems that it was this centralising aspect of the cooperation which can most plausibly be held to have had an independent effect on the ability of the member states to agree on common foreign policy activities. This also comes across as one of the more under-researched areas of EU foreign policy making, and should clearly be an interesting topic for further study.

We may however also say something about what does not seem to influence the development of the EU’s collective foreign policy to the extent that would have been predicted by the theories, or, for that matter, by many CFSP analysts. For example, those who assume that the CFSP has developed primarily when the external security situation so required – that is, that it should have been driven by reactions to new or more severe external threats – do not command the most convincing argument.¹ As was also shown in chapters five and six, the related possibility of the Cold War having either pushed the EU members together or hindered them in their cooperation also seems not to be one of the most important factors in the development of the EPC/CFSP. While the EPC certainly did intensify to an unusually high degree during 1991, these changes had in many ways started before the end of the Cold War, suggesting that the end of the bipolar era, while supposedly affecting the EPC in many ways,

¹ For a recent example, see Toje (2004, p. 7), who argues that the European security and defence policy has “come about in the tension produced by new threats arising”.

did not have a truly path-breaking effect.² It seems, in sum, that competition with the US for global influence adds more to the political will to cooperate than does a change in the external threat.

The black box

The answer to the question posed at the outset of this study can thus, a little simplistically, be summed up in one sentence: the EU's collective foreign policy is successively pushed to new levels when some or all EU members disagree with the US on issues related to international security management, and the new levels are subsequently locked in by new or improved institutional arrangements.

The more precise link between transatlantic disagreements and intensified EU foreign policy cooperation is presumed to be found in the EU member states' inherent wish to strengthen their capacity to influence international events. According to the theory, the members should, in particular, experience a lack of such capacity when they disagree with the US. Such disagreements should thus increase the political will – at a minimum in one capital but possibly in several or even all – to cooperate and consequently generate more collective activities. We need therefore not even assume that *all* members by necessity react or change their perceptions as new transatlantic disputes erupt; it is enough to assume that one or more of the members will do so.³ We thus have a plausible account of why transatlantic disagreements ought to lead to “more CFSP.”

Similarly, we also have a theory (or maybe even several theories) about the capacity of the institutional arrangements to lock in the new levels of cooperation. By increasing information, intensifying com-

² Thus, even the European Commission's own version of history may be called in question, as it indicates the three most important forces behind the development of the CFSP as being: “New threats and new requirements, linked to *the end of the Cold War*, the *reunification of Germany* and the *collapse of the former Yugoslavia* (emphasis added)” (European Commission 2002).

³ Depending on the distribution of interests on any particular issue, it may well be possible to unlock previously immovable negotiations if one or a few members change their position(s) only slightly.

munication, and providing more opportunities for bargaining, negotiations, and monitoring, the various institutional changes have helped reduce uncertainty, provided a measure of an institutional memory, and provided a focal point for continued discussions among the members. This, in turn, made it easier not only to maintain with levels already achieved, but also to agree subsequently on new issues when – notably – transatlantic disagreements arose again.⁴

These answers are however based on “circumstantial evidence,” or “black-boxing” of the most notorious kind. It is also possible that a study spanning over such a long period in time, and covering in a sense almost two thousand different foreign policy issues, cannot hope to do more than that. The three criteria for assuming causality, which were discussed in chapter two, have been taken into account, and we could thus settle with this and conclude that we have come up with the most plausible available explanation. One might even argue that the nature of at least the balance-of-influence thesis is too abstract for any meaningful verification by studying events in more detail. Even so, we may nonetheless, as a last step, attempt to corroborate or at least illustrate the events which have been assumed to take place inside this analytical black box. We may, as one scholar has argued, shed some additional light on the assumed causal relations by “careful attention to sequence and the perceptions of the actors themselves.”⁵

Such a last step will be taken in the next chapter, where a glimpse into the black box will be provided in order at least to verify whether the conclusions also carry the same weight when scrutinised in more detail. By looking at the EU members’ reactions during a new period of transatlantic disagreements over international security management, we may further increase the certainty with which we may draw the above conclusions. Such a glimpse into the black box

⁴ Whether this, in turn, depends on deeper changes in the interests of the participants, or mere strategic changes, cannot be settled by this study but nor is it of immediate importance here.

⁵ Lake 2001, p. 135.

can also provide a few hints about the workings of the institutions, even if it does not help us to demonstrate with certainty the independent effect of the centralised bodies. Before embarking on that last step in the analysis, we may however also reflect on a few intertwined empirical implications, as well as discuss the theoretical “lessons learned,” in order to provide some additional food for thought to keep in mind as the empirical events unfold in the next chapter.

The implications?

The previous chapters have also evoked a couple of questions for which this study has no certain answers but which may nevertheless be interesting to reflect upon briefly. We may for instance ask what the link between the transatlantic quarrels and the periods of intensified CFSP implies about the priorities of the EU members. Or, rather, what this link implies about those priorities that all members can agree upon. In essence, if we are to stretch the conclusions almost beyond the limit, we may ask whether the members’ general “lust for international influence” has been a more direct force behind the EU’s successive new foreign policy steps than their wish to create peace and security in the outside world.

When the EU members’ lack of influence in relation to the US has been highlighted, there has also been an intensification of the cooperation. But, when EU action for peace and security has been called for without there being any competition for influence, there has not always been any such extra political will in the process.⁶ It is indeed difficult to get a group of states to cooperate on foreign policy matters, and even a common threat perception is not always enough to generate a cooperative outcome. It appears as if it takes a little old-fashioned “power-struggle” to bring the group closer together and induce them to take new common steps. Another variant of the question is therefore whether it is possible that the EU members have

⁶ One exception being the first year or two of the conflicts in the Balkans, when the political will of the EU members was arguably much larger than the political capacity to reach results.

occasionally been able to agree on some foreign policy issues primarily in order to show themselves and others that they can “agree on something”, rather than primarily out of a genuine interest to have the Union engage in that particular issue?

Obviously, this way of interpreting the findings is basically tantamount to speculation, and many objections can be raised. Above all, the acquisition of power is arguably a prerequisite in order to engage seriously in international security management, and it is therefore in general not a matter of either-or. It is, nonetheless, interesting to note that the foreign policy instruments already attained seem easier to use when a transatlantic conflict lingers in the background. There are also a few events covered in the next chapter that at least support the raising of this question.

These questions also raise some possible doubts over the CFSP history-writing during the last decade. As noted above, even the European Commission suggests that the CFSP has developed in part because the lessons learned from the Balkans showed that the EU members were unable to make a difference.⁷ History books in the future will no doubt also suggest that it was primarily the Kosovo crisis that eventually made the EU, in 1999, take the historic step to start planning for the use of force in the name of the Union. While these events are no doubt interrelated, and to some extent indisputable, we may nonetheless raise the question whether it was perhaps not primarily the Balkan conflicts in themselves but rather the inability to exert any influence over these conflicts *when compared to the US*, that helped set off these new developments within the EU’s collective foreign policy?

⁷ See footnote 2. For other examples of this well-established “truth”, see for instance Duke 2003, who argues that “Past crises, such as those in the Balkans, have served as hard but salient lessons for the EU and the Member States. In spite of these crises, CFSP not only survived but progressed.” See also Haine (no year, p. 1f.) who speaks of Bosnia as a “painful learning experience” for the EU, or Ojanen et al. (2000, p. 37), who points to Yugoslavia and Kosovo as external “shocks” which have prompted “demands for more cohesion in this field.”

THE EXPLANATORY CAPACITY OF THE THEORIES

While the empirical conclusions from this study are, relatively speaking, quite uncomplicated, the conclusions related to international relations theory are perhaps less straightforward. Do the findings mean that “realism” (focusing on balancing behaviour) and “institutionalism” (focusing on the change in interaction) must be combined in order to provide an acceptable answer to why we witness a successively intensifying foreign policy cooperation between a group of states? Not necessarily. With the findings and implications from the previous chapters, we can now in hindsight discern a capacity within either of the two theories to house certain varieties that may well explain the stepwise development of the EPC/CFSP. As we now see the empirical development, we can also see that both theories could have provided a satisfactory answer, had they only been specified in terms somewhat different from those customarily employed by their current advocates.

The satisfactory realist explanation

Many realists today seem rather surprised that no state has begun to challenge the US since the end of the Cold War. For instance, in an edited volume called “America Unrivaled,” a number of scholars who belong in various ways to the realist tradition, ask the question: “Why, despite the widening power gulf between the United States and the other major states, has a counterbalancing reaction not yet taken place?”⁸ They subsequently devote the whole volume to analyses of what John Ikenberry calls the “remarkable” fact that “the other great powers have not yet responded in a way anticipated by balance-of-power theory.”⁹

As the theoretical implications from this study suggest, these analysts might rather have been looking in the wrong places. The biggest difference between the realist world proposed by for instance Ikenberry and the one that can explain the successive development of

⁸ Ikenberry 2002, p. 3.

⁹ Ibid.

the CFSP lies in the *definition of power*. With a different definition of power than the one used by mainstream realist scholars, we ended up with different anticipations and also saw a different empirical trend. Thinking of power in the form of influence over events rather than purely in terms of military capabilities (or resources easily converted into military capabilities) led us to see a recurrent balancing behaviour that pushed the CFSP to new levels. It is tempting to assume that many realist scholars have failed to spot this development because there has been no real hostility involved; it is not taking place in the form of balancing *against* the US, but rather *in relation to* the US. America serves not as the enemy but as a reference point by virtue of its status as the globally most influential actor. The balance-of-influence thesis may therefore be proposed as a fruitful – although still only embryonic – contribution to the realist debate on cooperation between states.

It has however also been argued above that the lack of serious set-backs must be accounted for by the *successive institutional changes*, which is a possibility that most realists of today tend to downplay. Can this insight too be incorporated into a realist framework? If we take one step back, and return to the main assumptions provided by the realist theories consulted in this study, it becomes quite obvious that it both could and should. As pointed out in previous chapters, we may think of the level of cooperation as the level where the states' perceived influence gains have been on a par with the autonomy losses stemming from the cooperation. This gives us, in a sense, two variables. If a new level of cooperation is reached, the states must either have perceived an increased need for the gains, or a reduced need to worry about the losses. It has also already been argued above that the balance of influence logic affects the "gains side" of the equation; periodically, the cooperating states are reminded of their need to cooperate further in order to gain more influence. In that situation, and on the general *ceteris paribus* assumption, the perceived losses should be assumed to stay the same. However, if the states also, in the process, change the way they interact by altering the institutions, the *ceteris paribus* assumption no longer apply, and we

may think of institutions as possibly affecting the “loss side” of the equation.

And, what does the loss side of cooperation consist of in a realist world? Interestingly, while the gains from foreign and security policy cooperation, in a realist conception, consist of possibilities of increased *power* (here interpreted as influence over events), the losses are generally portrayed in terms of increased vulnerability or a threat to the state’s *security*, in particular if the cooperative venture deals directly with issues related to the security policy sphere. As one realist scholar puts it, uncertainty is particularly high in security affairs, and the “costs of living up to the rules of a regime while others are not” are great and can have big consequences.¹⁰

However, unless trust and certainty about others’ intentions are assumed to be entirely static – and this is in effect where many realists part way – we must accept that *trust and certainty can vary over time*, and that they depend to a large extent on the amount of information available.¹¹ On a general level, as communication and interactions between cooperating partners increase, the available information about one another also increase, and therefore, too, the certainty about their future behaviour. As Thomas Schelling has put it, “moves have an information content.”¹² Thereby, the repeated interactions and communications in an ongoing cooperative arrangement must also be assumed to contribute to forming the perceptions of the credibility of others’ commitments.¹³ To the extent that this increased information leads to a greater degree of trust in the others’ commitment to the cooperation, the attained levels of

¹⁰ Jervis 1982, p. 359.

¹¹ Any theoretical framework that assumes purposeful behaviour on behalf of the actors must generally also accept the proposition that in an ongoing cooperative arrangement, each member’s estimates of the future behaviour of the partners relies at least partly on the information available of their commitments to the cooperation.

¹² Schelling 1960/80, p. 115.

¹³ This is the case irrespective of the “content” of the certainty, that is, irrespective of whether the certainty relates to a perception of a state being irrational and reckless (not trustworthy) or a state being rational and responsible (trustworthy). For instance, as Christer Jönsson (1990, p. 79) has pointed out, states believed with a considerable certainty in the 1980s that threats from Libya might actually be carried out.

cooperation could well be assumed to remain in place also without any particular external driving forces.

It thus follows that an institutional change that increases the flows of information and communication, must in this version of a realist framework be assumed to affect – positively or negatively – the participants’ strategic choices about whether to cooperate or not. To the extent that the behaviour of the participants starts to signal increased willingness to cooperate, the expectations about future cooperation should also increase. Changes in rules may thus change patterns of behaviour, and as Stephen Krasner has noted, “patterned behavior, originally generated purely by considerations of interest or power, has a strong tendency to lead to shared expectations.”¹⁴ Institutions may, simply put, without any problems for this version of realism be assumed to alter the degree of one actor’s certainty about another’s future actions. Institutions would however not be assumed, as in some “sociological institutionalist”¹⁵ frameworks, to change states’ fundamental interests profoundly. The increased will to cooperate would be seen as a purely strategic choice.

In sum, together with the assumption that states are influence-maximisers, any realist framework which accepts that power is a somewhat more complex concept than the purely material one, and defines it rather in terms of influence over events, as well as allows for the degree of uncertainty between states to vary, could actually quite well explain the development of the EU’s collective foreign policy. But this also implies that the logic of anarchy is also a variable, which is presumably an uncomfortable thought for many realists, and one may perhaps question how far that takes us from “mainstream realism.”

¹⁴ Krasner 1982a, p. 202.

¹⁵ Up until this point, the practice of labelling various schools of thought has deliberately been avoided as far as possible in this study. Seeing that the labels often obscure the similarities and only serve to highlight the differences, and seeing that the questions asked in this study occupy that small space in which a number of “labels” overlap, the labels in themselves were rather superfluous for our purposes. In this section, however, the occasional mention of a label seems almost inescapable.

The satisfactory institutionalist explanation

Turning attention now to the institutionalist frameworks, these too must be specified more clearly before arriving at a satisfactory explanation. As shown in this study, there have been very few occasions in the history of EPC/CFSP on which institutional changes have been followed by visible and immediate changes in the collective activities. This, however, does not mean that institutionalist theory cannot serve to explain the development. If only certain, mostly unarticulated, assumptions in institutionalist theory are spelled out, there are versions of this line of theoretical reasoning that may equally well explain the development of the EU's collective foreign policy.

Institutionalist accounts of cooperation often downplay or omit questions about the importance of non-institutional factors. This does not mean that other factors are not implied in these theoretical accounts, but they are rarely spelled out. However, the fact that institutional changes only rarely seem to have generated immediate changes in the EU's collective foreign policy, together with the insight that these changes seems to originate outside the cooperation, highlights the need for the institutionalist account to spell out explicit assumptions about the role of the external environment.¹⁶

Conveniently, such assumptions were discussed above, and may well be incorporated into an institutionalist framework. This however requires the focus of the institutionalist theory, which is often to *explain the occurrence and effects of institutions*, to be redirected towards explicitly *explaining state behaviour*. By openly addressing the obvious, that institutions can never provide the "whole story" about states' behaviour in the international system, the general assumptions discussed above should be explicitly acknowledged. This would provide an "institutionalist theory of international politics" with what is often not spelled out in current institutionalist frameworks (which often rather resemble "theories of international institutions"). This insight is neither new nor original. It was

¹⁶ Unless, of course, the focus is placed exclusively on *global* institutions, in which case the theoretical account may possibly coincide with a systemic theory.

explicitly pointed out in early “neo-liberal institutionalist” writings, but seems to have fallen into the background along the way as highlighting the differences with realism seems to have been perceived as the main task.¹⁷ In sum, an institutionalist account of cooperation which also specifies to what extent factors in the outside environment affect state behaviour would provide better hypotheses on when we should assume cooperation to intensify.

Another insight gained from this study is that institutionalist theories of various kinds may well be capable of explaining the *occurrence* of cooperation, but when using these explanations to spell out hypotheses also on the *growth* of cooperation, they were clearly somewhat weaker in their predictions.¹⁸ The findings in chapter four did however suggest that if any institutional change also had a more long-term independent effect on the cooperation, it was most likely to be the *centralisation* in the form of creating permanent Brussels-based bodies. The first such path-breaking institutional change took place when the EPC Secretariat was established through the Single European Act, and it has been argued above that this may have contributed to the faster growth of the EPC/CFSP from this time onwards. Since then, one more such dramatic “centralisation change” has occurred – the appointment in 1999 of a High Representative for the CFSP – but its possible effects could not be distinguished in the previous chapters because they concluded with the turn of the millennium. In the next chapter, though, the very active role of the

¹⁷ For instance, Robert Keohane (1989, p. 35) noted that realism is a necessary component in any analysis of world politics, because “its focus on power, interests, and rationality is crucial to any understanding of the subject. Thus, any approach to international relations has to incorporate, or at least come to grips with, key elements of Realist thinking. Even writers who are concerned principally with international institutions and rules, or analysts in the Marxist tradition, make use of some Realist premises.” Cf. Jervis 1999, pp. 44f. Other institutionalist frameworks, however, were never very clear on this point. Neo-functionalism, for instance, has few explicit propositions about the role of the outside environment.

¹⁸ In fact, this study tried to “force” hypotheses on the effects of institutional change from theories that were mainly developed to explain the effects of the setting up of institutions. Therefore, the finding that these theories served better to explain the perseverance of cooperation is perhaps not so surprising.

High Representative shines through at times, even if it is highly likely that his role has been much more influential than can be “proven beyond doubt” by any outside observer.

This study could furthermore not to any meaningful degree distinguish the relative importance of the different institutional dimensions in their role in locking in the attained levels of cooperation. That would require more detailed studies, and applying a different research method than the one used here. We may however end by asking why the institutionalist theories are generally better at explaining these locking-in effects than at explaining the intensification of cooperation. Does it have to do with the question of whether, or to what extent, foreign policy cooperation is typical of international cooperation in general or, on the contrary, is an exceptional case? The answer to that question of course also to some extent determines the possibilities to generalise some of the findings.

Foreign policy exceptionalism?

Cooperation between states on foreign and security policy towards the rest of the world is indeed quite different in comparison with cooperation on other issue areas. Several unusual characteristics can be distinguished, which clarify why neither a “typical realist” or a “typical institutionalist” hypothesis was readily available.

Most international institutions aim at solving a problem *between* the participating states, while a collective foreign policy is entirely directed towards the *external environment*.¹⁹ This means that it is – to an unusually large extent – events, conditions and actors in the outside world that determine the perceptions of desirable courses of action.²⁰ For this reason, when testing institutionalist theories on foreign policy cooperation, the omission of the external structure and the omission of explicit formulations of state interests in relation to

¹⁹ This must generally be assumed to be the case even if the EC members themselves early on suggested that one of the aims of EPC was to serve to unify the members with a view to the later creation of a European Union.

²⁰ Cf. Goldmann 1986, p. 5.

the external environment become more visible than they have been in “typical” issue areas studied by institutionalist scholars. Even those few institutionalists that have addressed security institutions have predominantly focused on institutions that aim at providing security *between* the participants.²¹

For related reasons, the *contents* of a collective foreign policy cannot be expected to be found in the institutional or procedural set-up. In most areas where regulatory, distributive or re-distributive types of issues are involved – in other words in most of the current international cooperation dealing primarily with trade, aid, and environmental issues – the institutional and organisational decisions are often part and parcel of the “common policy,” at least as long as the participants abide by the rules. For most scholars who study international institutions, an institutional change therefore equals a policy change. However, for foreign policy cooperation, the content of which can normally not be regulated or legislated, the *outcome* of any cooperative arrangement, in the form of a common *policy* or other activity, and its *legal-institutional framework* are not the same phenomena. In theory, one could very well change without a change in the other. As discussed in chapter two, it is perhaps for this reason that many analysts tend to equate integration with new institutional big bangs. And it is perhaps for this reason that institutional theory may well have provided plausible hypotheses on why institutions would change (a question that this study has entirely disregarded), but had more difficulty in proposing clear-cut ideas about the effects of institutional change.

Foreign policy is thus characterised, to a considerably higher degree than domestic politics, by a constant need to adjust to events outside the reach of a government’s formal legislative powers. It is to a very large extent the successive *future* events and conditions in the outside world that both must and will continuously determine the perceptions of the desirable courses of action.²² The contents of the policy can therefore not be laid down in advance. If a group of states

²¹ See for instance the contributions in Haftendorn et al. 1999.

²² Cf. Goldmann 1993, p. 323.

wish to be able to respond collectively to such unknown events, all they can do is to specify the procedural rules and perhaps some general and common points of reference. Therefore, as Ian Davidson has commented, in foreign policy cooperation, the “governments cannot know in advance what they are letting themselves in for.” Contrary to cooperation between states in many other areas, the participants in a collective foreign policy:

are not dealing with a closed system, they do not have the power to determine the outside participants, they do not have the power to determine which policies will affect them, they cannot be sure of being able to negotiate explicit bargains with outside interlocutors, they mostly cannot formulate these bargains in legislation (i.e., treaties), and they mostly will have no court to which they can appeal.²³

Therefore, in sum, foreign and security policy is an issue area generally characterised by an unusually high degree of uncertainty, unpredictability, and difficult risk-taking.²⁴

For these reasons combined, it is in fact difficult to suggest that the theoretical findings in this study could easily be generalised in order to apply also for international cooperation in *other issue areas*. Indeed, the presumption must be that they can *not*. They may however more likely be generalised to cover *other instances of foreign policy cooperation* between groups of states. As argued in chapter two, such groups are currently a rarity, but to the extent that other similar cases may materialise in the future, the findings from this study should deserve at least to be tested. Finally, in any event, the findings should most certainly lend themselves to generalisation about the same cooperative venture *over time*. A first such test is provided in the next chapter, where the findings that came out of a study spanning over thirty years of the EU’s collective foreign policy will be contrasted with a more detailed account of the events during three hundred days of yet another transatlantic crisis.

²³ Davidson 1998, p. 184.

²⁴ See for instance Snyder et al. 1962, p. 104; and Jervis 1982, pp. 358f.

Three Hundred Days of Collective Foreign Policy

THE EVENTS THAT UNFOLDED throughout the approximately three hundred days covered below, between November 2002 and September 2003, have been described as “the worst transatlantic crisis in memory.”¹ The conclusions from previous chapters would predict that the very tense diplomatic climate that developed – across the Atlantic and within Europe – over how to handle Iraq, would have led to new CFSP activities, notably on issues not necessarily related to Iraq. The new EU activities, furthermore, should likely be influenced not only by the wishes of the member states but also by the centralised bodies. In particular, one could expect the High Representative and the Council Secretariat to play a certain role in getting the members to agree on collective activities. The following account shows that this is also precisely what happened, and it also suggests one link which has hitherto not been visible in this study. The transatlantic quarrels clearly influenced the contents of the ongoing institutional reforms.²

This period may seem an arbitrary choice, but it is chosen precisely because it starts during the build-up of a serious diplomatic

¹ Peterson 2004, p. 14. Dana Allin (2004, p. 649) is more precise, claiming that it was “unprecedented in post-Second World War history.” Nicole Gnesotto (2003, p. 7) has pointed out that “2003 will be remembered as an *annus horribilis* par excellence for international relations as a whole, but particularly transatlantic relations.”

² Unless otherwise stated, all news references in this chapter refer to the internet edition of the news sources.

crisis between some EU members and the US, and it ends as the EU was just finishing one among a number of new “firsts” in the history of the CFSP: Operation Artémis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Furthermore, these three hundred days also cover a number of less spectacular issues which constitute, in a sense, a number of microcosms of the transatlantic rift.³

Significantly, the three hundred days below also cover a period of collective foreign policy that has been described as disastrous for the CFSP, during which the EU members were said to be “more unwilling than ever to speak with one united voice” and when European foreign policy was “shifting back to its natural home in individual capitals.”⁴ Or, as a former practitioner has put it, a period that was “the low point in modern times for the ambitions of the European Union as a global actor in the field of foreign affairs and security.”⁵ The following account shows that this was indeed the picture anyone would get when focusing exclusively on the EU’s response (or lack of response) to the US policy towards Iraq during this period. Yet, for those who simultaneously followed the CFSP *as a whole* during this time, including the rapid development of the European security and defence policy (ESDP), the picture of EU collective foreign policy was far more complex, and in a sense far more innovative than it had been for a long time.

BETWEEN BAGHDAD AND BUNIA

On November 8, 2002, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1441, threatening Iraq with “serious consequences” unless Saddam Hussein disclosed all aspects of Iraq’s programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and readmitted the UN weapons inspectors into the country. Resolution 1441, however, was a hard-won compromise, and seemed to satisfy few of the parties involved. This was not the starting point of the new transatlantic dispute,

³ Cf. *Financial Times*, February 25, 2003.

⁴ *Financial Times*, November 7, 2002.

⁵ Bildt 2004, p. 23.

which had already erupted, but from this time on the situation deteriorated markedly.

The “war on terror” moves to Iraq

Transatlantic relations, including relations within NATO, had successively worsened during the preceding months. Something of a diplomatic war had already broken out between the US on the one hand and Germany and France on the other. The disagreements over how to handle Iraq, linked to both the broader and primarily American agenda of the “war on terrorism” and the legality of “pre-emptive strikes,” were on full display for all to witness.

The US had for months spoken openly in favour of a military intervention in Iraq. In September, the US had announced an ultimatum: either the Security Council should deliver a resolution that would allow the use of force against Iraq in order to make it comply with the disarmament required in accordance with previous UN resolutions, or the US would provide such a compliance mechanism on its own.⁶ The US had furthermore made it clear that Washington would choose its alliance partners on the basis of contributions to the US aims, not on the basis of shared democratic values and existing institutions, and had thereby deliberately kept Iraq off the NATO agenda.⁷

The UK had, initially somewhat hesitantly, begun to support the US line. This was seemingly done in the hope of persuading the Bush administration to await UN approval of any military action.⁸ Soon, however, the UK line became more pronounced in its support for the US, and by September Prime Minister Tony Blair had signalled a readiness to join the US in military action against Iraq even without a UN mandate.⁹

⁶ *BBC News*, September 12, 2002.

⁷ Pond 2004, p. 62; *Financial Times*, February 11, 2003.

⁸ *Telegraph.co.uk*, September 11, 2002; Davidson 2003.

⁹ *Telegraph.co.uk*, September 9, 2002.

Germany on the other hand, and later joined by an initially somewhat more indecisive France, had for months spoken out strongly against any such action.¹⁰ The German government had, since the German election campaign during the summer of 2002, deeply upset the Bush administration by its uncompromising opposition to any form of military intervention in Iraq. Chancellor Schröder had called military intervention in Iraq an “adventure,” and had even barred the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from seeking any compromise position at the UN. He had also announced a German refusal to contribute financially to the reconstruction of the country after the war.¹¹ When the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), in coalition with the Greens, won the elections on September 22, President Bush did not even send routine congratulations to Schröder. During the following months, German diplomats in Washington were cold-shouldered, and senior officials from the Bush administration boycotted German receptions in the US capital.¹²

French President Jacques Chirac had initially been slightly more accommodating towards the idea of military intervention, but was firmly opposed to unilateral action by the US.¹³ The French message was that “nothing is impossible, if it is decided by the international community on the basis of indisputable proof,” but that overthrowing Saddam Hussein without the backing of the Security Council “would be a recipe for chaos in global affairs.”¹⁴

The EU as a whole, however, played no part during the weeks of negotiations leading up to the adoption of resolution 1441. In particular the German and the British views differed so much that any meaningful compromise position seemed out of reach. Or, as one EU official put it, Europe was “more unwilling than ever to speak with one united voice,” and the “myth that the Europeans were

¹⁰ *BBC News*, September 13, 2002.

¹¹ Pond 2003, pp. 57f.; *New York Times*, September 9, 2002.

¹² Pond 2003, p. 61.

¹³ *Telegraph.co.uk*, September 9, 2002.

¹⁴ *New York Times*, September 9, 2002.

going to get their act together and provide options to the Bush administration's foreign policy is over.”¹⁵

New institutional initiatives start to proliferate

In the midst of these diplomatic quarrels, several ideas on new institutional initiatives started to proliferate during the autumn. In a sense, NATO was the first institution to react. The NATO summit in Prague on November 20–21, decided *inter alia* to start planning for the creation of a new NATO response force (NRF). The NRF was to serve as an intervention force, and consist of some twenty thousand elite troops with supporting air and sea components.¹⁶ The motivation, as stated by the summit, was to “strengthen our ability to meet the challenges to the security of our forces, populations and territory, from wherever they may come.” To that effect, NATO needed to “be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed.”¹⁷ These were clearly formulations that went hand in hand with the repeated American calls for improved European military capabilities, and the idea had also been initiated by the US.

While all European NATO members accepted the decision, some were nonetheless worried that the creation of the NRF would give rise to renewed discussions about a division of labour between the EU and NATO in international crisis management, and thereby reduce the EU's potential role to low-end peacekeeping tasks while NATO would carry out the more complex and demanding missions.¹⁸ Such views were also publicly expressed by some NATO officials, who maintained that the NRF would be better suited to act globally while the EU should manage its own backyard.¹⁹

Simultaneously, however, the Europeans were also engaged in a much broader debate on how to reform the European Union. The European Convention, which had as its task “to consider the key

¹⁵ *Financial Times*, November 7, 2002.

¹⁶ Keohane 2003.

¹⁷ NATO, *Prague Summit Declaration*, November 21, 2002.

¹⁸ Ludlow 2004, pp. 266f.

¹⁹ *EUobserver*, November 28, 2002.

issues arising for the Union's future development and try to identify the various possible responses,"²⁰ had begun to intensify its work in the previous months.²¹ One of the main issues turned out to be that of Europe's role in the world. As German FDP leader Guido Westerwelle had already commented in April 2002,

the Union's capacity to act *as a union* is now a pre-condition to securing each European country's national interests. [...] Indeed, the current state of the world shows how necessary a common European foreign and security policy is. Today there is not too much America – as some maintain – but too little Europe. The challenges facing the delegates at the Brussels convention is nothing less than creating an open, democratic, and yes, greater, Europe.²²

The discussions during the autumn of 2002 in the Convention's two working groups on external action and on defence, proved to be heavily influenced by the "US factor." The Convention delegates, as well as other European politicians and a number of experts who were heard by the Convention delegates in various formats, highlighted the need to consider reforms of the CFSP and the European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) that would increase the EU's international influence. In addition to debating how to reform the CFSP in general, a heavy focus was placed on how to improve the EU members' military capabilities. The comparisons to, and relations with, the US seemed to be on the minds of most of the involved.

To give just a few examples: Commissioner Michel Barnier, who headed the Convention's working group on defence, laid out the stakes by declaring that "[t]he hour of truth is coming for Europe: do we want to be only an economic and financial community or do we want to become an independent political power?"²³ Former French Defence Minister Alain Richard, alluding to American comments, testified to the same working group that the lack of

²⁰ The Laeken European Council, 14–15 December 2001, "Laeken Declaration - The Future of the European Union."

²¹ The European Convention formally opened on February 28, 2002, but most of the working groups started their work in September 2002.

²² Westerwelle 2002 (emphasis in original).

²³ Quoted in *Telegraph.co.uk*, October 27, 2002.

sufficient European spending on defence was damaging to the EU's global influence.²⁴ UK Prime Minister Tony Blair delivered a similar message, saying that Europe's role in the world was too weak, and that he did "not want to limit Europe's security ambitions to low level peacekeeping."²⁵ Analysts participating in the process were of the same opinion, arguing, like Mathias Jopp, that the Union had to learn to speak with a single voice and increase its military capabilities so as to be able to influence the United States.²⁶ The working group, as a whole, also concluded that "[o]ne key factor in the credibility of the Union's defence policy and hence of its international role is that there should be suitable, interoperable military capabilities."²⁷ Thus, the discussions on institutional security policy reforms were not only (or even primarily?) motivated by the growing realisation of new types of threats facing the Union, but at least equally motivated by the desire to be able to participate in international security management on an equal footing with the US.²⁸

Among the most innovative institutional CFSP reforms that were discussed early on was the idea of a "double-hatted" Union Minister for Foreign Affairs belonging to, in one way or the other, both the Council and the Commission.²⁹ On the issue of military capabilities, a French-German contribution was fed into the Convention – the day after the NATO summit in Prague – that strongly influenced the discussions. The two foreign ministers called, among

²⁴ The European Convention, CONV 405/02.

²⁵ Blair 2002.

²⁶ The European Convention, CONV 417/02; cf. for instance Kagan (2002), who clearly had an impact on the discussions in the autumn of 2002 (Gordon 2003).

²⁷ The European Convention, CONV 461/02. In an explicit comparison to the US, the working group furthermore deplored the gap between the EU and the US on investments in military research (Ibid.).

²⁸ Or, to put it slightly differently, while the recent changes in US defence policy at the time had been guided by a new national security strategy, the European discussions (which lacked a similar guiding document) were rather influenced by the implicit and explicit comparisons with the US.

²⁹ See for instance The European Convention, CONV 459/02, for early ideas about the possible roles for such a post.

other things, for extended possibilities for enhanced cooperation³⁰ in the defence area, in particular as concerned military capabilities but also for those states that wished to incorporate the WEU's mutual defence commitments into the Union framework. They furthermore called for an adaptation of the Community regulations to allow for increased intra-European armaments cooperation and trade, and supported the idea of creating a European Armaments Agency.³¹ The initiatives from the UK were equally focused on improving military capabilities, but contrary to the French-German proposals they did not focus on an exclusive group, and aimed rather at making all EU members participate in making the EU's crisis management capability more efficient. The UK also suggested that the Petersberg tasks needed to be updated and modernised.³²

As the working group on defence concluded its work before Christmas it was clear that few, if any, of the interested parties had any wish to limit the Union's military capability to low-end peacekeeping in the vicinity. The UK argued that the ESDP should contribute to "pursuing the Union's interests world-wide,"³³ German Minister for Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer said he did not want the EU's rapid reaction force reduced to only a "peace corps,"³⁴ and the Finnish and Swedish Foreign Ministers jointly argued that the Union's crisis management tools should be used "wherever they are needed."³⁵ The working group also explicitly stated that while peace and security immediately outside the Union's borders may constitute a natural priority, "neither the Treaty nor the European

³⁰ Enhanced cooperation is the EU term for allowing a group of EU members to initiate cooperation, and use the European Union institutions, in an issue area where not all members wish to participate. The Nice Treaty explicitly prohibits enhanced cooperation in most overarching CFSP matters, and in all issues with a bearing on defence or military matters.

³¹ The European Convention, CONV 422/02.

³² Ibid., Working Group VIII, Working document 23.

³³ Ibid., Working document 42.

³⁴ Ludlow 2004, p. 267.

³⁵ *Dagens Nyheter*, December 17, 2002.

Council conclusions place any geographical limit on the Union's action."³⁶

To some extent, however, and as the working group also pointed out, the Union's crisis management capability was dependent on an agreement with NATO that seemed difficult to conclude.

Eventually – Berlin plus

In June 2002, the European Council in Seville had already signalled EU willingness to take over NATO's role in Macedonia, should NATO and the Macedonian government so wish.³⁷ But one building bloc, partly political and partly very real, in the EU's ongoing work to create a military capability remained to be solved. The EU had, from the outset of the ESDP in 1999, planned for an agreement with NATO that would give the Union access to certain NATO assets (notably its permanent headquarters with extensive planning and mission support facilities) for carrying out certain EU-led crisis management missions. The deal was however continuously put off by the NATO side, primarily due to Turkish objections.

As the deal, which was termed the Berlin plus agreement,³⁸ seemed no closer to conclusion the autumn of 2002, France suggested that the relatively limited military mission in Macedonia should be carried out by the EU without the use of NATO assets.³⁹ In terms of capabilities this would not have been a problem, as the EU had also planned for the alternative possibility to use one out of a few designated national headquarters when carrying out its crisis management missions,⁴⁰ but the political climate did not allow for such a bold move. An EU-led military mission in Macedonia would be the first

³⁶ The European Convention, CONV 461/02.

³⁷ Presidency Conclusions of the Seville European Council, June 21–22, 2002. The European Council had, on previous occasions, also discussed this possibility, but had been unable to reach a conclusion to this effect (Verhofstadt 2003, p. 29).

³⁸ The agreement was named "Berlin plus" because it was to be an extended version of the existing so called Berlin agreement between the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO, which was allowing the WEU to have recourse to certain NATO assets.

³⁹ *Financial Times*, December 15, 2002.

⁴⁰ Grant 2003a, p. 1.

time ever that the Union had ever dispatched troops in its own name, and should the EU show any further signs of distancing itself from NATO, many feared that increasing strains on the transatlantic relations would be the result. The Secretary General of the Alliance, George Robertson, also clearly and decisively signalled that such “short term fixes” were not the answer.⁴¹

By mid-December, however, the Berlin plus arrangement was eventually agreed in principle at the Copenhagen European Council and at a simultaneous extra meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, following intense negotiations led by Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative for the CFSP. The European Council then immediately proceeded to declare that the EU was ready to take over NATO’s peacekeeping role in Macedonia, but also quite unexpectedly signalled a willingness for an EU take-over of NATO’s role in Bosnia. The mention of Bosnia was made without any prior consultations with NATO, which upset US diplomats and added further to the already strained relations.⁴²

On Iraq, no distinct EU alternative to the US policy could be agreed, but the European Council declared that “[i]t is now up to Iraq to seize this final opportunity to comply with its international obligations.”⁴³ At this point, Germany was still the only EU member to have explicitly ruled out the use of force against Iraq under any circumstances. France had not entirely renounced military action, but maintained that it should only be done with a UN mandate and on the basis of a report from the UN inspectors. By the beginning of January 2003, President Chirac even told the armed forces to be “ready for every eventuality,” and French military planners declared that they were ready to send 15,000 men plus aircraft if required.⁴⁴

⁴¹ The European Convention, CONV 399/02.

⁴² Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council, December 12–13, 2002, point 27; Ludlow 2004, p. 284, 289; *Reuters News*, July 25, 2003.

⁴³ Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council, December 12–13, 2002, Annex IV.

⁴⁴ *EUobserver*, January 8, 2003. It seems, furthermore, that these French military contributions to a possible military operation were formally offered to Washington on

ESDP goes operational

Collectively, however, the EU took new steps elsewhere. On January 1, 2003, the Union launched its first ever crisis management mission. It was a follow-on mission to the previous UN International Police Task Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) consisted of some five hundred police officers, and aimed to contribute to the establishment of sustainable policing arrangements in the country.⁴⁵

The planning of EUPM had raised an enormous interest from non-EU members ever since the decision to go ahead with the mission had been taken in March 2002. As EUPM started its work, it contained personnel not only from the fifteen EU members but also from another eighteen states.⁴⁶ And, while the deployment of EUPM cannot be directly linked to the Iraq dispute across the Atlantic, the launching of the mission certainly came at a time when the EU was in need of some positive news about its international role. As Javier Solana remarked, what really mattered was of course EUPM's success in the area of policing in Bosnia, but

it is not without some emotion that we will see for the first time our European colours adorn the national uniforms of our police officers in a mission on the ground. It is a strong symbol of the collective will of Europeans to act jointly in this key task of consolidating stability and security in our continent.⁴⁷

The collective will, however, continued to be less pronounced when it came to the only international issue that caught the media's attention at the time – the unfolding of events in relation to Iraq.

December 16, on the condition of a UN mandate, but US officials declined the offer (*International Herald Tribune*, October 7, 2004).

⁴⁵ EU Council Conclusions (GAERC), January 27, 2003.

⁴⁶ In addition to 9 of the 10 states that were about to join the EU at the time (Malta being the exception), the non-EU contributors were Canada, Bulgaria, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and the Ukraine.

⁴⁷ Javier Solana web site, Press statement, December 27, 2002, no So244/02.

Old Europe, new Europe, real Europe

In Iraq, the UN weapons inspectors had gradually built up their capacity, and by the end of December there were about one hundred inspectors in the country. Simultaneously, the US military build-up and preparations for a possible war also continued. By the turn of the year, there were some 100,000 American troops in the area. While no formal US decision to go to war had been pronounced, there was a growing expectation that armed force would be used. As Hans Blix, who headed the UN inspectors team, puts it, the Washington clocks were ticking fast, and as Tony Blair told him, “the US could not keep troops idling in the area for months.”⁴⁸ The update on the progress of the UN inspectors, which was to be delivered to the UN Security Council on January 27, was much awaited, not the least by the US.

The week before the update, the diplomatic tone between Washington on the one hand and Berlin and Paris on the other, grew increasingly impolite. France and Germany, celebrating the 40th anniversary of the Elysée treaty in Paris on January 22, pledged to intensify their cooperation to avoid a war in Iraq.⁴⁹ They also renewed their calls for reforms of the CFSP/ESDP in the European Convention, arguing that improved European military capabilities would also be helpful for the balance in the world.⁵⁰

At a meeting between NATO ambassadors the same day, Germany, France and Belgium furthermore blocked an American request to initiate NATO planning for a possible protection of Turkey in the event of a war.⁵¹ One person in the Bush administration seemingly summed up the American sentiment by claiming that “it seems to me that the Germans owe it to us to at least keep quiet.”⁵² Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stirred emotions further after

⁴⁸ Blix 2004, pp. 109–131.

⁴⁹ *BBC News*, January 22, 2003.

⁵⁰ At the ceremony, Jacques Chirac notably argued that: “Une Europe capable d’agir, y compris dans le domaine militaire, est nécessaire à l’équilibre du monde.” (A Europe capable of acting, including in the military domain, is necessary for the balance in the world) (Chirac 2003).

⁵¹ *BBC News*, January 22, 2003.

⁵² *Telegraph.co.uk*, February 11, 2003.

the meeting by describing Germany and France as “old Europe,” causing, in turn, others in Europe to criticise the US for playing up the divisions.⁵³ German Minister for Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer said the only answer he had was: “cool down.”⁵⁴ The British Ambassador to Washington, however, in one of the remarkably few open recriminations *between* EU governments, took the idea further and started to refer to the European supporters of the US policy on Iraq as the “real Europe.”⁵⁵

No smoking guns in Iraq

On January 27, as Hans Blix could not report any indisputable findings of any “smoking guns” in Iraq, the international debate intensified further. The fifteen EU foreign ministers, meeting in Brussels on the same day, were deeply divided in their attitudes towards the US policy. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi was quoted in Italian newspapers saying it was “perfectly useless” even to try to find a common position.⁵⁶ Javier Solana nonetheless managed to persuade all fifteen ministers to agree on a compromise statement, urging Iraq to comply “without delay” and to help the UN inspectors.⁵⁷ There were however no references to the primarily German and French wishes to allow more time for the UN inspectors, nor any references to the primarily British view that military action could become necessary even without a UN mandate.

The internal EU disagreements over the US policy on Iraq were however not noticeably mirrored in other foreign and security policy areas. Apart from Iraq, it was pretty much business as usual when the foreign ministers met. For instance, the ministers discussed how to best renew the targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe, expressed grave concern over Israel’s military operations in Gaza and an-

⁵³ *CNN*, January 23, 2003.

⁵⁴ *EUobserver*, January 24, 2003.

⁵⁵ *Telegraph.co.uk*, February 11, 2003.

⁵⁶ *BBC News*, January 27, 2003.

⁵⁷ *Financial Times*, February 1, 2003; EU Council press release 27 January 2003, no. 5396/03 (Presse 8).

nounced an upcoming Presidency visit to the Middle East, agreed to send a high-level EU mission to North Korea, lifted the Union's restrictions on certain economic relations with Angola, adopted certain restricted measures against Somalia, and agreed on financing arrangements for EU military operations.⁵⁸ And, they certainly wrote CFSP history by adopting the formal decision to start planning for the Union's first ever military mission – the EU takeover of NATO's mission in Macedonia.⁵⁹

The following day, on January 28, in the annual state of the union address, President Bush confirmed his view that the US would not hesitate to overthrow the Iraqi regime by force, even without a new UN resolution. He was also clear on the stance that, although America would consult with others, "the course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others."⁶⁰ Five EU members, together with three of the new EU-members-to-be, swiftly responded to the call, without any prior EU consultation. In an open letter, published on January 30 in several newspapers including the Wall Street Journal, the heads of state or government from the UK, Spain, Italy, Denmark, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland declared their support for the US policy on Iraq.⁶¹ The letter clearly had less to do with their own views on Iraq *per se*, than with responding to Washington's policy. As one analyst has commented, the word "Iraq" did not appear in their statement until half way down; the first twelve paragraphs were essentially a declaration of loyalty and gratitude to Washington.⁶²

Germany and France, who had not been asked to sign the letter, reacted by playing down its significance, describing it as a "contribution to the debate." The Netherlands had been asked to sign it but

⁵⁸ EU Council press release January 27, 2003, no. 5396/03 (Presse 8).

⁵⁹ EU Council joint action 2003/92/CFSP.

⁶⁰ Bush 2003.

⁶¹ *EUobserver*, January 30, 2003. It seems that the letter was first drafted in Madrid, in the Prime Minister's office and not the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and then circulated to certain chosen European states as well as to the Bush administration (*Financial Times*, May 27, 2003).

⁶² Davidson 2003.

declined. Swedish Prime Minister Göran Persson, said he would have declined if he had been asked, calling the situation sad and arguing that it only played into the hands of the Iraqis. The Greek EU Presidency was more openly upset, and said it would consider the possibility of calling for an extraordinary European Council meeting.⁶³

The day after the letter, Tony Blair met with Bush and afterwards announced that the issue of Iraq was coming to a head in a matter of weeks, not months.⁶⁴ By mid-February, there were some 250,000 US and UK troops in the Gulf area.⁶⁵

Le Touquet – reviving l'esprit de St Malo

While the splits within Europe on the US policy towards Iraq were on open display, the calls for institutional reforms to improve the Union's military capability became increasingly concerted. Meeting in Le Touquet on February 4, Chirac and Blair issued a joint declaration. Referring to their meeting in St Malo five years earlier, which set off the process of creating a civilian and military crisis management capacity for the EU, they now concluded that "this is the time for the European Union to take on new responsibilities on the ground for crisis management" and that the European security and defence policy needed to "match the world-wide ambition" of the CFSP. It was therefore time to "intensify the efforts to improve the military capabilities of EU member states."⁶⁶

Among a number of proposals, Chirac and Blair announced that they were "convinced of the need to improve further European capabilities in planning and deploying forces [...] within 5-10 days," and that the two countries were to step up their cooperation to that effect. They also agreed to put forward a joint proposal in the EU for the Union to take over the role of NATO's stabilisation force

⁶³ *EUobserver*, January 31, 2003; *Financial Times*, February 1, 2003.

⁶⁴ Blix 2004, p. 147.

⁶⁵ Pond 2004, p. 73.

⁶⁶ Franco-British summit declaration (2003).

(SFOR) in Bosnia. While SFOR's tasks, together with the Union's more immediate plans for taking over the role of NATO in Macedonia, aimed at promoting the development in the Balkans, the two leaders also explicitly pointed out that these EU operations would be "contributing to a renewed and balanced transatlantic partnership."⁶⁷

NATO put to the test

Finding an agreement on the more acute issue of NATO's present role was more difficult. France, Germany and Belgium had continued to block the US wishes for a NATO decision to plan for the possible protection of Turkey in the event of a war. They argued that such a decision would both make war seem inevitable and make NATO seemingly a party to the war.⁶⁸ This led the Bush administration to further step up the diplomatic insults, criticising the "European pusillanimity" or even "treachery" over Iraq.⁶⁹ Some claimed that this situation had turned into "the biggest rift in the history" of the Alliance.⁷⁰

The NATO deadlock was only broken by moving the discussion to a committee on which France had no seat, and issuing a NATO statement which explicitly declared that any aid to Turkey would be solely defensive and that NATO "was not going to make a war."⁷¹

Meanwhile in Brussels: the Convention despairs

As the European Convention was to resume its work in the new year, the Iraq issue also took its toll on this process. In January, the Convention's presidium had planned to start forwarding successively draft parts of the new Constitutional treaty, including the treaty articles on the CFSP and the ESDP. All draft treaty articles

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ *Financial Times*, February 12, 2003.

⁶⁹ *Telegraph.co.uk*, February 11, 2003.

⁷⁰ See for instance *EUobserver*, February 17, 2003.

⁷¹ Ibid.; *Financial Times*, February 16, 2003.

were expected to have been presented by the presidium to the Convention by the end of March.⁷²

However, in February, as the first draft articles appeared, the text only had empty spaces where the CFSP and ESDP articles were to be placed.⁷³ While Convention presidium member Michel Barnier had clear and outspoken views on the desired reforms in the new articles, which furthermore he argued would not “lead to a superstate but a superpower which will exert influence throughout the world,”⁷⁴ the political climate surrounding the Iraq issue made the presidium decide not to forward any new treaty articles on the Union’s foreign and security policy at the time. As one presidium source said, there was “absolutely no point in having a discussion about it now, we don’t want to make even bigger fools of ourselves.”⁷⁵ Many seem to have read the situation just as one FT journalist put it, “likely either to precipitate institutional reform or lead to the collapse of efforts to construct a coherent EU foreign policy.”⁷⁶

Clearing the air over dinner

On February 17, the extraordinary European Council which had been called by the Greek Presidency, met in Brussels. The fact that the meeting took place at all was indeed a success in itself, at least in an historical comparison, considering the track-record of attempted emergency meetings in the EPC during the 1980s. On many previous occasions, the sentiment had been that there was “no point in meeting merely to disagree.”⁷⁷ This time, the heads of state and government did at least agree to meet, despite some reported hesi-

⁷² *EUobserver*, January 22, 2003.

⁷³ The European Convention, CONV 571/03 (articles 29 and 30).

⁷⁴ *EUobserver*, January 28, 2003.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, March 2, 2003.

⁷⁶ Judy Dempsey in *Financial Times*, February 1, 2003.

⁷⁷ For instance, neither Ireland nor Italy even called for an emergency meeting after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and torn between the American and the German view on the events in Poland in December 1981, the EU members (despite the efforts of some involved) failed to convene for an extraordinary meeting (Nuttall 1992, p. 155 and 201).

tance and reluctance.⁷⁸ The Greek Presidency said, ahead of the summit, that if “no common position on Iraq emerges from the meeting, the Greek Presidency will have exhausted every political and institutional means at its disposal and it will mean a profound crisis for the EU.”⁷⁹

The political tension ahead of the meeting was described in the media as “close to boiling point.”⁸⁰ The political climate across the Atlantic was so bad that UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, who had also been invited to the summit, explicitly complained about transatlantic tensions and “the tendency of turning on each other,” and cautioned that the focus must be kept on Iraq.⁸¹

An agreement on a compromise text, however, seemed quite far away in the days before the summit. In a letter to all his EU colleagues the previous week, Tony Blair had urged the governments not to rule out military action as a last resort.⁸² Three days ahead of the European Council meeting, the four EU members that were currently also members of the UN Security Council (UK, France, Germany and Spain) had however again displayed their diverging views in New York. And a day before the meeting draft texts or statements had still not been circulated. One official said it was better to clear the air over dinner on Monday night than to discuss details in a text.⁸³

A compromise proposal, forwarded by France, the UK and Belgium, served as a basis for the agreement that was eventually reached.⁸⁴ The conclusions from the meeting pledged “full support” for the UN Security Council and a more general commitment to “the United Nations remaining at the centre of international order.” They also stated that “war is not inevitable” but that it was “for the Iraqi

⁷⁸ The week before the meeting, it was still unclear whether all heads of state or government would actually attend (*Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, February 10, 2003).

⁷⁹ *AFP*, February 12, 2003.

⁸⁰ *Financial Times*, February 16, 2003.

⁸¹ *EUobserver*, February 17, 2003.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ *Financial Times*, February 16, 2003.

⁸⁴ *EUobserver*, February 17, 2003.

regime to end this crisis” or be responsible for the consequences of non-cooperation.⁸⁵ It was obviously a compromise, but it was a common statement nonetheless. Javier Solana said that “this proves the young and not-so-young Europe are together.”⁸⁶

The institutions had again delivered – if not any forceful and effective policy they had at least provided a forum for continued discussions and a common position. Furthermore, the extraordinary meeting provided a new opportunity to show the US that there were other issues on which the EU members had far less diverging views. In a response to the US refusal to make public the adoption of the “road map” for peace in the Middle East, which had already been agreed by the Quartet (the US, the EU, Russia and the UN), the European Council declared its view that the peace process in the Middle East must be invigorated and called for an early implementation of the road map.⁸⁷

The outbreak of war

In mid-March, the speed of events accelerated in relation to Iraq. On March 17, concluding that the UN track had been exhausted, the US asked the weapons inspectors to leave the country.⁸⁸ The same evening, President Bush delivered an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his two sons: a refusal from their side to give up power and leave Iraq within forty-eight hours, would “result in military conflict,” starting at a time chosen by the US.⁸⁹ On March 18, all UN inspectors had left the country, and Pentagon said US troops were ready to attack Iraq as soon as they received the order from the President.⁹⁰ On the morning of March 19, President Bush gave the military order to begin Operation Iraqi Freedom, and a few hours later called

⁸⁵ Conclusions from the extraordinary European Council, February 17, 2003.

⁸⁶ *EUobserver*, February 17, 2003.

⁸⁷ Conclusions from the extraordinary European Council, February 17, 2003.

⁸⁸ *CNN*, March 19, 2003.

⁸⁹ Woodward 2004, p. 367.

⁹⁰ *CNN*, March 19, 2003.

the leaders of the coalition partners with the message “we’re launching.”⁹¹

Simultaneously, in Brussels, the fifteen foreign ministers held their monthly Council meeting. Although Iraq was obviously the object of most of the discussions, the various positions on the issue had not changed and the meeting did not result in any new statements on Iraq. While the British position, as spelled out at the UN Security Council meeting later the same day, was supportive of the ultimatum and pointed to a UK participation in the attacks,⁹² German Minister for Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer said in Brussels that “[w]e are on the eve of a possible war that we do not support and profoundly regret.”⁹³ Taking the floor at the UN Security Council later the same day, he continued: “Iraq’s readiness to cooperate was unsatisfactory. It was hesitant and slow. The Council agrees on that. But can this seriously be regarded as grounds for war with all its terrible consequences?”⁹⁴

Chris Patten, Commissioner for External Relations, summed up the collective EU sentiment: “[t]here is a lot of broken crockery on the ground, and we have to work hard to put the pieces together.”⁹⁵ Chancellor Schröder likewise commented that the European foreign and security policy perspectives were “in ruin after current splits over Iraq.” He concluded, just as the German FDP leader had previously done, that “[t]here is not too much America – but too little Europe.”⁹⁶

⁹¹ Woodward 2004, p. 379.

⁹² United Nations S/PV.4721. The UK also argued that “any action which the United Kingdom has to take in this matter will be in accordance with international law and based on relevant resolutions of the Security Council.” Spain held the same view, arguing that “a new resolution, even if it were politically desirable, would not be legally necessary” (ibid.).

⁹³ *EUobserver*, March 19, 2003.

⁹⁴ United Nations S/PV.4721.

⁹⁵ *EUobserver*, March 19, 2003.

⁹⁶ *EUobserver*, March 27, 2003. This became a popular catchphrase. It was for instance repeated by Javier Solana on his visit to the US a couple of weeks later, when he ended his speech at Harvard University by concluding that “what we want is more Europe, not less America” (EU Council Secretariat, doc. Soo87/o3).

In the European Convention, the anticipated new draft CFSP-articles continued to be put off. The European Convention President, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, referring to the "current international scene," also openly called into question the idea of a Union foreign minister that had been proposed by the working group on external relations. He said the EU might have to consider a less ambitious solution of a "minister of co-ordination" instead. Pessimistically, he went on to say that there might not even be a common foreign and security policy in the new Constitution.⁹⁷ One of the Convention's vice-Presidents, Jean-Luc Dehaene, was however more optimistic, arguing that progress had been achieved out of crises in the past and that "the current situation should be a catalyst to find ways to avoid future 'Iraq-type' policy differences."⁹⁸

An EU view on weapons of mass destruction?

While the Council meeting on 19 March did not result in any new statements on Iraq, another – and in many ways highly related – issue was introduced by Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh at the meeting. On the theme "Not another Iraq" (and alluding to for instance North Korea) she suggested that the EU seriously needed to discuss how to achieve a common EU policy on weapons of mass destruction, notably on issues such as biological weapons, strengthening the test-ban treaties, non-proliferation and possibly also on tactical nuclear weapons.⁹⁹

At the Council meeting on 18–19 March the fifteen ministers for foreign affairs as usual also reached a number of other decisions. The most notable, considering the political climate and the current judgement about the failure of the CFSP, was the decision to launch the Union's first ever military crisis management mission by March 31.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Ibid., March 18, 2003.

⁹⁸ Ibid., March 20, 2003.

⁹⁹ Swedish Parliament, Committee on EU Affairs, shorthand record, March 14 and April 11, 2003.

¹⁰⁰ EU Council decision, March 18, 2003, doc. 7537/03.

Operation Concordia launched in Macedonia

Throughout the previous weeks, the planning for the Union's takeover of NATO's mission in Macedonia had proceeded almost according to plan. The Berlin plus arrangement, that had been finalised the previous week, was to be put to its first test. This part of the planning also seems to have been the only small obstacle in the process, mirroring the transatlantic climate. Some participants had the feeling that the Americans attempted to slow down the military planning between the EU and NATO, and rivalries and ill-will between NATO and EU diplomats was reported by the press.¹⁰¹ One NATO ambassador said the Pentagon did its best to delay getting it off the ground. A British defence official gave the same picture, saying that the "State Department was behind us. The Pentagon was difficult [...] I have rarely seen such pressure and attention to establishing the chain of command."¹⁰²

At the same time, there were also voices arguing that the situation in Macedonia could be considered secure enough for the international military presence to leave the country altogether, and that the new EU mission was unnecessary. Allegations therefore circulated that the operation was more important to the EU than to Macedonia, and that some primarily wished for the mission to be carried out due to its symbolic value for the Union.¹⁰³

Operation Concordia was eventually launched in Macedonia on March 31. It was a small mission, comprising some four hundred troops, but the interest from non-EU members was very high. In fact, the non-EU members again outnumbered the members; while thirteen EU states contributed to the mission, another fourteen non-EU members participated with personnel.¹⁰⁴ Handing over to the

¹⁰¹ *Financial Times*, February 25, 2003; *Financial Times*, March 31, 2003.

¹⁰² *Financial Times*, March 31, 2003.

¹⁰³ *BBC News*, March 28, 2003; *EUobserver*, March 31, 2003.

¹⁰⁴ The non-EU members that took part in Operation Concordia were Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey. The two EU members that did not participate were Denmark and Ireland (EU Council web-site on Concordia, list of participants).

EU, NATO Secretary General George Robertson said that “a new chapter in European security” had started, and Solana called it a “happy day.”¹⁰⁵

Back to normal – almost too normal

The day after the Iraq war broke out, the EU members’ heads of state and government met for the ordinary spring European Council. While reports said there were “no hugs, no smiles” between Chirac and Blair, others like the German Chancellor summed up the meeting as being normal, adding that it was almost too normal, considering the time spent on discussing Italian milk quotas.¹⁰⁶ When asked if the Iraq war had changed the UK’s commitment to Europe, Tony Blair replied: “Unhesitatingly no.”¹⁰⁷

The EU leaders also showed that, now that the war had started, there were possible areas for agreement also in relation to the continued process in Iraq. As they pragmatically concluded, they were now “faced with a new situation.” They indicated in their conclusions that they did not wish to see a US military administration run Iraq after the war, unless organised by the UN. They also signalled that they would seek a new UN mandate to give the UN a central role in organising assistance after the war ended.¹⁰⁸ On a more general note, and alluding to the American unilateral tendencies, the heads of state and government also concluded that they would “intensify work for a comprehensive, coherent and effective *multilateral* policy of the international community to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”¹⁰⁹

Some three weeks later, on April 14, the General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting was spent *inter alia* on discussing in depth the “paramount importance of an effective policy against the

¹⁰⁵ Robertson 2003.

¹⁰⁶ *Washington Post*, March 21, 2003; *EUobserver*, March 21, 2003.

¹⁰⁷ *EUobserver*, March 21, 2003.

¹⁰⁸ Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, March 20–21, 2003; *Washington Post*, March 21, 2003.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.* (emphasis added).

proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.” Following Anna Lindh’s initiative at the preceding Council meeting, the Secretariat and the Commission had prepared a document on the subject, which together with contributions by member states formed the basis for the discussion. The Council agreed to task Solana with the continued work in order to propose, among other things, a long term EU strategy on these issues to the next European Council.¹¹⁰

The Convention regroupes

On April 23, the Presidium of the European Convention eventually presented the first draft of the new articles on the Union’s “external action.” The Presidium wrote:

Having reflected at length on the current situation and the lessons of the Iraq crisis, the Praesidium takes the view that [...] it is also necessary to provide in the Constitution for more effective institutional mechanisms to underpin and assist the process.¹¹¹

Contrary to some of the previous comments from for instance Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the proposed new articles did contain a number of changes to the CFSP/ESDP framework.¹¹²

The draft CFSP articles proposed for instance the creation of a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, and a certain extension of the situations in which the Council could take decisions by qualified majority voting. In the ESDP section, many of the proposed reforms aimed, in various ways, at enhancing the member states’ military capabilities with a view to strengthening the EU’s crisis management

¹¹⁰ EU Council press release, April 14, 2003, no. 8220/03 (Presse 105).

¹¹¹ The European Convention, CONV 685/03.

¹¹² In addition to the comments quoted above, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing had also argued in the previous weeks that “La situation actuelle de division ne tire pas sa source d’un problème institutionnel. L’Union dispose déjà, pour l’essentiel, des institutions et des procédures nécessaires à l’expression d’une position commune. Ce qui manque encore, c’est la volonté d’y avoir recours ou, même, de les respecter.” (The current situation of division does not originate in an institutional problem. The Union already has, in essence, the necessary institutions for expressing common viewpoints. What’s still missing is the will to use them, or, even, respect them.) (Giscard d’Estaing 2003).

capability. These proposals included the creation of a European Armaments and Strategic Research Agency, and a “structured cooperation” for member states which were willing to subscribe to certain criteria related to their military capabilities. Furthermore, the Presidium proposed that until a decision to create a common defence were taken at some point in the future, “closer cooperation on mutual defence” could be initiated for those who wished to subscribe to mutual defence guarantees within the EU framework immediately on the entry into force of the Constitution.¹¹³ These draft articles were to be debated in the Convention’s plenary session on May 16.

Four “chocolate producers” get impatient

In the meantime, however, Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt hosted a “mini-summit” with France, Germany and Luxembourg. According to the host, the meeting was called in order to “relaunch” European defence.¹¹⁴ The Iraq crisis, Verhofstadt said, “has perhaps played the role of a catalyst, in the sense that it has once again shown that if Europe is not coherent in defence and foreign policy matters, it will not play a large role.”¹¹⁵ Other EU governments, however, criticised the meeting, arguing that its format of only four EU leaders, all of which were furthermore the most outspoken against the war in Iraq, in fact would risk splitting the EU further rather than inspiring more unity.¹¹⁶

After the meeting, the four heads of state or government issued a joint declaration on the reforms they wished to see in the new Constitution, as well as other initiatives they felt were necessary in order to improve the European security and defence policy.¹¹⁷ In

¹¹³ The European Convention, doc. CONV 685/03. These two last proposals were later substantially altered during the Intergovernmental Conference that started in October 2003.

¹¹⁴ *Times*, April 29, 2003.

¹¹⁵ *BBC News*, April 28, 2003.

¹¹⁶ *Times*, April 29, 2003; *BBC News*, April 30, 2003.

¹¹⁷ Déclaration commune des chefs d’Etat et de gouvernement d’Allemagne, de France, du Luxembourg et de Belgique (2003).

relation to the Constitution, there was little news, as most of the reforms had already been proposed by the Convention Presidium a few days earlier. Among the more immediate proposals on how to remedy European crisis management shortfalls, however, the idea of improving the EU's planning and mission support capacity by setting up a new military headquarters in Tervuren was the one that was again to put further strains on the transatlantic relations.

US Secretary of State Colin Powell immediately criticised the plan, saying that what was needed was more military capability, not more headquarters.¹¹⁸ And the American sentiment was perhaps made even more clear when the meeting was later referred to by a State Department spokesman as “a little, bitty summit” organised by “four chocolate makers.”¹¹⁹ Nicolas Burns, the US Ambassador to NATO, said this initiative was “one of the greatest dangers to the transatlantic relationship.”¹²⁰

An EU security strategy?

On May 2, the fifteen foreign ministers gathered on Rhodes and Kastellorizo for their informal Gymnich meeting, where EU-US relations were one of the main topics on the agenda. Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, George Papandreou, said the sentiment in favour of reinforcing the common voice of the EU was very strong.¹²¹ Recent events had “shown that Europe must formulate its own strategic dogma in foreign policy and defence issues,”¹²² and “what is clear is that we are in urgent need of a European strategic concept.”¹²³

¹¹⁸ *Financial Times*, April 29, 2003.

¹¹⁹ Transcript of State Department daily press briefing, September 2, 2003. Washington was even to call an emergency NATO meeting over this very issue later the same year (*BBC News*, October 17, 2003).

¹²⁰ *BBC News*, October 21, 2003.

¹²¹ Embassy of Greece, Washington DC, Statement by George Papandreou May 2, 2003.

¹²² Greek Presidency, Statement by George Papandreou, May 2, 2003.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, Press statement, May 3, 2003. According to one analyst, the idea “was pushed by France, Germany and the UK as part of their general attempt to regroup after the Iraq-related split” (Bailes 2005, p. 11, note 34).

Such a strategy, he continued, would cover new major issues, such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. It would furthermore “be effective and European” and “help us in our dialogue with the US, not as a competitor, but contributing to finding a solution to these problems.”¹²⁴

The ministers agreed to give Javier Solana the task of drawing up specific proposals in the coming weeks, and alluded to a further discussion at the upcoming Thessalonica European Council on June 20–21.¹²⁵ Thereby, one problem that had plagued the EU’s foreign policy cooperation since the beginning of the EPC – the lack of an agreed text on what exactly the European interests and objectives were in terms of its foreign and security policy – was finally placed on the official agenda. In other words, six weeks after the outbreak of the Iraq war, it was agreed that the EU was going to have, as Papandreou put it, a document that was in many ways similar to the US national security strategy.¹²⁶

In addition to the broad strategic concept, the foreign ministers also continued their discussions on the possible EU strategy against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In a thinly veiled reference to the US, the Greek Presidency concluded that the ministers had “discussed potential *alternatives to the pre-emptive use of force* against countries that pose a threat to international security.”¹²⁷

The US in the European Convention

A couple of weeks later, in the Convention’s plenary debate on May 16, the reactions to the Presidium’s proposed CFSP/ESDP novelties were mixed. Several voices argued that the Presidium had not gone far enough in extending the possibilities to use qualified majority voting within the CFSP area, and many questioned the ideas of the

¹²⁴ Greek Presidency, Press Conference, May 2, 2003.

¹²⁵ Ibid., Press statement, May 3, 2003.

¹²⁶ Ibid., Press Conference, May 2, 2003.

¹²⁷ Emphasis added. Embassy of Greece, Washington DC, *Gymnich – Foreign Ministers of the current and future EU member states have concluded their informal meeting in Rhodes and Kastelorizo*, May 4, 2003.

structured cooperation and the closer cooperation on mutual defence.¹²⁸

One theme was present in most Convention members' statements and comments. Almost all speakers either alluded to or explicitly mentioned two interrelated issues: the EU's relationship with the US, including the failure to agree on Iraq, and the future relationship between the ESDP and NATO, that is, should the EU develop its own defence guarantees or stick with the existing ones – guaranteed largely in practice by the US – within the NATO framework?¹²⁹

The debate on the future constitutional rules for the EU's collective foreign policy thereby clearly had the US as one – maybe even *the* – main ingredient. Indeed, as French Minister for Foreign Affairs Dominique de Villepin put it: “nous avons tous en tête la crise irakienne.”¹³⁰ And as Convention Vice-President Jean-Luc Dehaene summed up the debate: “de nombreux conventionnels ont insisté aujourd'hui sur le fait que [la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune], pour être crédible, doit être fondée sur des capacités militaires adéquates.”¹³¹

The US clearly followed the development and debate with great interest. A number of former US politicians, including several former Defence Secretaries, even suggested they ought to be granted observer status in the European Convention. The suggestion was met mostly by silence, but one more outspoken Member of the Convention highlighted the absurdity by saying “oui mais naturellement, sous condition de réciprocité, c'est-à-dire que nous participons aux

¹²⁸ See European Parliament, Verbatim Report of the Convention meeting on May 16.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Translated: “We all have the Iraqi crisis on our minds” (ibid.).

¹³¹ Translated: “a large number of Convention members insisted today on the fact that [the common foreign and security policy] in order to be efficient, must rest on adequate military capabilities” (ibid.).

travaux d'une prochaine conférence de révision constitutionnelle aux Etats-Unis."¹³²

ESDP goes out of area?

Meanwhile, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a somewhat more "traditional war" was being fought. The civil war between the minority Hema community and the majority Lendu community in the DRC's north-eastern Ituri region, which had claimed the lives of some 50,000 people since 1999 and displaced another half a million people, was rapidly intensifying by the beginning of May 2003.¹³³ MONUC, the UN peacekeeping mission in the Ituri region, had neither the political mandate, nor the weaponry required, to halt the situation.¹³⁴ The MONUC headquarters, sheltering thousands of civilians in the town of Bunia, was attacked by militias who were also firing into crowds of displaced persons seeking cover near Bunia airport.¹³⁵ In the press, comparisons were made with the beginning of the Rwandan genocide almost a decade earlier.¹³⁶

On May 10, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan asked the international community to make every effort to address the situation, and pleaded with the Security Council to consider effective measures to prevent the situation from deteriorating.¹³⁷ Early on, it was clear that the US, being heavily engaged elsewhere, showed no interest in rapidly providing troops to the DRC.¹³⁸ France, however, immediately sent positive signals to the UN Secretary General, saying it was prepared to send troops to the Bunia area.¹³⁹ In the following days,

¹³² Translated: "yes of course, under the condition of reciprocity, that is, that we will participate in the work of a coming conference to revise the US constitution." Alain Lamassoure in the Convention's plenary debate on May 16 (ibid.).

¹³³ *AFP*, August 3, 2003.

¹³⁴ *CNN*, June 3, 2003; *Newsweek* (Web Exclusive), June 30, 2003; *International Herald Tribune*, June 5, 2003.

¹³⁵ UN Secretary General Press release, SG/SM/8696.

¹³⁶ *EUobserver*, May 19, 2003.

¹³⁷ UN Secretary General Press release, SG/SM/8696.

¹³⁸ Gourevitch 2003.

¹³⁹ *New York Times*, May 14, 2003; *AFP*, May 14, 2003.

however, the response to the UN was to develop in an initially quite unexpected way.

At the Council meeting on May 19, Javier Solana briefed the ministers over lunch on the situation in DRC. He told them that he had been in contact with the UN Secretary General, and that the latter had asked him about the possibility for the EU to deploy an emergency military operation in and around Bunia until the UN itself could reinforce its presence in the area. The ministers agreed to give Solana the task of examining the political and military feasibility of sending an EU-led force to the DRC.¹⁴⁰

The most positive reactions immediately came from a number of the smaller EU members. After the meeting, Greek diplomats said that Athens strongly supported an EU involvement, Irish Minister for Defence Michael Smith said he “would not be surprised to see Irish troops in the Congo in the not too distant future,” and Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs Anna Lindh was positive and said she did not exclude Swedish participation. It is, she argued, important that not only France, with its colonial past, but also others participate.¹⁴¹ One British Member of Parliament expressed the same line of thought, although more bluntly, arguing that “the French have been itching to go in, but they are not the most loved in the region, so if it’s an EU force, with the Brits on board, it has far less political baggage.”¹⁴²

The immediate reactions from the larger EU member were however more mixed. France had already offered to carry out the mission on its own, the UK had no immediate official comments, and Germany was openly against the idea. A German diplomat said that “Congo was a long way from Europe, a difficult military challenge and a conflict on which there was no agreed EU foreign policy.”¹⁴³

Solana’s comments to the press after the meeting were nonetheless unmistakably optimistic. His remarks related not only to the

¹⁴⁰ *EUobserver*, May 19, 2003; *SHAPE News*, May 20, 2003; *AFP*, June 3, 2003.

¹⁴¹ *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, May 19, 2003; *EUobserver*, May 19, 2003.

¹⁴² *Telegraph.co.uk*, June 5, 2003.

¹⁴³ *SHAPE News*, May 27, 2003.

hope of the EU helping to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in the Ituri region, but also to the hope of providing tangible and concrete support for the UN at a time when such support was highly needed. Solana declared to the press that the “Security Council has another place where it can go to draw forces, which is the European Union.”¹⁴⁴ He also said, however, that he did not know how quickly the EU would be able to give a positive response to the UN Secretary General or when the EU troops may be ready to go, but he estimated that it would be a question of “months, not days.”¹⁴⁵

He was very soon to be proven wrong, together with all who assumed that the EU would always, by necessity, be a slow multilateral actor. The ESDP bodies in Brussels proved to work faster than anyone had expected. The following day, on May 20, France sent a dozen officers to reconnoitre the area of Bunia.¹⁴⁶ On May 23, as Solana and the ESDP organs in Brussels were in the process of examining the possible format and requirements for an EU operation, it became clear that Germany would drop its objection. Berlin said it would not block a decision but was unlikely to participate.¹⁴⁷ The issue was however still controversial among military officials, in Brussels and elsewhere, who warned that the EU force did “not have sufficient experience” yet for such a delicate mission. Some claimed that soldiers from Europe were not prepared for the situation in Congo, which was entirely different compared to the Balkans.¹⁴⁸

Four days later, however, on May 27, and still awaiting a formal UN request as well as a formal EU decision, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) asked the EU Military Committee to submit plans for the operation by the middle of the following week.¹⁴⁹ In the discussions it had become clear that the EU members wanted to make the deployment contingent on a “robust mandate” from the

¹⁴⁴ *Associated Press*, May 19, 2003.

¹⁴⁵ *EUobserver*, May 19, 2003.

¹⁴⁶ *SHAPE News*, May 21, 2003.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, May 27, 2003.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, May 28, 2003; *Deutsche Welle*, June 2, 2003.

¹⁴⁹ *SHAPE News*, May 27, 2003; *SHAPE News*, May 28, 2003.

UN Security Council,¹⁵⁰ i.e. a mandate under the UN Charter's Chapter which allows for the use of force to carry out the mission. The planned schedule, by now, had been cut in time, and the aim was for Solana to present a first recommendation to the EU foreign ministers at the Council meeting in Luxemburg on June 16.¹⁵¹ It was no longer a matter of months but weeks.

On May 30, the UN Security Council unanimously authorized a 1,400-member "interim emergency multilateral force in Bunia" to help stabilise the situation in DRC under a Chapter VII mandate.¹⁵² The Security Council could not specify that the mission was planned to become an EU-led operation since the EU had not formally taken any decisions yet. In addition to France, Sweden was also the only other EU member to have declared itself ready to participate.¹⁵³ This led to a lot of confusion in the press, and the Union clearly lacked a sufficient capacity to make the Union's plans visible to the public. Some wrote of an EU contribution to a French-led UN mission,¹⁵⁴ others only of a UN mission, others again of a French mission. The operation was later even described as undertaken by a "multilateral force," with no mentioning of the EU, on the web-pages of the EU Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office.¹⁵⁵

...and Berlin plus?

One international organisation, however, which clearly understood what was going on, was NATO. Ever since the birth of the ESDP in 1999, there had been something of an unwritten assumption which was linked to the Berlin plus agreement: the EU should act militarily only when NATO had had the "right of first refusal."¹⁵⁶ On the

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., May 28, 2003.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., May 27, 2003.

¹⁵² United Nations Security Council, S/RES/1484 (2003).

¹⁵³ EUobserver, May 30, 2003.

¹⁵⁴ *AFP*, June 3, 2003 (French).

¹⁵⁵ Ambassador Björn Lyrvall, intervention at a conference organised by the Swedish Network for European Studies in Political Science, Lund, March 25–26, 2004.

¹⁵⁶ Keohane 2003.

planned Congo mission, NATO had not been asked, which certainly upset some of the actors involved who saw this EU move as a breach of the Berlin plus deal.¹⁵⁷ One NATO official was quoted saying “it would be nice to see the European Union being [...] rigorous in adhering to the spirit as well as the letter [of Berlin plus].”¹⁵⁸ It seems that the NATO member most upset was the US,¹⁵⁹ although this time there were few, if any, American complaints in public.

However, whether immediately related to the plans for the Congo mission or rather to the mini-summit on April 29 or the previous opposition to the Iraqi war by a number of EU members, Washington in a simultaneous development begun to argue that the ongoing plans for a possible EU takeover of the SFOR mission in Bosnia during 2004 were “premature,” citing security reasons and problems with war criminals.¹⁶⁰ Discussions on this topic were held between NATO foreign ministers on June 3. Due to American reluctance and attempts to stall the process, the meeting achieved, according to a British diplomat, “no dates, no logistics and no agreement.”¹⁶¹ The US seemed intent on freezing the planning of a future EU military mission to Bosnia.

A political statement in a military minefield

The planning for the Congo mission was however still being carried out with remarkable speed. The same day, on June 3, Solana said he was optimistic that an agreement to decide on an EU operation in the DRC would be reached by the Political and Security Committee the following day. By now, he had changed his estimates and believed that the formal decision would be taken already within a week.¹⁶² France said it would host a meeting on June 6 for the states wanting

¹⁵⁷ Cf. *Financial Times*, July 19, 2003.

¹⁵⁸ *Reuters News*, July 19, 2003.

¹⁵⁹ Grant 2003b.

¹⁶⁰ *Financial Times*, June 4, 2003.

¹⁶¹ *EUobserver*, June 4, 2003.

¹⁶² *CNN*, June 3, 2003.

to contribute troops, and that the first French units would leave before the end of the week to set up a base in Uganda.¹⁶³ Everyone seemed to be in agreement that France would provide the majority of the troops (700–1000), as well as the operation commander and the force commander, and also provide the operation headquarters.¹⁶⁴

At the same time, intense diplomatic work was carried out in the DRC and in neighbouring countries. The Union realised that carrying out a rapid reaction mission also required very rapid views on how to handle a number of different parties with an interest in the conflict. In this respect too, the institutions proved to deliver. Particularly in neighbouring Rwanda and Uganda, both the EU's Special Representative Aldo Ajello and Commission representatives were busy conveying a message of both carrots and sticks: there would be a price to pay for these countries if they did not help to keep paramilitaries in eastern Congo at bay, while a cooperative attitude would be rewarded.¹⁶⁵

Meanwhile, media reported on a deteriorating situation in the town of Bunia, with humanitarian aid workers being under attack from the warring factions, and of looting of the refugee camps. Only some 40,000 inhabitants of Bunia, out of the 300,000 two months earlier, were still in the city. Aid workers spoke of systematic ethnic cleansing.¹⁶⁶ EU spokesman Diego de Ojeda said that the "situation is anything but safe or stable at the moment" and involves "considerable risks."¹⁶⁷ Financial Times pointed out that the "European Union could not have picked a worse conflict to test its peacekeeping skills."¹⁶⁸ As one analyst put it, it seemed that the EU forces would be "going into a military and political minefield."¹⁶⁹

¹⁶³ *AFP*, June 4, 2003; *CNN*, June 4, 2003.

¹⁶⁴ EU Council web site on Operation Artemis; *10 Downing Street Newsroom*, June 12, 2003; *CNEWS*, June 4, 2003; *International Herald Tribune*, June 5, 2003.

¹⁶⁵ Ambassador Björn Lyrvall, intervention at a conference organised by the Swedish Network for European Studies in Political Science, Lund, March 25–26, 2004.

¹⁶⁶ *Telegraph.co.uk*, June 4, 2003.

¹⁶⁷ *CNEWS*, June 4, 2003; *International Herald Tribune*, June 5, 2003.

¹⁶⁸ *Financial Times*, July 15, 2003.

¹⁶⁹ *AFP*, June 11, 2003.

On June 4, the PSC nonetheless approved the plans for an EU mission – now named Operation Artemis – and therefore there was no need to wait a full week for a Council approval.¹⁷⁰ The formal Council decision was taken the following day by the ministers for justice and home affairs who happened to meet that day in Luxembourg.¹⁷¹ The aim of the operation was to secure and pacify Bunia and its airport, and protect aid agencies and tens of thousands of refugees in two refugee camps.¹⁷² Parts of the force were expected to be deployed by June 7, and France estimated it would take about forty-five days for the force to be complete.¹⁷³

The decision was indeed historic. It was the first time the EU would deploy troops out-of-area, the first time on a UN Chapter VII mandate, and the first time without recourse to NATO assets. Again, some of the European comments alluded to the importance of the operation not only for the situation in the Congo, but also for the EU itself. Solana said the decision on Operation Artemis was, in addition to helping the UN, “putting down a political marker.”¹⁷⁴ The operation was, he continued, “politically very important for the Union.”¹⁷⁵

On June 7, as the first French troops were arriving and as the massive air transport operation was to begin transporting military hardware and other materials to Entebbe in Uganda, the situation in Bunia deteriorated further. Heavy gunfire and mortar shells rocked the town, as militiamen, including child soldiers, advanced through the suburbs towards the centre of town. The UN commander in Bunia, Colonel Daniel Vollot, said “we talked to both sets of soldiers, to the leaders. Nobody wants to talk, they all want to fight.”¹⁷⁶

The EU nonetheless went on with the plans. On June 12, an operation plan was formally adopted by the Council, as well as the

¹⁷⁰ *CNEWS*, June 4, 2003; *AFP*, June 4, 2003; *CNN*, June 4, 2003.

¹⁷¹ EU Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP; *EUobserver*, June 5, 2003.

¹⁷² *CNN*, June 4, 2003; *CNEWS*, June 4, 2003.

¹⁷³ *CNEWS*, June 4, 2003.

¹⁷⁴ Javier Solana web site, Interview, June 12, 2003.

¹⁷⁵ *International Herald Tribune*, June 5, 2003.

¹⁷⁶ *Telegraph.co.uk*, June 8, 2003; *AFP*, July 30, 2003.

decision formally to launch the operation.¹⁷⁷ This time, it was the ministers for agriculture who happened to meet in Luxembourg and adopted the documents that the ESDP bodies had negotiated and finalised in the previous days.

In this respect, the institutions clearly proved to deliver, as the whole process had thereby been accomplished *between* two General Affairs and External Relations Councils. The Union had been able to initiate, plan, negotiate (within the EU and with third parties in Africa) and decide on a crisis management mission as well as deploy troops in a “non-permissive environment”¹⁷⁸ without the foreign ministers even having to meet. It was a proud High Representative who answered the journalists’ questions on June 12. When asked if Operation Artemis had not “come a little suddenly, and possibly too soon,” Solana said it was rather the contrary:

It proves we have been working fairly hard since 2000. At that time, in December 1999, the EU governments set me the task of making precise preparations for such missions by the community. This is what I have done. The task has now been completed. It took us only a few days: first there was [UN Secretary General] Kofi Annan’s request, then our situation centre in Brussels drew up a first rate threat analysis, and now the first soldiers are already arriving in Ituri.¹⁷⁹

In fact, the High Representative himself had no doubt been instrumental for the decision to carry out a crisis management mission in Africa. As one analyst has put it, Solana was taking ESDP “to the ground to make the Europeans stop talking about theory and capabilities and instead carry out a mission.”¹⁸⁰

The EU is – like it or not – a global actor!

At their monthly meeting a few days later, on June 16, the foreign ministers were briefed by Javier Solana on the progress of what was

¹⁷⁷ EU Council web page on Operation Artemis.

¹⁷⁸ Lindstrom 2004, p. 111.

¹⁷⁹ Javier Solana web site, Interview, June 12, 2003.

¹⁸⁰ Steven Everts, quoted in *Financial Times*, July 15, 2003.

now officially termed the European Security Strategy, and named “A Secure Europe in a Better World.” The draft strategy identified, according to the Council’s press release, the key threats facing the world (sic!), discussed the instruments that the EU had to counter them, and proposed how the EU should be more active and coherent in this work.¹⁸¹

The US had clearly been on the mind of the authors,¹⁸² something which was seemingly even alluded to in the beginning of the document (and subsequently revised in its final version a few months later):

As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP), the European Union is, like it or not, a global actor; it should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security.¹⁸³

In an interview, Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, confirmed the link between the security strategy and the Union’s inability to get its act together in relation to Iraq, saying that “such deep divisions within the European Union are wrong and should never happen again. I have been in foreign affairs for quite some time now and I know I shouldn’t be overly optimistic, but we have let’s say seen another building block for the creation of a common foreign and security policy.”¹⁸⁴ De Hoop Scheffer also said the foreign ministers had been discussing the possibility of upgrading the Union’s representation in Washington, to a former foreign minister or even a prime minister, “to convey the message from Europe more strongly to the Administration and on Capitol Hill as well as to the US Senate and House of Representatives.”¹⁸⁵

¹⁸¹ EU Council Press release 10369/03 (Presse 166).

¹⁸² The head of the EU Policy Unit, Christoph Heusgen, later said that it “was clear for us [in the PU] from the beginning that we wanted to write a document which compared with the 2002 US National Security Strategy” (quoted in Toje 2005, p. 120).

¹⁸³ First official draft by Javier Solana of the European Security Strategy, 20 June 2003, published at Javier Solana’s web-site, Reports.

¹⁸⁴ *Radio Netherlands*, June 23, 2003.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

At the June meeting, the foreign ministers also gave their endorsement to a document called “Basic principles for an EU strategy against proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” and approved what had now become an “action plan” for the implementation of the basic principles of the strategy. The Political and Security Committee and other Council bodies, as well as the High Representative and the Commission, were asked to begin immediately the work of implementing the action plan.¹⁸⁶

The fundamental importance of “equal footing”

Later the same week, the European Council in Thessalonica welcomed the draft security strategy submitted by Solana, and asked him to finalise the work during the coming six months in close cooperation with the member states and the Commission.¹⁸⁷ The European Council also made a more general note of the need for the EU to be taken more seriously in Washington, as it

expressed its conviction that the development of transatlantic relations on an *equal footing* remains of fundamental importance in every domain not only for the two sides but also for the international community.¹⁸⁸

Among other things, the heads of state or government hoped “to continue discussions with the US on proposals for strengthening relations including ideas that could emerge from the elaboration of the European security strategy.”¹⁸⁹

The European Council also adopted a declaration on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At the EU-US summit in Washington a few days later, a “Joint Statement on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” was issued by the European Council President, Commission President, and US President. It welcomed the previous European Council declaration, and con-

¹⁸⁶ EU Council Press release, 10369/03 (Presse 166).

¹⁸⁷ Presidency Conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council, June 19–20, 2003.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid. (emphasis added).

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

cluded that non-proliferation must be tackled both “individually and collectively – working together and with other partners, including through relevant international institutions, in particular those of the United Nations system.”¹⁹⁰ The content was obviously a compromise, but this time – and contrary to the previous autumn – it was nonetheless the EU as a whole that was discussing with the US how to deal with weapons of mass destruction.

Moldova next?

There were however also initiatives during this period that never materialised. A planned EU crisis management operation in the Trans-Dnestr region in Moldova, for instance, never quite made it all the way to the decision-making table.

The Netherlands had initiated a discussion within the OSCE to launch an EU operation to replace the Russian troops along the Dnestr river on Moldova’s eastern border. In response to this, Washington’s position was made very clear: the US would not be sending any troops, but insisted that if the EU were to send a mission, the Berlin Plus arrangement should be used. The Political and Security Committee met with NATO’s North Atlantic Council to discuss the issue on July 15.¹⁹¹ At the meeting, NATO agreed to the idea of an EU operation using NATO assets. As one diplomat put it: “the Alliance is not likely to undertake the operation itself, as Washington is not interested, but would let the Europeans do it.”¹⁹²

It seemed however that finding an agreement with Russia would be the most difficult question this time.¹⁹³ At the time, however, a formal EU decision was not expected before the end of 2003.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹⁰ Joint Statement on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2003).

¹⁹¹ *Financial Times*, July 15, 2003.

¹⁹² *European Voice*, July 18, 2003.

¹⁹³ *Financial Times*, July 18, 2003.

¹⁹⁴ By which time the EU was no closer to a decision.

The Convention comes to an end

At the European Council meeting in June, the European Convention had also presented the finalised Part 1 of its “Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” to the heads of state and government. With some marginal revisions of the first draft CFSP and ESDP articles, the proposed provisions for the EU’s future collective foreign policy were basically the same as those presented in April.¹⁹⁵ On July 18, the Convention had also finalised the other parts of the draft Constitution, and the three chairmen handed over the draft to the Italian Presidency.

European crimes and American punishment

During the summer of 2003, the US continued to show that there was a price to be paid for not supporting the war in Iraq. One notable “punishment,” already mentioned above, was the American stalling of the process of an EU takeover of the SFOR mission, and the allusions that perhaps the EU should rather concentrate on modifying its police force in Bosnia.¹⁹⁶ This attitude was the more notable considering the outspoken American wish to scale down its own forces in the Balkans.¹⁹⁷

Another visible “retaliation” was the American blocking of EU Commissioner Antonio Vitorino as the new NATO Secretary General. He was, the US claimed, not suitable due to his favourable view on EU defence integration.¹⁹⁸ Other minor examples were also reported in the press, such as a boycott by top US military and aerospace figures of the annual International Aeronautics and Space Show in Paris on June 14, despite its traditional role as a meeting point for European and American plane makers.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁵ Although they were later quite substantially revised in the Intergovernmental Conference before Christmas 2003.

¹⁹⁶ *EUobserver*, August 25, 2003.

¹⁹⁷ *Independent*, August 5, 2003.

¹⁹⁸ *Reuters News*, August 7, 2003.

¹⁹⁹ *EUobserver*, June 16, 2003.

However, contrary to some of the previous periods covered in this study, the US retaliation was not extremely severe in this respect. This time, compared to for instance the US sanctions against Western Europe in response to the Siberian pipe-line dispute in the beginning of the 1980s (see chapter six), the Bush Administration was not as “hard-line” as some of its predecessors had been.

MISSION ACCOMPLISHED

On September 6, the last EU troops left the Congo, and the responsibility was handed back to the UN.²⁰⁰ In Bunia, a rule of “no visible weapons in town” had been imposed by the EU forces since the end of June.²⁰¹ The troops had brought a measure of peace, and by the end of July, tens of thousands of people had been able to return to their homes.²⁰² Chief Kawa Mandro, leader of the Party for the Unity and Integrity of Congo, said that the enforcement of the arms ban in Bunia was “a great achievement”.²⁰³

During the previous three hundred days, the US and a number of European states had clashed dramatically over how to handle Iraq, but at the same time the EU was by now ending a military operation that was only one of several examples where effects could be detected from the Iraq debacle on the EU’s collective foreign policy. French Defence Minister Michele Aillot-Marie quite rightly pointed out that this “very first autonomous operation by the European Union is a historic moment [...] It’s mission accomplished.”²⁰⁴

Summing up this period, Javier Solana concluded that “[i]n retrospect, 2003 will be seen as a crucial year in the remarkably rapid implementation of the European Union’s security and defence policy.”²⁰⁵ Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt wrote that “[w]hile Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and the Congo may be

²⁰⁰ EU Council, Press Information, September 16, 2003.

²⁰¹ *AFP*, August 1, 2003.

²⁰² *Ibid.*

²⁰³ *AFP*, June 29, 2003.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, August 3, 2003.

²⁰⁵ Solana 2003, p. 40.

minor steps on the world scale, I consider them major steps for the European Union.”²⁰⁶ And, the late Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs Anna Lindh, while campaigning for Swedish adoption of the Euro, spoke of the Congo mission as

an important example of what the EU can accomplish outside Europe’s borders. And I find it important that all those who worry about the development of a world which we call unipolar, where only one big country decides the agenda, where only the US makes decisions over right and wrong, that they may realise that the EU should not develop as a counterweight or opposite pole to the US, but that we need more committed forces, more committed voices, and that sometimes a strong EU will agree with the US, sometimes a strong EU will have an opposite view from the US, but the EU is needed to balance the US.²⁰⁷

As this study has shown, her comment was no doubt typical of one, if not *the*, most important driving force behind the development of the EU’s collective foreign policy.

²⁰⁶ Verhofstadt 2003, p. 35.

²⁰⁷ Speech printed in *Dagens Nyheter*, September 18, 2003 (author’s translation).

Epilogue

AS ONE PROMINENT STUDENT OF international change has noted, it is one thing to observe changing trends in for instance state behaviour, but:

for the theorist of international politics, mere quantitative change on a particular dimension of international communication over a relatively short period of time will probably be of relatively little interest unless those trends have a demonstrable major impact on how diplomatic, military, or commercial things are typically done. The change must have significant consequences.¹

While it is indeed tempting to suggest that the dramatic changes since 1970 in the volume and content of EPC/CFSP must be a sign of some quite fundamental changes, no such far-reaching conclusions have been drawn in this study. We may, however, end it with a few very brief reflections on this question. *Is the development of the CFSP “important”?* Does the evolving CFSP have a demonstrable major impact on, or significant consequences for, the way in which diplomacy is typically conducted? If not, has this study been focussed on a question of no importance?

One possible approach towards this question is to take at face value the definition of “important” as suggested in the quotation above.² *Has the development of the EU’s collective foreign policy profoundly changed the way in which diplomacy is typically conducted?* As regards the way in which the EU members themselves “conduct

¹ Holsti 1998, p. 7; cf. Verba 1971, p. 290.

² This is similar to the “typical” approach of scholars who argue that “institutions matter.” Among those who seek to demonstrate the importance of international institutions, the commonest method is clearly to look at the changing behaviour of the participating states (Lake 2001, p. 130; Martin & Simmons 1998, p. 742).

diplomacy” the answer must indisputably be yes, but for the functioning of the generic global institution of diplomacy, the answer is presumably no. For the EU members’ foreign ministries, the development of the EPC/CFSP has involved the gradual learning of a very different way of life. They are for instance tied together far more intimately than any of their non-EU equivalents, they often represent, both formally and informally, each other in third states and in international fora, and they have been accepted, as a collective, into the society of states. For the member states today, most foreign policy issues are at a minimum discussed, and at a maximum wholly formed, within the CFSP context. The fact that the CFSP has changed the behaviour of the member states can hardly be questioned.

On the other hand, as two international relations scholars point out, while no “other ‘supranational’ entity in world history, perhaps with the exception of the Catholic Church in medieval Europe, has developed a system of representation similar to the European Union, with permanent representations all across the world,” this is perhaps first and foremost a testimony “to the flexibility and adaptability of the institution of diplomacy rather than any profound transformation.”³ The fact that the EU has gradually acquired a diplomatic *persona*, with all that goes with it, has presumably not had any significant consequences for the way diplomacy is typically conducted.

There are however also other ways to think of the issue of importance, or as some would call it, the “so what?” test. One alternative method is to engage in a counterfactual thought experiment.⁴ It entails posing the question: *would we have seen the development of the CFSP if the member states themselves found it an unimportant cooperative venture?* To this, the answer would be: surely not. Unless the member states had found the CFSP important, it would be very

³ Jönsson & Hall 2005, p. 161.

⁴ Fearon 1991, pp. 169ff. This, too, is an approach which has at times been proposed by scholars studying international institutions (see for instance Keohane & Martin 1995, p. 40; Tallberg 1999, p. 18).

difficult to explain why they would invest all the time, effort, political prestige, administrative resources and money in developing the cooperation. Particularly when we consider the still highly intergovernmental character of the second pillar cooperation, providing far more formal opportunities to halt the development than those existing in the first pillar, we must clearly assume that this development would never be possible unless the governments believed it to be “important.”

Yet another way of addressing the question of importance could be to look at the reactions from third parties.⁵ *How has the “outside world” responded to the development of the CFSP?* This is one of the least researched areas of the CFSP, but at least three interesting reflections can be made, all of which may, in different ways, suggest some degree of “importance.” First, as Richard Rosecrance has pointed out, contrary to other examples in history when large power concentrations have formed, other states or groups of states have, quite surprisingly, not engaged in any “balancing behaviour” against the EU.⁶ The Union seems, so far, generally not to have alarmed or otherwise provoked its external environment. To the extent that that is correct, the question of *why* would be quite an intriguing topic for further research, both for international relations scholars and for historians.

A second, and possibly related, tendency, which has also not received enough attention so far from international relations scholars, is the readiness of third states to align themselves in various ways with the Union’s foreign, security, and defence policy. Consider for instance the fact that when the Union officially, for the first time ever, declared its intention to acquire the capacity to dispatch troops in its own name – thereby adding a military tool to this already quite odd political construction – Canada, Russia, and Ukraine, as well as most aspiring EU-members in Eastern and Central Europe immediately

⁵ As one student of international institutions has argued, “if third parties react strongly to institutional innovations, we can infer that the institution itself was relatively important” (Lake 2001, p. 130).

⁶ Rosecrance 1998, pp. 17f.

declared their interest in participating.⁷ As mentioned in the previous chapter, the EU members were furthermore outnumbered by non-EU members among the participating states in the two first crisis management missions ever undertaken by the Union. If we add to this the everyday practice of a number of non-EU European states of shadowing the constant flow of CFSP statements, by declaring their “agreement with what the EU has just said,” we end up with a picture of a quite popular entity. Some have pursued this argument in the economic field, proposing that the Union seems to have magnetic powers in the trade area, but the argument appears to be equally valid in the “high politics” field. The Union seems not only *not* to repel other states, but rather to possess a measure of special attraction. It is indeed tempting to suggest that the Union’s potential capacity to balance American influence may be part of its attraction.

The third tendency is perhaps also the most interesting in terms of the importance test. To the extent that there have been any strong reactions *against* the development of the CFSP so far, such reactions seem primarily to have come from Washington. While the US has never quite determined its sentiments about the EPC/CFSP, it has clearly tried to put its foot down now and then. Whether we think of Henry Kissinger’s condescending dismissal of EPC in 1973 or of Colin Powell’s even more condescending dismissal of the EU military headquarters in 2003, or of any of the many similar events in-between, it is clear that the US has occasionally demonstrated publicly its discontent with the idea of the EU members acting as a collectivity. Among all third states in the world it is thus, arguably, the one which should feel least threatened by an EU foreign policy that has reacted most strongly, and thereby also perhaps provided the best “proof” in the importance test. And, while the US may not always applaud the development of a collective European voice in world affairs, there have always been domestic voices acknowledging the potential importance of European foreign policy cooperation – for

⁷ Presidency Conclusions from the Helsinki European Council, December 10–11, 1999; Moens (2002).

the US and, by implication, also for the rest of the world. “Painful as it may be to admit,” as one prominent American has put it, “we could benefit from a counterweight that would discipline our occasional impetuosity and, by supplying historical perspective, modify our penchant for abstract and ‘final’ solutions.” These words, written by Henry Kissinger in 1968,⁸ provide a suitable end to this study.

⁸ Kissinger 1977, p. 74.

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