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## Storytelling in Jazz Improvisation

### Implications of a Rich Intermedial Metaphor

Bjerstedt, Sven

2014

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*Citation for published version (APA):*

Bjerstedt, S. (2014). *Storytelling in Jazz Improvisation: Implications of a Rich Intermedial Metaphor*. [Doctoral Thesis (monograph), Malmö Theatre Academy]. Malmö Academy of Music, Lund University.

*Total number of authors:*

1

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# Storytelling in Jazz Improvisation

Implications of a Rich Intermedial Metaphor

Sven Bjerstedt



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ISBN 978-91-981344-3-8  
ISSN 1404-6539

Printed in Sweden by Media-Tryck, Lund University  
Lund 2014



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Jazz speaks for life. The Blues tell the story of life's difficulties and if you think for a moment, you will realize that they take the hardest realities of life and put them into music, only to come out with some new sense of hope or triumph. This is triumphant music.

Modern Jazz has continued in this tradition, singing the songs of a more complicated urban existence. When life itself offers no order, the musician creates an order and meaning from the sounds of the earth which flow through his instrument.

Everybody has the Blues. Everybody longs for meaning. Everybody needs to love and be loved. Everybody needs to clap hands and be happy. Everybody longs for faith. In music, especially this broad category called Jazz, there is a stepping stone toward all of these.

**(Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., opening speech at the 1964 Berlin Jazz Festival)**





# Preface

As a small child playing the piano I noticed that even though listeners would display reasonable appreciation now and then, life on the piano stool essentially seemed to me a rather lonely enterprise. After a few years, however, I came to discover worlds in which my piano playing could function in contexts where I felt it was needed and made sense.

One of these worlds was the field of jazz music. In it, I found the encouragement of tutors, the friendship of fellow musicians, and the response of audiences. From the age of 12 and onwards, this world has meant a lot to me. Later on, I studied jazz and jazz pedagogy at Malmö Academy of Music and have remained a jazz pianist on an amateur or semi-professional level ever since.

However, during all of my musical life, I have returned to and repeatedly reflected on a fretting and somewhat alarming suspicion that my formal jazz education may not, in any significant way, have made me improve very much as a jazz musician. It seems to me that while almost all of what knowledge and skills I may possess in this field was attained in informal settings, almost none of it was the fruits of formal studies.

I realize, of course, that since I did study jazz in formal settings for a number of years, this might be a rather rude thing to assert. It should go without saying that I do not want to insult any of my former teachers by banging their heads with this thesis. Naturally, they helped me acquire repertoire, technique, and a much broader acquaintance with the field of jazz. I still cannot free myself of the overall impression that most of my insights as to *what really matters* in jazz came differently. Thinking back, I believe I knew some important things about what really matters before I entered the Academy of Music and learned a good deal more after I graduated.

I grant that, without further explication, the words 'what really matters' may certainly be perceived as a fuzzy expression bordering on the meaningless. But I put them forth on purpose. This book could well be viewed as, in part, a way to explore what it is – in the view of a number of highly accomplished individuals – that matters in jazz music.

It should be clear, then, that my interest in the questions dealt with in this thesis emanates to an important extent from my personal background. The opportunity to enter deeply into them during an extended time period has been very rewarding indeed. I remain grateful to the many individuals, meetings, and events that have made this project possible – in retrospect, from my point of view, I think it is fair to

describe a number of such decisive occasions as a series of fortunate coincidences. I extend my sincere thanks to the head, colleagues, and students at the Malmö Theatre Academy for putting up with a music teacher who on many occasions has been both present and absent at the same time. I am grateful to Dr Gunnar Heiling and Professor Göran Folkestad for enticing me into entering the field of music education research and for all their kind help during my first years in this new context. I am deeply grateful to my supervisors, Professors Petter Dyndahl and Liora Bresler, as well as to my seminar opponents, Professor Øivind Varkøy, Dr Johan Söderman, and Professor Alf Arvidsson, for sharing their time, many profound insights, and genuinely inspirational comments. My heartfelt thanks also go to Peter Berry and Åse Lugnér, university librarians, for their unwavering support, and to fellow research students, teachers, and guest teachers at the Academy of Music, as well as to conference participants (RIME, Exeter, 2011 and 2013; Die Metapher als Medium des Musikverstehens, Osnabrück, 2011; NNMPF, Reykjavik, 2012, and Bergen, 2013; ICQI, Urbana-Champaign, 2012; LIJEC, Leeds, 2013) for several important questions, comments, and words of encouragement. Many thanks to Inger Pettersson for language editing and to Mikael Cinthio for helping out with the landscape visualizations.

Thanks are also due, of course, to all interview participants who generously contributed their time and careful consideration in providing candid and thorough answers to my questions. I have learnt so very much about 'what really matters' from the interviews. They certainly have made me rethink my own playing and listening.

Anna, I much prefer to thank you orally for all that I owe to you, for your trust, your patience, your wisdom, your love.

With love and affection I dedicate this thesis to the memory of my father, the late Professor Åke Bjerstedt. In his very own way, he was indeed the greatest improvising storyteller I will ever know.

## Chapter 1

# Introduction

The title of this thesis is *Storytelling in jazz improvisation*. The work is an attempt to explore as fully as possible the significance (or 'implications') of these few words. I will try to attain a deeper understanding of what storytelling may mean in the field of jazz improvisation. Taken at face value, the concept may perhaps seem self-contradictory: how could stories be told without words? Nevertheless, the term storytelling has a long history of prominence in descriptive and prescriptive talk on jazz improvisation. I will study the meanings ascribed to this term by way of interviews with fifteen Swedish jazz improvisers. How do they view and use the concept storytelling in connection with their craft? Their perspectives will be analysed and discussed in the light of a rather wide scope of writings on jazz, on narrativity, on metaphor, as well as on educational and sociological issues. In brief, then, this is an exploratory study.

Throughout, regarding the relevance of different theoretical perspectives to my research aim, I have favoured an inclusionist approach. Consequently, the presentation of different theoretical perspectives will be rather broad. They are introduced on the ground that I consider them all of relevance to this field in a long-term research perspective. Even though not all aspects of them may be put to full use in the course of this study, the theoretical perspectives introduced here will remain pertinent to future research following up on the present investigation. This inclusionist strategy, its reasons and its consequences will be further discussed in Chapters 3 and 7.

Artistic and educational aspects are intertwined in all phases of this investigation. The study may be viewed from different perspectives. From one viewpoint, I as a researcher have collected and analysed empirical data regarding musicians' views on storytelling in jazz improvisation. From another perspective, these musicians are all artistic researchers in their own right; they have presented their results to me, and my contribution to the study is, rather, on a meta-analytical level.

*Die Metapher ist weit klüger als ihr Verfasser.* These words by Lichtenberg (1967, p. 512) certainly apply to this investigation: the metaphor is much wiser, richer, and more interesting than its interpreter, too. In this book, I try on a number of theoretical and methodological glasses in order to have a good look at the storytelling

metaphor. In the end, though, the eyes peeping through these glasses are inevitably mine. My own experiences tinge the study. For one thing, my thinking tends to focus on jazz improvisation as an art of the present moment. Indeed, this has come to seem to me a crucial aspect, and I have come to think that maybe no words will capture the nature of jazz better than Meister Eckhart's:

There exists only the present instant... a Now which always and without end is itself new. There is nor yesterday nor any tomorrow, but only Now, as it was a thousand years ago and as it will be a thousand years hence.

My view on improvisation in this regard is clearly influenced by personal experience. I will not forget how the trumpeter Rolf Ericson's eyes and voice were filled with a mixture of despair and scorn when yet another nostalgic aficionado – often his junior – at long last had stopped talking to him, during our intermission, about "the old days", more often than not referring to Rolf's Swedish tours in the 1950s. "It's disgusting", Rolf told his young pianist, "they know everything about way back when, but they don't know shit about what's happening now!" On a similar note, nobody probably has provided a better illustration of lifelong learning than Benny Waters, at the time a 92-year-old saxophonist, when he turned on his portable cassette recorder beneath his chair before picking up his horn for the next set, explaining to his accompanist: "I like to listen to my own playing the next day in my hotel room, to see what I can improve on."

I hope that the reader will be able to discover a number of personal favourite quotes from the interviews in this book. At this point, I will limit myself to agreeing with saxophonist Amanda Sedgwick's statement, "It's improvised music, so we have to be there all the time."

## 1.1. Conceptualizing an art form

The influence of music was noted and mythologized early on. The magical power of music over mind and matter – for instance, the power of singing and playing the lyre – is at the centre of ancient stories of Väinämöinen, Orpheus, and Amphion. Väinämöinen on one occasion sang himself a copper boat; another time, he defeated his enemy Joukahainen by singing him into a bog. The singing of Orpheus exerted power over Hades as well as over fish and birds. Even stones and rocks will obey music occasionally: Amphion made them his willing servants, jumping into position in a wall he thus managed to build around Thebes just by playing his lyre.

On the other hand, according to myth, Hercules was so enraged with his music instructor Linus that he killed him by banging his head with the lyre. Without doubt, the power of music has more than one aspect. It will not always work magic. On a

humorous note, Tennyson observed such discrepancy in his comments on Amphion's mythological gardening powers:

'Tis said he had a tuneful tongue,  
Such happy intonation,  
Wherever he sat down and sung  
He left a small plantation; [...]  
'Tis vain! in such a brassy age  
I could not move a thistle;  
The very sparrows in the hedge  
Scarce answer to my whistle

Everyone who has striven to exert the 'magical' powers of music might tune in: What makes the difference? Fish and stones left aside, how can I make my music affect people? Magic or method? Is there such a thing as the musical sorcerer's toolkit?

This study poses some questions of musical power within a specific frame: discourse on storytelling in jazz improvisation. Is there a sense in which non-verbal artists such as jazz instrumentalists turn to the musical sorcerer's toolkit, as it were, in order to increase the power of their art form through telling 'stories' in jazz improvisation, even though they have no words at their disposal? Through the course of this investigation, it will be evident that the question what it may mean to tell stories when improvising jazz entails several questions that are large, important, and difficult.

One of several foci of this investigation will be the tension between individual voice and tradition. Kelley (2009) in his evaluation of Thelonious Monk's musicianship emphasizes originality:

"Play yourself!" he'd say. "Play yourself" lay at the core of Monk's philosophy; he understood it as art's universal injunction. [...] Original did not mean being different for the hell of it. For Monk, to be original meant reaching higher than one's limits, striving for something startling and memorable, and never being afraid to make mistakes. (p. 452)

The dynamics of originality and convention – in the words of Guillaume Apollinaire, "cette longue querelle de la tradition et de l'invention / De l'Ordre et de l'Aventure" – permeates discourse on jazz improvisation. Martin (2002) points out that different styles of jazz are distinguished by "particular conventions" and that, furthermore, there may be different "schools" of playing within such styles, displaying, for instance, musicians' "affinity to influential mentors" (p. 135). Martin considers this point fundamental, since it has to do with relations between individual expression and collective expectations:

some of the ways in which jazz musicians, operating within an art world that values musical creativity and self-expression above all else, are nevertheless guided and constrained in what they do by the normative conventions of the musical community to which they belong. (p. 135)

Finkelstein (1948/1988) contends that "[t]he entire fetish of 'originality' [...] is a product of commercialism. In a folk culture, music is a common language" (p. 57). Every creative musician, Finkelstein argues, "learns only by using, with appreciation, what has gone before. It is an open and honest use of influences" (p. 57). Accordingly, he holds, "jazz is not simply improvisation on 'anything'"; the history of jazz is permeated by the use and re-use of valuable melodic material:

although each player has his own technique and personality, he can also take over bodily and play with affectionate rightness another jazzman's improvisation, as Bechet plays Dodds's 'Lonesome Blues' solo, as Williams plays Armstrong's 'West End Blues' solo, as Griffin plays Stewart's 'Boy Meets Horn,' as every jazz clarinet player knows the famous 'High Society,' 'Tiger Rag,' 'Weary Blues' and 'Panama' solos. (p. 56)

In Finkelstein's opinion, then, the notion of "pure improvisation" in jazz is a consequence of inferior, hackneyed melodies as a foundation for solos: "the jazz player had to fight his material to make something out of it" (p. 56). I interpret this view as an attempt to relate the intramusical background of jazz improvisation to what Finkelstein perceives as its relevant extramusical background: the commercialization of culture.

The societal power of jazz improvisation has been emphasized by several writers. According to Attali (1985), musical improvisation represents promising new possibilities for creating and transforming identity, social relationship, and the very nature of the world in which we live; music, Attali holds, can "invent categories and dynamics and regenerate social theory" (p. 4). Small (1987) views jazz improvisation as a means "to establish a different set of human relationships, a different type of society, from that established by fully literate musicking" (p. 296). It is interesting to consider outlooks on improvisation such as these in relation to the distinction between improvisation as individual expression and improvisation as dependent on traditional conventions. The view that jazz improvisation may possess the power to change the world is, arguably, more in line with the first of these perspectives, ascribing relatively little importance to established techniques and approaches, as well as to the interrelations of improvisation to social and musical conventions. It may of course, on the other hand, be argued that the tradition of jazz improvisation in its totality offers options to change, through its alternatives and challenges to predominant musical and societal values.

Väinämöinen, Orpheus, and Amphion are all mythological individuals clearly written into their respective tradition. To what extent does musical power depend on the power of tradition, or on the power of the individual musician's inner voice and inner vision? These are vast questions, of course. This study attempts to approach such and other problems in the field of jazz music by seeking the opinions of experienced jazz musicians and educators regarding the *ifs*, *whats* and *hows* of storytelling in jazz improvisation.

I believe that there are several such instances of rich conceptual loans between art forms, and I find this a very interesting phenomenon (cf. section 3.2). What is investigated here is a concept that music has borrowed from the narrative arts. Jazz instrumentalists, when improvising solos, have no words at their disposal. Still, storytelling is arguably the most common prestige word in descriptions of jazz improvisation (and arguably with a much longer history there than in its function as a buzzword or catch phrase in several other contexts). In a similar fashion, it seems to be a widespread notion in jazz discourse that if jazz tells no story, it is simply no good. In the very first sentence of his autobiography, the pianist and composer Randy Weston proclaims:

I come to be a storyteller; I'm not a jazz musician, I'm really a storyteller through music. (Weston & Jenkins, 2010, p. 1)

To be sure, other metaphors may be seen as equally apt. In the following few paragraphs, I will suggest some possibilities. For instance, the jazz pianist John Lewis perceived many analogies between jazz and Italian *commedia dell'arte*: the improvised character of the plays, where the actors took it "from an outline of the plot", would turn the performances into a player's theatre, not an author's theatre, just like jazz may be viewed as an instrumentalist's medium rather than a that of a composer (O'Meally, 1998, p. 538). Indeed, a Swedish textbook on theatre history puts forward the same analogy when describing the characteristics of *commedia dell'arte* (Tjäder, 2008).

It might be argued that jazz improvisation often includes some sort of change or transgression from well-known contexts to unknown territory, possibly including a search for exceptional modes of consciousness or ecstatic experiences. If we strive to attain a deepened understanding of the music along such lines, metaphors such as *sexual intercourse* or *religious meditation* may seem apt.

In role-playing games, peaking in popularity during the last decades, there are a variety of forms. I believe the following to be generic characteristics: players act out their roles within a narrative, through processes of decision-making, the development of which is governed by formal rules or guidelines. Even though the potential of such a parallel, to the best of my knowledge, remains to be explored, I suggest that *tabletop role-playing games*, for instance, might be considered a fruitful metaphor for improvised interplay in jazz music. The storytelling metaphor, on the other hand, is



old, common, and familiar – maybe even to the brink of having been watered down. Still, I believe that it carries a scope of meanings that may be vaster and richer than is often realized.

Even though the concept of storytelling has come to permeate jazz discourse worldwide, its origin is undoubtedly to be found in black music. In the words of Radano (2003), storytelling

represents one of the enduring rhetorical gestures among musicians, the principal trope conceptualizing the art of Lester Young, Charlie Parker, and so many others. So too does the conceit lie at the heart of black music's mystification. It serves to justify claims of musical transcendence, of a power projecting meaning beyond language. For many, it is through this beyondness that one discovers much about life generally. Black music emerges as an unspoken tale that nonetheless voices a truth about life and nation. (p. 25)

Needless to say, the individual instances of this discourse are innumerable. To pick but one, the aforementioned jazz pianist Thelonious Monk – in stark contrast to his reputation of being "uncommunicative" and "exiled from reality" – devoted extensive philosophical lessons to teaching fellow musicians "how to tell a story" with music. In a 1966 interview, Monk commented on his own distaste for rock and roll music: "it don't tell a story" (Kelley, 2009, pp. xviii, 259, 292, 402). On a similar note, Walser (1999) quotes a remark made in 1964 by pianist and band leader Stan Kenton:

The problem today is that good improvisers are so rare. There are many people who can make sense out of their improvisations, but very few people are really *saying* anything. (p. 281)

Undoubtedly, expressions to the effect that music tells a story have been understood in a near-to-literal sense by several musicians. Porter (2002) quotes bassist Charles Mingus's comments on Charlie Parker's recording of "Cosmic rays" in a 1955 blindfold test in *Down Beat* magazine:

You know how he used to be able to talk with his horn, the way he could tell you what chick he was thinking about. That's the way he's playing here. How many stars? FIFTY! (p. 118)

Washington (2004), in a footnote to his description of Eric Dolphy's and Charles Mingus's bass clarinet and bass duet on "What love" (on the 1960 album *Charles Mingus presents Charles Mingus*), in which the musicians are said to "approximate actual speech patterns rather than normal musical syntax" (p. 44), mentions that "Mingus claimed to be able to communicate [through his bass playing] actual sentences that were intelligible, especially to Eric Dolphy" (p. 48).

If jazz does tell a story, then how is that story to be understood? Obviously, if stories in books lend themselves to different interpretations, the 'meaning' of musical 'storytelling' must be characterized as notoriously open-ended. One musical example may serve as an indication of the difficulties involved in interpreting intention and function in such contexts, even regarding the briefest soloistic 'statements' in jazz. In an interesting way, such difficulties clearly relate, among other things, to the dynamics of improvisatory spontaneity and traditional convention.

Gioia (2011) views Jelly Roll Morton's 1926 recording of "Smokehouse blues" as "middle ground between the rigid compositional structures of ragtime and the spontaneous vivacity of jazz improvisation" (p. 40). Schuller (1968) interprets and comments on a few famous bars in Morton's piano solo on this record:

This solo contains one of Morton's most imaginative breaks followed by his exultant shout of self-approbation: "Ah, Mister Jelly." Few moments capture the essentially unpretentious nature and the bitter-sweet humor of jazz so creatively and spontaneously. (p. 162)

A rather curious interpretation of the very same recorded musical moment is put forward by Reinholdsson (1998) who views Morton's shout as an example of "self-surprise [!]" (p. 157). In contrast, Giddins (1998) in his interpretation of the shout as an example of controlled euphoria clearly perceives it in close relation to compositional structures, rather than spontaneous vivacity:

Morton brought controlled euphoria to composed jazz, as Oliver and Armstrong had to improvised jazz. In "Smoke House Blues," he fills what should have been a piano break with the lament, "Oh, Mr. Jelly!" as though notes could never fully express his feelings. (p. 73)

If an improvisational statement of only a few seconds' length, including clearly pronounced words, will entail so diverse interpretations regarding its meaning (ranging from "controlled euphoria" and "lament" over "self-surprise" to "exultant shout of self-approbation"), then we should not be consternated to find that interpretations regarding more complex instrumental jazz improvisations are not always completely consentient.

Murray (1973) offers a rich description of how, in his opinion, "the raw experience" of African Americans is transformed into a variety of musical utterances in the music of Duke Ellington:

Ellington creates blues-extension concertos in which the solo instrument states, asserts, alleges, quests, requests, or only implies, while the trumpets in the background sometimes mock and sometimes concur as the 'woodwinds' moan or groan in the agony and ecstasy of sensual ambivalence and the trombones

chant concurrence or signify misgivings and even suspicions (which are as likely to be bawdy as plaintive) with the rhythm section attesting and affirming. (p. 86)

Indeed, the complexity of jazz improvisation seems to call for metaphors. The Swedish art critic and jazz musician Ulf Linde's personal reflections on jazz improvisation strike me as at the same time profound, detailed – and highly metaphorical.

A jazz musician who really improvises – that is, who does not only play phrases acquired by practice – does not know what he does. As soon as he gets an idea about what to play, he is forced to abandon it. It never turns out exactly as he expected. The slowness of the instrument itself instantly repudiates his idea, and this discrepancy of the sound from the idea is exactly what produces the energy that carries the improvisation further. He loses control already after a few measures; the remainder will only be efforts to regain balance after his stumbling on the first phrase.

An improvisation is actually nothing but a series of corrections.

But what is it that enforces the corrections? – The fact that the sound was wrong? But that would imply that there also was a correct sound. And in that case, how would that sound? The musician has no idea...

A cryptic though wonderful reply was once given by Duchamp: "An unused match-box is lighter than one already begun since it does not rattle." – To improvise is to put the matches back into the box, one by one, until it becomes silent, light. (Linde, 2011, pp. 26–27; my translation)

As indicated by the four following quotes, the prevalence of the storytelling metaphor holds not only for American but for Swedish jazz discourse as well. In his autobiography, Swedish drummer Rune Carlsson quotes approvingly the song "Dear Rolf", in homage to Sweden's foremost jazz ambassador, trumpeter Rolf Ericson, written by Dave Castle (music by Lars Sjösten):

His philosophy it just seemed to be, to play honestly  
That was his A B C, there wasn't a single note played casually  
His concentration turned into energy  
And when he played it was a moment of pure art  
A big bouquet of blues and ballads coming from the heart  
No one could tell a story, you must agree  
Better than he the legendary Rolf, dear Rolf. (Carlsson, 2009, p. 166)

Carlsson (2009) often uses the American slang expression "send" instead of "tell stories". In his view, it relates in important ways to rhythmic aspects:

What does it mean to send? [...] If a jazz musician does not have swing and wail, neither will he be able to send. The message does not come through. [...] I mean that when something is swinging, it also has to do with contact and communication on the stage and outwards to the audience. [...] When it really swings in the actual sense of the word, it has to do with the rhythm in the body, with breathing, heart beats, and the swaying motion in a relaxed footstep. It is a matter of the duration of the tone and of a relaxed and natural feeling of focus and balance. (Carlsson, 2009, pp. 140-141; my translation)

In the following transcript from a television programme, reporter Kattis Ahlström (KA) interviewed two Swedish jazz musicians: pianist Leo Lindberg (LL, born 1993) and alto saxophonist Amanda Sedgwick (AS, born 1970).

KA (to LL) – I know that you think that one must tell of something when playing jazz. What do you think you tell of in your music?

LL – Well... I don't know. I try to convey a blues feeling with what I do.

KA – And what is that, in your opinion?

LL – It is impossible to lay your finger on that. That is the charm of the music, I think.

KA (to AS) – And what do you think about stories when playing jazz?

AS – You play who you are. That is why it is so important to be a whole person. And honest.

KA – Is that the case?

AS – Yes. Because if you are dishonest as a person, then it will not... You can hear it in the music.

KA – And what does a whole person amount to? To me it would seem that you include both grief and lightness, in a way.

AS – Absolutely. That is it.

KA – So you cannot be a shallow person, as it were, when you play jazz?

AS – (laughing) You can, but it will not sound good. (Nyhetsmorgon, 2011; my translation)

In a recent interview (Soenarso, 2013), pianist Jan Lundgren puts forward his image of jazz improvisation as talking "straight out of your heart", hinting at several relevant perspectives, such as individuality, impulses, and language mastery:

To Jan Lundgren, improvisation is about following your inner impulses, taking care of every individual's own dynamics. Essentially it is about the courage to be yourself: 'Improvisation is somewhat like our conversation right now. It is about the direct impulses, about not thinking too much. To talk straight out of

your heart. But in order to be able to improvise, you have to know the language.' (Soenarso, 2013, p. 18; my translation)

What does it mean to say that a musician tells a story? Is it a question of *how* to play? Of *what* to play? A great many utterances seem to be in agreement with saxophonist Charlie Parker's statement "If you don't live it, it won't come out of your horn" (Lewis, 1996, p. 119). Do such expressions intend to describe a more subjective way of playing music, as it were, in contradistinction to just executing the written music? Does musical storytelling require that the musician come forward as a human being in his or her playing? Ralph Ellison (1964) seems to have thought so, and he saw in this requirement "a cruel contradiction":

For true jazz is an art of individual assertion within and against the group. Each true jazz moment [...] springs from a contest in which the artist challenges all the rest; each solo flight, or improvisation, represents (like the canvasses of a painter) a definition of his identity: as individual, as member of the collectivity and as a link in the chain of tradition. Thus because jazz finds its very life in improvisation upon traditional materials, the jazz man must lose his identity even as he finds it [...]. (p. 234)

Ratliff (2008) adheres to the view of jazz improvisation as reflection of the improviser's consciousness, and he highlights the saxophonist Sonny Rollins's importance to the emergence of this phenomenon:

By 1957 or so, Rollins was using jazz to deliver a more accurate reflection of how his mind worked; the music wasn't just tightly framed, mediated entertainment, but a record of everything he was thinking in a certain place at a certain hour, with all the surging ahead and backtracking and repeating that are natural pathways in everyday consciousness. He [...] changed the way jazz audiences listened; suddenly it was more possible to understand jazz from the musician's perspective. (p. 36)

There are innumerable statements to the effect that coming forward as a human being is crucial to jazz improvisation. For instance, Marsalis and Hinds (2004) state: "Parker played Charlie Parker, not bebop. People say he played bebop, but he played himself" (p. 20).

In a discussion "Toward a definition of jazz", Berendt and Huesmann (2009) suggest three prerequisites: (i) swing, (ii) improvisation, and (iii) "a sonority and manner of phrasing that mirror the individuality of the performing jazz musician" (p. 661). The focus on phrasing is a perspective that merits further reflection.

The requirement that the musician come forward as an individual human being relates to questions of freedom of interpretation. One way for a musician to come forward as a person in one's playing may be to make use of a rhythmic flexibility in

one's phrasing of the melody. In jazz, the rhythmic relation of the melody line to the steady beat is flexible: depending on circumstances, notes are played ahead of, on, or behind the beat. This is also a feature of much classical music, for instance, the *tempo rubato* or *Tempo des Gefühls* in Romantic piano music. Frédéric Chopin described his ideal of phrasing with the oft-quoted words, "The singing hand may deviate from strict time, but the accompanying hand must keep time. Fancy a tree with its branches swayed by the wind – the stem is the steady time, the moving leaves are the melodic inflection" (cited by Dannreuther, 1895, p. 161). However, this interpretive practice is by no means a 19th century invention; clearly, it was well-established much earlier. In a 1777 letter to his father, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart takes it for granted that (when playing slowly) the left hand should keep time while the right hand phrasing should be rhythmically flexible. He criticizes people who are unable to understand and execute this: "Das tempo rubato in einem Adagio, dass die linke Hand nichts darum weiss, können sie gar nicht begreifen; denn bey ihnen giebt die linke Hand nach" (Nissen, 1828, pp. 318–319).

In addition to coming forward as a human being, the improviser's structural powers may be viewed as crucial to storytelling in jazz. Ratliff (2008), who calls Sonny Rollins "the living exemplar of narrative structure in jazz improvisation", quotes the saxophonist's explication of storytelling in jazz improvisation:

I guess it's making sense. It's like talking gibberish and making sense. That's on the very basic level. Then beyond that, of course, it's a beautiful story. It's uplifting. It's emotional. [...] somebody wrote that what I was doing in a certain song was asking a question and then answering the question. I think he was talking about harmonic resolutions. So that would be sort of what I think telling a story might be: resolving a thought. (p. 42)

Just like the 'coming forward as a human being' theme, issues of improvisational structure permeate several discussions in this investigation. This thesis deals extensively with the question of how jazz improvisers perceive the meanings of the storytelling metaphor. There is a special reason why it may be interesting to put this question to Scandinavian musicians. The jazz critic Stuart Nicholson in his 2005 analysis of contemporary jazz, *Is jazz dead?* observes that qualities such as freedom and individual expression seem to have become less prominent in American jazz during the last decades: "because most student follow broadly similar pedagogic routes to graduation while at the same time following broadly similar sources of stylistic inspiration", "[t]he inevitable homogenization effect of jazz education was leading to individuality becoming less important than technique" (Nicholson, 2005, p. 101, 18). Pianist Brad Mehldau detects in the contemporary jazz scene "a sort of post-modern haze that turns [young musicians] to chameleons with no identity" (Nicholson, 2005, p. 18). Nicholson also quotes pianist Keith Jarrett's statement, "It is personal narrative we're losing, personal awareness, people with something to say"

(p. 51), as well as saxophonist Dave Liebman's laconism, "[T]he obvious byproduct of streamlining is conformity" (p. 101).

This problem may have to do with questions of the socio-musical status of jazz. Schuller (1989) maintains that "the greatness of jazz lies in the fact that it never ceases to develop and change" (p. 846). However, in Nicholson's (2005) view, some of those who advocate the need for racial authenticity have been guilty of a "narrow elitism that encapsulated a circumscribed range of sounds, styles, and attitudes" (pp. 40–41). For instance, trumpeter Wynton Marsalis formulated a contradistinctive response to jazz critic Whitney Balliett's famous declaration of jazz as "the sound of surprise", claiming that the music is in fact – or at least ought to be – "the sound of accuracy" (p. 42).

Jazz is sometimes referred to as "America's classical music". This way of viewing jazz, Floyd (1995) argues, may be detrimental to our understanding of it, if it leads to a lack of authentic expression. This might be the case, for instance, when misguided jazz performances or perceptions of jazz "emphasize means of presentation (technique) rather than the ideas presented and the way they are mediated (substance)" (p. 233).

On a similar note, in his 1996 book on improvisation, *Effortless mastery*, jazz pianist and educator Kenny Werner complains that "when many young players play a ballad, it becomes a chance to play more notes. [...] Young singers are often so preoccupied with their scat singing that they don't even check out the words to the song. They have the opportunity to tell us a story and make us feel its meaning, but they miss the point" (Werner, 1996, p. 47).

The globalization of jazz has often been studied with a focus on glocal aspects: how global traits merge with local ones (Prouty, 2012). For instance, Dybo (2008) discusses Norwegian mainstream jazz as an example of cultural relocalization. In the same vein, Nicholson (2005) evaluates European jazz. He intends to show that musicians in Europe are able to create jazz in their own right, not only to imitate American jazz. Several times in his book, Nicholson compares the development of jazz with the development of a language: both language and jazz are "constantly being modified into something that works in the here and now for its users" (p. 71).

Needless to say, Nicholson's (2005) pessimistic outlook on contemporary American jazz has been contested. Prouty (2012) comments on Nicholson's "avoidance of discussion" regarding more experimental jazz in the United States; he interprets – and criticizes – this omission as an "unwillingness to look past" the image of American jazz put forward by neo-classicists; American jazz, Prouty holds, "is much deeper than one group of musicians" (p. 173). Notwithstanding, and regardless of whether or not we consider Nicholson's views to be true, relevant, or even interesting, his focus on personal narrative is arguably a crucial one, eminently highlighted in the usage of the 'storytelling' term in jazz discourse. In a sense, the topic of the present study is one single word; in another sense, it deals with an entire

world. Such is the expansive power and the multi-varied implications of this intermedial metaphor.

Nicholson (2005) repeatedly touches on the importance of personal narrative in jazz, lamenting that the music's storytelling quality seems to have gone missing in much of contemporary American jazz. However, as I interpret his account, he never really cashes out the storytelling concept. He somehow seems to fail to recognize its relevance and potential in connection with his description and discussion of the decline of contemporary American jazz. Could not the concept storytelling be put forward as a possible antidote to the maladies he depicts? Would it not serve exactly in the way desired: to put more focus on identity and individual experience than on technique? Or would such attempts only result in an increased yearning for the alleged advantages of yesteryear?

In brief, Nicholson somehow does not ask the question that seems to me as a logical conclusion: Can storytelling provide a solution to the problems he describes? And further, from our Nordic horizon: Might storytelling in jazz be too intimately connected with African American traditions to have specific relevance to jazz played in Scandinavia? Such questions bring me to the aim of my own research project: to clarify the ways the storytelling concept is viewed and used by jazz practitioners in Sweden.

## 1.2. Structure of the thesis

The first chapter of this thesis presents a number of conceptualizations of jazz improvisation, focusing on the concept storytelling and introducing a preliminary formulation of the research aim of the present investigation: to investigate *how the concept storytelling is viewed and used by Swedish jazz musicians*.

Chapter 2 offers an outline of the background of the study. In section 2.1, I briefly introduce the field of musical improvisation. Storytelling in jazz has been the subject of – or touched upon in – much research; section 2.2 offers an analytical overview of relevant previous writings. On the basis of this outline, the general aim of the present study as well as a number of research questions are formulated in the concluding section of chapter 2.

Chapter 3 gives a fairly extensive presentation of the theoretical framework of the study. In order to provide the reader with a fair view of how I attempt to arrive at the most relevant research strategy for this exploratory investigation, I need to include comprehensive accounts of several rich fields of ongoing academic debate as the basis for my choice of theoretical perspectives. In section 3.1, I first present *theories of narrativity* on a general level as well as in musical contexts; on the basis of this theoretical survey of the concept narrativity, I then formulate an interpretive stance that I consider apt for the present study. The *intermedial usage of concepts* provides an



important background and framework for this investigation. In order to position my study and clarify its relevance within this framework, section 3.2 offers a brief overview of the phenomenon of intermedially borrowed concepts. Since the conceptual loan in question could arguably be seen as an instance of conceptual metaphor or conceptual blending, selected *theories of metaphor* are made the objects of section 3.3. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 introduce a number of relevant *educational and sociological perspectives*, respectively, and the concluding section of this chapter includes a discussion of the selection and consistency of the theoretical perspectives that have been put forward.

Chapter 4 presents a number of methodological considerations, leading to an overview of the present research approach, the design of the empirical study, and the procedures of data collection and analysis. In addition, questions regarding the quality and relevance of the investigation are discussed.

Chapter 5 contains presentations of the results of qualitative interviews with jazz improvisers.

In Chapter 6, these results are viewed in relation to the theoretical framework. In accordance with the structure and contents of this framework, a number of theoretical, artistic, educational, and sociological implications of the investigation are presented and discussed.

While a number of potential areas and strategies for further research are outlined in Chapter 7, the final chapter contains a few concluding remarks on the present investigation.

## Chapter 2

# Jazz improvisation and storytelling: Previous writings

In order to be able to make any worthwhile contribution regarding the vast subject of musical power, I will need to make clear a number of limitations and definitions. At the same time, it is my sincere conviction that in order for any attempt at an investigation of the perceived meanings of a rich metaphor (such as storytelling in jazz improvisation) to successfully come to fruition, it must take pains with a multiplicity of perceived and constructed realities (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). As a consequence, my fundamental attitude when investigating, thinking, and writing about these matters has to be an inclusionist strategy. Storytelling in the field of jazz music has been the subject of a considerable amount of previous research. Section 2.2 offers an overview of writings in this area. It may be argued that the informants in the interview investigation of this thesis also have conducted research, and that my presentation of results in Chapter 5 thus, though presented separately for methodological reasons, ought to be viewed as an outline of research on the same epistemological level as the research overview in section 2.2. In the research overview I present and discuss a variety of ideas "by", in the words of Phillips (2008), "references to scholarly writers"; arguably, therefore, "[t]hose citations are [...] research data" as well (p. 75). One of the aims of the discussion in Chapter 6 is to develop a synthesis of this variety of perspectives on storytelling in jazz improvisation, employing the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 3 in order to reflect on previous studies (Chapter 2) as well as on the results of the empirical study (Chapter 5).

One comment may be relevant at this point in connection with this inclusionist mode of approaching the field of research. I will not be so bold as to suggest that the writing style of this thesis will in any way approach or try to assimilate a 'jazzy' quality; however, in one respect I believe I have tried to let one characteristic of jazz music inform the prose. The purpose to collect and analyse several perspectives on jazz improvisation is best served, I suggest, by supplying rich quotations. In order to provide optimal foundations for interpretation regarding several interrelated issues, the text had better provide rather extensive encounters with a string of soloists in collective interplay, as it were: a multitude of voices. In a sense, then, this thesis has a

bit more of Bakhtinian dialogism than of epic monologue; the preponderance towards extensive citations, while hopefully contributing to the richness of the picture, unfortunately also renders the volume somewhat heavier.

The aim of this chapter is to draw boundaries for a distinct field of investigation and to offer a formulation of the purpose of the present study and its research questions. While, in accordance with the inclusionist approach, the aim of this chapter's background sketch must be to offer a bountiful scope of perspectives, chapter 3 introduces a selection of concepts and views that make up the theoretical framework I consider particularly relevant for this investigation.

## 2.1. The field of investigation: Jazz improvisation

The term storytelling is abundantly used as a prestige word in discourse on jazz improvisation.

A certain art form thus attempts to explain things considered crucially important by borrowing a concept from another art form. I suggest that this is but one example out of several instances where art forms, or artists, tend to mirror themselves in each other in order to understand themselves better.

The borrowed concept of storytelling is obviously not used with exactly the same meaning in this field as elsewhere. This thesis aims to clarify the ways in which this concept is used by jazz practitioners.

Previous writings on storytelling in jazz improvisation will be reviewed in the next section.

But, to begin with: *what is improvisation?* This study does not set out to investigate whether all music tells – or can tell – stories. Its focus is more narrow: storytelling as a feature of the improvised elements of the musical genre(s) known as jazz. In order to approach this field, the notion of improvisation in musical contexts must be carefully considered. In this section, a number of perspectives on musical improvisation are presented, discussed, and evaluated.

Naturally, the concept improvisation in music may preserve important characteristics of how the concept is understood in a general context. It might be argued that the need to improvise, as well as the ability to do so, make up important parts of our human life conditions. Ryle (1976) argues that our everyday actions in response to life's ever-changing conditions always require some degree of improvisation:

the vast majority of things that happen in the universe are in high or low degree unprecedented, unpredictable, and never to be repeated. [...] To a partly novel situation the response is necessarily partly novel, else it is not a response. (p. 73)

Bresler (2006) contends that

life itself, lived creatively and meaningfully, requires improvisation, distinguishing a life lived from a life endured. (p. 33)

The improvisatory nature of human action is perhaps especially obvious in communicative activity; Nachmanovitch (1990) holds that the activity of "instantaneous creation is as ordinary to us as breathing" and that every conversation is "a form of jazz" (p. 17). Alperson (2010), arguing that "improvisation would seem to be a feature of most, if not all, directed human thought and action", offers a generalized characterization of improvisation as *a spontaneous activity that is goal-directed*:

In a very general sense, we can think of improvisation as a kind of goal-directed activity ('I need to find something to get this boulder out of the way'), but what makes the activity improvisatory is the sense that what is being done is being done on the fly ('Maybe I can use this branch as a lever to move the rock'). (p. 273)

There seems to be reasonable consensus among contemporary aesthetic thinkers that, on a general level, musical improvisation includes a combination of *spontaneity* and *tradition*.

It is sometimes argued that improvisation will elude scientific attempts to describe it, or that earlier approaches in this direction have been inadequate. Bailey (1993) views improvisation as "essentially non-academic", holding that it is "too elusive for analysis" and that it "contradicts the idea of documentation" (p. ix). In his philosophical contribution to the literature on improvisation, Peters (2009) states: "creating a concept of improvisation is here understood as itself an improvisatory process" (p. 5). Hagberg (1998) points out that even a " cursory glance" on jazz performances will render implausible several aesthetic definitions of the musical work; jazz improvisation "constitutes a powerful challenge to a good deal of music-definitional theory" (p. 480). Gioia (1988) points to the need for an adequate conceptual framework in order to treat jazz music on its own terms, "not as the bastard child of composed music"; he terms this framework an "aesthetics of imperfection" (p. 56).

In Alperson's (1984) view, discussions of musical improvisation have not always made sufficiently clear what is being discussed. Is it a productive *activity* or the *product* of that activity, such as a structure of sounds; or, in Alperson's words, is it "a variety of performance", "a kind of composition", or "a kind of editorial activity" (p. 17)? Alperson settles for the perspective on improvisation as a productive activity, describing it as "the particular shaping activity of the improviser who creates for us a

musical utterance unmediated by another human being" so that the listener "gains privileged access to the composer's mind at the moment of musical creation" (p. 24).

Cochrane (2000), defining improvisation as "real-time musical decision making on the part of musicians while engaged in performance", points out that such a practice actually exists "in all musical performances except for those carried out by machines" (p. 140). In general, improvisational practices have been prominent in both Western and non-Western musical traditions; for instance, most musical performances in ancient Greece seem to have been improvisations (Grout, 1981).

Spontaneity of some sort is at the core of improvisation, not least in jazz contexts, according to Hagberg (1998):

in jazz soloing one very frequently discovers in midstream where one 'wants to go': that is, the melodic trajectory, or the developmental impetus of a motif, reveals itself in the performance itself to the performer. (p. 480)

However, Gould and Keaton (2000) ask, "how much of a truly new entity is created in an improvisation?" They point out that an improvised jazz performance – like a classical performance – is normally based on a preexisting framework, including form and harmonic progression. They maintain, therefore, that "jazz and classical performances differ more in degree than in kind", finding both sorts of performances to involve "an immediacy of expression" (pp. 143, 146). By necessity, Gould and Keaton hold, a classical performance "goes beyond" the score; it might even "stray from" the score and be improvised in a way similar to a jazz performance (p. 146). They further argue that "all improvisation in musical performance relies on the foundations of the particular musical tradition in which the work exists" (p. 146). Granted that these authors make a valid point in arguing that a preexisting framework is of importance in jazz as well as in classical music, I would still suggest that these are more complex issues than the statement that "jazz and classical performances differ more in degree than in kind" would seem to indicate; differences in degree can be vast. For one thing, there are arguably often enormous differences in musicians' and listeners' expectations concerning the scope and character of improvisation with regard to freedom and individuality.

Small (1987) argues that what we call improvisation is "the normal way of musicking" in most of the world's musical traditions (p. 309). According to Small, "free" improvisation cannot take place without any rules or conventions whatsoever:

If musical performances establish relationships, no relationships can be established without the existence of commonly understood meanings, and there can be no meanings without rules. (p. 308)

Such rules, Small holds, come from "universal patterns of human behaviour and response"; a "new idiom" is created as the musicians "evolve a set of common

understandings; they invent, as it were, their own culture [...] from the creative blending of the manner of thinking and playing of each musician" (p. 308). Arguably, the bulk of musical improvisation does not concern itself with the invention of new idioms but is rather a matter of expressing already existing ones; which will be further dwelled upon in the next subsection.

### 2.1.1. Idiomaticity

Bailey (1993) distinguishes between *idiomatic* and *non-idiomatic* improvisation. In his view, jazz improvisation belongs to the former category alongside, for instance, flamenco or baroque improvisation; it is "concerned with the expression of an idiom" and "takes its identity and motivation from that idiom" (p. xi). With regard to "conventional" jazz, Bailey describes improvisation in this idiom very briefly as "based on tunes in time" (p. 48).

To some researchers, idiomaticity seems key to improvisation. In the words of Kenny and Gellrich (2002), "[t]he knowledge base used by improvising musicians typically involves the internalization of source materials that are idiomatic to individual improvising cultures" (p. 118). It may be argued that spontaneous speech is improvisatory. In many respects, inquiry into idiomatic musical improvisation may be likely to resemble inquiry into language use. This may prompt comparisons between the cognitive systems – including learning and performance – that are involved in musical and verbal forms of expression. Berkowitz (2010) holds that "musicians in many traditions learn through immersion in a musical system" and that "[t]he ability to improvise in a style relies on an intimate knowledge of the musical elements, processes, and forms of that style" (pp. xvii, xv); thus he investigates the knowledge that is needed to improvise idiomatically through the three questions: what is this knowledge, how is it acquired, and how is it used in performance? The results he points to importantly include musical formulas and the rules for their use. They show striking similarities to the tools and rules of language. On a similar note, Kenny and Gellrich (2002) distinguish between two "basic stages" in the learning of improvisatory skills, both of which are presented in terms of an analogy with language learning: "In the first stage of learning a language words and grammatical rules are acquired, and in the second students explore their various possibilities of combination and application"; the authors term these stages "the hardware and the software of improvisation" (p. 130).

To other theorists, idiomaticity is not at all crucial to their view of improvisation. Gagel (2010), in a thoroughly systematic overview of improvisational creativity in music, suggests a definition which is formulated in the negative: improvised music is music that to a certain extent is not foreseeable. As a consequence, he devotes quite little space to improvisation in jazz idioms. With reference to Bailey's (1993) apt expression "tunes in time" (p. 48), it might be argued that idiomatic jazz

improvisation is foreseeable with regard to structural, harmonic, and rhythmic parameters. Gagel's (2010) categorization of improvised music is founded on its degree of unexpectedness, visualized in a table as gradations of the unforeseen ("Abstufungen des Unvorhergesehenen", p. 139). In free jazz, like in non-idiomatic improvisation, *all* parameters must be improvised in the process, according to Gagel's schema, while in all other kinds of jazz improvisation there are, simultaneously, both fixed and open structures; some pattern is involved but one or more parameters are unforeseen ("Vorlage vorhanden, aber ein/mehrere Parameter sind unvorhergesehenen", p. 139).

Those who emphasize the role of spontaneity in improvisation will probably still acknowledge some contextual influence on the music. Alperson (1984), while viewing improvisation as "a spontaneous kind of music-making" (p. 17), also points out that "[e]ven the freest improviser, far from creating *ex nihilo*, improvises against some sort of musical context" (p. 22). He further remarks that "[m]usicians have probably 'borrowed' improvised phrases from each other since the beginning of music-making and this helps to preserve particular improvised structures (or at least parts of them)" (p. 26). In the context of jazz improvisation, Alperson mentions how jazz students assimilate not only the musical forms common to jazz repertoire (such as the 12-measure blues and the 32-measure AABA structure) but also "rules" regarding which scalar patterns are appropriate to which harmonic progressions. Indeed, the learning of jazz improvisation often includes "listening to and copying, from recordings or live performances, other players' musical phrases (or even whole solos), many of which have long ago attained the status of formulae" (p. 22).

Furthermore, naturally, the listener's perspective is also of interest. Alperson (1984) remarks that improvised music can be appreciated for "some of the same values" as other kinds of music: for instance, the sensitivity, lyricism, virtuosity, or compositional skills of the improviser (p. 23). This last-mentioned quality relates to features such as coherence. The creation of coherence arguably calls for certain abilities in the improviser. Kenny and Gellrich (2002) present a "speculative model" of cognitive processes during improvisation, including shifts between short-term, medium-term, or long-term anticipation and recall (pp. 123–125).

Alperson (1984) contends that jazz improvisations are criticized according to the same "criteria of internal purposiveness" as other kinds of music: "intelligible development, internal unity, coherence, originality, ingenuity, etc., the artful employment of prevailing idioms and the emergence of an individual style" (p. 22). He points out, however, that while some "irregularities" (for instance, in intonation, timbre, or rhythm) would count as deficiencies in other kinds of music, they will probably be accepted by listeners in the field of jazz improvisation; "we listen past the 'mistakes' and attend to the actual development of a work" (pp. 23, 24). This view clearly has to do with the activity perspective on improvisation advocated by Alperson. In this perspective, musical improvisation brings to light features of all

human activity; it is fundamentally improvisational in nature, tied, he argues, to "several underlying circumstances of the human condition":

the developmental arc and limitations of human knowledge and abilities, the recalcitrance of the world to human will, and the open-endedness and fragility of existence. (Alperson, 2010, p. 274)

Idiomatcity plays an important role in Small's (1987) view on all kinds of musical improvisation as ritual activities in which the players "explore, affirm and celebrate" their identities and relationships (p. 302). Small (1998) expands on these notions. By not only reflecting but in fact also bringing into existence and shaping "relationships that are thought of as desirable", this act is an instrument of *exploration*; in articulating these values, it is an instrument of *affirmation*; and in leaving the participants "feeling good about themselves and about their values", the musical activity is an instrument of *celebration* (pp. 183–184). While in idiomatic improvisation the players are "bound by the requirements of the idiom", idiomatic development (such as the emergence of bebop and later jazz styles) can be seen as a search for "new kinds of relationships"; and non-idiomatic, "free" improvisation as a search for "those universals of music which transcend idiom, and through them the universals of human relationships" (Small, 1987, pp. 302–306). However complex and difficult these perspectives may render an investigation of jazz improvisation, they still come forward as persuasive, relevant, and significant.

### 2.1.2. Tradition versus freedom

Stephen Davies (2001), characterizing improvisations as "spontaneous and unregulated musical playings that are not of works" (p. 11), still holds that the improviser draws on a "stock", namely, the resources of phrases and figuration available in a tradition (p. 12). It might even be argued that the relationship between spontaneity and tradition in jazz improvisation is not only dynamic and dialectic but also, in a certain sense, necessary. Murray (1998) views innovation in jazz as intimately, intertextually connected with tradition:

The most inventive, the most innovative jazz musician is also one with a very rich apperceptive mass or base, a very rich storehouse of tunes, phrases, ditties which he uses as a painter uses his awareness of other paintings, as a writer employs his literary background to give his statements richer resonances. As a matter of fact, the musician is always engaged in a dialogue or a conversation or even argument – not only, as in a jam session, with his peers – but also with all other music and musicians in the world at large. Indeed, his is an ongoing dialogue with the form itself. (p. 113)



On the other hand, learning and relating to an idiom may be dangerously close to conforming to it. Bailey (1993) holds that much jazz music is "almost totally derivative", a kind of music where the inspiration and imitation of well-known stylists has turned into mimicking (p. 53). The aims of this thesis do not include any ambition to lay out a history of jazz improvisation. However, a few brief reflective thoughts regarding the historical development might not be out of place at this point. It may be argued that the dynamics of tradition and individual spontaneity has been subject to change in the history of jazz improvisation. Perhaps, at the risk of oversimplification, it might be apt to view certain historical periods (such as, for instance, the eras of early jazz and bebop) as jazz's *modernity* while others (such as, perhaps, the current stage of jazz history) might be viewed as its *postmodernity*. Bailey (1993), it would seem, approaches such a perspective when writing about the drummer Max Roach that he "represents one of the *older* jazz traditions, that of *innovation*" (p. 57; my emphases). The notion of innovation, of course, carries a certain ambiguity. Gioia (1988) advocates a distinction between two kinds of innovation or progression in jazz: on one hand, the musician's development towards an individual and unique sound; on the other, the music's transformation as an art form:

The very emergence of the term 'modern jazz' to describe this musical movement was indicative of a new mentality, one in which traditions were viewed as obstacles to be overcome or discarded. (pp. 75–76)

Issues of tradition and freedom are undoubtedly important to all improvisation in jazz as well as to any other musical idiom. Cochrane (2000) points out that jazz solos are "constrained by interpretative rules", such as, for instance, the conventions of the bebop performing tradition, "as much as they are freed by variables" (p. 140). Discussing free jazz, he maintains that "free improvised performances are surrounded by a great many prohibitions, to such an extent that the use of the word 'free' must be considered questionable" (p. 141).

In an overview of contemporary aesthetic debate on the nature of musical improvisation, David Davies (2011) distinguishes "three ways in which improvisation might enter into a performance in the performing arts": (a) *improvisation on a theme* (the standard jazz phenomenon); (b) *improvisational composition* (such as, for instance, J. S. Bach's *Musical offering*); and (c) *pure improvisation* (such as, for instance, Keith Jarrett's *Köln concert* or "free jazz") (pp. 154–160). To sum up, Davies finds the claims that both spontaneity and tradition are essential to improvisation "quite compatible" (p. 153).

### 2.1.3. Playing jazz

The dynamic relationship between tradition and individuality will be a recurring theme in any investigation of musical improvisation. Indeed, it might be argued that the dynamics of rules versus freedom permeates all kinds of play. In a sense, this dichotomy seems closely related to the distinction between technique and playfulness. In his reflections on free musical improvisation, Nachmanovitch (1990) remarks regarding technical proficiency and its relation to "the gap between what we feel and what we can express":

Technique can bridge this gap. It also can widen it. (p. 67)

Nachmanovitch (1990) argues that when technique gets "too solid", when competence "loses a sense of its roots in the playful spirit", the resulting music may become distanced and rigid (p. 67). He concludes: "To create, we need both technique and freedom from technique. To this end we practice until our skills become unconscious" (p. 73).

Bailey (1993) notes that improvisers rarely use the word "improvise" to describe what they do. Jazz improvisers "play jazz", or just "play" (p. xii). In his analysis of human games, Caillois (1958/2001) proposes a distinction between four categories of play, placed in a continuum between control and spontaneity:

All four indeed belong to the domain of play. One plays football, billiards, or chess (*agôn*); roulette or lottery (*alea*); pirate, Nero, or Hamlet (*mimicry*); or one produces in oneself, by a rapid whirling or falling movement, a state of dizziness and disorder (*ilinx*). (p. 12)

*Agôn* (competition) includes ways of playing where some quality is subjected to testing (for instance, speed, strength, endurance). *Alea* (chance) includes ways of playing where the participant cannot control the outcome. With the term *mimicry* (simulation), Caillois designates ways of playing where participants momentarily accept an unreal world. *Ilínx*, finally, includes ways of playing where participants strive to change their experience of reality through loss of control of their perceptual balance. With regard to the degree of control involved, games in each category can be placed on a continuum between two opposite poles. At one end of the continuum, *paidia*, is the anarchic, capricious, uncontrolled fantasy. At the opposite end is the tendency to discipline the game with "arbitrary, imperative, and purposely tedious conventions", *ludus* (p. 13).

It may be interesting to discuss jazz improvisation in relation to Caillois's categories. You can win in *agôn* and *alea* (in the latter case, thanks to fate). In a certain sense, you can (or could) "win" as a jazz improviser, too, in the context of a *cutting contest*. The American jazz magazine *Down Beat's* critics poll, readers poll,

album of the year, lifetime achievement award, and jazz hall of fame ought to be considered, also, in this context. This kind of "winning" in jazz might be interpreted as instances of *agôn*, competitions regarding, for instance, musical inventiveness. The need for the jazz improviser to let go, to abandon conscious control, may be seen as related to the *alea* and *ilinx* categories of playing. Furthermore, the elements in jazz improvisation of musical self-reflectivity and intertextuality – whether analysed as quotes, signifyin(g), or musical irony, all of which will be discussed more extensively in subsections 2.2.5 and 2.2.6 – seem to make the mimicry category an apt one for analyses of jazz improvisation. Furthermore, regarding all these aspects of jazz improvisation, it might be argued that an improviser's actions may take place anywhere along a controlled/uncontrolled continuum between *ludus* and *paidia*. In the words of Berliner (1994), "[m]inimizing spontaneity, some musicians view improvisation as a process with the goal of creating an original but relatively fixed solo [...], and they deliberately consolidate their most successful patterns from previous performances into a fully arranged model" (p. 241); on the other hand, musicians also state, "When I play a solo, I never know any more about what I am going to play than you do" (p. 2).

In this investigation, I will assume the following working definition of musical improvisation: *an individual and/or collective musical activity which, though it is always situated in a socio-musical context (including input of momentaneous as well as traditional character), is to a certain extent characterized by real-time decision making by the performers of that musical activity.* It will be noted that this definition is broad enough to include performances in the classical tradition; the tension between individual voice and musical tradition is included, but its proportions remain unspecified.

## 2.2. Storytelling in the field of jazz improvisation: Previous writings

There are times when art is at a loss for words, when the terminological tools within an art form will not suffice to formulate things of crucial importance. In order to be able to express themselves properly, artists, analysts and educators consequently turn to the utilizing of concepts that have been borrowed elsewhere.

Jazz seems to offer a striking example of such terminological cross-over: the storytelling metaphor. A jazz improviser should tell a story. In recent years, several jazz scholars have discussed this metaphor from different points of view. My aim in this section is twofold: (a) through a brief thematized survey of this discussion, I try to point to some conceptualizations, themes and issues that seem relevant in connection with the storytelling metaphor (subsections 2.2.2–2.2.9); and (b) on the basis of this

survey, some educational implications of this conceptual loan as well as some reflections on its metaphoricality are put forward (subsections 2.2.10–2.2.11). In brief, employing yet another metaphor, I believe I may succeed in understanding this forest better through a process which first includes an investigation of the variety of trees of which it is made up.

### 2.2.1. Storytelling in jazz studies

Music may be perceived as a particularly intense mode of communication. The cultural analyst Raymond Williams (1961/1965) suggests that

rhythm is a way of transmitting a description of experience, in such a way that the experience is re-created in the person receiving it, not merely as an 'abstraction' or an 'emotion' but as a physical effect on the organism – on the blood, on the breathing, on the physical patterns of the brain. (p. 41)

The arts in general, according to Williams, "comprise highly developed and exceptionally powerful rhythmic means, by which the communication of experience is actually achieved" (p. 41). The way jazz improvisers communicate with audiences is, in Finkelstein's (1948/1988) view, by means of a mutually understood language:

A last characteristic of the blues, making for successful improvisation, is that they are a language familiar to both performers and audience. The performers do not merely 'express themselves,' but communicate to their listeners. Jazz improvisation reaches its greatest heights when its language is shared by both performers and listeners. (p. 78)

Finkelstein perceives this as a "restoration" of music; for, in his opinion, the phenomenon that music "speaks" is an ancient though forgotten one:

In its 'speaking' quality jazz is not bringing an unheard-of quality to music, nor is it an example, as some would describe it, of a folkish quaintness. It is a restoration to music of a necessary quality, temporarily abandoned in our 'classical' musical atmosphere. (p. 79)

To be able to tell a story, you will probably need some sort of language. Obviously, the storytelling metaphor pertains to discourse *on* music as well as to discourse *in* music (cf. subsection 3.1.2). Turning to discourse on music, in the case of jazz improvisation it is noteworthy that the storytelling metaphor is part of the discourse not primarily of theorists but, first and foremost, within the community of practitioners themselves. Beeson (1990) maintains that "narrative is an *-emic* structure through which jazz performers make sense of their art" (p. 1), and the many

statements of professional musicians in Berliner's (1994) 900-page ethnographic study *Thinking in jazz* form a vigorous testimony that linguistic metaphors permeate discourses on jazz improvisation. Consequently, in presenting the acquisition and development of improvisational skills, Berliner often returns to the metaphor of learning to speak a language, frequently highlighting the term "vocabulary" and offering thorough descriptions of the "tales" in transcribed solos by Miles Davis and John Coltrane (pp. 586–597 and *passim*).

The briefest acquaintance with jazz literature will demonstrate the abundance of similar linguistic metaphors in writings by scholars, critics, and educators. Even John Cage, a composer with seemingly no affinity to jazz music, has pointed to the similarity between jazz and talking, lamenting that "[i]f I am going to listen to a speech then I would like to hear some words" – which could be interpreted as intersubjective justification for the requirement that improvisers should "tell a story" (Lewis, 1996, p. 118).

It should be noted, however, that the storytelling metaphor is not present in all studies of how jazz improvisers describe their improvisational thinking. To be sure, several scholarly studies of jazz improvisation focus on structural issues and pay little if any attention to communicative aspects, let alone storytelling. A few examples may provide a variety of illustrations of such approaches.

Faulkner (2006) pictures jazz improvisation as a Janus-faced musical activity which is "simultaneously deliberate *and* spontaneous, imitative *and* experimental, routinized *and* innovation" (p. 92). In a thorough, sociology-based case study, a "look back at the steps that produced" through hours of practice some such acts of "organized imagination" that he views as essential to jazz improvisation, Faulkner never touches upon any intention in the improviser to communicate or express anything through the music.

Thematic and structural unity come forward as crucial qualities in jazz improvisation in an influential 1958 article by Gunther Schuller (1958/1999). He provides "an account of the ideational thread running through [Sonny] Rollins's improvisation [on his 1956 recording of "Blue 7"] that makes this particular recording so distinguished and satisfying" (p. 215). His analysis is said to reveal "many subtle relationships" between the improvisation and the main theme of the tune. Schuller argues that it is Rollins's use of thematic development and the "high level of structural cohesiveness" that make his solo improvisation so valuable; the ending, Schuller contends, is a "a perfect way to end and sum up all that came before! This then is an example of a real variation technique" (p. 218). Schuller's account has been questioned, notably by the object of the analysis himself. Sonny Rollins's decision to "stop reading his own press" and even his decision to "take a 'sabbatical' until 1962" have been interpreted as consequences of his discomfort with Schuller's analysis (Prouty, 2012, pp. 93, 185).

Much in the same vein, Tirro (1974) studies systematic repetitions in the same passage in a series of improvisations by a jazz soloist, and Knauer (1990) in his

thorough study of improvisation in the Modern Jazz Quartet presents his observations in three categories: "Paraphrasen-Improvisation", "Chorusphrasen-Improvisation", and "Motivische Improvisation" (pp. 193–233). Knauer's analysis is informed by the music's structural properties; any storytelling aspects are left without consideration. While Jost's (1975) analyses of free jazz rely to an important extent on musical transcriptions and technical descriptions, the author acknowledges that the subjective, expressive components of the music are crucial,

daß Emotionen in Jazz im allgemeinen nicht lediglich als Beiwerk eines ansonsten vom Intellekt gesteuerten Gestaltungsprozesses fungieren, sondern im Gegenteil sowohl beim Musiker als auch beim Hörer auf der Rangskala der musikalischen Notwendigkeiten häufig den ersten Platz einnehmen. (p. 19)

On the whole, however, any storytelling aspects of free jazz are hardly at the core of Jost's interest.

Norgaard (2008, 2010) in his studies regarding the thought processes of artist-level jazz improvisers distinguishes between a *theory mode* (focusing on technical and theoretical concepts) and a *play mode* (focusing on, among other things, interaction). The results of his investigations seem to indicate that it is the theoretical considerations that most prominently occupy the thoughts of jazz improvisers. According to Norgaard, jazz musicians' ways of creating improvised material can be described as four generative strategies: using memorized material from an *idea bank*, selecting pitches with attention to vertical or horizontal features of the material (*harmonic* and *melodic* priority, respectively), and, finally, *repeating* material that was played earlier in the solo. In addition to these strategies, the thought processes of jazz improvisers include ongoing planning and evaluation. There is nothing in the results of Norgaard's investigations, however, to indicate that jazz performers think about communicating something, let alone telling stories, when they improvise.

Based on an analysis of Pressing's (1988) and Sudnow's (1978, 2001) perspectives on jazz improvisation, Hargreaves (2012) discerns three "distinct possible sources of idea generation" (p. 359). Her discussion of these sources (strategy-generated, audition-generated, and motor-generated ideas, respectively), however, does not touch upon any intention on the part of the improviser to communicate through music with audience or fellow musicians. Dean (1992) in his analysis of jazz and improvised music since 1960 remains sceptical towards all sociopolitical interpretations of music; he holds that "musical development is primarily autonomous" (p. xxi).

Nevertheless, based on the bulk of jazz scholarship, criticism, and biography, it would seem that any attempt at understanding jazz improvisational thinking will do well to include the notion of storytelling. It is, of course, at the core of this investigation. In the next few sections, a number of relevant conceptualizations, themes and issues from jazz literature are put forward.

### 2.2.2. A role model: Lester Young

Notably, in the very first jazz music preserved on record, that of the Original Dixieland Jazz Band, there is little improvisation, if any. Gushee (2009) provides an interesting perspective through his analysis of the 1917 court proceedings regarding one of their recorded tunes. Quoting and interpreting excerpts from the court records, Gushee argues that in these New Orleans musicians' minds, the piece was regarded as a fixed composition, "essentially the same from one performance to another" (p. 268).

Interestingly, record listeners will be hard pressed to detect any full improvised solo choruses on jazz records earlier than 1923; it would seem that (recorded) solo improvisations up to that year hardly ever exceeded the boundaries of a two-bar break. Gioia (1988) points to the historical significance of the two-bar break in early jazz:

The break, like the solo in later jazz, was seen as an opportunity for the musician to make a personal statement. [...] In fact, much of the early jazz vocabulary was developed by artists taking greater and greater rhythmic and melodic liberties in their breaks. (p. 79)

The two-bar break, Gioia (1988) holds, was the first step in a process towards "an ever increasing emphasis on the individual soloist" (p. 80). The development comprised qualitative aspects as well as quantitative. Gushee (2009) offers an historical survey of how jazz improvisation was conceptualized with increasing abstraction during two decades from the mid-1910s onward: "From Faking to Hot Playing to Improvisation" (p. 278). The phenomenon of extended solo playing has since come to play a key role in our perception of jazz music. Stylistic development has influenced this change towards an increased focus on the individual improviser in jazz. Musicians returning from World War II found a new jazz style in vogue; bebop was different from swing in several respects. Myers (2013) reports pianist Dave Brubeck's statement, "When I got back, improvisation not only was encouraged in jazz; it was expected" (p. 56).

Even though jazz solos in the modern sense probably remained unknown to jazz during its first decades, the notion of individual improvisational voices in jazz may still be as old as the music form itself. Marquis (1978/2005) in his biography of the "first man of jazz", the New Orleans trumpeter Buddy Bolden, directs attention to the fact that the opinion that Bolden's sound was "unique and affected people deeply [...] comes through in any number of interviews" (p. 99). As jazz developed, this focus on the sonic individuality of the performer turned out to be a vigorous one. The idea of the jazz "voice" is perhaps especially obvious in the phenomenon known as the *blindfold test*, "that familiar parlor game of jazz fans [...] institutionalized in the leading jazz magazine, *Downbeat*, in the 1950s" (Alpers, 2010, p. 278).

Finkelstein (1948/1988) views voice quality as central to all jazz music, vocal and instrumental alike, and he distinguishes a number of basic elements of this quality:

the use of contrasts, the interplay of opposites: song and speech, on-pitch notes and blue notes, on-pitch notes and movements to surprising intervals and keys. This double or contrasting character of timbre and vocal handling is likewise basic to the entire jazz use of the instrument. (p. 27)

Sidran (1981) argues that the introduction of the saxophone as a jazz solo instrument "made the quality of vocalization more readily available to black instrumentalists, as that horn sounds like the human voice throughout its registers" (p. 74).

What, then, should a "voice" do? The directive that every jazz soloist must tell a story was repeatedly and perhaps most famously put forward by the saxophonist Lester Young. "You're technically hip," he would tell fast young players, "*But what is your story?*" (O'Meally, 1989, p. 221).

"Lester sings with his horn", Billie Holiday contended: "You listen to him and can almost hear the words" (Holiday & Dufty, 1956, p. 59). One of Young's biographers (Daniels, 2002) maintains that "Young's music evidently sprang from private sources of inspiration and was a very personal means of communicating his inner thoughts and feelings, particularly to those he loved" (p. 245). Daniels offers a number of quotes from interviews with Young's fellow musicians such as guitarist John Collins who described Young's playing as

*all truth and beauty. Simplicity. [...] Lester would grab at your heart. [...] It wasn't what he said, it was how he said it. It wasn't his technique as much as it was his soul.* (p. 233)

Irving Ashby, also Young's guitarist, noted that while "the *message* was always there" in Young's solos, then "tomorrow on the same song, he'd tell a different story" (Daniels, 2002, p. 323).

In accordance with his ideal to sing while playing, Young said of his dream band: "One of the rules of the band would be that everybody would know the lyrics of anything they played" (Daniels, 1985, p. 318). This interest in what the songs employed as vehicles for improvisation 'are about' has been a common denominator among several jazz musicians. One of Young's younger colleagues, saxophonist Dexter Gordon, often made a point of reciting the lyrics of a song before playing it, and several jazz instrumentalists also perform as vocalists (Berliner, 1994).

A few words from a jazz critic testify to the mature Young's ability to convey pregnant emotional messages to the listener:

he played valid, moving solos with an entirely new atmosphere, and I cannot refrain from quoting W. B. Yeats in an attempt to explain it: An aged man is



but a paltry thing [...] What Lester somehow conveys now is an impression of a man in totally exceptional circumstances [...] For the rest of his life there is a haunting quality in his music that can transcend technical failings and reach straight inside the listener. (Colombé, 1974/1996, p. 866)

Arguably Young was able to play valid, moving improvisations early on. Gustafson (2003) points to how the writing of the Swedish poet and songwriter Beppe Wolgers was influenced by Lester Young's 1936 "free flight" solo on "Lady be good":

What looks sloppy in the script brings life to the song [...], jazz pulse in writing. [...] Beppe writes: 'You could see the weightlessness. The annulment of inertia, gravity. You could hear the crushing of all resistance, a "finally", a sigh that had waited a thousand years. This was the proof, the verification of guesses, hopes, theories, utopias. Lester was 27, the greatest game player, poet, wizard of simplicity, bouncer, ballplayer, airman.' (Originally in *Expressen*, November 24, 1974; cited from Gustafson, 2003, p. 211; my translation.)

Otis (1993) views Lester Young's musical output in relation to his experiences of racism: "In spite of what he went through, however, I don't hear hardship in Lester's playing. I hear a melancholy power and a lament, but I also hear a joyous celebration of life, the human spirit, and sexuality" (p. 78).

Schuller (1989), seeing Lester Young's storytelling in the light of his blues playing, points to the "linear concept of playing" and "narrative form of expression" of the blues: "[i]t is essentially a vocal tradition; it tells a story" (p. 548). What Young did, according to Schuller, was to extend the storytelling aspects of the blues to non-blues materials as well.

Daniels (2002) points out that "[t]he aesthetic of the oral tradition reinforced the foundation of Young's very conception of instrumental music"; among other things, he "was fond of using two contrasting 'voices,' high and low, in a call-and-response pattern; and often phrased and fingered the keys in such a way as to produce a talking sound" (p. 54). In this respect, Daniels contends, Young was probably influenced to an important degree by the black cornetist Joseph "King" Oliver. Bushell (1998) certifies that compared to other more "legitimate" orchestras, Oliver's band (in 1921) was "more expressive of how the people felt [...; Joe Oliver] played things that hit you inside" (pp. 25–26). In Lester Young's case, the expressive power of his music would include jocularly: "The honking noise Young often made in his solos reflected the humor of jazz's roots in minstrelsy and the TOBA circuit" (Daniels, 2002, p. 78).

On the other hand, Sudhalter (1999) points to the fact that Young explicitly named white, that is, non-blues saxophonists (Frank Trumbauer, Jimmy Dorsey, and Bud Freeman) as his main sources of inspiration: "no black tenor saxophonists before 1936 played the way Lester Young played" (p. 255). However, Harrison, Fox, and Thacker (1984) point out that already Glyn Paque's alto saxophone solo in King

Oliver's recording of "Sweet like this", made in 1929, "sounds remarkably like Frankie Trumbauer, an illustration of how black and white styles were already overlapping" (p. 179). This, of course, is a telling example of the unsuitability of simplistic racial distinctions to the understanding of music and musical development. While the skin colour of jazz musicians has certainly been known to exert influence on their life conditions, its inadequacy as a tool for music analysis is aptly summarized by David Meltzer (2000) in one of his meditative poems on Lester Young (p. 179; "Bird" refers to saxophonist Charlie "Bird" Parker):

Bird learned from me  
from Trumbauer's C-melody  
& Dorsey's alto

pilfer from source  
to become source

skin's secondary

Daniels (2002) quotes Young's contention that Trumbauer "always told a little story" (p. 101). Gioia (2011) analyses Trumbauer's storytelling quality as a matter of linear (horizontal rather than vertical) solo playing, "an alternative to the harmonically oriented, arpeggio-based style characteristic of so many earlier jazz reed players" (p. 82). This distinction between linear and vertical improvisation has been prominent in subsequent debate, for instance, regarding the understanding of the differences in improvisational approach between Lester Young and Coleman Hawkins.

### 2.2.3. Coherence

DeVeaux (1997/2000) argues that the "plan" (both the conception and the execution of it) of Coleman Hawkins's saxophone solo on his 1939 recording of "Body and soul" finds a parallel in narrative, "or, in the jazz argot, telling a story" (p. 103). Williams (1993) suggests another parallel to the same solo plan: "the special declamatory drama of the concert singer" (p. 78). DeVeaux discerns several qualities that contribute to the storytelling of the saxophonist Coleman Hawkins's improvisations:

His [Hawkins's] way of 'telling a story' through his improvised solos was uncomplicated and emotionally direct. It was a continuous, carefully controlled crescendo of intensity on several fronts at once: a gradual thickening or hardening of timbre, a steady increase in volume, and a climb to a melodic peak carefully withheld until very near the end. The relentless linear logic of harmonic improvisation served as the connecting thread. None of this, it might

be added, was particularly Hawkins's property. The general scheme was so rooted in musical common sense, that it was widely imitated. Hawkins was simply better at it than anyone else, more adept at building seamlessly to a shattering climax. No recording better exemplified this formula, and its potential appeal, than his famous 'Body and Soul.' (pp. 97–98)

Which features make up this storytelling quality in a jazz musician's improvised output? Needless to say, any literature survey, however extensive, will not suffice to provide an exhaustive answer to this core question. The object of the present and the next few sections is to suggest at least some clues by presenting a number of concepts that are put forward as relevant in scholarly, critical, or biographical literature on jazz music. These are, in turn: *coherence, semantics, rhetoric, intra- and extra-musical memory, musical interactivity, linearity, temporality, sound, and embodiment.*

To an important extent, Harker (2011) devotes his analysis of Louis Armstrong's improvisational development to a description of the trumpeter's quest for coherence:

Armstrong was among the first to play lengthy solos on the abstract material characteristic of breaks. More important, he managed to connect the various phrases of his solos, creating a sense of ongoing coherence. In doing so he rejected the prevailing standard of novelty that encouraged a rambling, disjointed rhetoric in order to provide a more or less constant sense of the unexpected. In its place he substituted a structural conception that later musicians would identify with the phrase 'telling a story.' It was this conception, based on narrative, that would govern most jazz solos of the 1930s, 1940s, and beyond. (pp. 10–11)

Knauer (1990) points to the widespread influence exerted by a number of particularly felicitous solos on record, e.g., a number of solos by Charlie Parker, by Louis Armstrong in the late 1920s, by Bix Beiderbecke on "Singing the blues" (1927), Lester Young on "Lady be good" (1936), and Coleman Hawkins on "Body and soul" (1939), all of which have been put on a pedestal, as it were; these solos have been copied, studied, and re-created by numerous musicians and so have influenced their individual improvisational languages. In view of this exemplary status, Knauer employs the term "Spontankomposition" to designate this kind of jazz solo, "den stark durchdachten und mit äußerstem Formbewußtsein durchgeführten Improvisationskomplex" (p. 75).

Tirro (1979) points to the "strong internal logic" in Lester Young's solos (p. 252). Interviewed by Daniels (1985), one of Young's colleagues, trumpeter Buck Clayton, offers his explanation of musical storytelling from an architectonic perspective: "telling a story simply meant that it must have a logical structure, a beginning, middle, and conclusion, melodically and harmonically" (p. 318). A number of jazz studies have focused on how the formulaic (repetitive and imitative) composition

commonly found in oral tradition and folklore may be used to describe the work of jazz improvisers – including relatively modern ones such as Bill Evans and John Coltrane (Pressing, 1987).

Kernfeld (1995) contends that one important kind of jazz improvisation is formulaic, defining its essence as "the artful weaving of formulas, through variation, into ever-changing, continuous lines" (p. 137) and pointing out Charlie Parker as the greatest formulaic improviser in jazz: "Parker brought to any musical situation a well-rehearsed body of formulas, which he then embedded into his lines in a fluid and frighteningly effortless manner" (p. 138). Cropley (2006) also points to Parker as an example of the significant amount of *convergent thinking* in jazz improvisers: the "organized reuse of the already known" (p. 397; cf. Stewart, 1974–75; Owens, 1995; Martin, 1996).

Porter (2005) provides this definition of a *formula*:

A formula – called a 'lick' by jazz musicians – is a brief idea that is functional rather than compositional. It is, for example, a pattern that fits a particular chord, chord sequence, or cadence. Formulas recur in similar contexts regardless of the song. [...] But every artist has his own repertoire of formulas. [...] Formulas are the building blocks of style. All jazz artists practice formulas or licks regularly and in a variety of keys in order to develop a repertoire to use in improvisations. (pp. 57, 60)

In early jazz, a certain basic coherence in jazz solos may at times have been comparatively obvious. According to Berliner (1994), the storytelling in solos by Louis Armstrong, Sidney Bechet, and Lester Young "commonly involved" a rather basic rhetoric threesome: (1) melody; (2) variations on melody; (3) riff patterns (p. 201). Gushee (2009) quotes a number of late 1920s and 1930s analyses of "hot styles" which all have in common their emphasis on requirements such as organization, meaning, and logical construction.

It is interesting to note the early emergence of explicit structural analysis of jazz improvisation among musical practitioners. Commenting specifically on a cornet solo played by Bix Beiderbecke in his 1924 recording of "Jazz me blues", his friend and fellow cornetist Esten Spurrier pointed out that an important structural idea for this solo was inspired by Louis Armstrong: "Bix and I always credited Louis as being the father of the correlated chorus: play two measures, then two related, making four measures, on which you played another four measures related to the first four, and so on ad infinitum [!] to the end of the chorus. So, the secret was simple – a series of related phrases" (Sudhalter & Evans, 1974, pp. 100–101).

Harker (1997) speaks of the "architectural elegance", "rich network of melodic relationships", and "impressive coherence" of Armstrong's 1926 solo on "Big butter and egg man" (pp. 66, 72, 75). Harker (2011) chooses the title "Telling a story" for his chapter on this solo (pp. 39–67). Commenting on Harker's emphasis on

improvisational coherence, Iyer (2004) remarks, however, that this trait "seems more reminiscent of verse than narrative" but that it might perhaps be viewed as "just one facet of a larger, richer, and more complex narrative structure" (p. 393).

Generally speaking, it seems reasonable to assume that the communicative aspects of storytelling in this field may be of greater consequence than the architectural ones. Monson (1996) points out that in jazz improvisation "[m]usical intensification is open-ended rather than predetermined and highly interpersonal in character – structurally far more similar to a conversation than to a text" (p. 81).

On the other hand, conversational statements are clearly also in need of structure. A statement by saxophonist Joe Henderson expands on the interrelations between communicative and structural elements of language and music: "You use semicolons, hyphens, paragraphs, parentheses, stuff like this. I'm thinking like this when I'm playing. I'm having a conversation with *somebody*" (cited in Murphy, 1990, p. 15, as well as in Floyd, 1995, p. 236). Liebman's (1996) view of jazz music as narrative positions the 'story' on a rather general level. The story, in his perspective, is not inside an individual improvisation; rather it is the other way around:

The solo represents each man's version of the story. [...] If you analogize the idea of a concert to a novel, or an album to a short story, then each composition is similar to a chapter. Within the chapter, the solos are like paragraphs. In each solo, the pauses or changes in direction are equal to marks of punctuation and new sentences. Obviously, dialogue between instruments as well as soliloquies occur throughout. Also, a good solo will often have a period of introduction, exposition and a finale just as writing does. (pp. 34–35)

Kernfeld (1995) points to the fact that questions of soloistic coherence may be closely related to the harmonic structure. With the era of modal jazz, motivic improvisation became increasingly current: "Some players were thrilled to be freed from what they perceived as a harmonic straitjacket: the chord progressions of standard jazz themes. But that straitjacket had provided a guarantee of coherence: however rambling an improvisation might be, the underlying theme might nonetheless hold the listener's interest" (p. 145).

Hodson (2007) takes a different view on how differences in harmonic structure may affect jazz improvisation and interaction between musicians. He attempts to demonstrate that while "standard-practice jazz" is guarded by a "set of constraints", these are more or less broken down in modal jazz and free jazz, leading to "an increase and intensification in the interaction" between musicians (pp. 174, 24). The topic of such interaction is further touched upon in section 2.2.7, "Conversation".

## 2.2.4. Drawing on experience

The coherence of jazz improvisation discussed above is, of course, an issue of musical form. In addition to it, there is the ever-elusive question of the music's semantic content. The viewpoint that jazz solos can (or even should) refer to extra-musical phenomena is prominent in several sources. Floyd (1991), describing the jazz improviser's storytelling as "non-verbal semantic value", points to examples of musicians achieving a "telling effect", specifically referring to Albert Murray's description (quoted in the Introduction) of "how the solo instruments in Ellington's band, for example, state, assert, allege, quest, request, and imply, while others mock, concur, groan, 'or signify misgivings and even suspicions'" (p. 277). In an important early study of modern black folk practices, Howard W. Odum describes how slide guitarists in the South would mimic singers: "the instrument can be made to 'sing,' 'talk,' 'cuss,' and supplement in general the voice" (Odum, 1911, p. 261).

Louis Armstrong maintained that he saw his playing as a way to paint pictures, images of things that happened to him in his life: "When I blow I think of times and things from outa the past that gives me an image of the tune... A town, a chick somewhere back down the line, an old man with no name you seen once in a place you don't remember. ... What you hear coming from a man's horn – that's what he is" (Harker, 1997, p. 66). Several jazz studies confirm that there is far more to storytelling than its structural component: "the improviser's world of imagination considers more than musical abstractions"; "performances can reflect the individual's characteristic scope of expression, including extreme fluctuations of feeling" (Berliner, 1994, p. 202); "[w]orking as an improviser in the field of improvised music emphasizes not only form and technique but individual life choices as well as cultural, ethnic, and personal location" (Lewis, 1996, p. 110).

Walser (1999) cites saxophonist Gerry Mulligan's statement – made in 1964 – about how speech, in his view, may influence musical phrasing:

fellows who don't speak English wind up phrasing differently. Many times, I hear players who speak Swedish or French imitate the phrasing of an American jazz player, but it's not quite right, because the very phrasing of an American jazz player reflects his mode of speech, the accent of his language, even his regional accents. (p. 276)

Lewis (1996), viewing musical improvisation from a socio-cultural perspective, distinguishes between two different, historically emergent and antagonistic systems of improvising musicality which he terms *Afrological* and *Eurological* improvisation. They are wittily exemplified in his article by Bird and Cage – Charlie "Bird" Parker and John Cage – respectively. According to Lewis, Eurological improvisation has been defined by its promoters in terms of "pure spontaneity, unmediated by memory" (p. 107), and he speaks, perhaps somewhat provocatively, of "the elimination of memory

and history from music, emblematic of the Cageian project" (p. 109). While, in Lewis's view, the distancing of personal narrative is typical of contemporary Eurological music, emphasizing it is, on the contrary, typical of Afrological improvisation. He quotes an utterance to that effect by Charlie Parker: "Music is your own experience, your thoughts, your wisdom. *If you don't live it, it won't come out of your horn*" (p. 119; emphasis added). Parker's view is arguably one with profound roots in African American culture. Writing on singing in African American churches, Small (1987) remarks that "the key to the singer's power in the church was not the possession of a beautiful voice [...] but authority, the authority of one who has lived what he or she sings about, and the ability to communicate the sense of the experience. *If you haven't lived it, they say, you can't sing it*" (p. 105; emphasis added).

Nicholson (2005) remarks that "so many songs in the American popular songbook tradition deal with broken or unrequited love, and because many singers are simply too young to have had the kind of experiences about which they are singing, they appear inauthentic" (p. 94). Perhaps, if musical storytelling is viewed as crucial to jazz performance, something to the same effect might be argued regarding instrumental soloists. Berliner (1994), maintaining that jazz musicians "appreciate the musical statements of artists on their own terms", refers to the opinion expressed by trumpeter Lonnie Hillyer regarding the performance of a fellow musician as an example: "Well, that's what it means to him" (p. 282).

The personal narrative of jazz improvisation can of course be seen as closely related to the African American rhetorical practices of *signifyin(g)*, requiring an engagement with codes with which the audience is familiar (Gates, 1988). This is further expanded on in the next section (2.2.5). In the words of Floyd (1991), *signifyin(g)* is "a system of referencing [...] drawing from Afro-American folk music" (p. 285). Returning to the case of Lester Young will provide further corroboration of this view. Asked by Daniels (1985) about the connections between jazz improvisation and black oral storytelling, saxophonist Jimmy Heath expands on how a certain feeling could – and should – be conveyed by improvisers: "If they are good soloists, they speak the language that is understood by Afro-American people" (p. 318). As an example, Heath mentions that a soloist who had been to church might insert "Sometimes I feel like a motherless child" in the solo, and that Lester Young, in fact, used such quotes to convey his message. Furthermore, "whether he played the actual notes of a spiritual or ... just the feeling of being raised in this country, he portrayed that feeling in his solos." Young was always "portraying life, happiness and sadness, the dues we pay" (p. 319).

### 2.2.5. Signifyin(g)

Highlighting the social dimension of musical improvisation, Alperson (2010) puts forward the view that

the world of jazz, with its deep roots in black music and culture, can, to a certain extent, be thought to be about black history and experience. (p. 279)

Jazz improvisation is highly influenced by African American cultural practices, many of which seem directly pertinent to the concept of storytelling. The object of this section is to introduce briefly an overview of literature in this field. I view these perspectives as particularly relevant when considered in relation to musical narrativity, which is included as an important theme in the theoretical framework of this study. Therefore, the presentation and discussion of African American cultural practices is continued and further developed in section 3.1.4.

Sidran (1981) views the development of the improvised jazz solo as the result of an *oral approach to Western harmonic structure*:

The Negro appeared in terms of Western standards to be naive, but it would be truer to say that he simply applied an intuitive approach to problems of structure. Jazz solos came to compose a running commentary on Western structures, such as the 32-bar song form, and this commentary was often ironic, or mocking, in tone. [Louis] Armstrong himself was a master of the ironic use of Western song form, both as an instrumentalist and as a vocalist. The soloist's freedom became a function of his ability to extend or transcend the limitations of Western harmonic form through the application of an oral orientation. (p. 73)

Perspectives such as these are founded on an interpretation of musical practice rather than the musical work. In an influential analysis of African American cultural practices, Floyd (1991) formulates an outlook on music that resembles Small's (1987) *musicking*: "works of music are not just objects, but cultural transactions between human beings and organized sound – transactions that take place in specific idiomatic cultural contexts" (p. 278). Floyd (1995) points out that "African musical traits and cultural practices [...] played a major role in the development and elaboration of African-American music" (p. 5). Gates (1988) studies *signifying* as an African American cultural practice, "a carefully structured system of rhetoric" (p. 44). In his analyses of intertextuality in African American literary works, the concept – spelled Signifyin(g) by Gates – is prominent.

Gates (1988) views Signifyin(g) as a language of implication, as a black person's use of figurative modes of language. Rooted in mythology, Signifyin(g) is a mediating strategy for discourse, involving repetition and revision in order to create double



meaning. It is characterized by indirection and subtle humour. Walser (1999) offers this definition:

In contrast to dictionary definitions, where meanings seem clear and fixed, Signifyin(g) works through reference, gesture, and interaction to suggest multiple meanings through association; in this mode of artistic activity, performance, negotiation, and dialogue with past and present are essential. (p. 401)

Floyd (1991) explains that Signifyin(g), while it consists in the "borrowing and restating of pre-existing material", also includes "transformation of such material by using it rhetorically or figuratively – through troping, in other words – by trifling with, teasing, or censoring it in some way"; furthermore, Floyd adds,

Signifyin(g) is also a way of demonstrating respect for, goading, or poking fun at a musical style, process, or practice through parody, pastiche, implication, indirection, humor, tone- or wordplay, the illusions of speech or narration, and other troping mechanisms. (p. 271)

Arguably, storytelling in jazz could be seen as closely related to Signifyin(g) practices. Floyd (1991) uses the term call–response to convey "the dialogical, conversational character of black music", including Signifyin(g) practices (p. 277). A classic example of Signifyin(g), according to Floyd (1995), is when in a twelve-bar blues a two-bar sung "call" is answered by a two-bar instrumental "response"; this "sonic mimesis" creates an "illusion of speech or narrative conversation" (p. 96).

Floyd (1991) presents a thorough analysis of Jelly Roll Morton's 1926 recording of "Black bottom stomp":

The performance is governed by the Call-Response principle, relying upon the Signifyin(g) elisions, responses to calls, improvisations (in fact or in style), continuous rhythmic drive, and timbral and pitch distortions [...] At every point, 'Black Bottom Stomp' Signifies on black dance rhythms. [...] 'Black Bottom Stomp' is fraught with the referentiality that Gates describes as 'semantic value,' exemplifying (1) how performers contribute to the success of a performance with musical statements, assertions, allegations, questings, requestings, implications, mockings, and concurrences that result in the 'telling effect' Murray has described and (2) what black performers mean when they say that they 'tell a story' when they improvise. (pp. 279–281)

Gates (1988) also finds abundant musical analogues of Signifyin(g). For instance, he suggests, Jelly Roll Morton's 1938 piano recording "Maple leaf rag (A transformation)" "Signifies on" the composition "Maple leaf rag" by Scott Joplin: "it complexly *extends* and tropes figures present in the original. Morton's Signification is

a gesture of admiration and respect" (p. 63). Furthermore, Gates perceives a direct connection between Signifyin(g) and jazz improvisation: "Improvisation, of course, is 'nothing more' than repetition and revision. [...] The more mundane the fixed text ('April in Paris' by Charlie Parker, 'My Favorite Things' by John Coltrane), the more dramatic is the Signifyin(g) version" (pp. 63–64).

The jazz clarinetist Mezz Mezzrow's (1946) autobiography recognizes Signifyin(g) in musical as well as verbal contexts:

These cutting contests are just a musical version of the verbal duels. They're staged to see which performer can snap and cap all the others musically. (p. 231)

Gates's (1988) remark to this citation is well worth considering: "Signifyin(g) for Mezzrow is not what is played or said; it is rather a form of rhetorical training [...] – not specifically what is said, but how" (p. 70).

Miles Davis's 1956 recording of "Bye bye blackbird" has been interpreted as an example of Signifyin(g). Originally a light-hearted vaudeville ditty, the song allegedly grew popular among some white southerners in connection with lynchings of black people. Miles Davis's slow, almost tormented reading of the song stands out in stark contrast, carrying several layers of meaning (Kühl, 2003). It should be noted, however, that in Zbikowski's (2002) extensive critical discussion of whether Davis's recording of this song is actually an example of Signifyin(g), the author does not ascribe any specific importance to racial aspects: "There may [!] have also been still circulating a third, and more sinister model [apart from the upbeat and slow versions], derived from the first, that interpreted the song in racial terms – a signal for African Americans to be on guard, that they were not wanted here" (p. 239).

In Gates's (1988) words, "[t]radition is the process of formal revision" (p. 124). Signifyin(g) includes *formal revision* in (literary or musical) tradition; the concept is closely related to rhetorical practices (of literature or music) such as *pastiche* and *parody*. "Pastiche is an act of literary 'Naming'; parody is an act of 'Calling out of one's name'" (p. 124). Gates points to similarities between Signifyin(g) and Bakhtin's concept *double-voiced discourse*. In narrative parody, Bakhtin (1971) maintains, "the author employs the speech of another, but [...] he introduces into that speech an intention which is directly opposed to the original one" (p. 185). These perspectives on jazz improvisation are further developed and discussed in section 3.1.4.

## 2.2.6. Musical self-reflectivity

The last few sections have focused on notions of semantics and rhetoric, both of which seem to presuppose an ability in (jazz) music to make reference to extra-musical phenomena. Many sources in jazz literature indicate that not only extra-

musical memory but intra-musical memory as well is germane to jazz improvisation. This has to do with a kind of musical self-reflectivity that is often mentioned as a characteristic feature of much jazz playing.

Lester Young, expanding intra-musical memory to his everyday life, would often turn from words and "play a phrase from a song instead of speaking" (Daniels, 1985, p. 315); "he musicalized everything, often quoting relevant song lyrics or playing an appropriate melody in both social and musical settings" (Daniels, 2002, p. 87). Inserting quotes from tunes in improvised solos is a common feature among many improvisers. The use of hymn quotes in order to convey a spiritual feeling has been touched upon; in a contrasting vein, Charlie Parker allegedly used the melody "You go to my head", "the unofficial theme song of oral eroticists", as a "vehicle for coded messages [...] to women with whom he was having affairs" (Russell, 1972, p. 245).

On a more general level, Beeson (1990) maintains that "jazz 'tells a story' about itself; self-reflectivity is an integral part of the game" (p. 1). In his brief but groundbreaking article on the phenomenology of jazz, Pike (1974) points to the importance of memory in jazz improvisation: "Although creative jazz experience is direct, it involves expectations and some form of memory. The improviser is aware of earlier parts of his performance while he is producing the immediate, and his progress is spurred by his previous musical experience as well" (p. 89). Pike accordingly emphasizes the importance of prior knowledge to the work of the jazz improviser: inventions "emerge from", are "determined by", and are "logically related to" what was already known; "The new is rooted in the old" (p. 91). Relating this line of thinking to the concept of musical style, Alperson (2010) distinguishes between the kinds of improvisation that are "*intra-stylistic*" (within a style) and those that are "*inter-stylistic*" (juxtaposing one style with another) (p. 276). Both those improvisations that are played within a given style and those that cross stylistic borders could arguably be seen as instances of Signifyin(g), only on different levels (cf. 2.2.5 and 3.1.4).

Berliner (1994) maintains that for the jazz improviser, the meaning of a specific composition lies not only in the composition itself ("a piece's precise mood", p. 203) but also, to a significant degree, in its performance history: "the vibrancy of the human connections that inhabit the piece [...] Such varied imagery informs and deepens every story in the telling. In a sense, each solo is like a tale within a tale, a personal account with ties of varying strength to the formal composition" (pp. 204–205). The creation of meaning by virtue of relation to other texts is often referred to in literary theory as intertextuality. Applying this concept to jazz, Beeson (1990) briefly outlines the notion of *inter-texture-ality* ("intertextuality", p. 4), and Monson (1996) develops the idea of *intermusicality*: the improvisational process includes "interacting through music both in time and over time" (p. 129). Intermusical relationships are far from confined to direct musical quotation; indeed, excessive use of strict imitation has been referred to by musicians as the "parrot school of jazz" (Berliner, 1994, p. 390). Instead, such relationships can consist, for example, of

allusions to a particular solo, groove, or individual sound; Monson discusses at length a number of recorded examples of "musical irony" (pp. 106–125).

A well-known dilemma of improvisation is connected with the improviser's double quest for tradition as well as invention, the past as well as the future, the known as well as the unknown: "In one of the great ironies associated with improvisation, as soon as artists complete the rigorous practice required to place a vocabulary pattern into their larger store, they must guard against its habituated and uninspired use" (Berliner, 1994, p. 206). Oakland (1998) points out that "an important component of remembering is *forgetting*" (p. 14).

The dynamic interplay between tradition and innovation, between organisation and spontaneity, continues to be crucial to much discourse on jazz improvisation. It has often been argued that the greatness of iconic jazz improvisers such as Louis Armstrong, Charlie Parker, and John Coltrane lies in their ability to transform the tradition from within: to develop a synthesis of established conventions and individual expression (Berliner, 1994; Martin, 2002). In the words of Berliner (1994),

a soloist's most salient experiences in the heat of performance involve poetic leaps of the imagination to phrases that are unrelated, or only minimally related, to the storehouse. (pp. 216–217)

Oakland (1998) discusses how collective memory of past musical events will assist in binding a group such as the jazz community together: "without a group sharing common memories of past musical events, the improviser's 'stories' will fall upon ears which cannot comprehend them because the listener cannot relate to past performances" (p. 14). A similar requirement ("a context that is at least partially shared") is put forward by Monson (1996, p. 127).

According to Oakland (1998), this collective memory of the jazz community is kept alive "through the genre's self-referentiality manifested in the improvisatory performances of the present" (p. 16). Further, part of it "is constantly creating 'new' past musical events that may find a place in the larger community's memory" (p. 17).

### 2.2.7. Conversation

If jazz improvisations, then, are essentially *communicative*, there is little doubt that even though we often speak of them as solos, most improvisations are also the results of *collective* efforts. Sawyer (1992) points to the fact that improvisational interaction takes place in real time, here and now:

This synchronic nature of interaction during group improvisation is distinct from the type of social interaction which occurs over time in compositional

creative fields. The real time nature of the interaction within the creative group is a distinguishing feature of improvisational creativity. (p. 256)

According to Sawyer (1996), "jazz *requires* each performer to offer something new at each point, ideally something which is suggestive to the other performers" (p. 292). Alperson (2010) remarks that in jazz improvisation contexts there are "social protocols that pertain to the performance of improvisation in groups [...] In general, one strives for a group dynamic that keeps the conversation going" (p. 277).

Bastien and Hostager (1988) insist that jazz is a social, collective activity: "the great contributions to [jazz ...] were realized in a social and professional context"; "jazz is inherently and fundamentally a collective activity" (p. 599). Fischlin and Heble (2004) agree that musical improvisation is always a social practice: "musical practices in which improvisation is a defining characteristic are social practices" (p. 11; original emphasis).

From several points of view, then, it would be a mistake to equate improviser and soloist. Firstly, not only the 'soloist' improvises; arguably, much of the ongoing activity in a jazz group is improvisatory. Secondly, much jazz includes interesting dynamics between the individual and the collective. Gioia (1988) points out that while the history of jazz to a large extent has been a development towards individual, soloistic virtuosity, this is far from its only important tendency. Gioia puts forward the work of Jelly Rolly Morton, King Oliver, Duke Ellington, Gil Evans, and John Lewis as examples of the ideal of "a coherent group in which the soloist was subservient" to the composition and/or the ensemble (p. 96).

Liebman (1996) emphasizes the need for a *multidirectionality* in the improviser's attention: "I stress in my teaching the act of looking outward at the same time that you are looking inward to find your own expressive way" (p. 159). The collective direction in improvised jazz music is described by Becker (2000) as a force which can be perceived as large and rather independent:

at every moment everyone (or almost everyone) involved in the improvisation is offering suggestions as to what might be done next [...] The players thus develop a collective direction that characteristically – as though the participants had all read Emile Durkheim – feels larger than any of them, as though it had a life of its own. It feels as though, instead of them playing the music, the music, Zen-like, is playing them. (p. 172)

Interestingly, collective interplay between jazz musicians seems to prevail in verbal as well as in musical interaction. In order to access musical group identity in jazz musicians, Wilson and MacDonald (2005) conducted focus group interviews where the implications of being a jazz musician were seen to be "actively formulated in the conversational interaction of these musicians": "Rather than being an objective

configuration of the qualities of a 'good' improviser, the identity was enacted as a project through dialogue in the particular social context of a focus group" (p. 357).

Monson (1996) studies the conversation metaphor used by many jazz musicians; apart from pointing to structural analogies between music and language, it "emphasizes the sociability of jazz performance" (p. 97). Solos being collective may seem like a contradiction in terms – the collective improvisations of early jazz left aside. Still, it seems to be widely agreed that a solo improvisation in an ensemble, with few exceptions, is best understood as an interactional process.

Such interaction is not restricted to the musical group. Small (1987) points to the interaction between musicians and dancers; in the words of Lester Young, "The rhythm of the dancers comes back to you when you're playing" (p. 305). A dancer at the Savoy Ballroom in Harlem remarks on Dizzy Gillespie's trumpet solos in 1937: "Every time he played a crazy lick, we cut a crazy step to go with it. And he dug us and blew even crazier stuff to see if we could dance to it, a kind of game, with the musicians and the dancers challenging each other" (p. 305).

It should be noted, though, that Lester Young, in some respects, seems to have shown comparatively little interest in such give and take, at least regarding harmony: he reportedly exhorted his pianists to "just play vanilla", meaning to keep the accompaniment simple and neutral (Sudhalter, 1999, p. 638). However, several studies confirm that in the view of many performers, jazz improvisation largely depends on interaction and dialogue. Commenting on this kind of "give and take" interplay, Berliner (1994) observes that "interesting ideas that originate in any part can influence others" (p. 358). Iyer (2004) uses the term "sustained antiphony" to designate the dialogical process in jazz improvisation, "the interactive format, process, and feeling of conversational engagement" typical of the musicians' collective activity (p. 394).

In an early attempt to approach the phenomenon of collective interactivity in jazz analytically, Rinzler (1988) lists a number of common musical interactions in jazz performance: call and response; fills; marking structural boundaries through "accenting the end of formal units" such as a chorus or a phrase; and supporting the soloist's level of intensity. Commenting on Rinzler's list, Hodson (2007) argues that the interaction of jazz musicians should be regarded not as "isolated techniques" but as "something more elemental" (p. 22). While it may manifest itself in the phenomena listed by Rinzler, it may also involve "much subtler kinds of interactions"; "anything played by any member of the ensemble can potentially have an effect on any other member of the ensemble" (p. 22). Furthermore, Hodson states that

an analysis of an individual musician's improvisation that fails to consider the simultaneously improvised parts of the other members of a small jazz group is missing something essential. (p. 178)

This kind of musical interactivity has been the object of thorough empirical in-depth studies by Monson (1996) and Reinholdsson (1998). Monson interprets language metaphors commonly used by musicians as indications of the importance of improvisational interaction:

a good player communicates with the other players in the band. If this doesn't happen, it's not good jazz. The importance of communicativeness and the ability to hear is underscored by another type of language metaphor used by musicians: 'to say' or 'to talk' often substitutes for 'to play.' (p. 84)

While African American literature studies regarding the concept of Signifyin(g) have tended to focus on the intertextuality of texts with a single author, Monson points to the musical framework of Signifyin(g): it "developed from interactive, turn-taking games and genres that are multiply authored" (p. 87). Indeed, Floyd (1991) interprets the element of "swing" in African American music as Signifyin(g) "on the time-line" (p. 273). Monson further stresses the fact that this kind of give and take is held in high esteem by jazz practitioners: "such moments are often cited by musicians as aesthetic high points of performances. The indivisibility of musical and interpersonal interaction underscores the problem of thinking of jazz improvisation as text" (p. 80).

A concept of coherence seems applicable to the conversational view of jazz improvisation as well, according to Berliner (1994): "In their response to other players, musicians typically seek to preserve a general continuity of mood" (p. 368). Some analyses of jazz improvisation have taken into the picture the conversational maxims and the cooperative principle put forward by the linguistic philosopher H. Paul Grice (1989). For example, Davis (2005) concludes: "the process of jazz improvisation, similar to Grice's principles in language, depends significantly on maxims, context, and background knowledge" (p. 3).

### 2.2.8. Linearity and temporality

Improvising means inventing music on the spot, without the composer's possibility to stop and reflect. In the light of the storytelling metaphor, this raises interesting questions about linearity and temporality. As Berliner (1994) spells out, one important side of instant musical invention will include "constant revelations" on the part of the performer: "So that's how you can get from here to there!" (p. 218).

Generally speaking, the relationships between concepts such as time, linearity, and music must be of interest to anyone trying to understand the possibility of narrative in music. Notably, the view of time as a linear process is in itself by no means a timeless, overall view; before the 18th century, time was rather perceived as static or cyclic; spatial, even. When this way of perceiving time is gradually replaced by a view of time as a process characterized by a forward directionality, expectations regarding

the future will change significantly as a consequence: what is expected will be the emergence of something new, not the recurrence of something old (Koselleck, 1979/2004). It may well be argued that both these outlooks prevail in the performance of music, since music is a construct in which we have cyclic forms such as  $A_1$ – $B$ – $A_2$ . And in many cases,  $A_2$  will be 'identical' to  $A_1$ , i.e., the recurrence of something old. It may equally well be argued, however, that even in those cases where  $A_2$  is 'identical' to  $A_1$ , our experience of  $A_2$  will be different than that of  $A_1$ , because *we* are not the same anymore; we have experienced  $B$  in between. This, one might contend, is the technology and psychology of the refrain.

Kramer (1988) maintains that "virtually all Western music [...] is linear to a significant extent"; its "quintessential expression" is tonality (p. 23). He describes musical linearity as *processive*, "a complex web of constantly changing implications (in the music) and expectations (of the listener)"; and he defines it as "the determination of some characteristic(s) of music in accordance with implications that arise from earlier events of the piece" (p. 20). A musical event may be "implied by events that far precedes it"; therefore, linearity does not depend on continuity (p. 21).

On the other hand, in non-linearity these implications arise from "principles or tendencies governing an entire piece or section"; since its principles do not develop "from earlier events or tendencies" – though they "may be revealed gradually" – non-linearity is described by Kramer (1988) as *nonprocessive* (pp. 20–21). The first non-linear European compositions were clearly influenced by music from a totally different (Japanese) culture, he points out, referring to Debussy's music with its "extended moments of pure sonority, events that are to be appreciated more for themselves than for their role in linear progressions" (p. 44).

The dynamics of linearity and non-linearity comes forward as an interesting perspective on jazz improvisation. This perspective may also be explored, of course, in relation to that of other art forms, for instance, literature. Sometimes an author is led by what seems to be the independent life of the story's characters. According to Berliner (1994), something similar is often experienced by the jazz improviser; there is a "paradoxical relationship between musical actions calling for a passive performance posture and others calling for precise artistic control [...] Artists in many fields experience a creative tension when they explore new lines of thought" (p. 219).

The relationship between improvisation and composition is discussed by Sarath (1996) from the viewpoint of temporal perception. He calls attention to the fact that the compositional process includes possibilities to stop and reflect upon the past at length in a way that is impossible in improvisation. On the other hand, Sarath assumes "that the improviser experiences time in an inner-directed or 'vertical' manner, where the present is heightened and the past and future are perceptually subordinated" (p. 1).

Sarath (1996) expands on this "heightened conception" in the improviser: "The link between temporal conception and state of consciousness is critical [...]. Temporal associations may be thought of as indicators of awareness state. In ordinary



consciousness [...] time is experienced largely as a localized past-present-future sequence [...]. When the improviser deconstructs such relationships, he or she neutralizes the logic patterns which bind awareness to its ordinary state" (pp. 14–15).

Liebman (1996) also points to the importance of the present moment to jazz improvisation:

I think a central philosophical aspect of the art of improvisation is strongly related to the Tao or Zen concept of being in present time as much as possible; neither the past nor the future should interfere with living fully in the moment.  
(p. 33)

Expanding on this issue, Liebman (1996) terms this aspect of improvising "the truth factor"; "it focuses reality" since improvisers "are definitely in present time" (p. 159).

However, much improvised music will involve underlying, pre-established formats (termed "referent" in Pressing, 1987), such as harmonic-rhythmic framework in jazz. Such structures may certainly call for the improviser's awareness of past–future dimensions. Kühl (2003) points to certain limitations of the jazz improviser's liberty; at least in certain stylistic frameworks, s/he must submit to a given metric/harmonic topography. "If the heroine does not go to a ball at the royal castle, then it is not the story of Cinderella. If there is no E-flat major chord in the ninth measure, then it is not 'How high the moon'" (pp. 64–65; my translation). As noted above (2.2.3) the chord progressions of standard jazz repertoire may be seen as providing "a guarantee of coherence" (Kernfeld, 1995, p. 145) – or as "a set of constraints" without which (as in modal jazz, or in free jazz) musical interaction is increased and intensified (Hodson, 2007, p. 174).

This kind of awareness of past–future dimensions, in turn, would seem to imply some sort of conflict with the intensification of the present assumed by Sarath (1996). Sarath's solution to this problem is the supposition that the musician's powers are twofold: "the capacity for the improviser to conceive of the referent both in a moment-to-moment manner, and as a teleological (past-present-future) structure" (p. 19).

It is my distinct impression that this suggestion by Sarath captures a decisive feature in jazz improvisation and its storytelling capacity. During the course of this investigation, I will return several times to the combination of, on one hand, the improviser's intensified presence in the moment and, on the other, her relation to temporal structures. In particular, a theoretical framework selected in order to deal with these questions is presented in subsection 3.1.1: it makes use of a crucial part of Paul Ricoeur's theory of narrative with reference to Saint Augustine.

## TRIAL AND ERROR

The question of the harmonic framework's influence on the improviser's storytelling has another side to it as well. There are hardly any prescriptive chord/scale relationships in modern jazz; given the complexity of harmony, a certain note can no longer be defined as "right" or "wrong". In his analysis of the choices of notes in transcribed solos by three alto saxophonists (Parker, Dolphy, Braxton), Schwartz (1996) concludes: "In bebop, the logic of harmony is carried to a limit where it can no longer dictate what is played, but harmony is not abandoned. Indeed, it is more important than ever." Sarath (1996) agrees with Schwartz that "while the jazz format specifies that particular rhythmic and harmonic parameters shall hold at certain times, any given parameter may be realized in a virtually infinite variety of ways"; "[t]hus the possibilities for invention while still upholding a chord sequence are virtually unlimited" (pp. 20–21).

According to Pike (1974), when bringing an image or idea into being, a jazz soloist is "instantaneously grasping [...] its developmental possibilities by *prevision*" (p. 89). Berliner (1994) applies this notion of prevision to musical group interaction as well, stating that "[t]he exceptional state of communication artists describe sometimes allows them to [...] anticipate [...] the progress of another person's musical thoughts" (p. 390). However, there is yet another side to the question of the linearity of improvisational narratives, which has to do with the importance of misfires. Pike also touches briefly upon this field: "Even those seemingly disassociated ideas which sometimes take overt shape as 'wrong notes' or 'clinkers' are made relevant to the whole by positive repetition and assimilation into the jazz context" (p. 90). Pike clearly considers a kind of systematic trial and error process to be of importance in the jazz improviser's elaboration of musical ideas: "This trial and error is not blind. It is guided by goals and is methodical rather than erratic" (p. 91).

Sawyer (1992) points to the advantages of making mistakes; while jazz musicians might feel the need to develop ideas in advance, they are also aware that their playing may thereby run the risk of evolving towards rigid patterns. Mistakes, therefore, could be of great value; they could interrupt the prearranged ideas and force invention. One musician in Sawyer's interview study certified that "if you reach that point, it would be freeing, to free your ears to play a note that normally wouldn't belong there" (p. 260).

The question of musical mistakes and saves is much expanded on by Berliner (1994). He devotes a quite large section of his chapter on storytelling to the influences that musical mistakes may exert on the story being told. Thus, his informants dive into "the unpredictable relationship between the musical materials they have mastered for their large store and the actual ideas that occur to them during solos" (p. 205). They reveal strategies to "address even the most 'horrible accident' successfully", as for example "saving the situation with a chromatic movement", or different strategies to cope with "unintentional rhythmic displacement" (p. 211). A

word of advice from Dizzy Gillespie is quoted approvingly: "When you make a mistake, make a loud one" (p. 212).

"Saving the situation" may put the improvising musician to severe tests regarding both imagination and technique. In the words of Berliner (1994), the musician must possess "the imagination to conceive an instant solution in the face of error and the technical control to implement it" (p. 215); "[i]t is in dramatic movements from formerly mastered phrases to unrehearsed patterns [...] that improvisers typically push the limits of their artistry" (p. 217). These requirements seem to corroborate convincingly the assumption by Sarath (1996) of the intensification of the present in the improviser.

### *NOT THINKING IN JAZZ*

Cooke (2002) quotes Duke Ellington's views on how musical intent must rely in some sense on preceding thought and preparation: "there has to be some thought preceding each phrase, otherwise it is meaningless"; "Anyone who plays anything worth hearing knows what he's going to play, no matter whether he prepares a day ahead or a beat ahead. It has to be with intent" (p. 155). The view that the jazz improviser has a clear and rather detailed idea of the solo when beginning it is not uncommon; Gushee (1991) terms this a "rhetorical plan" (p. 250).

Discourse on improvisation has often tended to focus on the thoughts of the improviser, manifested in the title of Berliner's (1994) unsurpassed ethnographic study: *Thinking in jazz*. There may be several reasons to also approach jazz improvisation with a broader or alternative outlook. Firstly, as Johnson (2002) points out, there is one obvious link between musical phraseology and purely physical aspects of improvisation:

A musician's improvisational motifs will depend, among many other things, upon fingering sequences that have been habitualised in a particular key. [...] The relationship between cognitive and physical control in jazz performance is far too complex to be able to mythologise romantically the priority of the cognitive. (p. 106)

Secondly, conscious control is not necessarily a prerequisite for all good jazz solos. Some theorists point to the importance of *not* thinking when you improvise. Sawyer (1992), summing up results of his interviews with jazz musicians, finds that they

believe that their solos are better when they are minimally conscious. [...] There is a constant tension between fully conscious and fully nonconscious performance, and each musician must continuously resolve this tension to achieve a balance appropriate to the moment. (p. 257)

Interviewed by Bailey (1993), the British jazz saxophonist Ronnie Scott describes high quality in improvisation as a matter of becoming unconscious of playing:

as if something else has taken over and you're just an intermediary between whatever else and the instrument and everything you try seems to come off [...] when this happens – inspiration – duende – whatever you like to call it – a happy conjunction of conditions and events and middle attitudes – it will feel good. (p. 52)

Arguably, a suitable balance of thought and emotion may be favourable. The reed player Yusef Lateef (1970) in his spiritual principles of improvisation interprets the requirement that a jazz improviser should "say something" as a requirement of "a proper balance of thinking and feeling" (p. 5). Lateef rejects the word "jazz", preferring the term "autophysiopsychic music". In his opinion, a definition of jazz as the product of emotion is too narrow: "The point is that the skilled improviser is not just a mechanical, emotional dispenser but an interpretive artist creating organically" (p. 6). Lateef points to *emotional memory* as a "vital tool" in improvisation: it allows the musician to use a "highly emotional experience" to produce a musical expression of feeling in the present moment. To do this, he argues, involves not only the musician's emotions but the intellect and physical skills as well: "not only to recall his feelings but, to analyze and understand" (p. 6). According to Lateef, improvisation also depends on another kind of balance, or harmony, namely, between musicians and audience:

Improvisation [!] allows the performer to deliver his message or say what he has to say musically. With his soul attuned to other souls he is capable of giving deep and far reaching experiences. If the improviser is in harmony with himself and fellowmen, he too, will reach great spiritual heights with the tools he uses to improvise. (p. 3)

According to Borgo (2004a), the notion of improvisational freedom must not be restricted to rights and responsibilities of individual performers or even of groups. Indeed, certain aspects of improvisation seem to evade the musician's control as well as the analyst's. On another note, Borgo points to experiences of spiritual, ecstatic, or trance-like performance states described by several free improvisers, ranging from "total mental involvement" to "complete annihilation of all critical and rational faculties" as well as "spirit possession" and "a voluntary, self-induced form of trance – more akin to shamanic practices" (p. 175).

### 2.2.9. Sound and embodiment

The many "telling effects" that musicians achieve, mentioned above with reference to Floyd (1991, p. 277; cf. subsection 2.2.4), naturally depend largely on instrumental sound. Lewis (1996) insists that "[p]art of telling your story is developing your own 'sound'" (p. 117). Notably, though, Liebman (1996) contends that "the interpretations of a musical sound are as varied and numerous as the number of people listening" (p. 101).

Gioia (2011) finds "obsession with sound" essential to "the New Orleans revolution in music" (p. 48). He quotes Joe "King" Oliver, who claimed to have spent ten years refining his cornet tone, on the subject of tone production:

See how many ways you can play that note – growl it, smear it, flat it, sharp it, do anything you want to it. That's how you express your feelings in this music. It's like talking. (p. 48)

The quest for personal sound prompted inventiveness. The trumpeter Herman Autrey, speaking of sauerkraut cans, felt hats, and other devices, as the origins of brass mutes, remarks: "We used water glasses, cuspidors, everything, because everyone was looking for a different sound" (Crow, 2005, p. 31).

Gioia (1988) remarks that this focus on sound was in fact a major development in the history of music: "Such music [as that of King Oliver, Sidney Bechet, and Louis Armstrong] possessed a warmth and human sound previously found only in vocal music" (p. 139).

The word "sound" has tended to take on a broad meaning in jazz discourse. According to Iyer (2004), the highly valued personal "sound" of individual musicians means "not only timbre, but also articulation, phrasing, rhythm, melodic vocabulary, and even analytical methods [...] a sort of 'personality' or 'character' that distinguishes different improvisers" (p. 399). Iyer quotes Cecil Taylor's appraisal of John Coltrane with its manifest link between sound and storytelling: "his tone is beautiful because it is functional. In other words, it is always involved in saying something" (p. 400).

Iyer (2004) argues that establishing structure in terms of motivic development will consequently not be enough to describe the meaning in Coltrane's improvisations: "structure is merely a consequence of a greater formation – Coltrane's 'sound', his holistic approach to music" (p. 400).

Iyer (2004) quotes a section of dialogue from the outtakes to John Coltrane's "Giant steps". In this composition, Gioia (1988) finds "a level of complexity that was almost perverse in the demands it made on the soloist" (p. 60). During a studio rehearsal of the piece with its difficult chord sequence ("changes"), Coltrane can be heard saying: "I ain't goin be tellin no story... Like... tellin them *black* stories." Colleague: "Shoot. Really, you make the changes, *that'll* tell 'em a story." Coltrane:

"You think the changes're the story! [...] I don't want to tell no lies on 'em." Colleague: "The changes *themselves* is *some* kind of story (man I'm tellin you)" (Iyer, 2004, p. 394). Iyer (2004) speculates that for Coltrane "telling musical lies might have meant playing in an overly self-conscious, premeditated, or constructed fashion that rang false to his ears" (p. 395). In Iyer's interpretation, Coltrane's colleague "means to locate the kind of narrativity his leader seeks" not only "on" the music but also "precisely 'in' the moment-to-moment act of making the changes" (p. 395).

The Swedish pianist Per Henrik Wallin refused to view technical skills as a goal in itself; rather, technique is a means to express yourself, he insisted:

I'm not sure that Oscar Peterson has technique. [...] You don't really know who he is. Technique is not to play fast, but to have exactly the right technique for a certain expression. Technique is to get nearer to your own expressions, to be able to show one's hand instantly. Concentration is more difficult than brilliant runs. (Glanzelius, 1983, p. 4; my translation)

In his apology for an "embodied view of music", Iyer (2004) brings attention to the fact that musical motion is audible human motion, and he points out that different examples of bodily activities occur at different timescales. Breathing, walking, and speaking correspond rhythmically to different musical correlates (for example, harmonic rhythm, dance rhythm, bebop melodies, respectively). According to Iyer, the embodied view of music

facilitates a nonlinear approach to musical narrative. Musical meaning is not conveyed only through motific development, melodic contour, and other traditional musicological parameters; it is also *embodied* in improvisatory techniques. Musicians tell their stories, but not in the traditional linear narrative sense; an *exploded narrative* is conveyed through a holistic musical personality or *attitude*. [...] Kinesthetics, performativity, personal sound, temporality – all these traces of embodiment generate, reflect, and refract stories into innumerable splinters and shards. Each one of these fragments is 'saying something.' (pp. 401–402)

The present survey of perspectives relevant to storytelling qualities in jazz improvisation has introduced a series of concepts: *coherence*, *semantics*, *rhetoric*, *intra- and extramusical memory*, *musical interactivity*, *linearity*, *temporality*, *sound*, and *embodiment*. In the following two subsections of this review of previous writings on jazz improvisation I will turn to some educational implications of the conceptual borrowing of the term storytelling, as well as to some notes on the phenomenon of metaphoricality.

## 2.2.10. The need for a pedagogy of jazz improvisational storytelling

Lewis (1996) maintains that a pedagogy with regard to improvisation is absent from what he terms the Eurological music education system. It is in this light that he views Eurological improvisation, building on "performer choice and 'intuition' systems" (p. 116). But if jazz improvisation, on the other hand, builds on storytelling, what does the jazz learner need to learn in order to tell a story when improvising? There may be no limit to the answer to this question if, as Oakland (1998) puts it, "behind each improvisational performance is a lifetime of experience which the performer utilizes" (p. 7). According to Berliner (1994), it requires "rigorous practice on the part of the jazz learner [...] to achieve such diversity of expression"; "aspiring musicians must commit endless hours to practicing improvisation [...] if they are to acquire the cumulative experience upon which effective storytelling rests" (p. 205).

Such rigorous requirements notwithstanding, certain areas may seem especially suited for pedagogy. For instance, creative *structure* lends itself to educational endeavours. Of the many informed pieces of advice collected by Berliner (1994) about the constructional layout of a jazz improvisation, a few words on solo strategy by the bassist Buster Williams may serve as an example: "start from the beginning [...] like a game of chess"; "the use of space is very important – sparseness and simplicity" (p. 201). From a structural point of view, Berliner also emphasizes the need for both repetition and development, and he points to two major challenges for the storytelling improviser: "making the changes", that is, being able to relate logically to the music's harmonical development, as well as "placing the ball", meaning the ability to express ideas "thematically and rhythmically" (pp. 262–264).

Similarly, aspects of *sound* will make an advantageous object of pedagogy: "Crucial to the creation of a personal sound is the development of analytic skill on the part of the improviser" (Lewis, 1996, p. 117).

However, even the most well-wrought pedagogies in these areas will probably not be able to free themselves completely from the narrow and formulaic. Educators will be wise to realize that the ground-breaking potentialities of jazz lie beyond the boundaries of sets of concepts such as structure and sound. In the words of Schwartz (1996), "[i]mprovisation becomes a merely formal exercise if it is conceived as happening within borders instead of on them". In section 3.4, educational perspectives on jazz improvisation will be discussed extensively.

## 2.2.11. Metaphoricity

Let us conclude this survey by returning to our point of departure: the linguistic metaphor. According to Monson (1996), jazz musicians "often prefer metaphorical description" to theoretical analysis (p. 93); for example, one type of metaphor uses the term language to mean "musical style and syntax" (p. 85).

From one analytical standpoint, what goes on inside the brain when playing is in some ways similar to what goes on inside the brain when talking. Delving into "The Improviser's World of Consciousness", Berliner (1994) once again returns to the storytelling metaphor: "improvisers constantly strive to put their thoughts together in different ways, going over old ground in search of new. The activity is much like creative thinking in language, in which the routine process is largely devoted to rethinking" (p. 216).

From another analytical point of view, what comes out when playing is in some ways similar to what comes out when talking. Spontaneous speech seems to have a creative component comparable to musical improvisation. It is characterized by pauses, repeats, false starts, and delaying syllables. Pauses and repeats (at least) can presumably also be seen as indicative of real-time cognitive processing limitations in musical improvisation (Pressing, 1987).

However, Schwartz (1996) laments that "[t]he language metaphor has not been sufficiently examined". In his opinion, there is reason to regret this: "The dominance of the Chomskian linguistic model in jazz studies promotes the study of players whose work fits well with the model, and encourages student musicians to develop in similar ways, both of which fit well with the thriving neo-conservative movement in jazz."

Interestingly, a couple of the strongest statements regarding this kind of linguistic metaphors during recent years come from two practicing musicians who are also jazz theorists. They argue along rather different lines. The Indian American jazz pianist Vijay Iyer seems to accept the storytelling metaphor but advocates a *radically new understanding of the metaphor* (which he terms "exploding the narrative"; Iyer, 2004). On the other hand, the Norwegian jazz pianist Tord Gustavsen comes forward as a proponent of *radically different metaphors* (Gustavsen, 1998; 1999).

In the first sentences of his article, Iyer (2004) rather seems to take the storytelling metaphor for granted: "*Tell a story*. This oft-repeated directive for an improvised solo has become a cliché of jazz musicology. Its validity is unarguable" (p. 393). It is easy to agree that the vast body of statements by jazz musicians (as well as jazz analysts) will indicate the "validity" of the storytelling metaphor. However, it is also interesting to notice that Iyer avoids the term 'metaphor' altogether, using in its place words of a slightly different tenor: "directive" and "cliché", respectively.

The new understanding of the storytelling metaphor which Iyer (2004) advocates is summarized thus:

I propose that the story that an improviser tells does not unfold merely in the overall form of a 'coherent' solo, nor simply in antiphonal structures, but also in the microscopic musical details, as well as in the inherent structure of the performance itself. The story dwells not just in one solo at a time, but also in a single note, and equally in an entire lifetime of improvisations. In short, the story is revealed not as a simple linear narrative, but as a fractured, exploded one. (p. 395)



Gustavsen (1999), on the other hand, advocates "the need for metaphoric multiplicity", for a greater variety of perspectives in jazz studies:

I feel that there is something important missing when the linear aspects of the music [are] always brought to the front, and when one is always looking for some kind of 'semantics' in an improvisation. [...] I favor a multiplicity of metaphors and approaches, [...] switching between macro and micro levels, [...] switching eclectically between different kinds of focuses as to what qualities in the music we are 'zooming in' on. A greater variety of metaphors in jazz studies would also help make this branch of musicology more compatible with the many-flavored reality we are actually studying. (p. 5)

Gustavsen's own contributions to greater metaphorical variety in this field are highly impressive and interesting, consisting mainly of five "polarities" or "dialectical challenges" drawn from psycho-dynamic theory: moment *vs.* duration, difference *vs.* sameness, gratification *vs.* frustration, stimulation *vs.* stabilization, and closeness *vs.* distance (Gustavsen, 1998; 1999).

Monson (1996) points to the fact that while most jazz musicians are well acquainted with the analytical tools of music theory, they often "prefer metaphorical description for its ability to convey the more intangible social and aesthetic dimensions of music making. [...] There is nothing inarticulate or analytically vague about these statements; metaphorical images are in many cases more communicative than ordinary analytical language" (p. 93). While I think that the overview carried out in section 2.2 shows that there are indeed both ambiguities and an overwhelming richness connected with the storytelling metaphor which give good cause for further investigation, I do believe that Monson makes a very important point in arguing that any metaphoric association implies a metonymic (part-to-whole) relationship: "a metaphor (such as 'improvisation is conversation') links cultural domains by selecting an attribute in one domain (improvisation as part of music) similar to an attribute from another (conversation as part of language)" (p. 76).

Schippers (2006) argues that the use of metaphor in music educational practices has great potential as a teaching tool for communicating an understanding of music-making. He admits that, on one hand, metaphors may amount to nothing more than worn clichés and that, on the other, the references they evoke may be too obscure. In any of these cases, they are of little use to the learner. However, the creative metaphor may evoke a useful musical imagery. In conclusion, Schippers points at the need for multifaceted further investigation: "We have too little understanding of the present use of metaphorical language, the importance of receptivity to metaphor in learners, and the skills of teachers in finding the right metaphor for the right student at the right time in the right situation" (p. 214).

In brief, a metaphor is chosen to denote something, but not everything. Asking those who use it what they mean by it may help clear things up. Indeed, Berliner

(1994) does seem to offer a similar translation of sorts, when he sums up some of the "various skills" that are essential to the jazz improviser: "mastery over expressivity, over the shaping and pacing of ideas, and over any referential meanings that musical patterns have acquired in the jazz tradition"; and he maintains that "[i]mprovisers illuminate these principles with perhaps the richest of their language metaphors, storytelling" (p. 200).

However, in spite of the imposing empirical work of Berliner and others, it seems to me that the brief summary quoted does not necessarily cover all aspects of interest in the field of jazz improvisation as storytelling.

Many have commented on the phenomenon that metaphors that have been in use for some time become worn out. For instance, Friedrich Nietzsche states (in *On truth and lies in a nonmoral sense [Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinn]*, 1873):

Truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions – they are metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins.

Not only can metaphors become worn; they may also entail habitual seeing, thinking in grooves. In the view of Barthes (1975/1989), all words tend to drag with them all that which has already been said and intended. In order to avoid such routine, Barthes contends, we need a shock to strip words of their heavy naturalness, to make us perceive the old and familiar as historically contingent. He points to Bertolt Brecht as an expert at this kind of linguistic shock. Barthes himself employs a shocking image of Japanese bell-pins to make Brecht's mastery clear; Brecht's method, Barthes argues, was to transform

the logosphere by leaving the bell-headed pins in it, the signs furbished with their tiny jingle: thus, when we hear a certain language, we never forget where it comes from, how it was made: the shock is a *reproduction*: not an imitation, but a production that has been disconnected, displaced: *which makes noise*. Hence, better than a semiology, what Brecht leaves us with is a seismology. (Barthes, 1975/1989, p. 214)

The point of this shock is surprise: to make us wonder, to make us see things in new ways, to make us avoid the habitual thinking that metaphor may entail.

Not everyone might agree, however, that the storytelling metaphor carries a potential of linguistic shock; indeed, its very focus on a linguistic phenomenon may be perceived as an unfavourable restraint on the metaphor's power. Commenting on jazz music's usage of the storytelling and conversation metaphors in relation to the metaphors of writing and discourse in poststructural thinking, Monson (1996)

objects to language being perceived as the "general model of relationality". She reminds us that "metaphors placing language at the center of the universe [...] may or may not be fully applicable to non-linguistic phenomena such as music" (p. 209).

Maybe, however, also a common metaphor that has been in use for quite some time could still possess the power of constant surprise, as it were. When we speak of storytelling in jazz improvisation we may have, I believe, an example of this. To begin with, it could be argued that this usage includes a riddle: how do you tell stories without words? Answers that have been provided to the question what it means to tell stories in jazz improvisation include, as we have seen throughout this chapter, a large number of different aspects regarding, among other things, coherence, semantics, rhetoric, intra- and extra-musical memory, musical interactivity, linearity, temporality, sound, and embodiment. I view, therefore, the concept of storytelling in jazz improvisation as a *rich intermedial metaphor*, and I believe that further investigations of the meanings ascribed to this concept, far from being dead meat, may present things of interest from artistic as well as educational points of view. Following the line of discussion introduced in Chapter 1, I find the prospect of carrying out such investigations with Scandinavian informants particularly promising.

## 2.3. Aim of study and research questions

It will be clear from the previous section that the borrowed concept of storytelling is not used with exactly the same meanings in the field of jazz improvisation as elsewhere.

The aim of this investigation is to clarify the ways in which this concept is used by Swedish jazz practitioners.

In order to achieve this, I shall attempt to answer the following research questions.

- (1) How do Swedish practitioners in the field of jazz improvisation view and use the term storytelling in connection with the jazz improviser's craft?
- (2) What meaning(s) do they ascribe to this term?
- (3) What are the artistic and educational implications, if any, of this conceptual loan?

In order to pursue this task, a number of theoretical and methodological considerations are called for. These are the subject of the following two chapters.

# Theoretical framework

This chapter presents the theoretical framework of the study. Before proceeding to its diverse components, one distinction, in the interest of clarity, stands out as particularly important. This distinction relates closely to the distinction between discourse *in* music and discourse *on* music (Folkestad, 1996; K. Johansson, 2008). The title of this thesis is *Storytelling in jazz improvisation*. There are, however, several layers of storytelling in this context. (i) In a sense, the *phenomenon* that underlies this study may in itself be quite inaccessible to research, at least to research of the present direction; this phenomenon is jazz improvisers' storytelling (through the medium of musical instruments) *in* jazz improvisation. (ii) My *research aim* and my means of study, on the other hand, regard something else, another layer, as it were: how these improvisers perceive and express themselves verbally *about* this kind of musical storytelling. This could be called the jazz improvisers' storytelling (through the medium of language) *about* jazz improvisation, or, more exactly: *about* storytelling *in* jazz improvisation. (iii) Finally, my *research results*, the way I communicate them in this thesis, and the response to them from readers and other researchers, constitute an additional number of layers of storytelling: namely, what could be called the researcher's (i.e., my own) storytelling *about* the jazz improvisers' storytelling *about* storytelling *in* jazz improvisation; as well as the research community's (or other readers') storytelling *about* my own storytelling *about* jazz improvisers' storytelling *about* storytelling *in* jazz improvisation.

The word storytelling in itself is not a complicated one; but the way we employ it in several different contexts may run the risk of blurring matters. My intention in this study is to try to find out what jazz improvisers have to *say about storytelling* in music – not to find out what they say in music (i.e., what they *play when storytelling*).

Then again, distinguishing between storytelling through the medium of musical instruments and through the medium of language may seem like begging the question, if you adhere to the argument (made by several theorists presented in the following sections) that music can tell no stories. My point in making this distinction is, however, merely to articulate my wish to lay bare different layers of reference that the expression "storytelling in jazz improvisation" may contain. In the concluding remarks (in subsection 3.1.3) to the discussion of theories on music and narrativity, I

will advocate an interpretive stance towards the concept storytelling, when employed within the context in question in this study, that does *not* concur uncritically with all aspects of how narrativity traditionally has been understood.

In order to arrive at an interpretive stance, however, it will be necessary to examine closely several *theories of narrativity*. The present investigation sets out to study how the concept of storytelling is used on away ground, as it were. Before this can be done, however, this concept should be discussed, perhaps not exactly on home ground, whatever that may be, but rather on a more general level; and theoretical considerations ought to be presented regarding its applicability in the field of music. Hence, in section 3.1, I deal with theories of narrativity on a general level (3.1.1) as well as in musical contexts (3.1.2) before proceeding to a concluding evaluation of how these theories may pertain to the present study of storytelling in jazz, as well as a formulation of the interpretive stance that will, in my opinion, serve the aims of my investigation best (3.1.3). In connection with this, I consider it fruitful to proceed with a further outlook on Signifyin(g) (cf. 2.2.5), the African American rhetorical practices in jazz improvisation; this is the subject of the final part (3.1.4) of this section on theories of narrativity.

The subsequent section (3.2) offers perspectives on the phenomenon of *intermedially borrowed concepts*. Since the conceptual loan in question could arguably be seen as an instance of *conceptual metaphors* or *conceptual blending*, a number of pertinent theoretical attempts and their educational implications are made the objects of section 3.3. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 introduce a number of relevant *educational* and *sociological perspectives*, respectively.

Out of the multitude of references included in these sections, all will not – I had better clarify this strategy initially – actually serve as analytical tools in the discussion, included in Chapter 6, of the results in relation to the theoretical framework. Rather, a number of them are included here on the grounds that, in the course of constructing a relevant and applicable arsenal of theoretical tools, I need to reconnoitre several fields of vividly ongoing academic debate – musical narrativity, metaphor theory, educational perspectives of relevance to jazz learning, and sociological analyses of music and education – that are overwhelmingly rich and will eventually provide the pertinent framework for my present quest, but not without ado. Out of such conflating, conflicting, and contesting disputes I have to settle what is immediately applicable to this discussion of results and what is not. Since the actual reasons for my choices hence lie in the character and intrarelations of entire theoretical fields, comprehensive accounts are needed as explanations of my research strategy. Such parts of the theoretical infantry that eventually are not commanded into battle within the frame of the present investigation will, consolingly, most certainly prove to be in trim in related future research projects such as the ones described in Chapter 7. In the interest of clarity, transparency, and trustworthiness, I have striven to give the reader a reasonably fair view of the considerations included in these rather arduous processes by making them, to an extent, explicit in the text. The

concluding section (3.6) of the present chapter includes a discussion of the eventual selection and consistency of theoretical perspectives.

### 3.1. Theories of narrativity

As stone is to a sculptor, so time is to a musician. (Nachmanovitch, 1990, p. 31)

What is a story? While literary, folkloristic, and educational employments of the word may be some of the first to spring to mind, concepts like *story* and *narrativity* will be encountered in a great number of shapes in different kinds of research. The researcher's interest in stories is prominent in the case descriptions of Freud, in the myths of Lévi-Strauss, in language as an instrument for social action in Wittgenstein, and elsewhere. Roland Barthes, the French narratologist, claimed: "The narratives of the world are numberless. [...] [T]here nowhere is nor has been a people without narrative" (Barthes, 1977, p. 79).

Bruner (2004) points out that stories can be perceived as being constructed rather than having happened; referring to the author Henry James, Bruner holds that "stories happen to people who know how to tell them" (p. 691). Furthermore, according to Bruner, life is also an interpretive construction of the human imagination; "life imitates narrative" and "[i]n the end, we become the autobiographical narratives by which we 'tell about' our lives" (pp. 692, 694). In a sense, the notion of *story as construction* stands out as highly relevant to our understanding of storytelling in jazz improvisation.

During several decades, a narrative turn, or the growth of a narrative paradigm, has been discernible in several scholarly disciplines (Gislén, 2003). Narrative analysis can focus on the temporality and causality, on the structure and coherence, as well as on the different functions of a story. Narrative analysis is suited for systematic comparison of the structure and function of stories or "cases". While analysis in grounded theory, for instance, will typically focus on categories, the concentration on the structure and function of stories tends to imply an alternative methodology where processes rather than categories are emphasized.

In critical theory, the concept of *master narrative* (or metanarrative) – as well as the concept counter-narrative – has been coined to denote a fundamental narrative schema in a culture, including an element of ideology (e.g., "the good mother").

Lately the concept of storytelling has won great acclaim in the business world (*corporate storytelling*). It is predominant in several other fields as well. A Google search for the phrase "storytelling as" will result in a great variety of possible supplementing words: storytelling as a marketing tool, storytelling as a teaching method, storytelling as a healing art, storytelling as a pathway to peace, storytelling as

a radical feminist act, to mention only a few. Naturally, the ways of approaching and analysing the concepts of story and narrativity will differ in significant respects between these fields. However, the aim of this section is not to present a survey of a number of different discipline specific analyses. Rather, I will try here to sum up a few theories of a more fundamental nature which I consider pertinent to the concepts of story and narrativity in general, as well as to narrativity in music in particular.

### 3.1.1. Paul Ricoeur's theory of narrative

The French philosopher Paul Ricoeur's extraordinarily ambitious and comprehensive investigations of the concepts of *time* and *narrative* include wide-embracing conversations with hundreds of thinkers from a great variety of times and disciplines. This short survey will be restricted to a few major points which I consider particularly relevant to my investigation. To illustrate these points as fully as possible, however, the outline will include a number of rather extensive quotes.

"[W]hat is ultimately at stake", Ricoeur (1983–1985/1984–1988) points out at the very beginning of his work, "is the temporal character of human experience" (*I*, p. 3). Ricoeur refers to the analysis of time in Saint Augustine's *Confessions*. Augustine (1990) made clear the aporetic (contradictory, paradoxical) character of reflection on time: "How can time exist if the past is no longer, if the future is not yet, and if the present is not always?" (Ricoeur, 1983–1985/1984–1988, *I*, p. 7). The only possible response to the ruminating speculation on time, Ricoeur contends, is narrative activity. Emplotment is capable of clarifying the aporia, "but not of resolving it theoretically" (*I*, p. 6). At the heart of Augustine's analysis is "the distended relation between expectation, memory, and attention" (*I*, p. 9).

While narration implies memory, prediction implies expectation. Thus expectation is the analogue to memory. In the words of Augustine, "there are three times, a present of past things, a present of present things, and a present of future things" (*Confessions*, 20:26; this translation quoted from Ricoeur, 1983–1985/1984–1988, *I*, p. 11). The ground of all measurement of time, accordingly, is "an extension of the mind itself" (*Confessions*, 26:33; this translation quoted from Ricoeur, 1983–1985/1984–1988, *I*, p. 15).

Ricoeur (1983–1985/1984–1988) further analyses this extension of the mind (*distentio animi*). It must be linked to "the dialectic of the threefold present" (*I*, p. 16); it is "the activity of a mind stretched in opposite directions, between expectation, memory and attention" (*I*, p. 18). The distention of the mind consists in "the very contrast between the three tensions" (*I*, p. 19).

In the words of Augustine, the mind "performs three functions, those of expectation, attention, and memory", the result being that "the future, which it expects, passes through the present, to which it attends, into the past, which it

remembers" (*Confessions*, 28:37; this translation quoted from Ricoeur, 1983–1985/1984–1988, *I*, p. 19).

In short, in Augustine's analysis of time, Ricoeur sees an extended, three-part present, including the past present (memory), the on-going present (attention), and the present to come (expectation). By relating what happens when you are about to sing a song, Augustine offers a lucid picture of how these three time forms co-operate in a present that is not perceived as a punctual present but as the present that is *happening*.

Suppose that I am going to recite a psalm that I know. Before I begin my faculty of expectation is engaged [tenditur] by the whole of it. But once I have begun, as much of the psalm as I have removed from the province of expectation and relegated to the past now engages [tenditur] my memory, and the scope of action [actionis] which I am performing is divided [distenditur] between the two faculties of memory and expectation, the one looking back to the part which I have already recited, the other looking forward to the part which I still have to recite. But my faculty of attention [attentio] is present all the while, and through it passes [traicitur] what was the future in the process of becoming the past. As the process continues [agitur et agitur], the province of memory is extended in proportion as that of expectation is reduced, until the whole of my expectation is absorbed. This happens when I have finished my recitation and it has all passed into the province of memory. (*Confessions*, XI:28; this translation quoted from Ricoeur, 1983–1985/1984–1988, *I*, p. 20)

As Ricoeur (1983–1985/1984–1988) puts it: the dialectic of the threefold present in this description is a question of "an action that shortens expectation and extends memory" (*I*, p. 20). Augustine's attempt to resolve the aporia of the measurement of time resulted in a "supreme enigma": "the soul 'distends' itself as it 'engages' itself" (*I*, p. 21).

Augustine's inestimable discovery is, by reducing the extension of time to the distension of the soul, to have tied this distention to the slippage that never ceases to find its way into the heart of the threefold present – between the present of the future, the present of the past, and the present of the present. In this way he sees discordance emerge again and again out of the very concordance of the intentions of expectation, attention, and memory. (*I*, p. 21)

Through Augustine's analysis of time, based on consciousness, the devastating chasm between two concepts of time is made clear by Ricoeur (1983–1985/1984–1988). On one hand, there is the existential or phenomenological, private, inner, "mortal" experienced time; on the other, there is the cosmic or cosmological, public, outer, "infinite" clock time. This contrast has put phenomenology in a serious position. Ricoeur studies how Husserl and Heidegger, among others, have struggled to cope



with these two concepts. According to Ricoeur, the essential contribution of phenomenologists to the analysis of time is their further aggravation of the gap between the time of the soul and the time of the world: "an even greater aporicity" (*III*, p. 11).

Ricoeur thus regards the problem of time as insoluble within the directly descriptive discourse of phenomenology. He turns to the poetics of narrative and the concept of *mimēsis* in Aristotle's *Poetics*. According to Aristotle, the mimetic activity – the imitation or representation of action – takes place by means of *muthos*: through the verbal composition and staging of a plot. Mimesis is regarded by Aristotle as a *poiēsis*, an act of creation. The operational character of these concepts is emphasized by Ricoeur (1983–1985/1984–1988): he focuses on the human activity of organizing events through *emplotment*. The mimetic activity (*mimēsis*) consists in constructing the action. The emplotment (*muthos*) is "the 'what' of the mimesis": the organization of the events (*I*, p. 35).

In the emplotment, Ricoeur (1983–1985/1984–1988) sees "the poetic solution to the speculative paradox of time" (*I*, p. 38). Mimesis, he contends, "is directed more at the coherence of the *muthos* than at its particular story" (*I*, p. 41). Ricoeur develops the Aristotelian concept of mimesis into a theory of a threefold mimesis: *prefiguration*, *configuration*, and *refiguration* (*I*, pp. 52–87).

The first phase of mimesis proceeds from a pre-understanding originating in the practice of everyday life (cf. Gadamer's concept *Vorurteil*, pre-judgment as a condition for understanding; Gadamer, 1960/1975). According to Ricoeur (1983–1985/1984–1988), the actions of ordinary life include a time-oriented structure of experience, an understanding of the time-oriented character of the actions. This understanding forms a conceptual network, in which the meaning of actions is connected with a number of concepts: for instance, anticipated goals, explanatory motives, and responsible agents. In addition, human action is mediated by a symbolic system, and it includes temporal elements. All these features amount to a pre-narrative structure that tempts us to tell stories. In Ricoeur's analysis, the second phase of mimesis is a configuration *in* the story. The telling of a story has a mediating function, a *narrative competence* which creates coherence and which brings history (the reality of the past) and literature (the non-reality of fiction) closer to each other, for instance through the explanatory function of storytelling. This interaction is characterized by schematization and traditionality: "the received paradigms structure readers' expectations" and they "furnish guidelines for the encounter between a text and its readers" (*I*, p. 76). The act of reading joins the second phase of mimesis with the third phase which, according to Ricoeur, is a refiguration *through* the story. The act of reading is a point of intersection where the world of the text meets the world of the reader through another human activity: the reception. Paradoxically, the structure of acquirement includes both receptivity and activity: the text is read "in a passive or a creative way" (*I*, p. 77).

To Ricoeur the poetics of narration plays an important role in the problems of time. The plot has an ability to keep together the beginning, turning-point and end of a story in a coherent and organized course. The plot thereby develops a poetic rejoinder, as it were, to the contradictions of time. The heterogeneous, unstable, and ambiguous character of human time is connected with the fact that it is relational; it appears in and through communication. Ricoeur's investigations of time and narrative include perspectives of hermeneutics, poststructuralism, and analytical philosophy in an extraordinarily complex strategy to approach the question: Who am I? At the core of this question of personal identity Ricoeur places the ability of the narrative imagination to explore possible combinations of permanence and change, of the "is" of identity and the "is not" of difference. Narrative identity is an *identity that changes*; the narrative model comprises the notion of the inner dialectics of personality (Kristensson Uggla, 1994).

Some of the notions in Ricoeur's theory of narrativity stand out to me as especially relevant to the field of jazz improvisation: (i) the time-oriented structure of narration, (ii) the dialectic of the threefold present and of the corresponding threefold consciousness, as well as (iii) the relation between narration and change in identity. All of these lines of thought seem to connect in important and interesting ways to questions of linearity and temporality in improvisation that were outlined above (2.2.8). I will return to a further discussion of their applicability to the present investigation in my concluding remarks on music and narrativity (3.1.3).

### 3.1.2. Theories of musical narrativity

In the introduction of this book, a number of myths were given as examples of how the power of music was viewed in ancient times. Indeed, as Kivy (2009) points out, "[t]he idea that there is a very special connection between [sung] music and the affective life goes back, in philosophy, to Plato and before Plato to Pythagoras and the Orphic mysteries" (p. 79). The power of music to evoke and liberate strong feelings – notably homesickness – is highlighted in military and medical discourse of the 17th and 18th century (Johannisson, 2001). In order to avoid that cowherds' tunes from back home would transform strong soldiers to whimpering children, deserters, or suicides, doctors would ordinate brisk and merry march music; this discourse exemplifies a strong belief in the power of music to transform the listeners' emotions. The notion of storytelling in jazz improvisation is but one branch on an old and voluminous tree.

An important common feature of the arts was long considered to be their representational capacities. Against this view Hanslick (1854/1986) argued that music has no semantic content; "[t]he content of music is tonally moving forms" (pp. 28–29). Notions of affect (emotion), representation, and semantics may be viewed as interrelated, but they are certainly not the same. They all play a role in understanding

and estimating musical narrativity. As will be abundantly clear throughout this subsection, the complex relations between music and narrative have been, and continue to be, problematized in a great many ways. The discussion in this subsection attempts to deal with these complexities in some detail. In the following subsection (3.1.3), I try to sum up the discussion with regard to the present study in a few concluding remarks on music and narrativity.

Stern (2010) discusses how the time-based arts (music, dance, theatre, and cinema) "move us by the expressions of vitality that resonate in us. [...] Vitality is a whole. It is a Gestalt that emerges from the theoretically separate experiences of movement, force, time, space, and intention" (p. 4). Stern expands on the concept of *communicative musicality* (coined by Colwyn Trevarthen; cf. Malloch & Trevarthen, 2008). In brief, Stern views communicative musicality as the basis of sympathy; based on "the coupling of vitality dynamics between people", it makes us see others not only as "like me" but "with me" (p. 52). However – and this seems to be of some pertinence to this investigation of the storytelling capacities of music –, regarding the question of how vitality forms operate in different art forms, Stern distinguishes between the *time-based arts* on one hand and the *language-based arts* (traditional theatre, fiction, and poetry) on the other: the latter, he argues, are "usually driven by the narrative process and take place both in 'real' time (the time to read, hear, or see) and narrative time simultaneously, thus complicating the situation" (Stern, 2010, p. 77).

This classification of art forms in those which are language-based and those which are not, then, is one way of problematizing questions of narrativity and music: music may be expressive and communicative through its dynamics of vitality (in Stern's sense), but since it belongs to the time-based arts rather than the language-based arts, there must be some sort of distance between music and narrative.

A related way to problematize this field of research has to do with the uniqueness and *non-repeatability* of experiences in the time-based arts. In a study of vitality in music as basic existential experience, Fröhlich (2009) maintains that because experiences of music are non-repeatable, "the natural phenomenon of music-making escapes the empirical fishing-net" (p. 495):

This event is irreversible in that it refers to a lived execution or activity. Most notably, it is a lived experience: one of the qualities of experiences is that they unfold in 'presentness,' in the moment of their enactment. (p. 497)

Yet another way to problematize questions of the narrative capacities of music has to do with its representational properties. In contemporary philosophy of art, Danto (1981) famously has returned to the words of Socrates in Plato's *Protagoras* about what it is that painters know: "the making of likenesses" (p. 66). According to the art theory of Danto, artworks are *semantic vehicles*, i.e., have representational properties similar not only to those of words or propositions, but to "semantic vehicles of all

sorts – to images, concepts, ideas, gestures, beliefs, feelings, to pictures, maps, diagrams" (pp. 79–80). In accordance with this "aboutness" view, Danto holds that "appreciation [of art] must in some sense be a function of interpretation" (p. 113).

To what extent is music's capacity of conveying something a question of semantics, of representation, of narrative? Is it to be found beyond these concepts? Many have thought so. A famous quote from Heinrich Heine draws a boundary between words and music, "Wo Worte ein Ende haben, beginnt die Musik." Felix Mendelssohn replied in an 1842 letter to his cousin Marc-André Souchay who had taken the liberty of suggesting titles to the pieces in Mendelssohn's *Lieder ohne Worte*: "Die Leute beklagen sich gewöhnlich, die Musik sei so vieldeutig; es sei so zweifelhaft, was sie sich dabei zu denken hätten, und die Worte verstände doch ein Jeder. Mir geht es aber gerade umgekehrt." (Mendelssohn, 1878, p. 221) More recently, John Coltrane remarked to jazz critic Nat Hentoff: "If music doesn't say it, how can words say it for the music?" (Hentoff, 1978, p. 48).

The way music is perceived in relation to concepts of semantics, representation, or narrative – in one word, concepts of discursivity – need not be restricted by rigid distinctions between musical and linguistic domains; rather, a holistic outlook may prove more fruitful. In order to fully appreciate the ways in which music relates to narrative we may probably need to apply perspectives that include music as a situated social activity and music as an element of discourse. In order to position the problems of musical narrativity within such a more inclusive investigative scope, I include in the next few paragraphs a number of relevant observations put forward by Small (1998) and Radano (2003).

Small (1998) argues that music is not a thing but something that people *do*. His perspective on music as a situated activity ("musicking") has, of course, profound consequences for his view of what music means: "music's primary meanings are not individual at all but social. Those social meanings [...] are fundamental to an understanding of the activity that is called music" (p. 8). Furthermore, Small argues, "[t]he act of musicking establishes where it is happening a set of relationships, and it is in those relationships that the meaning of the act lies" (p. 13). According to Small, these relationships are to be found both intra-musically and extra-musically: between "organized sounds" but also between all kinds of participants; importantly, these relationships "model, or stand as metaphor for, ideal relationships as the participants in the performance imagine them to be: relationships between person and person, between individual and society, between humanity and the natural world and even perhaps the supernatural world" (p. 13).

It may be argued, of course, that an outlook on musical activity such as Small's will entail more questions regarding musical meaning than we can possibly hope to be able to answer, for the 'relationships' of a musical performance are clearly utterly complex; and this complexity is, of course, by no means reduced if we are to consider not only relationships that are at hand but also, and perhaps primarily, some set of imagined, 'ideal' relationships. Such complexities notwithstanding, I do believe that

Small points to significant connections between the narrative potential of music and its ontological status as an activity which is situated. Any stories told through musical activities reasonably have something to do with the specific social settings in which these activities are carried out.

In his analysis of the concept of black music as a product of racialized discourse, Radano (2003) formulates his perspective on music and discursivity:

Without reducing musical expression to the larger sphere of discourse, we need to acknowledge the simple fact of music as a social phenomenon if we are to comprehend the true extent of its significance. To their credit, a few historically sensitive scholars of European elite music have extended a (largely unacknowledged) ethnomusicological tenet, stressing how music's extradiscursivity may be itself a discursive formation, quite possibly human in nature, as it is particular to its local constitutions in culture. Discursive conceptualizations of 'music' are, they explain, played out in performance and in the phenomenology of hearing, circling back into the realm of language and textuality. Accordingly, music's place in the social and its impact on the listener develop from the way that sound actually inhabits the very tissues of the discursive, just as the saturation of ambiguous meanings that music contains (as the ultimate polysemic sign vehicle) produces a quality of experience exceeding full linguistic grasp. (p. 18)

This observation by Radano, I believe, points to crucial aspects of the dynamic socio-cultural interplay that may prevail between discourse *on* music and discourse *in* music (Folkestad, 1996; K. Johansson, 2008). With reference to the distinctions made in the introduction of this chapter, I consider these aspects highly important and relevant to the present investigation of practitioners' storytelling *about* storytelling *in* jazz improvisation.

In brief, questions of narrative and music are and have been the object of much debate. The purpose of this section is to present an analytical overview of perspectives in this field, many of which are intricately intertwined and partly conflicting, to clarify which ones of them may be the most pertinent to my aim and research questions, and to lay bare a theoretically sound operational stance regarding storytelling in jazz improvisation.

There seems to be general agreement that narrative need not be verbal. Wolf (2002) states without reservation that narrative is intermedial ("*Erzählen* [...] geht weit über das Medium Literatur und verbale Textsorten hinaus", p. 23). Analogies between literature and music are manifold and, to an extent, obvious. Nineteenth-century musicologists favoured dramatic interpretations of instrumental music (particularly Beethoven). In the late twentieth century, as musicologists turned to linguistic models such as formalism and structuralism, conceptions of musical narrativity attracted new interest.

Linguistic models of music can be traced back at least to writers on music theory from the early 18th century on (such as J. Mattheson, Marpurg, Sulzer, Koch, and H. Riemann), while others (such as Hanslick) have maintained that music is in lack of any semantic content. In his survey of the discussion in this field during recent years, Philpott (2001) suggests that modern theories of language and interpretation (for instance, those of Derrida, Barthes, and Gadamer) would support the view that music as well as language is part of human discourse. Other modern theories of prominent interest to the study of music include Bakhtin's (1981) relational view of language as meaning created in a dialogical relationship, as well as Foucault's (1969/2002) concept of *discursive practice*, a body of anonymous, historical rules which form a framework for what is possible to say, do, and perform in a given context.

The concept of 'discourse *in* music' (Folkestad, 1996) has sometimes been employed in contemporary literature on music education; for instance, Karin Johansson (2008) has studied discourse *on* music and discourse *in* music in the field of organ improvisation. To be sure, discourse is equal neither to narrative nor to storytelling. Nevertheless, in order to fully grasp the distinction between discourse *on* music and discourse *in* music, one question becomes crucial: what can actually be said *in* music? Since, during the last decades, the notion of musical narrative has been problematized by a great many writers and in a great many ways, there seems to be good reason for a researcher in music education to examine some of these views with interest and study them closely.

To begin with, it is easy to realize that many things cannot be represented in music, not even the simplest ones. Already Ferruccio Busoni pointed out the impossibility of "a musical representation of a poor but contented man" (quoted by Brown, 1948/1987, p. 234); on the other hand, it might be argued that such a representation is actually possible in a specific cultural context, namely, if the music quotes the melody of a song which the listeners can identify as a song about a poor but contented man (such as, for instance, the Swedish song "Torparvisa").

Nevertheless, the notion that music can actually communicate something is indeed an old one. Brown (1948/1987), in what seems to be the first systematic comparison of music and literature, distinguishes between three narrative elements in music: imitation, suggestion, and symbolism. The two latter elements may be intertwined: for instance, when Death's fiddle in Saint-Saëns' *Danse macabre* is tuned in the interval of the augmented fourth, this "weird sound", according to Brown, suggests "the idea of the evilly supernatural"; at the same time, "the suggestion is heightened by symbolism" if the listener "recognizes the *diabolus in musica* and associates the interval with its name and history" (p. 263).

However, Brown (1948/1987) contends that the main concern of music is not the representational element but the *structural patterns*: "The balance between pattern and representation, then, is not so complete in music as in literature" (p. 270). Notably, Robinson (1997) devotes more than one third of her anthology on music and meaning to the topic of music as storytelling, termed "the literary analogy" (p. 103).

Kivy (2009), in his description of a long-standing "quarrel" between literature and music, distinguishes between the understanding of (absolute) music in "broadly speaking, literary terms" and on the other hand in "its own terms"; Kivy himself strongly advocates the latter, "formalist" perspective (p. viii). Kivy (2007) points out that the interpretation of a literary work is not the same thing as writing about what a piece of music means to me (autobiography), to someone else (biography), or to a certain historical movement (social or musical history); "[t]here is a world of difference between the first occupation and the other three" (p. 151).

### *MUSIC AS LANGUAGE*

In order to be able to proceed to a fuller discussion of the question whether music can possess a narrative ability, it seems necessary to examine the status of music as a language. Many researchers have pointed out that music may depend on language in important ways. The anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss conceived of a close relationship between music and language: "there would be no music if language had not preceded it" (Lévi-Strauss, 1971/1981, p. 647). On a more specific level, musicologists have suggested that marks of language can be found in different kinds of instrumental music. For example, scholars have argued that the sonata form follows the rhetorical *dispositio*; that the accentuation of the first syllable in Czech is discernible in Czech music; and that the intonations of British English can be heard in Elgar's music (Georgiades, 1954; Nettl, 1956; Hall, 1953; Norton, 1984).

Kivy (2002) agrees that all music "possesses the *potential* for being used to underlie a text or dramatic situation"; but if you write a program or a dramatic plot that will fit a work of music, then you are creating, according to Kivy, a *new* work of art (p. 198). Obviously, if music is dependent of language, from a state of dependence it does not follow that music in itself *is* a language. Kivy (2002) specifies the following requirements for musical meaning:

To show that absolute music 'means' requires more than merely showing that it 'could have meant,' since its structures are expressive and capable of pictorial and structural representation. What must be shown is that absolute music exists as a representational or linguistic system. And that, as far as I know, has never been shown by any of those who practice the fictional or representational interpretation of absolute music repertoire. (p. 199)

Indeed, this notion of music as language has been problematized by the Swedish philosopher Göran Hermerén who suggests seven necessary (though not sufficient) conditions that X must fulfil, if X is to be a (communicative) language (Hermerén, 1986):

- (1) X contains discrete and repeatable *elements*.
- (2) *Sequences* of such elements suggest or evoke ideas, thoughts, feelings.
- (3) There is a *vocabulary* for X: a semantics, a lexicon.
- (4) For a sequence of elements in X, it is possible to identify what it refers to and what is said about that which the sequence refers to (*indexical* and *characterizing* parts).
- (5) X possesses *indicators* that are analogous to 'I promise that', 'I warn you that', etc.
- (6) Elements in X can be employed to refer to and say something about (other) elements in X (*meta-language*).
- (7) Elementary *logical operations* (negation, conjunction, etc.) can be performed in X.

In Hermerén's opinion, music hardly meets all of these conditions. Consequently, he finds it difficult to conceive of music as a language. For example, he is not convinced that music has a semantic vocabulary (condition no. 3): "the characterization of a piece of music in terms that refer to emotions does not necessarily entail that the music refers to, or symbolizes, these emotional states" (Hermerén, 1986, p. 10; my translation).

In connection with the condition regarding what music may refer to (no. 4), Hermerén discusses musical parody. Does a musical parody assert anything (true or false) about the work of which it is a parody? Hermerén denies this: illustrating something is not the same thing as asserting that something is true. Accordingly, Hermerén opposes Susanne K. Langer's (1942) cognitivist view of music, summed up in her statement: "Music expresses primarily the composer's *knowledge of human feeling*" (p. 221). Hermerén is not convinced that there is a language of music that can be used to communicate truths about aspects or features of the world. In his opinion, it is "more confusing than clarifying to speak of music as a language" (Hermerén, 1986, p. 15; my translation).

To be fair, it should be noted that in Langer's (1942) line of argument, she does not speak of music as language; on the contrary, she distinguishes clearly between music and language. According to Langer, the similarity of music and emotion is a question of formal congruence: "Because the forms of human feeling are much more congruent with musical forms than with forms of language, music can reveal the nature of feelings with a detail and truth that language cannot approach" (p. 199).

Hermerén (1986) also addresses the question of structural similarities between a musical passage and the feeling expressed by that passage. Referring to *the intentional fallacy* (Wimsatt & Beardsley, 1946/1954), he finds it problematic to verify assertions of any such similarities. Instead of using the words 'true' and 'false' in order to describe, for example, certain relations between an actual feeling and how it is



expressed in a musical passage, Hermerén suggests the term "internal (in)sincerity" (Hermerén, 1986, p. 14).

#### *THE NEED FOR A PAST TENSE*

The question of *temporality*, which is at the heart of Ricoeur's analysis of narrative, is also very much at the centre of the present discussion of narrative and music. Kivy (1993) points out that musical form typically involves extensive repetition of events, which cannot be the case in narrative form. In her study of musical narrative in nineteenth-century opera, Abbate (1991) opposes the conventional analogy between linear elements in music and events in a dramatic plot. Her reason is the "interpretative *promiscuity*" of this analogy: because it is so broad, it enables almost all music to be defined as narrative (p. xi). On the other hand, Meelberg (2006), advocating the possibility that "many, if not most, musical works are narrative" (p. 92), points out that Abbate's argument against an extensive paradigm of musical narratives is hardly valid: "The category of narrative literature is not rendered useless because all novels belong to this category" (p. 93). Abbate (1991), however, refuses to see music as narrative, specifying her position: "I will interpret music as *narrating* only rarely. It is not narrative, but it possesses moments of narration, moments that can be defined by their bizarre and disruptive effect" (p. 29).

One of Abbate's (1991) most important arguments against the view of music as narrative may be her contention that music lacks the temporal 'pastness' of literary narrative. Her viewpoint is well worth quoting since it has often been referred to in the debate of narrativity in music:

Music seems not to 'have a past tense.' Can it express the pastness that all literary narrative accomplishes by use of past or preterite verb tenses – 'it was early spring, and the second day of our journey?' To linger over 'was' as opposed to 'is' seems to exclude music from canons of narrative genres. [...] In one respect, music's existence as a temporal art precludes its speaking 'in the past tense.' As Ricoeur indicated, the pastness implicit in 'it was' tells us many things at once. It tells us that there is a narrator, someone who lived past the end of the story. But more important is the distance that this elicits. (pp. 52–53)

Neubauer (1997) does not agree with Abbate that music has no past tense. He favours, however, the term *temporal depth* which, he claims, describes a feature of music that "can be created by means of repetition and variation. Indeed, much of the pleasure in listening consists of recognizing familiar patterns" (p. 119).

Nattiez (1990), on the other hand, agrees with Abbate that music has no past tense: "It can evoke the past by means of quotations or various stylistic borrowings. But it cannot relate *what* action took place in time" (p. 244).

## THE PROBLEM OF REFERENTIALITY

This brings us to the inevitable question of *referentiality*. In a short systematic survey of music and narrative, Wolf (2005) identifies a number of general traits included in narrativity: meaningfulness, experientiality, and representationality. Wolf points to the fact that music possesses temporality, which is typical of narrativity. Further, he admits that music can suggest experientiality: characters, events, conflicts, and progressions.

On the other hand, Wolf (2002) criticizes some attempts to state conditions for a narrative ("eine Minimaldefinition des Narrativen", p. 34) that do not require much more of a narrative than two events in a time sequence; if such conditions were sufficient, he argues, cooking recipes and weather forecasts would qualify as narratives. Wolf (2005) points out that representationality entails *hetero-referentiality* (referring to something outside the medium). Music lacks this trait, he claims. While admitting that music can sometimes transcend its non-referentiality through "aural mimicry", Wolf considers the "tendency toward self-referentiality" in music a problem, if we wish to associate it with narrative (p. 325). In spite of the fact that "musical appropriations of narratives and narrativity have been attempted both in musical practice and in musicological discourse", Wolf contends that this is "problematic owing to the fact that music resists narrative's referential and representational dimensions" (p. 326).

Apart from the discrepancy between the self-referentiality of music and the hetero-referentiality of narrative, Wolf (2005) also indicates a number of other problems that, in his opinion, seem to prevent music from being a narrative medium:

- Music cannot indicate fictionality or other modes of reality (virtuality, potentiality).
- Music cannot indicate temporal levels (past, present, future)
- Music cannot generate intersubjectively shared mental pictures.

Apart from the topic of temporality, the problem of referentiality stands out as the predominant topic in discussions of music and narrativity. Can music refer to things non-musical? If so, to what?

## REFERENTIALITY: WHAT'S IT ALL ABOUT?

In the title of a very influential article, Nattiez (1990) poses the crucial question, "Can one speak of narrativity in music?" Nattiez insists that in order to address this question, literary narrativity must be taken as a "point of reference" (p. 242). His reply to the question he poses is negative: "in the discourse of music, it is only a question of a play of forms" (p. 244). This formulation is reminiscent of Brown's view, quoted above, that music is not so much a question of representation as of structural patterns (Brown, 1948/1987). Nattiez argues that music lacks the semantic

specificity which it would need in order to be narrative, that is, to identify and tell us about characters and their actions. Because of this limitation, Nattiez claims, the description of the formal structure of music in terms of narrativity is "nothing but superfluous metaphor" (Nattiez, 1990, p. 257).

Nattiez (1990) recognizes "returns, expectations and resolutions" in music – and he hastens to add: "but of what, I do not know". Since it is not in the "semiological nature" of music to tell us what it is about, we "wish to complete through words what the music does not say" (p. 245). Nattiez agrees that music *suggests* narrative, but he considers it an "ontological illusion" to state that music is narrative. This distinction, he says, "makes all the difference between literary narrative and musical 'discourse'" (p. 245).

Nattiez (1990) points out that since actions and events are "inscribed in time", they possess a "narrative potentiality", or, in terms borrowed from Ricoeur, "a *prenarrative* quality of experience" (p. 243). However, he adds, "neutral objects" in themselves do not constitute narratives in history; nor do they in music (p. 245). Nattiez adheres to the distinction between *story* and *discourse* (between what is told and how it is told) put forward by Chatman (1978; cf. the similar distinction between taleworld and storyrealm in Young, 1987). The story, that is, the content of a narrative, can be unfastened from its linguistic medium and taken on by another one, another kind of discourse, film or comic strip. In Nattiez's opinion, this distinction is vital in order to understand the dissimilarity between literary and musical narrativity: "The break with the symphonic poem is sharper. We cannot translate it. [...] In music, connections are situated at the level of discourse, rather than the level of the story" (Nattiez, 1990, p. 244).

It is highly noteworthy that this distinction – made by Chatman (1978) regarding fiction and film and by Nattiez (1990) regarding music – between *what* is told (story) and *how* it is told (discourse) relates in important and interesting ways to the characteristic features of African American cultural practices termed Signifyin(g). For instance, Gates (1988) gives this interpretation of Signifyin(g): "not specifically what is said, but how" (p. 70; cf. 2.2.5 and 3.1.4).

One may perceive a *succession of affective states* in a work of instrumental music (as, for instance, Anthony Newcomb has done in his approach to Schumann; Newcomb, 1987). However, in Nattiez's opinion this is not a legitimate reason to speak of narrative: "The narrative, strictly speaking, is not *in* the music, but *in the plot imagined and constructed by the listeners* [...] for the listener, any 'narrative' instrumental work is not *in itself* a narrative, but *the structural analysis in music of an absent narrative*" (Nattiez, 1990, p. 249).

Nattiez (1990) insists that a behavioural schema must be distinguished from a narrative structure. Music and language both consist of sound objects: rhythms, accents, durations of notes, and syllables. Further, these objects succeed one another: music and language have the linearity of discourse in common. Consequently, Nattiez claims, music "is capable of *imitating* the intonation contour of a literary narrative"

(p. 251). To imitate the outward appearance of a literary narrative, however, is not the same thing as *being* narrative. Even if, for example, we hear questions and answers in the finale of Beethoven's string quartet op. 35, "we do not know what is said", Nattiez insists; the way we perceive what is said is "as if we catch the inflections of it from the other side of the wall or as if we are hearing a conversation in a language which we do not know" (p. 251).

#### *REFERENTIALITY AS INDISPENSABLE TO NARRATIVE*

The problem of reference is obviously a crucial one in this context. Several writers have approached the question of musical narrativity in ways that try to avoid this problem.

Wolf (2002) suggests a number of internal musical criteria that, in his opinion, are relevant ("beachtenswert", p. 85) for the narrative quality in instrumental music:

- (1) a certain length of composition in order to mediate the temporal experience typical of narrative;
- (2) avoidance of *verbatim* repetition of long passages;
- (3) surprising, dramatic, unforeseeable development;
- (4) structures that allow the projection of characters;
- (5) tonal background which enables contrasts, expectations, tensions, and resolutions;
- (6) occasional features of musical intertextuality (for instance, reference to narrative vocal music or iconic imitation of acoustic reality);
- (7) features that suggest a narrator's voice.

Several of these criteria seem highly relevant to the field of jazz improvisation; these connections are further discussed in my concluding remarks on music and narrativity (subsection 3.1.3).

Meelberg (2009) sums up some of the views presented in the previous sections. They seem, in his opinion, too restricted to the paradigm of verbal narrative: "because music cannot explicitly refer to nonmusical phenomena, it does not comply with the most basic function of narrative" (p. 253). In contrast with such a "medium dependent" conception of narrative, Meelberg proposes a definition of narrative as "the representation of a temporal development" (p. 253). On a similar note, Almén (2008) suggests that music's lack of semantic specificity might "be viewed as a positive characteristic, in that music can display narrative activity without being limited to specific characters and settings" (p. 13).

To Meelberg (2009), the relation between narrative and causality is a matter of great validity in this discussion: "A narrative can be understood because its succeeding events can be interpreted as being related in a causal manner" (p. 248). However, Meelberg argues that "[r]eal, physical causation does not exist in verbal narratives; nor

does it in music" (p. 254). A dominant seventh chord is not actually unstable or tense; it is a musical representation of tension. What takes place in music is not real causation but a musical representation of causation: "the temporal development that can be heard in music is the result of representation. It is this temporal development that is the content of the musical narrative, however abstract that content might be" (p. 255).

Meelberg (2009) considers the performance "an integral part of the narrative itself". It is not just an interpretation of a narrative: "Each performance of the same musical piece has to be regarded as a new musical narrative, a new work. [...] Aleatoric music demonstrates this point in a very explicit manner" (p. 257).

#### *MUSIC AS A SUPPLEMENT TO NARRATIVE*

When Kramer (1991) offers a "theoretical outline" of musical narratology, he assumes as his premise that "music cannot tell stories" (p. 154). In Kramer's view, music's relation to narrative is that of a *supplement*, an *accompaniment*: "Anyone looking to narratology as a means of illuminating musical structure and musical unity had better look somewhere else" (p. 162). Wolf (2005) terms such supplementary practices *plurimedial* combinations of music and a narrative (non-musical) medium (such as, for instance, vocal music, musical drama, or film).

This function of music is one that, among others, scholarly works in film studies concentrate on, most importantly Gorbman's (1987) seminal book on narrative film music. Gorbman points out that the "connotative values" of film music "largely determine atmosphere, shading, expression, and mood"; she remarks that from a theoretical point of view, however, these functions are elusive ones, originating "in the complex of all connotative elements in the filmic system and beyond" (p. 30).

#### *NARRATIVIZATION: MUSICAL MEANING CONSTRUCTED BY THE LISTENER*

Even if music *in itself* is not narrative, this will not exclude the possibility for listeners to experience it as such, to ascribe certain emotional states, or indeed a certain meaning, to it. Nattiez (1990), though criticizing vigorously the "superfluous metaphor" of musical narrativity, still points to the fact that studies in empirical psychology "show empirically not only that listeners associate images, feelings and impressions with music, but also that [...] there is a convergence of opinion regarding the experience evoked" (p. 243). The *narrativization* of instrumental music is an important aspect of the present investigation. Wolf (2002) points out that narrative is one of the most powerful schemas of meaning construction in human thought ("eines der stärksten sinnstiftenden Schemata menschlichen Denkens", p. 83). Maus (2005) contends that "[t]o many people, patterns like sonata form resemble a story, in which the concluding section resolves tension and imbalance" (p. 467). In Meelberg's (2006) opinion, it is the analysis of music that "allows the music to speak" (p. 7). In accordance with this view, musical meaning must be defined as the result of interaction:

the meaning of the music the listener is listening to is not fixed by the music itself. Musical meaning emerges as a result of the interaction between the music and the listener. (p. 8)

This interaction between listener and music, Meelberg (2006) points out, is based on a natural human tendency. It includes a "narrative listening stance", an active stance, focusing on linearity, in which the music is narrativized:

Narrativization is a fundamental human tendency in order to come to terms with temporal phenomena. It is a tendency that depends on both the narrative potentialities of a phenomenon and of an interpretative act of that phenomenon on the part of the human subject. (p. 224)

In connection with this interaction view on musical meaning, Meelberg (2006) also touches upon the performativity of music theory: "Musicology, with music analysis as its principal instrument, is not the description of a musical practice, be it composing, performing, or listening to music. Rather [...], musicology forms these practices" (p. 10).

In his approach to the subject of narrativization, Neubauer (1997) favours the term *emplotment* rather than narration. Using examples from music history, he points to how music has been emplotted by composers themselves. There are portraits of storms in the music of Vivaldi, hens in Rameau, the battle of David and Goliath in Kuhnau: "Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century composers frequently emplotted their instrumental music by means of representing natural sounds and by using the affective and rhetorical conventions" (p. 119). First and foremost, however, Neubauer directs attention to the musical meaning constructed not by the composer but by the listener: "it may be as useful to study the ways in which listeners have emplotted music as to second guess the composer's intentions or to postulate cultural archetypes" (pp. 125–126). Neubauer reminds us that during the nineteenth century "emplotments of instrumental music, especially that of Beethoven, were extremely popular" (p. 120). However, such emplotments can never be binding for future listeners, since they rely on musical conventions that are neither timeless nor ahistorical: "re-emplotment under different cultural conditions must be possible" (p. 123).

It would seem that messages of a more abstract nature can also be extracted from instrumental music. Levinson (1990) extracts from Mozart's symphony in G minor (K. 550) the proposition that happiness could naturally follow unhappiness in the experience of a single individual; Schroeder (1990) finds in Haydn's symphony no. 83 and several other of his late symphonies the message of tolerance over dogmatism.

In an influential article with the interesting title "The impromptu that trod on a loaf: or How music tells stories", McClary (1997) judges most kinds of music as non-narrative, with one important exception: "The music that narrates by itself is [...] the

European canon from 1700 to 1900" (p. 22). Due to the stability of its tonal background, she claims, this music is governed by "a teleological model of time" which enables several kinds of events to occur within its linear framework: "obstacles, reversals, conflicts, surprises, anticipations, delays, defeats and triumphs – both temporary and final" (p. 22). To McClary, the "staged confrontation and negotiation" between several "cultural dichotomies" are discernible in this music: for instance, she points to "the tensions and mutual interdependence between a stable social unit and virtuosic individualism" in Vivaldi's concertos (p. 22). In short, McClary finds in this musical canon "narratives of subjective becoming or *Bildung*" (p. 24).

McClary (1997) offers an analysis of Schubert's impromptu op. 90, no. 2, in E-flat major. While it in her opinion would not qualify as a narrative according to literary models of narrative, it does "share a narrative trajectory" with Hans Christian Andersen's story "The little girl who trod on the loaf": "a trajectory unusually severe in its move from innocence through vanity to destruction" (p. 31). With respect to characters and actions, Schubert's music is far less concrete than Andersen's story, but it offers "great specificity of affect", McClary contends: "we actually experience blitheness, the exhilaration of motion, anxiety, a very long episode of unrelenting brutality, the pleasure of reconciliation, and the unexpected and devastating return to hell" (p. 31).

One example may suffice to show that music also can be narrativized on a much more general level. In her influential study on music and gender, McClary (1991) argues that patriarchal values and a lopsided 'masculine–feminine' dichotomy permeate musical discourses such as "the paradigms of tonality and sonata": "The 'feminine' never gets the last word in this context: in the world of traditional narrative, there are no feminine endings" (p. 16).

Meelberg (2006) suggests that some musical narratives can teach us about musical comprehension and that, more specifically, some of them are meta-narratives, telling *the story of the narrativization process*. Meelberg (2012) presents and discusses a case of an improvisation which, he argues, can be interpreted as a violent sonic act. This improvisation consists in a temporal development of *sonic strokes* by which the music violates the autonomy of the listener's body. Focusing on a view of music listening as *bodily affection*, Meelberg contends that "this succession of musical gestures can be regarded as a representation that teaches the listener about musical violence" (p. 274).

#### PARADIGMATIC PLOTS IN MUSIC

Any analogies between the putative narrativity of music and the verbal narrative of literature will of course depend, among other things, on the characteristics we ascribe to literature. A number of authors in a recent anthology on music and narrative (Klein & Reyland, 2012) address issues of narrativity in musical and literary modernism, arguing on one hand that the possibility of musical narrativity in modern music was sustained, in part, by the development of musical prose; and on the other

hand that the possibility of literary narrative itself was questioned by modernism in literature.

Based on conceptualizations of literature untroubled by modernity, Newcomb (1987) in his analysis of Schumann's instrumental music draws on the deduction of *paradigmatic plots* in structural studies of verbal narrative. He claims that much of the music from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries depend on "the musical analogue to paradigmatic plots" (p. 165). These are *implied* by the events in instrumental music, Newcomb contends, "in the sense of a conventional succession of functional events" (p. 167). A series of events can be experienced in terms of *continuation* and *change*. In Newcomb's view, this constitutes sufficient ground for the existence of narrative in music: "Inasmuch as music may be (and is by many listeners) heard as a mimetic and referential metaphor, the mimesis involved is of modes of continuation, of change and potential. And modes of continuation lie at the very heart of narrativity, whether verbal or musical" (p. 167). Newcomb argues that the listener, when listening to a work of music, will "engage in the fundamental narrative activity that Ricoeur calls 'following a story,' matching successions of musical events against known configurations, in order both to forge an understanding of what one has heard and to make predictions of possible continuations" (p. 174).

Meelberg (2006) points out that according to Newcomb's view, there are two narrative levels in music: "a series of events, and the plot level" (p. 41). This distinction is also prominent in the view of music as drama put forward by Maus (1988).

#### *EVENTS, ACTIONS AND AGENTS: MUSIC AS DRAMA*

In his article "Music as drama", Maus (1988) opposes a dichotomy which he considers undeservedly prevalent in discourse on music: the distinction between *structure* and *expression*, between technical and emotive descriptions of music. He presents and analyses a thorough description of a passage in Beethoven's string quartet op. 95. This description, he points out, "*explains* events by regarding them as *actions* and suggesting *motivation*, *reasons* why those actions are performed, and the reasons consist of combinations of psychological states" (Maus, 1988, p. 67). Not only does the music-theoretical language, Maus observes, bring out "aspects that are pertinent in describing and evaluating the events *as* actions"; it also describes the actions "in ways that show the intention with which the action is performed" (p. 70).

The actions and motivations described in the musical analysis cannot be ascribed to the composer or the performers: "it seems the analysis involves the ascription of at least one action to an imaginary agent". The listener seems to follow "a series of actions that are performed now, before one's ears". This sense of presence is crucial: "it is as though the future of the agent is open – as though what he will do next is not already determined". Consequently, in Maus's view, understanding music involves "some kind of imaginative activity or construction of fiction" (Maus, 1988, p. 67). This activity, however, does not belong to "determinately distinct agents"; according



to Maus, a listener will oscillate between "various schemes of individuation" (p. 68). A later article (Maus, 1997) provides further empirical evidence for the view that "music may create its narrative or dramatic effect without creating determinately individuated characters" (p. 300).

Maus (1988) refers to Todorov's (1981) description of an *ideal narrative*: a stable situation is perturbed by some force which results in disequilibrium; by the action of another force, equilibrium is re-established; the second equilibrium is similar but not identical to the first. Maus claims that "musicians will find it easy to think of many ways in which compositions can conform to Todorov's schema", pointing out the sonata form as a "particularly obvious example" of an ideal narrative (Maus, 1988, p. 71).

Obviously, if music is seen as drama, one must consider the differences regarding its agents. The fictional characters in a stage play are normally identifiable as the same characters through the play. The agents in music, Maus (1988) points out, must be indeterminate. There is even an "indeterminacy between sounds as agents and as actions" (p. 70). However, Maus seeks support for the view that music can be dramatic in his interpretation of Aristotle's analysis of tragedy. To Aristotle, the imitation of agents is of secondary importance; it merely serves the essential purpose of tragedy, which is to imitate an action. Kivy (2009) criticizes Maus's view of indeterminate agency: "One can't, after all, have actions without actors. Freely floating actions are as metaphysically suspect as freely floating properties in general. [...] [T]o argue that one can have a drama without [determinate characters] is to argue that you can have the duck without a quack" (p. 128). Maus's (2005) words in response to this kind of criticism are as open-minded as they are brief: "Other accounts of musical action and agency are possible" (p. 468).

In his article "Music as narrative", Maus (1991) returns to the question of indeterminate characters. He seeks further support for the view of music as narrative in Propp's (1968) formalist analysis of folktales. To Propp, Maus argues, it is the succession of events that determines the plot; the characters of the story are less crucial. According to Maus (1991), "[n]arrative theory abstracts from individual narratives in somewhat the same way that instrumental music abstracts from everyday human action. [...] One could almost claim that music is more like narrative theory than it is like narrative" (p. 15).

Maus (1991) discusses a description of the last movement of Beethoven's sonata op. 14, no. 1, in order to "show that story-like qualities are not restricted to overtly 'stressful' music" (p. 8) such as the passage in Beethoven's string quartet discussed in his earlier article (Maus, 1988). Maus (1991) takes as the starting point of his argument the fact that music listeners possess a "capacity for interpreting musical events anthropomorphically":

Musical events can be regarded as characters, or as gestures, assertions, responses, resolutions, goal-directed motions, references, and so on. Once they

are so regarded, it is easy to regard successions of musical events as forming something like a story, in which these characters and actions go together to form something like a plot. (p. 6)

In the description of the Beethoven rondo, Maus (1991) finds a series of actions that

seem to be best understood as behavior in a fictional world created through the music. The Rondo does not encode a story about something completely unmusical, in the manner of program music. Rather, the goals, actions, and problems of the story are musical ones, and they share only rather general descriptions (for instance, 'trying to return to a position of stability') with everyday actions. (pp. 13–14)

Several theorists define narrative in ways that exclude drama. Meelberg (2006), defining narrative as "representation of a temporal development", maintains that drama is not a representation but rather "a presentation, or a demonstration, of this development"; hence, he argues, drama "is not narrative, although it can contain narrative moments" (p. 39). In the opinion of others, it is the temporal character of drama which prevents it from being narrative. For instance, Scholes (1981) claims: "Drama is presence in time and space; narrative is past, always past" (p. 206). Such distinctions have been questioned from several points of view (Gislén, 2003). It is noteworthy that Ricoeur (1983–1985/1984–1988) adheres to the view of Aristotle that this is merely a question of "mode" of representation: "Either the poet speaks directly, and thus narrates what his characters do, or he allows them to speak and speaks indirectly through them, while they 'do' the drama" (*I*, p. 36). Still, questions of temporality remain crucial to anyone who wishes to view music as narrative or drama.

Maus (1991) addresses this problem by means of an attempt to problematize the distinction between *story* and *discourse* mentioned above (cf. also the discussion of this distinction in my concluding remarks on music and narrativity, 3.1.3). He points out that the temporal properties of story and discourse may differ in a number of ways: regarding (i) the *order* of events (they may be ordered differently in the discourse than in the story), (ii) the *frequency* of an event (one single event in the story may be mentioned repeatedly in the discourse), and (iii) the *duration* of events (the duration of discourse may differ from the duration of an event in the story).

Maus (1991) also points out that this kind of temporal discrepancies can be discussed from several points of view. Do they occur in music? Or does a piece of music "simply show its story from beginning to end, with no temporal distortions, like a rather simple form of stage play?" (p. 23) Maus claims that though it is not necessary for a listener to make a distinction between story and discourse, in some contexts s/he *might* do so, thereby experiencing "the play of different interpretations within a single hearing" (p. 33).

A narrative arguably presupposes a narrator. In his book *The composer's voice*, Cone (1974) addresses this question and coins the term *musical persona*. Kivy (2009), denying any merits of this concept, comments that "the failure of the persona interpretation" strengthens his own claim, namely, "that literature and absolute music are indeed *antithetical arts*" (p. 104). Wolf (2002) points out that Neubauer (1997) and Abbate (1991) have grounded their criticism on such a narrow concept of a narrative mediated by a narrator ("erzählervermitteltem Erzählen", p. 80). According to this view, a stage play is not a narrative. What about music? Maus (1991) presents two possible answers. There may be no sense of a narrator, if one sees music as drama, "a sequential presentation of the world in which the events are perceived directly" (p. 34). On the other hand, the temporal discrepancies discussed above hint at another way of viewing music: "Musical narrators are the shadows that are cast when a listener plays with the distinction between story and discourse" (p. 34).

Several of the theories we have touched upon make use of dichotomies such as events/plot, or story/discourse. Meelberg (2006) proposes a narratological approach to music with a trichotomized model. A theory employing only two levels of narrative, he claims, will not suffice to discuss "the consequences of relating the same story in different media":

The trichotomy musical text – story – fabula can be roughly equated with the trichotomy 'perceptible sounds' – 'musical structure' – 'a series of logically and chronologically related musical events that are caused or experienced by musical actors'. (pp. 43–44)

Another advantage of a three-level model, according to Meelberg, is that it can "distinguish between the one who speaks (the narrator on the text level) and the one who perceives (the focalizer on the story level)" (p. 43).

Kivy (2009) discusses extensively the properties of *absolute music* ("instrumental music without text, program, extra-musical title, bereft of either literary or representational content", p. 119). He holds that while, on one hand, it does not possess "either representational, narrative, or semantic content", it does, on the other hand, possess "expressive character" (p. 201). Kivy contends that while language can arouse a mood, "absolute music cannot do that; it does not have the words. So it must, *somehow*, arouse the mood in a *fait accompli*, without the 'previous series of ideas' that language can project. It must, somehow, convey the mood 'in finished form'" (pp. 72–73).

### 3.1.3. The applicability to the present study of perspectives on music and narrativity

If I now ask "So what do I actually experience when I hear this theme and understand what I hear?" – nothing occurs to me by way of reply except trivialities. Images, sensations of movement, recollections and such like. (Wittgenstein, 1980, pp. 69e–70e)

Very well, then: can music be narrative? To put it bluntly, yes and no. Replies to this question will vary significantly depending on the qualification included with the answer. "Metaphorically speaking", music can be narrative; "strictly speaking", it can not. The reply will also depend on, for instance, one's views regarding the questions of music's *status as a language*, its *temporality*, and its *referentiality*, as well as on the importance one ascribes to the interaction between the listener and the music.

In a strict sense, music cannot be a language, since it cannot meet all the relevant conditions: for instance, it cannot assert, negate, lie, or promise. So, if it takes a language to tell a story, then it would seem that music cannot do that. Still, music and language have several important traits in common: they both use sounds, they both have syntactic properties, and they both unfold over time.

If it takes the past tense to tell a story, then, in the view of many theorists, music cannot tell stories. On the other hand, drama employs the present tense. If a stage play can be narrative (which is anything but a settled matter), then so might perhaps music.

It might be argued that most people agree that music has meaning. Against such lines of argument Kivy (2007) holds that "there is no initial, pre-systematic presumption on the part of the general public that music has 'sense' or 'meaning'"; regarding the question whether "pure instrumental music" does or does not have meaning, Kivy contends that common sense "favors neither one side nor the other" (p. 140). Kivy even suggests a comparison between "the awful truth that music cannot possess semantic meaning, even broadly conceived" and the believer's path to atheism: "I think that the music lover feels the loss of musical meaning, in the semantic sense, the way the atheist feels the loss of God" (p. 152).

Notwithstanding, there seems to be general agreement that successions of events in music include, for instance, expectation, conflict, change, motion, and resolution. The relation between such events and non-musical events, however, according to the opinion of many, is not one of reference, but one of indeterminacy. To some theorists, music is only a "play of forms" which is quite insufficient in order to form a narrative. In the opinion of others, such series of events constitute "paradigmatic plots", "ideal narratives", or "actions".

Meyer (1956) puts forward a theory of how musical meaning is experienced through the comprehension of structural relationships. Musical meaning, he holds, is intramusical and affective. Affects are aroused when tendencies are arrested or

inhibited; musical meaning consists in a musical event pointing to or arousing "expectations of a subsequent musical event" (p. 35). Meyer's (1956) view of musical structure focuses on syntactic parameters such as melody, harmony, and rhythm, rather than dynamics, timbre, or texture.

Accordingly, Meyer (1956) views jazz improvisation as "expressive deviation" (p. 202) from the norm, i.e., the theme. He distinguishes between simultaneous deviation such as, for instance, in a dixieland tutti, and successive deviation such as a series of individual 'solo' improvisations; and he argues that in jazz "the expectation of a return to regularity is a basic organizing principle" (p. 243).

Against Meyer's theory of musical meaning and affective arousal, Elliott (1987) makes the objection that

a perceiver has an option as to whether or not s/he will participate in this or that expectation and its inhibition. Thus the inhibition of a musical tendency may well not arouse affect. (p. 16)

Furthermore, Elliott (1987) argues, Meyer's syntactic theory does not account for the affects that arise from patterns that are completely familiar, music that "does exactly what we expect it to do" (p. 17), e.g., the *swinging* of jazz music (including 'swing feel' as well as jazz-rock, salsa, bossa, and other time-feel dimensions). In Elliott's words, "jazz improvisation is simultaneously an act of composition *and* an act of performance"; "both a game *and* a sport" (p. 20). With regard to the phenomenon of storytelling in jazz improvisation, then, it would seem that a view on musical meaning as experienced through affective arousal may include a variety of musical parameters in which expectations aroused by the music may be inhibited and/or confirmed; in either case, these experiences may be perceived as carrying musical meaning.

Many additional questions could be asked and taken as starting points for further discussions. For instance, granted that a "play of forms" is insufficient in order to constitute a narrative, might not such a play of forms still communicate something that could perhaps be said to be *beyond* or *instead of* a narrative? To be sure, we need only think of a kiss or a punch on the nose to realize that all forms of communication or expression do not require language or narrative in order to function successfully. The fact that something could be communicated or expressed does not imply that it could be said, argued, or related; and, conversely, the fact that something cannot be said does not imply that it cannot be communicated. Nattiez (1990), though he denies the existence of narrative in music, still speaks of "musical 'discourse'" and of "*the plot imagined and constructed by the listeners*" (p. 245, 249). Furthermore, he holds that "any 'narrative' instrumental work is not *in itself* a narrative, but *the structural analysis in music of an absent narrative*" (p. 249).

Nattiez's comment serves as a reminder that we ought to distinguish clearly between *musical narrative* and *musical discourse*. Furthermore, I suggest, it might make a difference to our perception of musical narrativity if we distinguish between

*narrative as intention* (in the composer/performer), *narrative as experience* (in the listener), and *narrative as an analytical tool*. The fact that we detect a certain quality in the music could not be taken as proof that this was the intention of the composer or performer – which brings us back to the *the intentional fallacy* (Wimsatt & Beardsley, 1946/1954).

Still another question: Is it more appropriate to consider the listener's narrativization of the music as a process of *construction* or as a process of *interaction*? In the first case, the analyst's focus will be on the listener; in the second, the music itself cannot be viewed as "empty". And yet another one: This overview has concentrated mainly on the Western classical tradition; would it make a difference if music from other traditions were to be considered? Could the listener's reception of musical narrative depend on cultural competence, for instance, specific genre knowledge? A remark by Wittgenstein (1967) points in this direction:

For how can it be explained what "expressive playing" is? Certainly not by anything that accompanies the playing. – What is needed for the explanation? One might say: a culture. – If someone is brought up in a particular culture – and then reacts to music in such-and-such a way, you can teach him the use of the phrase "expressive playing". (p. 29e)

"Wo Worte ein Ende haben, beginnt die Musik," said Heine. As we have seen, even a formalist such as Peter Kivy (2009) will agree that instrumental music possesses "expressive character" (p. 201). However, it is abundantly clear that to link up that property to an argument that music also possesses narrative, representational, or semantic qualities will inevitably entail severe theoretical difficulties.

The main lesson to be learned from this survey of musicological debate, then, is that when we approach the concept of storytelling in jazz improvisation, in order to avoid a dead end, our understanding of that notion's relation to concepts such as narrativity and language must not be too narrow. Indeed, Almén (2008) finds the appropriate approach to the study of musical narrative to be an "analytical eclecticism" (p. 54). Klein (2012) argues that the narrative analysis of music is "a form of hermeneutics" which requires "the same set of cognate questions involved in any interpretive endeavor", including expectations and responses in the listener as well as cultural and historical contexts (p. 22).

In a certain sense, these prolegomena provide us with a rather paradoxical starting point for further investigations. Whether or not we adhere to Wittgenstein's (1953/2009) notion that "the meaning of a word is its use in language" (p. 18e), we will have to face a strange reality where musicians (in the usage of many) tell "stories" that are not only non-linguistic but (in the usage of many) "non-narrative" to boot.

In brief, there are two categories of interpretations of 'storytelling'. (i) There are the straight, *literal interpretations of storytelling as narrative*. It has been abundantly clear throughout this section that the majority of theorists I refer to find narrativity in

music highly problematic; their few opponents have no easy case to make. (ii) Then there is the category of all imaginable *metaphorical interpretations of storytelling*. As noted at an early stage of this investigation (cf. 2.2), in my view this latter category is, to begin with, the kind of interpretation that immediately suggests itself (given the fact that musical instruments cannot produce words). On further reflection, there is a considerable advantage involved with such metaphorical interpretations, it seems to me: they may avoid all or most of the problems pointed out by the many theorists mentioned regarding music's narrative potential. The aims of this investigation include finding out the meaning(s) of storytelling in the context of jazz improvisation, according to practitioners in this field. But if storytelling is narrative, and it is considered doubtful or even out of the question that music could be narrative in any acceptable sense of the word, then this aim is pointless, since storytelling cannot have any meaning in this context. Consequently, in order not to render the core questions of this study utterly meaningless, or, for that matter, not to exclude any potentially fruitful results in response to these questions, I find it necessary to attach great importance to metaphorical interpretations of the term storytelling when it is employed in the field of jazz improvisation. Section 3.3, therefore, includes an in-depth discussion of metaphor.

That time is highly relevant to improvisation is made plain by the synonym, *extemporization*. Literally, *ex tempore* (*ex*, out of; *tempore*, ablative of *tempus*, time) means out of time, i.e., in accordance with the needs of the moment, or, without time to prepare. Jazz exists as a temporal art form; hence, it cannot be grasped entirely in an instant. In a discussion of aesthetics and jazz, Gioia (1988) points to the question whether jazz as an art should be viewed as an object or an activity:

When viewed as an object of contemplation, jazz may well fail even the most basic tests of aesthetic success. [...] Yet when judged as an activity, jazz need make no apologies. (p. 102)

Based on this distinction, Gioia (1988) argues that an important characteristic of jazz performance, in comparison to all other kinds of artistic events, is that it "allows the audience to confront the creative act" (p. 105). This notion has significant bearing as a guide regarding how to view the concept of storytelling in this context: the *story* that is told in jazz may well be worth focusing on, but the activity perspective is also important; the jazz improvisation should be understood as the *telling* of a story.

The interpretive stance which I consider most apt for the present investigation, then, does *not* adhere to the predominant musicological problematizations of musical narrativity. Instead, it preserves an open, broad approach to the concept of storytelling and its usage in discourse on jazz improvisation. It ought not to be taken for granted that the meaning(s) of storytelling in this context equals the meaning(s) of narrative, or narrativity. Storytelling in the jazz context may be taken as meaning, for instance, communication, or expression; as noted above, there are certainly forms of

communication and expression that do not require narrative. In order to grasp as fully as possible the ways the storytelling concept is used in the field of jazz improvisation, therefore, the possibility must be kept open to include interpretations of it that diverge from a literal interpretation of storytelling as a narrative act. Therefore, to suggest definitions and lines of demarcation regarding concepts such as communication and expression would appear to be counterproductive at this stage, since they may run the risk of limiting the interpretive scope in an undesirable way.

Arguably, there are still many features that unite jazz improvisation and narrativity. The internal musical criteria regarded by Wolf (2005; cf. 3.1.2) as relevant to musical narrativity seem highly applicable to jazz improvisation: (i) the length of jazz solos approximates the temporal experience typical of narrative; (ii) jazz solos typically avoid *verbatim* repetition of long passages; (iii) jazz solos often include surprising, dramatic, unforeseeable development; (iv) they may also include structures that allow the projection of characters (e.g., call-and-response patterns, or the use of contrasting voices discussed in subsection 2.2.2); (v) further, jazz solos arguably often are performed with a tonal background which enables contrasts, expectations, tensions, and resolutions; (vi) jazz solos often feature musical intertextuality (cf. 2.2.6); and, (vii) not least by means of instrumental sound and embodiment (cf. 2.2.9), jazz solos include features that suggest a narrator's voice.

It might be argued that this variety of common features makes the connection between storytelling and music a reasonably strong case – a case further strengthened when some sort of metaphorical interpretation of storytelling in jazz improvisation is included. In this context, as I pointed out above (cf. 3.1.2), it is noteworthy that Chatman's (1978) and Nattiez's (1990) distinction between *what* is told (story) and *how* it is told (discourse) relates in important and interesting ways to the characteristic features of African American cultural practices termed Signifyin(g). For instance, as mentioned previously in the discussion of the problems of referentiality in music (3.1.2), Gates (1988) gives this interpretation of Signifyin(g): "not specifically what is said, but how" (p. 70; cf. 2.2.5 and 3.1.4). Borrowing and combining these terms, one might arrive at the stance that storytelling – or Signifyin(g) – in jazz improvisation may be not so much a question of a *story* told in music; rather, it may be a question of *discourse* in music.

Even if I am strongly inclined to avoid a literal interpretation of storytelling in jazz improvisation as a narrative act, there are indeed elements in theories of narrativity that I find very valuable, if not indispensable, to this investigation. First and foremost among them are the notions (presented above in subsection 3.1.1) of the time-oriented structure of narration, of the dialectic of the threefold present and of the corresponding threefold consciousness and the threefold mimesis, as well as of the relation between narration and change in identity. In important and interesting respects, these notions seem to connect closely to questions of linearity and temporality in jazz improvisation.



The point of departure for the survey in the present section was the analysis of time and consciousness inherent in Saint Augustine's description of the three-part present (memory–attention–expectation) involved in singing a song. Based on this analysis, Ricoeur has developed a theory of a threefold Aristotelian mimesis: prefiguration, configuration, and refiguration. The first of these phases involves pre-understanding. The second one involves narrative competence (coherence). The third phase of mimesis, according to Ricoeur, involves the reception of the narrative.

It seems to me that both these notions – the three-part present as well as the threefold mimesis – may prove highly relevant to the task of analysing storytelling in jazz improvisation. There also seems to be an interesting parallel in the field of theatre regarding the context of the actions of a dramatic character. In his analysis of this context, Rynell (2008) develops the concept "background–situation–intention" (BSI), "a term for the narrative form of drama framed by the tenses past, present and future" which he considers "applicable to most theatre texts as well as to the art of acting" (pp. 19, 35). Rynell's concept seems equally applicable to the context of jazz improvisation.

Improvisational interaction is characterized by its contingency; "at each moment a performer has a range of creative options" (Sawyer, 1996, p. 270). In this respect, the improvisational performance is similar to Mead's (1932) concept of the *emergent*. Mead's thoughts on nature and time are based on his view that change is not just a perceptive, subjective phenomenon; rather, it is metaphysically real: "reality exists in the present. [...] Existence involves non-existence; it does take place. The world is a world of events" (p. 1). Just as change is real, so is emergence. The past can only exist in the presence; thus, there can be no "real" past. The past changes in order to conform to new events:

It is idle, at least for the purposes of experience, to have recourse to a 'real' past within which we are making constant discoveries; for that past must be set over against a present in which the emergent appears, and the past, which must then be looked at from the standpoint of the emergent, becomes a different past. The emergent when it appears is always found to follow from the past, but before it appears, it does not, by definition, follow from the past. (p. 2)

Sawyer (1996) applies Mead's philosophical view to the context of improvisation. It may be that, as Sawyer argues, "after an act is performed, everyone assumes it was predicted by the prior flow of interaction"; however, any such assumption is an "analytic error" (p. 276).

Sarath (1993) puts forward a two-part model of the internal mechanics of the improvisational process:

the artist first generates a musical idea or event, from which he or she infers a field of possible subsequent events. Their subsequent realization (or

nonrealization) determines the balance of unity and variety, or expectation and surprise – the affective dynamics that govern musical response. How the musician engages in the ongoing decision-making process, where each moment is juxtaposed with an implied future, determines the spontaneity of the music. (p. 23)

In response to this two-part model, one question may be asked: What background, then, influenced the artist to generate this particular idea or event? Arguably, three-part models (such as, for instance, Saint Augustine's past–present–future, Rynell's background–situation–intention, or, for that matter, J. L. Austin's locutionary–illocutionary–perlocutionary) would have the potential of contributing even richer pictures of what goes on in jazz improvisation. To put it rather carelessly: in the view of many, a jazz soloist ought to know the tune, articulate musical ideas, and reach the listener. In the analysis of my empirical investigation, I shall strive – in a somewhat more thorough manner – to apply a triadic approach to understanding jazz improvisation, as well as a metaphorical rather than literal interpretation of the concept of storytelling in this context.

Before proceeding to the discussion of other relevant theoretical perspectives such as the intermedial use of concepts (3.2), conceptual metaphors and conceptual blending (3.3), as well as educational and sociological perspectives on jazz improvisation (3.4 and 3.5, respectively), I wish to return to and dwell further upon yet another aspect of the concept of storytelling that could be seen very much as an expansion of this concept in relation to the literal narrative interpretation: the African American rhetorical practices known as Signifyin(g).

### 3.1.4. African American rhetorical practices in jazz improvisation

As touched upon above in section 2.2.5, *double meaning* on several levels permeates the conditions of African American people, their culture, their rhetorical practices, and their music. This section dwells further on these rhetorical practices, in order to enable a discussion, evaluation, and operationalization of a number of perspectives of relevance to my investigation.

In the late 19th century, Du Bois (1903/1989) addressed issues of race in his observation that being at the same time African *and* American will entail psycho-social tensions and a deprivation of true self-consciousness. Du Bois referred to these phenomena as a sense of looking at oneself through the eyes of others: an African American "double consciousness", a "two-ness" of being "an American, a Negro; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder" (p. 5).

Fossum (2010) suggests that even though Bakhtin (1981, 1986) explicitly addresses questions of linguistic utterance, his thoughts may be applicable to the

mediation of music as well. This suggestion seems very much in accordance with the views of several writers on African American cultural practices. In particular, Bakhtin's (1981, 1986) concepts of *double-voiced discourse* and *dialogism* have been considered valuable. Before I proceed to a closer look at rhetoric in an African American context specifically, I present, therefore, a brief overview of some pertinent perspectives in Bakhtin's thinking.

A central notion in Bakhtin (1986) is the concept of *addressivity*. Its purpose is to shed light on a certain dimension of directedness in utterances. According to Bakhtin, an utterance is always "a link in a chain of communication" (p. 86); it is always addressed to someone and anticipates an answer. There can be no utterances without addressivity, he claims, and this dimension affects in an important way that which is expressed by any utterance. Addressivity has to do with the speaker's expectations regarding the addressee's reactions to the utterance. Everyone who utters something is conscious of the reaction or response from the addressee, and this is anticipated already in the utterance itself:

Any understanding of live speech, a live utterance, is inherently responsive [...] Any understanding is imbued with response and necessarily elicits it in one form or another: the listener becomes the speaker. [...] the speaker talks with an expectation of a response, agreement, sympathy, objection, execution, and so forth. (Bakhtin, 1986, pp. 68–69)

In other words, the listener does not stay in the role of a listener. The process in which the listener becomes a speaker commences as the reception of the utterance begins: through listening, the addressee takes a responding stance. There is thus a movement of sorts towards each other in a reciprocal relationship between speaker and listener:

A word is a bridge thrown between myself and another. If one end of the bridge depends on me, then the other depends upon my addressee. A word is territory shared by both addresser and addressee, by the speaker and his interlocutor. (Bakhtin & Volosinov, 1986, p. 86)

Bakhtin (1981) puts forward a similar image of language:

The word lives, as it were, on the boundary between its own context and another, alien, context. [...] Language [...] lies on the borderline between oneself and the other. The word in language is half someone else's. (pp. 284, 294)

Bakhtin (1986) also points out that each person's utterances are shaped in interaction with the utterances of others in a process of *assimilation*. According to Bakhtin (1986), the words used in speakers' utterances are normally not selected in their "neutral, *dictionary form*":

We usually take them from *other utterances*, and mainly from utterances that are kindred to ours in genre, that is, in theme, composition, or style. (p. 87)

This process of assimilation is an important feature of speech:

Our speech, that is, all our utterances (including our creative works), is filled with others' words, varying degrees of otherness or varying degrees of 'our-ownness'. (p. 89)

Every utterance is "a link in the chain of speech communication of a particular sphere"; it should be regarded as a response (in a broad sense of the word) to "preceding utterances of the given sphere" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 91).

Therefore, every word and sign is *interindividual*:

Everything that is said, expressed, is located outside the soul of the speaker and does not belong only to him. The word cannot be assigned to a single speaker. (Bakhtin, 1986, pp. 121–122)

Every utterance is filled with *dialogic overtones*. Bakhtin (1986) points out that our philosophical, scientific, and artistic thought

is born and shaped in the process of interaction and struggle with others' thought, and this cannot but be reflected in the forms that verbally express our thought as well. (p. 92)

Every utterance structures itself in the answer's direction:

Forming itself in an atmosphere of the already spoken, the word is at the same time determined by that which has not yet been said but which is needed and in fact anticipated by the answering word. (Bakhtin, 1981, pp. 279–280)

Furthermore, according to Bakhtin, there is no limit to the dialogic context. The dialogism of speech extends into a boundless past and a boundless future. Meanings "born in the dialogue of past centuries" are also unstable, since they change in future development of the dialogue (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 170).

[...] language is heteroglot from top to bottom: it represents the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past. (pp. 282, 291)

Bakhtin coins further terms to describe the features of dialogism. Speech and complex discourse in novels, scientific or philosophical prose, and so forth, are necessarily *polyphonic*, incorporating many voices, styles, and references that are not the speaker's

"own". Speech is mixed with *heteroglossia*: the appropriated words and expressions of an other's speech. Bakhtin (1981) introduces the concept of *double-voiced discourse*: a mixture of two social languages within a single utterance. This *internal dialogization*, in Bakhtin's view, is one of the complicated techniques with which this linguistic encounter can be represented in a novel:

Heteroglossia, once incorporated into the novel (whatever forms for its incorporation), is *another's speech in another's language*, serving to express authorial intentions but in a refracted way. Such speech constitutes a special type of *double-voiced discourse*. [...] In such discourse there are two voices, two meanings and two expressions [...]; it is as if they actually hold a conversation with each other. (p. 324)

To theorists building on Du Bois's account of African American consciousness as divided, Bakhtin's theory of double-voiced discourse has offered fruitful perspectives on the cultural self-articulation of African Americans. Floyd (1995) points out that "African musical traits and cultural practices [...] played a major role in the development and elaboration of African-American music" (p. 5). Gilroy (1993) argues that the special power of expressive black cultural forms "derives from a doubleness, their unsteady location simultaneously inside and outside the conventions, assumptions, and aesthetic rules" (Gilroy, 1993, p. 73). In the view of Radano (2003), "the sound of black music has acquired meaning through [interracial] discursive representation" (p. xv), in particular, "racialized constructions of difference" (p. 11).

Gates (1988), noting the "unique usage" (p. 81) of the word Signifyin(g) in black discourse, remarks that "Signification is a complex rhetorical device that has elicited various, even contradictory, definitions from linguists" (p. 88).

This perspective relates to the thinking of Jacques Derrida (2001), whose deconstruction of supposedly binary opposites in traditional Western understanding of human existence, such as nature/culture, or original/copy, shows that these dichotomies are not absolute; rather, they are based on socially constructed value hierarchies and ought to be viewed as arbitrary relations between components in a socio-cultural system. Knowledge of the world is, according to Derrida, knowledge of the signs in the world. There is no original meaning beyond or before the signs; the real world must be interpreted in the same way text is interpreted. Deconstruction thus promotes an anti-essentialist, discursive, social-constructionist stance, including a sceptic attitude towards everything that appears to be permanent and stable.

Gates (1988) quotes approvingly a definition of Signifyin(g) proposed by the literary critic and anthropologist Roger D. Abrahams: "the language of trickery, that set of words and gestures which arrives at 'direction through indirection'" (p. 74). Gates highlights Signifyin(g) as a term for rhetorical strategies; indeed, he argues, "for black adults, Signifyin(g) is the name for the figures of rhetoric themselves, the figure

of the figure" (p. 77). Since these are "the values assigned to Signifyin(g) by the members of the Afro-American speech community", Gates calls Signifyin(g) "the black trope of tropes, the figure for black rhetorical figures" (p. 51). He remarks that "Signifyin(g), in Lacan's sense, is the Other of discourse; but it also constitutes the black Other's discourse as its rhetoric" (p. 50).

Connecting the theoretical frameworks of Gates and Saussure, Kühl (2003) remarks: "*Signifyin'* exemplifies [...] the reflectivity between the *langue* of culture and the *parole* of the individual" (p. 90; my translation). In the words of Floyd (1995), "musical Signifyin(g) is troping; the transformation of preexisting musical material by trifling with it, teasing it, or censoring it" (p. 8). He views Signifyin(g) as closely related to play; it is, he says,

the ultimate artistic manifestation of the human play instinct, a magnificent substantiation of the *playing of* instruments and voices, the *playing with* musical ideas, feelings, and emotions, and *playing on* the content of the cultural memory. 'Play' is the essence of Call–Response. (p. 233)

Gates (1988) provides examples of pastiche and parody in the context of jazz improvisation. Count Basie in his composition "Signify" alludes to several jazz styles of the 1920s and '30s (for instance, ragtime, stride, boogie-woogie, and "walking bass"). According to Gates, Basie's composition is characterized by pastiche, recapitulating "the very tradition of which he grew" (p. 124). Furthermore, it is characterized by phrases that overlap the rhythmic structure: Basie does not play the downbeat but is "free to 'comment' on the first beat of the chorus":

When a musician 'signifies' the beat, he is playing the upbeat into the downbeat of the chorus. [...] Because the form is self-evident to the musician, both he and his well-trained audience are playing and listening with expectation. Signifyin(g) disappoints these expectations; caesuras, or breaks, achieve the same function. This form of disappointment creates a dialogue between what the listener expects and what the artist plays. Whereas younger, less mature musicians accentuate the beat, more accomplished musicians do not have to do so. They feel free to imply it. (Gates, 1988, p. 123)

Floyd (1995) lists several "characterizing and foundational elements of African-American music":

calls, cries, and hollers; call-and-response devices; additive rhythms and polyrhythms; heterophony, pendular thirds, blue notes, bent notes, and elisions; hums, moans, grunts, vocables, and other rhythmic-oral declamations, interjections, and punctuations; off-beat melodic phrasings and parallel intervals and chords; constant repetition of rhythmic and melodic figures and phrases (from which riffs and vamps would be derived); timbral distortions of

various kinds; musical individuality within collectivity; game rivalry; hand clapping, foot patting, and approximations thereof; apart-playing; and the metronomic pulse that underlies all African-American music. (p. 6)

Floyd (1995) further argues that all such musical practices can serve as Signifyin(g) figures, "since they are used as tropes in musical performances and compositions" (p. 7). In African American music, he points out, "musical figures Signify by commenting on other musical figures":

on themselves, on performances of other music, on other performances of the same piece, and on completely new works of music. Moreover, genres Signify on other genres – ragtime on European and early European and American dance music; blues on the ballad; the spiritual on the hymn; jazz on blues and ragtime; gospel on the hymn, the spiritual, and blues; soul on rhythm and blues, rock'n'roll, and rock music; bebop on swing, ragtime rhythms, and blues; funk on soul; rap on funk; and so on. (p. 95)

One "classic" example of musical Signifyin(g), according to Floyd (1995), is the call-and-response pattern:

Here, the instrument performs a kind of sonic mimicry that creates the illusion of speech or narrative conversation. When performers of gospel music, for example, begin a new phrase while the other musicians are only completing the first, they may be Signifyin(g) on what is occurring and on what is to come, through implication and anticipation. The implication is 'I'm already there.' And when soloists hang back, hesitating for a moment to claim their rightful place in the flow of things, they are saying, silently and metaphorically, 'But I wasn't, really.' This kind of Signifyin(g) allows the performer to be in two places at once; it is sheer, willful play – a dynamic interplay of music and aesthetic power, the power to control and manipulate the musical circumstance. In this way, performers combine the ritual teasing and critical insinuations of Signifyin(g) with the wit, dunning, and guile of the trickster in a self-empowering aesthetic and communicational device. (p. 96)

Musicological hands-on analyses of jazz recordings may offer interesting corroboration to the view of jazz improvisation as (sometimes) dialogic. Schuller (1989) points out that Coleman Hawkins possessed an ability to create "his Hawkins music in total independence of his surroundings" (p. 433). Contrasting monologic and dialogic approaches, DeVaux (1997/2000) suggests that there are interesting and characteristic differences in the rhetoric of different jazz soloists' storytelling:

Coleman Hawkins's earnestness has one fatal flaw. Once he has reached his climax, he has nowhere to go – no way of ratcheting the level of intensity up

another notch short of incoherent screaming. [Charlie] Parker's rhetoric, on the other hand, allows for irony, the juxtaposition of the unexpected. It may simply be the matter of ingeniously asymmetric phrasing. Or it may involve the juxtaposition of different *kinds* of rhetoric. [...] It is this open-ended quality – the open-endedness of ambiguity – that Parker shared with Lester Young, and that made both of them devastatingly effective in a cutting contest. If Hawkins's art is monologic [...], the art of Charlie Parker, and the bebop idiom he helped call into being, is dialogic. (p. 268)

For instance, DeVaux (1997/2000) finds the same "irony and disconcerting shifts of rhetoric" in the trumpeter Howard McGhee's 1945 solo on the recording of "Bean soup" (p. 406).

The notion of *ambiguity* had been put forward earlier in connection with jazz improvisation. Criticizing the influence of the concept of art on jazz music, Taylor (1978) argues that African American work songs and early blues were designed to be ambiguous, to carry one meaning which is acceptable to the white listener and another (often clandestine) one which delights the singer. Thus, Taylor argues, an African American attitude was bred of not meaning what you say, but *implying* what you mean. Taylor interprets improvisation in jazz as a phenomenon which has developed from this attitude: the melody appears to be present, but *something else* is intertwined with it, saying something else. To improvise is to add ambiguity.

Murphy (1990) applies Gates's perspectives on *signifyin(g)* in an ethnomusicological approach to the role of tradition and influence on jazz improvisation, "a holistic approach that seeks to make connections between musical performance and other aspects of [African American] culture" (p. 7) rather than applying criteria from other forms of expression such as Western art music or literature. Discussing and interpreting examples of motivic transformation processes in a number of jazz improvisations, Murphy points out that jazz improvisers often "celebrate their debt to their precursors" by making their influences obvious, "[b]y invoking and reworking music that is familiar to the audience" (p. 9).

Notably, the analytical outlook on improvisation based on Gates's perspectives finds a parallel in the post-structuralist analytical approach of Judith Butler (2004). Monson (1996) describes improvisation as "repetition with a signal difference" (p. 103), a phrase borrowed from Gates's analysis of *Signifyin(g)* as a literary procedure. This description relates in interesting ways to Butler's (2004) interpretation of human action as improvisation and, in particular, of gender as "a practice of improvisation within a scene of constraint" (p. 1). Arguably, Monson and Butler both take improvisation to exemplify the paradoxical conditions of human agency: to act is to recreate and to deviate at the same time. In the words of Butler (2004), human action, that is, improvisation, can never deny the way a human agent is "constituted by norms", "constituted by a social world I never chose", constituted, "invariably and from the start, by what is before us and outside us" (p. 3).



On an all-embracing level, Floyd (1995) contends that "all African-American music making is driven by and permeated with the memory of things from the cultural past"; "a compelling cultural and musical continuity exists between all the musical genres of the African-American cultural experience" (p. 10). For instance, he points out, the soprano saxophonist Sidney Bechet saw African American music as "expressive of cultural memory"; Floyd uses this term to refer to the subjective knowledge of members of a culture: "nonfactual and nonreferential motivations, actions, and beliefs" (Floyd, 1995, pp. 8–9). The same perspective seems to inform these lines of Swedish poetry:

och din kornett ropade  
om den fröjd och plåga som är det svarta livets  
[and your cornet called out  
about the joy and torment of black life]  
(Stig Carlson, "Bunk Johnson", 1951).

It is often stated that in African American music, the how of a performance is more important than the what. Gates (1988) points out that Signifyin(g) redirects attention from the signified to the signifier; hence, the performers' physical play becomes important material signifiers. The musicians' sonic gestures are accompanied by the movements of the players and their instruments: "These movements are the physical signifiers that are part and parcel of the black musical experience. [...] [I]t is in the material manifestations of Signifyin(g) that reside many of the clues and cues to the perception of black music and its evaluation" (Floyd, 1995, p. 97).

On the other hand, Radano (2003) cautions against the temptation to let the analytical tools guide and restrict the conception of jazz to include *nothing but* questions of musical allusions: "music scholars have presented literal readings of the mechanisms of signifying that ultimately deny the multiple and complex levels of meaning that determine musical experience" (p. 37). In Radano's view, analysts would be wise to avoid the "the temptation of fixing jazz practices into a Procrustean bed of indirection" (p. 303).

Radano (2003) maintains that no music can be considered a stable phenomenon, isolated from its historical context, and that the concept of music cannot be presumed to carry an ontological meaning which is independent of social forces: "the very concept of 'music' is grounded in a peculiarly European history that reified sound as form" (p. 41); "to name the many versions of acoustical knowing 'music' is to impose onto a diversity of experience a peculiarly western European socioartistic construct" (p. 103). Referring to Goehr (1992), Radano points out that

'Music' as we know it emerges as a local European concept that becomes a marker of an increasingly racialized conception of civility in the early modern era. This signature of value would be specified to its written, composed

manifestations that gain special primacy as 'works' with the emergence of romantic aesthetics. (Radano, 2003, p. 325)

Neither ought the concept of rhythm to be perceived as absolute or monolithic. Radano (2003) argues that "'rhythm' is itself constituted in an unstable discourse rather than being something natural and attributable to all music" (p. 42) and that "the discrete European category of rhythm was not likely a part of the slaves' musical epistemology [...] the social power of rhythm was invented within the discourses of colonialism as a way of defining African difference" (p. 103).

On a similar note, Butterfield (2010) points to a particular quality of the social construction of "swing" in jazz discourse: "use of the term inevitably carries racial meanings" (p. 335).

Culture is not identical with ethnicity, and cultural patterns do not necessarily coincide with national borders. In his analysis of black culture, Gilroy (1993) advocates *the Atlantic* as a cultural and historical unit of analysis in order to attain a perspective which is neither ethnocentric nor nationalist, but "transnational and intercultural" (p. 15). *The sea* and *the ship* become his means to elucidate "the inescapable hybridity and intermixture of ideas" (p. xi):

the histories of borrowing, displacement, transformation, and continual reinscription that the musical culture encloses are a living legacy that should not be reified in the primary symbol of the diaspora and then employed as an alternative to the recurrent appeal of fixity and rootedness. (p. 102)

In Foucault's views – that the modern soul is produced permanently within the body by the functioning of power that is exercised – Gilroy (1993) finds support for an anti-anti-essentialism that sees racialized subjectivity as the product of the social practices that supposedly derive from it (p. 102). Accordingly, Gilroy views black identity as a question of "outcome of practical activity":

Black identity [...] is lived as a coherent (if not always stable) experiential sense of self. (p. 102)

To an extent, Radano (2003) finds himself in sympathy with Gilroy's view: the distinctive feature of black music is "the musically articulated resistances to an overarching white racial supremacy" (p. 39). But he questions the existence of a transcendent, purely musical force beyond the instability of discourses. To maintain that black music possesses certain definite properties (for instance, "soulful, rhythmically affecting, based on collective engagements of call and response") depends, he argues, on "presentist assumptions" (p. 5). Radano's argument is decidedly anti-essentialist: firstly, he questions that black music would "play by a different set of rules, distinct from the traditions governing American social history"

(p. 35), secondly and more importantly, he questions the thought of what he terms the myth of a black identity ("the myth of a consistent and stable socio-racial position of 'blackness'", p. 3), since "the sound of black music has acquired meaning through discursive representation" (p. xv). Black music is the product of a social process in relation to white norms, not the symptom of some sort of "racially based" property (p. 8).

In his anti-essentialist analysis of black music, Radano (2003) points to how the meaning of this concept lacks a firm core. On the contrary, in accordance with Amiri Baraka's notion of "the changing same" (Baraka, 1967), he finds it to be the subject of constant renegotiations. Radano finds a concept of "strangeness" (Otherness), developed on the basis of white norms, to be an essential ingredient of Blackness:

The conception of difference records that which is both real and unreal. It designates the places that musical Africanness can inhabit as it inevitably translates those expressions into forms of strangeness that only then become accessible to European-based determination. This logical paradox is the core of black musical hermeneutic, for no one side of the tale can be accounted for without the other. (p. 44)

Swedish literature, too, may provide examples of such *discursive lability* regarding black music. Starting in the 1920s, jazz poetry has been an important subgenre in Swedish poetry. Saxophones and cymbals became prevalent metaphors of the noise and ecstasy of modernity (Everling, 1993). However, there was one very early bird among these jazz poets: Emil Kléen, who used the word "negermelodi" [Negro melody] already in 1888. (This was possibly a *Lese Frucht*, originating in some continental poet's encounter with the Fisk Singers.) In his lines

kände längtans timmar långsamt glida  
som takter i en negermelodi  
[felt the hours of longing sliding slowly  
as measures in a Negro melody]

Kléen focused on the tardiness, rather than the rapture, of the music (Bjerstedt, 2008).

Agawu (2003) remarks that every analysis focusing on cultural *differences* (for instance, between "black" and "white") will always depend on concepts that are socially constructed: "Differences [...] are not simply there for the perceiving subject. We do not perceive in a vacuum. Categories of perception are made, not given" (p. 232). Agawu advocates an alternative ethnomusicological stance: "Contesting differences through an embrace of sameness might also prompt a fresh critique of essentialism" (p. 235).

As a consequence of the new technological bases of mass culture, problems of cultural authenticity have become more significant. Gilroy (1993) points to the fact

that "black music has become a truly global phenomenon" (p. 96). Such authenticity issues, he argues, may lead to defensive reactions such as traditionalism. When black cultures display difficulties to see development as enriching, this can be seen as effects of "racism's denials not only of black cultural integrity but of the capacity of blacks to bear and reproduce any culture [...] This defensive reaction to racism can be said to have taken over its evident appetite for sameness and symmetry from the discourses of the oppressor" (p. 97).

Jones [Baraka] (1963) and several other writers have interpreted free jazz, emerging during the civil rights movement in the United States, as a social and cultural response to the appropriation and exploitation of African American music (Borgo, 2004a). In a fascinating investigation into the dynamics of freer forms of improvisation, Borgo and Goguen (2005) make use of insights from theories of complex and chaotic dynamical systems. They aim to demonstrate that while such performances lack the artificial symmetry of traditional music, their coherence is often reminiscent of natural processes; their forms can be turbulent and coherent at the same time. In particular, Borgo and Goguen's interest is focused on *phase transitions*, the shared cognitive ability and collective decision-making that enable musicians to transition as a seemingly self-organizing group from one kind of interactive approach to another. They suggest that such transitions can be triggered by the use of repeated figures that work as instances of signifyin(g) as described by Gates (1988): transition-prefiguring cadences that may or may not actually produce an actual transition.

Such lines of reasoning seem to fit well with Lewis's (1996) distinction between Afrological and Eurological improvisation in music (cf. section 2.2.4). A dichotomy between notated and improvised forms of musical creativity can be noted in many musical traditions; according to Borgo (2004a), it seems "less apparent in the African-American creative music community" (p. 170). Borgo finds that even if certain free improvisers have frequently expressed their desire for a "styleless" or "nonidiomatic" musical approach, free improvisation continues to display "certain shared traits" (p. 184).

Prouty (2012) emphasizes that the globalization of jazz (or, for that matter, of other American contributions to world culture) can be viewed as a two-edged sword: "For many Americans, globalization represents a challenge to American ideas [while] [f]or many others around the world, globalization heralds not a challenge to American hegemony but an extension of it" (p. 152). Commenting on European jazz approaches, Prouty quotes a musician's view regarding adequate roots for jazz playing: "jazz isn't based on classical music, it's based on blues and church and emotion and spirit – the real shit" (p. 175). However, in their book with the significant plural title, *Jazzs*, Duflo and Sauvanet (2003) sum up current globalization tendencies in jazz: "la cupération dans le jazz de thématiques de musiques populaires européennes [...], moyen-orientales [...], voire orientales tout court", and they state that "quel que soit l'avenir du jazz, son histoire ne s'écrit plus exclusivement aux États-Unis" (p. 70). In brief, then, the future of jazz may include many new input sources, and the music's

bonds to African American culture may decrease. Can the concept of Signifyin(g) be of relevance and value to the analysis of musical practices outside the realm of black music? There seems to be no reason why it should not. Nicholson (2005) quotes the Italian musicologist Stefano Zenni's perspective on the role of Signifyin(g) in European jazz:

All black music is a continuous process of *signifyin'*, of conversing constantly with elements of the tradition, of turning everything around all the time, playing with music and words, overturning their meaning with all the 'voices' that echo in music. When music is produced in Europe, it is logical that its *signifyin'* doesn't draw on blues or spirituals, of course, but on a different cultural heritage that ranges from archaic Nordic tunes to the effervescent Mediterranean cultures, which also have their own particular relationship, in their own particular way, to African-American music (in their case via the Arabic and North African interface), passing through the weighty tradition of classically 'educated' music. (p. 177)

There are questions to be asked in this context which may prove highly relevant to the aim of the present study. To what extent could Swedish jazz improvisers be expected to relate to phenomena of the kind described in this section? To what extent do they actually think about such topics and relate to them in their musical practice? These are questions that call for consideration in the course of this investigation.

Frith (1996) has formulated a perspective on storytelling in jazz that may serve well to sum up this section about the influence of African American traditions on this concept. For jazz writers, Frith holds,

the 'story' in music describes an entanglement of aesthetics and ethics; *such a narrative is necessary to any claim that art has something to do with life*. A good jazz performance, that is to say (like any good musical performance), depends on rhetorical truth, on the musicians' ability to convince and persuade the listener that what they are saying matters. This is not a matter of representation or 'imitation' or ideology but draws, rather, on the African-American tradition of 'signifying'; it puts into play an emotional effect, a collusion between the performer and an audience which is engaged rather than detached, knowing rather than knowledgeable. This is the reason why popular music (and I don't believe the argument is confined to African-derived forms, though it helps to explain their remarkable global impact) must be understood *not to represent values but to embody them*. (Frith, 1996, p. 117; emphases are mine.)

This overview of literature on African American rhetorical practices has rendered a number of perspectives on jazz music. I consider several of them highly important and relevant to the present investigation of storytelling in jazz improvisation: for instance, the potentialities of double-voiced discourse in jazz improvisation; the

importance of transformation of preexisting musical material, playing on cultural memory while playing with musical ideas; the relation between the music and the life of the performers and the audience; as well as the importance of embodiment, the performers' physical play ("the how is more important than the what").

## 3.2. Intermedial use of concepts

Il est des parfums frais comme des chairs d'enfants,  
Doux comme les hautbois, verts comme les prairies  
(Baudelaire, "Correspondances", 1857)

My research questions regard a conceptual loan: storytelling in jazz improvisation. The concept storytelling has been transferred from one art form to another. The intermedial use of concepts constitutes an important framework for my own way to this investigation: originally, the *prima facie* paradoxical usage of the concept of musicality in discourse on spoken theatre (cf. 3.2.4) awakened my curiosity and interest, and, through that, the more generalized notion that art forms, or artists, tend to mirror themselves in each other in order to understand themselves better.

The phenomenon of intermedial conceptual loans thus provides an important background to the present investigation. Even though it is not directly related to my research questions on how the term 'storytelling' is viewed and used in the field of jazz improvisation, this phenomenon is highly relevant as a frame. In Chapter 7, I return to questions regarding how issues of the present study may be connected and expanded to perspectives of intermediality in future investigations.

Even though 'rhythm', as a concept of the arts, would seem to originate in the time-based arts, and 'colours' in the visual arts, we still tend to speak – seemingly without much hesitation – of rhythm in a picture and colour in musical orchestration, for instance. This intermediality on a conceptual level is arguably rather different from intermediality in practice, such as a *Lied* (words plus music) or a rock video (music plus film). On a general level, the phenomenon of intermedially employed concepts stands out to me as a very important and interesting research area. Indeed, certain dichotomies seem to encompass our conceptual understanding of all art forms. In his *Republic*, Plato distinguishes between *diegesis* (narration) and *mimesis* (imitation). Arguably, this dichotomy has since permeated our understanding of all the arts. From an intermedial perspective, the dichotomy is closely related to a number of distinctions of similar shape, for instance, epic/dramatic, story/action, telling/showing, word/picture, or conceptual art/perceptual art. Christer Johansson (2008, 2012, & forthcoming) in his project on concepts of medium and intermediality discusses how this category of intermedially applicable dichotomies as

well as a number of concepts such as language, text, narrativity, and fictionality relate to several art forms such as prose, film, and theatre.

In a discussion of synesthetic phenomena, Asplund (2003) points out that one answer to the synesthetic question "How does a sunrise sound?" – however ridiculous it may appear – was composed by Jean Sibelius in his symphonic poem "Nightride and sunrise" (Op. 55). Asplund offers this description of what he hears:

At first it gets lighter little by little, then eventually the sun's disk rises above the horizon with a start and the light pours out like the smelt from a blast-furnace. This 'and there was light' is like a bellowing chord that lasts for a couple of seconds. Then the light drowns everything. (p. 76; my translation)

The aim of the following short paragraphs, which need to be – and which I intend to be – nothing more than mere sketches, is to illustrate that this kind of *intermedial use of concepts* is not, by any means, confined to the example of musical storytelling only. A number of other instances will be introduced briefly. In a sense, they are all paradoxical. From the theory of literature, there is the case of *the voice in the text*. From the theory of fine arts, there is the case of *the music in the picture* as well as *the rhyme in the picture*. In the field of spoken theatre, the concept of *musicality in spoken theatre* functions as a common and important prestige word. After presenting these scattered exemplifications, I will proceed in a concluding subsection (3.2.4) to a preliminary discussion of a model and a classification of intermedial relations.

### 3.2.1. The voice in the text

Reading in modern society is primarily a silent occupation. Still, paradoxically, we often seek to understand an object of literature better through looking for its 'tone' or its 'voice'. Writing about the voice in the text, Engdahl (1994/2005) commences his essay with an assertion and a question: "No text has begun until the author has struck a tone. But what is a tone?" (p. 11; my translation).

In a footnote, Engdahl offers an elegantly compressed summary of the richness of this question.

Tone should not be mixed up with grammatic intonation, the melodic and dynamic voice changes that are necessary to make clear the structure of the sentence. The difference is easy to illustrate. The sentence "You behave" can be altered from an assertion to a question through a change in the pitch curve. "You behave?" But even after the interrogative shape has been established, the words will mean very different things depending on whether they are pronounced as an inquiry, a prayer, a command, or a jest. And partly irrespective of these alternatives the utterance can express different degrees of

concern, fear, disdain, pride, or perhaps mere indifference. (p. 13; my translation)

Engdahl also asks why tone (from the Greek word *tónos*) has come to denote this "linguistic border phenomenon" (p. 13; my translation). Maybe, he says, it has to do with the fact that *tónos* also means musical key or mode. In ancient Greece, of course, musical modes were considered to express and affect human characteristics.

Based on this fundamental concept of tone in writing, innumerable applications of more or less elaborate musical conceptualizations permeate discourses on literature. For instance, in the 1996 press release of the Nobel prize committee, the following words were used to characterize the poet and Nobel prize winner Wisława Szymborska: "the Mozart of poetry [...] her wealth of inspiration and the veritable ease with which her words seem to fall into place [...] also something of the fury of Beethoven" (Nobelprize.org, 1996). Obviously, to the Nobel committee's understanding of Szymborska's poetry, both formal and expressive musical features had seemed relevant.

Intermedial conceptual loans plainly travel in both directions between music and the narrative arts. Just as musicians are compared to storytellers, so will the art of writing sometimes be understood through comparison with that of musical composition. Interestingly, novels such as Michael Ondaatje's *Coming through slaughter* and Geoff Dyer's *But beautiful* explicitly aim to capture in prose a number of characteristics of the playing of jazz musicians (Ondaatje, 1976; Dyer, 1991). Jarrett (1999) provides an in-depth examination of relations between jazz music and writing.

### 3.2.2. The music in the picture

Paintings, like books, are silent. Nevertheless, musical concepts are quite common in discourse on the visual arts. For instance, the concept of *rhythm* is often employed in connection with the (more or less regular) recurrence of elements in visual representation, prominently so in works of, for instance, Pollock, Mondrian, and Miró. In this context, rhythm – like structure – is the product of visual repetition.

In a similar vein Engdahl (2009) writes of the "life-giving exaggeration" in the paintings of Ola Billgren: "as if he put a magnificent orchestral sound over a raw, irresistible melody he just heard someone whistle in the square" (p. 179); "We only watch the music" (p. 180). Engdahl also refers to an essay by Billgren about "the orchestral effect" in Turner's paintings, "their surprising modulations and overwhelming tonal climbs" (p. 179–180; my translations).

In this network of intermedial conceptual relations, there are probably no art forms that remain in complete mutual isolation. The next subsection touches briefly upon relations between the visual arts and poetry.



### 3.2.3. The rhyme in the picture

Linde (1981/1985) points to how Mallarmé treats the rhymes in his complicated sonnet "Une bouteille..." (1887): a sensual unity appears through putting together in couples, "independent of the meaning of that which is put together". Linde compares these rhymes to a similar phenomenon in the painting *Loons* (*Storlommar*, 1901) by Bruno Liljefors. The artist has not painted the wave around which the loons are swimming. The white wing markings of the loons "are" the foam of the wave; "the wave can only be seen by the poetic eye – an eye which puts together in couples [...] In this sense the painting is a work of poetry" (p. 160–161; my translation). In short, Linde sees *rhymes* in the picture. He points to a number of similar examples of "mutuality play" in the works of Liljefors.

I interpret this interesting observation as exemplifying, on one hand, a sort of special case of the rhythm in the visual arts but at the same time, on the other hand, an extension and in-depth exploration of both the musical concept of rhythm and the poetic concept of rhyme in the visual arts medium. It would seem, then, that intermedial conceptual relations between the arts will not necessarily be restricted to pairs of art forms; intermedial relations in *ménages à trois* as well as, probably, other combinations are also feasible.

### 3.2.4. Musicality in spoken theatre

The previous subsections present a few scattered exemplifications of conceptual loans between narrative, visual, and musical art forms. In a previous investigation by this author, one similar intermedial conceptual loan in the dramatic art forms was the object of study. The study focuses on how the concept of *musicality* is used in artistic and educational discourse on spoken theatre; it is entitled *Musicality as a standard and an educational goal for Western spoken theatre* (Bjerstedt, 2010). The prominent use of the term 'musicality' in theatre contexts is considered both interesting and a bit mysterious. It is used as a prestige word in theatre discourse; indeed, to say that an actor or a performance lacks musicality might be some of the harshest words of criticism imaginable in this field. The concept of musicality in this context is interpreted as a rich intermedial metaphor. It is found to mediate holistic views in artistic practice, analysis, and education. There seems to be an interesting relationship between this investigation and the present one. In chapter 7, I will outline a number of questions for further research that may build on both of these studies.

The investigation (Bjerstedt, 2010) takes its point of departure in the prominent use of the term musicality as a prestige word in theatre discourse where, obviously, not exactly the same reference and meaning is ascribed to the concept as in contexts of music. There seems to have been very little previous research in this area, if any.

The research question is formulated thus: What do theatre practitioners mean when they speak of an actor acting with musicality?

The investigation is divided into three studies. The first one focuses on different perspectives on musicality in the field of music, based on explorative literature studies. The second study focuses on a sample of citations from literature on theatre where musicality and related concepts seem to be put forward in interesting and relevant ways in connection with spoken theatre. The third study, finally, is based on a series of explorative interviews with theatre practitioners working as educators at Malmö Theatre Academy, Sweden.

References to art forms other than music are shown to be very rare among musicologists discussing the concept of musicality. Furthermore, there are reasons to distinguish between three different perspectives on musicality, introduced by Brändström (1997, 2006) as an absolute, a relativistic and a relational view; and to distinguish also between different perspectives on music, for instance, an aesthetic view (Reimer, 1970/1989) versus praxialism (Elliott, 1995).

From an historical point of view, three ideals or paradigms of theatre can be discerned: the rhetorical, the realistic and the modernistic ideal, respectively. The meanings and functions of musicality in theatre are shown to be historically and culturally dependent. Furthermore, a systematic overview of different theatre practitioners' perspectives indicates that educational and professional theatre discourses through history as well as today include a great variety of perspectives on music and musicality.

A detailed analysis of the interviews study indicates that in the usage of the informants, the concept of musicality takes on several important meanings; *in toto*, these meanings constitute a field of properties and abilities in the actor that are perceived as necessary conditions for good acting. The concept of musicality as employed in theatre discourse is hence interpreted as a set of dialectically related and interdependent faculties. These faculties are categorized in three fields, all of which constitute necessary conditions for the actor's musicality: acting and being "here and now" with all senses (faculties of *presence*); apprehending, analysing and building structures (faculties of *structure*); and acting and being free, relaxed, active and open (faculties of *fluidity*).

In conclusion, the results of the study seem to indicate that the term musicality is often applied in the field of theatre in a way that could be understood as (i) metaphorical and (ii) socially constructed.

### **3.2.5. A model and a classification of intermedial relations**

As noted initially in this section, the intermedial use of concepts in the arts is the object of study of Christer Johansson (2008, 2012, & forthcoming). However, it is my distinct impression that most intermedial studies focus on the interrelation and

integration of artistic practices and products, not of conceptualizations. In this subsection, I will touch briefly upon the question how intermedial interrelation and integration can be subsumed by a model or a classification.

Cook (1998, 2001) has developed a model for integrated art forms. It is based on the conceptual metaphor theory of Lakoff and Johnson and the conceptual blending theory of Fauconnier and Turner, both of which are introduced elsewhere in this thesis (cf. sections 3.3.6 and 3.3.7, respectively). Cook's model contains two elements: (1) *enabling similarity*, common attributes in the art forms which are necessary for their "perceptual interaction"; (2) *blended space*, a space where new meaning is created through the combination of attributes which are unique to either art form (Cook, 2001, p. 181). In my opinion, these two elements seem to be of great interest in connection with the intermedial use of the concept storytelling in jazz improvisation. It seems reasonable to assume that the intermedial use of the concept of storytelling would not have come about unless the art forms in question displayed certain common attributes which enable practitioners and theorists to perceive them as similar in certain respects. In order to understand better the way this concept is used intermedially, it might be fruitful to adapt a theory of a blended space where attributes from the respective art forms can be combined. I will return to the question of the pertinence of Cook's model in the discussion of the results of the present investigation.

Lund (2002) provides a classification of intermedial relations:

*Combination*: one medium is added to another in different ways;

*Interreference*: media refer to each other from isolated positions (e.g., music & title);

*Co-existence*: media are mixed on the same "surface" (e.g., a rock video);

*Integration*: media in symbiosis (e.g., calligraphy);

*Transformation*: media represent or in other ways refer to other media which are present only indirectly (e.g., programme music; a film interprets a novel);

*Co-referring media*: media refer to one and the same phenomenon (e.g., the Orpheus myth in words, music and pictures).

Lund (2002) characterizes his classification as a "heuristic construction": "Like all typologies, it is necessarily marred by great simplification" (p. 21; my translation). Notably, it deals exclusively with artistic practices and products, leaving all intermedial relations on a conceptual level aside.

In brief, therefore, I find it difficult to use Lund's classification as a point of departure for the categorization of the intermedial relation which is the subject of my research interest. Questions of how intermediality on the level of artistic practice differs from intermediality on a conceptual level will be raised, problematized, and discussed in section 6.1.

### 3.3. Fictions, metaphors, and conceptual blending

Was bei jeder andern Kunst noch Beschreibung, ist bei der Tonkunst schon Metapher. (Hanslick, 1854/1922, p. 62)

In my view, an intermedially borrowed concept such as 'storytelling' in discourse on jazz improvisation constitutes a highly interesting and important but insufficiently investigated borderland phenomenon in the arts. In line with the discussion in subsection 3.1.3, I find it reasonable to approach it as an instance of *metaphor*. In order to render possible a thorough examination of the functions of this conceptual loan, I therefore find it urgent to include a rather rich overview of theories of metaphor in the theoretical framework of this study – and to formulate my own stance with regard to these theories. The survey in this section commences with an early theory of *fictions* influenced mainly by Kant and Nietzsche (Vaihinger, 1911). Interestingly, this view (introduced in subsection 3.3.1) shows some similarities with the theories of *conceptual metaphors* and *conceptual blending* in modern cognitive linguistics (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Fauconnier & Turner, 1994; cf. subsections 3.3.6–3.3.7). Intermediate theorists during the 20th century have formulated a variety of important and highly interesting perspectives, termed here the discursive, interaction and tension views on metaphor, respectively. Brief overviews of these perspectives are included in subsections 3.3.3–3.3.5. In order to operationalize this theoretical framework with regard to the present study, further subsections focus on applications of these theories to the field of musical thinking (3.3.8–3.3.9), on the topology of metaphor (3.3.10), as well as on educational perspectives on metaphor (3.3.11). In a final subsection (3.3.12) I discuss the applicability of different kinds of metaphor theory to the present investigation.

#### 3.3.1. Fictions (Hans Vaihinger)

With his fictionalism, or philosophy of "as if" (*Die Philosophie des Als Ob*), Vaihinger (1911) sets out to shed light on a seemingly paradoxical feature of human thinking, namely, our ability to reach valid results on the basis of false assumptions ("bewußtfalschen Vorstellungen", p. VII). Vaihinger insists that it is an essential, overall tendency of human thinking to *make detours* ("Das Denken macht Umwege", p. 175). According to Vaihinger, such false assumptions, for which he coins the term *fictions*, constitute a very important part of what he calls the technology of thinking ("Maschinenlehre des Denkens", p. 180), and he presents a voluminous survey of theoretical, practical, and religious fictions. Attempting to capture their essence, Vaihinger lists four important features.

- (1) A fiction *contradicts reality* ("eine willkürliche Abweichung von der Wirklichkeit, also ein Widerspruch mit derselben", p. 172).
- (2) Because of this contradiction, a fiction can only be used *provisorically* ("provisorisch", p. 173).
- (3) A fiction is used with explicit *awareness of its falsity* ("das ausdrücklich ausgesprochene Bewusstsein [...] der Fiktizität, ohne den Anspruch der Faktizität", p. 173).
- (4) A fiction is used *for a specific purpose* ("Zweckmässigkeit", p. 174).

Therefore, Vaihinger argues, fictions must be viewed as opposed to hypotheses. A hypothesis aims to adequately depict the objective reality. A fiction, on the contrary, can never be verified by reality. It is used with full awareness that it represents an *inadequate, subjective, and figurative* ("bildliche") way of thinking ("Vorstellungsweise", p. 606).

At some points, Vaihinger's concept of illustrative fictions ("illustrative Fiktionen", p. 426) seems rather close to the much later theory of conceptual metaphors in the field of cognitive linguistics (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Illustrative fictions substitute a (concrete) picture in the place of an abstract concept; one of Vaihinger's examples of how we attempt to clarify concepts by rendering them more graphic ("Veranschaulichungsversuche", p. 426) is the depiction of the concept of force by a picture of lines.

In this context, Vaihinger also mentions as an example how time can be perceived and symbolized as movement ("die Auffassung der Zeit unter dem Symbol der Bewegung", p. 426). In an interesting way, his discussion of illustrative fictions by this example predates with several decades the rather similar discussion of the "conceptual metaphors" TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT and TIME IS STATIONARY AND WE MOVE THROUGH IT as presented in the field of cognitive linguistics by Lakoff and Johnson (1980).

The development (and abundance) of theories of metaphor during the twentieth century is of pertinence to the issue of borrowed concepts in the arts. Before we turn to the cognitive linguistic view of conceptual metaphors, a short survey of some of these other views is called for. It will be noted that they are interrelated in a number of interesting ways.

### 3.3.2. The substitution view of metaphor

Naturally, different aspects of metaphor can be stressed. While many analysts of later days view metaphor as primarily a cognitive phenomenon, others focus on its linguistic and textual nature (e.g., Goatly, 1997).

Traditionally, metaphor analysis has tended towards what may be called a *substitution view*, according to which the entire sentence is seen as "replacing some set of literal sentences" (Black, 1962, p. 31). The *comparison view*, which is a special case of the substitution view, regards this literal paraphrase as a statement of similarity or analogy. It thus takes the metaphor to be "a condensed or elliptical simile" (Black, 1993, p. 27). This strong tradition – going back to Aristotle – could be said to identify metaphor with a word that deviates from ordinary usage: a "substitution for an available but absent ordinary word" (Ricoeur, 1975/2003, p. 21). According to this view, metaphors are linguistic embellishments that do not carry any additional information about reality.

### 3.3.3. The discursive view of metaphor (I. A. Richards)

Richards (1936/1971) denies that words have either proper meaning or figurative meaning: indeed, words can possess no proper meaning in themselves, because it is discourse that carries the meaning. Meaning, like discourse, should be regarded as an undivided whole. Richards points out that through the history of rhetoric, metaphor has been treated as "a grace or ornament" (p. 90) while it is in fact "the omnipresent principle of language" (p. 92). While traditional theory made metaphor seem only a verbal matter, a shifting of words, it is fundamentally "a borrowing between and intercourse of thoughts, a transaction between contexts. Thought is metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and the metaphors of language derive therefrom" (p. 94).

The meaning produced by a metaphor, then, can never be found in a dictionary; the meaning is produced by the interaction between the word and the sentence. Beardsley (1958) comments on the fullness of metaphor: "it means all it *can* mean" (p. 144).

### 3.3.4. The interaction view of metaphor (Max Black)

According to Black (1962), a metaphorical statement has two distinct subjects, the "primary" subject and the "secondary" subject. The latter is to be regarded as a system rather than a thing; the metaphorical utterance projects upon the primary subject a set of "associated implications" that are predicable of the secondary subject. In doing so, certain features of the primary subject are selected, emphasized, suppressed, and organized (Black 1993, pp. 27–28).

The *interactive level of metaphor* has been the topic of much debate in later years, in part incited by Black's (1962) statement: "It would be more illuminating in some of these cases [...] to say that metaphor creates the similarity than to say that it formulates some similarity antecedently existing" (p. 37).

Three decades later, Black (1993) notes that "no remark in *Metaphor* has provoked stronger dissent" than this "strong creativity thesis" (p. 35). He still argues vigorously in favour of viewing metaphors as cognitive instruments:

If some metaphors are what might be called 'cognitive instruments,' indispensable for perceiving connections that, once perceived, are *then* truly present, the case for the thesis would be made out. Do metaphors ever function as such cognitive instruments? I believe so. When I first thought of Nixon as 'an image surrounding a vacuum,' the verbal formulation was necessary to my seeing him in this way. [...] I still wish to contend that some metaphors enable us to see aspects of reality that the metaphor's production helps to constitute. [...] the world is necessarily a world *under a certain description* – or a world seen from a certain perspective. Some metaphors can create such a perspective. (pp. 37–38)

Black (1962) sees metaphor as "a sentence or another expression in which *some* of the words are used metaphorically while the remainder are used non-metaphorically" (p. 27). Black suggests that the metaphorical word be designated with the word *focus* and the rest of the sentence with the word *frame*. Black concerns himself with the complete metaphorical statements and, derivatively, with those of their ingredients (words or phrases) that are used metaphorically "only as they occur in *specific* and relatively complete acts of expression and communication" (Black, 1993, p. 24).

### 3.3.5. The tension view of metaphor (Paul Ricoeur)

Ricoeur (1975/2003) also attacks the substitution view on metaphor. Instead he advocates a tension view, which he develops into a theory of cultural creativity and of how communication in language can function innovatively. While the substitution theory concerns the meaning effect at the level of an isolated word, Ricoeur's tension theory applies to how metaphors are produced "within the sentence as a whole" (p. 3). He adheres to I. A. Richards's criticism of the cardinal distinction in classical rhetoric between proper meaning and figurative meaning:

Words have no proper meaning, because no meaning can be said to "belong" to them; and they do not possess any meaning in themselves, because it is discourse, taken as a whole, that carries the meaning, itself an undivided whole. (Ricoeur, 1975/2003, p. 89)

Like Richards, Ricoeur maintains that a metaphor's meaning is produced by the tension between the word and the sentence. However, the tensions that Ricoeur distinguishes are threefold, applying to three different levels: (a) between the word and the sentence; (b) between literal meaning and metaphorical meaning; and (c)

between similarity and difference. In the following few paragraphs, these levels of metaphorical tension are presented.

*Tension between word and sentence.* Ricoeur adheres to the holistic view on sentences and their meaning (summarized in the concept of *énonciation*) put forward by the French linguist Émile Benveniste (1966/1971): "The sentence is realized in words, but the words are not simply segments of it. A sentence constitutes a whole which is not reducible to the sum of its parts; the meaning inherent in this whole is distributed over the ensemble of constituents" (p. 105). In accordance with Benveniste's view that "[t]he sentence is the unit of discourse" (p. 110), Ricoeur contends that metaphors can only be found in concrete metaphorical statements, *discourse events* contextually bound in the use of language. The title of Ricoeur's book, accordingly, is the living (or lively) metaphor (*La métaphore vive*; Ricoeur, 1975/2003).

*Tension between literal meaning and metaphorical meaning.* Beside ordinary usage and scientific language, Ricoeur advocates a third strategy: poetic discourse. Instead of disparaging or fighting certain properties of words, such as their ambiguity and their dependence on context, this strategy will hold such qualities in esteem and attempt to render them productive.

The meaning of metaphor, according to Ricoeur, is produced by a combination of tensions. Metaphor is a relation which can come about only when one seeks to exceed the conflict or tension within a sentence and when one has an innovative intention in doing so. In accordance with this view on how the meaning of a metaphor is produced by at once keeping and transgressing a conflict, Beardsley (1958) has coined the expression "a significant self-contradiction" for metaphor (p. 141). Consequently, the understanding of metaphor also demands a transgression of categories, where new relations of meaning between words are established by our imagination. A poetic metaphor, unlike a trivial one, will carry an infinite number of meanings and will be impossible to translate; it produces new meaning.

*Tension between the "is" of similarity and the "is not" of difference.* Is there such a thing as metaphorical truth? According to Ricoeur (1975/2003), such a concept is of an "inescapably paradoxical character"; "there is no other way to do justice to the notion of metaphorical truth than to include the critical incision of the (literal) 'is not' within the ontological vehemence of the (metaphorical) 'is.'" In doing so, the thesis merely draws the most extreme consequence of the theory of tension" (p. 302).

Metaphors offer a new description of reality in accordance with a logic of discovery of sorts which might be viewed as a *poetic function*. In metaphorical reference, the "is not" of difference will function as an enrichment of the "is" of similarity. Ricoeur quotes Beardsley (1958) who calls metaphor "a poem in miniature" (p. 134). Ricoeur (1975/2003) also refers to Nelson Goodman's (1976) theories of how art as a heuristic fiction provides a new description of reality.

Indeed, when formulating his thoughts on metaphor, Goodman's (1976) own use of metaphor is rather rich, even poetic:



Metaphor, it seems, is a matter of teaching an old word new tricks – of applying an old label in a new way. [...] The shifts in range that occur in metaphor, then, usually amount to no mere distribution of family goods but to an expedition abroad. A whole set of alternative labels, a whole apparatus of organization, takes over new territory. What occurs is a transfer of a schema, a migration of concepts, an alienation of categories. Indeed, a metaphor might be regarded as a calculated category-mistake – or rather as a happy and revitalizing, even if bigamous, second marriage. (pp. 69, 73)

However, with respect to the poetic function of language, Ricoeur does not find the distinction between denotation and connotation especially fruitful; since poetry has a referential function, it will "add to the shaping of the world", and poetic qualities "are 'true' to the extent that they are 'appropriate,' that is, to the extent that they join fittingness to novelty, obviousness to surprise" (p. 282).

Ricoeur (1975/2003) further refers to Max Black's (1962) and Mary Hesse's (1966/1990) views on *scientific models* as instruments of redescription. The strength of models consists in their ability to offend against a descriptive discourse and function as a possibility to see something as something else. Ricoeur concludes: "with respect to the relation to reality, metaphor is to poetic language what the model is to scientific language" (p. 283). He thus uses this "detour via models" to emphasize "the connection between heuristic function and description" (p. 288), "the conjunction between fiction and redescription" (p. 291). In his homage to the "redescriptive power" of poetic language, Ricoeur maintains that "metaphor is that strategy of discourse by which language divests itself of its function of direct description in order to reach the mythic level where its function of discovery is set free" (p. 292).

### 3.3.6. Conceptual metaphors (George Lakoff and Mark Johnson)

In the introduction to this section, I pointed out interesting similarities between examples of fictions offered by Vaihinger (1911) and examples of *conceptual metaphors* offered by Lakoff and Johnson (1980). Today, the latter researchers' cognitive linguistic view of metaphor may be considered "a comprehensive, generalized, and empirically tested theory" (Kövecses, 2002, p. X). In their seminal work *Metaphors we live by*, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) propose that our conceptual system is "fundamentally metaphorical in nature" (p. 3): metaphors, then, are not merely linguistic phenomena; rather, they manifest themselves in the thoughts and actions of our everyday life. Metaphors allow us to comprehend one aspect of a concept (the *target*) in terms of another concept (the *source*). This, Lakoff and Johnson point out, "will necessarily hide other aspects of the concept" (p. 10). The systematic correspondences between source and target are referred to as *mappings* (Kövecses, 2002, p. 6).

For instance, the so called CONDUIT metaphor is a combination of a number of conceptual metaphors: IDEAS ARE OBJECTS, LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS, and COMMUNICATION IS SENDING. However, in "cases where context is required" to determine the meaning of statements, the CONDUIT metaphor will prove inadequate (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 10).

Many fundamental concepts are organized in terms of spatialization metaphors, such as HAPPY IS UP, SAD IS DOWN. Lakoff and Johnson term these *orientational metaphors* (p. 14). Metaphorical mapping, in short, is the process of getting from bodily experience to the structure of thought and language. Experience is kinesthetic, it is structured preconceptually; we "think" with our bodies.

Are metaphors based on experience? Yes, according to these authors, the "IS" used in stating metaphors should be viewed as "shorthand" for the experiential bases of the metaphors (p. 19). Johnson (1987) proposes that meaning is grounded in repeated patterns of bodily experience, giving rise to *image schemata*, preconceptual structures which provide the basis for concepts.

Another important category of conceptual metaphors is the *ontological metaphors*. These let us *view an experience as an entity* "via the noun" (p. 26), thereby enabling us to deal rationally with our experience. For instance, "viewing inflation as an entity allows us to refer to it, quantify it, identify a particular aspect of it, see it as a cause, act with respect to it, and perhaps even believe that we understand it" (p. 26). According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), ontological metaphors pervade our thought to the extent that "they are usually taken as self-evident, direct descriptions of mental phenomena" (p. 28).

Further, the authors maintain that "all experience is cultural through and through, [...] our culture is already present in the very experience itself" (p. 57). *Structural metaphors* (such as, for instance, THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, AN ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY, etc.) are grounded in "systematic correlations" within our physical and cultural experience (p. 61). They also influence our experience and our actions.

One crucial feature of conceptual metaphor theory is its *holistic* view on how experience is structured in human thought. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) present a thorough characterization of the concept of causation through a number of properties which are considered prototypical for this concept. They conclude that we experience "as a *gestalt*; that is, the complex of properties occurring together is more basic to our experience than their separate occurrence" (p. 71).

*Metaphorical entailment* is said to be at hand when rich additional knowledge about a source is mapped onto a target (Kövecses 2002, p. 94). Lakoff and Johnson (1980) maintain that though metaphors are typically consistent with each other, they are rarely completely consistent. Metaphorical expressions that may at first seem random and isolated may often prove to be parts of metaphorical systems that characterize a concept "in all of its aspects, as we conceive them" (p. 105). Metaphorical entailments, then, link all of the instances of a single metaphorical

structuring of a concept; and a shared metaphorical entailment can establish a "cross-metaphorical correspondence" (p. 96).

Gärdenfors (2000) points out how *dead metaphors* can also be understood in terms of metaphorical mapping:

Given metaphors as mappings between domains, the 'death' of a metaphor can be explained as a result of incorporating the structure of the mapping into the target domain itself. [Sometimes] only the metaphorical meaning survives. (How many remember the original meaning of touchstone or scapegoat?) (p. 179)

Based on their findings that we understand one domain of experience in terms of another through metaphors, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) conclude that "understanding takes place in terms of entire domains of experience and not in terms of isolated concepts" (p. 117). Further, such a domain of experience is a structured whole, conceptualized as an *experiential gestalt*. Lakoff and Johnson term such gestalts "natural" kinds of experience, since they are products of (a) our bodies; (b) our interactions with our physical environment; and (c) our interaction with other people within our culture (p. 117).

As a consequence of this view, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) propose that experiences and objects should not be defined in terms of a *set of inherent* ("objective") properties. Instead, since concepts in metaphorical definitions correspond to natural kinds of experience, they should be understood in terms of *interactional properties* that do not form a set but rather a *structure gestalt* (pp. 119–122). Concepts arising from our experience are "open-ended" rather than rigidly defined (p. 125).

Lakoff (1993) formulates this perspective on the *cognitive topology* in metaphorical mapping: "Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the image-schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain" (p. 215).

In sum, according to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), "we *understand* the world through our *interactions* with it" (p. 194); "our experience is structured holistically in terms of experiential gestalts" (p. 224). The authors see metaphor "as essential to human understanding and as a mechanism for creating new meaning and new realities in our lives" (p. 196).

### 3.3.7. Conceptual blending (Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner)

Lakoff and Turner (1989) criticize the theory that the metaphor is *bidirectional*, consisting of a connection across domains but lacking source or target. Against this "Interaction Theory", they argue that

Of course, two different metaphors might share two domains but differ in which is source and which is target [for instances, PEOPLE ARE MACHINES and MACHINES ARE PEOPLE] [...] But these are two different metaphors, because the mappings go in opposite directions, *and different things get mapped*. [...] In short, there is no evidence for the Interaction Theory. The phenomenon that gave rise to it can be accounted for in terms of the theory we have advanced. The predictions made by the claim of bidirectionality are not borne out, since neither the logic nor the language of the target domain is mapped onto the source domain." (p. 133)

In later years, however, the *two-domain* model of conceptual metaphor put forward by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) has been replaced with a *network model* (Fauconnier & Turner 1994, 2002; Turner & Fauconnier 1995, n.d.; Fauconnier 1986/1994, 1997). According to Kövecses (2002), the many-space model offers "several distinct advantages" (p. 232) such as more precise and refined metaphor analyses.

Fauconnier and Turner propose that our conceptual system has several ways of operating with domains in general. It can project elements from one domain to another; it can fuse two domains into one; and it can build up new domains from existing ones. In their description of such conceptual processes, Fauconnier and Turner introduce the notion of *mental space*. Every conceptual integration network consists of at least four transitory domains called mental spaces. A mental space should not be understood as synonymous with a specific thought, but rather as the frame or limitation of this thought. Mental spaces exist at all levels of conceptualization: from the tiniest phoneme to vast entities such as universe, God, and mind. In the words of Fauconnier and Turner (2002), "we are living directly in the blend and cannot escape it [...] [i]t is the pattern of human cultural learning worldwide" (p. 391).

A *blended space*, according to these authors, derives from *input spaces*, which may be related to each other as source and target. In other words, such a blended space may form a conceptual metaphor. Therefore, a conceptual metaphor should be viewed as a special case of the larger issue of mental space.

The abstract structure which applies to both (or all) input spaces and defines the basic topography of the conceptual integration network is an important part of Fauconnier's and Turner's model; they call such a structure a *generic space*. The status of the generic space has been explained by Fauconnier (1997) thus: it "reflects some common, usually more abstract, structure and organization shared by the inputs and defines the core cross-space mapping between them" (p. 149).

Visual representations of conceptual integration networks typically include double-headed arrows linking the generic space to the input spaces, and the input spaces to the blended space. These arrows indicate structural correlation between elements in the interconnected mental spaces. For instance, a network model for the

anthropomorphic blend resulting in Eeyore, the old grey donkey in A. A. Milne's *Winnie the Pooh*, might consist of the following four spaces:

*generic space*: mapping between beings and beings, traits and traits;

*input space 1*: human space (including gloomy disposition and ability to talk);

*input space 2*: donkey space (including a slow-moving donkey eating thistles);

*blended space*: anthropomorphic blend, Eeyore space (talking, gloomy donkey).

The reason the arrows between the mental spaces in such a diagram would be double-headed is that structures may also be projected from the blended space back into the input spaces; in this example, the resulting blend, namely, the idea of anthropomorphic animals, may influence how we think about and act toward real animals – as if they had human characteristics (Zbikowski, 2002, pp. 79–80).

Presently, conceptual metaphor theory and conceptual blending theory constitute the most influential contributions to the intense development of modern metaphor theory. In the following two sections, I will present applications of these two theories, respectively, to the field of music and musical thought.

### 3.3.8. Conceptual metaphor in the field of music (Michael Spitzer and Christian Thorau)

While it might be fair to say that Spitzer's (2004) *Metaphor and musical thought* presents the most ambitious application to date of the conceptual metaphor theory (presented in section 3.3.6 above) to music, the scope of his book is much broader than such a summary would suggest, and its outlook on cognitive theory is in fact highly critical. Spitzer offers a thorough analysis of the many ways in which the richness of music (an art form that has often been called "the universal language", "the most expressive of the arts", etc.) has been made the subject of metaphorical description. He views musical metaphor as a *bidirectional relationship* within music reception and music production: "the relationship between the physical, proximate, and familiar, and the abstract, distal, and unfamiliar" (p. 4). Spitzer's theory, aiming to avoid oversimplification, allows for complex relations between mutually interpenetrating and permeating metaphors. He contends that "music can be a source as well as a target for metaphorical mapping, and that musical experience shapes thought just as thought shapes music" (p. 54):

With reception, theorists and listeners conceptualize musical structure by metaphorically mapping from physical bodily experience. With production, the illusion of a musical body emerges through compositional poetics – the rhetorical manipulation of grammatical norms. (Spitzer, 2004, p. 4)

Such are the complexities of metaphor and music, according to Spitzer (2004): *music structures thought and thought structures music*. While music resists conceptualization, it also arouses new modes of thought: "The watchword of aesthetics is particularity, which means that art affords a richly grained mode of experience that is valuable exactly because it cannot be subsumed by concepts" (p. 77). This "tensive dialectical relationship between music and conceptualization" calls for an analysis which is "diametrically opposite cognitive metaphor's unidirectionality thesis" (p. 78). Music helps us "perceive reality in different ways": "Whereas conceptual metaphor redescribes music, the poetic metaphors of art music in turn redescribe the world" (p. 101).

So, while Spitzer's (2004) outlook on metaphor in the field of music is clearly influenced by the main merit of cognitive theories of the late 20th century – namely, the recognition of metaphor's function as an agent of conceptualization – his concept of metaphor is, however, a much broader one. Cognitive metaphor, he argues, is, due to its focus on bodily experience, interested in verbalization "only at a propositional level, never engaging with its poetic ('musical') dimension" (p. 82).

In this regard, Spitzer's views closely resemble those of Christian Thorau (2003, 2009, & 2012) who has elaborated the notion of musical metaphoricity, the notion that music itself can be structured metaphorically. Incidentally, German literature on music and metaphor, though largely unfamiliar outside Germany, is extremely rich; the most thorough and comprehensive overview available to date of metaphorical language in the field of music has arguably been provided by Oberschmidt (2011). Thorau, in his approach to musical metaphoricity, attempts to revise and complement the schematistic rigour of cognitivist theories through a turn to Max Black's and Nelson Goodman's outlooks on metaphor, primarily:

Dass dort Metaphern nicht als omnipräsente Denkform betrachtet werden, sondern als prägnante Sprachfiguren analysiert werden (Black) und die Reflexion auf die Eigenheit von Kunst und Kunstwerken ausgerichtet ist (Goodman), halte ich musikanalytisch für einen Vorteil. (Thorau, 2009, p. 78)

Thorau's model of artistic metaphor may doubtless be of great musicological interest: "Modell einer künstlerischen Metapher – konflikthaltig, interagierend, exemplifikativ, dabei beidseitig offen, unfixiert und individualisiert" (Thorau, 2003, p. 120). However, its details may bring us too far from the focus of the present investigation.

Spitzer (2004), on his part, finds Ricoeur's tension theory the most useful metaphor theory available, with its focus on how metaphorical imagery inspires thought, how "metaphorical discourse redescribes reality" (p. 98). Arguing that Ricoeur's theory of semantic innovation relates closely to the Kantian notion of *schema* as a mechanism for producing mental images, Spitzer employs the concept of schemata in order to attain several important connections or isomorphisms: between cognitive and artistic perspectives on metaphor, between intramusical and cross-

domain metaphors, and between lower-level perceptual/analytical and systemic cultural/historical metaphors. Combining the modern, American, cognitive approach of Lakoff and Johnson and others with an older, Austro-German, hermeneutic metaphorical tradition, Spitzer argues that there are three distinguishable kinds of musical metaphor, each of which corresponds with a certain period in the history of music:

- harmony and painting (baroque style, 17th century);
- rhythm and language (classical style, 18th century);
- melody and life (romantic style, 19th century).

Spitzer (2004) points to the richness of cross-domain metaphors. He states laconically: "Music has probably been compared to, heard as, everything" (p. 66). However, he finds evident historical and cultural patterns in this variety: "individual metaphors coalesce into systems" (p. 67). Spitzer holds that systemic metaphors in music can be analysed in two ways: on one hand, the cognitive analysis of their technical form (i.e., the style); on the other hand, the hermeneutic analysis of their cultural form (i.e., the tradition). The latter kind of analysis "finds its centers in base or root metaphors" (p. 45). He argues that "these metaphors are cognate with contemporary theories of metaphor. Thus metaphor was explained in terms of proportion and vision by the baroque, of rhythmic gesture and poetic expression by classical theorists, and of dynamic or organic process by the romantics" (p. 59).

For instance, Spitzer provides examples of the linguistic paradigm that underlies the metaphor of rhythm and language (proceeding from cadences and phrases to larger forms), hailing from Mozart's music as well as Rameau's, Sulzer's, and Koch's theories of music. Comparing a passage from Mozart with passages from Bach ("tone painting") and Beethoven ("life force"), Spitzer argues that "Mozart's squarer, more metrical discourse" is closer to "the conventionality of linguistic syntax" (p. 27).

Before I proceed to a summary, an evaluation, and an operationalization of the variety of metaphor theories, I also need to include a presentation of some applications of conceptual blending theory to the field of music and musical thought.

### **3.3.9. Conceptual blending in the field of music (Lawrence M. Zbikowski and Ole Kühl)**

Zbikowski in his book *Conceptualizing music* (2002) as well as in several articles (1997, 1999, 2000, 2008, 2009a, 2009b) has applied the blending model of Fauconnier and Turner (presented in section 3.3.7 above) to music. At the core of his studies is the view of conceptualization as a process of cross-domain mapping in which correspondences between the source domain and the target domain are

established (as, for instance, in the topic of my own investigation: between storytelling and jazz improvisation). In an early article (Zbikowski, 1997), he formulates important perspectives on how cross-domain mapping relates to our understanding of music:

Each such mapping will preserve only a portion of the structure of the target domain, and import only as much of the structure of the source domain as is appropriate. The description afforded by applying any given conceptual model to the domain of music is consequently constrained by those aspects of the structure of the target domain that are preserved in the mapping, and those aspects of the structure of the source domain that are imported. Our accounts of music may vary widely, but they will not vary absolutely inasmuch as they are limited by the process of cross-domain mapping. It follows that conceptual models do not give us access to deep, timeless, and immutable truths about musical structure. They instead offer us an image of how we construct our understanding of music. (Zbikowski, 1997, pp. 217–218)

Agawu (1999) puts forward a number of propositions regarding the metaphor that sees music as language. He holds that "[w]hereas language interprets itself, music cannot interpret itself. Language is the interpreting system of music" (p. 145). Zbikowski (2008) points out that "[g]iven the range of musical expression and its independence from language, it is not surprising that language about music is often metaphorical" (p. 519). The multiple levels of meaning that are typical of metaphor in musical thinking form an important point of departure for Zbikowski's contributions to this field. While he seems to consider Ricoeur's theories unclear and unsatisfactory with regard to the explanation of different interpretive possibilities, Zbikowski (2009a) finds that conceptual metaphor theory affords a framework for understanding "how mappings between incommensurable domains such as sights and sounds are established and constrained" (p. 96). Specifically, he has taken an interest in mappings between the domains of language and music:

mappings from language to music will tend to focus on static aspects of the musical domain; mappings from music to language will draw out the dynamic aspects of the domain of language. (Zbikowski, 2009b, p. 364)

However, Zbikowski (2002) points out that concepts are not necessarily tied to language. To have concepts is, among other things, a matter of recognizing relationships between categories; for instance, "a musical concept can be related to other concepts" such as bodily states, perceptual categories, and linguistic constructs (p. 61). Zbikowski (2009b) points out that music constructs meaning in a different way than language. Instead of representing objects and relations symbolically, music offers *sonic analogues for dynamic processes*, "processes that include movement through



space (such as descent), physical gestures (like knocking), and emotional states (such as obsession or the development of intimacy)" (p. 376).

In a musical passage from Palestrina, Zbikowski (2002) identifies "the correlation of 'up' and 'down' of physical space with specific pitch relations" (p. 63), leading him to the conceptual metaphor "PITCH RELATIONSHIPS ARE RELATIONSHIPS IN VERTICAL SPACE" (p. 66). Experiences and perceptions of verticality give rise to a verticality image schema (Johnson, 1987). This, of course, is reflected in everyday discourse such as the linguistic expressions "high and low" and "above" on the piano. In a similar fashion, our understanding of notions such as tension and release in the musical domain is grounded in repeated patterns of bodily experience (Zbikowski, 2000).

For a blend of text and music to occur, Zbikowski (2002) holds, the domains involved must not only be correlated but must have a "uniform topography" (p. 88). He picks as one example Donald Francis Tovey's analysis of Beethoven's Sixth (*Pastoral*) Symphony. Zbikowski's visual representation of the conceptual integration network of Tovey's analysis includes the generic space of anthropomorphism (ascribing human characteristics to non-human entities); the input spaces of anthropomorphized music and anthropomorphized nature, respectively; and finally the blended space of Tovey's interpretation, including the murmur of a brook played by clarinets and bassoons, the climax of a storm played by trombones, and the rainbow played by oboes (p. 93).

Zbikowski (1999, 2002) presents further studies of mappings between language and music. With the intention to show how different musical environments interact with the same text to produce radically different conceptual blends, he analyses two musical settings (by Bernhard Klein and Franz Schubert) of the same poem (Wilhelm Müller's "Trockne Blumen"). He argues that conceptual integration networks afford a way to coordinate analyses of text and music together, the "syntax of song" (Zbikowski, 1999, p. 314). This possibility prompts him to expand on the concept of storytelling:

Musicians have long recognized that music tells stories. These stories are not of the simplistic kind related in programme notes, but they are also not the highly detailed and elegantly figured stories of literature. Music tells somewhat more general stories, and it tells them through patterned sound. (Zbikowski, 1999, p. 339)

The syntax of song, therefore, Zbikowski (2002) argues, is "a syntax of conceptual blending", to be found in the way words and music relate to one another (p. 286).

The four-part blending model presented by Fauconnier and Turner has been criticized for not considering sufficiently how cognitive processes are influenced by the contexts in which they take place. Curiously, though, it is abundantly clear throughout Fauconnier and Turner (2002) that they do not exclude multiple blends:

"Conceptual integration [...] can operate over any number of mental spaces as inputs" (p. xv). Nevertheless, some of their critics have advocated alternative blending theories. In particular, researchers at the Danish Centre for Semiotics at Aarhus have developed an alternative blending model: the "fivespacer", presented and applied to the process of jazz (bebop) improvisation by Köhl (2003). The name of the model derives from the five mental spaces – *three input spaces* and *two blended spaces* – which it contains, in addition to which a base space is included. The material of the blending process is cast from the base space to three inputs. No new structure will emerge; via the inputs, everything can be brought back to the base space.

Inputs 1 and 2 together with blend 1 represent, in principle, the operation described by the model suggested by Fauconnier and Turner. However, according to the five-space model, this blend is provisional, not stabilized. Input 3 is termed *the space of relevance*. It contains the mental representation of the context where the blending takes place. This input space contains material which contributes to stabilizing the final blend (blend 2). It also provides a contextual explanation of the structure that emerges as a result of the blending process. (For a concrete example, see Köhl's jazz application below.)

Köhl (2003) further explains the different functions of the three input spaces of the "fivespacer" blending model: Input space 1 contains the figurative material (*presentation space*). Input space 2 contains the material to which the presentation is referring (*reference space*). Input space 3 contains the material cast by the base space as relevance-productive in the specific context (*relevance space*).

In his application of the "fivespacer" model to the process of jazz (bebop) improvisation, Köhl's (2003) presentation includes integrated network models on macro and micro levels. The following brief review focuses on the macro-level model.

The base space of Köhl's (2003) model is a situation where jazz (bebop) is played. As input spaces 1 and 2, Köhl suggests 'the figure' (presentation space) and 'the chorus' (reference space). The preliminary blend resulting from these two inputs (blend 1) is a mental representation of a musical intention. This intention is stabilized through the influence of social relevance, included in the model as input space 3: 'the group'. The resulting blend (blend 2) represents the ensuing musical action.

Köhl further points to the importance of a diachronic dimension in the base space: namely, the sociocultural background frame. He emphasizes that cognition may depend also on sociocultural aspects of the situation, manifested as collected experiences and memories. Jazz improvisation, for instance, may hence be affected by extramusical factors.

On the same note, Borgo (2004b) points to the interesting connections between conceptual blending and the musical phenomena deriving from African American rhetorical practices that were described in sections 2.2.5 and 3.1.4. Signifyin(g), Borgo contends,

offers a culture-specific example of musical and conceptual blending; one which involves playful comment and criticism, calling the original work into question and potentially inverting or subverting the status quo. [...] Music performance, and indeed all aspects of cultural performance, relies on a strong link to community and tradition. Jazz music has hinged on and heralded resistant social formations for over a century, and it continues to provide a rich context for investigating the relationship between musical syntax, social interactive processes, and cognitive and cultural understandings. (p. 189)

Needless to say, the interpretation of (jazz) musical storytelling or Signifyin(g) as instances of conceptual blending (Kühl, 2003; Borgo, 2004b) seems pertinent to my investigation. In an ensuing subsection (3.3.12) I will attempt to evaluate the variety of perspectives on metaphor presented above as well as their applications to the field of music and musical thought. Before I do this, however, I wish to discuss briefly the notion of a metaphorical topology or landscape (3.3.10), as well as the educational functions of metaphor (3.3.11).

### 3.3.10. Landscapes of metaphor

How can the meaning(s) of a metaphor be interpreted? Specifically, how can a variety of metaphorical meanings and their interrelations be construed as a topography or topology, a zone or a landscape? This notion has been developed by the German musicologist, professor Günter Kleinen. Kleinen (1997) sets out to investigate the potential of metaphor to explain music experiences. His point of departure is "the assumption of a fundamental analogy between the development of language metaphors and the process of music reception. [...] Music sounds like emotions feel (Langer, 1942). In an analogue way metaphors demonstrate how perception operates" (p. 644). A thorough and comprehensive categorization of music listeners' verbal descriptions of their subjective experiences allows Kleinen to present "a catalogue and an empirically proofed distribution of image schemas and metaphors specific to music", including interconnections between metaphors (p. 646).

Kleinen (2011) reports a coding and content analysis of metaphors in 110 music texts (reviews pertaining to five different musical genres). The results are presented on three levels: music as sensory impressions (hearing, seeing, etc.); music as metaphor (form, space, time, building, nature, etc.); and interpretations of music (myths, dreams, beauty, etc.). A selection of categories is displayed in graphic representations showing the *topography* of metaphors. Kleinen (2011) concludes that "[d]ie Metaphernbildung erklärt die innere Welt des Denkens sowohl im Sprachgebrauch als auch in der Wahrnehmung der Musik" (p. 4).

The concluding discussion of the results of the present investigation (Chapter 6) will include an expanded discussion of the landscape of metaphor as a means of

exploring educational implications of the storytelling metaphor in discourse on jazz improvisation.

### 3.3.11. Metaphors, etc. as educational tools

It is hardly surprising that the use of metaphor in educational settings has attracted scholarly interest. Indeed, on a general level, metaphor theorists' descriptions of how metaphor can play an important role to conceptualization processes would seem very compatible with ideas of developmental psychology and theories of sequential progression. For instance, Swanwick (1988), inspired by Piaget's observations that senso-motoric experiences are fundamental for children's construction of reality (Piaget, 1951; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969), views the development of children's musical intelligence in terms of a progression from thinking with the body (figurative knowledge) to conceptual intelligence (operative knowledge):

There is surely a developmental continuum of mastery from the pleasure experienced by a baby who has just learned to repeat a vocal sound or to shake a rattle continuously, to the achievement of a sitar player technically exploiting the potential of a particular raga. (Swanwick, 1988, p. 55)

Swanwick (1988) does make explicit connections between children's development and the use of metaphorical language; the world, he says, is "thinkable" through metaphor, through "likeness" (p. 47). Such educational perspectives may blend well with the notion of metaphorical mapping viewed – in the manner of Johnson (1987) – as a process of getting from bodily experience to the structure of thought and language.

According to Schippers (2006; cf. section 2.2.11), metaphors are common and probably important in music education, especially regarding "intangible", "elusive" qualities of expression (p. 210). Mayer (1993) focuses on what he terms the *instructive metaphor hypothesis*, "the idea that metaphoric language can play a productive role in fostering students' understanding of scientific descriptions and explanations" (p. 561). In particular, Mayer focuses on how instructive metaphors create familiar analogies, thereby enhancing the learning processes of "selecting, organizing, and integrating" (p. 572). Mayer further points out that the concept of constructivism is itself based on a metaphor, "the learning-as-construction metaphor"; "the idea that human understanding is the result of mental construction by the learner" (p. 563).

Sticht (1993) distinguishes between on one hand *metaphors as tools for thought* and on the other hand *metaphor as a tool for efficient communication*: "the effective use of metaphor for producing a functional context for communication and learning requires the teacher to know that students possess the knowledge addressed in the metaphor" (p. 624).

As noted above, several metaphor theorists insist that the functions of metaphor are fundamental to human thought. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that metaphor should be considered crucial by some epistemologists and educational philosophers as well. Taking their point of departure in the paradox of Plato's *Meno* (How can something radically new be learned?), Petrie and Oshlag (1993) maintain that "metaphor is one of the central ways of leaping the epistemological chasm between old knowledge and radically new knowledge" (p. 583). Referring to the view of interactive metaphors proposed by Black (1962), they conclude that such a metaphor that creates similarities "would allow truly new forms of knowledge and understanding" (p. 585); there would be no need to presuppose that the student – in some sense – knows and understands already.

According to Petrie and Oshlag, interactive metaphors transfer "chunks of knowledge" (p. 587) by way of their *anomalous* character. They are anomalous in terms of the students' current framework of understanding. When radically new knowledge is acquired, metaphors can be essential in bringing about a change in this framework.

The role and function of the storytelling metaphor in jazz improvisational learning contexts is discussed extensively from different perspectives in sections 5.3 and 6.3.

### 3.3.12. Concluding remarks on the applicability of metaphor theories

This survey of theories of fictions and metaphors, as noted initially, was prodded by my interest in a borrowed concept in discourse on jazz. It is now time to return to this conceptual loan. Is it justifiable and useful to regard 'storytelling' in jazz improvisation as a fiction or metaphor?

It will be clear from the survey above that metaphors, far from being mere rhetorical ornaments, may *communicate* a deep understanding of musical experience as well as *create* meanings of music. Like Vaihinger's (1911) fictions, the concept of storytelling in the field of jazz improvisation *contradicts reality* in a certain sense. Saxophones or pianos can produce no words; Beardsley (1958) might consider this use of the concept of storytelling "a significant self-contradiction" (p. 141) and, hence, a clear instance of metaphor.

Is this borrowed concept used for *specific purposes*, then, like Vaihinger's fictions? This is of course a vast question with significant bearing on educational issues as well as artistic ones. In my opinion there can be little doubt that the concept of storytelling in the field of jazz improvisation may serve the specific purpose of *clarifying* things of importance in its field. The present investigation may provide valuable insights into questions about the purpose of this conceptual loan.

Clearly, the variety of 20th century metaphor theories will have significant perspectives to offer when we make the storytelling metaphor our object of study. Its meaning(s) in the jazz context – as Richards (1936/1971) and Ricoeur (1975/2003)

would likely contend – cannot reasonably be expected to be found in a dictionary; for the meaning of the storytelling metaphor is carried by discourse, in what Ricoeur terms *discourse events*. Consequently, we will probably do well to approach it as an undivided whole.

Black's (1962, 1993) distinction between two subjects in the metaphorical statement seems to be relevant to the case in question. When jazz improvisation is said to be storytelling, in all likelihood this amounts to the projection onto our primary subject (jazz improvisation) of a set of *associated implications* that are predicable of a secondary subject (storytelling). In this projection, some features of jazz improvisation may be emphasized while others are suppressed.

This dynamics of emphasis and suppression in the metaphorical projection relates, of course, to the metaphor's tension (emphasized by Ricoeur) between similarity and difference. But in a crucial way it also has to do with the metaphor's potential as poem (Beardsley, 1958), heuristic fiction (Goodman, 1976), or a tool of discovery, offering new descriptions, *redescriptions*, of reality (Ricoeur, 1975/2003). Given the abundant evidence of how the storytelling metaphor is and has been employed by jazz practitioners themselves in order to highlight important features of jazz improvisation, this redescriptive potential in metaphor, analysed as its *interactive* level by Black (1962, 1993) may seem highly pertinent to the present investigation. Black's contention that metaphors function as cognitive instruments that *create* similarities, thereby enabling us to view reality from new perspectives – to see something as something else – comes forward as very thought-provoking indeed. In this perspective, the storytelling metaphor may be used not only to describe but to prescribe as well.

In the manner of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), the concept of storytelling in the field of jazz improvisation could very well be viewed as a conceptual metaphor: IMPROVISING JAZZ IS STORYTELLING. It might also be fruitful to consider it as an instance of what these researchers term *ontological* metaphor, letting us view experiences as entities via a noun: TO IMPROVISE JAZZ IS TO TELL A STORY. I find particularly inspirational these authors' *holistic* view: we understand one domain of experience in terms of another through metaphors, not in terms of isolated concepts but in terms of a structured whole: a domain of experience conceptualized as an experiential *gestalt*. Accordingly, isolated metaphorical utterances should be viewed as parts of such structures.

This holistic view relates, of course, to Black's (1962, 1993) emphasis on sets of associated implications projected by metaphors. In the field of cognitive linguistics, the metaphorical mapping of such rich additional knowledge has been termed *metaphorical entailment*. In allowing us to comprehend certain aspects of jazz better, the borrowed concept of storytelling will assumably function to a considerable extent by *selecting*, *emphasizing*, and *organizing* these aspects.

Lakoff and Johnson (1980) propose that concepts arising from our experience should not be rigidly defined in terms of "objective" properties. Rather, such concepts

should be understood in terms of interactional properties. Conceptual metaphors help us understand the world through our interactions with it. The concept of storytelling in the field of jazz improvisation is abundantly employed by practitioners and theorists alike. Clearly, this concept ought to be understood in terms of how we *interact* with it, not in terms of any "objective" properties. In this respect it seems closely related to conceptual metaphors as described by Lakoff and Johnson (1980).

Naturally, the explanatory potential of this variety of metaphor theories remains to be ascertained in the discussion (Chapter 6) of the results of my investigation. It might be fruitful at this stage, however, to include a brief discussion regarding possible advantages and disadvantages of particular ways of approaching the empirical results.

The concept of storytelling in discourse on jazz improvisation could be interpreted as a conceptual metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), more specifically as a *multimodal metaphor*: IMPROVISING JAZZ IS STORYTELLING.

According to such a view, this conceptual loan is characterized by a metaphorical (*uni*)*directionality*. Music is seen as the target domain, onto which structural features of narrativity (source) are mapped. According to this view, what happens when a concept is borrowed from one field to another is that one modality enables us to understand another modality better; one modality sheds light on the meaning construction of another.

However, this conceptual loan could also be interpreted as an instance of *conceptual blending* (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Zbikowski, 2002; Köhl, 2003). The *blended space* resulting from this conceptual blending will display structural features which are mapped onto it from the input spaces:

rather than one domain (the source) providing structure for the other (the target) – a mapping that gives rise to the directionality of metaphor [...] – in a blend correlated spaces each contribute to structure that is mapped onto the blend. (Zbikowski, 2009b, p. 375)

In the case of jazz improvisers telling stories there are two input spaces – narrativity and music, with the possible addition of a Köhlian *relevance space* – which will together contribute to the structure that is mapped onto the resulting blended space.

As a consequence, the conceptual (multimodal) metaphor interpretation and the conceptual blending interpretation might yield significantly different answers to questions on how resources for meaning construction are provided by the usage of the borrowed concept of storytelling in contexts of jazz improvisation.

If we choose the conceptual (multimodal) metaphor interpretation, metaphorical mappings involving established domains will yield systems of metaphor. In the case in question, we will use our understanding of storytelling to structure our understanding of jazz improvisation.

If we, on the other hand, turn to the conceptual blending interpretation, blending involving fluid and pragmatic mental spaces will tend to destabilize the boundaries of conceptual domains and suggest novel extensions of them. This choice of interpretation may yield new insights in our understanding of music, new possibilities to understand how these modalities relate to the construction of meaning in human culture; for instance, we might arrive at new understandings of storytelling through the study of how this concept is employed in discourse on jazz improvisation.

However, I hasten to add, I agree vigorously with Spitzer (2004) and Thorau (2003, 2009, & 2012) that the rigorous schematicism of these cognitivist approaches may miss out on crucial issues. In my mind, the interpretation of musical metaphor as a *bidirectional* (rather than a unidirectional) relationship deserves serious consideration.

Indeed, the perspective of metaphorical bidirectionality relates closely to the fundamental distinction introduced at the very beginning of this chapter. (i) On one hand, we have the phenomenon of jazz improvisers' storytelling through the medium of musical instruments. The basis of this phenomenon, of course, is musical tones; these tones could be seen as *musical metaphors*, carrying extra-musical meaning. (ii) On the other hand, we have the discourse context where improvisers and others speak about storytelling taking place in and through jazz improvisation. Arguably, this talk could be seen as *linguistic metaphor*, relating to intra-musical phenomena.

Therefore, a view on metaphorical usage that is exclusively unidirectional (such as the conceptual metaphor theory of Lakoff and Johnson) would probably entail unfavourable limitations to the present investigation; at least, such a view will have to be supplemented with additional perspectives.

In the writings of Keith Swanwick (1999, 2007) I find further support for a bidirectional perspective on music and metaphor. Swanwick (2007) – although he insists that "[m]usic is the most difficult art to think of in terms of metaphor" (p. 499), and, also, though he does not especially dwell on theoretical difficulties of metaphor theory – does make an apt and, to my mind, crucial point regarding the bidirectionality of musical metaphor.

On one hand, storytelling may function as a metaphor for music. (In the present case, it is a metaphor for a specific kind of music, namely, jazz improvisation.) On the other hand, as Swanwick (2007) very pertinently points out, music consists of musical tones which are metaphors in that they are perceived as expressive shapes: "'tones' are heard as 'tunes'" (p. 499).

In addition to this primary metaphorical level of music, Swanwick (2007) holds, there are two more levels. To begin with, "musical gestures are brought into new relationships with elements of internal playfulness and musical speculation" (p. 500); among other things, such creation of new relationships may have to do with the "tensions between the likeness of repetition and the unlikeness of contrast and transformation" (p. 500). Furthermore, Swanwick suggests a third metaphorical layer



characterized by a strong sensitivity, perhaps "flow", perhaps a "strong sense of significance" (p. 500).

In the words of Parsons (2007), "[t]he arts don't just use metaphors, they invent them" (p. 539). In my interpretation, the metaphorical layers of music presented by Swanwick clearly indicate that storytelling in jazz improvisation may be a clear example of a bidirectional metaphor. Not only is storytelling an oft-employed metaphor for a certain kind of music; as noted above, musical tones themselves may be perceived as metaphors, carrying meaning.

In the last few paragraphs, I have argued at some length that questions of music and metaphor are complex ones. Also, rather than subsuming all human thought in simplistic, omnipresent patterns, one ought to keep in mind at all times the distinctive character of music and musical thought; as well as Black's and Ricoeur's notion of how metaphorical discourse *redescribes reality*. Consequently, any interpretations of the empirical results will do well to apply conceptual metaphor and conceptual blending schemes with great care, and to strive to supplement them with a thoughtful hermeneutic approach.

### 3.4. Learning how to improvise

It is reasonable that educational perspectives regarding musical improvisation, in contradistinction to the performance of written music, should have their distinctive features. Just as is often the case in discussions of improvisation in general (cf. 2.1), the language analogy is seldom far away. Thomas (1991) points out that the "'knowing' skills" ordinarily taught in music education – such as knowing notes, visual recognition, and kinesthetic response – are quite different from those developed through improvisation. Thomas terms the latter *music fluency skills*, contending that "they deal exclusively with the language – the sounds of music – rather than with the symbolism and rules of notation" (p. 28).

Expanding on the differences between executing notated music and improvising "by ear", Sidran (1981) formulates a version of the Deweyian slogan: in jazz improvisation, he argues, learning is doing:

Relying on the ability to read music implies a rigid *preconception* whereas playing 'by ear' is part of the more free-flowing oral tradition and is merely *conception*. Hence, a musician can always learn to read music but, as is well known, even some of the best readers, i.e., the Western classical musicians, cannot 'fake it,' or improvise on a given body of material. One cannot be taught how to improvise black musical idioms, because the *theory* of improvisation develops through the *doing* of it. The act is the theory. [Louis] Armstrong, it has been said, proved the idea that 'if you can't sing it, you can't

play it,' that improvisation is based on the ability to 'hear' with internal ears the sound of an internal voice. (pp. 61–62)

In this section I review a number of theoretical approaches to musical learning that I consider pertinent to my investigation. Since learning in jazz improvisation contexts is to a large extent practice-based, this overview focuses on *situated learning* (Lave & Wenger, 1991), *ecological perspectives* (Gibson, 1979/1986; Boyce-Tillman, 2004; Clarke, 2005; Barron, 2006), and the concept of *stolen knowledge* (Brown & Duguid, 1993).

In addition to the discussion of theoretical educational perspectives, and in order to operationalize these perspectives with regard to the present investigation, I consider it important to also provide a significant number of concrete examples from practitioners' discourse on jazz learning and its contexts; these are included in subsection 3.4.3.

### 3.4.1. Situated cognition and legitimate peripheral participation

Advocates of theories of *situated cognition* argue that knowing is inseparable from doing; knowledge is always situated in activity in a socio-cultural context. Hence, regarding the relations between mind and body as well as between person and environment, the perspective of these theories is *non-dualistic*.

The concept of *legitimate peripheral participation* (Lave & Wenger, 1991) emanates from studies of apprenticeship in communities of practice. It provides a framework to describe how a person becomes a part of a learning community; "it is in practice that people learn" (p. 85). According to Lave and Wenger, successful learning depends on several factors such as, for instance, the newcomer's access to the community, involvement in its activity, and learning of community discourse. In their case descriptions, *learning* is the basic phenomenon, while "there is very little observable teaching" (p. 92). In the view of Lave and Wenger (1991),

learning is not merely a condition for membership, but is itself an evolving form of membership. We conceive of identities as long-term, living relations between persons and their place and participation in communities of practice. Thus identity, knowing, and social membership entail one another. (p. 53)

Furthermore, learning is viewed as an *improvised practice*: "A learning curriculum unfolds in opportunities for engagement in practice. It is not specified as a set of dictates for proper practice. [...] [M]astery resides not in the master but in the organization of the community of practice in which the master is part" (Lave & Wenger, 1991, pp. 93–94).

*Cognitive apprenticeship* techniques relate closely to theories of situated cognition and legitimate peripheral participation. Learning is seen as a process of enculturation: students are encultured into authentic practices through activity and social interaction. Therefore, learning in groups of practitioners is crucial. Apart from featuring collective problem solving and providing collaborative work skills, group learning permits multiple roles to be displayed when a task is carried out. It also permits ineffective strategies and misconceptions to be confronted. During joint engagement in a task, a more knowledgeable person offers his or her thoughts, provides scaffolding when needed, models expert behaviors, and encourages reflection (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989).

Nielsen (2006) points out that the study of apprenticeship offers a way to understand how people learn without any formal teaching taking place. Nielsen and Kvale (2000) distinguish between four aspects of apprenticeship: (1) *learning in a community of practice*; (2) *learning as the development of a professional identity*; (3) *learning without formal teaching*; and (4) *evaluation through practice*. Referring to Polanyi's (1958) notion of tacit knowledge as well as Bourdieu's (1992) discussion of the role of silence in education, Nielsen and Kvale emphasize that language may often be of minor importance in the implicit knowledge of a profession. They also point to the question how independent critical reflection may be included in educational perspectives on apprenticeship; in their opinion, critical reflection runs the risk of being subordinate to features such as observation, imitation, and mechanical reproduction. Instead of focusing on the individuals (the "master" and the "apprentice"), they put forward a decentered, ecological understanding of learning. In this perspective, the metaphor of landscape is crucial: it is the learning resources of the environment that are focused on, rather than the individual learners. This perspective seems highly relevant to conditions and environment in jazz learning as presented in Berliner's (1994) description of "understanding of jazz acquired directly through performance", for instance, participation in jam sessions, "sitting in" at professional engagements, as well as extended band tenures (p. 41).

In the discussion (Chapter 6) of educational implications of the results yielded by this investigation, such aspects of apprenticeship will serve as useful analytical tools.

### 3.4.2. Ecological perspectives on perception, music, and musical learning

The *ecological perceptual theory* proposed by Gibson (1979/1986) suggests that the observer and the surroundings are inseparable and complementary; they mutually define each other. Meaning is closely related to perception. Perception is not considered to be a constructive process where the observer builds structure into an internal model of the world. Rather, in an ecological approach, the *structure of the environment* itself is emphasized. Perceiving is picking up and resonating to this already structured information. A living organism, such as a human being, is able to

move and take new perspectives. When she perceives events in the environment, she tries to understand and adapt to them. Perception and action are linked to each other in a constant cyclic relation. Further, there is constant mutual adaptation between organisms and their environments.

The ecological perspective, of course, has educational implications. Gibson (1979/1986) construes the term *affordances* in order to imply "the complementarity of the animal and the environment" (p. 122);

[t]he *affordances* of the environment are what it *offers* the animal, what it *provides* or *furnishes* for good or ill. (p. 127)

On one hand, affordances are *properties* in the environment that s/he can act upon; on the other hand, they may also be understood as the *actions* that are the results of encountering perceptual information.

According to Gibson's theory, everything is fundamentally situated. To learn is to perceive new affordances. Creative action may be understood as the ability to perceive new affordances; hence, creativity relates to the surrounding context. According to the view of contextualized knowledge, learning must involve rich contexts that reflect real-life learning processes.

Along these lines, Clarke (2005) formulates an *ecological approach to musical perception*, proposing that the experience of musical meaning is fundamentally a perceptual experience (rather than a question of, for instance, expression, semiotics, or social construction). While music in many ways fits readily into a Gibsonian scheme of affordances – "music affords dancing, worship, co-ordinated working, persuasion, emotional catharsis, marching, foot-tapping, and a myriad other activities of a perfectly tangible kind" (p. 38) – in certain traditions, however, such as Western concert music, listening appears to have become autonomous. Even though music is the product of socialized human beings, listening to it "has become somewhat divorced from overt action" (p. 38); it would seem that music's "worldliness can be suspended" (p. 206). Clarke notes that this phenomenon exemplifies "the social nature of affordances for human beings" (p. 38). One of the aims of Clarke's ecological approach to the perception of musical meaning, however, is to deconstruct the illusive myth of passive musical listening: "there really is no such thing as passive listening"; "ecological theory provides a way to understand how music is able to move seamlessly between autonomy and heteronomy" (p. 205).

The overview of previous writings (Chapter 2) makes it abundantly clear that ecological, contextual, historical, social, and cultural perspectives are relevant to the study of jazz music. Accordingly, an ecological outlook on the teaching and learning of jazz improvisation comes forward as adequate; it will be expanded on in the remainder of section 3.4, and is employed in the discussion of the educational implications of the present investigation in section 6.3.

Boyce-Tillman (2004), presenting preliminary considerations regarding an *ecology of music education*, notes that "musicology has concentrated only on certain aspects of the musical experience, ignoring areas such as expressive character, value systems, and spirituality" (p. 102). She proposes an ecological model of five areas of musical experience: *materials, expression, construction, values, and spirituality*. One important aim with this model is to incorporate the Foucauldian notion of *subjugated knowledge* in order to "make clear the interface between politics and education" (p. 123). Relevant questions from this perspective may regard choice of materials; the perceived value of knowledge compared to emotion/expression; and the perceived value of unity compared to diversity. An overarching aim of Boyce-Tillman's model is to open up "the totality of the musical experience [...] to produce musics that are really reflective of the interrelationship of music with a pluralist society – a truly musical ecology" (p. 123).

Barron (2006) points to the need to better understand "how learning outside school relates to learning within school or other formal organizations". She defines a learning ecology as "the set of contexts found in physical or virtual spaces that provide opportunities for learning" (p. 195). Such contexts are comprised of a unique configuration of activities, material resources, relationships, and interactions. Barron argues that "a learning ecology is best conceptualized as a dynamic entity that can be characterized by the diversity and depth of learning resources and activities" (p. 217).

At the centre of the learning ecology framework are self-initiated, interest-driven learning activities. Barron (2006) points out that an ecology of education is "a dynamic learning system open to multiple influences" (p. 200). By appropriating and adapting the resources provided, people choose, develop and create their own learning opportunities. When learners not only choose but also develop and create their own learning opportunities, "[i]nterest-driven learning activities are boundary-crossing and self-sustaining" (p. 201). Introducing the concept of *learning ecology framework*, Barron identifies five types of self-initiated knowledge-building strategies: finding text-based information, creating interactive activities, exploring media, seeking out structured learning, and building knowledge networks.

In the next subsection, the notion of interest-driven, self-sustaining learning activities will be matched against the concept of *stolen knowledge*.

### 3.4.3. Stealing knowledge

Obviously, apprenticeship training was put forward as an important educational possibility long before the publication of the studies referred in the previous subsections. In his article "The school is a lousy place to learn anything in", Becker (1972) points to the discrepancy between what a school intends to teach and what its pupils actually learn:

I do not suggest that students learn nothing in school, only that they typically learn what the school does not intend to teach and do much less well with what the school focuses on. [...] A minimum use of the present analysis might then be to broaden educators' perspectives so that they will be aware of the possibilities of apprenticeship training that may be available to them. (pp. 103–104)

Similar viewpoints are connected with the loosely defined boundaries of the concept of situated learning and its "multiple, theoretically generative interconnections with persons, activities, knowing, and world" (Lave & Wenger, 1991, p. 121). When introducing the concept of learning ecology framework, Barron (2006) also emphasizes that "structured social arrangements such as apprenticeships are often crucial learning contexts" in non-school environments (p. 197). Brown and Duguid (1993) propose that schools and places of work ought to make it possible for learners to participate legitimately and peripherally in authentic social practice. They introduce the concept of stolen knowledge, inspired by a story told by the Indian Nobel prize winner, author and musician Rabindranath Tagore [1861–1941] about his own musical learning:

Our family friend Srikantha Babu was absorbed in music day and night. [...] he never taught us songs, he simply sang them to us, and we picked them up almost without knowing it. [...] After this, when I was a little older, a very great musician called Jadu Bhatta came and stayed in the house. He made one great mistake in being determined to teach me music, and consequently no teaching took place. Nevertheless, I did casually pick up from him a certain amount of stolen knowledge [...] which remains to this day in my store of rainy season songs. (Cited from O'Connell, 2003, p. 68)

According to Brown and Duguid (1993), legitimate peripheral participation (Lave & Wenger, 1991) could be viewed as *legitimate theft*. Learning can be viewed from the teacher's perspective (supply) or from the learner's perspective (demand). Lave and Wenger explicitly focus on "learning resources in everyday practice *viewed from the perspective of learners*" (p. 97). Learning can be seen as the result of a (more or less successful) process of knowledge transmission. On the other hand, it can be seen as an uncompleted, ongoing process. Tagore "stole" knowledge through listening to what the teacher played for his own pleasure, outside the lessons. In other words, *what is learnt is not restricted to what is taught*.

It is an important educational goal, Brown and Duguid insist, to make these kinds of knowledge theft possible through providing *windows onto practice*. They strongly advocate that learning should be viewed and supported from the demand side.

A demand-side view of this sort of knowledge theft suggests how important it is not to force-feed learning, but to encourage it, both provoking the need and making the resources available for people to "steal". We regard this as the paradoxical challenges of encouraging and legitimating theft. (Brown & Duguid, 2000, p. 136)

The concept of stolen knowledge has found favour in literature on learning environments (Baets, 1998; Baets & van der Linden, 2003). According to Jonassen and Land (2000), it provides directions for the shaping of learning environments: "coordinating and compiling resources, the guiding participation – as opposed to prespecifying complete learning resources and activities" (p. 78).

Ekelund (1997a, 1997b) problematizes the concept with regard to vocational education.

The implicit aspects [of professional practice] are pivotal for successful development of professional competence. And, the implicit is not in the telling and writing [...]; it is only in the being and doing. [...] What is there for our students to steal, and from whom? [...] The classroom [...] is the authentic scene for only one profession, the teaching profession. (Ekelund, 1997b, pp. 13–14)

Despite its origin in Tagore's story about musical learning, the concept of stolen knowledge has not yet gained ground in music education research. However, it seems to relate in interesting ways to well-known examples of jazz musical learning which traditionally has included different ways of gaining knowledge from active musicians.

The attitude that teaching and learning jazz improvisation is not only difficult but also a bit mysterious might be a rather common one. The British saxophonist Benny Green (1973) expresses such an outlook on "the art of making jazz":

It is an elusive and highly demanding art, extremely difficult to perform with any degree of subtlety, and the only known way of mastering even its rudiments is to spend ten or twenty years of instrumental practice, learning by trial and error how to play a game whose rules can never really be formulated. (p. 132)

The ways in which improvisational ability is commonly viewed are clearly contextual, according to Martin (2002): "The specific skills required for musical improvisation may be regarded, not as exceptional, but as normal and achievable in appropriate cultural contexts" (p. 140). Specifically, Berliner (1994) points out that "children who grow up around improvisers regard improvisation as a skill within the realm of their own possible development" (p. 31).

Many jazz musicians testify to the importance of role models:

[T]here is someone in nearly every musician's background who helped show the way. Often there were many who did so. Many jazz musicians refer to their "musical fathers," the musicians who taught or inspired them either personally or via performances and phonograph records. (Crow, 1990, p. 40)

Although he never employs the term stolen knowledge, the accounts in Berliner's (1994) study of the learning of jazz improvisation seem to approach this concept remarkably often.

Even the young musician in a lengthy apprenticeship with a master artist-teacher supplements this training with various other learning opportunities. The jazz community's traditional educational system places its emphasis on learning rather than teaching, shifting to students the responsibility for determining what they need to learn, how they will go about learning, and from whom. Consequently, aspiring jazz musicians whose educational background has fostered a fundamental dependence on teachers must adopt new approaches to learning. Veterans describe the trials and tribulations that accompany the learner's efforts to absorb and sort out musical knowledge as examples of "paying dues". (p. 51)

Kelley (2009) quotes drummer T. S. Monk's teenage experiences from lessons with Max Roach:

He did not sit me down and say, 'This is how you play a paradiddle.' No, because it's all about hanging and digging the music, listening and learning. So basically, I did everything with Max, from carrying drums to gigs to going to car shows. Of course, you know you got to study, you've got to practice, but what makes you a great jazz player is philosophy. (p. 377)

His father, the pianist Thelonious Monk, essentially did not interfere with his music studies during several years: "there wasn't one word on the subject between me and my father. Not one utterance" (Kelley, 2009, p. 377).

In practitioners' discourse on jazz learning, the crucial importance of listening has traditionally been emphasized. Crow (2005) relates an episode from a university jazz clinic where jazz educator Jamie Aebersold offered detailed analyses of the students' musical output, after which his co-clinician, the trumpeter Red Rodney, pointed to his ears and exclaimed: "God gave you these [...] That's what guys like me use when we don't understand the intellectual terms. And learn the melody, because the melody is never wrong!" (p. 48).

Gioia (1988) points out that several famous jazz players and innovators (such as Bix Beiderbecke, Henry "Red" Allen, and Charlie Parker) exemplify jazz learning processes that relied heavily on their "apprenticeship at the gramophone" (p. 67). Such listening practices still prevail in jazz learning; Johansen (2013b) provides an



empirical study of the practice of copying from recordings in contemporary Norwegian jazz students' instrumental practice.

The following story told by saxophonist Eddie Barefield is but one of many examples of the dynamics between musical ear and musical literacy in discourse on jazz learning. At his first alto sax lesson, young Barefield learned the fingering for the chromatic scale:

Well, that's all I needed. We had records all of these years and I started fooling around playing what little things I had in my ear. I was copying Coleman Hawkins, the first saxophone player I remember hearing. When my mother gave me the fifty cents every week to take the lesson, I would go deposit my horn in the drug store and go to the movies and then come home and practice with the records. She would say, "Is that your lesson?" And I would say, "Yes, that's my lesson." This is actually the way I learned how to play. (Crow, 2005, p. 26)

In the chapter "Hangin' out and jammin'", Berliner (1994) presents samples of traditional frameworks for jazz musical learning, such as jam sessions and participation in orchestras.

As essential to students as technical information and counsel is the understanding of jazz acquired directly through performance. In part, they gain experience by participating in one of the most venerable of the community's institutions, the jam session. (pp. 41–42)

The custom of sitting in also extends to professional engagements, or gigs, where guests display their skills before paying audiences. (p. 44)

Musicians also cultivate their skills through extended tenures in successive bands, sometimes developing their first affiliations shortly after obtaining an instrument and learning a few scales. (p. 46)

Such frameworks seem very much in line with the windows onto practice recommended by Brown and Duguid (1993).

Without doubt, jazz musical learning at a high professional level is often also a question of seeking knowledge where it appears to be available. Two famous saxophonists chose different strategies in order to "steal" knowledge from an important source: the technique and harmonic conception of the pianist Art Tatum.

Don Byas bought everything that Tatum recorded. He actually used to sit down and copy Tatum's solos and play them on saxophone. He said that that's where he got his greatest harmonic education, by listening to Tatum. (Crow, 1990, p. 43)

[Charlie] Parker went to New York, where for a while he took a job as a dishwasher at the Chicken Shack in Harlem, where Tatum was playing, so that he could immerse himself in Tatum's flow of notes. By this point in time [1939] Parker, the soon-to-be legendary hero of the be-bop movement, had identified Tatum's playing as having many of the features he wanted to master. (Lester, 1994, p. 170)

For clarity's sake, it ought to be added that the task of stealing knowledge in this context would not be considered as an end in itself; sheer imitation is seldom encouraged in jazz. Pianist Billy Taylor tells his story of Art Tatum's reaction to a near-perfect imitation of his own virtuoso recording of "Tiger rag":

I took him to an after-hours club and a guy came in and told him, 'I've been admiring you for so many years and I'd just love to play "Tiger Rag" for you. I made a transcription of your record of that, and I'd love to play it for you.' So Art said, 'OK,' and so the guy sat down and played it, and my mouth fell down and I said, 'Man, this guy has really got an ear on Tatum.' And Art Tatum couldn't have cared less. He said, 'Well, he knows what I do, but he doesn't know why I do it.' (Brown, 2010, p. 211)

The tension between imitation and creation constitutes a central educational dilemma in arts pedagogy. Perhaps all education needs to be founded on the supposition that there is a way to dissolve this seemingly paradoxical challenge. Liebman (1996) strongly advocates transcription and imitation as educational means for the jazz improviser to attain musical individuality: "all artists go through imitation" (p. 17); "The inspirational effect of being able to sound like the records being admired will spur the youngster on to find his own individuality" (p. 117).

Beyond doubt, informal learning environments have been and continue to be crucial to jazz learning. Apart from listening to live and recorded music, activities such as jamming together, hanging out together and even living together with more experienced musicians is an important means – or indeed the important means – of designing a window onto practice, making knowledge theft possible in this musical tradition. This may also help explaining why a professional jazz musician who finds herself or himself in a formal jazz education context may sometimes be hard pressed to verbalize the knowledge that jazz students may be in need of.

At one clinic, Thelonious Monk listened to a student band play and gave careful consideration to what he wanted to tell them. After much musing and beardstroking, he stood before them and said, "Keep on tryin'!" (Crow, 1990, p. 45)

According to Prouty (2008), "self-teaching", commonly perceived as essential to non-academic jazz traditions, will permit performers to determine their own aesthetic

course. Ratliff (2008) quotes composer Maria Schneider's view on bad jazz education: "The only bad thing is when jazz education leads the person before they've explored something themselves" (p. 78). The colourful recollections of Miles Davis (1989) offer interesting perspectives on how the dynamics of formal and informal learning could be experienced by a young jazz musician in 1944.

I started really getting pissed off with what they was talking about at Juilliard. It just wasn't happening for me there. Like I said, going to Juilliard was a smokescreen for being around Dizzy and Bird, but I did want to see what I could learn there. [...] I was learning more from hanging out, so I just got bored with school after a while. Plus, they were so fucking white-oriented and so racist. Shit, I could learn more in one session at Minton's than it would take me two years to learn at Juilliard. At Juilliard, after it was all over, all I was going to know was a bunch of white styles; nothing new. And I was just getting mad and embarrassed with their prejudice and shit. (p. 49)

However, Davis was not at all against music studies in principle:

I couldn't believe that all them guys like Bird, Prez, Bean, all them cats wouldn't go to museums or libraries and borrow those musical scores so they could check out what was happening. I would go to the library and borrow scores by all those great composers, like Stravinsky, Alban Berg, Prokofiev. I wanted to see what was going on in all of music. Knowledge is freedom and ignorance is slavery. (p. 51)

Playing gigs and jam sessions in the evenings, nights and early mornings did not facilitate Davis's (1989) formal studies: "At Juilliard I'd sleepwalk through them sorry-ass classes, bored to tears, especially in my chorus classes. I'd be sitting there yawning and nodding" (p. 53).

During the last half century, however, the role of nightclubs and jam sessions to jazz performance and learning has diminished dramatically. College-based programmes have replaced the traditional learning grounds for young jazz musicians as well as the primary professional homes of many jazz performers (Ake, 2010). Arguably, the changing contexts of jazz learning have had significant impact on *what* is being taught and learnt, and *how*. A discussion of these and related questions has started to grow in jazz literature during the last few years.

The concept of literacy is arguably an important aspect of this development. One general perspective is formulated by Small (1987) in his remark that "black musicians have historically *tended* not to rely on notation" and that "an increase in dependence on notation indicates a tendency towards the aesthetic and the values – and the implicit higher social status – of European classical music" (p. 235). Small views this development with regret, arguing that "not only does the very ephemerality of the

performance in Afro-American musicking help to keep in motion the living process [...] but also the musicians' non-dependence on notation permits a much more open situation in terms of both musical techniques (in particular, rhythm) and of potential for continuing development and for the assimilation of multiple influences. Literacy is a good servant but a bad master" (p. 244).

The complex processes of performance and learning of jazz improvisation depart significantly from Western art music practices, especially in relation to the employment of written scores (Prouty, 2006). Historically, the concept of improvisation has been viewed as a troublesome one within musical academia. As a consequence of having been met by strong opposition in these contexts, jazz educators have created relatively codified systems for improvisational instruction (Prouty, 2008). Monson (2002) sums up one important development regarding educational content:

Since the 1960s, jazz pedagogy has been dominated by the chord-scale approach to jazz harmony. Improvisers learn to associate scales with particular chords, which then guide their note choices while improvising. (p. 123)

Prouty (2012) finds in George Russell's theoretical concepts of the 1950s "the first systematic expression" (p. 55) of this approach. Solis (2009a) notes that jazz teachers during almost half a century "have produced countless variations on chord-scale theory, the dominant model for instruction in post-bop improvisation" and that "the easily gradable quality of orthodox chord-scale theory has made it the most common classroom jazz theory technique" (p. 5). According to Liebman (1996) there are several reasons why bebop music offers beneficent educational material:

in my opinion it should be mandatory for all music education majors [...] Playing bebop necessitates instrumental technique, theoretical knowledge, a good fluent rhythmic feel and training of the ear. It is the calisthenics of jazz improvisation no matter what idiom. (p. 118)

Prouty (2012) points out, however, that the publication of pedagogical material for jazz improvisation was criticized as early as in the 1970s, based on the argument that it would turn a "fundamentally oral" tradition into a written one (p. 73).

In the words of Bailey (1993), bebop is "the pedagogue's delight" because of "its somewhat stylistic rigidity, its susceptibility to formulated method" (p. 49). However, he maintains that the original qualities of the music have been watered down as a consequence of the "standardized, non-personal" educational approach to improvisation:

The mechanics of the style are everywhere; of the restlessness, the adventurousness, the thirst for change which was a central characteristic of the jazz of that period there seems to be no sign at all. (p. 50)

The relationship between jazz 'theory' and jazz 'practice' may appear rather different in formal or informal learning environments. The question whether it is legitimate for a student to start improvising without having first acquired a certain amount of theoretical footing is anything but a settled matter. Prouty (2012) relates his experience as a jazz student in Texas in the 1990s: "undergraduates generally completed a two-semester sequence of jazz theory and ear training before being allowed to take the basic improvisation course" (p. 60). According to Prouty, jazz improvisation pedagogy can be either theory-based or practice-based. The viewpoint that theory gives rise to improvisational practice does not exclude the opposite perspective, that practice determines what will be regarded as theory. In Prouty's (2012) view, "both of these viewpoints are valuable" (p. 63).

Ake (2002) criticizes this kind of theory-based educational practice mainly on the grounds that jazz improvisation based on it stands the risk of becoming a search for mastery rather than for freedom. It has been argued that as a result of these processes, conventional jazz pedagogy does not focus on experiential, exploratory, and collective approaches to jazz improvisation; and that instead it frequently treats musical knowledge as individual, abstract, relatively fixed and unaffected by the activities through which it is acquired and used (Borgo, 2007). Prouty (2008) even argues that attempts to organize knowledge in much (if not most) jazz pedagogy is an exercise in power, reflected in a circumscription of improvisation. However, it may be added, jazz education in a global perspective is far from homogeneous and ought perhaps not to be summed up in simplified schemata. Solis (2009a) remarks that neither is chord/scale theory the sole content of the dominant models for jazz improvisation training, "nor the only approach to the study of jazz improvisation practiced at present" (p. 5). In many contexts, jazz educators are likely to be reasonably aware of the complexities of jazz performance and learning. For instance, Johansen (2013a), in an empirical study of contemporary Norwegian jazz students' instrumental practice, coins the term *explorational practice* to designate ways of practising – considered crucial by these students – that "involve experimenting with musical conventions and instrument norms" (p. iv).

The limits to what is possible to verbalize in learning processes, obviously, is a recurring theme in the educational perspectives presented in this section. In legitimate peripheral participation, according to Lave and Wenger (1991), there is "very little observable teaching" (p. 92). As noted above, Nielsen and Kvale (2000) emphasize that language may often be of minor importance in the implicit knowledge of a profession, e.g., when knowledge is transferred through processes of cognitive apprenticeship. Similarly, problems of verbalization are at the core of Rabindranath Tagore's story about stealing knowledge.

Before I proceed to a presentation of the concept of *landscapes of learning*, I will try to sum up briefly the previous discussion of educational perspectives considered relevant to this investigation.

As a means to understand storytelling in jazz improvisation, the ecological approach – perspectives on learning and creativity based on Gibson's (1979/1986) theory of perception – offers a significant alternative or complement to the – mainly musicological – perspectives on narrativity and music that were presented in section 3.1.2. In the view of Clarke (2005), our experience of musical meaning is not so much a matter of semiotics or reference; rather it is fundamentally a *perceptual experience*: "there really is no such thing as passive listening" (p. 205).

Ecological perspectives on jazz education may enable us to perceive and evaluate several alternative aspects such as, for instance, *expression*, *values*, and *spirituality* (Boyce-Tillman, 2004) – all of which seem potentially quite relevant in connection with the concept of storytelling.

Jazz learning contexts, historically, will probably provide rich exemplifications of the dynamic and diverse *learning ecology frameworks* presented by Barron (2006). Classrooms are not authentic scenes for learning the jazz profession; as noted by Ekelund (1997b), a classroom is the authentic scene for one profession only, namely, that of the teacher. Activities such as sitting in with professional bands and participating at jam sessions would, I believe, qualify to a high degree as instances of interest-driven, self-initiated, boundary-crossing, and self-sustaining learning. Similarly, as the many concrete jazz examples in subsection 3.4.3 indicate, traditionally prevalent jazz learning activities such as jamming and hanging out with more experienced musicians would seem to qualify well as instances of *stealing knowledge* in the sense of Brown and Duguid (1993).

The many-splendoured learning environments of jazz music have been touched upon several times above. Could their diversity be construed as topologies, zones, or landscapes? The following subsection proposes an attempt in such a direction.

#### 3.4.4. Landscapes of learning

*Didactic topology* is a concept which has been developed by Aslaug Nyrnes, the Norwegian professor of art didactics. Regarding the educational implications of the present investigation, I think there are interesting possibilities in relating the *landscapes of metaphor* discussed above (in subsection 3.3.10) with a notion of *landscapes of learning* regarding jazz improvisation. My main reason for preferring the term "landscape", or "zone", rather than "topology" (Nyrnes, 2000), or "topography" (Kleinen, 1997, 2011), is to avoid connotations that may be too narrow or perhaps too permeated by cognitivist perspectives. The notion of landscape, in my understanding, may carry about the same scope of meaning as "zone" according to Wasser and Bresler (1996):

unsettled locations, areas of overlap, joint custody, or contestation. It is in a zone [or landscape] that unexpected forces meet, new challenges arise, and solutions have to be devised with the materials at hand. The notion of zone [or landscape] implies dynamic processes of exchange, transaction, transformation, and intensity. (p. 13)

"Landscape" also relates to perspectives on cognitive apprenticeship and the learning resources afforded by the learners' environment, as Nielsen and Kvale (2000) point out. Furthermore, it connects to the concept of musical ecology put forward by Boyce-Tillman (2004), reflecting music's interrelations with a pluralist society. Finally, in addition, I ascribe to the notion of landscape a more open, rich, and hermeneutic interpretive stance than to the concepts of topology and topography, which seem to connote a focus on schematic or even simplistic interpretations.

In the present subsection, I will restrict myself to a brief presentation of Nyernes's (2000) concept of didactic topology. I will expand further on the possibilities to explore relations between the landscapes of the storytelling metaphor and the landscapes of learning regarding jazz improvisation in the concluding discussion of the results of this investigation (section 6.3). It should be noted that the choice of the term landscapes of learning indicates a focus on learning perspectives rather than teaching (didactic) perspectives.

In her analysis of a text by the 18th century writer Ludvig Holberg, Nyernes (2000) points out how didactics can be found inscribed in an individual work of art. Based on this analysis, she attempts to formulate "a minor didactics" ("en mindre didaktikk") for the arts. According to this perspective, didactics should not be understood as a general framework, a theory outside the text or subject of study. Rather, in this alternative point of view, didactics is a question of trying to focus on understanding the individual text: "To study what and how students read always implies being a reader yourself" (Nyernes 2000, p. 4; my translation).

Nyernes criticizes the linear model of communication that she finds inherent in traditional didactics: sender (curriculum/teacher)–subject–receiver (student). In its place, she advocates a topological and situated way of thinking. This *didactic space*, Nyernes (2000) contends, is larger than its users: "it contains fundamental conditions that every didactic situation is subject to" (p. 11; my translation). The topology (showing the positions of the agents involved in education) of the didactic space includes three coordinates: *mimesis*, *temporality*, and *copia*.

The inclusion of the concept of *mimesis* points to the relation of knowledge to imitation; consequently, learning will include methodical form and genre practices. However, Nyernes (2000) problematizes overly simplistic views on mimesis. Imitation will represent difference, she points out, since the world is made available through our ways of categorizing it: "The texts are topological, they concern [vender sig i] language, not reality" (p. 12; my translation).

Clearly, the rhetorical perspective latent in Nyernes's topological model may yield certain shifts of focus in our outlook on arts and arts education, such as an increased attention to questions of form, to the concrete material, as well as to tradition. This change in perspective seems to relate to current lines of thought such as constructivism, neopragmatism, and poststructuralism.

*Temporality* as a didactic dimension includes a tension between *chronos* (horizontal time; time independent of human influence) and *kairos* (vertical time; time influenced by human decisions and actions). Didactics has to do with being at the right place (*topos*) at the right time (*kairos*).

The dimension of *copia* (stock, supply) has been problematized by traditional didactic theory, mainly regarding the question of selection of didactic content. Nyernes (2000) points out that the concept of *copia* activates the didactic question of how to store up. It further has to do with the supply of forms on all levels: from details to large structure; for instance, from vocabulary to style.

Nyernes (2002) assesses the topological model thus: "Copia, mimesis, and temporality [are] three didactic basic conditions. And they appear to be relational. [...] The radicality of the 'didactic room' as an analytical approach is perhaps that temporality thus is inscribed in a spatial understanding" (p. 124; my translation).

According to Nyernes (2000), all linguistic utterances can be analysed as different *topoi* in the space constituted by the three problem areas mimesis, temporality, and *copia*. "Thinking evolves in the encounter with a material. Also, thinking is cultivated and changed by the material it encounters. The material provides new categories of perception. Like this: the didactic space. Spectacles to bring along in order to read new and other examples more sharply" (p. 16; my translation).

Without doubt, Nyernes's views on mimesis, temporality, and *copia* are of interest to the study of art forms other than literature. Several researchers (e.g., Berliner, 1994; Monson, 1996) have studied how improvising jazz musicians on an individual as well as a collective level include in their music-making processes of *copying*, *recycling*, and *combining* elements of (individual and collective) musical memory. I trust, therefore, that Nyernes's topological model may prove highly relevant to certain concepts in jazz improvisation education, such as, for instance, emulation of style, swing, and formulaic improvisation.

I should add at this point that my intention in the discussion of the results of the present investigation (Chapter 6), however, will not be to aim at a faithful rendition of Nyernes's topology. As stated initially in this subsection, I consider the notion of *landscape* preferable in several respects: compared to the rather static graphical representations indicated by the term topology, 'landscape' connotes, to my mind, a dynamic and hermeneutic interpretive openness to the unsettled and unexpected. Also, it seems feasible to subsume by this metaphor several aspects of the educational perspectives presented in this section: the practice communities of situated learning (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Nielsen & Kvale, 2000); the concepts of an ecology of music education (Boyce-Tillman, 2004), learning ecology frameworks (Barron, 2006), and



stealing knowledge through windows onto practice (Brown & Duguid, 1993). I consider all these features of the concept of *landscapes of learning* to be potentially valuable assets in the process of exploring the rich metaphor of storytelling in jazz improvisation.

### 3.5 Perspectives on the worlds of jazz music and jazz education

The present study focuses on how a certain concept, storytelling, is used in artistic and educational jazz contexts. Sociological perspectives on this usage may prove highly relevant to our understanding of it. Nevertheless, such perspectives are notoriously absent in much jazz literature. DeVaux (1998) points out that "the ideal of jazz as an autonomous art" is prominent in many writings on jazz history: "the concept of jazz tradition tends to leach the social significance out of the music, leaving the impression that the history of jazz can be described satisfactorily only in aesthetic terms" (p. 417). Sociological studies of identity and socialization in jazz contexts in the United States include Jost (1982) and Lopes (1982). Myers (2013) is, according to the book's sleeve note, "the first comprehensive social history of jazz [in the United States]". Gender issues are notoriously underrepresented in jazz studies; however, Tucker's (2000) study of female big bands provides one important exception (cf. also Rustin & Tucker, 2008; Selander, 2012).

Szlamowics (2005) makes a direct connection between the stories told in jazz and the cultural context of the music: "saisir ce qu'il raconte [...] nécessite d'en comprendre la réalité culturelle [...] pour saisir ce que *le jazz* communique, il faut bien l'écouter avec les oreilles de ses createurs" (p. 80). Indeed, it might be argued that in order to understand what storytelling in jazz is all about, you need to approach and understand extramusical aspects. Baraka (1998) states, for instance:

The notes *mean something*; and the something is, regardless of its stylistic considerations, part of the black psyche as it dictates the various forms of Negro culture. [...] The blues and jazz aesthetic, to be fully understood, must be seen in as nearly its complete human context as possible. People made bebop. The question the critic must ask is: *why?* (pp. 139–140)

In the following subsections I present and discuss a theoretical framework which I consider apt for such a sociological analysis. First, I present and discuss the concepts of *cultural capital*, *field*, and *habitus* in the theories of Bourdieu (1984; 1998) and relate them to Becker's (1963/1991) interactionist analysis of *deviant groups* such as jazz musicians (subsection 3.5.1). Secondly, I put forward some general features of the

*discursive construction of society* as presented by Potter (1996) as well as some more specific features of the discursive construction of *musical authenticity* as presented by Hamm (1995) (subsection 3.5.2). Thirdly, I introduce and evaluate the discourse analysis approach to expose and interpret ways in which discourse contributes to the constitution of the social world (subsection 3.5.3). In the concluding subsection (3.5.4), I suggest how these theoretical approaches may contribute to the present investigation through an analysis of the sociology of the worlds of (jazz) music and (jazz) education.

### 3.5.1. Cultural capital, field, and habitus

In the terminology of Bourdieu (1984; 1998), to be a jazz improviser might be viewed as having been socialized into a certain *field* and to have acquired a certain *cultural capital* which has become part of the body of the improviser as *habitus*. A central concept in Bourdieu's analysis is that of *symbolic capital*, closely relating to the concepts of cultural capital and field. Bourdieu's approach in mapping out the intellectual world aims, it might be argued, at freedom from illusions: the increasement of the intellectuals' awareness of the production of modes of thought and hierarchies of value is an act of liberation.

The economy conceptualized by Bourdieu includes the world of symbols and beliefs; it encompasses the production, reproduction and exchange of all kinds of symbolic and material assets. The symbolic assets have become part of people's bodies as habitus: their recollections, habits, and dispositions. Every individual tends to take on a certain position in any field. The habitus is the choice of positions according to one's dispositions. Any group develops strategies towards life conditions grounded in the habitus, the unity of dispositions. Different groups inherit or are able to acquire different amounts of economic and symbolic capital.

Just like economic capital, though separate from it, cultural capital is accumulated and unevenly distributed. In fact, Bourdieu (1993) employs the phrase *the economic world reversed* to characterize cultural production. He defines cultural capital as a form of knowledge, an internalized code, a competence to appreciate cultural artefacts or relations. Importantly, Bourdieu's sociology includes the study of social fields (*champs*) where people fight over symbolic and material assets. A field is inhabited by people with certain dispositions, certain investments and profits. Something is at stake which all participants have in common. The field implies specialists, institutions, and acknowledged hierarchies of value. When entering a field, a person is supposed to have acquired competence through investments and to demonstrate acceptance of certain basic beliefs. People who inhabit a field may have divergent opinions about the nature of the values they fight about, but they agree that the fight is worth fighting.

Indeed, the metaphoric language employed by Bourdieu (1993) to describe the field of cultural production is one of warfare:

The literary or artistic field is a *field of forces*, but it is also a *field of struggles* tending to transform or conserve this field of forces. The network of objective relations between positions subtends and orients the strategies which the occupants of the different positions implement in their struggles to defend or improve the positions (i.e. their position-takings), strategies which depend for their force and form on the position each agent occupies in the power relations. (p. 30)

The theory of fields places the work of art in social relations and conditions – in other words, in a system of collective belief – that sustains it as art. Bourdieu (1993) views his definition of the artistic field – at the same time a field of positions and a field of position-takings – as a means to escape the dilemma of analysing the art work through "internal reading of the work (taken in isolation [...]) and external [...] analysis, i.e. analysis of the social conditions of production" (p. 34). According to Bourdieu, the analysis of works of art must be dialectic; the works should be analysed in relation both to other works and to the field's structure and history, as well as to the specific agents involved. In the context of jazz improvisation, I take this as a call for methodological diversity: in order to fully understand the storytelling concept, for instance, it is not enough to investigate its *meaning(s)* (its *what*); another perspective which is equally relevant calls for an analysis of the *effects* that this usage is employed to bring about – in terms of, for instance, positions and position-takings in a fight about the values connected with storytelling (its *how*) – is equally relevant. Consequently, sociological perspectives are included as an important part of the discussion of the results of the present study (section 6.4).

Along what appears to be related lines of thought, Becker (1963/1991) studies *deviance* as a collective human activity. People act "with an eye to the responses of others": "They take into account the way their fellows will evaluate what they do, and how that evaluation will affect their prestige and rank" (p. 183). Becker (1976) argues that "[a]n organized world is the source of whatever social value is ascribed to a work" and that in this world the participants' "mutual appreciation of the conventions they share and the support they mutually afford one another convinces them that what they are doing is worth doing" (p. 705). Most artists in an organized art world, he holds, are *integrated professionals*, but there are also *mavericks*, *naïve (grassroots) artists*, and *folk artists*, whose work may eventually be adapted by and incorporated in the art world, in a few instances perhaps even honoured as innovative.

In the case of jazz improvisation, it might perhaps be argued that too extensive an incorporation of deviant voices into an "organized art world" may face the risk of watering down important characteristics of the music. For instance, Bailey (1993) offers his sceptical comments on what he perceives as "a movement towards a new

conception of jazz as 'black classical music', a movement guided by the desire to present an (institutional and academic) authority to counter-balance the authority of white classical music: "These are strange ambitions in a music which once so clearly demonstrated the empty fatuity of all these things" (p. 56). The institutionalization of jazz and jazz education is a recurring topic of discussion in this thesis (cf. 3.4.3, 3.5.4, 6.4.2, and 6.4.3).

In his interactionist analysis of deviant groups, Becker (1963/1991) focuses, among other things, on the culture of jazz and dance musicians: "their culture and way of life are sufficiently bizarre and unconventional for them to be labeled outsiders by more conventional members of the community" (p. 79). Becker argues that the culture and the careers of musicians are shaped by the "antagonistic relationship" between musicians and these other people (p. 102). Musicians emphasize "maintaining their freedom to play without interference from nonmusicians, who are felt to lack understanding of the musician's mysterious, artistic gifts" (p. 108). Jazz musicians and commercial musicians agree on this attitude towards the audience. It is based on two conflicting influences: the desire for self-expression and the recognition that this desire cannot be satisfied, due to external forces. As Becker points out, jazzmen know that in order to get jobs "they must satisfy the audience" (p. 93). However, the status of musicians as outsiders is intensified due to behavioural "patterns of isolation and self-segregation", which are a consequence of the musicians' fear "that they must sacrifice their artistic standards to the squares" (p. 95; "squares" referring to non-musicians). Furthermore, Becker contends, "the process of self-segregation is evident [...] in the use of an occupational slang" (p. 100).

Becker's (1963/1991) analysis of what "playing what you feel" may mean in this context is noteworthy for its relevance to the usage of the storytelling metaphor in jazz contexts as well as to jazz authenticity discourses (cf. subsection 3.5.2):

most men find it necessary to sacrifice the standards of their profession to some degree in order to meet the demands of audiences and of those who control employment opportunities. This creates another dimension of professional prestige, based on the degree to which one refuses to modify one's performance in deference to outside demands – from the one extreme of 'playing what you feel' to the other of 'playing what the people want to hear.' The jazzman plays what he feels while the commercial musician caters to public taste; the commercial viewpoint is best summarized in a statement attributed to a very successful commercial musician: 'I'll do anything for a dollar.' (p. 108)

The cited standard "The jazzman plays what he feels" stands out as relevant ground for a sociological interpretation of the requirement that a jazz soloist should tell a story. If the improviser does *not* tell a story (i.e., does not play her feelings), then, according to Becker's description and analysis of the processes involved, she may have sold her soul for filthy lucre. Liebman (1996) adds to this perspective in his

observation that jazz has developed largely in "difficult creative situations" such as night clubs where "musical creativity was not the primary reason why the people were in the audience" (p. 33).

Furthermore, according to Becker (1976), attitudes and exhortations based on such an outlook on improvisation ("play what you feel" or, perhaps, "tell your story") may eventually be adapted and incorporated, perhaps even honoured as innovative, by the organized world of music, arguably including the world of music education.

Another phenomenon may provide further exemplification of the relevance of sociological analysis of the development of jazz, as well as changes in view regarding the storytelling concept. When music progresses, the relevance of earlier forms will inevitably be called into question. For instance, it may be argued that this holds for how the blues were viewed by many young musicians in the 1940s. DeVaux (1997) argues that many African American bebop musicians, linking progressive social ambitions with progressive musical ambitions, viewed bebop as a way out of the blues which they considered as a symbol of social and musical restrictions. Porter (2002) suggests that these young musicians' reasons for rejecting the blues may be interpreted as "a collective ethos involving exploration, mental acuity, group pride, an aversion to categories, and an understanding that racial boundaries and assumptions can be called into question" (p. 70). Gillespie (1979/1999) states, however, that even though "[t]echnical differences" existed between bebop and blues musicians, "modern jazz musicians would have to know the blues" (p. 166).

The dynamics of processes like the ones outlined above appear highly relevant to a sociological analysis of storytelling in jazz improvisation and will be further pursued in the discussion of the results of the present investigation (Chapter 6).

### 3.5.2. Discursive construction of society and of musical authenticity

Throughout these sociological perspectives on the music world, it is apparent that language plays a key role. As noted above, Bourdieu (1993) points out the need for both internal and external analyses of art works; in the context of the present investigation, I take this as an exhortation to view the usage of the storytelling concept in discourse on jazz improvisation both as a question of interpreting the meaning(s) of this concept and at the same time analysing its functions in a social fight about values connected with this concept. The discursive version of constructionism developed by Potter (1996) focuses on how facts are constructed through the use of language. His theory relates in important ways to the speech act theory view of *language as a medium of action* (Austin, 1955/1976) and the sociology of knowledge view of the *construction through social actions* of the worlds we live in (Berger & Luckmann, 1966/1991).

Potter (1996) prefers to view language not as a mirror reflecting how things are, but rather as a construction yard; according to this metaphor, on one level

"descriptions and accounts construct the world" and, on a second level, "these descriptions and accounts are themselves constructed" (p. 97). Potter's concern is with "*talk and texts as parts of social practices*" (p. 105). In the view of conversation analysts, Potter holds, reality construction has to be "achieved using some devices or techniques" (p. 102). Focusing on how descriptions function, Potter distinguishes between their *epistemological orientation* and their *action orientation*:

descriptions can be analysed both in terms of the sorts of actions that they are performing or contributing to, and in terms of fact construction; that is, the process by which description is built up into accepted fact. (p. 121)

Potter (1996) argues, in short, that on one hand a description "will be used to accomplish an action"; and on the other, it "will build its own status as a factual version" (p. 108). A common approach to descriptions is to view them as being about the relationship between a set of words and a part of reality. An emphasis of rhetoric, Potter argues, can serve as a counter to this approach by emphasizing, instead, the relation between a description and alternative descriptions. Potter distinguishes between the *offensive rhetoric* of a description, in which it undermines alternative descriptions, and its *defensive rhetoric*, which depends on its capacity to resist undermining. Similarly, Potter also distinguishes between two sorts of discourse. One kind is reifying discourse, which constructs the world as solid and factual and which "turns something abstract into a material thing", producing it as an object, a thought, or an event. Another kind is ironizing discourse, which undermines the literal descriptiveness of versions of the world through treating it "not as literal but as a product of interests or strategy" (p. 107). In short, when descriptions are constructed as factual accounts, they can be related to a hierarchy of epistemological modalities: at one end of the hierarchy, descriptions are reified as solid (fact construction); at the other end, they may be ironized as defective (fact destruction).

Potter (1996) explores *categorization* as one important feature of the action orientation of descriptions. He points out that the use of any descriptive word will involve categorization; through categorization, "the specific sense of something is *constituted*" (p. 177). Potter notes, furthermore, that while "metaphor is often considered as an area where descriptions are being used performatively" (p. 180), the distinction between metaphorical and non-metaphorical is notoriously blurred. Potter concludes that regardless of its metaphoricity, "all discourse can be studied for its rhetorical and constructive work" (p. 181). One of the aspects of making any description, Potter holds, is that it will "pick out a particular range of phenomena as relevant and ignore other potential ones" (p. 184); similarly, "one of the features of using any descriptive categorization is the terms that are *not* used" (p. 187).

In the discussion of the results of the present investigation (Chapter 6), the informants' discourse on storytelling in jazz improvisation will be analysed from perspectives of rhetoric and construction. Why does this discourse flourish? What can

it be used to achieve? How are values ascribed to storytelling, values that appear to be solid and independent of the speaker?

Already at this stage, however, it may be useful to take a closer look on the discursive construction of one concept which, according to several accounts, is at the heart of discourse on improvisation: *authenticity*. Issues of musical authenticity have been the subject of much debate with regard to several musical genres, especially, perhaps, genres emanating from folk music. There may be reason to view such debates in relation to the requirement that a jazz soloist ought to tell a story. Is this requirement one of authenticity? If so, what does it amount to? In which sense is it required that the jazz improviser, or the jazz improviser's story, should be authentic?

Hamm (1995) argues that the notion of musical authenticity, going back to Johann Gottfried Herder, includes the view of folk music as an authentic, spontaneous expression of a certain culturally defined group of people, as well as the view that folk music thus gives voice to the "inner nature" of this group, and that mediation by outsiders may be "a threat to its authenticity" (p. 16). Hamm analyses authenticity discourses in popular music contexts, such as scholarship concerned with ragtime and jazz. For instance, he discerns narratives of authenticity in writings on the mid-20th century ragtime revival. According to Hamm, the ragtime revivalists were concerned with *historical authenticity* (who and when) as well as *stylistic authenticity* (how), whereas *social authenticity* was "not considered"; ragtime's "new social setting and cultural meaning had nothing to do with its original environment and audience" (p. 12).

The notion that jazz is in some sense a black music has been, and still is, a common one. In the words of Sidran (1981), jazz can be seen as "a product of a peculiarly black voice (blues) in a peculiarly white context (Western harmony)" (p. 33). Hamm (1995) comments on how a racialized perspective on musical authenticity permeated discourse on jazz early on: "The idea that jazz was an authentic black product [...] was widely accepted, though not always clearly articulated" (p. 13). Still, Hamm argues, such authenticity claims may be questionable:

the argument that only a certain repertory played by certain black musicians is authentic [...] distorts two aspects of the history of popular music: the critical role played by the mass media in the development of jazz and other genres by black musicians themselves; and the historical reality of repertories created by white musicians and accepted by contemporary audiences and performers as 'jazz'. (pp. 14–15)

In Hamm's (1995) view, then, writers on ragtime and jazz have formulated a modernist narrative borrowed from writings on folk and popular music. This narrative emphasizes values from a purist, authenticist perspective, combining this outlook with a pessimistic view on the historical development of the music in question: "a stable, authentic repertory shaped in an isolated and culturally pure

environment is distinct from, superior to, but unfortunately threatened by, subsequent commercial and contaminated products" (p. 16).

In an influential article on authenticity in music, Moore (2002) advocates a shift of focus from performer to listener. He points out that in order to understand better what 'authenticity' in musical performance may refer to, we ought to focus not so much on the originators' intentions but rather on the reasons that various perceivers may have to find a performance authentic. Authenticity, Moore holds, is not inherent in musical sound; rather, it is a matter of interpretation: "It is ascribed, not inscribed" (p. 210).

Moore (2002) argues that the researcher ought to ask "who, rather than what, is being authenticated" (p. 220); the answer may be the performer, the audience, or an absent other. In line with these three possible answers, Moore suggests that there are three kinds of authenticity:

- (i) authenticity of expression (or, first-person authenticity), which conveys to the perceiver the impression that the originator's musical utterance is "one of integrity" (p. 214);
- (ii) authenticity of execution (or, third-person authenticity), which conveys to the perceiver the impression that the originator's musical utterance accurately represents "the ideas of another" (p. 218); and
- (iii) authenticity of experience (or, second-person authenticity), which conveys to the perceiver the impression that "the listener's experience of life is being validated, that the music is 'telling it like it is' for them" (p. 220).

The view of authenticity as authentication has been a fruitful one in recent research on jazz; for instance, interesting perspectives on the role and function of authentication processes have been presented and discussed regarding Japanese jazz history (Atkins, 2001) and New Orleans revivalism (Ekins, 2013).

In the words of DeVeaux (1998), "ethnicity provides a core, a center of gravity for the narrative of jazz" (p. 487). Sidran (1981) holds that there is a close relationship between the sounding music and its socio-cultural context, including racial perspectives:

Because a jazz musician cannot escape his own cultural referents and because the idioms of jazz force the musician to stand naked, emotionally, before his audience, jazz music has always maintained, indeed, has stimulated, a race consciousness. (p. 68)

The relation between authenticity and *essentialism* is a problematic one; just as the idea that there are "white" and "black" sounds of jazz is a problematic one. The stance of many modern jazz musicians will probably include a dynamic relationship between universalism and Afro-centrism, between "universalist and ethnically assertive points



of view" (Monson, 1996, p. 201) where concepts such as *colourblind vision* and *de-ethnicization*, but also *authenticity* and *Eurocentric/afrocentric hegemony*, are seen as important. Against racial sound stereotypes, we might argue that jazz is universal and open to all; still, its origins are African American. Monson (2009) points out that

the idea of the modern artist is a double-edged sword. If it enabled African American musicians to partially break out of a race-based, second-class citizenship by appealing to merit and genius, it also provided a rhetoric through which white musicians could insist that the music be understood as colorblind, and those who emphasized its African American history dismissed as reverse racists, or in more recent terminology, essentialists. (p. 29)

In her discussion of music making and society, Monson (2009) sums up a few points that seem to unite a number of definitions of an African American cultural aesthetic in music: "vocalization of sound"; "swing, or groove"; "interplay between the sacred and the secular"; and "embodiment" (p. 30). The central importance to jazz of oral culture is pointed out by Brown (1973):

The principle of the ear as a primary sensor prevails among Afro-Americans as well as in most African societies. (p. 15)

Sidran (1981) expands on several of the perspectives mentioned by Monson; viewing the development of jazz as a manifestation of black oral culture as opposed to white literate culture, he points in particular to black music's *vocalized tone* which, according to Sidran, "is part of the greater oral ability to lend semantic significance to tonal elements of speech" (p. 6). Sidran also contends that oral cultures entail a different *approach to time* than literate cultures: in an oral culture, man "is forced to behave in a spontaneous manner, to act and react (instantaneous feedback) simultaneously" (p. 3). Furthermore, Sidran points out that African oral cultures do not distinguish between artist and audience. As a consequence, he argues, "individuality, rather than be stifled by group activity or be equated with specialization, actually flourishes in a group context" (p. 8).

The concept of storytelling may be fitted into this picture. Gaines (2004) elaborates on how African-influenced rhythmic conceptions have been expanded during a long process of development:

Through a continuum of speech, song, textual meaning, music, dance, and gesture, more traditional elements of African-American music (swing) and culture (sorrow songs, or spirituals) were supplemented by newer black diaspora rhythmic forms, bringing to listeners a cosmopolitan historical consciousness and spirit of social advancement that anticipated and accompanied movements for black freedom and social change in the 1950s and 1960s. How fitting, then, that the jazz soloist's effectiveness as an improviser was measured by his ability

to 'tell a story,' articulating the gaps in signification between speech and music, or between rhythm and melody, to the satisfaction of audiences. Within this dialogue between musicians and audiences, between creation and reception, seemingly commonplace acts of watching and listening to black subjects in performance become suffused with political importance. (p. 208)

It must be noted, though, Monson (2009) points out, that since individual jazz musicians have fashioned their sounds drawing upon multiple aesthetic perspectives, the "sonic relationships" among black and white musicians are characterized by a considerable complexity; for instance, Nat King Cole displayed his mastery in the crooning style of Bing Crosby and Frank Sinatra, whereas Stan Getz modeled his light saxophone timbre on that of Lester Young (cf. the discussion of Young in subsection 2.2.2):

however central the black aesthetic in music [...] has been in highlighting the distinctiveness of African American music, it is also true that it does not describe the full range of music making practiced by African Americans. (p. 31)

May we infer, then, that jazz is colourblind? Monson (2009) argues that in a "racially stratified social structure", this is not the case: even though non-African Americans may master the "sonic parameters" of African American musical style, they will still have a different social relationship to the music than an African American. In articulating this argument, Monson may be seen as relating closely to the "anti-anti-essentialism" of Gilroy (1993):

there are structural limits to aesthetic agency and practice. Even though individuals in the jazz world can reach beyond their sociologically defined categories through practical acts of imagination, emulation, and creativity, their social relationship to styles not of their home social categories is, frustratingly, shaped by the continuing race, class, and gender hierarchies in American and global society. (Monson, 2009, p. 34)

If the relationship between authenticity and essentialism is a problematic one, the same might be argued regarding the adjectives authentic and *classical*. In the history of popular music, certain tunes and recordings may gain status as "classical"; this is no uncommon phenomenon. This may have bearing on authenticity issues. Hamm (1995) points out that as a result of this focus on a few models, much other music may face obscurity or oblivion. On a general level, the relevance of dynamics between text and context ought to be emphasized. When discourse on popular music adapts a conceptual framework based on the discourse of classical music, this entails "the elevation of selected pieces of popular music, or of entire popular genres, to the status of 'art' music". This in turn has the effect of *emphasizing text over context*, resulting in

"the marginalization of all pieces within that genre not singled out as 'masterpieces,' or, worse, of entire other genres" (p. 20). Arguably, in the context of jazz improvisation, such an adaptation of a "classical" conceptual framework may also have significant effects. One effect might be that this framework underpins a jazz historiography that *emphasizes the (construed) musical 'giants' or 'geniuses' over the musical community* (Solis, 2009b). Another effect may be expressed in terms of *emphasizing substantive over verb*, disregarding performativity and activity aspects on improvisation, instead focusing mainly on *improvisation as music*, as opposed to *improvisation as music making*; cf. the basic assumption of Small (1987): "music is not primarily a thing or a collection of things, but an activity in which we engage" (p. 50).

In seeming affinity with Small's (1987, 1998) concept of musicking, Nachmanovitch (1990) comments on how language structure may affect the way we perceive the world we live in, including music: "[W]e speak a language that uses nouns and verbs. Thus we are predisposed to believe that the world consists of things and forces that move the things. But like any living entity, the system of musicians-plus-instruments-plus-listeners-plus-environment is an indivisible, interactive totality; there is something false about splitting it up into parts" (p. 143).

Arguably, the *nounization* involved in conceptualizations of musical activities has strong impact on our thinking about them: e.g., music, rhythm, jazz, swing, and improvisation. Attali (1985) directs attention to the commoditization of Western music since the 1700s: "Until the eighteenth century, music was of the order of the 'active'; it then entered the order of the 'exchanged'" (p. 57). In particular, he argues, "the colonization of black music by the American industrial apparatus" created a broad market, making music a commodity (p. 103). In the view of Mackey (1998), this development eventually continued with the "nounization" of swing (p. 523). Small (1998) contends that "the trap of reification [...] has been a besetting fault of Western thinking ever since Plato" (p. 2). It might be argued that our thinking about musical activities would be better off if we conceptualized these activities as gerunds: musicking (Small, 1987), "Rhythm-a-ning" (a composition by Thelonious Monk), jazzing, swinging, and improvising.

The dynamics of musical text versus musical context – as well as improvisation as music versus improvisation as music making – relate in interesting ways to the jazz improviser's dynamic relation to tradition and spontaneity. Arguably, the processes where music gains status as classical or authentic carry important implications regarding perspectives on jazz improvisation. These implications will be further pursued in the discussion of results (Chapter 6).

### 3.5.3. Discourse analysis

According to social constructionism, the ways in which we understand and represent the world are products of discourse; they are historically and culturally specific and contingent; and they are created and maintained by social processes. Furthermore, according to social constructionism, the social construction of knowledge and truth has social consequences. Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) point out that discourse analysis is "one of the most widely used approaches within social constructionism" (p. 4). A discourse, in their definition, is "a particular way of representing the world"; consequently, "the limits of the discourse are where the elements are articulated in a way that is no longer compatible with the terms of the discourse" (p. 143). They suggest that discourse be viewed as an analytical concept, "an entity that the researcher projects onto the world in order to create a framework for study" (p. 143). The question how a discourse ought to be delimited, they argue, is hence a strategic one in relation to one's aims of research.

The discourse theoretical approach of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) views all social practices as discursive; they do not distinguish between discursive and non-discursive dimensions of the social. According to their discourse theory, different discourses are engaged in a constant struggle in order to fix the meanings of language in their own way; to achieve hegemony.

According to Norman Fairclough's (1995) *critical discourse analysis*, as described by Jørgensen and Phillips (2002), social and cultural practices are partly discursive. Discourse contributes to the constitution of the social world. It stands in a dialectical relationship with other social dimensions; as a social practice it both *constitutes* the social world and *is constituted* by other social practices. Furthermore, discursive practices have *ideological effects*: they contribute to the creation and reproduction of unequal power relations between social groups. In brief, critical discourse analysis focuses both on the discursive practices themselves and on the ideological role these practices play. Fairclough does distinguish between discursive and non-discursive dimensions of the social, but, according to Jørgensen and Phillips (2002), the consequences for empirical research of this distinction "remain unclear" (p. 89).

Thirdly, discursive psychology studies the social consequences of how people create and negotiate representations of the world through their flexible use of available discourses.

Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) point out that theoretical perspectives differ in their ability to account for change. *Structuralism* restricts its object of study in language to the underlying structure (*langue*) and neglects the practice of language (*parole*). *Poststructuralism*, on the other hand, attempts to fuse structure and practice into a single process. The dynamics of earlier and new productions of meaning are crucial to the analysis of change. According to Jørgensen and Phillips, different discourse analysis approaches all have a dualist view of discursive practice, recognizing that "in every discursive practice, it is necessary to draw on earlier productions of meaning in

order to be understood, but that some elements may also be put together in a new way, bringing about a change in the discursive structures" (p. 139). The *practice* is analysed in the light of the *structure* to which it relates. For instance, Fairclough (1995) distinguishes between the *communicative event* and the *order of discourse*, while Laclau and Mouffe (1985) distinguish between *articulation* and *discourse*. An order of discourse is "a complex configuration of discourses and genres within the same social field or institution" (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 141). This may serve as a conceptualization of different discourses competing in the same domain:

the relationship between contingency and permanence within a particular domain can be explored by studying an order of discourse: areas where all discourses share the same common-sense assumptions are less open to change and more likely to remain stable, whereas areas where different discourses struggle to fix meaning in competing ways are unstable and more open to change. (p. 142)

An analysis of the order of discourse may also be of help to approach power imbalances between different discourses.

Monson (2007, 2009) analyses the development of American jazz in relation to the political situation and struggle of African Americans. In her analysis, important themes are highlighted by aid of concepts such as discourse (Foucault, 1969/2002) – it is noteworthy that Monson conceives of music itself as a discourse –, structure (Giddens, 1984), and practice (Bourdieu, 1992). Monson views the growth of a "black" musical aesthetics and of a "colourblind" jazz music as related to differences in experiences and conditions among musicians. Several other studies also include discussions and exemplifications of the relevance of discourse analytical perspectives on jazz in the United States (Gabbard, 1995a, 1995b; O'Meally, 1998; Porter, 2002; O'Meally, Edwards, & Griffin, 2004). The fascinating source book of jazz history compiled by Meltzer (1993) provides a plentiful foundation for a discourse analytical approach and its selection is indeed guided by such perspectives; in the words of its editor, the book puts forward

aspects of the ways jazz was mythologized, colonialized, demonized, defended, and ultimately neutralized by white Americans and Europeans. This is about the white invention of jazz as a subject and object. (p. 4)

Meltzer (1993) argues that the "[w]hite fascination with slave culture is complex", including "the creating and re-creating of a romantic other" as well as implying "a dialectic that polarizes between racism of hate and racism of desire" (p. 9). Furthermore, he holds that the relation between jazz and issues of race and racism are characterized by a notorious ambiguity:

Jazz acts can not only be seen as reflecting institutional racism but as posing creatively resilient answers to the transcendence of racism. [...] jazz declares options for moving beyond racial division. But, like other arts, it can also serve to reproduce them. (p. 30)

The boundaries of jazz as an object of study (should jazz be perceived as a genre? a culture? a discourse?) is discussed by several writers in Ake, Garrett, and Goldmark (2012). Specifically, Tucker (2012) in her study of jazz as an "unstable object" (p. 275) problematizes jazz as a constructed category, the ways jazz is permeated with discourses of gender, race, and nation, and the ways in which such constructions of jazz relate to the desires and dissonances of new jazz studies.

Studies of the political dimensions of jazz in Britain (McKay, 2005; Parsonage, 2005; Moore, 2007; Heining, 2012) are based mainly on analyses of mass media, interviews, and biographies, applying class, race, postcolonial, and gender perspectives. Sernhede (2006) discusses how adolescents have been inspired in their creation of identity and meaning by elements from African American culture; in particular, he focuses on how jazz and blues music informed the meaning production of adolescents in London in the 1950s, as well as hip hop in Gothenburg in the 1990s. In a similar fashion, Fornäs (2004) provides a thorough study of connections between the stylistic-aesthetic history of jazz and prevailing socio-economic structures. Taking his departure in a multitude of texts from the 1920s, '30s, and '40s, Fornäs shows how different identity forms (age, class, sex, and ethnicity) were thematized and formulated in partly new ways during this period of modernity. Pointing out that identity implies difference, Fornäs presents descriptions and analyses of how identities and differences were negotiated intertextually through discursive practices: poetry, fiction, non-fiction, interviews, popular songs, in several cases mediated through new technologies such as sound recordings, photographs, and film. The representation of jazz in Swedish newspapers, jazz magazines, and jazz criticism has also been studied by Nylöf (2006) and Arvidsson (2011); jazz representations in Swedish poetry is the subject of Everling (1993).

Ryu (2012) presents an investigation similar to that of Fornäs, though comprising a considerably larger time period on considerably fewer pages. Based on a discourse analysis of Korean media, Ryu examines how jazz has contributed to creating the social meanings of modernity in Korea during nine decades. Three different but intertwined discourses are identified: a "lifestyle discourse" emphasizing images and appearances, an "authenticity discourse" pursuing the perceived essence of jazz, and a "Koreanization discourse" trying to illuminate Korean tradition (p. 109).

For reasons stated in Chapter 4, I have chosen not to pursue discourse analysis as a primary methodological approach to the present empirical study. Nevertheless, discourse analytical perspectives are put forward as relevant to discussions of the sociological implications of the study (section 6.4) as well as to urgent questions for further research (7.4).

### 3.5.4. Sociological analyses of worlds of music and education

The cultural sociology of Bourdieu (1984; 1998) is closely related to educational sociology (Broady, 1988; Broady & Palme, 1989 a, 1989b). In Bourdieu's view, the mastery of the world of high culture and education is connected with symbolic and mythological conceptions (for instance, love for the art for its own sake, as opposed to financial aspirations). The educational system distributes the cultural capital but is at the same time responsible for the existence of this capital: it shapes people's habitus into dispositions to acknowledge the kind of values on which the cultural capital is founded. In this process, the educational system as a social system creates a reconnaissance through maintaining a symbolic order by which people can be classified and images of the world and its power relations can be mediated.

Academic degrees and titles are a certain form of 'objectified' cultural capital. Forms of examination as well as intellectual traditions are inseparably intertwined with power hierarchies. Cultural capital includes embodied dispositions that are favourable in the systems of education; the encounter between people's habitus and the social structure of the educational system is of central importance in Bourdieu's sociology. Thus, sociological explanations are seen as instances of structural causality: a single variable such as social background must be understood in relation to the whole educational structure (Broady & Palme, 1989b).

If, as Bourdieu contends, cultural products should be viewed as symbolic capital which can be used in social domination, and which is influential in social positioning, then important questions must be raised with regard to how relationships between culture and power relate to the field of music education. In Bourdieu's view, the educational system plays an important role in relation to the fights that are fought over symbolic and material assets in social fields.

Wright (2010) suggests that what sociological theory may bring to music education research is a framework that will help us see our findings as for the first time; "it makes the familiar strange" (p. 1). Sociology of music studies how meanings are constructed, maintained, and contested through music which is produced, distributed, and consumed by social groups (Green, 2010).

Regarding the scope and applicability to music education research of Bourdieu's theory of cultural production and reproduction, Wright (2010) remarks that "Bourdieu has a tendency to view culture as a dominant and exclusive ideology imposed by ruling groups and incapable of admitting alternatives" (p. 14). Bernstein (2000) asserts that education is centrally involved in producing and reproducing distributive injustices: "some social groups are aware that schooling is not neutral [...] and] use this knowledge to improve their children's pedagogic progress" (p. xxiii).

For the purpose of applying relevant sociological perspectives on the world of jazz education, I find Green's (2010) argument regarding the social aspects of musical meaning elucidatory and inspirational. Green argues that musical meaning is by no means a monolithic concept. In addition to the *inherent meaning* of music, she points

to the importance to our experience of musical meaning of contextualizing, symbolic factors, i.e., non-musical elements, including an awareness of the social context of the music's production, distribution, and reception. She terms this aspect of musical meaning *delineated meaning*, stating that "[i]t is not possible to hear music without some delineation or other" (p. 25). Our responses to music's inherent and delineated meanings may conflict, Green points out: "the one is able to overpower and influence the other" (p. 28). She exemplifies this statement by pointing to how some listeners have reacted negatively to symphonies written by female composers or pop music played by long-haired boys.

Furthermore, Green (2010) argues, musical delineations are adopted as symbols of social identity: class, ethnicity, gender et cetera. Even though this symbolization is a product of music's delineations, Green holds, "delineated and inherent meanings come together as one unified apperception [...] the two appear as one. Therefore delineations appear to arise, not from the social context of musical production, distribution and reception, but mysteriously, from within the music itself" (pp. 31–32). Green's perspective comes forward as relevant in relation to Becker's (1963/1991) analysis of jazz as music performed by socially deviant groups. Advocates of jazz in music educational systems have arguably had and probably still have to confront attitudes, structures, and power relationships that are permeated not only by traditions and conventions of Western classical music – including conceptions of jazz as musical deviance – but also, however implicitly, by conceptions of jazz music as symbolizing social deviance.

The focus on written music scores which is typical of the dominant ideology of Western art music educational practices has exerted great influence on the development of jazz education (cf. 3.4.3). The prevalent codification and systematization tendencies in formal jazz pedagogy could probably be understood as instances of the social positioning of educators within the educational system. As noted in subsection 3.4.3, the impact of these tendencies on cultural reproduction should probably not be underestimated.

Several writers (e.g., Prouty, 2006, 2008, 2012; Borgo, 2007; Monson, 2009; Solis, 2009a; Ake, 2010) seem to agree that discourses of power are of relevance to our understanding of the development of jazz education; in the following few paragraphs, I make use primarily of a number of perspectives put forward by Prouty (2012). One line of argument focuses on a discrepancy between how power relations are generally structured in jazz music and in educational systems. Prouty critically examines the educational system's impact on jazz as a 'democratic' form of music. The relative equality in the interaction of individual improvisational voices, he argues, is not guaranteed in educational systems where students are assessed by teachers who in turn are assessed by administrators. Pedagogy, Prouty points out, "can be a very undemocratic system" (p. 76). In the development of jazz education, academic norms have been adopted that, in Prouty's words, have had "profound implications" (p. 11)



for power relationships between musicians in general, and between teachers and students specifically.

Prouty (2012) holds that the "intellectual territory" of the academic environment "is clearly defined in the terms and cultural practices of Western art music, and jazz is, in a sense, a visitor" (p. 109). Its visit in academia, furthermore, may even be tinged with alienation and fear. In a study of instrumental music education in Florida high schools, Hinkle (2011) points to the influence of teachers' experience of jazz performance on their "level of anxiety[!]" with jazz, arguing that "[d]irectors' lack of background in jazz inhibits the potential for jazz-related courses to be included in high school programs" (p. ix). In general, Prouty (2012) argues, academic faculty will often focus on the enforcement of curricular requirements with little relation to musical performance, and on an interpretive stance that may be seen as "overintellectualizing" (p. 108). Furthermore, he holds, the context of institutionalized education affects how improvisation is defined, taught and assessed by jazz educators:

Instructional sequences must be able to be broken down and represented on a syllabus, courses within an instructional sequence must flow into each other, methods of evaluation and assessment must be designed so that they can be applied to a large group of students. (p. 67)

If democracy issues constitute one important discrepancy between worlds of jazz music and jazz education, between informal and formal jazz education, then another important discrepancy stands out as closely related to the first one: it regards questions about *what* is taught and assessed, and *by whom*? Indeed, Prouty (2012) holds, educators are often forced by "institutional pressures" to focus on techniques and neglect "less definable" factors such as individual ability or creativity (p. 68). Nothing is more emphasized in institutional jazz pedagogy, he argues, than "pitch structures" (p. 62), for instance, relationships between scales and chords. Furthermore, Prouty contends, while in self-teaching the power to assess performances "rests mainly with the performer", teachers in formal jazz education exercise power through assessments "based on the correctness of harmony and melody, whether students have mastered patterns or are interpreting a recording correctly" (p. 76). It may be argued that such assessments of correctness in relation to a certain norm or authority are inherited from the educational system of Western classical music. However, in jazz education, Prouty holds, "[t]he authority of the score is replaced by the authority of recordings, or of theoretical constructs and the language of bebop" (p. 76).

Yet another related issue of importance regarding differences between formal and informal jazz learning environments has to do with the question *by whom* these things are taught and assessed. Put another way: what are the jazz educational environments' connections to the professional music life? Prouty (2012) points out that it is an "oft-

cited criticism that jazz educators [...] are often not equipped with the requisite real-world experience to function as effective teachers" (p. 58). On the other hand it may be argued that permanent or occasional appointments as educators probably constitute an important labour-market possibility for many professional jazz musicians.

Granted, the descriptions of jazz, jazz education, and society provided above are based mainly on American sources and American conditions; Swedish scholarship in this field is scarce. It may well be argued that in the Scandinavian countries, the position of jazz music in society has developed differently. Arvidsson (2011) points out that the official support of jazz in Scandinavia has been foreseeing and provident; in effect, he finds it "exemplary" (p. 269; my translation). Arvidsson analyses the history of jazz in Sweden in the 1960s and '70s as a development towards a 'high middle brow' position (Gendron, 2002); through its gradual incorporation in high culture, jazz has challenged and problematized the status of classical music. In addition to this, jazz has contributed – for instance, through crossover compositions and concerts – to the classical tradition.

Furthermore, Arvidsson (2011) points to certain aspects of jazz that have been generalized to an extent where they are no longer thought of as jazz-based (for instance, the function of the rhythmic pulse, the bass, and the vocal style of rock-based popular music); as well as to the usage of chord symbols in classical accompaniment training.

According to the accounts cited above, however, authority-centered or – to borrow a mathematical term – *norm-convergent* models of education prevail in many formal jazz education environments. The predominance of such models is arguably closely related to academic power structures. In order to overcome conservative opposition from the academic establishment, educators have developed methods for improvisational instruction that were meant to demonstrate the compatibility of jazz with academic pedagogy. These methods have been criticized in turn for "too much accommodation" (Prouty, 2012, p. 75). Insofar as jazz teaching and learning is perceived and carried out mainly according to norm-convergent models, the ensuing jazz improvisational performances may well be perceived as taking place "within borders instead of on them" (Schwartz, 1996). In the discussion of the results of the present study, issues of jazz educational norm convergence will be pursued further (sections 6.3 and 6.4).

### 3.6. Summary: Remarks on selection and consistency of theoretical perspectives

Throughout this chapter on the theoretical framework of my investigation, the need for an open, broad approach is emphasized. The supposition that storytelling in jazz contexts equates narrative must be abandoned; and the same goes for the supposition that such storytelling requires that music be a language. In jazz contexts, storytelling must be interpreted in a broader sense, including possible interpretations such as communication and expression, both of which are feasible without language. In brief, a literal interpretation of storytelling as narrative is considered much less fruitful in this context than a metaphorical interpretation.

Nevertheless, theories of narrativity (3.1.1) as well as of theatre (3.1.3) offer valuable perspectives to this study. In particular, I consider a triadic approach (past–present–future, or background–situation–intention) potentially fruitful to an understanding of jazz improvisation.

Several perspectives on African American rhetorical practices come forward as relevant to the present investigation: the potentialities of double-voiced discourse in jazz improvisation; the importance of transformation of preexisting musical material, playing *on* cultural memory while playing *with* musical ideas; the relation between the music and the life of the performers and the audience; as well as the importance of embodiment, the performers' physical play ('the *how* is more important than the *what*'). It will be noted that a couple of these perspectives (cultural memory and transformation of preexisting musical material, especially) relate closely to Nyrces's concept of didactic topology (3.4.5).

An open, broad approach is considered important also with regard to the metaphorical interpretation of the storytelling concept. Theories of conceptual metaphor and conceptual blending may help us arrive at new understandings of storytelling, of jazz improvisation, and of how our conceptualizations of them are structured by each other. However, rather than yielding to the temptation to subsume the metaphorical use of the concept of storytelling in simplistic schemata, I view several complementary, hermeneutic lines of thought as important and useful: perhaps most importantly, the distinctive character of music and musical thought, as well as the notion of how metaphor redescribes reality.

Similarly, the educational perspectives on jazz learning that are included in the present chapter point to the necessity of an open, broad approach. The ecological perspectives that I advocate include a view of the experience of musical meaning as a perceptual experience. They also include an emphasis on a number of alternative educational aspects such as expression, values, and spirituality. The crucial importance of the learner's socio-cultural environment is emphasized in connection with the perspectives of learning ecology frameworks and of stealing knowledge. In the

concluding subsection, I suggest the possibility to represent this situated, contextual, and relational character of jazz learning by means of the notion of landscapes of learning.

It may be urgent to attempt not only to interpret the meanings ascribed to the storytelling concept by those who use it but also to try to understand how this usage might function in terms of power relations and the construction of identities. In order to study more closely how the storytelling concept is informed by, and informs, artistic and educational jazz contexts, several sociological perspectives come forward as relevant. Taking concepts from Bourdieu's theories such as cultural capital and field as a point of departure, this selection of perspectives importantly includes the discursive construction of society, of musical authenticity, and of power relations in educational systems.

In sum, the theoretical framework of this study presents a multi-variety of aspects; some of them (such as theories of narrativity and metaphor) may perhaps be seen as primarily 'theoretical', bordering on musicology and the philosophy of music, while others focus on artistic, educational, or sociological perspectives. The confrontation of this framework with the empirical results of the present investigation renders new conceptualizations. In Chapter 6, I present and discuss a number of theoretical, artistic, educational, and sociological implications of the storytelling metaphor in jazz improvisation contexts.



## Chapter 4

# Methodology, method, design, and analysis

On the day of Judgment, surely, we shall not be asked what we have read but what we have done. (Thomas à Kempis, *The imitation of Christ*, 1:3)

In the empirical study, functions of the intermedially borrowed concept of storytelling in the field of jazz improvisation are investigated with perspectives of Swedish practitioners in this field as the main focus. The first section of this chapter presents a number of methodological considerations on a more general level regarding empirical studies of this kind. These considerations form the theoretical point of departure for the methods that were chosen for this particular investigation. The next few sections deal with the present research approach: the design of the empirical study (4.2) and the procedures of data collection and analysis (4.3). The concluding section of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of questions regarding the quality and relevance of the investigation (4.4).

### 4.1. Methodological considerations

A number of main methodological routes seem possible with regard to the present study. At its centre is the usage, in a certain field of discourse, of a certain metaphor. The ways the concept of storytelling is employed with reference to jazz improvisation could be studied, it seems to me, either by means of *discourse analysis*, *conversation analysis*, *critical discourse analysis*, or with the aid of a *hermeneutic approach*.

According to discourse analysis (Foucault, 1969/2002), meaning production and truth claims emerge on the basis of *statement (énoncé)*; this basic unit of discourse is considered the basis of networks of rules by which meaning is established. Conversation analysis (Sacks, 1992) focuses on social interaction processes (in contradistinction to Foucauldian discourses, or even to written texts) and on exploring how participants in these processes themselves understand their

communication. Critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1995) aims to examine ideologies and power relations involved in discourse. In subsection 3.5.3, I included a more extensive discussion of the relevance of discourse analytical perspectives to the study of jazz and social processes.

However, none of the three methodological approaches mentioned here would seem fully fit to handle the openness and richness that I perceive as crucial features in the present field of investigation. In my view, this is due to their focus on particular aspects – rules of meaning production networks, self-understanding of social interaction participants, or ideologies and power relations – which, however interesting they all may be, run the risk of unfavourably limiting the scope of results.

On the other hand, a *hermeneutic* approach will include interpretive processes that potentially encompass all aspects of communication, including explorations of meaning from the viewpoints of semiotics and philosophy of language, as well as precommunicative aspects such as presuppositions, and nonverbal communication. This methodological breadth could be said to be in tune with the variety of theoretical perspectives included in this investigation (cf. Chapter 3). I consider a broad approach in methodological as well as theoretical respects valuable if not indispensable in order to grasp as fully as possible the ways the storytelling concept is used in the field of jazz improvisation.

The methodological approach of this study, then, has its foundations in the hermeneutics stemming from Dilthey and Gadamer.

#### 4.1.1. Interpreting expressions of lived experience (Dilthey)

According to Dilthey (1883/1989, 1996), the method of the *Geisteswissenschaften* (including, in my opinion, research in music education) is interpretive, seeking meaning rather than cause, *Verstehen* rather than *Erklären*. *Verstehen*, notably, is not identical with sympathy; rather, it is an intellectual understanding. To understand how it is with another human being includes a kind of general understanding. To Dilthey (1883/1989), history and language are the important means by which human beings understand each other. Man is – and must be studied as – a socio-historical creature, Dilthey argues: "the human being which a sound analytic science takes as its object is the individual as a component of society" (p. 83). When we study history and society, our units of study are

individuals, psychophysical wholes, each of which differs from every other, each of which constitutes a world, for the world exists nowhere else but in the representation of such an individual. (Dilthey, 1883/1989, pp. 80–81)

Dilthey further criticizes the notion of a "universal explanatory framework for all historical facts" (p. 141). He does not try to establish laws of all historical reality;

rather his goal includes finding "uniformities that apply to the more simple facts into which we can analyze that reality" (p. 144). History, Dilthey (1883/1989) holds, is related to poetry; it is the art of generalization from the particular:

The particular is merely permeated and shaped by the idea in the mind of the historian; and where generalization does occur, it simply illuminates the facts in a flash and releases abstract thought momentarily. (p. 91)

This is a kind of research which strives to *Sichhineinversetzen*, to get into the thoughts of other human beings, through interpreting and understanding their *Erlebnisausdrücke*. According to Dilthey (1883/1989), "[s]elf-reflection and understanding are central. To be sure, self-reflection is primary, but the understanding of others also conditions self-reflection; similarly, self-consciousness and the world are connected with each other in one system" (p. 438).

The hermeneutical theory of Dilthey (1883/1989, 1996) is based on the relations between three fundamental concepts: experience, expression, and understanding (*Erlebnis*, *Ausdruck*, and *Verstehen*). All human activity is viewed as signs of inner activity, as being in need of interpretation and understanding. The *Erlebnisse* in Dilthey's theory, as opposed to the sense data of the British empiricists, have an active, intentional quality. *Ausdruck* in Dilthey's sense is an objectification of the mind and its lived experience, for instance in a work of art. Manifestations of human inner experience, according to Dilthey, are of a couple of different kinds: there are ideas and actions which are *manifestations of life* (*Lebensäußerungen*); there are also consciously controlled expressions of lived experience (*Erlebnisausdrücke*) such as art works. Consequently, for Dilthey, hermeneutics, as the understanding of art works, becomes the theory not only of text interpretation but of how *life expresses itself*. Hermeneutics as a theory of interpretation relates not only to speech and writing but to all kinds of human objectifications such as visual art, physical gestures, and actions. *Verstehen*, the third key word in the Diltheyan formula (experience–expression–understanding) designates the grasping of another person's *Geist*. This understanding is something larger, fuller than cognitive, rational theorizing; it is the mental process in which life understands life. Needless to say, theories of interpretation have developed considerably since Dilthey formulated his Romantic hermeneutic, tripartite approach to historical understanding. Notwithstanding, I consider his basic contentions important, useful, and inspirational: the understanding of others and self is intertwined and based on the interpretation of the mind's manifestations, the expressions of inner experience. At the end of this section I sum up my own methodological approach. In order to provide a sufficient foundation for it, I proceed to select, discuss and evaluate issues of relevance in other hermeneutic theorists such as Gadamer and Skinner.

In any theory of interpretation, the role played by the author's *intention* will pose an important problem. Even those theorists who consider the text, the work, to have



an autonomous meaning will probably agree that this meaning necessarily depends on contextual conventions; and so, text autonomy notwithstanding, its author's intention or motives will be of relevance. The dualism of Dilthey between *Verstehen* and *Erklären* is denied by several writers on hermeneutics (by Ricoeur and Habermas, for instance; cf. Nordin, 1978). In their view, explanation of the causes of a text presupposes understanding it, and understanding it presupposes the explanation of its causes. There is a necessary connection, they argue, between *what* and *why*. When hermeneutics is perceived as an act of *disclosure of truth* (potentially including meanings, reasons, and causes), the polarization between subject and object as well as the border between science and humanities may be dissolved. These issues are prominent in the thinking of Gadamer, who on one hand could be said to diminish the scope of hermeneutics through his denial of the methodological claims of Dilthey but who on the other hand clearly expands it through his view on hermeneutics as a fundamental condition of human existence. In particular, I will focus in the next subsection on Gadamer's concepts of horizon and prejudice, as well as on his emphasis on the dynamic, dialogical interaction between our understanding and our self-understanding, or tradition.

#### 4.1.2. Man as a hermeneutic creature (Gadamer)

To human existence, in the view of Gadamer (1960/1975), language, like all culture, is a given. Language is the medium through which we exist. Man is a hermeneutic creature. The significance of hermeneutics is universal and ontological, a way of being.

Gadamer (1960/1975) denies the possibility of absolute truth and objectivity in interpretation. The title of his work, *Truth and method*, includes a crucial irony: method is *not* the way to truth. He explicitly states that his main concerns are not of method, but of philosophy. Gadamer criticizes not only positivism but also the methodologism and scientism in earlier hermeneutics. He protests against claims that there are methods of correct interpretation as well as against the view (of Schleiermacher and Dilthey, among others) that correct interpretation is a matter of recovering the author's intentions. Human knowledge, Gadamer holds, is historically and linguistically situated. Truth is not reducible to a set of criteria. What remains as a fundamental means towards understanding is dialogue.

Gadamer (1960/1975) argues that to be conscious of the hermeneutical situation is to be conscious of being affected by history (*wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein*, p. 301); we are embedded in the culture and history which have shaped us. Being situated in this tradition defines the *horizon* within which we think: "the way in which thought is tied to its finite determinacy, and the way one's range of vision is gradually expanded" (p. 301). Hermeneutics, then, for Gadamer, is much more – and something else – than a help discipline for the humanities; it is a philosophical

account for the ontological process of a human being. His focus is on the fundamental phenomenon of understanding itself; on the conditions, not the procedures, of understanding. Practical principles of interpretation are consequently not Gadamer's main interest.

Gadamer (1960/1975) argues that "all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice" (p. 272). The presuppositions are part of the tradition to which we belong: "*Understanding is to be thought of less as a subjective act than as participating in an event of tradition*, a process of transmission in which past and present are constantly mediated" (p. 291). The hermeneutical circle "describes understanding as the interplay of the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter" (p. 293). Our self-understanding (tradition, horizon, world) interacts with that which we encounter. In this interaction, our horizon is broadened. Gadamer highlights the dynamic, expansive nature of understanding:

The concept of 'horizon' suggests itself because it expresses the superior breadth of vision that a person who is trying to understand must have. To acquire a horizon means that one learns to look beyond what is close at hand – not in order to look away from it but to see it better, within a larger whole and in truer proportion. (p. 304)

The understanding of a text necessitates some presupposed assumption about its nature. Gadamer calls this *Vorurteil*, prejudice. The interpretations of the individual parts of the text are determined by this presupposition. Hence, the parts will confirm the presupposition, i.e., will render the interpretive process subjective. Interpretation depends, Gadamer insists, as much on the interpreter as on that which is interpreted. Indeed, in his view, our existence in the world consists in our interpretive apprehension of the world. Our life condition is to be hermeneutic creatures. We cannot possibly recover the original meaning of a work, according to Gadamer; we can only interpret its meaning as best we can.

Truth, Gadamer (1960/1975) summarizes, is larger than the result of criteria-based judgment. His concepts of truth and understanding are holistic ones. Truth is fundamentally something that happens to us. In this event we encounter something beyond ourselves:

When we understand a text, what is meaningful in it captivates us just as the beautiful captivates us. It has asserted itself and captivated us before we can come to ourselves and be in a position to test the claim to meaning that it makes. [...] In understanding we are drawn into an event of truth and arrive, as it were, too late, if we want to know what we are supposed to believe. (p. 484)

Following Gadamer, I have no other alternative in my efforts to investigate the concept of storytelling in jazz improvisation contexts than to acknowledge the

inescapable condition that my own thought and understanding necessarily involves a constant interplay between myself as an interpreter and that which I attempt to interpret. Consequently, it is vital that I remain conscious throughout the investigation of the fact that my horizon of understanding is affected by the tradition that has shaped me.

#### 4.1.3. Understanding as seeing connections (Wittgenstein)

There are some interesting and striking parallels, I would argue, between the hermeneutics of Gadamer and the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, particularly the way in which Wittgenstein (1953/2009) expresses his conception of *understanding as seeing connections*:

A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not *command a clear view* of the use of our words. – Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in "seeing the connexions." Hence the importance of finding and inventing *intermediate cases*. The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things. (p. 54)

In my interpretation of this remark by Wittgenstein, his notion of understanding as seeing connections constitutes a strong reason to conduct this investigation of how the concept of storytelling is understood and used in jazz improvisation contexts by means of an interview study which is quite broadly organized.

#### 4.1.4. The hermeneutical circle: The impotence of being logical, the importance of being intuitive

Hermeneutics originated as a practical discipline aiding Bible interpretation. Nearly two centuries ago, based on the philological writings of Ast, Wolf, and others, Schleiermacher (1838/1977) formulated the problem of the hermeneutical circle thus:

Überall ist das vollkommene Wissen in diesem scheinbaren Kreise, daß jedes Besondere nur aus dem Allgemeinen, dessen Teil es ist, verstanden werden kann und umgekehrt. (p. 95)

Our understanding of a whole work and its parts is similar to our understanding of one sentence and its parts. We understand the individual word in reference to the sentence, and we understand the whole sentence on the basis of the meanings of the words in it.

In addition to the hermeneutical circle of the whole and the parts, building on Gadamer's discussion of prejudice we may also perceive a hermeneutical circle of fore-understanding and understanding (*Vorurteil–Verstehen*). Arguably, these two hermeneutical circles (part–whole and understanding–preconception) ought to be considered as complementary rather than opposed to each other (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2008). It might be suggested that hermeneutic activity also oscillates between the 'philological' study of the text's structure and the 'psychological' study of the originator's intention. The hermeneutic circle, then, would include not only a movement between part and whole of the text and a movement between understanding and preconception in the interpreter, but also a movement between two foci: on the originator of the text and on the text itself.

There are at least two main strategies to deal with the paradoxical problems posed by the hermeneutical circle: the *leap of intuition* and the *spiral of revised interpretations*.

*The leap.* The hermeneutical circle points to problems regarding logic and understanding. Indeed the circle involves a contradiction: if we must understand the whole before we understand the parts, then how can we ever understand anything? The response to this paradox would be that logic can never fully account for how understanding works. Our understanding of the whole and the parts comes about through one or more intuitive leaps. Rather than depending on rational, 'discursive' ways towards knowledge, hermeneutics suggests the importance of *intuition* (Palmer, 1969). It is probably clarifying in this context to distinguish between different kinds of intuition: for instance, on one hand, the understanding, *Verstehen*, of meaning but not of cause (Dilthey); and on the other hand, the all-encompassing disclosure of holistic truth (Gadamer).

*The spiral.* We cannot understand the parts without the whole and not the whole without the parts. In a step-by-step process, more similar to a spiral than to a circle, however, our first interpretations are constantly revised. We build from parts; but the parts change as we build. The preconception, the *Vorurteil*, being a necessary beginning, is continuously revised, or even discarded, or replaced, during the interpretive process. Like the Wittgensteinian ladder, the *Vorurteil* might be thrown away once we have climbed up it (Nordin, 1978; cf. Wittgenstein, 1922/1988).

#### 4.1.5. Aspects and themes of interpretive processes

In this subsection, I present and discuss aspects of hermeneutic interpretive work in practice. In particular, two perspectives are highlighted:

- (i) the need for openness as a guiding principle of investigation with regard both to the way we seek information and to the way we lay bare our pre-understanding;

(ii) the complex and dynamic character of the interpretive act.

In the last paragraphs of this subsection, I comment on the selection, consistency, and applicability of these perspectives to the present study.

Ödman (1971/2007) laments the absence of hermeneutic practice in many scholarly works that are allegedly inspired by hermeneutic theory. He points, in particular, to two discrepancies:

there are interpretations but they have not been problematized as interpretations; and the arguments in support of the interpretations have often been left out. (p. 235; my translation)

In brief, it is essential to hermeneutic practice (i) to provide explicit arguments upon which one's interpretations are founded; and (ii) to problematize one's own interpretations in a thorough and systematic fashion.

To a large extent, hermeneutic theory has been put forward with a high level of abstraction. Most, if not all, sources of hermeneutics focus on philosophical conceptions of reality rather than methods and techniques. Ödman (1971/2007) attempts to formulate in general terms a few aspects and guiding principles for hermeneutic interpretive work. Their points of departure are the different phases of the interpretive process.

One aspect of Ödman's overview has to do with our *interpretive approach*. According to the *principle of openness* in our questioning, we ought to seek information that might change our present views and interpretations (our pre-understanding). The same principle of openness also applies to our pre-understanding; we ought to report our relevant views on which our interpretations are based (Ödman, 1971/2007, p. 237).

Another aspect of Ödman's overview regards our *acts of interpretation* and how they are carried out. Ödman distinguishes between three interpretive dimensions: time, abstraction, and focus. Regarding the first of these dimensions, *time*, Ödman points out that in the interpretation of a phenomenon, both its historical background and its future potentialities must be taken into consideration. The second interpretive dimension, *abstraction*, is connected with a leading working principle of hermeneutics: the holistic criterion of coherence. In this dimension, the dynamics of part and whole is in focus. Elementary interpretations of details are followed by sociocultural interpretations which gradually change the meanings of earlier details and interpretations. In brief, Ödman suggests, "the interpreter must note the oscillation between part and whole" (1971/2007, p. 239; my translation). The third interpretive dimension mentioned by Ödman regards the *focus* of our interpretive act. Ideally, Ödman holds, it includes a dynamic interplay between explanation and understanding: "different forms of interpretation should be allowed to interact with one another" (p. 240; my translation).

The leap from hermeneutic theory to hermeneutic practice is by no means facilitated by the anti-methodologism of Gadamer. The aspects put forward by Ödman (1971/2007) – and cited above – provide at least a few suggestions regarding ingredients in the practical process of hermeneutic interpretation. An attempt to sum up these aspects may indicate the complexity involved in this kind of work. As a hermeneutic researcher, one needs to indulge in a dynamic, dialogical process which takes into consideration relations between the phenomenon under study and (i) one's own pre-understanding regarding it; (ii) new information about it; (iii) its history and future; (iv) its details as well as its totality, in its sociocultural context; and (v) questions regarding 'what' and 'why' (explanation and understanding).

Hastrup (1999) proposes three rather drastic metaphors to illuminate the qualitative researcher's demanding task. The interpretive process, she suggests, on one hand includes the aspect or position of devoted identification and empathy (*shamanism*). On the other hand, it also includes the aspect of complete distancing from the object of research (*cannibalism*). Furthermore, the interpretive process typically includes a continuous oscillation between empathy and reflection (*schizophrenia*).

How can one go about such a complex process which seems to be defined by its instability, its continuous oscillation and its 'leaps'? The present investigation deals with the usage of 'storytelling' within the jazz tradition. A comparison with a rather detailed case description of an interpretive practice regarding related matters might be illuminating. In his study of flautists' learning and teaching within the French flute tradition during the last three centuries, Ljungar-Chapelon (2008) takes the hermeneutics of Gadamer as his methodological point of departure. He conducts two kinds of empirical studies. The first attempts to describe the tradition from a historical perspective, employing instruments, methods, literature, music, and recordings as data sources. The second study is based on interviews with flautists. It might be said that the investigation is constructed in accordance with the hermeneutic circle, since the two studies represent whole and part, respectively. These two studies provide Ljungar-Chapelon with rich material from a tradition in which he himself is situated as an artist, an educator, and a researcher. Ljungar-Chapelon offers this general description of his hermeneutical interpretive practice:

I initially use data assembled from Study A in order to relate them to data from Study B; the process continues by data from Study A alternately elucidating data from Study B and vice versa. At the same time I employ a maieutic and dialogicizing approach in relation to the data that emanate, which means that I, from my horizon of understanding, 'ask questions' and 'have a dialogue' with the material. This governs the research process and may generate new questions. (p. 51; my translation)

I consider Ödman's (1971/2007) and Ljungar-Chapelon's (2008) accounts of aspects and themes in interpretive processes, on their respective level of abstraction, both elucidating and inspirational. In my opinion, the selection of issues emphasized by these authors stands out as relevant and consistent. The applicability of these perspectives to the present study will be a matter for further discussion in this methodological chapter and, eventually, for the evaluation of the investigation in its entirety.

#### 4.1.6. Criteria for understanding

The ontological and epistemological basis for the research approach of this study relates closely to the educational perspectives comprehensively outlined in section 3.4. In accordance with this focus on the socio-cultural context of learning and creativity, my approach to issues of ontology and epistemology should be described, in sum, as non-dualist, non-essentialist and non-objectivist. The knowledge and meaning potentially generated in an investigation such as the present one are thus seen as dynamic rather than static. Their contextual and relational character should be emphasized. The purpose of the empirical investigation, obviously, is to achieve some form of understanding using language as a medium. In view of the non-objectivist, non-methodologist perspectives presented above, this comes forward as an urgent but delicate matter. I will now consider a number of aspects regarding prerequisites and methods for understanding.

What does it mean to understand, what does it take to understand, and how do we know for certain that we understand correctly? Such philosophical issues are among the most vast and difficult imaginable. When it comes to interpreting interview statements, nevertheless, to address them is unavoidable.

Against the anti-objective view put forward by Gadamer, several theorists have argued that valid interpretation is possible within certain limits. Hirsch (1967) distinguishes between the author's original *meaning*, which is stable (and the interpretation of which, he argues, can be validated), and the text's *significance* to its readers, which is not. The theory put forward by Nordin (1978) discusses how textual evidence may support the interpretation of literature. Importantly, Skinner (1988) contends that an interpretation must focus on the intention of the author and that there are valid ways of investigating this intention.

The methodological approach of this study makes use of criteria for understanding put forward by both Gadamer and Skinner. For the aim to understand the meaning of something such as a linguistic utterance, one question becomes crucial: meaning to whom? According to the methodology of Skinner (1988), that question can be given three interpretations: (i) what is the (lexical) meaning of the words? (ii) what is the relevance of the text to us? (iii) what is its relevance to the author (historical meaning)? Skinner applies the terminology of Austin (1955/1976). *To say something*

is called a locutionary act. It usually includes an illocutionary act (for instance, to ask, to answer, to tell, to warn, to judge, or to criticize) which is an act *in* what you say. Finally, a perlocutionary act consists of the bringing about of a certain adequate effect. Locutionary: he said; illocutionary: he advised me; perlocutionary: he convinced me. The illocutionary dimension of an utterance is in the focus of Skinner's interest: the *intention* or point of the agent. Skinner advocates non-causal explanations; knowing the cause of an action provides no ground for understanding the action itself, he claims (Bjerstedt, 1993).

So how do we know that we interpret and understand something correctly? Gadamer's criterion of coherence and Skinner's criterion of intention are two mutually complementary attempts to answer this question. They both stand out, to my mind, as reasonable and promising and will be presented briefly in the next paragraph. Each one of them has its obvious problems, to be sure; and the interrelations between them are filled with tension. However, I find this tension quite in tune with the present investigation's basic epistemological perspectives on meaning and knowledge production as the result of dynamic, contextual, and relational processes. In view of the respective merits and shortcomings of Gadamer's and Skinner's criteria regarding the validity of interpretations, I consider a *combination* of these two the best answer available to this crucial question: how do we know that an interpretation is correct? I proceed now to a brief description of these two criteria.

On one hand, Gadamer's *holistic* criterion points to the coherence of the details with the whole. This may be problematic in a couple of ways. First, there may be several possible interpretations of the whole, and the criterion provides no directions for choosing between them. Secondly, not all texts are coherent. On the other hand, according to Skinner's *agent* criterion, the researcher's interpretation should agree with the intention of the author or agent. This is also problematic. First, because in order to be able to interpret a text correctly, we must know the intentions. Secondly, because the intentions of the author often are of minor importance in literary works, poems etc. As indicated by my evaluation above of these criteria, I agree vigorously with the suggestion put forward by Gilje and Grimen (2007) that one solution – and, in my opinion, probably the best solution possible – may be to make use of *both* the holistic criterion and the agent criterion. The interrelation between these criteria and, consequently, the application of them will then be characterized by a certain dynamic openness. In brief, in the course of the present investigation I will consider two aspects of an interpretation of an interview statement crucial: (i) its details ought to be coherent with its whole, and (ii) it ought to agree with the intention of the informant.



#### 4.1.7. Life, research, and improvisation

The approach of this investigation takes its point of departure in the view of human knowledge as a constructed form of experience, a reflection of mind. Rather than constituting an object of discovery, knowledge, according to this view, is made.

As pointed out in section 2.1, Bresler (2006) states that "life [...] requires improvisation" (p. 33). On a similar note, Bateson (1990) suggests that jazz is a suitable *metaphor for life*, which is an improvisatory art. Her collection of comparative biographies of five women is, in her own words, "a book about life as an improvisatory art, about the ways we combine familiar and unfamiliar components in response to new situations, following an underlying grammar and an evolving aesthetic" (p. 3). In a sense, then, it might be argued that any living creature would know *in principle* what jazz improvisation is about.

An example from the jazz world may be quoted as corroboration of this perspective on jazz as a metaphor for life. Speaking of how bebop musicians handled and protested against the conditions of life in the racist society of the United States in the 1940s and 1950s, Gillespie (1979/1999) employs the metaphor of musical improvisation:

Within the society, we did the same thing we did with the music. First we learned the proper way and then we improvised on that. (p. 163)

Inspired by Bateson's perspective, Oldfather and West (1994) address methodological issues in a playful attempt to shed light on the nature of qualitative inquiry through a metaphor of *qualitative research as jazz*. Oldfather and West point out that jazz music is characterized by its unifying structures and common body of knowledge as well as by the open-endedness of its improvisatory nature. The uniqueness of each improvisation, they hold, corresponds to the adaptive methodologies and contextually bound findings of each qualitative inquiry.

Arguably, both content and form of this thesis relate to these perspectives on life and research as improvisatory arts. The subject matter of this investigation and its methodology are united by their relation to improvisation, by their inherent improvisatory nature.

#### 4.1.8. Pre-understanding, contexts, and interview dynamics

In a research approach guided by a contextual and relational epistemological view, the researcher's pre-understanding in the field of jazz improvisation must be considered of importance.

My own background as a jazz musician and a researcher places me on the inside as well as on the outside of the culture that I study. From my own experience, I am well

acquainted with the jazz improviser's occupation. It is highly probable that such a familiarity with the studied cultural context can facilitate the researcher's striving for access, trust and knowledge of the interviewees.

Lincoln and Guba (1985) advocate *prolonged engagement* as one of several techniques by which a researcher can ensure that the research results meet criteria of trustworthiness. Through the investment of time, certain purposes may be achieved: learning the 'culture', testing for misinformation, and building trust. Among other things, Lincoln and Guba hold, prolonged engagement requires that the investigator's involvement is "sufficiently long to detect and take account of distortions that may otherwise creep into the data" (p. 302). Foremost, the period of prolonged engagement is needed in order for the researcher to *build trust*, which, as Lincoln and Guba emphasize, is "not a matter of applying techniques" and "not a matter of the personal characteristics of the investigator" but a "*developmental* [...] time-consuming process" (p. 303). In the present case, my own background includes several decades as a performer in the same artistic field as the informants. Arguably, this investment of time meets Lincoln and Guba's requirements regarding the researcher's prolonged engagement. In Chapter 7 I include, however, some thoughts on how the dynamics between the specific research process and such a prolonged engagement – with data, with theories, with rich experiences, with multi-layered reflections – may provide interesting and important perspectives on the nature and significance of prolonged engagement.

The aim of the empirical investigation is to generate knowledge regarding the use of certain concepts and the meanings ascribed to them. The informants are asked to contribute actively to this analytical endeavour. I believe that the employment of the terminology of *emic* and *etic* perspectives might run the risk of entailing more confusion than clarity in this context, for two reasons: (i) many jazz analysts weigh heavily on conceptualizations borrowed from the views of performers; and (ii) the thinking of many performers is influenced by their acquaintance with analytical writings on their craft. But if one were nevertheless to employ the terminology of *emic* and *etic* perspectives, it might be fair to describe the interviews as attempts to let the researcher and the interviewee together indulge in processes of understanding that were continuously oscillating between these two perspectives. Consequently, the researcher's pre-understanding regarding the subject matter, jazz improvisation, as well as the informants' pre-understanding regarding theoretical framework – and, needless to say, vice versa – must be considered of importance.

Similarly, the dynamics between different perspectives of pre-understanding must be taken into consideration. Bouij (1998), in his thoughtful considerations regarding interview methodology, views the interview as a meeting of two subjects where something is problematized which has not been reflected on earlier. In Bouij's view, the interviewer's task is "to lay bare an individual's coherent and in its own way consistent perception"; when studying a field with which the interviewer is familiar, it

is vital not to take for granted that "you have the same perspective as the interviewee" (pp. 42–43; my translation).

Kvale (1996) offers a thorough descriptive and prescriptive presentation of features, procedures, and potentials regarding qualitative interviews. I find myself very much in agreement with several of his statements of a more general nature. Apart from their appeal from a theoretical, epistemological standpoint, they are very much in tune, I believe, with prevailing learning ecologies of jazz contexts: this holds for the view of *conversation as a basic mode of knowing*, as well as the view of knowing as a *right to believe* rather than as having an essence, and the view that we *constitute ourselves* and our worlds in our conversational activity. I find very fascinating the notion that the interviewer/traveller (in Kvale's metaphor) may not only gain knowledge but *change* in the course of the interview/journey. This outlook on the interactional power of the interview is particularly interesting and a bit paradoxical, I think, in relation to Kvale's observation that the interview is no conversation between equal partners but rather a situation which is defined, controlled, and structured by the interviewer/traveller. The expertise, skills, and craftsmanship in the interview researcher is crucial according to Kvale's description. In a way, then, the potential for change in the interviewer would seem to be in proportion to her or his interview skills.

Brinkmann (2013) argues that there is much to learn from interviews that contain "misunderstandings or other breaks in the conversational flow": "Aspects that stand out as strange may often prove to be valuable to understanding how talking about the subject matter in a specific way constructs what we may know about it" (pp. 65–66). In order to elucidate these issues further, I will make use of a number of interview excerpts.

Before doing that, however, I will include some brief reflections on different contexts in which my interviews are situated. To begin with, the contexts of these interviews obviously include the *educational* aspect. Even though I am a fellow jazz musician to the informants and we speak about issues that relate to the music we have in common as performers, I believe that the interview situation makes them perceive me as a doctoral research student in the first place. I am not sure whether this affects their attitudes and responses in any particular way; in some cases, though, it is my impression that an informant has tried to communicate a certain message vigorously because the context has appeared to include a possibility to 'get published in print'.

The *professional* context, however, has also been of importance. I believe that most of the informants, if not all, have identified me as a colleague with whom they could speak about music and, hopefully, not be completely misinterpreted. Several of them expressed their satisfaction to have had this opportunity to be able to discuss at length questions that they found important though often difficult to articulate (and, maybe therefore, not often talked about). In a few cases, the interview meeting developed into impromptu music making together.

There is at least one other aspect of importance, however: the *artist/audience* context. Several of the musicians I have interviewed are well established nationally and internationally and I have admired their music for many years. Naturally, the opportunity to meet them to talk about 'the secrets of their trade' was a great experience to me. This may have caused some initial anxiety or stiffness in me, but I believe it was overcome due to the informants' generous readiness to share their thoughts and experiences.

In order to provide a richer picture of the dynamics in an interview situation, I include three extensive excerpts from my talk with alto saxophonist Amanda Sedgwick. In them, there are, I believe, a number of rather instructive examples of how perspectives of the interviewee (AS) and the interviewer (SB) may differ at some points and coincide at some, and how the interview works as a sort of mutual journey towards a deeper understanding of issues in question.

Following the three excerpts, I will discuss briefly four points of agreement or disagreement (marked with bold font and letters A–D in the excerpts). I believe that the illustrations of conversational dynamics regarding these issues provide the basis for interesting reflections on how understanding was construed in the interviews.

#### Excerpts from interview with Amanda Sedgwick Hässleholm, 15 March 2011

##### Excerpt 1

SB - What makes a good jazz improvisation good?

AS - To me it's impossible to take that out of its context. I think what makes a musician good is a whole life. I don't think you can pull it out of its context. A musician who has something to say, something important, is a whole and interesting human being, full of nuances.

SB - And you can hear that in the music?

AS - Yes, of course. That's how it works. It's a very spiritual thing we're into. A spiritual or universal principle. If it's in a certain way within, that will show.

SB - Let's turn it around: what sorts of things could prevent you from being a whole person in the way that is relevant here?

AS - That's a good question, I think, because I think it's exactly that way of viewing things. That may be another question, but that view is common in today's education, I think. **I'm very much against that (A)**, and so are many colleagues. But I'm digressing from the question, sorry, ask again.

SB - Well, if you say the condition is to be a whole and... well-integrated human being...

AS - **No, I don't think that you necessarily have to be well-integrated (B)**.

SB - No, I'm sorry, I made that word up myself. But an interesting...

AS - Interesting. To be that you don't have to be balanced or integrated or even intelligible. There are many bizarre and difficult people who are great musicians. But I think you have to be an interesting person in order to have something to offer.

SB - You used the word whole.

AS - Yes. Good that you mentioned that. I don't mean whole as in balanced, but whole as in honest.

SB - That's a big difference, of course. But if you try to nail that which comes out in the music, in the jazz improvisation, what is it that can prevent that?

AS - Yes. It's exactly this kind of view, I think: what makes a jazz improvisation good?

SB - That it's a too narrow view?

AS - Not just too narrow. It has nothing whatsoever to do with creating. And that brings me to this sidetrack about jazz schools.

SB - Yes, I'm very interested in that, so I'd like you to follow that track.

AS - I believe, like many others, that jazz schools have ruined a lot of the music life. It's just an intellectual view, and the way of teaching is very narrow. To learn this and this style. And many believe you can think it out, like...

SB - I'd very much like to get at the things I believe you're thinking of now.

AS - You're welcome to put words in my mouth...

SB - Yeah, and then you can correct me. What is done in teaching may to some extent be guided by the fact that it's easier to teach things that can be written down?

AS - Partly that. And partly that people have an idea about creativity... that it has to be something new all the time. And they miss out on the fact that the new stuff, the creative stuff, happens in the moment, it happens because you're honest. And they miss out on that it's necessary to know the tradition. You have to have roots.

[...]

## Excerpt 2

[...]

SB - The storytelling view on jazz solos might help to get around some of these problems?

AS - How do you mean?

SB - You say: there is a whole and honest human being. What does she do when she plays? Isn't that to tell stories?

AS - Sure. Whether she likes it or not. If you're honest, it'll show.

SB - Maybe you don't have to intend to tell a story; maybe you just want to seem like a cool guy. But then that's what people hear: aha, she wants to seem like a cool guy.

AS - **Yeah, exactly!** [Laughs.] (C)

SB - Of course, that's far away from the teachings in jazz schools.

AS - Yeah, of course. And these are things you really can't learn in a school, no matter how good the teaching is.

[...]

### Excerpt 3

[...]

SB - Can you imagine jazz music that actively and consciously strives to tell no stories?

AS - No. Why would one do that, what do you mean?

SB - Maybe music always tells of something?

AS - No... There's lots and lots of music that doesn't tell of anything, but it's so boring to listen to. Why should you aim at that? That's awful.

SB - If that happens, it's a disadvantage.

AS - Yeah, then it's only because you have nothing to say. Then it's just technical.

SB - It's a natural aim to say something?

AS - **No, I don't think it's a natural aim (D).** But it's a natural result of having something to say. The natural aim is that you want to play. You have a natural impulse and passion to do whatever you do, in this case, to play music. You know, it's not as if you're thinking: now I'm going to tell this story.

[...]

### Comments

I will comment briefly on issues A–D. Obviously, these comments are based on my interpretations of the dialogue. By presenting and discussing them as openly as possible, I hope to provide readers with the possibility of developing their own view of the conversational dynamics and the construction of understanding in the interview.

- A. Amanda Sedgwick is annoyed by my formulation of the initial interview question, "What makes a good jazz improvisation good?" In her opinion, this formulation is problematic in ways that relate closely to problems she perceives as acute and very distressing in jazz schools. Fundamentally, Sedgwick believes that you have to be a "whole" person in order to play good

jazz improvisations. The question "What...?", however, may indicate a mistaken presumption that one could point out isolated qualities that are sufficient in order to make jazz solos good. Sedgwick relates this formulation to her view of the "narrow" teaching at jazz schools, as well as to what she perceives as the schools' mistaken views (and focus) on creativity.

- B. In her first response, Sedgwick mentions the condition that a musician ought to be "whole and interesting". Returning, after a few moments, to that statement, I misrepresent her phrasing and intention by saying, "whole and... well-integrated". As Sedgwick protests, I respond, "I'm sorry, I made that word up". This was not entirely true; the view that a jazz soloist ought to be a psychologically well-integrated human being had been put forward shortly earlier by another of my interviewees. This mistake on my part had at least two positive consequences. First, Sedgwick found reason to offer even more careful and thorough formulations of her own view regarding necessary personality traits in the successful jazz soloist. Second, as a consequence of having exposed Sedgwick to another interviewee's opinion (one she did not agree with), I gained material for an interesting comparison of diverging opinions regarding which psychological qualities may be valuable when improvising jazz.
- C. At one point during the interview, I suggest that the storytelling concept may provide a solution to some of the problems that Amanda Sedgwick and I have been discussing. At first, however, she does not see my point. I try to explicate my suggestion by way of an example: if a jazz improviser is "whole and honest", then her solos will tell stories. Sedgwick agrees, and she adds, "Whether she likes it or not. If you're honest, it will show." In making this remark, Sedgwick addresses the crucial question whether storytelling in jazz improvisation requires an intention to tell a story on the part of the soloist. Clearly, in her view, it does not. After I expand on this perspective, her strong agreement with what I say is emphasized by her laughter and her words, "Yeah, exactly!" Concrete examples in this excerpt (the suggestions that listeners will hear stories in the playing of the "whole and honest" improviser but also in the playing of the improviser who only wants to seem like a cool guy) provide the ground which enabled interviewer and interviewee to reach a mutual understanding and agreement regarding crucial issues in the field of investigation.
- D. Yet another important aspect of the relation of intention to storytelling was touched upon as a consequence of my questions regarding non-storytelling music. Sedgwick holds that even though such music is very common, you should never strive at playing music that tells no stories. If the music doesn't have anything to say, she adds, it is because the musician has nothing to say.

On the other hand, Sedgwick insists, in direct reply to one of my questions, that storytelling is not the aim of the musician; her aim is to play music, and saying something is a consequence of this aim (provided that she has something to say). Interestingly, the formulation of these important distinctions came about as a result of Sedgwick's response to a series of seemingly rather banal yes-or-no questions.

This is the place, I think, to also try to shed some light on more general difficulties involved in talk about elusive issues such as music, metaphor, and meaning. It is quite natural that an interviewee may feel uncomfortable with perceived expectations in the interview situation, if she feels it to be her task to produce some sort of definitive analytical formulations regarding difficult issues. The following excerpt from my talk with singer/violinist Lena Willemark provides, I believe, an exemplification of this phenomenon.

**Excerpt from interview with Lena Willemark  
Stavsnäs, 17 October 2010**

[...]

SB – You said at the beginning that there must be [in music] the wish to communicate. I'm interested in the image of music as storytelling. Do you find that an apt image of your craft, that you tell stories?

LW – Yes, I think so, in a way. [...] You know, we have some expressions in order to explain things without going very deep into them. It may be great to leave some expressions a bit open; maybe it isn't always so good to have concrete meanings. Because then it's there, and what should I fill it out with myself then? If it's so precise, what should I fill it with? But now that you ask the question, and I have the time, and you're listening... I think I feel that presence is very... presence and discovery, some sort of discovery of... discovery of being present. Some sort of... Well, many have said it before but it's... Well, the great discovery of being present.

SB – I think that's a great way of putting it.

LW – Yes, actually. Maybe that's what storytelling is. It comes out. That discovery comes out. Yes.

[...]

SB – You had this way of putting it that I was very fond of: the great discovery of being present, and to communicate that. [...] It seems that you bring meaning to the word storytelling, what it's really about. Do I get you right?

LW – I think so. But this discovery... It's right then. Wow! It was there, you know, you didn't even have time to think. You don't have that time. That's why everything we're talking about, the great discovery of being



present... – it already has been... You said you're so fond of this way of putting it. Because you want to, that's what you do, so it's no bad thing, but... "yeah, great, now maybe we can get it in here"... [Laughs.] But that's just it: I just discovered it. And now – no, now has been. But it is this connection, to be in the present and communicate it. That's it, I think... to me at least.

[...]

Obviously, Lena Willemark's sound scepticism towards the researcher's aim to "get it in here" is very much to the point. The delight at a *bon mot* must not obscure the need for reflective interpretation. From an ethical point of view as well as on grounds of fact, interview statements should be treated with thorough respect and cited with relevant reservations.

Willemark's remark "no, now has been" stands out as a pregnant formulation of Fröhlich's (2009) observation that lived experiences unfold in "presentness"; because experiences of music are non-repeatable, "the natural phenomenon of music-making escapes the empirical fishing-net" (pp. 495, 497; cf. 3.1.2). It is noteworthy that Willemark's concise statements, on the whole, sum up several theoretical and methodological considerations of the greatest importance to the present investigation: the need for open-ended interpretations of metaphors in this field; the elusive, temporal, subjective nature of the phenomena in question; and the unsuitability of simplistic, schematic formulations in order to capture them.

Needless to say, I do not consider it meaningful or even possible to draw conclusions of a general nature on conversational dynamics from the observations made in connection with the excerpts from the Amanda Sedgwick interview. Interviews do not proceed in accordance with mechanisms; they develop in different and unpredictable ways. The excerpts cited above are nothing more than a few scattered examples of how processes of deepened understanding may develop. The notorious richness of this field, obviously, calls for a careful, sensitive, and thorough analytic approach.

Interviews, it could be argued, are similar to both jazz improvisation and storytelling in that it is not only what is said that matters, but how it is said. I have tried to avoid misunderstanding my informants but cannot be certain that I have succeeded in this. The member check (cf. 4.4) is an attempt to minimize the risk for misunderstandings.

#### 4.1.9. Concluding remarks

In section 4.1, I argue that a hermeneutic methodological approach is best suited for the present investigation, primarily for the reason that such an approach – in contradistinction to several other possible methodological approaches – potentially would include interpretive perspectives regarding all aspects of communication. The

epistemological foundation of the study is specified as the view that knowledge and meaning are constructed in dynamic, contextual and relational processes.

My aim is to find out the meanings ascribed to a certain concept (storytelling) which is employed in a certain field (jazz improvisation). In order to do that, I will try to get into the thoughts of practitioners in this field. This could be described as an aim towards a Diltheyan *Verstehen*. Several aspects of hermeneutics are considered important: understanding is, in part, dependent of leaps of intuition; furthermore, an interpretive process towards a deeper understanding could be described as a complex, dynamic, dialogical movement, including oscillation between whole and part as well as between understanding and preconception; and in this process, the interpreter's original *Vorurteil* is gradually abandoned and replaced.

Language is the given, unavoidable medium for this investigation. In accordance with Gadamer, I shall aim for coherent interpretations. At the same time, in accordance with Skinner, I shall aim for interpretations that agree with the practitioners' intentions. The tensions between these two criteria have been discussed and evaluated (cf. 4.1.1).

The methodological considerations presented in this section also include recognition of the importance of pre-understanding both on the part of the researcher and of the interviewees. Similarly, the constant oscillation between *emic* and *etic* perspectives on the part of interviewer and informants is emphasized. Furthermore, I point out that the interviews are situated in a number of contexts: an educational, a professional, as well as an artist/audience context. A number of interview excerpts serve as concrete illustrations of diverse ways in which conversational dynamics may relate to the construction of understanding. I especially emphasize that the richness and unpredictability of human conversation calls for a certain sensitivity in the analytical process.

## 4.2. Method and design of the studies

In the introductory phase of the investigation (October 2010) thirteen qualitative interviews with practitioners in the field of jazz were carried out. In later phases of the investigation, when the analysis of the transcripts had progressed, two additional interviews were carried out in order to check whether they would render additional categories to the analyses.

The strategic selection of the participants focused on (i) a high artistic level – all of them are of national renown, some of them very successful internationally – as well as on (ii) a documented willingness to engage in verbal communication regarding topics related to their profession. In addition, the selection was guided by (iii) the aim to include a large proportion of informants well experienced in educational aspects of their trade.

Several of the interviews were carried out in the informants' homes. Others took place in a number of different locations such as offices, rehearsal rooms, and hotel lobbies.

Before each interview, I presented brief overviews of my research project twice: the first time by letter as the interviewee was asked to participate in the investigation, and the second time verbally when we met for the interview. Consequently, my interest in the concept of storytelling in jazz improvisation was well known to the participants. All of them had also expressed that this, in their opinion, seemed an interesting topic to talk about. All participants were asked whether they would prefer to remain anonymous when the results of the investigation were published. They all agreed, however, to being identified with their real names in this thesis.

It might be questioned whether views and conceptualizations presented in the interview results would come forward more distinctly if the informants were anonymized. It is an interesting and important question. Difficult though it is, I have been forced to choose. My main reason for including the names of the informants is hinted at already in the Introduction: their contributions might be considered as research results in themselves (while my own work might be viewed as a meta-study). Including the informants' names is normal procedure in jazz research literature; Berliner's (1994) ethnographic study is but one significant example. In brief, I consider the informants' contributions as important, individual, thoroughly thought-through results of artistic experience, research, and reflection. As a consequence I find it reasonable to give each and everyone of them credit where credit is due. I am aware that this choice may be perceived by some readers as unfortunate, if they feel that their preunderstanding may colour their impressions of interview data. Nevertheless, I believe that the hermeneutic interpretive approach which I have tried to apply throughout this study – including a principle of openness regarding both one's preunderstanding and one's seeking for information that might change one's present views – may be relevant to the reader's process of understanding as well.

The fifteen practitioners in the field of jazz improvisation were:

**Peter Asplund**, born 1969, trumpeter, composer. (PA)

**Elise Einarsdotter**, born 1955, pianist, composer, jazz educator at the Royal Academy of Music in Stockholm. (EE)

**Bengt Hallberg**, born 1932, pianist, composer. (BH) (†)

**Lars Jansson**, born 1951, pianist, composer, educator, professor in rhythmical music at Århus Music Conservatory, Denmark. (LJ)

**Ulf Johansson Werre**, born 1956, trombonist, pianist, educator, teacher at the Department of Musicology at Uppsala University. (UJW)

**Anders Jormin**, born 1957, bass player, composer, educator, visiting professor at the Sibelius Academy, Helsinki, Finland, professor in improvisation at the Academy of Music and Drama, Gothenburg University. (AJ)

**Roland Keijser**, born 1944, saxophonist, multi-instrumentalist. (RK)

**Jonas Kullhammar**, born 1978, saxophonist, composer. (JK)

**Gunnar Lindgren**, born 1941, saxophonist, educator, senior lecturer at the Academy of Music and Drama, Gothenburg University, co-author (with Lennart Åberg) of *Jazzimprovisation* (1978). (GL)

**Joakim Milder**, born 1965, saxophonist, composer, educator, professor in improvisation and ensemble at the Royal Academy of Music in Stockholm. (JM)

**Nisse Sandström**, born 1942, saxophonist, educator. (NS)

**Amanda Sedgwick**, born 1970, saxophonist, composer, educator. (AS)

**Ann-Sofi Söderqvist**, born 1956, trumpeter, composer, teacher in composition and arranging at the Royal Academy of Music in Stockholm. (ASS)

**Lena Willemark**, born 1960, singer, musician ("riksspelman", violin and härjedalspipa), composer. (LW)

**Lennart Åberg**, born 1942, saxophonist, flautist, MD of Radiojazzgruppen, co-author (with Gunnar Lindgren) of *Jazzimprovisation* (1978). (LÅ)

The interviews were loosely structured (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). All of them commenced with the question "What makes a good jazz improvisation good?" My intention, of course, was to find out the interviewees' views regarding the concept of storytelling in particular. However, I wanted to avoid as far as possible to initially put words in the informant's mouth, as it were. By not introducing the term storytelling as my topic of interest at the outset, I hoped that the interviews might provide me with a better overview of the informants' perspectives on jazz improvisation as a whole, and, eventually, of how the concept of storytelling fit into the picture according to them. Apart from the opening line, there were no preconceived questions; each interview would turn out as a series of consequences of the interviewee's reply to this question and my follow-up questions. The main aim of this formulation of the introductory question was to provide prerequisites for a general picture of the interviewees' views of important quality criteria for the work of the

musician, thereby enabling me to analyse their conception of storytelling in relation to their overall ideas in this field.

The average time duration for an interview was circa 90 minutes; the minimum duration was 60 minutes and the maximum duration of an interview was 180 minutes. The interviews were audio recorded using a digital voice recorder (Olympus VN-8500PC). To ensure a satisfactory interpretation of gestures and other significant instances of body language in the interviews, they were also video recorded using a digital video recorder (Zoom Q-3). In order to further minimize risks of misinterpretation, transcriptions were carried out by me (i.e., the interviewer himself) as soon as possible after the interviews and sent to the participants for comments and corrections.

### 4.3. Analysis

My interview study includes 15 interviews which is completely in agreement with Kvale's (1996) statement, "In current interview studies, the number of interviews tends to be around  $15 \pm 10$ . The number may be due to a combination of the time and resources available for the investigation and of the law of diminishing returns" (p. 102).

The interview transcriptions made a volume of 212 text pages. A transcription of each interview was sent to the interviewee within a few months after our meeting. Comments and corrections were invited. In some cases, further (email or telephone) communication ensued which was transcribed and added to the material. Interview transcriptions were initially made verbatim, later on with a slightly altered direction. I will try to briefly describe and state reasons for this change in the transcription approach.

Regarding the task of transcribing interviews, Bogdan and Biklen (2003) advocate the alternative "to transcribe the first interviews more or less completely [...] and then narrow what you transcribe in later interviews" (p. 124). I believe that during the phase of transcribing 15 interviews with musicians, I have done exactly that. One reason to narrow down my transcripts was the one mentioned by Bogdan and Biklen: after a while, I believed I had "a better idea about [my] focus" (p. 124). However, there also was another and perhaps stronger reason. I made it a point to ask every informant to read the interview transcript when I had completed it. In the cases of my first interviewees, their response to my transcripts included shock and distress; I couldn't help noticing that they were extremely unhappy to realize that they had expressed themselves in so many ungainly or incomplete sentences, lacking logic and grammar, with false starts, contextually meaningless habitual words and so forth. I had tried to transcribe what they said as fully and correctly as I could. However, given these negative reactions, I found that the disadvantages of this approach might clearly

outweigh the benefits. After this experience, I tried to narrow down my transcripts and exclude parts that seemed irrelevant to the point the informant was making.

Alvesson and Sköldbberg (2008) distinguish four aspects between which a hermeneutic interpretation oscillates: *interpretive pattern–text–dialogue–partial interpretations*. In brief, starting from the interpreter's preconceptions, questions emanate. The active interrogatory approach is complemented in a dialectical manner by a humble, distanced approach which is dictated by respectfulness towards the autonomy of the object of interpretation. Thus, an interpretive pattern and partial interpretations are worked out in dialogue with the text, rendering a continuous transformation of the interpreter's preconceptions throughout the interpretive process. Alvesson and Sköldbberg (2008) discern a rather large number of hermeneutic "themes". These, the authors suggest, in combination with the four elements of the hermeneutical circle (whole–part, understanding–preconception) and the four aspects of the interpretive process (interpretive pattern–text–dialogue–partial interpretations), make up *a diversity of perspectives that may be confronted with each other* in a hermeneutical search for truth. Among perspectives listed by Alvesson and Sköldbberg, I note the following for their potential relevance to the present investigation: investigating the metaphors and narrative conventions of the text; asking questions to the text and listening to the text; penetrating the implicit dimensions of the text; aiming at the fusion of horizons.

In order to enable confrontations between perspectives in a way that corresponds to these methodological suggestions as optimally as possible, a large number of potentially significant statements were extracted from each interview transcription. During the initial process of analysis, I considered potentially significant any interview utterances about jazz improvisation and/or storytelling that contained statements of opinion or fact, questions, or coherent lines of thought. These statements were arranged according to content. Thereby a number of categories were established. As further interview transcriptions were analysed, the categories that had already been established were employed as a means of identifying additional statements of potential significance. At the same time, the extraction of other statements would render additional categories. The interviews were re-read several times in order to complement the number of significant statements as well as the number of categories.

This process can be described as a continuous effort to integrate reflection and attention, thereby adding further insights to an evolving pattern of interpretation on multiple levels. The abductive – in a sense nearly intuitive – element in this reflective, multi-level interpretive process should be noted, as well as its continuous interplay between empirical data, hypothetical inferences, and theoretical perspectives.

The translation of interview statements from Swedish to English was perceived as a delicate matter with regard to the character of the investigation, the amount of concept analyses involved, and the notorious fuzziness of language. In order to

represent the intended meaning(s) as fully and truly as possible in every instance, the Swedish original is given in brackets.

## 4.4. Quality and relevance

Given the epistemological foundations of this research approach, the interpretations rendered will necessarily be culture dependent – dynamic, contextual, and relational –; this, in accordance with the perspectives presented in section 4.1, will include the position of the researcher. Assessing quality in this kind of qualitative research necessitates a set of criteria other than that of quantitative empirical investigations. This section discusses a number of pertinent perspectives on quality.

One oft-repeated piece of advice concerns the *convincing internal logic* of the research presentation. While the assessment of rhetorical qualities must remain a matter for the reader, I believe it is fair to state that considerable efforts have been made to keep these aspects in focus during the different phases of the research project.

Careful *theoretical, mental, and practical preparation* before the interviews was aimed at; brief descriptions of the diversified character and content of such preparation follow shortly. The reasons for this were manifold. Since the topic of the interviews was the conceptions of highly qualified individuals on complex, even philosophical questions regarding aspects of their craftsmanship – questions, one might add, that according to several interviewees are not very often talked about – it was considered urgent to provide the interviewees with sufficient reason to feel assured that their views would be understood correctly and reproduced with sensitivity and respect. This aim includes a delicate balance between a number of qualities in the interviewer: wide reading on aspects of jazz improvisation (e.g., in the background literature represented in Chapter 2); preparedness to relate, more or less instantly, statements made in the moment with other relevant lines of thought, either cited from literature or from previously conducted interviews (this might be described as qualities of conversational agility, fluidity, or even musicality in the interviewer); at the same time, also, propensity for listening without interrupting in order to explore and understand as fully as possible the views of the interviewee. It should be added that it was considered urgent to be well-read regarding several aspects of jazz improvisation in order to enable the researcher's pre-understanding to function in an active and perceptive manner *not only* in the interview situation, but during all phases of the investigation. Another important aspect regarding the acquisition of thorough pre-understanding was, of course, the need to facilitate the analytical awareness in the researcher after the interviews had been carried out. But one additional and probably not unimportant consequence of the theoretical preparations before the interviews was that the content analysis process was in a sense very much at work already during the interviews.

In addition to this kind of theoretical and mental preparation, careful practical arrangements were made in order to secure that the interviews could be conducted under the best possible circumstances, including not only preparation of my own twofold (audio and video) digital recording gear, but also favourable acoustic conditions, a secluded and comfortable room, and something to eat and drink during the interview. I am grateful to many interviewees for generously assisting in providing these things.

I focused on getting to know the multiple realities of numerous individuals. As noted above apropos of the professional context of the interviews (cf. subsection 4.1.8), several informants said that they were happy about this opportunity to discuss questions that they found important though often difficult to articulate and maybe therefore not often talked about. On several occasions, the communication seemed to indicate in various ways that *my own background* as a jazz musician was of help in the conversations with persons specialized in the fields of jazz. For instance, such indications would consist in signs that there was mutual confidence that matters of opinion, understanding, or reference could implicitly be taken for granted; as well as signs of immediate agreement on the (non)applicability of a certain term or concept. There were also instances where the informant's view and my own were clearly divergent.

Ödman's (1971/2007) overview of guiding principles for hermeneutic interpretive work focuses, among other things, on the aspect of our *choice of interpretations*. The system of interpretations at the final phase of the interpretive process ought to make up a coherent whole. The inner logic of the interpretive system ought to be valid.

Yet another aspect of Ödman's (1971/2007) overview regards our *mediation of understanding*. Our language, he argues, should facilitate the reader's understanding. This may be attained partly through reporting our pre-understanding, thus enabling the reader to experience our mediation of understanding as an existential situation; "this form of experience is significant to understanding" (p. 241; my translation).

Furthermore, Ödman (1971/2007) points out, our interpretations can (and should) be the objects of intersubjective discussion, in which readers and listeners may scrutinize the interpreter's claims of validity. In a Swedish pun which does not easily lend itself to English translation, Ödman points out that interpretation is an act of creation, namely, creation of knowledge; in Swedish, "Egentligen handlar det om att skapa, att *vetenskapa*" (p. 242; *veta* = know, *skapa* = create, *vetenskapa* = pursue scientific research). In German this pun would translate as "Eigentlich geht es um schaffen, *Wissen schaffen*". On a similar note, in his book on hermeneutics and postmodernity, Madison (1988) advocates a casuistic view on hermeneutical method, building on a logic of argumentation rather than a logic of validation. In his view, judgment and argumentation are crucial elements, leading to a provisional intersubjectivity but not to definitive truth. Methodological principles of hermeneutics according to Madison include a number of holistic criteria such as



*coherence, comprehensiveness, penetration, and thoroughness*; but also criteria that could be said to regard the fertility of the investigation, such as *suggestiveness* and *potential*.

Regarding the validity of the understanding attained by the qualitative researcher, Hastrup (1999) points to the importance of the researcher's earlier experience, distinguishing between *reference* and *resonance*:

our theories cannot be supported by their *reference*, i.e., that which their words seem to point to, but by the degree of *resonance* they have with our own experience of being human. (p. 279; my translation)

Arguably, it might be regarded as especially valuable if the understanding communicated by the researcher does resonate with those who represent the field of study. The communication with the interview participants afterwards was not only intended to establish that their statements had been transcribed and interpreted correctly; to an important degree, it was also a question of ascertaining the *pragmatic* and *ecological validity* (Kvale, 2009; Folkestad, 1996) of the investigation. As the research results are brought back to the investigated reality, the assessment of their communicability and validity is an important criterion of research quality.

In the view of Lincoln and Guba (1985), the *member check* is "the most crucial technique for establishing credibility" (p. 314). In a formal sense, my selection of data, analytic categories, interpretations, and conclusions have been tested with the informants on three separate stages after the interviews had been carried out and transcribed:

- (i) informants were given the opportunity to read and give feedback to interview transcripts (Winter/Spring 2011), including an opportunity to confirm the correctness of transcripts, to correct errors, and to provide additional clarification, lines of thought, or pieces of information;
- (ii) informants were given the opportunity to read and give feedback to Chapter 5 (Summer 2013), including a second opportunity to confirm the correctness of transcripts, to correct errors, and to provide additional clarification, lines of thought, or pieces of information, as well as an opportunity to summarize and assess the overall adequacy of the presentation of results and to articulate opposing or complementary points of view;
- (iii) informants were given the opportunity to read and give feedback to the entire thesis script of that time (Autumn 2013; only one informant accepted to undertake this task), including yet another opportunity to contribute in the ways mentioned above, but with a wider scope.

All comments and requests offered during phase (i) of the member check were met. In phase (ii) I received letters of response from informants asking me to exchange

individual words in order to render an interview statement truer to its intent or easier to understand; I have complied with these requests. In addition, this phase of the member check rendered kudos of the following kind (my translations), which seemed to indicate positive assessment of the communicability and validity of the research results.

I think this is incredibly fun and interesting to read. Wow! I hope this attains wide circulation. Many will take great pleasure in reading all of this.

Thanks for letting me read your work. It is extremely interesting. I usually don't like comparisons regarding music, but in this case it is the very comparisons that become so interesting. Your questions have engaged everyone. There are different sorts of attitude and temperament. It is very exciting from a psychological point of view. I've read it all through twice. I want to congratulate you on a great work which will attract much attention. Something like this has never been done in Sweden before. It's about time.

I have read the text and I must say that it is very interesting to compare all the musicians' statements with the homemade psychological images I have of them. This is a long-awaited text.

Finally, given the constructionist foundations of this study, the very investigation itself must be viewed as a social construct. Its validity, therefore, must be tested against and in relation to other texts, other research processes and products. The inner logic and mediation of my interpretive work, as well as any suggestiveness and potential it may possess, could only be assessed in intersubjective discussion. In brief, it remains for the research society to scrutinize the *communicative validity* and *generalizability* of the results of the present investigation.



# Results: Storytelling in jazz improvisation

This chapter describes the results of interviews with jazz improvisers. The first section of the chapter presents general perspectives on storytelling as a description of jazz improvisation. The categories in the following section have been structured in accordance with a model of a manifold now, which can be seen as an essential characteristic feature of jazz improvisation as described by the informants. The concluding section of the chapter presents a number of educational implications of the view of jazz improvisation as storytelling.

## 5.1. Storytelling in jazz improvisation: A description of jazz improvisation

This section presents general perspectives on storytelling as a description of jazz improvisation. As mentioned previously (in section 4.2), even though I had presented my field of interest to all participants beforehand, I tried as a rule to avoid putting the word 'storytelling' in an informant's mouth during the interview. Through the strategy of beginning each interview with a 'large' question ("What makes a good jazz improvisation good?") I hoped to learn eventually during the conversations if and how the concept of storytelling played a part in each informant's perspectives on jazz improvisation. Needless to say, there were variations in the outcome of this approach, but the concept of storytelling did come up quite soon in the course of all the interviews. In several of them, it remained the core of our conversation throughout.

### 5.1.1. Adequacy of description

The interviewees were asked to comment on how they perceive the term storytelling as a picture or description of what jazz improvisation is about: Is it accurate? Are there better alternatives?

Peter Asplund is all for the storytelling metaphor: "One hundred percent. Really." ["Hundra procent. Verkligen"] (PA2). Joakim Milder responds in a similar vein: "Yes, definitely." ["Ja, definitivt"] (JM17). Lars Jansson agrees, offering a description of the bass player Red Mitchell's solo playing as an explanation:

You paid attention. You paid attention. Just as a story-teller who can captivate his children by the camp fire... Wow! Easy to follow, easy to understand the logic in the choice of notes and the rhythm and the breathing of the phrases, all that, the gestures.

[Man lystrade. Man lystrade. Precis som en sagoberättare som kan fånga sina barn vid lägerelden... Wow! Lätt att följa, lätt att förstå logiken i tonvalet och rytmiken och andningen i fraserna, all det där, gestiken.] (LJ20)

However, Ann-Sofi Söderqvist maintains that "it is a matter of something more abstract" ["det handlar ju om någonting mera abstrakt"]. Using the trumpet soloist Miles Davis as an example, she points out how difficult it is to answer the question "what is it really that you tell?" ["vad är det egentligen man berättar?"]

I think he's a real story-teller when he plays. But what does he tell? That isn't that easy to make concrete. [...] I experience a lot of melancholy, quite a bit of loneliness in his expression. At the same time, I think there is a shimmering light, something almost a bit sublime, which also makes the other musicians around him raise themselves in a way. And he has a tone that goes straight into you. I only have to hear one note to know that it's him. But melancholy, loneliness... it isn't at all certain that he feels it that way. Maybe he doesn't feel that way at all. Maybe it's only me thinking of it that way, because it hits something within me. [...] "This is the sort of human being I am" may be what you tell, in a way. And then there is... That is the beauty of jazz music, that space.

[Jag tycker han är en verklig berättare när han spelar. Men vad berättar han? Det är inte lika lätt att konkretisera. [...] Jag upplever väldigt mycket melankoli, ganska mycket ensamhet i hans uttryck. Samtidigt så tycker jag att det finns ett skimmer, någonting som nästan är lite upphöjt, som också får de andra musikerna som han omger sig med att höja sig på något sätt. Och han har en ton som liksom träffar rakt in. Jag behöver bara höra en ton så vet jag att det är han. Men melankoli, ensamhet... det är ju inte alls säkert att han känner

det så. Han kanske inte känner så alls. Det kanske bara är jag som tänker in det, för att det träffar någonting i mig. [...] "Det här är den typ av människa jag är" är väl kanske vad man berättar om på något sätt, va. Och det finns ju... Det är ju det som är det sköna med jazzmusik, att det finns det utrymmet.] (ASS4,33)

As I interpret her words, Ann-Sofi Söderqvist here points to the possibility of conceiving of storytelling in jazz improvisation not as necessarily a *narrative structure*, but as a *statement*, e.g., as an expression of an emotional state. This comes forward as an important alternative or complement to a strictly literal interpretation of 'storytelling' in jazz contexts.

The picture of how jazz improvisers tell stories can be problematized in several ways. In Lars Jansson's opinion, such problematization can be the product of ways of thinking that are determined by cultural contexts: "That it's fluffy, that it's difficult, that it's mysterious – and yet it's so simple; that opposition is what I think we have difficulties with in the West. We want orderliness, to be able to explain things, to prove..." ["Att det är luddigt, att det är svårt, att det är mystiskt – och ändå så är det enkelt; den där motsättningen, jag tror att det är det vi har svårt med i västerlandet. Vi vill ha ordning och reda och kunna förklara saker, bevisa..."] (LJ43).

Like Ann-Sofi Söderqvist, Lars Jansson also seems open to an interpretation of storytelling in jazz improvisation as an expression of the player's emotional state. Specifically, he points to the significance of the player's own accumulated experience. Jansson perceives a connection between storytelling in jazz improvisation on one hand and the improviser's personal and musical maturity on the other:

If you think about storytelling and you identify it as... content in music, then maybe you have to be a little older, too. [...] I think I've got more structure, more content, more sound and expression over the years. I think so. And that's because you have worked with yourself on different levels. Experienced more things. [...] if you tell stories from your heart, then you carry your own luggage. Maybe therefore this storytelling ability that you are asking about demands that you get a little older, that you have received a few blows, that you have been around a little.

[Om man nu tänker på berättande och identifierar det som... innehåll i musiken, så kanske man behöver bli lite äldre också. [...] Jag tycker att jag har fått mer struktur, mer innehåll, mer klang och uttryck med åren. Det tycker jag. Och det är ju för att man har jobbat med sig själv på olika plan. Upplevt och erfårit mer saker. [...] om du berättar från hjärtat, då har du med ditt bagage. Därför kanske den här berättandeförmågan som du är ute efter nu kräver att man blir lite äldre, att man har fått lite törnar, har varit med lite.] (LJ42,44)

Gunnar Lindgren is loyal to the view that storytelling is an essential function of jazz improvisation as well as of several other artistic expressions.

Storytelling, that's exactly what it begins and ends with. [...] It really is the story of the heart, and it does not matter whether it's told through a saxophone or through a line and a gesture in a theatre. It's really the same thing.

[Just storytelling, det är det som det börjar och slutar med, va. [...] Det är egentligen hjärtats saga, och sen spelar det ingen roll om det går genom en saxofon eller om det går genom en replik och en gest på en teater. Det är ju samma sak egentligen.] (GL26,28)

Lindgren's expression "the story of the heart", in all probability, is a conscious reference to the title of a popular Swedish romantic song from the late 19th century ("Hjärtats saga") and, perhaps, to its content as well. In this song, by way of numerous analogies with simple phenomena of nature (there is a well in every forest and a flower in every meadow), Alfred "Sigurd" Hedenstierna's naïvistic lyrics put forward the view that every human heart has a story of its own; however, though silent – notably, according to this song the story of the heart remains a secret, for it is never told! –, it is perennial and will not run dry like the well or fade like the flower.

Furthermore, Lindgren points out that the way a story is told depends on the storyteller:

If the same story is told by ten different persons, that story will be different every time. [...] That is to say, the one who tells it can give it an expression which is just his own [...] the great storytellers, you know... It must be that it comes with a kind of sincerity and naturalness.

[Om samma historia berättas av tio olika människor, så blir den där historien olika varje gång. [...] Det är alltså den som berättar det där, som kan ge den ett uttryck som är precis hans eget, [...] de här stora berättarna, vet du... Det måste vara att det här kommer med en slags uppriktighet och en självklarhet.] (GL1,12)

In order to demonstrate the essence of a musical story's *authenticity*, Lindgren offers a parable where the real-life stories in a person's own experience are contrasted with those built on second-hand information.

Chet Baker, and Miles, [...] and Bix Beiderbecke. They had one thing in common. That was an irrepressible sort of melodiousness in their music. While we others often have phrases or sequences or whatever you wish to call it, that do not feel like a tale or a story where a human being is telling something, but it sounds as if they have learnt a story. Pretty much as if you say: "well, I read in

GP [the local paper] this morning, it was a [...]", well, you know, tell some damn story. But if you had seen this, and experienced it, the same story, then you would have told it in a different way and probably been able to captivate people in a totally different way. Because you have details that make it seem authentic and credible when you tell it. [...] the difference between the best musicians and the second best is that the second ones tell... GP stories, you know, and the first ones tell their own stories. Even if it is the same story.

[Chet Baker, och Miles, [...] och Bix Beiderbecke. De hade en sak gemensamt. Det var att de hade en okuvlig melodisk, vad ska vi säga, sångbarhet i sin musik. Medans vi andra ofta har fraser eller sekvenser eller vad du vill kalla det, som inte känns som en historia eller berättelse där en människa berättar någonting, utan det låter som om de har lärt sig en historia. Ungefär som om man säger: "ja, jag läste i GP i morse, det var en [...]", ja, alltså, berättar någon djävla historia där, va. Men hade man sett det här, och varit med om den, samma historia, då hade man berättat den på ett annat sätt, och förmodligen kunnat fånga människor på ett helt annat sätt. Därför att man har alltså detaljer som gör att det känns autentiskt och trovärdigt när man berättar det. [...] skillnaden mellan de bästa musikerna och de näst bästa, det är att de ena berättar... GP-historier, alltså, och de andra berättar egna historier, alltså. Även om det är samma story.] (GL10)

Lindgren views the jazz improviser Chet Baker as a truly authentic storyteller. He shares his recollections of a situation where Baker seems to have perceived Lindgren in the same way.

I have always had this incredible admiration for Chet Baker. And I played at Blå Stället here with Opposite Corner. It is a number of years ago now. And I played a ballad there and it turned out very well, [...] And then I suddenly see how he [Chet Baker] comes walking slowly, slowly towards the stage, [...] and he came damn close like this... [whispers] "I really liked your playing"... and I was damn happy, you know, and then he went... back. And when he came he turned... [whispers] "I really mean it". You see... The fact that it was a person who played melodiously and whom I had looked up to... whom I identified with, you know...

[Jag har alltid haft en otrolig beundran till Chet Baker. Och så spelade jag på Blå Stället här med Opposite Corner. Det är ju ett antal år sedan nu. Och så spelade jag en ballad där och fick till det väldigt fint, [...] Och så plötsligt så ser jag hur han [Chet Baker] kommer gående, gick sakta sakta sakta fram emot scenen, [...] och så kom han djävligt nära så här... [viskar] "I really liked your playing"... och jag blev djävligt glad, vet du, och så gick han... tillbaka. Och så när han kom där så vände han...[viskar] "I really mean it". Du förstår... Just



det att det var en människa som spelade sångbart och som jag hade sett fram till... som jag identifierade mig i där, alltså...] (GL13–14)

As I interpret the statements by Söderqvist, Jansson, and Lindgren cited above, they point to an interpretation of storytelling which these informants seem to consider crucial: that jazz improvisations ought to *express the players' own emotional experiences in a truthful and direct manner*. The following few quotations provide further dimensions of this view, indicating that similar perspectives are shared by several other informants as well. Elise Einarsdotter points out that listeners can experience considerable differences in messages conveyed by musicians.

It's almost strange sometimes how you can listen to two musicians who play the same tune, and maybe with the same notes, on the whole. And one of them conveys something, or perhaps a lot, and the other one conveys nothing, or perhaps very little. It has a lot to do with the tone, I think. The intention and the tone.

[Det är ju nästan konstigt ibland hur man kan lyssna på två musiker som spelar samma låt, och kanske med samma toner, i stort sett. Och den ene förmedlar något, eller kanske väldigt mycket, och den andre förmedlar ingenting, eller kanske väldigt lite. Det är väldigt mycket tonen, tycker jag. Intentionen och tonen.] (EE21)

Lena Willemark thinks that storytelling "in a way" ["på sätt och vis"] gives a good impression of the improviser's task:

I think I use it quite a lot, actually. A desire to tell a story – and it doesn't always have to do with words, it has to do with expression. [...] I use "conveying" a lot, too. To convey. But if you are to convey something, you have to be there in yourself.

[Jag använder nog det rätt mycket faktiskt. En vilja att berätta – och att det då inte alltid har med ord att göra, utan det har med ett uttryck att göra. [...] 'Förmedlandet' använder jag väldigt mycket också. Att förmedla. Men om du ska förmedla någonting så måste du vara där i dig själv.] (LW17,20)

Anders Jormin regards improvisation as "the form of music where you have the possibility to play yourself" ["den musikform där man har möjlighet att spela sig själv"].

And it also is a form of music which demands you and me. It doesn't demand a style. Improvisation to me is not a style, it is personal expression. [...] We all know that there is a great way to express something. Well, there are several: it

can be movement, that is, the body – but it can also be speech. All human beings have that in common as a means of expression. Body and speech. But for some reason we choose something outside of our body: an instrument. Why do we do that, and what happens in that act? [...] In the storytelling phenomenon there may be this connection between expression and voice, which you either look for in an artificial way when you play your saxophone, or that you have for free, seemingly, when you sing or tell a story.

[Och det är också en musikform som kräver dig och mig. Den kräver inte en stil. Improvisation är inte en stil för mig, det är ett personligt uttryck. [...] Vi vet alla att det finns ett jättebra sätt att uttrycka någonting. Ja, det finns flera: det kan vara rörelse, kroppen alltså – men det kan också vara talet. Det har alla människor gemensamt som uttrycksmedel. Kropp och tal. Men av någon anledning väljer vi något utanför vår kropp: ett instrument. Varför gör vi det, och vad sker i den akten? [...] I fenomenet berättande kanske ligger den här kopplingen mellan uttryck och röst, som man antingen söker på ett artificiellt sätt när man spelar sin saxofon, eller som man till synes har gratis när man sjunger eller berättar.] (AJ19,28)

Jormin points to the saxophonist Wayne Shorter as an example of a storytelling musician. His way of playing is described by Jormin as "very simple, naïve, without frills, straight to the point, with a tone that reminds you of a... well, a thunderous voice, in a way" ["våldigt enkelt, naivt, utan krusiduller, rakt på sak, med en ton som påminner om... ja, en tordönsstämma på något sätt"].

It is extremely firm and apparently convinced – and really storytelling in some way... with connections far back in time, in a way. That may be the most storytelling one, I think. And he also plays in an apparently non-virtuoso manner nowadays. But we who have studied music understand, of course, that it's on a level where he has gone in circles, deeper and deeper into a spiral in some way.

[Det är oerhört bestämt och till synes övertygat – och verkligen berättande på något slags... med kopplingar långt tillbaks i tiden, på något sätt. Det tycker jag kanske är den mest berättande. Och han spelar ju också till synes icke-virtuost nuförtiden. Men vi som har studerat musik förstår ju att det är på en nivå där han har gått i cirklar, djupare och djupare in i en spiral på något sätt.] (AJ26)

Joakim Milder, too, calls attention to Shorter, in particular his way of

sometimes playing incredibly little and taking very long pauses, and sometimes being very active. Everything is governed by and depends on what needs to be expressed. So it isn't centred on his achievement. At all, really.

[ibland spelar otroligt lite och tar väldigt långa pauser, och ibland är väldigt aktiv. Allt styrs av och är beroende av vad som behöver uttryckas. Så det kretsar inte kring vad han presterar. Alls, egentligen.] (JM24)

Nisse Sandström comments on the point that storytelling could be viewed as a question of *how* rather than of *what*, pointing out that he does not view the storytelling of jazz improvisers as the communication of a certain message:

It is about *how* you convey this. Stanley Turrentine... when I hear him I really hear a black priest. Not literally, of course, but the black priest's rhythm. [...] Rhetoric. [...] It is in his marrow. It isn't something he has learnt, but he has been influenced, in church, by the priest's way of standing out there, conveying this rhythmic message. And Turrentine does it with his tenor.

[Det handlar om *hur* man framför det här. Stanley Turrentine... när jag hör honom så hör jag egentligen en svart präst. Alltså inte ordagrant, va, men den svarta prästens rytmik. [...] Retorik. [...] Det sitter i ryggmärgen på honom. Det är inget han har lärt sig, utan han har blivit påverkad, i kyrkan, av prästens sätt att stå där framme och framföra det här rytmiska budskapet. Och Turrentine gör det med sin tenor.] (NS19–20)

Sandström reports the opinion of a fellow saxophonist which he thinks might be of relevance to the picture of the jazz improviser as a storyteller.

Warne Marsh told me: "You are the most melodious saxophonist I have heard. *It's unbelievable*", he said. I guess I am a melodist. That is what I do, simply, play melodious phrases. But I don't know if it's a story. Of course, on one hand you could say that it is. Maybe it's two aspects of the same thing. You play melodiously.

[Warne Marsh sade till mig: "Du är den mest melodiska saxofonist jag har hört. *It's unbelievable*", sade han. Jag är nog en melodiker. Det är det jag gör, helt enkelt, spelar melodiska fraser. Men om det är en berättelse, det vet jag inte. Det är klart, det kan man ju å ena sidan säga att det är. Det är kanske två olika sidor av samma sak. Man spelar melodiskt.] (NS26)

I believe that a reasonable interpretation of Sandström's – or Marsh's – emphasis on the melodious quality would be to conceive of it as an *attitude*, a posture or way of behaviour in the improviser – if by voluntary choice, or as a consequence, rather, of a personality trait or of an emotional state. Sandström's description of his impressions of a certain Lester Young solo seems to me to corroborate such an interpretation. Sandström offers his reflections on how the saxophonist Lester Young appears as a storyteller in a particular solo improvisation.

The cool is born with Lester Young when he plays "These foolish things" in 1944. [...] He does not assert himself. It's as if he has... "After you, sir." At the same time as he's playing this marvellously. Enormous tones. [...] His rhythmic timing. [...] Sometimes he plays rather similar to Louis Armstrong or Bix Beiderbecke, that is, gentle lines, [...] diatonically. [...] The way he begins is like a story. You start a bit quietly, like. And then he proceeds in this... and tensions set in, which he himself creates, through his choice of notes, and through the rhythm. He goes into a few rhythmic things that occur... bapp-ba-daa, bapp-ba-daa [sings] ... and, hell, then it's a story. And the tempo makes it easier to tell a story, because it's a ballad, not too slow a ballad, but a sort of *walking ballad*... makes it easier to convey this storytelling thing.

[Det coola föds med Lester Young, när han spelar "These foolish things", 1944. [...] Där finns ingenting att hävda. Utan han har liksom... "After you, sir." Samtidigt som han spelar så här fantastiskt. Enorma toner. [...] Hans rytmiska tajming. [...] Ibland spelar han ganska likt Louis Armstrong eller Bix Beiderbecke, alltså mjuka linjer, [...] diatoniskt. [...] Sättet han börjar på är som en berättelse. Man börjar lite stillsamt, va. Och sen går han vidare i den här... och det börjar uppstå spänningar, som han skapar själv, genom tonvalet, och genom rytmiken. Han kommer in på några rytmiska grejer som dyker upp... bapp-ba-daa, bapp-ba-daa [sjunger] ... och då är det fan i mig en berättelse. Och tempot gör att det blir lättare att berätta, eftersom det är en ballad, inte en alltför långsam ballad, utan en slags *walking ballad*... gör att det är lättare att få fram den här berättande grejen.] (NS41–43,46)

So far, the interview quotations I have put forward have emphasized the jazz improvisation's function as an expressive statement made by the improviser, i.e., a 'soloist' perspective. However, situational features are clearly also of relevance. In my interview study, *contextual* aspects of jazz improvisation were accentuated by all informants; the contextual aspects of the concept of 'storytelling' as a description of jazz improvisation were highlighted by one informant in particular. Roland Keijser agrees with the description of the jazz improviser as a storyteller. He extends it into a picture of the the communication and response from the rest of the jazz group as well.

If you are a small company, comparable to a smaller jazz group, quartet or quintet or something like that. If someone plays a solo, that is, tells a story – then the others sit and listen, and perhaps make comments, or ask some question, support, "yeah", like, or laugh – that is, they contribute. [...] You relate to it. OK, now he's doing his solo, and we back him up.

[Om man är ett litet sällskap, jämförbart med en mindre jazzgrupp, kvartett eller kvintett eller något sådant. Om någon spelar ett solo, det vill säga berättar en historia – då sitter de andra och lyssnar, och kanske kommenterar, eller

ställer någon fråga, stödjer, "jaa", liksom, eller skrattar – alltså, de bidrar. [...] Man förhåller sig till det. Okej, nu är det han som kör solo, och då backar vi upp honom.] (RK10–11)

Keijser also meditates on the character of storytelling in jazz. In his opinion, elements such as group communication and tradition can be emphasized if storytelling is perceived as *relating*, *recounting*. Keijser points out that storytelling in German would translate as

*Wiedererzählung*, that is, recounting, as in *raconter*, *re-*. That is to say, a story isn't just something that I make up instantaneously, which is the wet dream of the *wannabe* jazz musician, like, but it also is that you tell a story of something that already exists, that you recount something and pass on something. You simply are in a tradition. If you have this picture of a bunch of buddies sitting, then it could be like someone is telling a story about something that you... try to remember! How the hell was it, do you remember when we were... in Enköping twenty years ago. It could be that situation, kind of [...] scenario, you remember certain common things identically, but then there are a little different colours... Then there will be a rich sound, sort of. But if you think that you sit there as a gang, and someone's going to tell a story about an experience you have in common, and then everyone agrees one hundred percent in every tiny detail: Yes, it was exactly like that! Then it probably does not swing.

[*Wiedererzählung*, alltså återberättande, liksom i *raconter*, *re-*. Alltså, en berättelse är inte bara något som jag hittar på i stunden, som är *wannabe*-jazzmusikerns våta dröm, liksom, utan det är ju också att man berättar om något som redan finns, att man återberättar någonting och för vidare någonting. Man är i en tradition helt enkelt. Om man har den här bilden av ett gäng kompisar som sitter, så kan det ju vara så att någon berättar om något som man... försöker komma ihåg! Hur fan var det, kommer ni ihåg det där när vi var... i Enköping för tjugo år sedan. Det kan ju vara den situationen liksom [...] scenario, man kommer ihåg vissa gemensamma grejer identiskt, men sedan är det lite olika färger... Då blir det ju en rik klang, liksom. Men om man tänker att man sitter ett gäng, och så är det någon som ska berätta om en gemensam erfarenhet, och sedan i varje minsta detalj så är alla hundra procent överens: Ja, exakt så var det! Då svänger det förmodligen inte.] (RK11)

Keijser's extended description of the storytelling situation in jazz improvisation can easily be further expanded to include the audience as well – in a somewhat more peripheral relationship to the improviser at the story's centre.

If you speak about the traditional jazz club, then it just becomes an extension of that group. It's a few people who sit a bit further away in the room and who may not be personally so closely acquainted with those in the centre, as it were. But they, too, hear the story that's told, and may already be familiar with it, to a great extent. That is to say, the person who tells the story can do it in a very internal way. Let us say that it's about a story that the orchestra, this smaller group in the centre, have in common, like this thing that happened in Enköping. It can be abused, or unfortunately turn out that way, that it only deals with what we who sit here learnt last semester at the Academy of Music. [...] But otherwise, if it's a good storyteller who has not got stuck in that rather internal way of telling a story, then of course those who are sitting a bit further away from the centre, that is, the audience, can also appreciate the story. [...] I am also thinking that a good storyteller can be someone who does not have any experiences at all in common with the rest of the group, but who catches their interest and gains their support, and also captivates the audience, because it really is a darn unique personality. [...] Such as Frippe Nordström, for instance.

[Om man säger den traditionella jazzklubben, så blir det ju bara en utvidgning av den där gruppen. Det är några som sitter lite längre bort i rummet och kanske inte är personligen så nära bekanta med dem som är i centrum så att säga. Men även de hör ju vilken historia som berättas, och är kanske redan bekanta med stora delar av den. Alltså, den som berättar kan ju göra det på ett väldigt internt sätt. Låt oss säga att det handlar om en historia som orkestern, den här mindre, centrala gruppen, har gemensamt, som det här som hände i Enköping. Det kan ju missbrukas, eller tyvärr dra iväg åt det hållet, att det bara handlar om vad vi som sitter här lärde oss förra terminen på Musikhögskolan. [...] Men annars, om det är en god historieberättare som inte är låst till det där ganska interna sättet att berätta på, så är det klart att de som sitter lite längre bort från centrum, alltså publiken, också kan uppskatta historien. [...] Jag tänker också: en god berättare kan ju vara någon som inte alls har några vidare gemensamma erfarenheter med de övriga i gruppen, men som fångar deras intresse och vinner deras stöd, och även fångar publiken, därför att det verkligen är en djävligt unik personlighet. [...] Som Frippe Nordström till exempel.] (RK13)

Comparing some of the great saxophonists in jazz history (Lester Young, Dexter Gordon, Sonny Rollins, John Coltrane), Keijser concludes: "they are very different kinds of stories – at the same time, there is a great affinity" ["det är ju väldigt olika slags berättelser – samtidigt är det ju ett stort släktskap"] (RK17). He directs attention to the fact that it is also possible for an individual musician to tell many different kinds of stories.

Such a guy as John Coltrane... I do not think it ever happens that I laugh when I hear him play. It is very serious – in one way or another, depending on which period in his life: [...] that religious nerve, [...] that incredibly beautiful ballad playing in a more conventional spirit... [...] Or his early stuff as well, where he has to play all the notes in the chords, neurotically, [...] that is an entirely different story, sort of.

[En sådan som John Coltrane... det händer nog aldrig att jag liksom skrattar när jag hör honom spela. Det är väldigt allvarligt – på det ena eller andra sättet, beroende på vilken period i hans liv: [...] den där religiösa nerven, [...] det där otroligt vackra balladspelet i mera konventionell anda... [...] Eller också hans tidiga grejer, där han så där neurotiskt ska spela alla tonerna i ackorden, [...] det är en helt annan story, liksom.] (RK17)

In some of the interviews, I got the impression that the concept of storytelling, though familiar, was not exactly perceived by the informant as the most appropriate means to display the core of jazz improvisation. One of the concept's limitations might be that 'storytelling' could be viewed as some sort of technical device which, while not a necessary condition, could or could not be applied in the process of improvising. Lennart Åberg calls attention to two concrete examples of storytelling jazz improvisation. He relates how the trumpeter Clark Terry on one occasion used

that gimmick, switching with fluegelhorn, so that he played a duet with himself, kind of. And he produces phrases just like talking, in a way, instrumental. With his sound and all. You know, he has a very special sound. You could speak of storytelling there. Even dialogue.

[det där trixet, byta med flygelhorn, så han spelade liksom duett med sig själv. Och då fick han till sådana fraser så det var precis som prat, på något sätt, instrumentalt. Med sitt sound och allt. Han har ju ett väldigt speciellt sound. Där skulle man kunna tala om berättande. Till och med dialog.] (LÅ18)

Åberg's second example is Charlie Parker's introductory phrases on the recording of "Parker's mood":

ba-dobede-dweedede---de-dweedededede-deyde... You can hear that it is someone complaining. You have all the blues lyrics tradition at the bottom of it, so you add that, of course.

[ba-dobede-dweedede---de-dweedededede-deyde... Då hör man att det är någon som klagar. Man har hela bluestexttraditionen bakom, så att det lägger man ju till.] (LÅ18)

Åberg views storytelling jazz improvisation as a phenomenon occurring mainly in instrumental solos in blues and ballads.

There you tell about something personal, experienced. It is not as if you can tell: "oh, yesterday a strange thing happened to me", and then you tell about that when you play a solo. [...] You hear an expression in the person playing that gives you the feeling that he is telling you something – or opening himself up, his feelings, showing himself. It can mean that as well. You show your feelings. But the faster the tune, the farther away I think you get from that storytelling thing.

[Då berättar man något personligt, upplevt. Man kan liksom inte berätta: "åh, igår var jag med om en konstig sak", och så berättar man det när man spelar ett solo. [...] Man hör ett uttryck hos den personen som spelar, som gör att det känns som att han håller på och berättar något – eller öppnar sig själv, sina känslor, visar sig. Det kan ju betyda det också. Man visar sina känslor. Men ju snabbare en låt går, så tror jag man kommer längre och längre ifrån det där att det skulle vara en berättelse.] (LÅ27–28)

In Åberg's opinion, then, as I take it, to view jazz improvisation as storytelling might be relevant sometimes but not always. If this seems reasonable from the listener's perspective, then it might perhaps also be argued that from the musician's perspective, a storytelling mode or attitude could be chosen or employed if and as the improviser pleases. Commenting on a similar argument, Gunnar Lindgren puts forward an example which he clearly considers regrettable and objectionable. Lindgren recalls how he once reacted when he read about the saxophonist Juhani Aaltonen's response to a question about his musical ambitions.

He said like this, you know: You know, I would like to be an excellent actor, that's what I aim at, who's able to go into any part I like... [...] go into any part whatsoever and do a great job. [...] in relation to these things, Chet Baker, authenticity and the melodious quality, I find it difficult to accept his view.

[Då sade han så här, alltså: Du, jag skulle vilja vara en utmärkt skådespelare, det är det jag syftar till, som kan gå in i vilken roll jag vill... [...] krypa in i vilken roll som helst och göra ett bra jobb. [...] i relation till det här, Chet Baker, autenticitet och det sångbara, då tycker jag att det är svårt att köpa hans synsätt.] (GL14–15)

As I interpret Lindgren's stance, he finds it possible in principle for a jazz improviser to adapt a position such as the one ascribed to Aaltonen: to tell any story. Clearly, however, given his opinion that jazz improvisations ought to express the players' own



emotional experiences in a truthful and direct manner, Lindgren finds this kind of musicianship objectionable.

So far, I have argued that a non-literal, non-narrative interpretation of storytelling would seem reasonable in order to understand the perspectives put forward by several informants. Naturally, such questions of interpretation ought not to be accepted without discussion and problematization. Some of the informants were not prepared to accept non-literal interpretations of the term 'storytelling' unreservedly. For instance, Anders Jormin points out that different meanings of concepts could and should be distinguished. Telling a story, communicating and being personal, he argues, are different concepts and should not be used synonymously.

You can communicate in other ways than with stories. [...] "Personal" can mean easily identifiable. But that is not the same phenomenon as if it is perceived as storytelling.

[Man kan kommunicera på fler sätt än med berättelser. [...] "Personligt" kan ju innebära lätt identifierbart. Men det är ju inte samma fenomen som om det upplevs som berättande, storytelling.] (AJ24–25)

Jormin thinks that the concept of storytelling probably "can catch something essential" ["kan träffa något centralt"]. But he directs attention to the fact that certain jazz musicians – even though they "perhaps not are Cage disciples" ["måhända inte är lärjungar till Cage"] – do not perceive it as an ideal or even as a possibility.

They don't tell anything. It's music, period. Why increase the complexity and imagine that there is something in between the notes? There's a, should we say, rather harsh line among jazz musicians. And then there are others, to whom I myself certainly belong, who have a more poetic, spiritual vision of the music, that there really is something, where you either imagine that you have a vision or a mission, even, maybe, or that something is said, at least, but it's beyond words. Then you could speak of some kind of storytelling, anyway, perhaps.

[De berättar ingenting. Det är musik, punkt slut. Varför öka komplexiteten och inbilla sig att det finns någonting mellan tonerna? Det finns en, låt oss säga, ganska krass riktning bland jazzmusiker. Och så finns det andra, till vilka jag säkert hör själv, som har en mer poetisk, andlig vision kring musiken, och att det visst finns någonting, där man antingen anar att man har en vision eller mission, kanske rentutav, eller att det åtminstone är någonting som sägs, men det är bortom orden. Då kan man ju i alla fall tala om något berättande, kanske.] (AJ9)

Jonas Kullhammar's attitude towards storytelling jazz improvisation comes forward as ambivalent. As I interpret his words, they may be coloured by conflicting (literal versus non-literal) interpretations of the concept of storytelling.

When I play myself, I have never tried that: ah, I will tell a story. I want to improvise in some way. But at the same time I find that, in a way, some tunes I have written actually... are about something. They sort of came about in a certain mood, or because of something or in connection with some event in my life, you know. And in some way that comes back to me when I play the tune.

[När jag själv lilar så har jag aldrig försökt det där: ah, men jag ska berätta en historia. Jag vill improvisera på något sätt. Men samtidigt så har det blivit så, lite, att vissa låtar som jag har gjort faktiskt har en... handlar om någonting. De har liksom tillkommit i en viss sinnesstämning, eller på grund av någonting eller i samband med en händelse i mitt liv, liksom. Och på något sätt så kommer det tillbaka till mig då, när jag lilar låten.] (JK17)

At the outset of this section, I stated that the concept of storytelling was brought up early in most interviews and remained a central topic in them. Interestingly, though, a couple of the informants did not find it particularly relevant as a description of jazz improvisation. I interpret their stance as closely connected to matters of interpretation. Bengt Hallberg, for instance, seemingly tends to understand the term storytelling in a near-to-literal sense. Perhaps as a consequence of this interpretation, he views the description of jazz improvisation as storytelling with some scepticism.

It may be something about storytelling, that you still have a need to express yourself, even if you think that it's mostly about notes and rhythms, not about what you could characterize as events or drama or... Well, it could be a wordless drama, but... what's that?

[Det kanske är någonting med historieberättandet, att man har ett behov att uttrycka sig i alla fall, även om man tycker att det handlar mest om toner och rytmer, och inte om vad man kan karakterisera som händelser eller drama eller... Ja, det skulle vara ett ordlöst drama, men... vad är det?] (BH57)

Sixty years ago, Hallberg as a young piano soloist was mentioned as a "storyteller" in a blindfold test in an American jazz magazine. He recalls that he was very surprised by this designation and has no idea regarding which the qualities were that had given cause for it.

To me the approach was, how should I put it, purely theoretical. If it's an A-flat seventh, then you play those and those... [...] Then there were not as much expressions of emotion at that time, either. Or perhaps they were unconscious.

But it wasn't something that I strove for... [...] Rather, it was to... shape the music according to a logical pattern, a distinct pattern.

[För mig var, vad ska man säga, inställningen helt teoretisk. Är det Ass-sju, då spelar man de och de... [...] Det var inte så mycket känsløytringar på den tiden heller. Eller också var de omedvetna. Men det var inte någonting som jag strävade efter att... [...] Utan det var mer att... forma musik efter ett logiskt mönster, ett tydligt mönster.] (BH13–15)

Hallberg imagines that the term storytelling could possibly serve as "a way to characterize coherence and... that the music leads somewhere. [...] That there's a desire to... how should you put it... to follow the flow of time... in a reasonable way, a musical way." ["ett sätt att karakterisera sammanhang och... att musiken leder någonstans. [...] Att det finns en vilja, att... vad ska man säga... att följa tidsflödet... på ett vettigt sätt, musikaliskt sätt"] (BH1).

Personally, however, he is hesitant about the value of the concept of storytelling as a description of jazz improvisation.

You do not think of stories, but of structures. And contrast. [...] Monotony can be very charming sometimes, but unbearable in the long run. [...] Still, it... hangs together in some strange way. Perhaps that's the art of storytelling. [...] It becomes a question of organizing time.

[Man tänker inte på berättelser, men på strukturer. Och kontraster. [...] Monotoni kan ju vara väldigt charmigt ibland, men outhärdligt i längden. [...] Men ändå att det... på något underligt sätt hänger samman. Det är väl kanske berättarkonsten. [...] Det blir ju att organisera tid.] (BH70–72)

Ulf Johansson Werre shares Hallberg's scepticism.

On a superficial level, you could view the abstract content of a good improvisation as a story, but I don't think you should do that, rather, it's on a standard of its own. [...] In certain solos you can hear: wow! It's revealed... the meaning of being a human being. How could you translate that into words? [...] It would only be ridiculous. [...] Good jazz music [...] brings forward the essence of human life, I think. [...] To reduce that to a story would be to flatten it out. It's no story. You bring to life parts of the human brain that you did not know existed.

[Det abstrakta innehållet i en bra improvisation kan man på ett ytligt plan betrakta som en berättelse, men jag tycker inte man ska göra det, utan det står på en nivå för sig. [...] I vissa solon så kan du höra: oj! Detta, det uppenbaras... meningen med att vara människa. Hur kan du omsätta det i ord? [...] Det blir

bara löjligt. [...] Bra jazzmusik [...] tar fram essensen i mänskligt liv, tycker jag. [...] Det blir platt att ta ner det till en berättelse. Det är ingen berättelse. Du levandegör delar av den mänskliga hjärnan som du inte visste att du hade.] (UJW8)

Johansson Werre further discusses a number of reasons why certain descriptions of the jazz improviser's task may render erroneous conceptions of what it really is about.

I have avoided the word "storytelling" because it's so fashionable. It's used about the same way as the word "predictable". I don't like that word either. "Predictable" is used by people with blunt ears. As soon as they have heard how a phrase ended, or how something sounds when it's finished, they say: "I see. Exactly what you would have expected." Then they write: "It was predictable." But if you would have interrupted the phrase right in the middle of it and asked them: "OK, now sing how he's going to continue this!" – how many do you think would have hit the mark? Not one. On the contrary, it's often a false and untalented rewriting of something that was logical and intelligent, I think. So I avoid it. And with "storytelling", there's the risk that you immediately turn to language and compare with words. And that there must be a comprehensible meaning in that which has been played. I don't think that music really is about that. Music is a world of its own. You can say that you play in a storytelling way, but I don't think that what you have told can be translated into a story of words.

[Jag har undvikit ordet "berätta" därför att det är så modemässigt. Det är ungefär som att använda ordet "företsägbart". Jag gillar inte det ordet heller. "Företsägbart" används av människor med trubbiga öron. När de väl har hört hur en fras har avslutats eller hur någonting låter färdigt, då säger de: "Jaha. Precis vad man hade kunnat förvänta sig." Då skriver de: "Det var företsägbart." Men hade man avbrutit mitt i frasen, och bett dem: "Okej, sjung nu hur han kommer att fortsätta det här!" – hur många tror du hade prickat rätt? Inte en. Utan det är många gånger en falsk och obegåvad omskrivning för att något har varit logiskt och intelligent, tycker jag. Så jag undviker det. Och med "berätta" finns det risk att man direkt ska komma in på språk och jämföra med ord. Och att det ska finnas en förståelig mening i det som har spelats. Jag tycker inte musiken riktigt handlar om det. Musiken är en värld för sig. Du kan säga att du spelar på ett berättande sätt, men vad du har berättat tycker inte jag går att omsätta i en berättelse i ord.] (UJW8)

Since Johansson Werre came forward during the interview as quite sceptical and hesitant regarding the use of the concept of storytelling with reference to jazz improvisation, I chose to bring up questions of interpretation in our conversation. In particular, I was interested in how he perceives the meaning and intent of Lester

Young's question "*But what is your story?*" Johansson Werre clarifies that he does not take this to mean that "it should be possible to write down on paper what I mean" ["att det ska gå att teckna ner på papper och skriva vad jag menar"] – rather, it should be taken metaphorically, as "a way to describe what I mean": "OK, now you have showed that you know a lot, but what adventures do you have in store? Where is your personality?" ["ett sätt att beskriva vad jag menar": "Okej, nu har du visat att du kan mycket, men vad bjuder du på för upplevelse? Var är din personlighet någonstans?"] (UJW11–12) In a sense, then, it would seem that Johansson Werre also adheres to the view that 'story' and 'storytelling', when interpreted in an appropriate non-literal manner, may be relevant descriptions of jazz improvisation.

### 5.1.2. The notion of non-storytelling jazz improvisation

Most informants doubt the existence of a jazz improvisation which aims *not* to tell or communicate anything. "I hope it's not like that" ["Jag hoppas att det inte är så"], says Jonas Kullhammar (JK39–40). Amanda Sedgwick expresses her discomfort with such an aim: "There is a whole lot of music that doesn't tell a thing, but it's so boring to listen to it. Why should you strive for that? That's awful." ["Det finns ju jättemycket musik som inte berättar någonting, men det är ju jättetråkigt att lyssna på. Varför ska man sträva efter det? Det är ju hemskt"] (AS42).

Roland Keijser finds storytelling in jazz improvisation "rather compulsory" ["tämligen obligatoriskt"] and goes as far as to question the possibility of its non-existence.

In a broad sense, you put yourself in some kind of storytelling situation. In fact. Like a role. [...] Whether you dedicate your music to God, or if you stand there playing bebop, then it's a tribute to Charlie Parker, who's a kind of God, or whether you stand there playing in order to find yourself, or if you want to be famous, no matter how far you wish to shrink the project, so to speak – it's still a sort of story. Then you tell about that even if it may often be unconsciously or completely unintentionally.

[I en vid mening så är väl det att man försätter sig i någon slags berättande situation. Egentligen. En roll, liksom. [...] Antingen man nu tillägnar sin musik Gud, eller om man står och spelar bebop, så är det en hyllning till Charlie Parker, som är en sorts Gud, eller om man står och spelar för att hitta sig själv, eller man vill bli känd, eller hur långt man nu vill krympa hela projektet, liksom – så är det ju en sorts berättelse. Då berättar man ju om det, visserligen oftast måhända omedvetet eller helt oavsiktligt.] (RK14; revised by RK in the ensuing email correspondence)

As I interpret these remarks, Keijser makes an interesting and convincing point. Even if we assume that jazz improvisations will, as a rule, tell stories, it does not necessarily follow that this is always the consequence of the improviser's conscious intentions. Amanda Sedgwick does not think that telling stories is a natural aim for jazz improvisers. Rather, in her opinion, it is the natural effect

of having something to say. The natural aim is to play. You have a natural impulse and a passion for doing what you do, whatever you are doing, in this case playing music. It is not as if you think: now I am going to tell this story. [...] I think the whole thing, going in with an intention to do something special, is going to fail. For if this passion to play isn't enough in itself... it's going to be rather shallow. That's my opinion. [...] And to have a good thing together. It makes good stories, but it isn't something that you sit down and plan.

[av att man har någonting att säga. Den naturliga strävan är att man vill spela. Man har en naturlig impuls och passion att göra det man gör, vad det nu är man håller på med, i det här fallet att spela musik. Det är ju inte så att man tänker: nu ska jag berätta den här historien. [...] Jag tror att hela den grejen att gå in med en intention att göra något speciellt kommer att misslyckas. För om inte den här passionen att spela är sig själv nog... det blir ganska ytligt. Det är min åsikt. [...] Och ha en bra grej ihop. Det blir bra berättelser av det, men det är ingenting som man sitter och tänker ut.] (AS44,47–48)

I view Sedgwick's observations as both elucidative and thought-provoking. According to this perspective on storytelling in jazz improvisation, intention and consequence are not entirely compatible. If the music does come forward as 'telling a story', it is rather the very intention (of a player "that has something to say") *to play* that has mattered in bringing about this – but not, according to these informants, any actual intention to tell a story.

This line of thought seems to fit well with the notion of narrativization on the part of the music listener. Several informants touch upon this view. For instance, Peter Asplund points to the importance of paying regard to listeners' response.

The improvisation will make some person think of something and feel something all the time. [...] It comes from images and feelings that you have yourself when you are telling a story. [...] I definitely think that you draw power from your own experiences, and perhaps, unfortunately, also from the Hollywood movies... [...] So I find it very hard to think that you could play something that did not immediately turn into images.

[Improvisationen får ju hela tiden någon människa att tänka på något och känna något. [...] Det kommer ju inifrån bilder och känslor som man har själv

när man ska berätta en historia. [...] Jag tror definitivt att man hämtar kraft ifrån sina erfarenheter, och kanske, tyvärr, också Hollywoodfilmerna... [...] Så jag har jättesvårt att tänka att man skulle kunna spela någonting utan att det blir direkt bilder.] (PA16)

Joakim Milder calls a deliberately non-storytelling improvisation an "interesting aim" ["intressant strävan"]. However, he does not consider it a real possibility,

because whatever we do, we will tell something. [...] I do not view it as possible not to be personal. [...] So far I've never heard music that hasn't told something. [...] It's often meaningful to aim for the opposite of what we want to achieve, in order to catch sight of it. [...] To tell stories – it's sort of beyond our control. We don't have to worry that it won't tell anything.

[därför att vad vi än gör så kommer vi att berätta någonting. [...] Jag ser det inte som möjligt att inte vara personlig. [...] Jag har hittills aldrig hört musik som inte har berättat någonting. [...] Ofta är det meningsfullt att sträva efter motsatsen till det vi vill uppnå, för att få syn på det. [...] Att berätta – det är bortom vår kontroll, liksom. Vi behöver inte vara oroliga för att den inte ska berätta.] (JM30–32)

Lars Jansson, on the other hand, speculates that "it's quite possible that there's music which doesn't tell anything, which would be exciting to hear" ["det är mycket möjligt att det skulle finnas musik som inte är berättande, som skulle vara spännande att höra"]. He points to the composer John Cage's attempts to "not include, as far as he could, himself in the music, not include his ego in the music" ["så långt han kunde att inte ha med sig själv i musiken, inte ha med sitt jag i musiken"] (LJ25–26). Anders Jormin suggests that the music of the guitarist Mike Stern, for instance, "could be perceived as virtuosity, achievement, a technical, mechanical approach to music. [...] It might perhaps not carry any spiritual or poetic value, it's a sort of... functional music, music for musicians, what do I know." ["kan upplevas som virtuositet, prestationer, teknisk, hantverksmässig inställning till musiken. [...] Den bär måhända inte på något andligt eller poetiskt värde, den är ett slags... funktionsmusik, musik för musiker, vad vet jag"] (AJ10).

Other informants seem to accept, at least in principle, the notion of non-storytelling jazz improvisation, though they view it neither as commendable nor as the result of conscious efforts; rather, they consider it a kind of misfire. Gunnar Lindgren emphasizes that non-storytelling, even though it may not be the effect of conscious efforts, might ensue from *lack of authenticity*. Lindgren refers to his distinction (mentioned in the previous section) between authentic and non-authentic storytelling in jazz improvisation.

Then we have people like Wynton Marsalis who tell stories they have learnt, you know. [...] The admiration for a good solo also includes technical elegance [...] a soloist who tells GP stories can do it with a damn technical refinement, you know. And get huge applause.

[Sedan har vi sådana här som Wynton Marsalis, som berättar historier som de har lärt sig, vet du. [...] I beundran för ett bra solo finns det också en teknisk elegans, så att [...] en solist som berättar GP-historier, han kan göra det med en djävla teknisk finess, alltså. Och få jätteapplåder.] (GL11)

Lennart Åberg expresses a similar perspective, perceiving lack of authenticity as attempts in the improviser to *illustrate* or *imitate* true expression.

It could also be that... When you play something because you've had an experience of it, but you don't convey that experience, but you imitate an expression. [...] You illustrate an expression, rather than expressing something yourself. As a listener, you have the ability to hear the difference between an authentic expression and something that somebody has adopted.

[Det kan också vara så... När man spelar någonting för att man har haft en upplevelse av det, men man förmedlar inte den upplevelsen, utan man imiterar ett uttrycksätt. [...] Man illustrerar ett uttryck, i stället för att uttrycka någonting själv. Man har ju som lyssnare en förmåga att höra skillnad på ett äkta uttryck och något som någon har lagt sig till med.] (LÅ8–9)

In sum, the interviews indicate that it is a common view among improvisers that most jazz improvisations will communicate something to its listeners, regardless of the players' *intentions*. An actual intention to communicate through the music, however, might not always be necessary or even relevant in order to bring about this effect. In the opinion of some, music's communicative power may depend to an important extent on improvisational *authenticity*.

### 5.1.3. Music and language; the unspeakable

In the bulk of everyday conceptualizations about storytelling, the notion of language is probably very few steps away; the same holds for most theories on music and narrativity (as is amply demonstrated in section 3.1). Naturally, I was interested to find out the informants' perspectives on issues regarding the relations between jazz improvisation and language.

Some informants touch upon the connection between music and language on a more general level. Nisse Sandström says: "When I hear Max Roach or any of these great drummers play a drum solo, an extended solo, I often think that this sounds like



an African language." ["När jag hör Max Roach eller någon av de här bra trumslagarna spela trumsolo, ett längre solo, så tänker jag ofta att det här låter som ett afrikanskt språk"] (NS23). Elise Einarsdotter employs the language metaphor when she speaks of different styles or traditions within the jazz genre.

It's very interesting how you perceive and understand the codes. What language is it in this group, which dialect? [...] You can play the same tune with people influenced by bebop or by the ECM sound. It is cool, actually. Then of course you're more at ease in certain situations than in others.

[Det är jätteintressant hur man uppfattar och förstår koderna. Vilket språk är det i den här gruppen, vilken dialekt är det? [...] Samma låt kan man ju spela med folk som är präglade av bebop eller av ECM-sound. Det är häftigt, faktiskt. Sedan är man ju mer bekväm i vissa situationer än andra, naturligtvis.] (EE6)

Roland Keijser directs attention to the fact that parallels between language and music can be perceived on several levels.

Language consists of elements on different levels. There are sounds, of course. And there are words, and whole idiomatic expressions, phrases. There is sentence structure, there is period and comma and whatever you like, pause and so forth. And then there are dialects and all kinds of languages in the world. All that could be understood as verbal language, spoken as well as written, has some kind of parallel in the world of music. In the so called jazz improvisation... today it's a sort of special situation where you often take the liberty of mixing small meaningful formulae from widely differing language dialects, as it were – because so much is available that you may be inspired by.

[Språk består ju av byggstenar på olika nivåer. Det är ju också ljud. Och det är ord, och det är hela idiomatiska uttryck, fraser. Det är meningsbyggnad, det är punkt och komma och allt vad du vill, paus och så vidare. Och så finns det ju dialekter och alla möjliga språk i hela världen. Allt det där som man kan förstå som verbalt språk, såväl muntligt som skriftligt, det har ju någon sorts parallell i musikens värld. I så kallad jazzimprovisation... idag är det ju en lite speciell situation där man kanske ofta tar sig friheter att blanda små betydelsebärande formler från vitt skilda språkdialekter, så att säga – i och med att man har så mycket tillgängligt att låta sig inspireras av.] (RK3)

Interestingly, several informants emphasize the *bluntness* of language which, in their opinion, makes music a richer, more sophisticated, and much more complex means of expression. On a general level, this phenomenon points to the boundaries of verbalization.

A number of informants discuss *differences regarding expressive potential* between music and language. Peter Asplund finds language blunt and poor in nuances: for instance, he argues, there is perhaps no expression in the Swedish language for an intermediate position between "älska" (love) and "tycka om" (like).

Between these stations we have nothing. We have to embroider things enormously to achieve something somewhere in between "älska" and "tycka om" – whereas music doesn't have those stations at all, you don't have any joints at all, which enables music to always say exactly which feeling it is, and produce it. It's emotionally boundless, and at the same time exactly the feeling you want to evoke, with nuances and everything. [...] there are no joints, no stations, too hard or too soft words.

[Mellan de här stationerna så har vi ingenting. Vi måste lägga ut texten enormt mycket för att det ska bli någonting någonstans emellan "älska" och "tycka om" – medan musiken inte har de där stationerna alls, utan man är ju helt fri från skarvar, vilket gör att musiken hela tiden på pricken kan säga exakt vilken känsla det är, och framkalla den. Det är känslomässigt gränslöst, och samtidigt på pricken exakt vilken känsla man vill ha fram, med nyans och allting. [...] det inte finns några skarvar, inte några stationer, för hårda eller för mjuka ord.] (PA3)

Joakim Milder expresses a similar view, pointing out that there is a strange paradox between the musicians' possibility to be exact and their inability to understand what they play.

The fact that the words are missing, the signifying element, means that we can be much more specific through our instruments. I often think of language usage or words as endless compromises. Words with the aim of defining something become a rough simplification. I think that only in very exceptional cases do you feel that you succeed in saying exactly that which needed to be said. [...] I believe that in playing you have the possibility, since the signifying element isn't there, the possibility to much more precise, [...] Spoken language has universal meanings. It's in order for us to understand each other. We use these simplifications. But there is no correspondence in the playing. That is why we are not even capable of understanding ourselves what it is we are playing, or what we express, or even what we wish to express. But, as any player can testify, you have a satisfactory feeling of emptiness when you have played that which needed to be played. Something has been formulated.

[Det faktum att orden saknas, det betydelsebärande elementet, innebär att vi via våra instrument kan bli mycket mer specifika. Jag kan uppleva språkbruket eller orden som, egentligen, kompromisser hela tiden. Ord i syfte att definiera

någoting blir en grov förenkling. Jag tror att det är bara väldigt undantagsvis som man känner att man lyckas säga precis det som behövde bli sagt. [...] där tror jag att man i spelet har möjligheten, i och med att det betydelsebärande saknas, så har vi möjligheten att bli mycket mer exakta. [...] Det talade språket har universella betydelser. Det är för att vi ska förstå varann. Vi använder de här förenklingarna. Men det finns ju ingen motsvarighet i spelet. Därför är vi inte ens själva kapabla att förstå vad det är vi spelar, eller vad det är vi uttrycker, eller ens vad det är vi önskar uttrycka. Men som alla som spelar ju kan vittna om, så har man ändå en tillfredsställande känsla av tomhet när man har spelat det som behövde spelas. Någoting har formulerats.] (JM2)

Several informants express their opinion that language can seem blunt with regard to possibilities to speak about their activity as improvisers. Lena Willemark shares this view, but she adds that "it may be great to leave some expressions a bit open; maybe it isn't always so good to have concrete meanings" ["vissa uttryck kanske är lite härligt att lämna öppet; kanske inte det är så bra alltid att ha konkreta betydelser"]. The fact that language can seem insufficient when we seek the essence of musical experiences is connected to the fact that these include bodily experiences to a high degree.

If it's right within me, then it is as though I fill up... that I'm present in the whole body. [...] And then I experience that the canals are open, so to speak... [laughs] to whatever we call it. [...] I can't explain, I don't think anyone can. How can you explain a love?

[Om det stämmer i mig, så är det just att jag fyller... att jag är med i hela kroppen. [...] Och då upplever jag att kanalerna är liksom öppna... [skrattar] till vad vi än kallar det. [...] Jag kan inte förklara, det tror jag ingen djäkel kan förklara. Hur kan du förklara en kärlek?] (LW4-5) (LW4-6,18,23)

Elise Einarsdotter agrees with the view that there are boundaries for the speakable.

You can talk about certain things, certain things can be communicated, but then some secrets ought to remain secrets. In all music, but especially in improvisation, there is such an incredible lot of unconscious contact.

[Att vissa saker går att berätta om, vissa saker går att överföra, men sedan är det vissa hemligheter som bör förbli hemligheter. I musik överhuvud taget, men speciellt i improvisationen, är det så otroligt mycket undermedveten kontakt.] (EE2)

Einarsdotter also remarks that some boundaries for the speakable may have to do with norms and conventions. For instance, she maintains, it has not always been common for jazz musicians to discuss these kinds of questions openly.

This is very exciting to talk about. [...] It was a little forbidden before.

[Det här är väldigt spännande att prata om. [...] Innan var det ju lite förbjudet.] (EE37–38)

In brief, there seems to be agreement among the informants that music is viewed as having greater expressive potential than language and that, consequently, not everything in music is considered possible to verbalize. In the opinion of jazz improvisers, a 'story' told in jazz improvisation would not be entirely translatable into language.

#### 5.1.4. Qualities pertaining to storytelling

In the replies to the introductory question in the interviews ("What makes a good jazz improvisation good?"), qualities pertaining directly or indirectly to storytelling are notably predominant. This section briefly presents a number of these replies thematized in a number of subsections. The next few sections enter more deeply into some of the predominant themes.

##### *IMPROVISATORY CHARACTER; RISK, RESISTANCE, NON-PERFECTION*

Many informants express the view that an improvisation has – and must have – an improvisatory character; they provide complementary perspectives on what this may imply. Jonas Kullhammar emphasizes the fact that the music *is improvised*: that the musicians challenge themselves, "take chances and risks in their playing. [...] Resistance, and the relation to resistance, that is what I find the most interesting." ["chansar och tar risker i sitt spel. [...] Motstånd, och förhållandet till motstånd, det är det som jag tycker är mest intressant"] (JK1).

*The aim not to repeat oneself* is mentioned by several informants. However, Nisse Sandström adds: "you really shouldn't be so afraid of that, because you can't be so unique that you don't repeat yourself." ["det ska man egentligen inte vara så rädd för, för så unik kan man inte vara, så att man inte upprepar sig"] (NS24). Kullhammar explains this aim: "I want to go on, I want to become better." ["jag vill ju komma vidare, jag vill ju bli bättre"] (JK3).

When music displays little or no resistance, it may be the result of the musician's strive for perfection, says Kullhammar. However, in his opinion, perfectionism does not agree with the idea of improvisation, "because it *won't* be perfect. [...] There are many modern superstars on the saxophone, for instance, who don't affect me, because it is too smooth, in a way. It's too easy. They can play anything, you know, without any resistance. And it doesn't touch me." ["därför att det *blir* inte perfekt. [...] Det är många moderna superstjärnor på saxofon, till exempel, som inte berör mig, därför att

det är för obehindrat på något sätt. Det går för lätt. De kan spela vad som helst, liksom, utan något motstånd. Och det berör inte mig"] (JK15). Sandström agrees:

The funny thing is that it doesn't have to be perfect. [...] Hank Mobley plays with a human touch. That is, he isn't overly technical. He plays a bit stumblingly and a little sloppily, but [...] it's filled with human warmth. [...] Some of my favourite records, which you can't outdo, are live recordings, where it also happens that the musicians misunderstand each other. [...] I'm drawn into something that I can't resist, where everything that happens is exciting.

[Det lustiga är att det inte behöver vara perfekt. [...] Hank Mobley spelar mänskligt. Han är alltså inte överteknisk. Han spelar lite snubblande och lite slarvigt, men [...] det är fyllt av mänsklig värme. [...] Vissa av mina favoritskivor, som är oslagbara, är liveinspelningar, där det också händer att man missförstår varandra. [...] Jag sugts in i någonting som jag inte kan stå emot, där allting som sker är spännande.] (NS2-6)

In brief, as I interpret these statements, a significant aspect of jazz improvisation may be that the lack of perfection that is arguably a condition of much improvisatory activity is outweighed by some other quality, such as coming forward as a human being with discernible human qualities (such as, for instance, courage or warmth).

#### *SEPARATE ELEMENTS CONCUR TO AN EXPRESSION*

As noted above (5.1.1), a number of informants seem to advocate an interpretation of storytelling in jazz improvisation as the direct and truthful expression of the players' own emotional experiences. Needless to say, the ways musicians may go about this will call for further investigation and problematization. The subject is touched upon by several informants. Elise Einarsdotter quotes approvingly the concise response of the trumpeter Rolf Ericson when he was asked about his thoughts during solo playing: "*intonation – timing – dynamics*" (EE10). However, the urge to analyse the storytelling aspect of jazz improvisation through a number of separate but concurrent elements may be problematic in itself; a holistic perspective seems to stand out as more appropriate to some of the informants. For instance, Joakim Milder points out that separate elements (such as phrasing, gestures, ornamentation) ought not to be viewed as isolated qualities; an improvisation is successful "when the whole performance corresponds with that which is to be said, and then it is about all parameters. It is dynamics and density... Simply when you have found the optimum way of saying something." ["när hela utförandet korresponderar med vad som ska sägas, och då är det ju alla parametrar. Det är dynamik och densitet... Helt enkelt när man har hittat det optimala sättet att säga någonting"] (JM20).

Ann-Sofi Söderqvist points to the difference between "playing show trumpet" ["spela uppvisningstrumpet"] and "trying to express something" ["försöka uttrycka

någoting"): "For all soloists I like I think there is something... it's something urgent. You want to express something very strongly." ["För alla solister jag tycker om tycker jag att det finns något... det är något angeläget. Man vill uttrycka någonting väldigt starkt"] (ASS11,16). Lena Willemark offers several alternative formulations: "the nerve I can feel there is, [...] that it is a matter of life and death, [...] that it comes from deep within. A need to express." ["den nerv jag kan känna att det finns, [...] att det är på liv och död, [...] att det kommer djupt inifrån. Ett behov av att uttrycka"] (LW1).

These statements point, I believe, to the need felt by some informants to focus not on some set of separate elements that together would make up a successful and meaningful jazz improvisation, but rather to try to attain an adequate understanding of it through some appropriate corresponding holistic expression (such as perhaps, for instance, 'urgency', 'nerve', or 'need').

### *A PERSONAL VOICE*

As noted early on in this investigation (2.2.2), the notion of a personal improvisational 'voice' may be as old as jazz itself. Several informants express their views on this topic. When Joakim Milder listens to a jazz improvisation, an essential part of the experience is

hearing a voice that tells something. [...] It's a real-time telling, fabulation, which in many ways isn't far from conversation. That is, most conversations are improvised. And really, to me, it is the same qualities that captivate me in a musical improvisation as in hearing a good rhetorician speak. I look for voices, really, to a great extent. So that is what is captivating. [...] That has much less to do with *how* you express yourself [...] – this is a voice and a storytelling that I want to hear.

[att höra en röst berätta någonting. [...] Det är ett realtidsberättande, fabulerande, som på många sätt inte är särskilt långt ifrån samtalet. Alltså, de allra flesta samtal är ju improviserade. Och egentligen, för mig, är det samma kvaliteter som fånglar mig i en musikalisk improvisation som att höra en god retoriker tala. Jag letar efter röster, verkligen, i väldigt hög grad. Så det är det som fånglar. [...] Det där har mycket mindre att göra med *hur* man uttrycker sig [...] – utan det här är en röst och ett berättande som jag vill höra.] (JM1,6)

In Lennart Åberg's opinion, it is mainly the very great jazz soloists (such as, for instance, Miles Davis, Sonny Rollins, and John Coltrane) that can be perceived as having a personal voice "that nobody else has, and that is so strong, and has such specific contents" ["som ingen annan har, och som är så stark, och har sådant specifikt innehåll"] capable of leading the listener's thoughts to a storyteller. Hearing Miles Davis, Åberg may perhaps not experience "that he tells any story, but he creates

moods and expressions that are general in a way. A feeling of life or something like that." ["kanske inte att han berättar någonting, men han skapar ju stämningar, och uttryck, som är liksom generella. En livskänsla eller någonting."] Less important jazz improvisers do not reach this level, according to Åberg: "it won't be about those aspects." ["det blir ju inte de aspekterna"] (LÅ1).

As I interpret these remarks by Åberg, one perspective on storytelling in jazz improvisation may be that the 'story' resides, to an important extent, *in the instrumental 'voice'* of the improviser.

### EXPRESSION, STORY

As mentioned previously (5.1.3), several informants view music as having greater expressive potential than language. Hence, 'stories' told in music may differ in significant respects from those told in language. Joakim Milder points out that a musical expression should not be confused with a specific meaning.

It is as if we had those expectations of music, too, that there is something there to understand. [...] Actually, we play *instead of*, it is that simple. [...] There is a need, when music becomes a necessary way of communicating, [...] It is simply a degree of urgency. This needed to be expressed.

Det är som att vi har de förväntningarna även på musik, att det finns någonting där att förstå. [...] Det är ju egentligen så pass enkelt som att vi spelar *i stället för*. [...] Det kommer ett behov, när musik blir ett nödvändigt sätt att kommunicera, [...] Det är en angelägenhetsgrad, helt enkelt. Det här behövde uttryckas. (JM 3–5, 19)

Hence, Milder maintains, music does not carry a truth value that is testable for the listener:

Only the sender knows the purpose and can judge if this was in accordance. [...] That is a job that all musicians have to do, and that I feel is the truly essential thing in the art of improvising. To be able to capture music, and that it comes out as unadulterated as possible.

[Det är bara avsändaren som känner till avsikten. Som kan göra det här avgörandet, om det här överensstämde. [...] Det där är ett jobb som alla musiker måste göra, och som jag upplever är det helt centrala i konsten att improvisera. Att lyckas fånga musik, och att den kommer ut så oförvanskad som möjligt.] (JM22)

Nevertheless, even though there are limits to what can be verbalized, the listener can perceive different qualities in a jazz improvisation. Though Ann-Sofi Söderqvist emphasizes the difficulties to say something in general terms about them, she offers a

few examples of this kind of experiences: the listener is *affected* ("berörd"), s/he senses that the improviser is in touch with his/her *inner flow* and that the improvisation is going on *just now*.

What touches me I experience as good. [...] to reach out from the stage. [...] When I feel that someone has contact with her inner flow, when I feel that this person is playing from the inside out, so to speak... what that is, of course, is extremely subjective. [...] it's a bit more uninteresting to hear, if I can hear very clearly which exercises someone has been practising, or which phrases they have been practising. [...] But when you have the feeling that it is happening in the moment [...] a note that contains a lot can be of great value in itself. And if they have good timing, a driving rhythm, that's also of great value.

[Det som jag blir berörd av upplever jag som bra. [...] att nå över scenkanten. [...] När jag upplever att någon har kontakt med sitt inre flöde, att jag upplever att den här personen spelar inifrån och ut, så att säga... vad det är, är naturligtvis extremt subjektivt. [...] det är lite mera ointressant att höra, om jag kan höra väldigt tydligt vilka övningar någon har övat på, eller vilka fraser de har övat på. [...] Men när man har mera känslan av att det ändå händer i ögonblicket [...] en ton som innehåller mycket kan ju vara i sig ett stort värde. Sedan om de har bra tajming, drivande rytmik, det är också ett stort värde.] (ASS1)

Lars Jansson emphasizes the experience of solo *content*. Even though it may be impossible to verbalize this content, given the view that music's expressive potential exceeds that of language, the first word he uses in order to describe it is 'story':

You have to tell a story when you play a solo. It's an abstract thing. You don't tell it in words, you tell it in notes when you tell it in a solo, an improvisation. But clearly, if a musician only plays with masterly skill but with no soul or content, the listener will often get tired. You want to be touched by the one you hear playing. And that goes for all great musicians such as Billie Holiday and Coltrane and Miles and Bill Evans, that is, they mirror their own life in their playing, their music. And that is what touches us. So content is extremely important.

[Du måste berätta en historia när du spelar solo. Det är ju en abstrakt sak. Man berättar inte i ord, man berättar i toner när man berättar i ett solo, en improvisation. Men det är helt klart att om en musiker bara spelar virtuost skickligt men utan själ och utan innehåll, så tröttnar lyssnaren ofta. Man vill bli tagen av den man hör spela. Och det gäller alla stora musiker som Billie Holiday och Coltrane och Miles och Bill Evans, alltså, de speglar sitt eget liv i



sitt spel, sin musik. Och det är det som berör oss. Så att innehåll är fruktansvärt viktigt.] (LJ1)

Peter Asplund compares the jazz improviser's task to that of telling a bedtime story:

A good improvisation is about the same thing as a good, captivating story when you sit at a child's bedside at night, who wants you to read or make up a story before she goes to sleep, you know. It should contain... it should start from the beginning and be exciting, have a plot, and then a lot of exciting things should happen and there should be some sort of unravelling... Ask questions, too, that make the child interrupt you from time to time and say: but what was that, and that person? And all that is made up in the moment. You want the audience to be like this little child who is captivated by this story.

[En bra improvisation är väl ungefär som en bra, fångslande historia när man sätter sig på sängkanten hos ett barn på kvällen, som vill att man ska läsa eller hitta på en historia innan den somnar, liksom. Det ska innehålla... det ska starta upp från början och vara spännande, ha en intrig, och sedan ska det hända en massa spännande saker och komma någon slags upplösning... Ställa frågor också, som gör att barnet avbryter en emellanåt och säger: men vad var det då, och den där personen? Och allt det där hittas ju på i stunden. Man vill ju att publiken ska vara som det här lilla barnet, som blir fångslat av den här berättelsen.] (PA1)

It is the storytelling that makes the jazz improvisation stand out, in Asplund's opinion: "I buy a record with Miles Davis because he tells good stories. [...] all the great jazz musicians are good storytellers." ["Jag går och köper en platta med Miles Davis därför att han berättar bra historier. [...] alla de stora jazzmusikerna är ju bra berättare"] (PA7,11). The *jam sessions* and *cutting contests* of the Swing Era, he maintains, were not a matter of playing loud and strong, but

who reached the audience emotionally? It wasn't about straining your muscles on stage, it was about other things. To tell a story that was so incredibly captivating and great and emotionally varied so there was nothing to add afterwards. I think I have experienced that now and then. Live, and above all on record with the great old masters. Storytelling on a high level.

[vem nådde fram till publiken mest känslomässigt? Det handlade inte om att spänna musklerna på en scen, utan det handlade om andra saker. Att berätta en historia som var så makalöst fångslande och bra och känslomässigt varierande så att det fanns ingenting att säga efter det. Det tycker jag att man har varit med om ibland. Live, och framför allt på platta med de stora gamla mästarna. Storytelling på hög nivå.] (PA11)

This way of interpreting storytelling in jazz improvisation, as I take it, distinguishes between different manners of improvising in a way that is similar to Ann-Sofi Söderqvist's distinction, mentioned previously, between "playing show trumpet" and "trying to express something". In some of the interviews, interesting aspects of the latter approach are put forward. Several qualities in a soloist are considered to be of relevance for such storytelling. Peter Asplund especially mentions knowledge of the *vocabulary* of jazz language and a sense of musical dramaturgy (PA1). Gunnar Lindgren emphasizes *ornamentation*: a jazz improvisation, as well as a verbal story, can be monotonous and boring if it lacks "life in the ornamentations" ["liv i ornamenten"] (GL1).

Anders Jormin views the successful improvisation as a question of *coming close to one's own inner voice*.

If I for instance am playing on my own... I hear some form of music, a structure and a possible development of a musical course of events within me. [...] And I'm happy afterwards if I managed to capture that vision or that music that dashes past or arises out of the moment, if I manage to capture it and manage to translate it to my instrument, in this case to the double bass. And it takes preparation and craftsmanship on a masterly level. It also takes a mental and spiritual state of concentration and openness at the same time. [...] It doesn't have so much to do with sounds as with my coming really close to my inner voice.

[Om jag till exempel står och spelar själv... så hör jag någon form av musik, en struktur och en möjlig utveckling av ett musikaliskt skeende inom mig. [...] Och nöjd efteråt är jag om jag lyckas fånga den visionen eller den musiken som svिसchar förbi eller uppstår ur ögonblicket, om jag lyckas fånga den och lyckas översätta den till mitt instrument, i detta fallet då till kontrabasen. Och det kräver förberedelser och ett hantverk på en virtuos nivå. Det kräver också ett mentalt och andligt tillstånd av koncentration och öppenhet på samma gång. [...] Det har inte så mycket med det klingande att göra som att jag kommer riktigt nära min inre röst.] (AJ2)

Again, a number of quotations indicate that 'storytelling', interpreted as the communication of an inner vision or an emotional content, is considered by the informants to be an apt description of important aspects of jazz improvisation.

## SIMPLICITY, PRESENCE, FREE CREATION OF COHERENCE

Lars Jansson points out that good jazz improvisations are often *simple*.

If you transcribe a good solo, a good soloist, you can be surprised that it is so logical and inside, that it is so simple. It can be completely diatonic, no chromaticism, sort of. Nothing strange, difficult, substitutions or... dodecaphonic series or anything – just very simple. But WOW, you just get *carried away*. [...] Then it is the sound and the presence... and something larger.

[Om man transkriberar något bra solo, någon bra solist, då kan man bli förvånad att det är så logiskt och inside, att det är så enkelt. Det kan vara helt diatoniskt, ingen kromatik, och så. Inget märkligt, svårt, substituerat eller... tolvtonsserier eller vad som helst – utan jätteenkelt. Men WOW, du bara blir *carried away*. [...] Då är det klangen och närvaron och... någonting som är större.] (LJ21–22)

Obviously, many replies to questions about music that include some variant of the question "What is good?" will depend heavily on the respondent's aesthetic proclivities. Throughout the interviews, I had to bear in mind that the informants' perspectives on storytelling in jazz improvisation would necessarily be tinged with matters of taste – which, on the other hand, would by no means make them any less interesting or valuable. Bengt Hallberg considers it important that the listeners are familiar with the piece of music that is the point of departure for the improvisation, if they are to perceive it clearly and "be able to judge it correctly" ["kunna bedöma den riktigt"]: "Naturally, you can conceive of a totally free improvisation, but then you rather address a specialized audience or... no audience at all" ["Det är klart, visst kan man tänka sig ett helt fritt improviserande, men då vänder man sig nästan till en specialiserad publik eller... ingen publik alls"] (BH2,8). In Hallberg's opinion, good jazz improvisation is *the creation of coherence* ("sammanhang") *in improvised variations over a well-known material*: "that it is coherent, that there is a... what do you say, narrative thought behind it. But it is difficult to express in words what that might be." ["att det är sammanhängande, att det finns någon... som de säger, berättartanke bakom. Fast det är svårt att uttrycka det med ord vad det skulle kunna vara"] (BH16).

Ulf Johansson Werre maintains that the soloist ought to be able to *raise above the form of the musical material and create freely*: "A jazz improvisation is actually simultaneous composition. That is, you should rise above the skeleton of chords and scales." ["En jazzimprovisation är ju egentligen ett simultant komponerande. Det vill säga att man ska lyfta sig ovanför skelettet av ackord och skalor"]. In Johansson Werre's opinion, this is mainly a question of creating "a good rhythmical phrase; rhythm has a meaning of its own" ["en bra rytmisk fras; rytmik har en egen mening"]. Moving easily on a level above the form of the musical material is also a question of courage:

to dare to take hold of the course of events by playing things that you don't really know beforehand. [...] Then you have a split second to choose your direction, and then you try to create something that sounds like a completed composition out of an embryo of a musical idea. [...] To an intelligent listener you communicate the feeling of joy of creating in the present, when that quality seems to be there. [...] As long as you think you can hear that the performer is thinking about where he is and is relating to the vertical in the music, there is still something missing. All that must be there intuitively. [...] The more free you are above this material, the greater the listener's experience. [...] this is something of the most fantastic you can do as a human being. It is great and divine, in a way. To me it is really about being free. [...] Freedom is to have a musical form to work with, and to reach far enough to be able to turn it inside out, intuitively. [...] The inner song, that I believe is the be-all and end-all to me. What you hear within you, that you will play well. [...] A really great improviser has a rich and very nuanced inner musical life. That is, every second you hear a lot of possibilities within you. [...] You have an inner logical hearing that you only have to manage to find on the instrument.

[att våga ta tag i skeendet genom att spela sådant som man förhand inte riktigt vet. [...] Så har man en bråkdel av en sekund på sig att bestämma riktning, och sedan försöker man skapa någonting som låter som en färdig komposition utifrån ett embryo av musikalisk idé. [...] För en intelligent lyssnare förmedlar man känslan av lusten att skapa i nuet, då den kvaliteten också finns närvarande. [...] Så länge man tycker sig kunna höra på utövaren att han tänker på var han är och han förhåller sig till det vertikala i musiken, så är det ändå något som saknas. Allt det där måste finnas intuitivt. [...] Ju friare man är ovanpå det här materialet, desto större upplevelse får lyssnaren. [...] detta är något av det mest fantastiska man kan syssla med som människa. Det är stort och gudomligt, på något sätt. För mig är det verkligen att vara fri. [...] Frihet är att ha en musikalisk form att jobba med, och att komma så långt att man kan vända ut och in på den intuitivt. [...] Den inre sången, det tycker jag är A och O för mig. Det du hör inom dig, det kommer du att spela bra. [...] En riktigt stor improvisatör har ett rikt och väldigt mångfasetterat inre musikaliskt liv. Alltså, man hör inom sig själv en massa möjligheter i varje sekund. [...] Du har ett inre logiskt hörande som det bara är att leta fram på instrumentet.] (UJW1,2)

My conjecture is that Johansson Werre's description of commendable qualities in the jazz improviser, though perhaps based on a particular aesthetic outlook, would meet with agreement from several jazz musicians, regardless of their stylistic inclinations.

Throughout this introductory section of the presentation of interview results, I have attempted to arrange quotations in a way that would make clear a number of perspectives that I regard as important, and to present them in the best possible

sequence, in order to clarify similarities and differences between conceptualizations, opinions, and perspectives. Needless to say, several other ways of selecting and presenting the material would have been possible. The present version, as described in section 4.3, is the result of a complex – interpretive and intuitive – reflective process. Similar strategies of presentation will be applied in the following sections. At the risk of oversimplification, I will try to sum up briefly a few of the issues that have been highlighted in the present section.

'Storytelling' in jazz improvisation is not necessarily interpreted by the informants as a narrative structure. (When, occasionally, the term is understood in a near-to-literal sense by an interviewee, this may raise his or her doubts about its applicability to the field of jazz improvisation.) Rather, it is interpreted in a non-literal, non-narrative manner as a statement, for instance, as an expression of the player's own emotional experience.

In the view of several informants, such an expression ought to be put forward in a direct and truthful way. The concept of authenticity is considered crucial. At the same time, storytelling in jazz improvisation is also interpreted as a contextually situated activity where not only the soloist is of importance but the fellow musicians and the audience as well.

A number of aspects are mentioned in the interviews where musical 'stories' clearly are seen as different from linguistic ones. Among other things, it is pointed out that even though listeners may conceive of an improvisation as a 'story', it does not follow that the improviser has actually intended to tell one. Since improvising is at the core, informants hold, there is no need to strive for perfection; it is more important that the improviser come forward as a human being. The personal instrumental 'voice' is of importance. In the opinion of some, 'storytelling' in jazz improvisation might be best understood through holistic concepts (such as, perhaps, 'urgency', or 'need'). Furthermore, in general, music is viewed as having more expressive potential than language; hence the content of musical 'storytelling' is not considered translatable into words.

## 5.2. Storytelling in jazz improvisation: The threefold now

In the preceding section, I have presented and commented on a selection of interview quotations that seem to me to describe the informants' general views on the adequacy and relevance of the concept of 'storytelling' in connection with jazz improvisation. Already at the outset of this investigation (cf. Chapter 1), I stated that I am inclined in my thinking on jazz improvisation to focus on it as an art of the moment. In this section, the results of the qualitative interviews are presented in accordance with Ricoeur's analysis of narrative, taking its temporality as a point of departure. As I have mentioned previously (in subsection 3.1.3), I have come to view a three-part analytic

approach such as the *past–present–future* model of Saint Augustine and Ricoeur as potentially adequate and fruitful to this investigation. As it turns out, I find that the threefold now of narrative turns out to provide an adequate, lucid and all-embracing model for structuring the many nuances in the informants' views on the task of the storytelling jazz improviser. In brief, this task can be perceived as *multi-directionality*. This categorization of the interview results follows Ricoeur's trisecting concepts of prefiguration (5.2.1), configuration (5.2.2), and refiguration (5.2.3). In these subsections, respectively, I will attempt further explications of how these concepts are relevant to the understanding of the informants' perspectives on storytelling in jazz improvisation.

### 5.2.1. Prefiguration

The term prefiguration, borrowed from Ricoeur's narrative analysis, is used here with reference to the ways in which jazz improvisers relate to, and transform, pre-existing musical material. The jazz soloist will always – whether willingly or reluctantly – carry several pieces of luggage. Among these pieces, the informants especially emphasize connection to *tradition and style*, the use of *musical citations*, as well as many kinds of preparation which could, with some simplification, be summarized as *technique* and *theory*.

#### TRADITIONALISM

A number of informants express their opinion that storytelling is especially adequate as a description of jazz improvisation in *certain eras or traditions* within jazz – in others, it is less applicable or relevant. Again, it is clear that perspectives of the informants' aesthetic taste are relevant in at least two ways in this context: to their interpretations of 'storytelling', as well as to my own interpretations of their interview statements. Nisse Sandström shares his reactions to current Swedish jazz in rather harsh words.

It's damn difficult for me to listen to jazz music recorded now. Some records I find are OK, but something has gone missing. [...] Something that has to do with pain. Something that is deeper than that which is played. I can't listen to NN [musician's name]. [...] Something is missing, and it's damn hard to say what it is. [*Added afterwards, in a telephone conversation:* Something mental is missing. Sometimes I have to turn it off.] I don't want to be a whiner or seem reactionary. There are some recordings that are OK, but not many. [...] Erik Söderlind more than passes, absolutely. The things he plays go straight to my heart. He is almost the only one. And he plays so damn good I don't think it's true. There is such joy in his playing.

[Jag har djävligt svårt att höra jazzmusik som spelas in nu. Det är några skivor jag kan tycka är OK, men det är någonting som gått förlorat. [...] Någonting som har med smärta att göra. Någonting som är djupare än det som spelas. NN [musikernamn] kan jag inte höra. [...] Det är något som saknas, som är djävligt svårt att sätta fingret på. [*Tillägg i efterhand per telefon*: Det är något som saknas rent själsligt. Ibland måste jag stänga av.] Jag vill inte vara gnällig och verka bakåtsträvande. Det finns några inspelningar som är OK, men inte många. [...] Erik Söderlind får fullkomligt godkänt. Absolut. Det han spelar går raka vägen till hjärtat på mig. Han är nästan egentligen den enda. Och han spelar så in i helvete bra så jag tror inte det är sant. Det är sådan glädje i hans spel.] (NS56–57,62)

Though Sandström finds it difficult to define exactly what it is that he misses, he says it has to do with human expression.

Something has gone missing, I can come to that conclusion. But I have no response to what it is that has gone missing. [...] Simply... that which Bernt has, Bernt Rosengren, that I consider human expression. Which doesn't have to be so damn technical... now, he is very technical, technical enough to express what he wants... but that is what I miss. However much we talk it over it remains very private, that is, subjective. There simply isn't anything more subjective than the things we are talking about. People simply don't hear the same things.

[Något har gått förlorat, det kan jag komma fram till. Men jag har inget svar på vad det är som har gått förlorat. [...] Helt enkelt... det som Bernt har, Bernt Rosengren, som jag betraktar som mänskligt uttryck. Som inte behöver vara så djävla tekniskt... nu är han ju väldigt teknisk, tillräckligt teknisk för att uttrycka det han vill... men det är det som jag saknar. Hur vi än resonerar så blir allt väldigt privat, alltså subjektivt. Det finns väl inget subjektivare än det här vi pratar om. Var och en hör inte samma saker, helt enkelt.] (NS60,62)

Sandström points to the importance of connecting to tradition. In his opinion, the problems he experiences have to do in part with the fact that musicians are not bound to jazz tradition with close ties and in part with the fact that technical virtuosity is encouraged at the sacrifice of expression.

Jazz music really is very closely related to folk music. Swedish folk music, for instance, where you go to see older people and learn. [...] Young musicians would benefit a lot from playing with older musicians, who have the experience. Even though the younger may be more technical, they have a lot to learn there. [...] Those who play best, whom I like, they play in an extremely traditional way. Those I vote for are traditionalists. [...] It may be a matter of taste, but it may be something else as well. Whether I am touched by those who

play. I have to be touched in order for anything to happen. [...] From a purely technical point of view, it has never been so good as now. People have never been so good music readers as now. Thanks to education. It's really great. But I'm thinking about something else. [...] A new generation of musicians is coming, playing in a completely new way which doesn't... reach me. But they reach each other. It's a strong music in itself, but maybe it doesn't really concern me. [...] It may be languages I don't understand, though they do. And that's fine by me.

[Egentligen är jazzmusik väldigt närbesläktat med folkmusik. Svensk folkmusik, till exempel, där man söker upp de äldre och lär sig. [...] Unga musiker skulle tjäna mycket på att spela ihop med äldre musiker, som har erfarenhet. Även om de yngre kanske är mer tekniska så har de mycket att lära där. [...] De som spelar bäst, som jag tycker om, de spelar oerhört traditionellt. De jag röstar fram är traditionalister. [...] Det kanske är en smaksak, men det kanske är något annat också. Om jag blir berörd av dem som spelar. Jag måste bli berörd för att det ska hända någonting. [...] Rent tekniskt har det aldrig varit så bra. Folk har aldrig varit så duktiga notläsare som nu. Tack vare utbildningarna. Det är ju helt enormt. Men det här är något annat som jag tänker på. [...] Det kommer en helt ny generation musiker, som spelar på ett helt nytt sätt, som inte... når mig. Men de når varann. En stark musikform i sig, men den kanske inte riktigt angår mig. [...] Det där kanske är språk som inte jag förstår, men som de förstår. Och det tycker jag är helt schysst att det är så.] (NS64–69)

Lars Jansson links up with similar perspectives in his description of young Swedish jazz as brilliant and, in a sense, complicated.

There is a tendency that the music gets "böcklig" [complicated], if you understand the expression. Everyone is playing odd meters, plus it's virtuoso playing. Naturally, that is a new thing in jazz.

[Det finns ju en tendens att musiken blir "böcklig", om du förstår uttrycket. Alla ska spela udda taktarter, plus att de spelar väldigt virtuost. Och det är naturligtvis ett nytt grepp inom jazzen.] (LJ35)

Some informants adopt an historical perspective on the question of the storytelling qualities of jazz improvisation. Joakim Milder points out that

that sort of description, *telling a story*, was much more essential fifty years ago than nowadays. [...] I really can appreciate that in that music, it's really these captivating voices. And often it is such a rhetorically elegant way of playing. But in many music forms today, this is not at all essential.



[den typen av beskrivningar, *telling a story*, var mycket mer central för femtio år sedan än vad den är numera. [...] det kan jag verkligen uppskatta i den musiken, för det är verkligen de här fångslande rösterna. Och det är ju ofta ett så retoriskt elegant sätt att spela. Men i väldigt många musikformer i dag så finns det inte alls i centrum.] (JM55)

In an email communication after the interview, Lennart Åberg offers his reflections in a similar vein, pointing out that storytelling

is probably connected to a certain type of jazz, blues, swing, bebop, I don't think it so common when it comes to later styles in jazz, such as fusion, ECM jazz and so forth, where you would probably rather think of landscape, natural scenery, not storytelling. In later days music has often been described as cinematic, too.

[nog är bundet till en viss typ av jazz, blues, swing, bebop, jag tror inte det är så vanligt när det gäller senare stilar i jazzen, som fusion, ECM-jazz etcetera, där man nog hellre associerar till landskap, natur och inte berättande. På senare tid har man ju också ofta beskrivit musik som filmisk.] (LÅ, email communication, December 2010)

As I interpret the statements cited above, they all point to the importance of musical tradition to our understanding of 'storytelling' in jazz improvisation. In brief, older and newer traditions may include divergent perspectives on the relevance of the concept of storytelling in this field. In addition to this dimension of the historical development of jazz, there is also the question of the relation between the individual musician and the tradition. The following quotations from a couple of the informants indicate, as I interpret them, that they attach great weight to how improvisers are inscribed in musical traditions. Lena Willemark finds this perspective very important in the case of her own musicianship.

I very much bear the impress of my upbringing and the people I was apprenticed to back home. To me it has always been important that... I know they left something. They left something that remains within me.

[Jag är ju jättepräglad av den uppväxten som jag hade och de människorna som jag gick i lära hos hemma. Och för mig har det alltid varit viktigt att... jag vet att de lämnade kvar något. De lämnade kvar något i mig.] (LW)

Roland Keijsers thinks that the view of jazz soloists as innovative artists, on a general level, ought to be considered in an historical perspective.

It's still there in certain cultural environments, this old apprentice system where you're taught by a master and spend several years learning to play like that master, and your value as a musician depends on how well you are able to approach that playing style – instead of claiming at all costs, at the age of seventeen and a half years, that you have your very own voice... a modern attitude. [...] Earlier, in New Orleans and that phase of jazz history – I believe there was much more of the older attitude there... But soon the cult of the soloist arises, who does his own thing, like.

[Det lever ju kvar i vissa kulturmiljöer fortfarande, det här gamla lärlingsystemet där man lär sig av en mästare och ägnar åtskilliga år åt att lära sig spela som den här mästaren spelar, och ens värde som musiker bestäms av hur väl man kan närma sig den där spelstilen – istället för att vid sjutton och ett halvt års ålder till varje pris hävda att jag har en helt egen röst... en modern attityd. [...] Tidigare, i New Orleans och den fasen av jazzen – jag tror att det fanns mycket mer av den äldre inställningen där... Men ganska snart kommer ju den där kulturen av solisten som gör sin egen grej, liksom.] (RK4)

With his own experiences as a point of departure, Keijser directs attention to how the ideal of originality has permeated the views of the jazz musicians themselves in several respects. In Keijser's opinion, such views can be highly questionable.

There is an ideal that the great artist, the jazz musician in this case, makes up everything on his own, he is a unique individual who is doing something spontaneously. When I was young, thinking along those lines, reading *Orkesterjournalen* and *Estrad*, such things were discussed. The worst thing you could do was to "planka" [imitate] someone else, as it was called. That word had a bad sound. To imitate somebody else, steal someone else's ideas. But you study, and you instinctively assimilate... It's like you hear a language being spoken. And then you pick up certain intonations. To a certain extent, you need to use this language, so to speak.

[Det finns ett ideal av att den store konstnären, jazzmusikern i det här fallet, hittar på allting själv, han är en unik individ som spontant gör något. När man var ung och levde sig in i de där tankebanorna och läste *Orkesterjournalen* och *Estrad*, det var sådana diskussioner. Det fulaste man gjorde, det var att plankna någon annan, som det hette. Det ordet hade en dålig klang. Imitera någon annan, stjäla någon annans idéer. Men man tar ju del av och omedvetet tar till sig... Man hör ett språk talas, liksom. Och så tar man till sig vissa tonfall. Man måste i viss mån använda det här språket, så att säga.] (RK4)

Keijser contrasts such views with his experiences of how musicians relate to tradition in Moroccan folk music.

when I was in Morocco with these musicians, they were actually illiterate, more or less. Their music isn't written down, you know. [...] But their traditional way of remembering music, there are hundreds... there are ever so many small tunes that should be kept alive, like. [...] In their spare time, [...] they sit around and play these melodies, keep them alive. And then maybe someone says: No, but he plays it like this, you know... Well, but... And that's how they keep the musical memory alive. It's a very important part of it. How do I remember the C major scale?

[när jag var i Marocko med de musikerna, de var ju i princip mer eller mindre analfabeter. De hade ju ingen notskrift på sin musik. [...] Men deras traditionella sätt att minnas musik, det är ju hundra... alltså hur många som helst små melodier, som ska hållas liv i, liksom. [...] På lediga stunder [...] sitter de och spelar de där melodierna, håller liv i dem. Och så är det kanske någon som säger: Nej, men han spelar den så här, liksom... Ja, men... Så håller de minnet levande av musiken. Det är en väldigt viktig del av det hela. Hur kommer jag ihåg C-dur skala?] (RK12)

Keijser describes his own listening strategies in later years as a return of sorts to the roots of jazz. Instead of keeping up with new jazz, he has "started to listen vertically in time" ["börjat lyssna vertikalt i tiden"].

It's better for your own playing, too. [...] The root nourishment, so to speak, it yields a metabolism... [...] The blues thing is one of the strongest roots of jazz. So you get the root nourishment there, you know.

[Det är bättre för ens eget spel också. [...] Det där att ta till sig rotnäring, så att säga, det ger en ämnesomsättning... [...] Bluesgrejen är ju liksom en av de starkaste rottrådarna i jazzen. Så man fyller på rotnäring där, alltså.] (RK15)

Obviously, there is a tension between the view of jazz improvisational 'storytelling' as, on one hand, statements that express the player's own emotional experience and as, on the other, formulations influenced by the tradition in which the musician is situated. There will be ample reasons to return to these issues in the ensuing presentation as well as in the discussion of the results of this investigation; for instance, in the following paragraphs about an improviser's adherence to a certain musical style.

### *STYLE*

Several informants comment on the well-known phenomenon of formulaic improvisation where jazz solos to some extent consist of elements or formulae that recur in different combinations. Roland Keijser points out that this phenomenon is related to the concept of style.

Parker [...] makes those repetitions, variations, so creatively. He is brilliant in combining that set of phrases. I don't think that is a negative thing. [...] But, of course, a less talented combiner... It can get terribly locked up when somebody is just playing ready-prepared phrases. It just gets crazy. But I would still say that in many music traditions around the world, it's rather the Parker model that may be the common one. That is, a musical idiom, a style, a tradition that builds on a set of this kind of small melodic and rhythmic formulas that can be combined in an infinite number of ways. And be varied, of course.

[Parker [...] gör ju de där upprepningarna, variationerna på ett så kreativt sätt. Han är ju mästerlig på att kombinera det där frasförrådet. Det tycker inte jag är något negativt. [...] Men det är klart, en mindre talangfull sådan där kombinator... Det kan ju bli fruktansvärt låst när det är någon som bara står och blåser färdiga fraser. Det blir skitknasigt. Men jag skulle ändå vilja säga att i många musiktraditioner runtom i världen så är det snarare den där Parker-modellen som kanske är den vanliga. Alltså att ett musikidiom, en stil, en tradition bygger på en uppsättning sådana här små melodiska och rytmiska formler som kan kombineras på oändligt många sätt. Och också varieras, naturligtvis.] (RK22)

A jazz improvisation can be affected to a significant extent by whether or not it is played in a musical context which is considered by the improviser to be stylistically unfamiliar or strictly controlled. In the interview with trumpeter Peter Asplund, he expands on the perspective of improvisational 'voice' – which he considers crucial with regard to the notion of storytelling in jazz improvisation –, comparing the voice of a jazz instrumentalist such as himself with the voice of a well-known Swedish actor, such as Allan Edwall. Asplund employs the same comparison when discussing the topic of playing jazz improvisations in musical situations that are, to an extent, beyond the improviser's control. He offers an example of this in his description of his experiences as a guest soloist with big bands.

If you don't adapt to the situation, it is frustrating [to be a big band soloist]. [...] I have to realize that here it isn't Peter Asplund and his Allan Edwall voice [in reference to Swedish actor Allan Edwall, mentioned above] that are important, but that it gets right concerning style. You might say that you prostitute yourself as a storyteller. It may be about the same thing as letting [actors] Mikael Persbrandt or Robert Gustafsson do commercials. Sometimes you do.

[Om man inte anammar situationen så är det frustrerande [att vara storbandssolist]. [...] Jag måste inse att här är det inte Peter Asplund och hans Allan Edwall-röst som är det viktiga, utan att det blir stilistiskt rätt. Där kan man ju tycka att man prostituerar sig som historieberättare. Det är väl ungefär

som om man låter Mikael Persbrandt eller Robert Gustafsson läsa in en reklamtext. Det gör man ju ibland. (PA18)

Once more, I find it probable that different aesthetic perspectives may entail different outlooks on these issues. One's assessment of the relevance of 'storytelling' to jazz improvisation may depend on one's adherence to a style or tradition of jazz, or on one's valuation of that style. Pointing to the stylistic diversification of jazz music, Anders Jormin contends that such qualities as a personal voice and expression are more prominent in certain jazz styles than in others.

In much of jazz music, authenticity is that you in some sense are true to yourself. You can't borrow anything. [...] Nevertheless there are people who like to play standards and bebop and the like, who really are very close to their heroes and are appreciated for it. But we also have an entirely different side of jazz music where the personal voice and expression is encouraged and almost is a condition for being taken seriously or being respected. [...] there are people in jazz who reproduce more than others, and you don't have to rate that. That is why it is so difficult to say "jazz"; what kind of music do we mean by that?

[I stora delar av jazzmusiken är ju äkthet det här att man på något sätt är trogen sig själv. Man får inte låna någonting. [...] Likväl finns det ju de här som gillar att spela standards och bebop och så, som faktiskt är jättenära sina hjältar, och uppskattas för det. Men vi har också en helt annan sida i jazzmusiken, där just den personliga rösten och uttrycket premieras och nästan är en förutsättning för att man ska tas på allvar eller respekteras. [...] det finns de i jazzen som reproducerar i högre grad än andra, och man behöver inte värdera det. Därför är det så svårt att säga "jazz", för vilken sorts musik menar vi?] (AJ34–35)

Ulf Johansson Werre expresses his opinion that the jazz styles of the 1920s displayed several valuable qualities which ought to be more appreciated and adopted by jazz improvisers today. He describes, for instance,

a quality during the '20s which is incredibly ingenious, making very extrovert sound. That is, you dared to take hold of a course of events, make *flares*, play an incredibly powerful, dynamic rhythm with very few notes. [...] And the personalities dare to show themselves and take a hold of it. That is a quality which I find rather unique, but which may later have become a bit more streamlined.[...] There is a particular intuitive talent in jazz music, I think, which isn't to be able to chisel out scales and chords, but which is more original, more African in a way. It is a movement that can go on forever. If it swings... To play the blues for half an hour doesn't seem too long. You can create drama with simple means, and that is a typical, good '20s music quality. If it doesn't swing, then a three minute tune is too long.

[en kvalitet under 20-talet som är otroligt sinnrik med att våga göra väldigt utåtriktade ljud. Alltså: man vågade ta tag i ett skeende, vågade göra *flares*, vågar ligga och spela en otroligt kraftfull, dynamisk rytmik på väldigt få toner. [...]. Och personligheterna vågar visa upp sig själva och ta tag i det hela. Det är en kvalitet som jag tycker är rätt unik, som sedan kan ha blivit lite mer strömlinjeformad. [...]. Det finns en speciell intuitiv jazzmusikalisk begåvning, tycker jag, som inte är att kunna mejsla ut skalor och ackord, utan som är mer ursprunglig, mer afrikansk på något sätt. Det är en rörelse som kan hålla på hur länge som helst. Svänger det, så... Att spela en blues i en halvtimme känns inte för långt. Man kan skapa ett drama med enkla medel, och det är en typisk, bra kvalitet för 20-talsmusik. Svänger det inte, så är en låt på tre minuter för lång.] (UJW7)

The influence of tradition on jazz improvisation may be intra-stylistic, i.e., taking place within a certain style. It may also be inter-stylistic, i.e., draw on influences from traditions outside a certain jazz style, or even outside jazz altogether (cf. 2.2.6). Bengt Hallberg's piano education was strictly classical. He thinks that this might have affected him as a jazz improviser to some extent: "Some classical music may perhaps have inspired phraseology and the like." ["Kanske lite klassisk musik inspirerade fraseologier och sådant där"] (BH23). On the other hand, Hallberg does not think that his way of perceiving and performing classical music has been affected by his jazz playing.

No. I can't remember anything of the sort. There are those who think that liking both jazz and classical music is a serious case of a split personality. And even worse to practise both kinds. I have performed as a piano soloist in Bach's D minor Concerto, for instance, and Gershwin... I played Shostakovich with the Yggdrasil Quartet, the Quintet No. 5 in G minor. It was awful. The terror nearly killed me. It was a live broadcast, you know.

[Nej. Jag kan inte erinra mig någonting sådant. Det finns väl de som tycker att det att man tycker om både jazz och klassiskt är ett allvarligt fall av personlighetsklyvning. Och ännu värre att utöva bägge delarna. Jag har ju framträtt som pianosolist i Bachs d-mollkonsert, till exempel, och Gershwin... Sjostakovitj har jag spelat med Yggdrasil-kvartetten, den här femte kvintetten, g-moll. Det var hemskt. Jag höll på att avlida av skräck. Det var ju direktsändning.] (BH81)

Certain jazz movements display an aim to avoid improvisations that are constructed by combinations of the kind of elements or formulae mentioned above. Roland Keijser points out that there are problems as well as advantages with such an aim.

You can hear that Lee Konitz and Warne Marsh in a way are dealing with the same language, unlike other contemporaries who have another dialect. Certain popular phrases, licks, do recur. [...] But on the whole it is something of... there are unexpected solutions, it's a particular kind of freedom in it, I think, that is damn attractive in many ways, but I can also find it a bit abstract in a way. And maybe it gets a little similar to the ideological attitude in free improvisation where for some ideological reasons you consciously avoid – there are certain things that you aren't allowed to play. Because then it isn't free. Yeah, it's paradoxical. There was an attitude that if you were to play a free improvisation, then you couldn't play anything that could be identified as a singable melody. Above all, you can't have a melody already known. You have to avoid that at all costs. And you can't make a cadenza, can't end on a seemingly obvious keynote... You have to avoid at all costs everything that leads in these directions. I think there may be some kinship between that and what, for instance, Warne Marsh is doing. That is, as the receiver of their story I can experience a certain stinginess, so to speak: couldn't you have... that phrase, couldn't you have treated us to that, it would have been quite nice, you know, to rest in that note for a while and feel that that was the end of that sequence, you could have made a little... it isn't such a big deal to treat us to that, is it, it wouldn't make you unimaginative.

[Man kan ju höra att Lee Konitz och Warne Marsh på något vis håller på med samma språk, till skillnad från andra samtida, som har en annan dialekt. Vissa populära fraser, licks, går ju igen. [...] Men som helhet är det något... det är oväntade lösningar, det är någon speciell sorts frihet i det, kan jag tycka, som är djävligt attraktiv på många sätt, men jag kan också tycka att det kanske blir lite abstrakt på något sätt. Och kanske att det blir lite som i ideologiattityden i fri improvisation, där man av någon sorts ideologiska skäl medvetet undviker – det är vissa saker man inte får spela. För då är det inte fritt. Ja, det är en paradox i det där. Det fanns ju en attityd att om man skulle spela en fri improvisation, då får man inte spela något som går att identifiera som en sångbar melodi. Framför allt inte en redan känd melodi. Man måste undvika det till varje pris. Och man får inte göra en kadens, sluta på en till synes självklar grundton... Man ska undvika till varje pris allt som leder åt sådana håll. Jag tycker det kan finnas ett visst släktskap hos det där och vad till exempel Warne Marsh gör. Det vill säga, som mottagare av deras berättelse kan jag uppleva en viss snålhet inom citationstecken: ja, men kunde du inte... den där frasen, då kunde du väl ha bjudit på den där, det skulle ha varit rätt skönt, liksom, att få vila lite en stund i den där tonen och känna att där var det partiet slut, att du gör en liten sådan... vad då, är det så farligt att bjuda på det, du är väl inte fantasilös för det.] (RK23)

Keijser expands on his thoughts about the relationship between so called free jazz and concepts such as style and language.

What the free jazzers in free improvisation are doing, it's more like some sort of scientific attitude like going into the brain or the blood circulation... It's some kind of basic research in the world of sounds, alongside or beneath the level of ordinary language. At the same time both specialized and exclusive, as well as universal and accessible. Communication doesn't demand any conventional knowledge of language. It's interesting what kinds of sounds you can find in a saxophone, for instance, beyond those Adolphe Sax dreamed of... Then it soon becomes a style, a lot of young saxophonists start to imitate, but it's still called free improvisation. It's not more free than anything else. There, too, a convention is developed, a language, a tradition.

[Det som de här frijazzarna, fri improvisation håller på med, det är mera som någon slags naturvetenskaplig attityd där man liksom går in i hjärnan eller blodomloppet... Det är någon sorts grundforskning i ljudvärlden, vid sidan av eller under det vanliga språkets nivå. På samma gång specialiserat och exklusivt som allmängiltigt och tillgängligt. Kommunikation kräver inga konventionella språkkunskaper. Det är väl intressant vad man kan hitta för ljud exempelvis i en saxofon bortom vad Adolphe Sax drömde om... Sedan blir det då en stil ganska snabbt, det står en massa unga saxofonister och härmar, men fortfarande kallas det fri improvisation. Det är liksom inte friare än något annat. Även där utvecklas en konvention, ett språk, en tradition.] (RK24; revised by RK in the ensuing email correspondence)

In sum, the notions of musical style (an idiom which includes, to an extent, the use of formulaic improvisation) versus free improvisation (where, in principle, all kinds of formulae are avoided) come forward as important ones in many informants' perspectives on jazz improvisation and the concept of storytelling. One particular example of musical formulae is the case of conscious, meaning-laden musical quotations (a kind of musical self-reference presented in subsections 2.2.5 and 2.2.6); which is the topic of the next few paragraphs.

#### MUSICAL CITATIONS

Several informants comment on a specific feature displayed in many jazz improvisations: the deliberate inclusion of *quotes* from other musical contexts. Roland Keijser calls it "a sport that some jazz guys cultivate and find very funny, but it's more of an internal thing" ["en sport som somliga jazzkillar odlar och tycker är väldigt rolig, fast det är mera en intern grej"] (RK4). Nisse Sandström views this phenomenon of musical citations as a kind of musical humour: "Humour often comes about when you quote. The quote is often from some classical context. Charlie



Parker... you could hear exactly what sort of classical music he was listening to." ["Humor blir ofta när man citerar. Citatet är ju ofta från något klassiskt sammanhang. Charlie Parker... man hörde ju precis vad han lyssnade på för klassisk musik"] (NS27). Sandström emphasizes that this is not a common phenomenon in all jazz improvisers nor in all musical contexts.

Louis Armstrong wasn't serious. He was happy, he was wonderful, the captain of the ship. So was Ellington. It was their way of surviving during rather hard times in the US. But later, if we get to the ones we call geniuses, that is, Monk, Bud Powell, John Coltrane... Lester Young... Those are serious men. They don't go about quoting a lot. They only bring their own. And that is serious stuff. [...] Dexter Gordon is a person who loves to quote, but it's more of his humour that is put forward, not his depth. There's more of that when he plays a blues, in a rather quick tempo, there he really is able to bring forward his own profundity. [...] Then he is struggling, doesn't go about laughing and... You can see how concentrated he is. You also see how he is enjoying himself when he has a good comp group.

[Louis Armstrong var inte allvarlig. Han var glad, han var underbar, kapten på skutan. Ellington likaså. Det var deras sätt att överleva under ganska svåra tider i Amerika. Men sedan, om vi kommer fram till dem vi kallar för genier, alltså Monk, Bud Powell, John Coltrane... Lester Young... Det är allvarliga män. De håller inte på och citerar särskilt mycket. Utan de har bara sitt eget att komma med. Och det är allvarliga saker. [...] Dexter Gordon är en person som älskar att citera, men det är hans humor mera som kommer fram, inte hans djup. Det finns ju mera när han spelar en blues, i ganska snabbt tempo, där kan han verkligen ta fram djupet av sig själv. [...] då kämpar han, håller inte på och garvar och... Man ser hur koncentrerad han är. Man ser också hur han njuter om han har ett bra komp.] (NS31–34)

The use of citations may occur within a jazz group as well, for instance when a phrase that was played by one musician is echoed by a fellow musician. In Sandström's opinion, this kind of quoting is an example of musical degeneracy: "Some pianists have a tendency to imitate the phrase a horn player just played. [...] It's not very funny really. It's one of those things the audience will see through." ["En del pianister har en tendens att härma den frasen som en blåsare just har spelat. [...] Det är inte så kul egentligen. Det är en sådan sak som genomskådas av publiken"] (NS30–31).

Peter Asplund describes a related phenomenon which could not, however, be termed citations. He points to certain culturally conditioned *codes* which presumably are well-known to the listeners. This makes it possible to predict with some certainty how some parts of the music will be perceived. In Asplund's opinion, this phenomenon enables the jazz improviser to govern in some sense what the music will communicate.

We have seen so many Hollywood films where a certain kind of harmony and a certain instrumentation has been devised for certain scenes. [...] You play in a certain fashion and you know that thanks to Hollywood everyone in the audience will know what you are after.

Vi har sett så mycket Hollywood-filmer där man litegrann har bestämt en viss typ av harmonik och en viss instrumentation för vissa scener. [...] Man spelar på ett visst sätt och så vet man att tack vare Hollywood så kommer alla i publiken att veta vad man är ute efter. (PA3)

Among the interview statements, I find this particular expansion on the use of musical self-reflectivity in jazz improvisation quite inspirational. On the whole, however, my impression is that the informants do not see any great creative potential in the inclusion of musical quotes in jazz improvisation, at least not in a way that is comparable to how pastiche, parody, and indirection have been considered essential features of African American practices of Signifyin(g).

#### *TECHNIQUE AND THEORY*

What I intend to deal with in this subsection is, as stated initially, the occurrence of different kinds of pre-existing musical material in jazz improvisation. So far, the survey has focused on features of musical tradition, elements of style, formulae, and quotes. It may well be argued that many additional kinds of musical knowledge such as technical skills and theoretical insights ought to be included in this category as well. Obviously, the questions of the different kinds of musical knowledge it takes to improvise a jazz solo cannot be neglected. Amanda Sedgwick points to the constant need for practice in order to maintain and extend, for instance, one's ear, one's command of instrumental technique, theory of harmony, and sense of rhythm.

You know, I can only speak for myself. It helps me to practise a lot. And it helps me to learn more and more about... I can play in different ways over harmonies. And it helps me to study harmony, and it helps me to write music myself. Yes, and to acquire as much knowledge as possible.

[Alltså, jag kan ju bara tala för mig själv. Det hjälper mig att öva mycket. Och det hjälper mig att lära mig mer och mer om... jag kan spela på olika sätt över harmonier. Och det hjälper mig att kunna harmonilära, och det hjälper mig att skriva musik själv. Ja, och få så mycket kunskap som möjligt.] (AS23)

Ann-Sofi Söderqvist points out that technical requirements are instrument specific to a certain degree.

Naturally, technique is incredibly important in order to be able to express yourself. If you have problems with the C major scale, you will have problems

with... That is very far away from the picture I have. So you need to acquire instrumental control. [...] For a horn player, the cultivation of sound is incredibly important. Technically speaking, it's simply about air and control. For a trumpeter, too: chops. To have the embouchure, to have strength enough. It's demanding to play jazz solos.

[Teknik är naturligtvis otroligt viktigt för att kunna uttrycka sig. Har man problem med C-dur skala så kommer man ju att ha problem med... Då är det ju väldigt långt ifrån den här bilden jag har. Så man behöver ju tillägna sig kontroll över instrumentet. [...] Som blåsare är ju tonbildning otroligt viktigt. Rent tekniskt handlar det om att få luft och att få kontroll, helt enkelt. Som trumpetare, också: chops. Att ha ambisen, att orka med. Det är krävande att spela jazzsolon.] (ASS18)

Elise Einarsdotter calls attention to the importance of knowledge of music theory: "it could be difficult when playing and theory don't match at all well" ["det kan bli kärt när det är ett väldigt glapp mellan spel och teori"] (EE42).

In brief, then, when the informants point out qualities and abilities that are relevant to the jazz improviser, they include technique and theory as important requirements: among other things, technical command of one's instrument ('chops') as well as a developed theoretical knowledge of harmony, and a sense of rhythm.

### 5.2.2. Configuration

In line with my strategy to present the results of the qualitative interviews with the temporality of the 'storytelling' jazz improviser's practice as a point of departure, in accordance with Ricoeur's *past-present-future* model of narrative, I continue in this subsection with the concept of configuration as a category.

This term, which is also borrowed from Ricoeur's narrative analysis, is used here with reference to improvisational multi-directionality in the present moment, including collective, interactional creativity. A considerable amount of the informants' replies deal with different aspects of *presence*. The fact that jazz improvisation is an art form of the *now* is essential. In order to reach maximum presence in the now, the jazz improviser must aim for openness and wholeness. This is a question of both a directionality inwards, towards the inner voice and musical vision of the musician, and at the same time a directionality outwards, towards the environment, the fellow musicians as well as the audience.

## BEING OPEN AND WHOLE IN THE PRESENT

Several informants emphasize that it is essential that the jazz improviser is *present in the moment*. One must not let oneself be fettered by plans and intentions, according to Ann-Sofi Söderqvist.

I can't say that I enter the stage with the ambition to tell a story. I think the best conditions are when you are completely neutral. [...] I enter the stage and it will be whatever it will be. [...] to be open to the fact that things can go in different directions in a way, and not try to govern it too much.

[Jag kan ju inte säga att jag går upp på scenen med ambitionen: nu ska jag berätta en historia. Jag tycker att de bästa förutsättningarna är när man är totalt nollställd. [...] Jag går upp på scenen och så får det bli vad det blir. [...] att vara öppen för att saker kan ta olika riktning på något sätt, och inte försöka styra det alltför mycket.] (ASS36,38)

Söderqvist verifies that improvisations come out best "when you don't know what you're doing, when you forget yourself, [...] when you feel that you are one with... this canal, [this] higher spirit that you're connecting to" ["när man inte vet vad man håller på med, när man glömmer sig själv, [...] när man känner att man är ett med... den här kanalen, [det] högre medvetande som man kopplar upp sig mot"] (ASS3).

Jonas Kullhammar describes his experiences as a particular mental state.

The brain isn't there. It's there in some way, but it doesn't govern anything. And that's some kind of, what should you call it... trance, almost. You only try to follow. And I remember when I first experienced it when playing myself. I think I was seventeen, it was a performance, and just after I played I felt, what the hell, I don't remember anything. I wasn't there, like. But things happened. And I try to achieve that every time I play.

[Hjärnan är inte med. Den är med på något sätt, men den är inte med och styr och ställer. Och det är ju någon slags, vad ska man kalla det... trance, nästan. Man försöker bara följa med. Och jag kommer ihåg när jag upplevde det första gången när jag själv spelade. Jag tror jag var sjutton, på en spelning, och precis efter jag hade lirat kände jag bara: vad fan, jag minns ingenting. Jag var inte med liksom. Men det hände grejer. Och jag försöker uppnå det varje gång jag spelar.] (JK4)

Adopting a philosophical perspective on the jazz improviser's presence in the moment, Lars Jansson refers to Eckhart Tolle's book *The power of now*.

you think you live in the present, but often you're on your way to what you're going to do next. We can deepen our experience of the presence. That is, going

into the present, [...] like going down into a well or something. [...] You live now, the only thing you have is now – but the now in itself is damn elastic and big and deep. [...] The experience has a mystic quality. [...] Our Western culture is very much about ready-made, custom-made rules: that's what happiness is like. [...] But there is a deeper happiness than that. And it's very simple and basic.

[man tror att man lever i nuet, men ofta är man på väg till vad man ska göra sedan. Vi kan fördjupa vår upplevelse av nuet. Alltså att mer gå in i nuet, [...] som man går ner i en brunn eller något. [...] Man lever nu, det enda man har är nuet – men nuet i sig är djävligt elastiskt och stort och djupt. [...] Upplevelsen har en mystisk kvalitet. [...] Vår västerländska kultur handlar väldigt mycket om färdiga, måttbestämda regler: så är lycka. [...] Men det finns en djupare lycka än det. Och den är väldigt enkel och basal.] (LJ43)

Joakim Milder agrees that the aspect of presence is of consequence for what the soloist is able to play.

When we feel that we touch bottom in what we do, then we are very good at it. Then we are able to play things that are actually very complicated, and that we haven't actually prepared, [...] because that's what needs to be played right now. In two minutes I might not even be able to play this. We get charged by the moment. At best we become good at expressing what needs to be expressed.

[När vi känner att vi bottnar i det vi gör, då är vi också väldigt duktiga. Då klarar vi av att spela saker som egentligen är väldigt komplicerade, och som vi egentligen aldrig har förberett, [...] därför att är det här som behöver spelas just nu. Om två minuter så kanske jag inte ens är kapabel att spela det här. Vi laddas av stunden. I bästa fall blir vi duktiga på att uttrycka det som behöver uttryckas.] (JM39–40)

In Lena Willemark's opinion, such presence is about *openness* and *wholeness*.

How do you practise openness? I don't know. I don't know, but to me it has a lot to do with being whole in your body. My body includes my brain, my heart – you know, everything. And if I don't get to know all of me, I won't have the openness. Because then some part of me is closed. [...] When I'm in openness I can feel being a part of the great. Yes, actually. And that can happen like a flash. I don't know what happens, if it's me experiencing that I become whole, or if it's something making me whole. Which is which?

[Hur övar man öppenhet? Det vet jag inte. Det vet jag inte, men för mig har det väldigt mycket [att göra] med att vara hel i kroppen. I min kropp ryms både

min hjärna, mitt hjärta – allting ryms där, liksom. Och om jag inte lär känna hela mig, så missar jag öppenheten. För då är det någon del av mig som är stängd. [...] När jag är i öppenhet så kan jag ju känna delaktigheten i det stora. Faktiskt. Och det där kan ju gå blixtnabbt. Jag vet ju inte vad som händer, om det är jag som upplever att jag blir hel, eller om det är någonting som gör mig hel. Vilket är vilket?] (LW10,11)

Willemark views presence in the moment as intimately connected with the musician's storytelling.

The great discovery of being present. [...] That may be what it is to tell a story. And that's how it comes out. That discovery comes out. Yes. [...] You must connect to exactly that which is happening, and that which is coming out. Because you can't throw your storytelling ahead of you, and then try to catch it, and then tell it.

[Den stora upptäckten av att vara närvarande. [...] Det är kanske det som är att berätta. Och så kommer det ut. Den upptäckten kommer ut. Ja. [...] Du måste ha en länk till precis det som sker, och det som kommer ut. För du kan inte kasta iväg ditt berättande framför dig, och sedan försöka fånga det, och sedan berätta det.] (LW18,19,21)

Several informants mention that thoughts may hinder the improviser. Joakim Milder lists a number of conditions which, in his opinion, are favourable to the improvisation: "Not to stand in your own way. Not to think. Not to fulfil expectations. Not to try to express something specific." ["Att man inte står i vägen själv. Att man inte tänker. Att man inte uppfyller förväntningar. Att man inte försöker uttrycka någonting specifikt"] (JM43).

Amanda Sedgwick points out that while thinking and planning must be part of the musician's preparations, they become cumbersome in the performance situation.

As soon as I start to think about it, I can't play anymore. If I think: now I'm going to play creatively, that will lead to nothing. But if I have lots of knowledge to profit from, and if I have thought and practised like that at home, how should I do this, how should I play this differently, what kind of chord substitutions are there, how can I play it in different ways so it won't sound too formulaic... But I can't think like that when I'm playing. [...] It's improvised music, so we have to be there all the time.

[Så fort jag börjar fundera över det så låser jag mig. Om jag tänker: nu ska jag spela kreativt, då blir det ju ingenting. Men om jag har mycket kunskap att ta av, och har tänkt så hemma och övat så hemma, hur ska jag göra det här, hur ska jag spela det här annorlunda, vad finns det för ersättningsackord, hur kan

jag spela det på olika sätt så att det inte låter för formelbundet... Men jag kan ju inte tänka det när jag spelar. [...] Det är ju improviserad musik, så vi måste ju vara med hela tiden.] (AS26–27)

Some of the thoughts that are a hindrance may be purely music-related. Nisse Sandström warns that "to think while playing... then you're into a sort of planning that makes you decide to play a certain thing... and that is really the problems of music reading. It can go wrong in ways you didn't count with." ["att tänka när man spelar... då är man inne i ett planerande som gör att man har bestämt sig för att spela en viss sak... och då är man egentligen inne på notläsandets problematik. Och då kan det bli fel på ett sätt som man själv inte hade räknat med"] (NS21). Jonas Kullhammar points out that also many thoughts other than the music-related ones may have different effects: "Anything can distract you. Then again you can be inspired, by the same stuff." ["Man kan bli distraherad av allt möjligt. Sedan kan man bli inspirerad också, av samma grejer"] (JK5). Joakim Milder explains these difficulties by stating that thinking is slow: "It's never ever, in the moment we play, a thought process. [...] Thinking is infinitely slow in such a situation. [...] Music has to travel much much faster than we are capable of thinking." ["Det är aldrig någonsin, i ögonblicket vi spelar, en tankeprocess. [...] Tänkandet är ju ofantligt långsamt i en sådan situation. [...] Musiken behöver färdas mycket, mycket snabbare än vad vi är kapabla att tänka"] (JM25).

Bengt Hallberg directs attention to the fact that the musician's experiences in the moment of improvisation may differ considerably from his or her experiences when listening to a recording of it later on.

When you think you've succeeded, it could be down the drain, and when you think, "Oh no, what was that" – then it was a success! The fact is that you can discover these things yourself by listening to old recordings that you remember. You may think that it was so damn good, and damn, everything really was in place... and it wasn't at all!

[När man tycker själv att man har lyckats, då kan det vara helt borta, och när man tycker själv att "Nej, vad var det där för någonting" – då har det gått hem! Faktum är att man kan upptäcka det där genom att lyssna själv på gamla inspelningar, som man har minnen av. Man kan tro att det var så djäkla bra, och djäklar vad det satt allting... och det gjorde det inte alls!] (BH53)

Summing up these informants' views on the requirements that the improviser be 'open' and 'whole' in the present moment, I notice, first of all, the unanimity in their putting forward this perspective and its importance. The perspectives may differ in details, but the resulting picture appears to be unequivocal: if the jazz improviser is to succeed in 'telling a story', i.e., in communicating a statement in a truthful and direct

manner, then it is necessary to be open in mind, whole in body, and unaffected by premeditated plans.

### *THE SOUND, THE VOICE*

The issue of the improviser's personal voice has been touched upon previously in the presentation of the results, since it seems to me to constitute a significant aspect of the informants' overall perspective on storytelling in jazz improvisation. Indeed, as noted above, one perspective may be that the 'story' is, to an important extent, present *in the instrumental 'voice'* of the improviser. The question of sound and voice is eminently relevant in relation to improvisation in the present moment; hence, I choose to include a number of further interview statements on this topic in connection with the configuration perspective of the present subsection.

In Swedish usage, the English word *sound* is often employed to designate the instrumental tone of musicians in jazz contexts. Several informants state that the sound is essential to a successful jazz improvisation. Roland Keijser calls it "absolutely crucial" ["helt avgörande"] but points out that its importance may be overlooked now and then, since "it's so basic and obvious" ["det är så grundläggande och självklart"] (RK1). Joakim Milder also employs the expressions *inflection* ("tonfall") and *timbre*. Judging the sounds of soloists is necessarily subjective, he maintains: "I think that in some way you must be physically attracted by the sound" ["Jag tror att man på något sätt måste bli fysiskt attraherad av ljudet"]; it is "captivating" ["fängslande"] and has "the ability to attract listening... I'm not sure whether that quality can be pinpointed" ["förmågan att kunna attrahera ett lyssnande... jag är osäker på om det går att ringa in den kvaliteten"] (JM18).

To Jonas Kullhammar, the sound is the most important quality of his own saxophone playing.

the thing I'm most satisfied with in my own playing. [...] The sound is probably what I care most about. Because if I had the other pieces, and it sounded like a duck toot, it would have been of no help. On the other hand, if I had the sound I have but not the technique, I think I could have expressed myself anyway.

[det är det som jag är mest nöjd med i mitt eget spel. [...] Soundet är nog det som jag lägger störst vikt vid. För om jag skulle ha de andra bitarna, och det lät anktuta, så hade det liksom inte hjälpt. Däremot om jag hade soundet som jag har nu, men inte tekniken, så tror jag att jag skulle kunna uttrycka mig i alla fall.] (JK21)

Several informants associate the instrument's sound with the *human voice*. Lennart Åberg says: "People react directly on being addressed, on the sound. [...] very easy to think of a voice, as if it were a voice expressing something." ["Folk reagerar direkt på



tilltalet, soundet. [...] väldigt lätt att associera till röst, att det liksom är en stämma som uttrycker någonting") (LÅ5). Anders Jormin reflects on differences between instruments, some of which may be perceived as closer to the human voice than others.

The phrasing and creating of certain musicians seems to be connected to the human voice, and I realize that when I improvise, when I play my improvisations on the double bass, I probably have a human voice, I have melodiousness, dynamics, pauses, that is, the time to reflect after a phrase: when has the time come for the next one, just as if I was listening for response in the room. That is my ideal, while other jazz musicians may not have the voice as their point of departure but rather the technical limitations of the instrument, and this egalized tone, you know.

[Vissa musikers frasbildning och skapande verkar vara knutet till den mänskliga rösten, och jag inser själv, när jag improviserar, spelar mina improvisationer på bas, att jag har nog mänsklig röst, jag har sångbarhet, dynamik, pauseringar, alltså eftertanke efter en fras: när är det dags för nästa, ungefär som jag lyssnar på en reaktion i rummet. Det har jag som ideal, medan andra jazzmusiker kanske inte har rösten som utgångspunkt utan mer har instrumentets tekniska begränsningar, och just den här egaliserade tonen.] (AJ28)

Different ways of playing a certain instrument may also relate more or less closely to the human voice, according to Jormin. For instance, comparing the saxophonists Wayne Shorter and Michael Brecker, he finds that the latter

has a completely different kind of aesthetic, where it's virtuosity, evenness, where all notes have the same colour, it's been practised a great deal, he's made the saxophone an instrument that he masters more than anyone else – while Wayne Shorter has made the saxophone into a megaphone or something like that.

[har en helt annan estetik, där det är virtuositet, där det är egalitet, alla toner har samma klangfärg, det har övats jättemycket på det, han har gjort saxofonen till ett instrument, som han behärskar mer än någon annan – medan Wayne Shorter har gjort saxofonen till en megafon, eller någonting sådant där.] (AJ26)

As indicated previously, Peter Asplund puts forward an exemplification of the importance of instrumental sound by way of a specific comparison between the voice of a jazz instrumentalist (such as himself) and the voice of an actor (such as the well-known Swedish actor, Allan Edwall). Peter Asplund expands on this comparison between instrumental sound and the human voice:

The voice, that's the same thing as the sound then. The sound you have, the approach. That's everything: the attack, the tone, vibrato or no vibrato, the release of the tone – all these things are included in the voice. It's half the thing, really, to have a captivating voice. It's one of the great means to communicate something. [...] Miles [Davis] had a special way of talking, a special voice and a special way of dealing with music.

[Rösten, det är lika med soundet då. Soundet man har, approachen. Det är allting: attacken, tonen, vibrato eller inte, avslutandet på tonen – alla de delarna är ju rösten. Det är halva grejen på något sätt att ha en röst som blir fångslande. Det är ju ett av de stora medlen att förmedla något. [...] Miles [Davis] har ett speciellt sätt att prata, en speciell röst och ett speciellt sätt att ta i musiken.] (PA13)

Asplund imagines that the audience attends his concerts "to hear me tell these stories, and they recognize my voice in about the same way they recognize [Swedish actor] Allan Edwall – or Miles" ["för att höra mig berätta de här historierna, och de känner igen min röst ungefär som de känner igen Allan Edwall – eller Miles"] (PA13).

Gunnar Lindgren provides an example of how differences in sound may affect improvisers' ability to tell the stories they want. His own sound on the tenor saxophone was different from that of Dexter Gordon, his friend and mentor.

I had something in my own sound that made me different from him, so when I tried to quote the same things he did, it came down flop and felt affected and silly, while he did it with authority and naturalness. [...] It was something about his sound, he had a richer and fuller sound than mine, more Coltrane... a bit more pointed.

[jag hade någonting i mitt eget sound som skilde från honom, så att när jag försökte citera samma saker som han så föll det pladask och kändes maneriskt och fånigt, medans han gjorde det med auktoritet och självklarhet. [...] det var någonting med hans sound, han hade mustigare och mer utfyllt än mitt, mer Coltrane... lite spetsigare sound.] (GL1)

Bengt Hallberg envies the expressive potential of melody instruments: "this immediacy, you envy that as a pianist – but it's wonderful to experience it together" ["den här omedelbarheten, den avundas man när man är pianist – men det är underbart att få uppleva den tillsammans"]. He views the piano's potential in this regard with some scepticism.

I must say I don't think I have been thinking about cultivating the sound. [...] Maybe I find it a little difficult to believe in it as well... that such a thing exists on the piano... But OK, different pianists sound differently.

[Jag måste säga att jag har nog inte funderat över tonbildning. [...] Jag har kanske lite svårt att tro på det också... att det existerar någonting som tonbildning på piano... Men OK, det låter ju olika om olika pianister.] (BH56,74)

Some informants point out that there is an interesting relationship between story and sound. It cannot be taken for granted that the sound that is the most desirable from the storytelling jazz improviser's point of view can be attained by conventional means. Employing the storytelling metaphor, Roland Keijser distinguishes between credibility and technical perfection:

The storyteller sitting on a bench telling his lies, he may mispronounce a few words, or... have some technical deficiencies or something, but he's a damn good storyteller. That's just an extra spice, you know. The timing is there and all the important qualities. There are some jazz saxophonists who think they should improve their playing by taking a number of lessons for a reed teacher at some university, teaching classical playing. And then they acquire a somewhat more neutral technical approach to the instrument. To me that may sound damn weird, I must say. [...] Of course you can learn many valuable things also from classically trained musicians, but there is no neutral technique. If your dream is to be a good jazz saxophonist, then you should play jazz. Which of course doesn't exclude being inspired by a variety of traditions and techniques from the whole world that attracts your interest.

[En sådan här historieberättare som sitter på en bänk och ljuger, han kanske uttalar en del ord fel, eller... har några tekniska svagheter eller någonting, men han berättar skitbra. Det ger bara en liten extra krydda åt det, liksom. Tajmingen finns där, och alla kvaliteter som är viktiga, liksom. Det finns ju en del jazzsaxofonister nu som tycker att de ska förkovra sig även på det sättet att de tar ett antal lektioner för en rörlärlärare på någon högskola som undervisar i mera klassiskt spel. Och så tillägnar de sig en lite mera neutral teknisk approach till instrumentet. För mig kan det låta djävligt konstigt, måste jag säga. [...] Självfallet finns det mycket värdefulla saker att lära sig även från klassiskt skolade musiker, men det finns ingen neutral teknik. Om din dröm är att bli en god jazzsaxofonist, så spela jazz! Vilket naturligtvis inte utesluter att låta sig inspireras av alla möjliga andra traditioner och tekniker från hela världen som väcker ens intresse. (RK20; revised by RK in the ensuing email correspondence)

Lennart Åberg remarks that the ideal of a personal sound or voice may entail an educational dilemma.

The schools teach that you should get your own voice, that is preached a lot. You listen to Miles and Dizzy and Clark Terry, and why have they come so far,

well, they had a personal voice, and then all should become just as personal – in the end, that gets damn strained. [...] When you start teaching that – now I'm going to do just like Miles in order to get a more comprehensive, a deeper expression – I think you can hear that instantly, you know. [...] Oh yeah, now he's going to try to be just as profound as Miles. That is an educational dilemma, I think.

[På skolorna lärs det ut att man ska skaffa sin egen röst, det predikas det väldigt mycket. Man lyssnar på Miles och Dizzy och Clark Terry, och varför har de kommit så långt, jo, de hade en personlig röst, och så ska alla bli lika personliga – och till sist blir ju det djävligt krystat. [...] När man börjar lära ut det – nu ska jag göra precis som Miles för att få ett mer innehållsrikt, ett djupare uttryck – det tycker jag hörs direkt, alltså. [...] Jaha, nu ska han försöka verka lika djupsinnig där som Miles. Det är ett dilemma för pedagogiken, tycker jag.] (LÅ8)

In sum, the informants consider the concepts of sound and voice crucial to jazz improvisation. The instrumental sound of the improviser, in the view of many, is and should be closely connected to qualities of the human voice. In line with the perspectives presented in the previous section, a strive for perfection, as in classical music, is not considered altogether relevant in the jazz improvisational context; rather, a sound distinguished by its individual character is put forward as a commendable aim. It is pointed out that the promotion of such a quality may involve educational difficulties.

#### *DIRECTIONALITY INWARDS: THE INNER VOICE; PREPAREDNESS FOR THE NOW*

In addition to the sounding voice, another conceptualization of 'voice' is also prominent in the interviews: the musician's individual, internal voice. Several informants emphasize the need for the improviser to have contact with his or her *inner voice* in the improvisational moment.

"All improvisation demands enormous preparations" ["All god improvisation kräver enorm förberedelse"], says Elise Einarsdotter. "Day after day after day you have built up your knowledge and your sensitivity and your ear." ["Man har byggt upp, dag efter dag efter dag, sin kunskap och sin känslighet och sitt öra"] (EE8). This is not only a question of being prepared in general but of being prepared for the particular performance situation as well:

As a listener, I'm disappointed if I feel that the energy is missing, or the preparation, or the readiness to meet whomever I'm meeting. [...] Then it takes a very long time before there is any communication.

[Som lyssnare blir jag besviken om jag känner att det inte finns den här laddningen, eller förberedelsen, eller beredskapen att möta vem det nu är jag möter. [...] Då dröjer det väldigt lång tid innan det blir någon kommunikation.] (EE16,17)

Joakim Milder prefers the term *mental preparedness*, since it is not a question of being equipped with ready solutions to situations that might occur.

What we must have is the ability to listen to the now and adjust our playing to the demands that are called for right now and to be able to have that flexibility which to some extent is motorically and physically conditioned. But if we prepare, should we say, segments with the aim of being prepared when it happens, then I think that we, in a way, make the same mistake as when we talk. Then we'll have these roughly constructed sentences that really weren't what we... You pick the roughest thing, the most suitable. We know it isn't this, but this is what I can. [...] I really do believe that preparations, practice, must include something other than preparing oneself for imagined scenarios. [...] To me it's really completely a mental preparedness.

[Det vi måste ha, det är förmågan att liksom avlyssna "nu" och anpassa vårt spel efter de krav som ställs just nu och kunna ha den flexibiliteten som i viss mån är motoriskt och fysiskt betingad. Men om vi förbereder, ska vi säga, block i syfte att vara redo när det händer, då tror jag att vi på ett sätt begår samma misstag som när vi talar. Då blir det de här grova meningsbyggnaderna som egentligen inte var det som... Då väljer man det grövsta, det som är lämpligast. Vi vet att det är inte det här, men det här är vad jag kan. [...] jag tror verkligen på att förberedelser, övning, måste innebära något annat än att förbereda sig inför tänkta scenarier. [...] För mig är det verkligen helt och hållet en mental beredskap.] (JM35–36)

In Ann-Sofi Söderqvist's opinion, thoughts and plans are worthless in the performance situation. Everything is about "here and now, only, you know. And that which I haven't prepared enough, that's too late anyway." ["här och nu, bara, va. Och det som jag inte har förberett tillräckligt, det är ändå försent"] (ASS39). Lena Willemark points out both how important it is for the soloist to get into contact with one's whole person and how impossible it is to state in which way this state can be achieved:

You can never decide that it's going to come. [...] But you can prepare yourself for it. And I think everyone has somewhat different approaches to that, you know. This is the part you can't get hold of. You know, people have different ways of pouring more energy into themselves. [...] How to prepare – hell, I don't know. I have a few things that are important to me. In that moment, of

course, for one thing. But also in a longer... To me it's important that I can feel the scent of two different flowers. That they smell differently, that I can feel that, you know. It's a kind of awareness – that you're not too rough. You can develop your sensibility.

[Du kan aldrig bestämma att det ska komma. [...] Men du kan förbereda dig för det. Och det tror jag alla har lite olika ingångar till, liksom. Det är det här som inte går att ta på. Alltså, alla människor har olika sätt att fylla på sin energi. [...] Hur man kan förbereda – ja, det vetet fanken. Jag har ju vissa saker som är viktiga för mig. Dels kanske lite i stunden naturligtvis. Men också i ett längre... För mig är det viktigt att jag kan känna doften på två olika blommor. Att de doftar olika, att jag kan känna det, liksom. Det är någon slags awareness – att du inte är för yxig. Du kan öva upp din sensibilitet.] (LW7,12)

As I interpret the quotations cited above, the informants all put forward as crucial the improviser's ability to be present in the 'here and now' of the improvisational moment. This ability is characterized with different words: as an energy, a readiness, a mental preparedness, an awareness, a sensibility, or an ability to get into contact with one's whole person.

#### *MIND AND TECHNIQUE*

Perspectives on the dynamics of musical mastery and musical freedom, the improvisers' thoughts and feelings, or, as it were, sense and sensibility, are eminently present in the informants' statements. Many perspectives in the interviews touch upon qualities of mind in the improviser, such as presence, listening, expressive ability and interhuman relations. Several informants also emphasize the importance of the improviser's musical craftsmanship. Gunnar Lindgren reflects on the *balance* between knowledge and expression, sense and sensibility:

If you know rather little [music theory], but your emotional life is in balance, then you can go quite far in relation to how little you know. [...] Much of his [Coltrane's] success and greatness had to do with the fact that he was damn skilled – but he also had a damn expressiveness.

[Om du kan ganska lite [musikteori], men du har ett balanserat känsloliv, då kan du komma ganska högt i förhållande till hur lite du kan. [...] Mycket utav hans [Coltranes] framgång och storhet hängde på att han var djävligt kunnig – men han hade också ett djävla uttryck.] (GL18)

Lars Jansson points to the potential dangers in putting too much emphasis on theory and technique: "then there is a danger that the music gets a bit soulless" ["då finns det en fara att musiken blir lite själlös"]. He stresses the importance of the jazz

improviser's development along two lines, as a human being as well as a musician: "it's a rotation of crops" ["det är ett växelbruk"].

You know, it's a damn balancing between being serious and, should we say, humourous, easy-going. Either it could be dixieland and cigars and beer, you know, hullabaloo, and then it loses its substance. Or it could be so serious that it becomes grey and introvert, and you almost fall asleep. [...] It's really both things. And if you're just reading Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard, meditating, practising yoga and the like, then you could swim, disappear out in the blue. And if you're just practising... ["Giant steps"]... the circle of fifths or whatever, then you could be like a sewing-machine, you know. But it's damn wonderful to do both things. It's damn liberating, you know.

[Det är ju en djåkla balansgång mellan att vara seriös och vara, ska vi säga, humoristisk, lättsam. Antingen kan det bli dixie och cigarr och bärs, va, tjo och tjim och hej, och då tappar det liksom substans. Eller också kan det bli så seriöst så det blir grått och inåtvänt, så man somnar nästan. [...] Det är verkligen båda grejerna. Och håller du bara på och läser Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, och mediterar, yogar och sådant där, så kan du ju simma, försvinna ut i etern. Och sitter du bara och övar... ["Giant steps"]... kvintcirkel eller vad du vill, så kan du bli som en symaskin, va. Men det är djävligt skönt att göra bägge delar. Det är djävligt frigörande, alltså.] (LJ3,18,46)

Jansson also offers his reflections on how the spiritual aspects of music and life are closely connected with simplicity.

Mysticism is something extremely beautiful and positive. [...] All these great divine moments [...] aren't something you could produce yourself. But you prepare yourself for a long time in your life, and then suddenly it is as though you come to a boiling-point where something happens. [...] Most people who have this kind of experiences, they just laugh. Or cry. Because it's like that: oh, damn, that's the way it is. And it is like returning to yourself, returning to the simple things in life. That the green tea is good, that autumn leaves fall, that it's beautiful outside. It's nothing more than that. We would like to have great big answers.

[Mystik är någonting oerhört vackert och positivt. [...] Alla de här stora gudomliga ögonblicken [...] är ju ingenting som du kan framkalla själv. Utan du förbereder dig under en lång tid i ditt liv, och så plötsligt är det precis som att du kommer till en kokpunkt, så sker någonting. [...] De flesta som har sådana upplevelser, de skrattar bara. Eller gråter. För att det är så: jamen djåklar, så här är det ju. Och det är ju att komma tillbaka till sig själv, att komma tillbaka till det enkla i tillvaron. Att det där gröna teet är gott, att höstlöven

faller, att det är vackert ute och så. Det är inte mer än så. Vi vill gärna ha jättestora svar på det.] (LJ24)

In the interviews, when called for in the course of conversation, I tried to invite the informants to expand on issues of a philosophical nature, such as their outlook on jazz improvisation in relation to their thoughts about music and life. In almost all cases, the informants appeared to view the inclusion of this kind of perspectives as natural and, also, important in order to attain a deeper understanding of the field of inquiry. Needless to say, however, as in matters of aesthetic taste, the informants' statements will vary according to their personal philosophical proclivities. As I interpret the quotations above, attaining a balance or combination between mastery and freedom is considered crucial: between, on one hand, playing with technical proficiency and theoretical knowledge and, on the other, playing in an emotional, humorous, spiritual, and simple manner.

#### *APPEARING AS A HUMAN BEING*

One of the crucial points that is predominant in the interviews is the view that 'storytelling' in a jazz improvisation consists in a statement that, for instance, expresses the player's own emotional experience; in a sense, that allows the improviser to come forward as a human being. In line with several of the statements in the present section, this is something that would have to take place in the moment. Naturally, this perspective may be problematized in different ways. How is it possible to truthfully express one's own emotional experience in a jazz improvisation? To what extent can a jazz musician come forward as a person in his or her improvisations? Bengt Hallberg will not go too far in this respect.

That was a difficult question. [...] It is very much a question of responsibility – both for the music and for that which you represent. And, of course, as in all other cases, to try to do your very best. And I suppose that ambition is predominant when you perform. And you have a sort of obligation, at least, to meet some expectations. Of course, you can't meet all expectations. But... the expectations of both the audience and yourself.

[Det var en svår fråga. [...] Det är väldigt mycket frågan om ansvar – för både musikformen och för det man representerar. Och naturligtvis, som i alla andra fall också, att försöka göra sitt bästa. Och det är väl den viljan som är dominerande när man uppträder, skulle jag tro. Och man har en slags förpliktelse, i alla fall, att möta lite förväntningar. Det är klart, man kan inte möta alla förväntningar. Men... både publikens och sina egna förväntningar.] (BH44–45)



To Ann-Sofi Söderqvist this is a question of "daring to be yourself" ["våga vara sig själv"] in the jazz improvisation: "I'm not afraid of big gestures, neither of doing something that is completely bare and naked. [...] It must be true in some way." ["Jag är inte rädd för stora gester och inte heller för att göra något som är totalt avskalat och naket. [...] Det ska vara sant på något sätt"] (ASS12–13).

Gunnar Lindgren argues that it is important that a broad emotional range (humour, joy, grief, regret) can be expressed by the jazz improviser: "A well-integrated human being, a healthy human being, has the ability to express polarities." ["En välintegrerad människa, en sund människa, har förmåga att uttrycka polariteter."] Such abilities depend on "psychosocial circumstances in a person's life" ["psykosociala förhållanden i en människas liv"], according to Lindgren (GL5–6).

On the other hand, Amanda Sedgwick points out that an interesting human being and jazz improviser does not necessarily have to be harmonious:

To do that you don't have to be balanced or integrated or intelligible even. There are many bizarre and extremely difficult persons who are fantastic musicians. But I think you have to be an interesting person in order to have something to give.

[För det måste man ju inte vara balanserad eller integrerad eller förståelig ens. Det finns ju många bisarra och jättejobbiga människor som är fantastiska musiker. Men jag tror att man måste vara en intressant människa för att ha något att ge.] (AS5)

Sedgwick emphasizes that the most important quality in this regard, in her opinion, is to be "whole, meaning honest" ["hel, i betydelsen ärlig"] (AS6).

I believe that what makes a good, genuine musician is a full life. I simply don't believe that you can pull it out of its context. A musician who has something to say, something important, is a musician who is a full and interesting and nuanced person. [...] It's a very spiritual thing we're doing. A spiritual or universal principle. If it is a certain way inside you, it will show.

[Jag tror det som gör en bra, fullödig musiker är ett helt liv. Jag tror helt enkelt inte att man kan dra ut det ur sitt sammanhang. En musiker som har något att säga, något väsentligt, är en musiker som är en hel och intressant och mångfasetterad människa. [...] Det är ju en väldigt andlig grej vi håller på med. En andlig eller universell princip. Om det är på ett visst sätt inuti så kommer det att visa sig.] (AS1–2)

Roland Keijser points out that the soloist, in some sense, *must* appear as a person in the jazz improvisation.

Then of course in a certain sense you play, try to get close to what you want to or dream of being able to play. That is, the person I would like to be, the one I would like to stand out as. [...] In that sense you always tell about yourself, too. You can't do anything else, really. Some people try, but they mostly don't succeed very well. [Laughs.]

[Sedan är det klart att man i en viss bemärkelse spelar, försöker komma i närheten av det man vill eller drömmer om att kunna spela. Det vill säga: den jag helst skulle vilja vara, den jag helst skulle vilja framstå som. [...] I den bemärkelsen berättar man ju alltid om sig själv också. Man kan inte göra något annat egentligen. Det är väl en del som försöker, men det brukar inte gå så bra. [Skrattar.]] (RK19–20)

Elise Einarsdotter mentions listening experiences that are full of meaning:

Sometimes a note can actually tell of a whole life. [...] It's about life energy. And that energy is communicated. The intention is to communicate that energy. [...] The greatest, [John] Coltrane especially, occupied himself with inner thinking, soul searching. Miles [Davis], too, no matter how tough he may seem. Keith [Jarrett], too. They have really worked with themselves, you know.

[Ibland kan en ton berätta ett helt liv, faktiskt. [...] Det handlar om livsenergi. Och det är den energin som förmedlas. Intentionen är att förmedla den energin. [...] De allra största, [John] Coltrane om någon, sysselsatte sig med inre tänkande, soul searching. Miles [Davis] också, hur tuff han än kan verka. Keith [Jarrett] också. De har ju verkligen arbetat med sig själva.] (EE22,40)

Lars Jansson also comments on the range of the communication in John Coltrane's saxophone improvisations: "there is a very strong spiritual foundation in his playing, sort of, [...] a fabulous expression. Transcendence. [...] His music was a contact with the divine." ["där är en väldigt stark andlig grund i hans spel på något sätt, [...] ett sagolikt uttryck. Transcendens. [...] Hans musik blev en kontakt till det gudomliga"] (LJ20).

Anders Jormin has formulated his ambitions as a musician and improviser in a written credo. It focuses as much on the listener's person as on the musician's person. "I want to communicate the vision of a fuller life, a life lived in harmony with yourself, with respect and nearness to the world, the spirituality and the people around. If I from time to time am able to be the catalyst that brings a fellow human being closer to her vision and makes her grow, then I am grateful." ["Jag vill förmedla visionen om ett fullödigare liv, ett liv framlevt i harmoni med sig själv, i respekt och närhet till världen, andligheten och människorna omkring. Kan jag då och då vara den katalysator som för en medmänniska närmare sin vision och får henne att växa, är jag tacksam."] Jormin further develops these intentions:

I hope that the things I express with my music can work as a catalyst for someone else, for a listener or a fellow musician, to get closer to their own vision of creativity and of life as a whole. In the end, if you look at it from an overarching musical perspective, then a successful improvisation of course is when I manage to touch another human being on a spiritual level. [...] If you listen to me, the important thing isn't to impute my own vision to you, but to open your heart to your own vision.

[Det jag ger uttryck för med min musik hoppas jag kunna fungera som en katalysator för någon annan, för en lyssnare eller medmusikant, att komma närmare sin egen vision kring skapandet och kring livet i stort. I slutändan, om man ser det i ett övermusikaliskt perspektiv, då är givetvis en lyckad improvisation när jag lyckas beröra eller tänga en annan människa på det själsliga planet. [...] Om du nu lyssnar på mig, så är inte det viktiga att pådyvla dig min vision, utan att öppna ditt hjärta för din egen vision.] (AJ3–5)

Lars Jansson describes a related ambition which in some sense addresses the kind of polarities mentioned by Gunnar Lindgren in the quote above: humour and joy of life, but also melancholy and pain.

Some values in life I try to... and maybe intuitively shape in music. [...] There is a joy of life and happiness in playing music together with musicians and communicating with an audience. But, at the same time, this melancholy, we know that we are going to die, that our parents disappear from us... The pain in life is there. You can't escape that. And I think that, hopefully, good music and good art comes about when you can recognize and accept both sides.

[Vissa värderingar i livet försöker jag... och kanske intuitivt gestaltar i musiken. [...] Det finns en livsglädje och lycka i att spela musik tillsammans med musiker och kommunicera med en publik. Men samtidigt det här vemodet, att vi vet att vi ska dö, att våra föräldrar försvinner ifrån oss... Smärtan i livet finns där. Det kommer man inte undan. Och jag tror att det förhoppningsvis gör bra musik och bra konst, när man kan acceptera, bejaka bägge sidorna.] (LJ3)

To Jansson, music is indeed a way towards better knowledge about his own self.

To me music is a path to follow, [...] in Japanese culture, especially in Buddhist Zen culture, gardening, tea ceremonies, archery, and the art of warfare all really are ways to get to know yourself, and understand our existence, and become one with being, with the ground of being, with nature. [...] Music has taught me something about myself and about life.

[För mig är musiken en väg att gå, [...] i japansk kultur, speciellt i den buddhistiska zen-kulturen, är ju trädgårdsskötsel, teceremoni, bågsytte, stridskonsten, allting egentligen en väg för att lära känna sig själv, och förstå tillvaron, och bli ett med varat, med urgrunden, med naturen. [...] Musiken har lärt mig någonting om mig själv och om livet.] (LJ2)

In sum, the statements above seem to me to indicate that a majority of the musicians actually find that the medium of jazz improvisation can be a means for truthfully expressing the improviser's own emotional experience, for coming forward as a human being.

*DIRECTIONALITY OUTWARDS, TOWARDS THE MUSICAL ENVIRONMENT;  
LISTENING, PAUSES*

Previously – in the section (5.1) where I attempted to present the informants' general views – situational and contextual features, such as collective, interactional creativity, were included as one important perspective on the concept of 'storytelling' in the field of jazz improvisation. These aspects are of course highly relevant to the issues focused on in the present section, namely, improvisational multi-directionality in the present moment: that category of the 'storytelling' jazz improviser's practice for which I have suggested the term configuration, borrowed from Ricoeur's past–present–future analysis of narrative. Several informants emphasize the importance of the improviser's contact with the environment.

Some informants point to the importance of pauses in jazz improvisation. Roland Keijser says: "The bebop of the 50s, that language and that phrasing is built on breathing, you know. It's part of that language." ["50-tals-bebopjazz, hela det språket och den fraseringen bygger ju liksom på att man andas. Det är ju en del av det språket"] (RK8). Nisse Sandström mentions Chet Baker as an example; his playing, in Sandströms opinion, is "completely unaggressive, you know, if you think of aggressiveness as pushing it. He treats himself to pauses. And drummers say it was completely wonderful to play with him. So easy. He leaves something for the others to think about when he solos." ["totalt oaggressivt liksom, om man tänker sig att aggressiviteten är att ligga på. Han kostar på sig pauser. Och trumslagare säger att det var helt underbart att spela med honom. Så lätt. Han lämnar någonting till de andra att fundera på när han spelar solo"] (NS14).

Sandström further discusses how musicians can employ pauses in their improvisations.

If, when you play the blues, you leave every fourth bar, bar 4, empty – you solo for three bars, then a pause in the fourth bar – then you get exactly the same story as when a blues singer is singing. I heard Jimmy Heath play like that. I was standing behind him at [the Stockholm jazz club] Fasching, and I thought: what the hell is he doing? Because it started to swing enormously. He played

fifteen choruses that way. It becomes repetition, and repetition can lead to ecstasy. [...] Then we are talking about a kind of architecture that is planned.

[Om man när man spelar blues lämnar varje fjärde takt, takt 4, tom – man spelar solo i tre takter, paus fjärde takten – då får man exakt samma berättelse som när en bluesångare sjunger. Jag hörde Jimmy Heath spela så där. Jag stod bakom på Fasching, och jag tänkte: vad fan är det han gör? För det började svänga något enormt. Han spelade femton chorus på det sättet. Det blir en upprepning, och en upprepning kan leda till en slags extas. [...] då är vi inne på en slags arkitektur, som är planerad.] (NS46,48)

Roland Keijser points to the importance of pauses for the soloist's credibility.

If you hang a little more on the rhythm and maybe are a little bit more generous with the pauses between your statements, it will give a certain quality to your storytelling. I came to think of Dexter Gordon. [...] he plays heavily like that, in a way. [...] it gives enormous authority to it all. It inspires confidence that what he tells is true, so to speak. While a soloist who hurries a bit too forcedly, you get a feeling that... oh, he's going to stumble soon. These really good storytellers [...] often you like to have this weight, a little of this slowness, a pause now and then, so the listener can reflect himself about what will come next.

[Om du hänger lite mera på rytmen och kanske är lite mera generös med pauserna mellan påståendena, så ger ju det en speciell kvalitet i berättandet. Jag kom att tänka på Dexter Gordon. [...] han spelar så där tungt på något sätt [...] det ger en väldig auktoritet åt det hela. Det inger ju en sorts förtroende att det han berättar är sant, så att säga. Medan en som jagar på djävligt fingerfärdigt, med ett lite tunnare sound kanske, med en väldig drive kanske, men jagar på lite väl forcerat, då får man ju en känsla av att... oj, snart snubblar han. Han har för bråttom, liksom. Sådana här riktigt goda historieberättare [...] ofta får det ju gärna vara den där tyngden, lite den här långsamheten, en paus ibland, så att den som lyssnar får fundera själv: vad kommer nu då, liksom.] (RK7)

The pauses of the improvised solo may provide possibilities for the fellow musicians to listen, react, and respond, thereby facilitating a kind of improvised conversation. Anders Jormin tries out the notion that this kind of listening could be culturally conditioned.

the concept "fjälljazz" [fjeld jazz], which is a bit careless and almost embarrassing – I often thought about and discussed it with some friends, among others Jon Balke, my Norwegian colleague, who thinks that we have a

comparatively long tradition of no wars, [...] of democracy, [...] of counsel, discussing and listening to others before you make a decision. And you may indulge in fancies about how the democratic heritage that we have up here has led to a tradition of listening as much as talking. And that the listening in what we carelessly call Scandinavian music takes up more space than in American music [...] It's sort of a... semi-scientific notion.

[begreppet "fjälljazz", som är lite slarvigt och närmast pinsamt, det har jag ibland tänkt på och diskuterat med en del vänner, bland annat Jon Balke, norsk kollega, som menar att vi har ju en förhållandevis lång tradition av icke-krig, [...] av demokrati, [...] av rådslag, att man diskuterar och att man lyssnar till andra innan man tar ett beslut. Och det demokratiska arvet som vi har här uppe skulle man kunna fantisera om att det har lett till en tradition av att man lyssnar lika mycket som man säger någonting. Och att lyssnandet i det som slarvigt kallas skandinavisk musik har en större plats än i amerikansk musik [...] Det är en lite... semivetenskaplig idé.] (AJ29)

Jormin also expresses the opinion that the essential thing in this context is not the pause in itself but the listening that takes place in, and owing to, the pause.

We can learn a lot of creative practice through comparison with speech. With a talk, a conversation, perhaps. And I think a lot like that. If I'm playing myself, I have an imagined interlocutor, whose phrase I wait for – and to me it becomes a pause, if I'm calm enough. [...] We musicians don't experience it as if we take pauses every now and then. We feel that we listen to what happens, and that's a damn difference.

[Vi kan lära oss mycket av utförandepraxis med att jämföra med talet, just. Med ett samtal, med en konversation, kanske. Och jag tänker mycket så. Om jag spelar själv så har jag en tänkt samtalspartner, vars fras jag väntar in – och den blir till en paus för mig, om jag är lugn nog. [...] Vi musiker upplever ju inte att vi tar paus stup i kvarten. Vi upplever att vi lyssnar till vad som sker, och det är en djäkla skillnad.] (AJ29,30)

Musical pauses, then, in the informants' opinion, come forward as important to jazz improvisation in several respects: they may serve as an assurance that the musical interplay includes listening to each other; they may also support the improviser's authority and trustworthiness.

#### *RHYTHM, SWING*

One particular aspect of jazz musical interplay is the rhythm, the swing. Joakim Milder views the rhythmical aspects of the improvisation in relation to the story that is told. If the rhythmical aspects are only embryonic, the improviser's storytelling will

be impeded, in Milder's opinion: "The rhythm is a consequence of that which needed to be said." ["Rytmiiken är ju en konsekvens av vad som behöver sägas"] (JM34). Bengt Hallberg compares positive collective experiences in jazz and classical music: "I remember from chamber music that happy feeling when you succeeded in making a ritardando together. It was enormous. It was about the same thing as when jazz music begins to swing." ["Jag minns från kammarmusik just den lyckokänslan som blev när man lyckades göra ett ritardando tillsammans. Den var enorm. Det var ungefär som kicken när det börjar svänga i jazz"] (BH100). Several informants stress the importance of rhythmical balance within the jazz group. Ulf Johansson Werre says:

Swing is something I consider an incredibly essential part in all the jazz music trade. Sometimes you're regarded with something of a scornful smile when you speak of swing. [...] But to me the word stands for something very great.

[Svänget är något som jag ser som en otroligt central del i jazzmusikalisk hantering över huvud taget. Det betraktas ibland till och med lite av ett hånleende, när man pratar om svänget. [...] Men ordet står för mig för något som är väldigt stort.] (UJW3)

When listening to current jazz music Lennart Åberg experiences rhythmical differences that he views as culturally conditioned: "I can't find very many Swedish musicians who live up to the rhythmic level that many of the Americans have." ["Jag kan inte hitta så många svenska musiker som lever upp till den rytmiska nivån som många av de amerikanska har"] (LÅ16). Gunnar Lindgren shares this opinion and defines the problem as a question of polyrhythmical abilities: "to be able to shift between two and three in your improvisation" ["att i sin improvisation kunna vagga mellan två och tre"]. According to Lindgren, Scandinavian jazz musicians have

a rather vague rhythmic conception and not that much triplets and syncopation, but more of storytelling related to folk music. I think of Jan Johansson and not least Lars Gullin, and Jan Garbarek as well, you know. They have one thing in common: they don't carry on with these rhythmic subtleties. And I think it's natural and correct to begin where you are, you know, and not try to dress up in some other clothes.

[en rytmuppfattning som är ganska vag och inte så mycket trioler och synkoper och så, utan mer storytelling runt folkmusik. Jag tänker på Jan Johansson och inte minst Lars Gullin, och även Jan Garbarek, alltså. De har det gemensamt att de inte håller på och härjar med de här rytmiska finesserna. Och då menar jag att det är också naturligt och riktigt att börja där du står, alltså, och inte försöka att klä det i en annan dräkt.] (GL7)

Lindgren thinks the rhythmical ability is crucial for young musicians' career prospects: "As a rule, those who succeed have a rather rich rhythmic conception, you know, they are like a little more African than the others – if you are to generalize. [...] Those who formulate a didactics of rhythm in the West will supply a great demand." ["De som lyckas har som regel en ganska rik rytmisk uppfattning, alltså, de är liksom lite mer afrikaner än de andra – om man ska generalisera. [...] Den som formulerar här i västvärlden en pedagogik för rytm kommer att fylla ett stort behov"] (GL7).

In my interpretation, issues of rhythm and swing constitute yet another area where the informants' statements are clearly tinged with their different aesthetic convictions. On the crucial importance of rhythm to jazz improvisation, however, there appears to be no disagreement.

#### *INTERPLAY WITH FELLOW MUSICIANS*

My presentation of the informants' views on the abilities required in jazz improvisation has focused, among other things, on their conceptualizations of the musician's ability to have contact with his or her individual, internal voice in the improvisational moment. This ability of presence is characterized as a mental readiness, an awareness; in brief, as a sensibility that is directed not only inwards but also, and importantly, outwards towards the fellow musicians and the audience. In the next few paragraphs, informants' perspectives on the improvising musician's relations to fellow musicians are in focus.

Anders Jormin offers a multi-directional picture of a jazz musician's interplay: "I often speak of the outward and the inward gaze. [...] It's the gaze outwards, towards the listeners, towards the fellow musicians – and inwards, to your own inner voice and vision. Among all players." ["Jag talar ofta om blicken utåt och blicken inåt. [...] Det är blicken utåt mot lyssnarna, utåt mot medmusikanterna – och så inåt, sin inre röst och vision. Alla spelare emellan"] (AJ8). Ann-Sofi Söderqvist develops a similar line of thought: "It's a balance between an outward ear and an inward ear. Listening inwards to your own voice, so to speak, that wants to express itself. But at the same time you must have an outward ear towards the ones you play with, so that you can be influenced by them, too." ["Det är en balans mellan ett yttre gehör och ett inre gehör. Att man lyssnar inåt på sin egen röst, så att säga, som vill uttrycka sig. Men samtidigt måste man ha ett gehör utåt mot dem som man spelar med, så att man också kan låta sig influeras av dem"] (ASS21).

Elise Einarsdotter views the things the improviser plays as "a reaction to that which is happening between the musicians, the codes between the musicians and, above all, the vibes coming from the audience" ["en reaktion på det som händer musikerna emellan, koderna musikerna emellan och framför allt de vibes som kommer från publiken"] (EE2). Nisse Sandström mentions Louis Armstrong as a concise and legendary example of how these connections can work together: "He lives through the audience. [...] It gives the musicians a feeling of joy." ["Han lever genom publiken. [...] Det ger musikerna en känsla av glädje"] (NS10–11).



Joakim Milder, too, points out that jazz improvisations ought not to be viewed in isolation, as the products of a single mind: "All of that exists in a context together with other instruments and other improvisers" ["Allt det där finns ju i ett sammanhang tillsammans med andra instrument och andra improvisatörer"], and the directions chosen by the improviser "are intimately connected with and sometimes inseparable from them" ["är intimt förknippade och i vissa fall oskiljbara från dem"] (JM7–9).

The composition and communication of jazz groups are considered by the informants to be of great consequence to the individual musician. "A prerequisite is that you play with musicians that you are triggered by" ["En förutsättning är ju att spela med musiker som triggas av"], says Jonas Kullhammar (JK7). Lars Jansson points to the importance of allowing each other space: "With certain musicians you get more space, and you are more relaxed, and it works better" ["Med vissa musiker så får man mer plats, och man blir mer avspänd, och det funkade bättre"] (LJ17). Amanda Sedgwick stresses the rhythmical interplay: "I'm very dependent of which drummer it is, I play a lot together with the drummer, [...] not only the kind of swing, but the phrases that drummer is playing" ["Jag är jätteberoende av vad det är för trummis, jag spelar jättemycket med trummisen, [...] inte bara typen av sväng, utan vilka fraser den trummisen spelar"] (AS28–29).

Anders Jormin emphasizes that it is important that the musicians provide each other with challenges:

At least I find that the most stimulating thing is to work with people who both challenge me – on all levels, as a human being and as an artist – and at the same time provide space and even demand my own voice, my own standpoint or my interpretation of something. And those are the contexts I choose today.

[Jag finner det i alla fall mest stimulerande att arbeta med dem som både utmanar mig – på alla de nivåer, som människa och som konstnär – och samtidigt både ger plats och till och med kräver min egen röst, mitt eget ställningstagande eller tolkande av någonting. Och det är de sammanhangen som jag väljer i dag.] (AJ20)

Ulf Johansson Werre maintains that the functioning of a jazz group is highly dependent on how it is put together.

You play quite a lot for one another in a jazz band. It's a pleasure to feel jointly where you have the timing. Any combination of people – you may pick any simple group, a quartet, trio plus a horn player or something like that – any such combination is completely unique in this respect. If you switch one, the balance will be slightly different, maybe both rhythmically and harmonically

and everything. You affect one another very much. More than 25 percent changes, actually.

[Man spelar rätt mycket för varandra i en jazzorkester. Det är en njutning att gemensamt känna in var man har en tajming. Varje kombination av människor – om du tar en enkel grupp, en kvartett, trio plus någon blåsare eller något sådant där – varje sådan kombination av fyra personer är i det här fallet helt unik. Om du byter ut en så blir det en slightly annorlunda balans, kanske både rytmiskt och harmoniskt och allting. Man påverkar väldigt mycket. Det är mer än 25 procent som förändras, egentligen.] (UJW6)

Ann-Sofi Söderqvist verifies that fellow musicians are "extremely important" ["extremt viktiga"] to a soloist: "You can go on a journey together – or you can feel very lonely when you play, depending on how it works" ["Man kan ju vara på en resa tillsammans – eller man kan känna sig väldigt ensam när man spelar, beroende på hur det funkade"] (ASS21). Bengt Hallberg views the relation with fellow musicians as "a more intuitive and emotional thing" ["en mera intuitiv och känslomässig sak"].

If you get on well together and like each other's ways of playing, you know, then it's quite another thing to play together. I know, in Dompan's [alto saxophonist Arne Domnerus's] band, we had lots of foolish pranks, but it was such damn fun, you know. The audience liked it, too. And you can do that when you appreciate each other and understand each other, but... in unfamiliar environments they might get very angry.

[Om man trivs tillsammans och tycker om varandras spelsätt, alltså, då är det en helt annan sak att spela samman. Jag vet, i Dompan's band, där gjorde vi en massa tokigheter, men det var så jäkla roligt alltså. Publikerna gillade det också. Och det där går ju an att göra när man uppskattar varann och förstår varann, men... i främmande sammanhang så kunde de ju bli väldigt arga.] (BH27)

Hallberg mentions his work with the singer Karin Krog as especially joyous and rewarding:

She feels like a work-mate, not a star standing up front... That contact exactly. The same with Monica Zetterlund. I have experienced moments in some ballads, [Povel Ramel's] "Underbart är kort", or something, when it almost felt indecent, the contact... It was so incredibly inspiring.

[Hon känns som en arbetskompis, inte som en stjärna som står där framme... Just den kontakten. Monica Zetterlund likadant. Jag har upplevt ögonblick i vissa ballader, "Underbart är kort" eller någonting, då det nästan kändes oanständigt, kontakten... Det var så oerhört inspirerande.] (BH51)

Several informants testify to relations with fellow musicians as being very deep and strong experiences. Ann-Sofi Söderqvist says: "I have different levels of consciousness. [...] I think a human being has much within her, [...] think you have lots of information within, that you sometimes can access and sometimes not. [...] if you feel that everybody's energy is going in the same direction, then you can be incredibly strong as a collective" ["Jag har olika medvetandenivåer. [...] Jag tror människan har mycket inom sig, [...] tror att man har väldigt mycket information inom sig, som man ibland har tillgång till och ibland inte. [...] om man känner att allas energier går åt samma håll, då kan man bli otroligt starkt som kollektiv" (ASS35). Nisse Sandström recounts a story from the trumpeter Rolf Ericson.

When he [Rolf Ericson] was playing with Ellington's band, it was for quite some time, he sat next to Cootie Williams. And it happened a few times that he felt: I'm about to take off. So he sat there holding on to his chair. And looked at Cootie Williams, and Cootie Williams looked at Roffe – and smiled! [...] He knew what it was all about, yeah. This is part of the magic we cultivate. We can't deny that we do. And that magic is on records, too. It's funny that it sticks.

[När han [Rolf Ericson] spelade med Ellingtons band, det var rätt länge, så satt han bredvid Cootie Williams. Och det hände några få gånger att han kände: jag håller på att lyfta. Så han satt och höll sig i stolen. Och tittade på Cootie Williams, och Cootie Williams tittade på Roffe – och log! [...] Han visste vad det handlade om, ja. Det här ingår i den magin som vi odlar. Det kan vi inte komma ifrån att vi gör. Och den magin finns ju också inspelad på skivor. Det är rätt kul att den fastnar.] (NS15–16)

Peter Asplund expands on a description of how a jazz group can experience how musical interplay and extra-musical being together form parts of the same continuum.

With my quartet there is a constant dialogue. And then we go on stage and play two full sets, and afterwards we went home to my kitchen and sat there at a round table with some nice cheese and wine, and we continued talking. And then I started to think of it like this: it's really the concert that goes on. We play the same parts, we speak in the same manner, we provide each other with the same space, we make associations, we laugh in the right places, we start talking seriously, sometimes we talk about commonplace stuff that we heard before – that is, an old standard tune – and sometimes we start talking about some new idea that someone brings up and we haven't thought about before – which would be some new tune, you know. [...] The gig went on at night, or rather the supper started on stage.

[Med min kvartett har vi en dialog hela tiden. Och så går vi upp på scenen och spelar två fulla set, och efter det där så åkte vi hem till mitt kök och satt där vid ett runt bord med lite goda ostar och vin, och så pratade vi vidare. Och så började jag tänka så där: det är faktiskt konserten som fortsätter. Vi har samma roller, vi pratar på samma sätt, vi ger varann samma utrymme, vi associerar, vi garvar på rätt ställe, vi börjar prata allvar, ibland pratar vi om grejer som är banala som vi har hört förut – det vill säga en gammal standardlåt – och ibland börjar vi prata om någon ny tanke som någon kommer med och som vi inte har funderat på tidigare – och det innebär någon ny låt, liksom. [...] Giget fortsatte på kvällen, eller rättare sagt att middagen började på scen.] (PA17)

However, some informants also report experiences of a different kind, where certain musicians – guest soloists, in particular – draw very clear boundaries for the musical interplay within a jazz group. Bengt Hallberg recalls that "American guest soloists, they want very strict patterns... and they want, how should I put it, the established chord sequences for standard tunes" ["Amerikanska gästande solister, de vill ha absolut fasta mallar... och de vill ha, vad ska man säga, de harmoniseringar av standards som är liksom etablerade"] (BH29). Lennart Åberg describes the same phenomenon: "They are happy being the soloists and [...] playing with comp groups where not very much happens, no surprises and such things" ["De är nöjda med att vara solisterna och [...] spela till komp där det inte händer så mycket, inga överraskningar och sådant där"] (LÅ26).

The stories and reflections contributed by the informants provide a very rich picture of how the interaction between musicians may affect the jazz improviser: as a source of joy and inspiration, musical, intellectual and emotional challenge, energy, and well-being. Judging from their statements, musicians are clearly quite sensitive to whether such interplay functions well or not.

#### *INTERPLAY WITH THE AUDIENCE*

What significance does the audience have in relation to the jazz improviser? "They contribute to the result. No doubt about that." ["De bidrar till resultatet. Det är ingen tvekan"], Nisse Sandström verifies (NS14). Bengt Hallberg thinks the audience is "extremely important" ["oerhört betydelsefull"]:

I can't say whether I'm imagining it or not, but I think you sometimes can feel if the audience is friendly or if it's indifferent. Or even hostile, too, sometimes.

[Om det är inbillning eller ej, det kan jag inte säga, men jag tycker man känner på sig om publiken är vänligt inställd eller om den är ligkiltig. Eller rentav fientlig ibland också.] (BH34)

Amanda Sedgwick describes her own experiences from the United States of the integrated function that African American church music possesses in the divine service. She reflects upon how this phenomenon relates to jazz music: "Jazz has that element very strongly. It's one of its roots, you know. [...] It's so much call and response. That's the whole thing about it, I feel, with black church music. It's completely integrated." ["Jazz har ju det elementet väldigt starkt. Det är ju en av rötterna. [...] Det är så mycket fråga-svar. Det är det som är hela grejen med det, upplever jag, med svart kyrkomusik. Det är totalt integrerat"] (AS30).

Ulf Johansson Werre agrees that the audience "means a lot" ["betyder mycket"] but he stresses the problems with generalization in this regard. As a musician, one may experience "totally perfect music" ["fullständigt fullödig musik"] in rehearsals without an audience. Situations sometimes occur where the audience is "a factor that makes it worse, musically" ["en faktor som gör att det rent musikaliskt blir sämre"] (UJW6). Ann-Sofi Söderqvist emphasizes the positive power of the audience: "If you feel that the audience is listening and is open to what you do, that will have incredibly positive impact on the concert." ["Om man känner att det är en lyssnande publik som är öppen för det man gör, så är det ju en otroligt positiv inverkan på konserten"] (ASS22).

Jonas Kullhammar, too, finds the audience important to the jazz improvisation: "The number doesn't matter, but the feeling that you connect. [...] I try to play the same way whether there is an audience or not. But I'm certain that it's affected by the audience, and my favourite records are almost all live recordings." ["Antal spelar ingen roll. Däremot att man känner att man når varann. [...] Jag försöker spela på samma sätt oavsett om det är publik eller inte. Men jag tror säkerligen att det påverkas av publiken, och mina favoritskivor är nästan genomgående live-skivor"] (JK11–12).

Several informants describe their experiences of situations with an inattentive audience: "If you accept the situation, then there can be something very relaxed where maybe you play mostly for one another, the musicians. [...] You have to stand by what you do. Otherwise you can't win anyone." ["Om man accepterar situationen så kan det ju finnas någonting väldigt avspänt, där man spelar kanske framför allt för varann, musikerna. [...] Man måste ju själv stå för det man gör. Annars kan man inte vinna någon"] (ASS24). Bengt Hallberg describes a possible strategy on such occasions: "I have experienced that you make an inattentive audience pay attention by lowering the sound volume. [...] By playing so softly that in the end they start to cry hush. [...] In most cases you turn up the volume. And that is so wrong, you know." ["Jag har varit med om också att man har fått en ouppmärksam publik att bli uppmärksam, genom att sänka tonstyrkan. [...] Spela så svagt så att till slut börjar de hyssja. [...] I de flesta fall så skruvar man ju upp. Och det är ju så tokigt"] (BH37–39). Ulf Johansson Werre points out that the reactions of the audience may have to do with the way the musician appears as a person:

If I have made the best out of my possibility to communicate with the audience, then there is nothing more I can do. [...] I have to show my self as a person. People want to hear a personality. They don't come just to experience something capable, they want to hear a human being.

[Om jag har gjort det bästa av min möjlighet till kommunikation med publiken, då kan jag inte göra mer. [...] Jag måste visa upp mig som person. Folk vill höra en personlighet. De kommer inte bara för att uppleva något som är duktigt, utan de vill höra en person.] (UJW6)

Among the informants there are also, however, different perspectives on the improviser's relation to the audience. Lars Jansson says that even though he aims to "be myself in front of everyone" ["att vara mig själv inför alla människor"], the audience still does not always seem absolutely necessary to him: "You know, sometimes I've felt that I could actually just stay home and play. Nobody would listen. I guess there's some sort of performance anxiety in that." ["Ibland har jag ju känt att jag skulle egentligen bara kunna sitta hemma och spela. Ingen får höra. Och i det ligger väl någon slags prestationsångest"] (LJ15). Joakim Milder expresses a similar view with somewhat different reasons:

I can feel the same satisfaction playing in a room with no audience. [...] To me it's enough that this is music that needs to be played. On another level it's very gratifying, of course, that somebody wants to hear it. [...] It's a bit odd that you don't address someone in particular. It's about the same way when you write a book, I imagine. [...] It could almost be problematic if you're too occupied with the receiver.

[Jag kan känna samma tillfredsställelse att spela i en lokal utan publik. [...] För mig räcker det med att det här är musik som behöver spelas. På ett annat plan är det naturligtvis väldigt glädjande att någon vill höra den. [...] Det är ju lite märkligt, att man inte adresserar någon specifik. Det är på ett liknande sätt när man skriver en bok, kan jag tänka mig. [...] Jag har väldigt svårt att just rikta mig, försöka uttrycka något till någon. [...] Det kan nästan bli problematiskt om man är för upptagen av mottagaren.] (JM10–11,13–15)

The relation between musicians and listeners is also connected to questions about what or how much in the music that the listener is able to catch, assimilate, or understand. Nisse Sandström points to TV concerts with the pianist Erroll Garner as a kind of snapshot of how this relation may appear: "When he has played one of his delicious phrases he immediately looks into the camera! He is so incredibly happy to hear what he plays. And he wants to check: are you with me?" ["När han har spelat en av sina läckra fraser så tittar han omedelbart in i kameran! Han är så oerhört glad över att höra det han spelar. Och han vill kolla: är ni med?"] (NS29).

Peter Asplund reflects on the question how the improvisation is perceived by the listener. Even though he finds it impossible to ascertain, he still thinks that there is a sort of consensus of listeners' reactions. "It is muddled in the sense that you never know. [...] Why most people perceive the same thing, I don't know." ["Det blir ju grumligt på det sättet att man vet ju aldrig. [...] Vad det beror på att de flesta uppfattar samma sak, det vet jag inte"] (PA5).

In an email communication after the interview, Lennart Åberg shares his thoughts on how the picture of jazz improvisation as storytelling can relate to the listener and the musician, respectively. Åberg thinks that "experiencing a solo as a story is probably within the listener, not the performer [...] I think much fewer musicians think 'now I'm going to tell a story' than the number of listeners who experience a solo as a story" ["att uppleva ett solo som en berättelse nog ligger hos lyssnaren och inte hos utövaren [...] jag tror att det är mycket färre musiker som tänker att 'nu ska jag berätta en story' än antalet lyssnare som upplever ett solo som en story"] (LÅ, email, December 2010).

In Lena Willemark's opinion, the reactions of the audience do not necessarily have an unequivocal relation to the music they hear: "You may roam [as a listener]. It might be a hell of a good solo, but it didn't catch me. I can go on without being touched by it, maybe if I'm under stress, or if I wasn't there, in myself." ["Man kan vandra iväg [som lyssnare]. Det kanske är ett skitbra solo, men det grep inte tag i mig. Jag kan gå vidare utan att bli berörd, om jag kanske är stressad, eller om jag inte var där, i mig själv"] (LW3).

The audience, in several statements by the informants, is viewed as an important source of inspiration and energy to the jazz improviser; but also, sometimes, as a source of distraction and irritation. In connection with these issues, the informants once more reflect on how listeners perceive a jazz improvisation; and once more, some of them put forward the perspective that the concept of 'storytelling' may well be at its most relevant to the field of jazz improvisation when it is viewed from the audience perspective.

### 5.2.3. Refiguration

My presentation of interview results has dealt first (in subsection 5.2.1) with aspects of the improvisers' technical and theoretical luggage, as it were; bluntly put, all that which in a sense constitutes their memory. Borrowing from the terminology of Saint Augustine's and Ricoeur's tripartite narrative analysis, I have chosen to use the word *prefiguration* for this category of perspectives ('the present of past things'). Second, I have presented (in subsection 5.2.2) aspects of the improvisers' presence in the now; or, their attention. This category has been termed *configuration* ('the present of present things').

I turn now, thirdly and lastly, to a category termed *refiguration* ('the present of future things'). It is used here with reference to all those aspects which, in a sense, constitute the improviser's expectation. I take refiguration to designate their acts of conveying improvisationally created coherence, as a means of reaching listeners through the communication of meaning in ways which may be perceived as 'stories'. In the interview investigation, several of the informants present their perspectives on the improviser's plans for the future directions of the solo improvisation.

#### *FORM, STRUCTURE, PLAN*

There are, at least in some earlier jazz traditions, examples of how certain *structural qualities* are aimed at in a jazz improvisation: according to such a view, it ought to be rhetorically well-turned, coherent, and well structured. In more modern traditions, harmonic and rhythmic frameworks very often remain to be considered by the improviser. Is there a contradiction between the aim, on one hand, to attain maximal presence in the moment and the aim, on the other hand, to relate to the forms and structures of the musical material and to plan one's improvisation? Joakim Milder does not perceive any such contradiction.

There are always conditions that govern, and if we choose that sort of terrain, we're grateful to be governed. [...] I really don't think there is a contradiction exactly. I think that elegant rhetorics is rather the outcome of a safe relationship to the now.

[Det finns alltid förutsättningar som styr, och om vi väljer den typen av terräng så är vi tacksamma för att få den styrningen. [...] Jag tror egentligen inte att det är någon motsättning, direkt. Jag tror att den där eleganta retoriken är snarare frukten av ett tryggt förhållande till nuet.] (JM27,47)

Peter Asplund gives a humorous description of a common structure for the development of dynamics and intensity in jazz improvisations: "dinosaur shape: start soft, then it gets big in the middle and then it gets thinner... John Cleese said that. It's often like that, you know." ["dinosaurieformen: börja soft och så blir det stort i mitten och så smalnar det av... Det var John Cleese som sade det. Så är det ju ofta"] (PA17).

One of the solo qualities mentioned above is *simplicity*. The aim for simplicity can be a deliberate strategy in the jazz improviser, according to Nisse Sandström.

there is a certain simplicity [...] a simplicity which isn't due to lack... of ideas, no, it's due to wealth. That's where they find that simplicity... that can be so enormously packed with excitement, where a pause can give... A pause for half a bar can be like an eternity... Excitement... And it leaves it to those who accompany. [...] Jan Johansson. I believe he often thought like that: now I'll



play as simple as possible, as few notes as possible, as sparse as possible, as much air as possible. And in another context the opposite, lots of notes, crammed, you know. I believe he thought like that. If you imagine the way you make a draft of something...

[det finns en viss enkelhet [...] en enkelhet som inte beror på fattigdom... på idéer, utan den beror på en rikedom. Det är där de hämtar den här enkelheten... som kan bli så oerhört laddad, där en paus kan ge... En paus på en halv takt kan vara som en evighet... Spänning... Och den lämnar över till den som är med och kompar. [...] Jan Johansson. Han tror jag ofta tänkte: nu ska jag spela så enkelt som möjligt, så få toner som möjligt, så sparsamt som möjligt, så mycket luft som möjligt. Och i andra sammanhang motsatsen, massor av toner, fullpackat liksom. Jag tror han tänkte så. Om du tänker dig som man gör en ritning inför någonting...] (NS9–10)

Another solo quality mentioned above has to do with how the improviser employs *contrasts*. In 2010, Ann-Sofi Söderqvist was awarded the Jan Johansson Prize. The explanatory statement said: "Both as a soloist and as a composer her language is unique and profoundly human" ["Både som solist och kompositör är hennes språk unikt och djupt mänskligt"]. Söderqvist comments on this: "I think it's about me daring to be dramatic" ["Jag tror att det handlar om att jag vågar vara dramatisk"] (ASS6). On a general level, the aim for contrasts and drama can be perceived as typical for a large portion of Western music. Roland Keijser points out that the same aim does not permeate certain other musical cultures. Furthermore, certain structural phenomena which could be seen as typical for jazz music are culturally conditioned to a high degree, he maintains.

An aspect in European music which is unique is this constant modulation, shifting between different feelings in stead of remaining in one, and trying to clarify that one, like in classical Indian music. You know Beche, Bengt Berger, who spent a lot of time in India, he told me once that he was about to play some Beethoven or some typical example of advanced European music for some Indian friends, and they... they started laughing hysterically, they didn't at all understand these dramatic shifts between different emotional states. They are used to a slower process where you by subtle means gradually open the door to a room which eventually turns out to contain innumerable nuances of one and the same colour. A psychologically and spiritually deepened experience, you might say. That kind of drama with lots of abrupt emotional twists, which is so typical of European opera... they didn't know how to handle it. Naturally there is drama and contrast in classical Indian music, too, as well as in Arabian, or in seemingly more monotonous idioms such as Swedish folk music or the blues. But not through extreme changes in dynamics or through constant changes in modality, but on another level. [...] Well, to us it's an established language, but

if you look at it from a distance, pretending you're from some other planet: what the hell is that, really? And to someone who was raised with rock shows at [the Stockholm arena] Globen and happens to slip into some jazz club where people sit and listen, and then suddenly they start to clap, as if it were on someone's command, after solos – that, too, must seem damn bizarre and incomprehensible. I think that jazz music actually has more in common with older traditions, such as for instance Indian and Arabian music or Swedish folk music, rather than with European classical or modern contemporary so called art music. But as a part of Western modernity and its cultural values, jazz music has gradually approached the market of art music, thereby removing itself from its earlier roots in folk music. To me this is for better and for worse, but I love the exciting unclarity this creates in the itinerary.

[En sida hos europeisk musik som är unik är ju det här eviga modulerandet och kastandet mellan olika känslor i stället för att som i klassisk indisk musik stanna kvar i en enda och försöka förtydliga den. Han Beche, Bengt Berger, som var mycket i Indien, han berättade en gång att han skulle spela Beethoven eller något typiskt exempel på europeisk högstående musik för några indiska vänner, och de... de började skratta hysteriskt, de förstod inte alls de där dramatiska kasten mellan olika känslolägen. De är vana vid en långsammare process där man med små subtila medel gradvis öppnar dörren till ett rum som småningom visar sig rymma ett otal nyanser av en och samma färg. En psykologisk och andlig fördjupning, kan man säga. Den där dramatiken med massor av tvära känslkast, som är så typisk inte minst inom europeisk opera... ja, de visste inte hur de skulle hantera den... Naturligtvis finns dramatik och kontraster även inom klassisk indisk musik, liksom inom arabisk dito, eller till synes mera monotona idiom som svensk folkmusik eller blues. Men inte genom extrema skiftningar i dynamiken eller genom ständiga byten av modus, utan på ett annat plan. [...] Ja, för oss är det ju ett etablerat språk, men om man distanserar sig lite och låtsas att man kommer från någon annan planet: vad fan är det där för någonting egentligen? Och för någon som är uppväxt med rockgalor på Globen och råkar slinka in på någon jazzklubb där det sitter folk och lyssnar, och så plötsligt börjar de applådera som på befallning, efter solon – det måste ju också vara djävligt bisarrt och obegripligt. Egentligen tror jag att jazzmusiken i grunden har mer gemensamt med äldre traditioner, som till exempel indisk och arabisk musik eller svensk folkmusik, än med europeisk klassisk eller modern samtida så kallad konstmusik. Men som en del av den västerländska världen och dess kulturpolitiska värderingar har jazzmusiken alltmer kommit att närma sig konstmusikens marknad och därigenom avlägsnat sig från sina tidigare folkmusikaliska rötter. Jag kan tycka att detta är på både gott och ont, men jag älskar den spännande oklarhet i färdplanen som därmed skapats.] (RK24; revised by RK in ensuing email communication)

As mentioned previously, it is often emphasized by the informants, when they speak of the requirements of the present moment, that thoughts and plans are of no value in the performance situation; what is needed is, primarily, the ability to be mentally prepared, open, and aware. On the other hand, several aspects are put forward in the preceding paragraphs that point to the importance of plans and expectations: with regard to the structural framework of the musical material, with regard to the overall development of structure and intensity, and with regard to qualities such as simplicity versus complexity, or continuity versus contrast and drama.

The previous subsections have presented the informants' views on how 'storytelling' in jazz improvisation relates both to perspectives of the improviser's *memory* and to perspectives of the improviser's *attention* to the present moment. Furthermore, the quotations in this subsection seem to indicate that the multi-directionality of the improvising mind, in the opinion of the informants, also includes perspectives of *expectation*, of the musician's plans for the jazz improvisation's future directions.

### 5.3. Storytelling in jazz improvisation: Educational implications

In order to attain a better understanding of how the informants perceive the relevance and meaning of the concept of storytelling with regard to jazz improvisation, I have devoted much attention and interest in this investigation to aspects of professional musical practice among jazz improvisers. The research questions of this study (cf. 2.3) include educational aspects as well, and questions about teaching and learning jazz improvisation were included extensively in all interviews. It is my distinct impressions that the informants, from their different perspectives, regard such questions as highly important ones. The concluding section of this chapter presents a number of educational implications of the view of jazz improvisation as storytelling.

#### 5.3.1. Education in jazz improvisation: General considerations

Several informants emphasize that jazz improvisation education often, for different reasons, has come to focus on certain aspects at the sacrifice of others. Joakim Milder thinks that "education is marked by that which is easy and clear to teach" ["undervisningen blir präglad av vad som är lätt och tydligt att undervisa i"] (JM58). Things that can be "analysed from a school perspective" ["analyseras ur ett skolperspektiv"] are often stressed, says Ann-Sofi Söderqvist. In her opinion, this results in *schematization* and *simplification*: "That's not the way life looks. And that's

not what your own learning looks like, you know." ["Så ser ju inte livet ut. Och så ser ju liksom inte ens eget lärande ut"] (ASS27). Amanda Sedgwick views the educators' focus on written culture in a wide context: "the attitude that it should be written down... it's a political thing, too, I think, to raise the standing of these educations" ["attityden [att] det ska vara nerskrivet... det är en politisk grej också, tror jag, att man ska höja statusen på de här utbildningarna"] (AS13).

Roland Keijser fears that important things may be neglected.

All those textbooks that are published with those meddlesome chord analyses – [...] it might be an overly emphasis on the theoretical, [...] whereas the sound may be neglected. And maybe you neglect the melodic aspect. Not to mention the precipitous questions why you concern yourself with jazz music at all... My own experience is that these kinds of puzzles should perhaps not be included in any school curricula even though the need to debate these things is infinite. In my youth, you simply spent time with older musicians and talked about all kinds of things, both regarding musical technique and philosophy of life. Happily, people probably do this still today, but not during school hours.

[Alla de där läroböckerna som publiceras med sådana där beskäftiga analyser av ackord – [...] det blir kanske en överbetoning av det där teoretiska, [...] medan man kanske försummar soundet. Och man kanske försummar den melodiska aspekten av saken. För att inte tala om de bråddjupa frågorna varför man överhuvud taget ägnar sig åt jazzmusik... Min erfarenhet är att dylika gåtor kanske trots allt inte hör hemma på något skolschema, samtidigt som behovet av att ventilera sådana ting är hur stort som helst. I min ungdom umgicks man helt enkelt med äldre musiker och pratade om allt möjligt, både musiktekniska spörsmål och mer livsfilosofiska frågor. Och det gör man lyckligtvis förmodligen än i dag, men inte på skoltid.] (RK2; revised by RK in ensuing email communication)

Peter Asplund thinks that what is neglected is mainly the *focus on storytelling* in jazz improvisation. In his opinion, educators must make "students and musicians in general conscious of this constant connection to storytelling" ["elever och musiker i allmänhet medvetna om att det finns den här kopplingen hela tiden till historieberättande"] (PA8). Asplund finds that jazz schools devote "incredibly much time" ["en otrolig tid"] to

going through whether you played the correct scale or the correct chord, if you were in time or out of time and things like that. Of course I'm not saying that you shouldn't practise these things. But you also have to realize that this is the foundation for what comes next, that is, to let go of that and tell a story.

[att gå igenom om man spelade rätt skala eller rätt ackord, om man var i *time* eller ur *time* och sådana saker. Naturligtvis säger jag inte att man inte ska öva på det. Men man måste också se att det är det som är grunden för att det sedan blir det som det ska bli, nämligen att man bara släpper det där och berättar en historia.] (PA1)

Several informants discuss different aspects of the saxophonist John Coltrane's music as a paradigmatic example of the qualities that might be focused or neglected, respectively, in jazz improvisation education. In the interviews, these aspects are exemplified by the recordings "Giant steps" and "A love supreme". Lars Jansson reflects on these two pieces:

That ["Giant steps"] isn't my favourite, you know. I think it's awesome and I practise it myself, I practise it like Paganini etudes. [...] I guess it's become a trial of manhood to play it. [...] That ["A love supreme"] is a prayer. You know, that's different... "Giant steps" is more like human invention, knowledge, virtuosity, circus, equilibrium. [...] People like to hear virtuosity.

[Det ["Giant steps"] är ju inte min favorit. Jag tycker det är häftigt och jag övar det själv, jag övar det som Paganini-etyder. [...] Det har väl blivit ett mandomsprov att spela den. [...] Det ["A love supreme"] är ju en bön. Det är liksom andra... "Giant steps" är ju mer det mänskliga påfundet, kunskapen, virtuositeten, cirkusen, ekvilibrismen. [...] Folk tycker om att höra det virtuosa.] (LJ37–39)

Some informants discuss the possibility to perceive Coltrane's solo in "Giant steps" as storytelling to a smaller degree than his solo in "A love supreme". Anders Jormin problematizes such a distinction between the two pieces.

I wouldn't like to be trapped into saying that "A love supreme" is storytelling while "Giant steps" isn't. I wish we had Mr Coltrane here and were able to discuss it with him. In the same way that you sometimes shout and sometimes hum as a human being, I think that you sometimes play fast and much, and sometimes thoughtfully and, let's say, poetically. It's the same soul behind, the same person. Together it's a whole.

[Jag skulle inte vilja falla i fällan att säga: "A love supreme" är berättande och "Giant steps" är nog inte det. Jag önskar vi hade herr Coltrane här och kunde diskutera det med honom. På samma sätt som man ibland skriker och ibland nynnar som människa, så tror jag att man ibland kan spela fort, snabbt och mycket, och ibland eftertänksamt och låt oss kalla det poetiskt. Det är samma själ bakom, samma människa. Tillsammans blir det en helhet.] (AJ15)

Ulf Johansson Werre points to the fact that Coltrane's solo playing in "Giant steps" to a greater extent has been dealt with in jazz improvisation education than other kinds of solo playing. Johansson Werre thinks that Coltrane's "system" ["system"] in "Giant steps" is "comparatively simple to turn into didactics" ["förhållandevis enkelt att göra en pedagogik på"]. As a contrasting example, Johansson Werre points to the saxophonist Julian "Cannonball" Adderley.

To me he has the qualities I'm looking for. Completely impossible to turn him into didactics. You never know what he's about to do. He turns phrases inside out, does strange things – that always come down right. You say: what the hell is he doing? And then, when the phrase is finished: oh yeah! That was it! Completely fantastic, [...] [but] People can't analyse it. It's difficult to turn it into exercises.

[För mig är han den som har de kvaliteterna som jag letar efter. Fullständigt omöjligt att göra en pedagogik på honom. Man vet aldrig vad han ska göra. Han vänder ut och in på fraser, gör konstiga grejer – som alltid landar på fötterna. Man säger: oj, vad fan gör han? Och sedan så, när frasen är slut: aha! Var det så! Fullständigt fantastiskt, [...] [men] Folk kan inte analysera det. Det är svårt att göra övningar på det.] (UJW2)

Peter Asplund hopes that young musicians "perceive the connection" ["uppfattar kopplingen"] between improvisation and storytelling. He thinks of it as a change of perspective. For that reason, it could be difficult for an educator to go into detail. "I can only give them: this exists, and think like that, and how would it feel to play like that. Then I can't meddle with it any more, you know." ["Jag kan bara ge dem: det här finns, och tänk så, och hur skulle det kännas att spela. Och sedan kan jag liksom inte lägga mig i mer"] (PA14). Perhaps, he adds, jazz improvisation education has to go outside the traditional boundaries.

You always hear how important it is to know the language. [...] Maybe a really good, inspirational author or acting teacher, a director, could have seminars with the improvising musicians [...] captivating storytellers, the tempo of the way you tell a story, the different colours, the different images. [...] interesting to get some input from theatre and literature.

[Det tjasas så mycket om hur viktigt det är att kunna språket. [...] En riktigt bra inspirerande författare eller teaterpedagog, regissör, kanske skulle hålla seminarier för just improvisationsmusikerna [...] fångslande historieberättare, tempot i sättet att berätta, de olika färgerna, de olika bilderna. [...] intressant att få lite input från teatern och litteraturen.] (PA6)

Inevitably, one aspect of the interview statements on educational aspects has to do with the perceived scope and limits of teaching with regard to jazz improvisation. One view among the informants, firstly, is that it is important to realize that there are things of relevance in this field which cannot, however, be made the object of teaching without difficulty. Among these things, concepts such as individuality and creative growth are mentioned. Secondly, there is the view that current jazz education, by focusing too much on teaching things that are not altogether relevant, has missed out on important issues. Among aspects that are perceived as missing, craftsmanship and knowledge of tradition are mentioned.

Ann-Sofi Söderqvist wants to set limits for the educator's work with regard to the growth of personal improvisers.

As a teacher you provide some sort of service where you point to possibilities: different kinds of music, analyses, techniques – but, you know, you can't teach a person to acquire individuality. You present things in different ways, and you can do that more or less pleasurable – then it's still up to the student to make something of it.

[Som lärare är man ett slags service, där man kan visa på möjligheter: olika typer av musik, analyser, tekniker – men man kan ju inte liksom lära en annan person att bli individuell. Man presenterar saker på olika sätt, och det kan man göra mer eller mindre lustfyllt – sedan är det ändå upp till eleven att göra någonting av det.] (ASS32)

Amanda Sedgwick expresses her opinion that "jazz schools have destroyed much of musical life" ["jazzskolorna har förstört mycket av musiklivet"] (AS9). She traces the problems in a lopsidedness towards creativity, the strive for the new, at the sacrifice of craftsmanship.

You have a conception that creativity is... that it has to be something new all the time. And you miss out on the fact that the new, the creative, happens in the moment, happens because you're honest. [...] What else can you teach apart from craftsmanship? You can't teach creativity, you know. You can only learn that in life. You can't learn it in a school, you know.

[Man har en uppfattning om att kreativitet är... att det måste vara något nytt hela tiden. Och man missar att det nya, det kreativa, händer i stunden, och händer i och med att man är ärlig. [...] Vad annat kan man lära ut än ett hantverk? Man kan ju inte lära ut kreativitet. Det kan man ju bara lära sig i livet. Det kan man ju inte lära sig på en skola.] (AS9,40)

The knowledge of jazz tradition has also been put in the shade in modern jazz education, according to Sedgwick.

And that it's necessary to know the tradition. You have to have roots. Many don't... There are many students in the schools, and they don't know any tunes. And the tunes they learn nobody learns by heart.

[Och att det är nödvändigt att kunna traditionen. Man måste ha rötter. Det är många som inte... Det går många studenter på skolorna, och de kan inga låtar. Och de låtar de lär sig är det ingen som lär sig utantill.] (AS9,11)

As mentioned above, individuality and creative growth are perceived by some informants as problematic issues from an educational point of view. Other interview statements, however, put forward these issues as urgent aims for jazz teaching. In Elise Einarsdotter's opinion, the jazz educator's task is twofold: "You try to make this person flourish. But with a certain rigour: you have to know this, you have to understand this." ["Man försöker att den här personen blomstrar. Men med en viss stränghet: det här måste du kunna, det här måste du förstå"] (EE30). Gunnar Lindgren describes it as a mission to deliver the individuality of every improviser: "you must bring forward that artistic baby, whatever it looks like, that every human being carries [...] feel how that student's... well, universe... and then you must help her in the best way possible and [...] try to find this web that everyone is carrying." ["man ska locka fram den konstnärliga baby, hur nu den ser ut, som varje människa har [...] känna efter hur den där elevens... ja, universum... och sedan ska man hjälpa den på bästa sätt, och [...] försöka att hitta den här väven som alla människor går och bär på"] (GL1). Lindgren points to the kind of musical learning processes that took place among musicians working with Miles Davis.

When they've tried [to ask] all those shaped by Miles: "What did he teach you? What did he do to you?" And they replied: "Nothing." That is, he let this damn baby come out. Even though he was an authoritarian bastard, in many respects, in social life, he still had that openness.

[När man har försökt hos alla de här som formades utav Miles: "Vad var det han lärde er för något? Vad gjorde han med dig?" Och då kom svaret: "Ingening." Alltså, han lät den här djävla babyn komma fram. Även om han var en auktoritär skitstövel i många fall i det sociala livet, så hade han i alla fall den öppenheten.] (GL6)

Elise Einarsdotter emphasizes that jazz improvisation education to an important degree can concern qualities that are not only connected with music: "Create trust. And encourage craziness." ["Skapa tillit. Och uppmuntra till *craziness*"] (EE35).

Some informants point out that to an extent, individuality and creative growth could be promoted through the attainment of a deeper understanding of the craft and its conditions. Anders Jormin describes an educational method based on *analysis* and *reflection* regarding a number of concepts.



Sometimes I try to analyse the elements of the music with my students. [...] "You go home and think about the word dynamics [...] And you think about sound. You think about expression and impression." And someone gets the word presence. And that is [...] an example of a word we like to borrow from the dramatic arts. [...] there is an expression in flamenco, *duende*, which in a way is a similar concept. As far as I know, flamenco is the only kind of music that has a word where they have an idea of what it means: a music word for presence.

[Ibland brukar jag försöka bena upp musiken i dess beståndsdelar för mina studenter. [...] "Du får gå hem och fundera kring ordet dynamik [...] Och du får fundera på sound. Du får fundera på uttryck och intryck." Och någon har fått ordet närvaro. Och det är [...] ett exempel på ett ord som vi gärna lånar från scenkonsten, [...] det finns ett uttryck i flamencon som heter *duende*, som väl på något sätt är ett liknande begrepp. Vad jag vet är flamencon den enda musikform som har ett ord där de anar vad det betyder: ett eget musikord för närvaro.] (AJ7)

Elise Einarsdotter employs linguistic metaphors in her description of jazz improvisation education. In her opinion, the basis of the education must be "the aim of jazz: the free language, to create your own language. To learn the existing languages, [...] to listen inwards, play it, write it down. That is, to develop your own dialect. And then, at the same time, this stylistic knowledge." ["jazzens uppgift: det fria språket, att skapa sitt språk. Att lära sig de befintliga språken, [...] lyssna inåt, spela det, skriva ner det. Alltså utveckla sin dialekt. Och sedan parallellt, som sagt, den här stilkunskapen"] (EE23).

Bengt Hallberg emphasizes the importance of "knowledge and experience" ["kunskap och erfarenhet"], especially the jazz improviser's *knowledge of traditions* in the field of jazz: "If you haven't acquainted yourself with the older types of music, when it comes to jazz, I think it would feel very strange" ["Har man inte bekantgjort sig med äldre musiktyper, när det gäller jazz, så tycker jag att det skulle kännas väldigt konstigt"] (BH17). Amanda Sedgwick advocates an education focus on craftsmanship and tradition: "I think it would be better if you learned to play classical music and learned to play your instrument, learned harmony properly. [...] And then go home and transcribe records, and play a lot with older musicians." ["Jag tycker det skulle vara bättre om man lärde sig att spela klassisk musik och lärde sig att spela sitt instrument, lärde sig harmonilära ordentligt. [...] Och sedan gå hem och planka skivor, och spela mycket med äldre musiker"] (AS12).

Nisse Sandström directs attention to the fact that the connection of learning processes in jazz to tradition is sanctioned by long usage.

I use to tell young people: listen to your idols, and imitate them, and then gradually it will grow... Because then you have something to work with, and then gradually something will grow. And the American, mostly black musicians that I have played with did just that. [...] And that's why jazz music is similar to a language... it's a culture, that's all.

[Jag brukar säga till de unga: lyssna på era idoler, och härma dem, och sedan så småningom så kommer det att växa fram... För då har ni någonting att jobba med, och sedan så kommer det att växa fram något eget ur det. Och de amerikanska, företrädesvis svarta musiker som jag har spelat med har gjort precis så. [...] Och därför liknar jazzmusiken ett språk... den är en kultur helt enkelt.] (NS22)

Bengt Hallberg points out that anyone who wants to develop a personal musical language ought to obtain *a broad range of musical impressions*, preferably "as many models as possible" ["så mycket förebilder som möjligt"].

One thing could be not to listen to your own instrument so much, but to take an interest in others. And even try to play... I've been very interested in the tenor sax. And the way Ben Webster and Coleman Hawkins played. They had these wonderful, sliding ways of phrasing across the bars. And I tried to imitate that on the piano. And maybe that triggered... [...] As many impressions as possible, that may promote your own personality. [...] Then you should probably not remember too well, either. [...] That might be it, too, to be interested in all sorts of music. I've even heard rock music that I think was good – but it's uncommon. [...] Argentine tango, for instance, that's absolutely wonderful, I think. [...] It's so wonderful with this... both structure and dynamics, and drama and whatever you like. Plus an improvisatory stance. I think it's exceptional music.

[En sak kan ju vara att inte lyssna på sitt eget instrument så mycket, utan att intressera sig för andra. Och rentav försöka spela... Jag har varit väldigt intresserad av tenorsax. Och det sätt som Ben Webster och Coleman Hawkins spelade på. De hade ju sådana härliga glidande, taktöverskridande fraseringar. Och jag försökte härma det där på piano. Och det är möjligen att det var det som triggade... [...] Så mycket intryck som möjligt, det är väl kanske främjande för det egna personliga. [...] Det gäller väl att inte minnas för tydligt heller. [...] Det är kanske konsten, att vara intresserad av all sorts musik också. Jag har till och med hört rockmusik som jag tycker har varit bra – men det är sällsynt. [...] Argentinsk tango, till exempel, det är något alldeles underbart, tycker jag. [...] Det är så härligt med denna... både struktur och dynamik, och drama och allt vad man nu vill. Plus en improvisatorisk hållning. Jag tycker det är en enastående musik.] (BH40–42,64–66,88)

However, Hallberg's view on improvisation education is pessimistic.

I don't understand how you can teach improvisation – except from presenting certain elementary concepts and explain and clarify them. But, I mean, the rest you have to find out for yourself. I don't know... I would feel as if I were criticizing someone if I would try to guide them, if I should put myself in a teaching position. I don't think I have any educational talent at all.

[Jag förstår inte hur man kan undervisa i improvisation – annat än att ge vissa elementära begrepp, och förklara, reda ut dem. Men, jag menar, resten måste man hitta på själv. Jag vet inte... jag skulle känna det som om jag kritiserade någon om jag försökte vägleda, om jag skulle sätta mig i lärarsituationen. Jag tror inte att jag har någon pedagogisk talang alls.] (BH61)

As mentioned previously, such a pessimistic view on the potential of formal education in jazz is shared by several informants. Amanda Sedgwick views the possibilities to make storytelling in jazz improvisation the subject of education with scepticism: "you really can't learn those things in a school, no matter how good the education is" ["man kan ju egentligen inte lära sig sådant på en skola, hur bra pedagogik det än är"] (AS18). Several informants verify that their own learning processes regarding jazz improvisation have almost not at all taken place within formal educational structures. Lars Jansson sums up the way to jazz that musicians of his generation have followed: "We learned how to play by playing, [...] listening and checking it out" ["Vi har ju lärt oss att spela genom att spela, [...] lyssna och kolla upp"] (LJ47). Ann-Sofi Söderqvist reflects on the consequences of this kind of learning processes. In her opinion, they may result in a *strong identity* in the jazz improviser.

You know, I haven't studied improvisation very much. I graduated from the "gymnasium" in 1975. There wasn't very much around to choose from then. So I have found out very much by myself. And then asked musicians, of course. And there are benefits and disadvantages with that. When you find out things for yourself, you create your own mix. Everyone is a mixture of all one's impressions. People you've met, comments that have been made, things you've studied... somehow everything has come down in you, and the result is the person you are today. When you look on your own you get a strong identity in many ways, because the decisions are your own. On the other hand you might miss out on things simply because you don't know that this or that exists.

[Jag har liksom inte studerat särskilt mycket improvisation. Jag gick ut gymnasiet '75. Det fanns inte speciellt mycket att välja på då. Utan jag har tagit reda på väldigt mycket själv. Och sedan naturligtvis frågat musiker och så. Och det finns för- och nackdelar med det. När man tar reda på saker och ting själv

så skapar man ju sin egen mix. Alla människor är ju en mix av alla sina intryck. Människor man har mött, kommentarer som har sagts, saker man har studerat... allt har på något sätt landat i en, och resultatet är den man är idag. När man letar på egen hand får man en stark identitet på många sätt, därför att det är egna beslut. Å andra sidan kan man missa saker därför att man helt enkelt inte känner till att det finns det eller det]. (ASS18)

On the other hand, informants also express their belief that jazz education does have potential, and that it is meaningful to strive for educational improvement. Elise Einarsdotter expresses her conviction that jazz improvisation education is possible: "It's an art form you can conquer. Improvisation demands exactly the same work effort [as classical music]." ["Det är en konst man kan erövra. Improvisationen kräver precis samma arbetsinsats [som klassisk musik]" (EE24). However, Jonas Kullhammar does not find current Swedish jazz education good enough. He offers, and states reasons for, three recommendations for learning processes in jazz. In his opinion, technical practice ought to be less focused on and much more attention and work should be devoted to musical interplay.

Number one is to play together with others. I have a kind of ranking list. And number two is to listen a lot. To go to a lot of concerts and listen to a lot of records. And then [number three]: to practice, practice on your own. Music will never work without communication. And that you listen to those you play with. I don't know how many practice rooms I have passed, and I have been so impressed and shook up by how people have played – and then when I heard them play together with others, it was completely meaningless.

[Nummer ett är att spela ihop med andra. Jag har någon slags rangordning. Och nummer två är att lyssna på mycket. Gå på mycket konserter och lyssna på mycket skivor. Och sedan [nummer tre]: öva, enskild övning. [...] Musik funkar inte utan kommunikation. Och att man hör dem man spelar tillsammans med. Jag vet inte hur många övningsrum jag har gått förbi, och varit så imponerad så jag har skakat över hur folk har spelat – och sedan när jag hört dem spela ihop med några andra så har det bara varit totalt poänglöst.] (JK22–23)

Lena Willemark, pointing out as essential qualities in the improviser the ability to be open, whole and present in the moment, still thinks that it might lead astray if these qualities should be considered the goals of jazz improvisation education.

A lot of things happen that we don't know. And when we try to reach it, if we try to go the other way, I think it's a failure. You know, we try: now I'm going to be present. You can't go that way. It's as if you have to free yourself of some sort of general thinking of exercises, or achievements, or goals. It takes on

different forms, it has other... It has another time axis. It has, sort of, another... way.

[Det händer en massa som vi inte vet. Och när vi försöker nå det, om vi försöker gå andra vägen, så tror jag det är misslyckat. Alltså, vi försöker: nu ska jag vara närvarande. Man kan inte gå den vägen. Du måste liksom frigöra dig från något slags allmänt övningstänkande eller prestation eller målinriktat. Det har andra former, det har andra... Det har en annan tidsaxel. Det har en annan, liksom... väg.] (LW35)

Willemark thinks that the important thing for improvisation education is to focus on work with body and movement – in order to practise your intuitive capacity.

You do too little bodily work in all education. [...] To me music is movement, a lot. [...] Body and movement. [...] Then you as a teacher must be able to open up, to be a door opener, and then of course you want to have the keys that may open a door. [...] To me it's working with the body, bodily work, working with that which isn't so much thinking. [...] The body is very important. It's there, in the movement, that we can be fairly free of that which has been thought out. [...] One experience from education is that it can become too much "brains". When you practise improvisation, it is important also to practise the intuitive. You can do that by looking for the playfulness, the immediacy that children have, in the bodily movement. In children an improvised song is often born in an instant, on the spur of the moment. Bodily movement is exactly what can help you practise the intuitive, that which isn't settled in terms of form, theme, or style.

[Man jobbar för lite rent kroppsligt i all undervisning. [...] För mig är ju musik rörelse, mycket. [...] Kroppsligt, och rörelse. [...] Du måste ju också som lärare liksom kunna öppna, vara dörröppnare, och det är klart att då vill du ha de nycklarna som kanske gör att en dörr öppnas. [...] För mig är det att jobba med kroppen, kroppsligt, och att jobba med det som inte är så mycket tanke. [...] Kroppen är väldigt viktig. Det är där, i rörelse, som vi kan vara någorlunda befriade från något slags uttänkt. [...] En erfarenhet från undervisningen är att det kan blir för mycket "huvud". När man övar improvisation är det viktigt att också öva det intuitiva. Det kan man göra genom att söka efter det lekfulla, barnets omedelbarhet, i den kroppsliga rörelsen. Hos barnet föds ju ofta en improviserad sång i sekunden, i ögonblickets infall. Just det här med den kroppsliga rörelsen kan hjälpa till att öva det intuitiva, det som inte är formmässigt, tematiskt eller stilistiskt bestämt.] (LW24–25,38–39; revised by LW afterwards, in a telephone conversation)

In sum, in the view of many informants, important things – such as sound, melodiousness, or, indeed, 'storytelling' – may have been neglected in much formal jazz education which may tend to be marred by schematization and simplification. Individuality and creative growth, though admittedly urgent issues, are seen as difficult to deal with in teaching. Some informants point out that teaching ought not to prioritize less relevant things at the expense of important ones such as craftsmanship and knowledge of tradition. Furthermore, some informants advocate the attainment of a deeper understanding of jazz improvisation and its conditions, for instance, through analysis and reflection, through knowledge of tradition, through listening to a broad range of music, through extensive experience of musical interplay, and through focus on work with body and movement.

### 5.3.2. Education in jazz improvisation: Methodology

I also aimed at devoting some time in each interview to questions regarding specific teaching and learning methods. It is my impression that jazz musicians in general perceive these issues as particularly meaningful and urgent. Amanda Sedgwick points out the importance of *learning as a driving force* for the jazz musician's development.

I think this music is so cool, because it is so rich. It is so rich of so much. There is so much to learn. So rich harmonically and rhythmically. There is so much you can do, so much you can learn. [...] I also think you grow as a human being by seeking honestly for more knowledge.

[Jag tycker att det är så häftigt med den här musiken, för den är så rik. Den är så rik på så mycket. Det finns så mycket att lära sig. Så rik harmoniskt och rytmiskt. Det finns så mycket man kan göra, så mycket man kan lära sig. [...] Jag tror också att man växer som människa genom att ärligt söka efter mer kunskap.] (AS23)

Several informants mention different concrete methods in improvisation education. Gunnar Lindgren takes his starting point in *imitation*. Among other things, he gives this reason: "People's emotional life and language is very much affected by dialogues between parents and small children. How they imitate each other. And then you should make use of that educational model." ["Människors känsloliv och språk präglas väldigt mycket av dialoger mellan föräldrar och små barn. Hur de härmar varandra. Och då ska man ta vara på den pedagogiska modellen"] (GL4).

Ann-Sofi Söderqvist, too, conceives of ear training and imitation as basic elements of the educational methodology of jazz improvisation:

And to try to make them find an experience when they play, an experience that makes them want to learn, for instance, the scale of D minor seventh. You see? So that it isn't just something I tell them to do, and they don't really see why. [...] I think it's important that you talk about technique all the time, at all levels. [...] You always have to make the student realize herself [that technique is essential].

[Och att försöka få dem att hitta en upplevelse när de spelar, en upplevelse som driver dem att vilja lära sig till exempel vad det är för skala på D-moll-7. Förstår du? Så att det inte bara blir någonting som jag säger att de ska göra, som de inte riktigt begriper varför egentligen. [...] Jag tror att det hela tiden är viktigt att man pratar om teknik, på vilken nivå det än är. [...] Man måste hela tiden få eleven att inse det själv [att teknik är centralt]."] (ASS30)

Söderqvist describes her experiences of the role her own motivation would play in connection with these kinds of exercises in her learning process.

I believe there's a huge difference between transcribing a solo because I'm very interested in what this person plays, and because a teacher says you should do this. Then you have another motive. Then I transcribed different solos. It's a way of practising both your outer and your inner ear. [...] You don't just find out what notes this person plays, but you incorporate the whole frame – timing, cultivation of tone, you know. I've tried to play along just in certain bars and to play *exactly* the way this person plays – not in order to play exactly the same way, just to get the feeling of it. How does it feel in the body when you play like this?

[Jag tycker att det är väldigt stor skillnad på att plankat ett solo för att jag är väldigt intresserad av vad den här personen spelar, än att en lärare säger att du ska göra det här. Då har man en annan motivation. Då har jag plankat olika solon. Det är ju ett sätt att öva både det yttre och det inre gehöret. [...] För man tar ju inte bara reda på vilka toner den här personen spelar, utan man inkorporerar ju hela – tajming, tonbildning – hela inramningen. Jag har provat att försöka spela med i bara vissa takter och försöka spela *exakt* som den här personen spelar – inte för att jag ska spela exakt likadant, utan bara för att känna hur det känns. Hur känns det i kroppen när man spelar så här?] (ASS18)

Lars Jansson relates how he sometimes in his way of commencing lessons has tried to introduce a *spiritual dimension* as a complement to the technical and theoretical elements of improvisation education. Such methods can consist in

going into a silence, a stillness, trying to reach zero before we started to work. And then we could play scale exercises or II-V-I or a *super basic* musical

vocabulary, and they got to practise playing one phrase or two, over and over, to make it swing, to make it sound. So I try to work both with the very concrete things, to go back to the foundations of music, the vocabulary and letters of the language – but also to make the students acquire the taste of the spiritual part. It may seem far apart, but it's actually part of life.

[gå in i en tystnad, en stillhet, försöka komma till en nollpunkt innan vi började jobba. Och sedan kunde vi spela skalövningar eller II-V-I eller *super-basic* musikalisk vokabulär, och de fick öva på att spela en fras eller två, om och om igen, för att få det att svänga, för att få det att klinga. Så jag försöker jobba både med det helt konkreta, gå tillbaka till grunderna i musiken, språkets vokabulär och bokstäver – men också få eleverna att få smak på den andliga biten. Det kan tyckas väldigt långt ifrån varandra, men det tillhör faktiskt livet.] (LJ4)

Jansson describes these elements in his teaching as a development of the educational methods of the Swedish piano pedagogue Gottfrid Boon.

Often I begin the piano lesson with five or ten minutes of relaxation. We sit in silence, stillness. I don't always do that, but sometimes. Then I start with cultivation of sound, practise it on the piano. Many people just sit down with an instrument and go for it and play. I may play a major scale very slowly. [...] To prepare the note before you play it – physically, in relation to the piano keys... [sings scale notes] dee-dah-dee-dah... That is, to hear the note before you play it. [...] You add from zero all the time. That gives a security and a calm that is quite important. [...] Sound, listening, sound and relaxation – that's the first thing. [...] To reduce the distance between yourself and the instrument. To become one with the instrument, that's the first thing.

[Ofta börjar jag pianolektionen med avspänning fem-tio minuter. Vi sitter i tystnad, stillhet. Det gör jag inte jämt, men ibland. Sedan börjar jag med tonbildning, övar tonbildning på pianot. Många sätter sig ju bara ner vid ett instrument och drar järnet och spelar. Jag kanske spelar en durskala jättelångsamt. [...] Att förbereda tonen innan du spelar den – rent fysiskt också, kopplat med pianotangenterna... [sjunger skaltoner] di-da-di-da... Alltså att höra tonen innan man spelar den. [...] Man bygger på hela tiden från nollpunkten. Det ger en trygghet och ett lugn, som är rätt viktigt. [...] Klang, lyssnande, klang och avspändhet – det är det första. [...] Att minska avståndet mellan sig själv och instrumentet. Att bli ett med instrumentet, det är början.] (LJ8–14)

Jansson also presents a number of concrete methods aiming to "to render improvisation, something which is so cool and big, comprehensible – and analyse its elements" ["att göra improvisation, som är så häftigt och stort, begriplig – och plocka



ner det i bitar"]. In this connection, Jansson refers to Hal Crook's book *How to improvise*. One exercise may consist in repeatedly quoting the melody in the solo improvisations, "to stay in touch with the melody that is your point of departure" ["att ha kontakt med melodin som man utgår ifrån"]. Other exercises focus on distinctions between, for instance, short and long phrases, or diatonic and chromatic melodic phrases.

Then maybe one exercise has to do with phrase length. To play several choruses with only very short phrases. [...] And then somewhat longer phrases. And at last very long phrases, almost a chorus. And then you may do an exercise where you play very much *inside*, diatonically, melodically. And then one where you play chromatically. One where you play – what do you call it – horizontal improvisation, that is, more linear, Ornette Coleman, and one where you use triads and four-note chords on the tunes, more vertical. There are lots of approaches you can practise. You practise it in a creative way, and then you mix it all.

[Sedan kanske en övning är fraslängd. Att spela i flera chorus med bara väldigt korta fraser. [...] Och sedan lite längre fraser. Och till sist jättelånga fraser, nästan ett helt chorus. Och sedan kan du göra en övning där du spelar väldigt *inside*, diatoniskt, melodiskt. Och sedan ett där du spelar kromatiskt. Ett där du spelar – vad säger man – horisontell improvisation, alltså mer linjärt, Ornette Coleman, och ett där du använder treklanger och fyrklanger på låtarna, mer vertikalt. Det finns en massa olika *approach* som man kan öva. Man övar det kreativt, för att sedan blanda alltihop.] (LJ45)

Ann-Sofi Söderqvist offers an example of an exercise recommended by the trumpeter Tim Hagans.

You should play completely free at least half an hour a day – completely free improvisation. And then you can try different frames than the usual ones, "now I'll practise D minor seventh – G seventh – C major seventh": now I'll play as fast as I can, for instance, never mind what notes come out. Now I'll play only these five notes, for ten minutes. I've tried that – it's very difficult! After a while you think you've emptied out all possibilities. But... force yourself to research a little! In your own imagination. In the same way that you sometimes think you could try to walk another way to work.

[Man ska spela minst en halvtimme helt fritt varje dag – totalt fri improvisation. Och så kan man pröva att sätta lite andra ramar än de vanliga, "nu ska jag öva på Dm7 – G7 – Cmaj": nu ska jag spela det snabbaste jag kan, till exempel, skit samma vad det blir för toner. Nu ska jag bara spela de här fem tonerna, i tio minuter. Det har jag provat – det är jättesvårt! Efter ett tag tycker

man att man har uttömt alla möjligheter. Men... tvinga sig att forska lite! I sin egen fantasi. På samma sätt som man ibland tycker att man kan prova att gå en annan väg till jobbet.] (ASS10)

Peter Asplund outlines a methodology with the aim to make it easier for the jazz improviser to focus on storytelling. The complexity of the music ought to be adjusted, Asplund maintains, allowing students to

not primarily play on any tunes, any fixed patterns so that you have to think about language too – but to be able to express yourself completely freely. That should be the first step. Then include it in a fixed pattern, a standard tune or a blues, a fixed pattern that you know very well. The next step, maybe, to include it in a pattern where you have to read, chords and scales and the like.

[inte i första hand spela på några låtar, några fasta former så att man måste tänka på språket också – utan att helt fritt kan uttrycka sig. Det borde vara det första steget. Sedan lyfta in det i en fast form, en standardlåt eller en blues, en fast form som man kan väldigt bra. Nästa steg, kanske att lyfta in det i en form där man måste läsa, ackord och skalor och så.] (PA8)

Several informants advocate *composition exercises* as a way to develop improvisatory skills. Anders Jormin views composing as "reflected improvisation" ["en reflekterad improvisation"]:

as a composer you can take it nice and slow, reflect a little. It's a sort of creating in real slow motion, with the possibility to go back and revalue. [...] I often recommend that: do it once more over again, and over again. And in that, more and more of your own choices come forward. [...] You create the conditions for your own music which comes from your own knowledge but also from your own taste, your own budding inner voice. If I encourage young improvisers to compose as well [...] they get on the track of themselves quicker. That's my firm conviction.

[som komponist så kan man ta det lugnt och fint, tänka efter lite. Det blir en slags skapande i rejäl *slow motion*, med möjlighet att gå tillbaks och omvärdera. [...] det rekommenderar jag ofta: ta en vända till, och en vända till. Och i det så kommer det mer och mer av egna val. [...] Man skapar förutsättningar för sin egen musik, som kommer utifrån ens eget kunnande men också utifrån ens eget tycke och smak, ens egen gryende inre röst. Genom att uppmuntra unga improvisatörer att också komponera [...] kommer de sig själva kvickare på spåren. Det är min bestämda övertygelse.] (AJ16,33)

Elise Einarsdotter finds composition exercises advantageous in several ways: "The improviser gains consciousness, theoretical knowledge, knowledge of forms, structure, and several layers" ["Improvisatören vinner just medvetenhet, teoretisk kunskap, formkunskap, kunskapen om struktur och flera lager"]. She points out that rotation between improvisation and composition is profitable in both directions: "The more you compose, that is, strict composition, the better the improvisation will get. And the more you work with the free flow that is improvisation, and stay in touch with your inmost, the better the composition will get. But it's two different ways of working." ["Ju mer man komponerar, alltså strikt komposition, desto bättre blir improvisationen. Och ju mer man ägnar sig åt det fria flödet som improvisationen är, och har kontakt med sitt inre, ju bättre blir kompositionen. Men det är två olika sorters sätt att arbeta."] Einarsdotter finds it important that the results of composition exercises are written down carefully. One reason for this is that it helps the student gain an improved structural awareness. Another reason is that writing down the results makes it easier for the student to see what has been accomplished: "it's a very plain way of collecting this vocabulary" ["det blir liksom ett sätt att samla de här glosorna väldigt tydligt"] (EE2,5,27–29).

In sum, several informants mention imitation and ear training as a foundation of jazz education methodology. Some exemplifications of more specific approaches are also put forward such as, for instance, composition exercises as a way towards reflective improvisation; the inclusion of a spiritual element in instrument practice; the pursuit of improvisational freedom versus familiarization with patterns; and the analysis of particular elements of improvisation, such as closeness to melody, phrase length, and pitch choices.

## 5.4. Storytelling in jazz improvisation: Summary

The aim of this study has been to document different views among jazz practitioners regarding storytelling in jazz improvisation. In addition to an introductory section on general perspectives on the relevance and applicability of the concept of storytelling in this field, as well as a section on educational issues, the focus in the presentation of results has been on a rich collection of perspectives which have been structured in accordance with Ricoeur's analysis of narrative, thus taking the temporal character of jazz improvisation and storytelling as a point of departure for the categorization. In the subsequent chapter the results will be further analysed and discussed.

# Discussion: Theoretical, artistic, educational, and sociological implications of the storytelling metaphor

The previous chapter included a presentation of a number of themes and issues generated by the empirical investigation. In this chapter the results are viewed and discussed from points of departure which are slightly different, rendering perspectives that tend to be, perhaps, at the same time more narrow and more abstract. When the results are discussed in relation to the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 3, new conceptualizations come forward as relevant. While some of these concepts are borrowed directly from the theoretical perspectives, others are construed as a result of the confrontation between theory and empirical results.

It should be noted that questions formulated in the negative may also be of importance when the results of the empirical study are viewed in relation to the background and theoretical framework. What aspects are *not* covered by the informants? Do they consider intermedial conceptual relations between music, language, and narrativity? Do they reflect on metaphoricity in connection with the storytelling concept? Do their perspectives on jazz improvisation include Signifyin(g) in any sense similar to that of Gates (1988) and other analysts? If not, what questions arise as a consequence of such results? In this chapter, I also address questions regarding what aspects come forward as covered and not covered by the informants.

The first section in this chapter (6.1) includes a discussion of *theoretical implications* of the storytelling metaphor, explored as an example of rich intermedial metaphoricity. The exploration of the concept of rich intermedial metaphoricity includes two perspectives, both of which may be seen, to an extent, as original theoretical achievements generated by the present study: (i) the status and function of intermediality on the level of metaphorical concepts; and (ii) the bidirectional

function and relevance of conceptual metaphor and conceptual blending in an intermedial context.

The empirical results of this study point to conceptualizations of jazz storytelling characterized by their broadness and complexity. The second section of this chapter (6.2) sums up a variety of *artistic implications* of these broad and complex conceptualizations, such as, for instance, narrativization, cultural competence, and musical patterns. Furthermore, the relevance of cultural contexts to these conceptualizations is discussed with regard to a Scandinavian interpretation of jazz storytelling as focused on qualities such as openness, genuinity, self-authenticity, and 'inner voice', rather than focused on Signifyin(g), as in an interpretation of jazz storytelling based on African American rhetorical practices.

In the third section (6.3), the broad and complex conceptualizations of jazz storytelling are interpreted as a multidimensional landscape of metaphor. It is suggested that the *educational implications* of the storytelling metaphor may be visualized as a corresponding landscape of learning, including several areas other than relatively codified systems for improvisational instruction, such as imitation, and genre and form practices; in addition, the relevance and importance of more experiential, exploratory, collective, and reflective approaches come forward as essential. Such approaches include, for instance, the improviser's multi-directed relations to fellow musicians and audience as well as to inner voice and vision.

In the fourth section of this chapter (6.4), the usage of the storytelling metaphor is interpreted as an inclusionist discourse and/or an exclusionist counter-discourse. Focusing on cultural and educational *sociological implications* of the storytelling metaphor, this section puts forward different functions and effects of such discourses. It is suggested that an exclusionist counter-discourse may be employed (i) by an older generation of musicians against a younger generation of musicians; (ii) by an (earlier) autodidactic, "uneducational" musical culture against a (later) educational culture; (iii) by a later, heterodox ("holistic" or "synthetic") educational culture against an earlier orthodox ("analytical") educational culture; and (iv) by advocates of genuinity/authenticity against technical proficiency.

## 6.1. Rich intermedial metaphoricity

I guess I am a melodist. That is what I do, simply, play melodious phrases. But I don't know if it's a story. [...] Maybe it's two aspects of the same thing. (Nisse Sandström)

This section focuses on the theoretical implications of this investigation of the storytelling metaphor in the context of jazz improvisation. I suggest that storytelling has been explored as an example of *rich intermedial metaphoricity*. I will divide the

discussion of this phenomenon in two parts: (i) the status and function of intermediality on the level of metaphorical concepts (subsection 6.1.1); and (ii) the bidirectional function and relevance of conceptual metaphor and conceptual blending in an interartial context (subsection 6.1.2).

In section 3.2, I noted that there is a rich and fluid network of intermedial conceptual relations which may prove very valuable to explore and gain a fuller understanding of artistic as well as educational practices in the arts. One basic assumption when I set out to investigate the concept of storytelling in the field of jazz improvisation was that the intermedial use of this concept would not have come about unless the art forms in question (music and narrative) displayed certain common attributes which enable practitioners and theorists to perceive them as similar in certain respects. I suggested that in order to understand better the way this concept is used intermedially, it might be fruitful to adapt Cook's (1998, 2001) *model for integrated art forms* (cf. 3.2.5). This model contains two elements: (1) *enabling similarity*, common attributes in the art forms which are necessary for their "perceptual interaction"; (2) *blended space*, a space where new meaning is created through the combination of attributes which are unique to either art form (Cook, 2001, p. 181).

However, Cook's model seems to be designed and, thus, relevant primarily for the integration of art forms in artistic practice. In the following subsection (6.1.1), I advocate and discuss the need to analyse the intermedial relations involved in the case of storytelling in jazz on a conceptual level. In brief, I do not consider the scope of Cook's model broad enough to enable us to fully comprehend intermediality on a conceptual level. Yet, within its limits, the model is clearly relevant to the present case. First, indications of "enabling similarity" are indeed everywhere, as I believe the totality of this study (and, in particular, section 6.2, "The jazz storyteller") makes abundantly clear. Second, the element of blended space is certainly of pertinence and will be discussed extensively in subsection 6.1.2.

It might be noted, furthermore, that this discussion chapter will, later on, introduce the notions of *landscape of metaphor* and *landscape of learning*. While primarily designed in order to discuss educational implications of this study, these models and their interrelations constitute a development of Lakoff's (1993) view that metaphorical mappings preserve what he terms the 'cognitive topology' of metaphors' source domain. I suggest, therefore, that the landscapes of metaphor and of learning (that are introduced, discussed, and visualized in section 6.3) may also be seen as constituting important theoretical implications of the investigation of storytelling in the jazz improvisation context.

### 6.1.1. Intermediality on a conceptual level

One of the original theoretical achievements of this study is its exemplification of the status and function of intermediality on the level of metaphorical concepts.

In accordance with the view of most modern metaphor theorists, the meaning of the metaphor storytelling in jazz contexts must be seen as carried by discourse; there cannot be a single translation of it, as in a dictionary (Richards, 1936/1971; Ricoeur, 1975/2003; cf. 3.3.12). Consequently, the methodological approach of this study aims at handling the openness and broadness that seems to be characteristic of the discourses of jazz theorists, critics, musicians, and educators.

I have included the words "rich intermedial metaphor" in the title of this thesis. The word "rich" relates to, and is inspired by, the holistic view on metaphor shared by several modern metaphor theorists. When jazz improvisation is viewed as storytelling, a whole set of *associated implications* are projected from storytelling to jazz improvisation. One of the functions of this *metaphorical entailment* is to emphasize certain aspects of jazz improvisation; understanding through metaphors includes a structured whole, a *gestalt* (Black, 1962, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; cf. 3.3.12).

In order to fully understand the theoretical implications of the intermedial relations between storytelling and jazz improvisation, we need to analyse these relations on a conceptual level. Since we are dealing with metaphoricality, a mere analysis of artistic practice, though indispensable, will not suffice. Hence, a classification of intermedial relations in artistic practice such as the one quoted above (Lund, 2002; cf. subsection 3.2.5) will be unapt to find room for the intermedial relations dealt with in the present investigation. As noted in 3.2.5, this study concerns *conceptual intermedial relations*. From a classificatory point of view, intermedially applicable concepts such as the ones studied by Christer Johansson (2008, 2012, & forthcoming; cf. section 3.2) will constitute such additional categories of intermedial relations. Storytelling in jazz improvisation is yet another one.

To speak of storytelling in jazz is not similar to speaking of intermedial relations in practice, such as rock videos or programme music. The nature of the intermedial relation in such cases is one of addition, mixture, reference, or representation (Lund, 2002). In the case of storytelling in jazz improvisation, however, the intermedial relation has to do with the conceptualization and self-understanding of an artistic medium through an intermedial metaphor. It concerns the question how artists who are active in a certain art form (and audiences, and researchers who take this art form as their subject of research) look at and analyse central aspects of their work through the adaptation of a term from another art form. This kind of conceptual intermedial relation would seem to constitute an additional category outside Lund's classification. It focuses not on artistic practice but on a way of understanding artistic practice. I propose the following distinction. Arguably, a jazz improviser will probably not very often engage in *reflection-in-action* of these contents: "I am telling a story now!" Hence, the concept of storytelling may be of relatively little significance to the

intensified present of jazz improvisational practice – but in *reflection-on-action*, when the artists reflect on this practice, the concept is of crucial importance. Consequently it has become potentially significant to everyone who speaks of this art form. One of the main results of the present study is that light has been shed on these matters through the attainment of a deeper understanding of the functions and meanings of this intermedial conceptual loan.

One significant result of the present investigation, then, is that it has generated, through the detailed analysis and discussion of a specific example, a deeper and more specified theoretical understanding of the classification of conceptual intermedial relations as a fruitful resource for developing our understanding of the arts in general. In Chapter 7, I present an outline of further research in the field of conceptual intermedial relations in the arts.

### 6.1.2. Bidirectionality

Another theoretical achievement of this investigation is that it points to, and exemplifies in detail, the *bidirectional* function and relevance of conceptual metaphor and conceptual blending in an intermedial context.

Jazz soloists are said to tell stories. Since instrumentalists do not use words, I have put forward the rather self-evident suggestion that to say such a thing is to use a metaphor.

Furthermore I argue that in order to fully understand and assess the metaphorical usage of 'storytelling' in this context, a unidirectional model of interpretation is insufficient. I suggest that the trivial fact that instrumental solos contain no words has two distinct and crucial consequences for how we interpret this usage.

On one hand, *the playing of the improvisers* – the music – is a metaphor for a story. When we say that jazz improvisation is 'storytelling', what we mean is that we hear 'stories' when we hear music. So, the music itself is a metaphor; the musical sounds are metaphorical.

On the other hand, *the saying of the listeners* (potentially including, to be sure, the soloists themselves) – such as, "this music tells a story" – is a metaphor, too. Our language about music is metaphorical.

I take these two distinct consequences of how we speak about storytelling in jazz improvisation as an indication that there are two kinds of metaphoricity at work here: *musical metaphoricity* and *linguistic metaphoricity*. These two kinds of metaphoricity can only be fully understood, I suggest, with a bidirectional model of interpretation.

There are at least two distinctive interpretive possibilities: the metaphor of storytelling in jazz improvisation could be interpreted as a *conceptual metaphor* (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), or, alternatively, the metaphor of storytelling in jazz improvisation could be interpreted as an instance of *conceptual blending* (Fauconnier & Turner, 2002; Zbikowski, 2002; Köhl, 2003). As noted in subsection 3.3.12, the insights



yielded by these two interpretations will probably differ significantly. In the unidirectional mapping of conceptual metaphor theory, one modality (the source) sheds light on the meaning construction of another (the target), while in conceptual blending theory, correlated mental spaces each contribute to the structure that is mapped onto the resulting blended space.

Lakoff and Turner (1989) oppose bidirectional models of metaphor. According to their view, every metaphor consists in a unidirectional mapping from source to target. They claim that if there seems to be a bidirectional metaphorical mapping, this is only a confusing impression, since "*different things get mapped*" as the metaphorical mappings go in different directions (p. 133; original emphasis). The instances of metaphor that Lakoff and Turner discuss in this context, however, are not at all similar to the case in question here. Lakoff and Turner only consider cases where two metaphors share the same domains but differ in which is source and which is target (e.g., HUMANS ARE MACHINES and MACHINES ARE HUMANS). In the case of the metaphor investigated here, this might correspond to IMPROVISING JAZZ IS STORYTELLING and STORYTELLING IS IMPROVISING JAZZ. The second one of these two metaphors may very well be of interest in principle, but it is certainly not a matter of the present discussion. The bidirectionality I consider to be crucial to the interpretation of the case in question is of another kind than the bidirectionality criticized by Lakoff and Turner (1989). They consider only *mappings between exactly the same domains*. If we avoid this limited perspective, the bidirectionality of the storytelling metaphor in the jazz improvisation context might be explicated as a *mapping between different media or modes of expression*:

Musical sounds (e.g., jazz improvisations) are perceived as meaningful expressions, i.e., as metaphors for 'stories'.

'Storytelling' is perceived as a meaningful expression, i.e., as a metaphor, for jazz improvisation.

Let us now turn to the question how this this kind of bidirectional metaphoricity can be analysed in the schemata of conceptual blending theory.

Building on Fauconnier and Turner's (2002) theory of conceptual blending – which has been applied to music by Zbikowski (2002) and Köhl (2003), among others – we might attempt to sum up the metaphoricity discussed here in the following schema:

*generic space*: mapping between expressive modes of different art forms;  
*input space 1*: music contains expressive shapes that carry extra-musical meaning, i.e., that may express something about extramusical phenomena;  
*input space 2*: language may express something about music;  
*blended space*: musical narrativity blend (music is said to tell stories; we speak of storytelling in jazz improvisation).

Considering Kühl's (2003) emphasis on the importance of the diachronic, socio-cultural, extramusical background frame of jazz improvisation, we might consider adding yet another input space to the model, thereby turning it into what Kühl terms a "fivespacer":

*generic space*: mapping between expressive modes of different art forms;  
*input space 1*: music contains expressive shapes that carry extra-musical meaning, i.e., that may express something about extramusical phenomena;  
*input space 2*: language may express something about music;  
*input space 3*: both music and language may be affected by, and express, socio-cultural background frames;  
*blended space*: situated musical narrativity blend (music is said to tell socio-culturally situated stories).

It should be noted that this model is by no means restricted to jazz improvisation; its potential relevance and interpretive force regards all kinds of music and musical narrativity.

One way of perceiving this conceptual blending schema might be to view it as a psychological description of senders' *intentions* and recipients' *interpretations*: in the case of jazz improvisation, the improviser intends to tell a story and/or the listener interprets the improvisation as a story. This, however, is a rather restricted way of perceiving the conceptual blending schema. It may also be viewed on a more general level which potentially includes a large number of implications; in this chapter, they have been divided in four categories: theoretical, artistic, educational, and sociological implications. This, I argue, illustrates the *richness* of this intermedial metaphor.

We ought not to forget the contention of Black (1962, 1993) and Ricoeur (1975/2003) that a distinctive feature of metaphors is their *interactive* function: *metaphorical usage redescribes reality*. To say that A is B is not only to say something about A. The fact that jazz improvisation is often talked and thought about as storytelling does indeed have something significant to say about how we understand jazz improvisation. Expressed in the terms chosen for this study, the metaphorical usage of this conceptual loan has artistic, educational, and sociological implications. I

suggest, however, that this usage *also* has significant theoretical implications which are based (i) on its contribution to our understanding of the classification of conceptual intermedial relations (6.1.1), and (ii) on the bidirectional metaphoricity that characterizes this intermedial conceptual loan (6.1.2).

Not only has the term 'storytelling' been shown to be a meaningful expression for jazz improvisation. In addition, I argue, the usage in question implies that jazz improvisations (musical sounds) are meaningful expressions for 'stories'. Previous writings on jazz as well as the interview results of this investigation (Chapters 2 and 5, respectively) are permeated by intermedial metaphoricity and by perspectives on musical narrativity in ways which make up significant contributions, additions as well as problematizations, to prevalent discussions of narrative in music (section 3.1), the intermedial use of concepts (section 3.2), and theories of metaphor (section 3.3). The possibilities to pursue these directions regarding the theoretical bases for the intermedial conceptual loan come forward as important tasks for future research investigations. I will attempt an outline of such studies in Chapter 7.

## 6.2. The jazz storyteller

A good improvisation is about the same thing as a good, captivating story when you sit at a child's bedside at night. (Peter Asplund)

This section focuses on *artistic implications* of the storytelling metaphor in the context of jazz improvisation. I suggest that the results of the present study indicate that conceptualizations of storytelling in this context are broad and complex. Language structures reality; and the word storytelling has come to structure the ways in which players, audiences, critics, theorists, teachers, and students think and act with regard to jazz improvisation. Significant parts of what matters in jazz improvisation must be understood, then, in relation to the dynamics between individual, subjective experiences and the culturally and historically constituted usage of the word storytelling to designate musical practice. As Finkelstein (1948/1988) observes, the language shared by performers and listeners is of the greatest importance to the construction of jazz improvisation; and the word storytelling is one significant element in the shared understanding of the music.

It might be argued that the "metaphoric multiplicity" advocated by Gustavsen (1999) is in fact satisfied by the storytelling metaphor alone, for, just as pointed out by Iyer (2004), it can – and, I suggest, should – be interpreted in multiple ways. In a sense, two perspectives that were mentioned in the Introduction seem to be at the foundation of it all: *individuality* coming forward through *structured sound*. The word storytelling is a compound: we have the *story* and we have the *telling* of it; the noun and the verb, the product and the process, the improvisation and the improvising;

and, further down the line, we have the multi-layered dynamics of convention, coherence, and individual creativity. Storytelling in the jazz context is imbued with meaning.

Verb or noun? Is storytelling a noun? Should the story be in our focus of interest, i.e., *that* which is told, whether it regards a state of soul or some set of structural, intra-musical aspects? Or should nounizations be avoided; is storytelling rather a verb, a gerund (Attali, 1985; Mackey, 1998; cf. 3.5.2)? Small (1987) strongly advises against all reification: "improvisation is all process; there is no product" (p. 301). Should we, then, rather focus on the *telling* of the story, i.e., the process rather than the product? Or, with Nachmanovitch (1990), conceive of the music experience as an "indivisible, interactive entity" (p. 143)? The theoretical considerations in this study include a brief discussion of related matters (cf. 3.1.3).

Small (1987) advocates a view on music as activity rather than entity. According to Small, it is "the *act* of musicking that is central to the whole art of music the world over", so that "whatever meaning there is in music is to be found in that act" (p. 51). According to such a perspective, jazz improvisation should be understood not as an object of art but as an artistic act: the process of improvis-*ing*. Small holds that "there is no such thing as jazz, but only musicians who play in a certain manner and listeners who like to listen to them doing so" (p. 13).

The noun/verb distinction may be seen as the linguistic manifestation of a profound dichotomy which, according to Small (1987), is both ontological and cultural: "The European tends to think of music primarily in terms of entities, which are composed by one person and performed to listeners by another [...] The African musician, on the other hand, thinks of music primarily as action, as process, in which all are able to participate" (p. 45). The compound story-telling allows us to oscillate between two ways of viewing: either we focus on the (de-personalized) noun or entity, the *story*; or on the verb, the process or activity (in which all may participate), the *telling*.

According to performative perspectives (Butler, 2004), what is traditionally viewed as qualities should rather be perceived as something people *do*, not something they *are*, or *have*. Such a perspective renders crucial the question of *identity* behind the actions of a human being. Butler's response to this question is negative; there is no identity behind the performed actions. I suggest, however, that the concept of construction implies that some sort of essence is thinkable. In a way, this is similar to other pairs of concepts such as, for instance, nature and culture: if we reject the concept of nature, this would arguably render the concept of culture meaningless. I would argue that in order for our usage of concepts such as performance and performativity to be meaningful, the meaning of contrasting concepts such as identity (or genuinity, or sincerity) is crucial. Thus, I suggest, identity does exist, though as a process rather than as something static. It may be necessary to conceive of concepts such as essence and construction in a dialectic fashion: essence may be characterized

by a continuous process of becoming, and construction may exist at all times in its very coming into existence.

In the view of Ricoeur (1983–85/1984–88), narrative includes the inner dialectics of personality; the narrative identity *changes*. The dialectic perspective on identity thus, I believe, comes forward as fruitful with regard to the storytelling jazz improviser's identity. On one hand, this identity ought to be viewed as a continuous improvisational process of construction. On the other hand, this construction (or performance, or improvisation) exists at all times in its very coming into being.

The temporal outlook on improvisation thus is important not only regarding the quality of the improvisational act but, crucially, regarding its very essence. The ontology of improvisation, I suggest, is best understood as *a temporal performative process of construction of improvisational identity*.

This compound includes at least four distinct concepts, all of which can and should be made the object of further discussion and problematization: a (i) temporal (ii) performative process of (iii) construction of (iv) improvisational identity. On several different levels of abstraction, all of these concepts are included in perspectives and discussions throughout the present study, thus corroborating the relevance of the ontological outlook presented here. In an interesting way, this mode of understanding of storytelling in jazz improvisation could be related to Bruner's (2004) notion of story as construction, suggesting that stories could be perceived as being constructed rather than having happened (cf. 3.1).

Among the artistic implications presented here, both 'verb' and 'noun' perspectives are represented. In this section, the discussion of these conceptualizations is divided in three parts: (i) narrativization (subsection 6.2.1), (ii) cultural competence (6.2.2), and (iii) musical patterns (6.2.3). Furthermore, I discuss (in subsection 6.2.4) to what extent the results point to a specific 'Scandinavian storytelling mode' in the sense that a Scandinavian interpretation of storytelling in jazz improvisation may include qualities such as openness, genuinity, authenticity, and 'inner voice', et cetera – rather than rhetorical practices known as Signifyin(g) which have traditionally been associated with storytelling in jazz. Finally, this section includes analytical observations and suggestions regarding the crucial importance of temporality and the present moment to jazz improvisation (6.2.5).

### 6.2.1. Narrativization

The *how* and *what* (or, perhaps, *where*) of musical storytelling are potentially eternal questions. Once posed, they tend to remain paradoxical dilemmas for musicians, listeners, and analysts to ponder. If music's status as a language as well as its narrative capability are called into question, how, then, are you supposed to be able to tell stories in or with music? And is there 'really' a story in the music, or is it all in the listener's imagination?

In Chapter 3, I discussed at length several perspectives on the relations between music and concepts such as language, narrative, and discourse. An early study of music and language suggests that music has three narrative elements: imitation, suggestion, and symbolism (Brown, 1948/1987; cf. 3.1.2). Clearly, however, the conception of music as a language can be problematized (Hermerén, 1986; Kivy, 2002; cf. 3.1.2). Several other points regarding these relations have also been the subject of much controversy. For instance, the need for music to have a past tense in order to be narrative is one point of debate (Nattiez, 1990; Abbate, 1991; Kivy, 1993; Neubauer, 1997; Meelberg, 2006; cf. 3.1.2). Another point of debate is the need for music to be able to refer to something outside itself (Wolf, 2002, 2005; cf. 3.1.2). On the whole, a literal interpretation of the meaning of narrative in music seems to generate a large number of difficult problems.

For instance, one might argue that a story is always told by a storyteller. The requirement that there ought to be a narrator behind a musical narrative, then, could be answered in two ways: there is none (like in drama), or there is something like a "musical persona". Both these attempts at a solution come forward as problematic (Cone, 1974; Maus, 1991; Wolf, 2002; Kivy, 2009; cf. 3.1.2). In the view of some theorists, furthermore, music could be viewed not necessarily as narrative in itself but as an accompaniment to narrative (Gorbman, 1987; Kramer, 1991; Wolf, 2005; cf. 3.1.2).

With regard to the argument that a story is always told by a storyteller, one aspect of the differences between composed and improvised music comes forward as a handy response: the improviser, on the face of it, could easily be seen as the narrator. Insofar as the individual solo is, in some sense, equated with a story, this is clearly a reasonable view. It should be noted, however, that there are alternative perspectives on how and on which level jazz narrates. For instance, as previously noted (cf. 2.2.3), Liebman (1996) positions the story told in jazz music on a more general level: if the concert is a novel, then each composition is a single chapter within which "the solos are like paragraphs" (p. 34). Such a view on storytelling in jazz obviously leaves the analyst with remaining questions very similar to those described above.

#### *METAPHORICAL AND LITERAL MEANING OF 'LANGUAGE'*

I strongly advocate the view that since terms can be used literally and/or metaphorically, for clarity's sake, we ought not to confuse one kind of usage with the other. For instance, I suggest, the term 'language' can be used metaphorically, and is often used in this way with regard to jazz music. Several scholarly investigations testify that jazz musicians favour language metaphors when they speak of jazz (Berliner, 1994; Monson, 1996; Schwartz, 1996; cf. 2.2.11). The results of the present study provide further material to corroborate this phenomenon. Speaking of the "codes" in different jazz contexts, one informant employs language metaphors: "What language is it in this group, which dialect?" Another one associates certain drum solos with African language. Yet another interviewee offers an elaborate overview of similarities

between the structures of language and jazz improvisation, rather in tune with his colleague Joe Henderson's view (quoted in 2.2.3) of the grammatical structure of conversational statements in jazz solos: "Language consists of elements on different levels. [...] then there are dialects and all kinds of languages in the world. [...] you often take the liberty of mixing small meaningful formulae from widely differing language dialects" (cf. 5.1.3).

On the other hand, a great many informants throughout the investigation emphasize that they find language blunt and poor in nuances, when compared to music. In connection with this, one of them finds that there are boundaries for the speakable: "some secrets ought to remain secrets". Another one points out that the difficulty to explain everything in words may be a good thing rather than a disadvantage (cf. 5.1.3). I suggest that when formulating these perspectives on music and language, the informants no longer stick to the same metaphorical use of the term 'language'. Instead, they use the word in a literal sense. For instance, one informant views with scepticism the risk that a conception of music as language might imply theories of translatability: "Music is a world of its own. You can say that you play in a storytelling way, but I don't think that what you have told can be translated into a story of words" (cf. 5.1.1). Another informant points out that musical expression should not be confused with specific meaning; there is not something there to be understood in the sense of being translated to language: "Actually, we play instead of, it is that simple. [...] This needed to be expressed" (cf. 5.1.4). Obviously, in order to understand these different utterances correctly, and in order to avoid contradiction, we need to distinguish between literal and metaphorical use of the word 'language'.

#### *METAPHORICAL MEANING OF 'STORYTELLING': COMMUNICATION, EXPRESSION, MISSION, VISION*

As noted early on in this study, my own stance regarding the usage of the storytelling concept in this context is one of metaphorical interpretation (cf. 3.1.3). Different points of view in the empirical study seem compatible with the perspective that storytelling in jazz ought to be interpreted in a metaphorical sense. One informant points out that storytelling in jazz improvisation is not about narrativity in a strict sense: "It is not as if you can tell: 'oh, yesterday a strange thing happened to me' [...] You show your feelings" (cf. 5.1.1).

One interviewee in particular touches upon the distinction between literal and metaphorical interpretations of storytelling. He is inclined not to use the term with regard to jazz improvisation, since a literal interpretation of it would imply that music could be translated into words. On the other hand, he freely acknowledges a metaphorical interpretation of an utterance such as Lester Young's "But what is your story?" In the interviewee's opinion, this might be taken as meaning: "what adventures do you have in store? Where is your personality?" (cf. 5.1.1).

I suggest that storytelling need not mean narrative. It may be interpreted as meaning, for instance, communication or expression (cf. 3.1.3). Communication, to be sure, is a much wider concept than storytelling. Telling stories – in a literal sense – is only one of several ways to communicate. Notably, one informant points out that communicating and being personal should not be used synonymously with storytelling: "You can communicate in other ways than with stories. [...] 'Personal' can mean easily identifiable" (cf. 5.1.1).

Another interviewee also connects storytelling in jazz with the concept expression: "It may be something about storytelling, that you still have a need to express yourself, even if you think that it's mostly about notes and rhythms" (cf. 5.1.1).

Arguably, jazz improvisation can also be *much more* than a mere expression of feeling. In the opinion of one informant, the storytelling concept is too narrow to mirror its great potential: "In certain solos you can hear: wow! It's revealed... the meaning of being a human being. How could you translate that into words? [...] To reduce that to a story would be to flatten it out."

In the words of another interviewee, storytelling in jazz may be a question of "a vision or a mission, even [...] it's beyond words" (cf. 5.1.1).

A metaphorical interpretation may nullify the demand that narrative be linear. In accordance with Iyer's (2004) view, storytelling in jazz improvisation may consist in a holistic, embodied, personality- or attitude-based – hence, non-linear – approach.

If linear aspects of storytelling are less significant in certain instances of jazz improvisation, these instances may be less marked by processiveness, by notions such as implication, determination, and expectation (Kramer, 1988). Notwithstanding, such improvisation may be perceived as storytelling, provided that aspects such as sound and embodiment contribute to the music's expressing, communicating, saying something.

Notably, the scope of metaphorical interpretations of the storytelling metaphor with regard to jazz improvisation is quite a wide one. On one level, the improviser can be understood to communicate and express, using the improvisation as a medium of communication and expression of, for instance, emotions, attitudes, and states of mind. On another level, what is mediated may be understood in terms of a vision or even a mission. Interestingly, not only do such interpretive perspectives always corroborate the view of music as a situated social activity; they also coincide in important and, to my mind, elucidative ways with Small's (1998) perspective on musicking, which he understands as the exploration, affirmation, and celebration of "ideal relationships as the participants in the performance imagine them to be" (p. 13).

### *IT'S THE LISTENER'S STORY*

At the beginning of this section, I mentioned that even though questions regarding music's status as language and its narrative potential pose serious problems, the *how* of musical storytelling is not the only dilemma. There is, of course, also the *what* (or



*where*) question: Is there 'really' a story in the music, or is it all in the listener's imagination?

Several informants seem to adhere to the view of musical narrative as the listener's construction of musical meaning through narrativization (Nattiez, 1990; McClary, 1991, 1997; Neubauer, 1997; Wolf, 2002; Maus, 2005; Meelberg, 2006; cf. 3.1.2). One interviewee remarks a propos her own listening impressions when hearing a Miles Davis solo: "melancholy, loneliness... it isn't at all certain that he feels it that way. [...] Maybe it's only me thinking of it that way, because it hits something within me." (cf. 5.1.1) Another informant remarks that "There simply isn't anything more subjective than the things we are talking about. People simply don't hear the same things" (cf. 5.2.1). Yet another one thinks that "experiencing a solo as a story is probably within the listener, not the performer [...] I think much fewer musicians think 'now I'm going to tell a story' than the number of listeners who experience a solo as a story" (cf. 5.2.2).

On the whole, the musicians I interviewed do not seem to aim at telling stories in their jazz improvisations: "When I play myself, I have never tried that: ah, I will tell a story" (cf. 5.1.1); "I can't say that I enter the stage with the ambition to tell a story. I think the best conditions are when you are completely neutral" (cf. 5.2.2). As noted in 4.1.8, not all informants think that storytelling in jazz improvisation requires an intention to 'say something' on the part of the improviser. According to one view, storytelling is not the jazz improviser's aim but the effect "of having something to say. The natural aim is to play. [...] It is not as if you think: now I am going to tell this story. [...] It makes good stories, but it isn't something that you sit down and plan" (cf. 5.1.2). Saying something, then, according to this view, is a consequence of the musician's aim to play music (provided that she has something to say).

Several informants doubt that jazz improvisation could exist *without* telling some sort of story: "To tell stories – it's sort of beyond our control. We don't have to worry that it won't tell anything." – "Whether you dedicate your music to God, or if you stand there playing bebop, then it's a tribute to Charlie Parker, who's a kind of God, or whether you stand there playing in order to find yourself, or if you want to be famous, no matter how far you wish to shrink the project, so to speak – it's still a sort of story. Then you tell about that" (cf. 5.1.2).

### 6.2.2. Cultural competence

In addition to my interpretive stance regarding the necessity of a metaphorical interpretation of storytelling in jazz improvisation, I argue that music's capacity of conveying something (such as 'storytelling') must be understood socio-culturally, as part of an intricate interplay between discourse in music and discourse on music (Mendelssohn, 1878; Folkestad, 1996; Radano, 2003; K. Johansson, 2008; cf. 3.1.2). Every jazz listener is situated in a specific socio-cultural context. Arguably, the

listener's narrativization of music may be dependent of cultural competence (Wittgenstein, 1967; cf. 3.1.3).

One informant points to how a certain cultural competence in the listener may facilitate understanding the story told by a jazz soloist, for instance, Charlie Parker's introductory phrases on the recording of "Parker's Mood": "ba-dobede-dweededede---de-dweededede-deyde... You can hear that it is someone complaining. You have all the blues lyrics tradition at the bottom of it, so you add that, of course" (cf. 5.1.1). Another informant points to Hollywood movies as a reference for understanding images that may be connected to improvisation, which seems to suggest that the (listener's and/or player's) construction of meaning may be seen as a socio-cultural phenomenon: "I definitely think that you draw power from your own experiences, and perhaps, unfortunately, also from the Hollywood movies... [...] So I find it very hard to think that you could play something that did not immediately turn into images" (cf. 5.1.2). He also points to certain culturally conditioned codes which presumably are well-known to the listeners: "We have seen so many Hollywood films where a certain kind of harmony and a certain instrumentation has been devised for certain scenes. [...] You play in a certain fashion and you know that thanks to Hollywood everyone in the audience will know what you are after" (cf. 5.2.1).

The role of *imagination* and imaginative power in storytelling comes forward as an interesting perspective. One ought probably to distinguish between the imagination of the mind of the player on one hand, and the listener's imagination on the other. It is conceivable that any narrativization involved may be a matter of one party but not the other.

### 6.2.3. Musical patterns

The listener's narrativization of a piece of music may depend on socio-cultural context to a high degree. The view that it should be completely without relation to the music itself, though, comes forward as counterintuitive. What in the music, then, can provide the basis for such narrativization? In the case at hand, what features in an instrumental jazz improvisation might make the listener hear a story? According to one perspective introduced in Chapter 3, events in instrumental music may imply narrative through patterns of continuation and change, highlighted by Newcomb (1987) as "the musical analogue to paradigmatic plots" (p. 167). A number of informants seem to share this view to a degree; when speaking of jazz storytelling, they employ words such as logic, pattern, and organization. These views, summarized in the next few paragraphs, are in tune with Gushee's (1991) notion of the *rhetorical plan* of jazz improvisation. Monson (1996) problematizes the relation between architectural and communicative aspects of jazz improvisation, suggesting that the latter may be of greater consequence to its storytelling quality. Notwithstanding, in the present study the informants' views regarding intra-musical qualities come

forward as highly interesting complementary perspectives to the extra-musical issues presented above, such as communication, expression, narrativization and socio-cultural contexts.

One informant analyses the reasons why a certain solo would seem as if you heard a story-teller captivating his children by a camp fire: "Easy to follow, easy to understand the logic in the choice of notes and the rhythm and the breathing of the phrases, all that, the gestures" (cf. 5.1.1).

Another informant is inclined to view jazz improvisation as structures rather than stories. In his view, to improvise is "to shape the music according to a logical pattern". To him this is "mostly about notes and rhythms, not about what you could characterize as events or drama". Still, however, he speculates that storytelling in jazz "could be a wordless drama, but... what's that?" He interprets the term storytelling in this context as referring to coherence and to "that the music leads somewhere. [...] That there's a desire to... how should you put it... to follow the flow of time... in a reasonable way, a musical way." In the view of this informant, one important challenge for the improviser is to master the paradoxical dynamics of coherence and contrast: "Monotony can be very charming sometimes, but unbearable in the long run. [...] Still, it... hangs together in some strange way. Perhaps that's the art of storytelling. [...] It becomes a question of organizing time" (cf. 5.1.1).

In subsection 2.2.3, the importance of convergent thinking in jazz improvisation was pointed out. Questions of divergent and convergent thinking come forward as an important perspective on both artistic and educational issues. In the next few paragraphs I will try to relate the artistic implications of the present study to the concepts of divergence and convergence.

To be sure, there would be no discourse of the 'jazz voice' nor any blindfold tests if jazz were not permeated by divergent thinking. The prevalent musical ideals of jazz include strong individuality. On the other hand, Cropley (2006) points to the significant amount of convergent thinking in jazz improvisers, exemplified by Charlie Parker's 'licks', the "organized reuse of the already known" (p. 397). Arguably, the creation of coherence calls for convergent thinking.

I suggest that several agendas may prompt an improviser to reuse motivic elements, for instance: (i) the reference to, or advancement towards, important role models; (ii) the establishment of a recognizable solistic 'profile'; (iii) the construction of musically coherent structures; and (iv) the strive for contrast, a point of relief, or perhaps a last resort.

In subsection 6.4.3, I will return to the notions of divergence and convergence in an attempt to relate them also to the implications of this study regarding sociological aspects of education.

Soloistic simplicity is also an important feature in the opinion of several informants. One of them holds that musical simplicity ("logical and *inside*") goes well with other qualities such as sound and presence (cf. 5.1.4). Another one holds that this kind of simplicity, which he considers to be a wealth in improvisation, could be

the product of an active planning on the part of the improviser: "now I'll play as simple as possible". Another solo quality has to do with the improviser's aim for contrast (cf. 5.2.3).

One interviewee describes in some detail how a solo by Lester Young ("These foolish things", 1944) grows into becoming a story: "You start a bit quietly, like. And then he proceeds in this... and tension sets in, which he himself creates, through his choice of notes, and through the rhythm. He goes into a few rhythmic things [...] and, hell, then it's a story" (cf. 5.1.1).

In a similar vein, an informant describes his ideal of a jazz solo as a captivating bedtime story: "it should start from the beginning and be exciting, have a plot, and then a lot of exciting things should happen and there should be some sort of unravelling" (cf. 5.1.4). The same informant also describes the structure of dynamic development in a jazz solo as a "dinosaur shape: start soft, then it gets big in the middle and then it gets thinner" (cf. 5.2.3).

#### 6.2.4. The notion of a Scandinavian storytelling mode

Lewis (1996) proposes a distinction between *Afrological* and *Eurological* modes of improvisation; the latter is exemplified by the music of John Cage (cf. 2.2.4). Such improvisation is, Lewis suggests, (ideally) unaffected by the improviser's sociocultural context. There is nothing in the results of the present investigation to suggest that Swedish jazz musicians aim at that kind of mode in their improvisations. On the contrary, sociocultural aspects permeate the informants' perspectives. This result is in tune with the contention of Nicholson (2005) that Signifyin(g) may well be relevant to European jazz, though since its cultural and historical background differs from that of (African) American jazz, it draws on "a different cultural heritage" (p. 177). The *cultural memory* (Floyd, 1991, 1995), though different in content, is relevant. Sociological aspects are doubtless also highly pertinent to an attempt at a globalized understanding of jazz. In his analysis of authenticity discourses in popular music contexts, Hamm (1995) points to the importance of social authenticity (cf. 3.5.2). Following Monson (2009), it might be argued that even though Swedish musicians may "reach beyond their sociologically defined categories" (p. 34) and master many parameters of African American musical styles, their social relationship to the music will still be a different one.

Authenticity comes forward as a key concept in this subsection. However, I suggest that there may be differences in the dynamics of authenticity regarding on the one hand the tradition in which the improviser is situated, and on the other the improviser's individuality. Also, sound and embodiment come forward as important issues in the interview results.

### THE HOW OF PLAYING

In several respects, then, it would seem that the Swedish informants' views on jazz improvisation adhere to qualities that are prominent in African American traditions. Several sources agree that in African American music making, the *how* of the performance is more important than the *what* (cf. 3.1.4); and several informants chime in with this perspective. One of them speaks of Wayne Shorter's shifting between high and low soloistic activity: "Everything is governed by and depends on what needs to be expressed. So it isn't centred on his achievement. At all, really." Another informant, speaking of how the "rhythmic message" of Stanley Turrentine makes him hear "a black priest", sums up: "It is about *how* you convey this."

Speaking of the *how* of playing, one interviewee especially emphasizes the importance of having "life in the ornaments" in jazz improvisations. This might perhaps be interpreted as a requirement for expressions of vitality in the sense of Stern (2010). In the same vein, an informant describes the jam sessions and cutting contests of the Swing Era not as a matter of playing loud and strong, but of reaching the audience emotionally; this he terms "storytelling on a high level" (cf. 5.1.4).

### VOICE, SOUND, TONE

Several informants concur with the importance of the notion of the jazz *voice*, the instrumental sound (Lewis, 1996; Iyer, 2004; Alperson, 2010, and many others; cf. 2.2.9). In one interviewee's view of what matters in a jazz improvisation, the concept of voice is prominent: an essential part in the experience is "hearing a voice that tells something. [...] I look for voices, really, to a great extent." The impression of the voice may, in a way, be stronger than the impression of the story, according to another informant; he may not experience so much that Miles Davis "tells any story, but he creates moods and expressions that are general in a way. A feeling of life or something like that" (cf. 5.1.4).

One informant attempts to explain why some musicians convey so much more than others: "It has a lot to do with the tone, I think. The intention and the tone." Another one speculates that "In the storytelling phenomenon there may be this connection between expression and voice". For instance, he describes the saxophonist Wayne Shorter's voice as "the most storytelling one", "thunderous", "extremely firm and apparently convinced" (cf. 5.1.1).

One interviewee recalls how Clark Terry employed differences in sounds for storytelling purposes: "that gimmick, switching with fluegelhorn, so that he played a duet with himself, kind of. And he produces phrases just like talking, in a way, instrumental. With his sound and all. You know, he has a very special sound. You could speak of storytelling there. Even dialogue" (cf. 5.1.1).

In the opinion of one informant, certain jazz styles (such as bebop and standard jazz) may have less of personal voices, since reproduction is more common and legitimate in these styles (cf. 5.2.1). However, to several informants, the sound is

essential to successful jazz improvisation. Many connect the instrumental sound to the human voice; one person speaks of similarities in "melodiousness, dynamics, pauses". Another one thinks of judging a soloist's sound as a matter of "physical attraction". Yet another one points out that the sound that will make the most credible story in jazz improvisation is probably not the neutral sound of a classically trained musician's approach. One informant points out that there may be an educational dilemma in the study of great soloists' personal voices as a means to attaining your own personal voice (cf. 5.2.2).

### OPENNESS

In several interviews, the mental state of *openness* comes forward as an important requirement in storytelling in jazz improvisation. One informant finds it best to be "open to the fact that things can go in different directions in a way, and not try to govern it too much". In her opinion, improvisations come out best "when you don't know what you're doing, when you forget yourself, [...] when you feel that you are one with... this canal, [this] higher spirit that you're connecting to". In a similar vein, one interviewee describes the ideal, trance-like state in the improviser: "The brain isn't there." Several informants agree on the importance of being there in the moment. One of them says: "We get charged by the moment." He also offers a few prescriptions in order to attain this state: "Not to stand in your own way. Not to think. Not to fulfil expectations. Not to try to express something specific." Another informant speaks of going into the present as a "mystic quality", "very simple and basic", "a deeper happiness". To one interviewee, being present is the essence of storytelling in improvisation: "The great discovery of being present. [...] That may be what it is to tell a story." In her view, to be present requires a mental state of openness: "When I'm in openness I can feel being a part of the great [...] that can happen like a flash [...] I become whole". Several informants emphasize that thinking and planning will only be a hindrance to playing; in comparison, thinking is too slow (cf. 5.2.2).

The need for the improviser to let go, to abandon control (Lateef, 1970; Sawyer, 1993; Borgo, 2004a), was discussed in section 2.1 in relation to Caillois's (1958/2001) categorization of human games. Caillois identifies games where chance (*alea*) rules the playing and the participant cannot control the outcome, as well as games aiming at disorder (*ilinx*) where participants strive to change their experience of reality through loss of control. Both of these categories of game playing appear to be highly relevant to understanding the aspect of jazz improvisational storytelling as openness and presence in the moment. The other two aspects of Caillois's game analysis have to do with competition (*agôn*) and simulation (*mimicry*), respectively. Both of these categories also seem relevant to jazz improvisation, though from rather different points of view, such as improvising along the lines of African American Signifyin(g) practices.

The *ability to listen* comes forward as one important aspect of being open in the present moment. One informant hypothesizes on a historical background to the Nordic jazz approach sometimes referred to as "fjälljazz" [fjeld jazz]: maybe, he says, its ingredients of breathing and listening – which may perhaps by some be perceived as more predominant here than in most American jazz – build on "a comparatively long tradition of no wars, [...] of democracy, [...] of counsel, discussing and listening to others before you make a decision [...] a tradition of listening as much as talking" (cf. 5.2.2).

Listening to others is important, but listening to oneself also comes forward as crucial. In his reflections on free musical improvisation, Nachmanovitch (1990) notes that "music taught me to listen, not just to sound but to who I am" (p. 11). He also states that "[f]inding the heart's voice [...] is what every artist is dedicated to: the lifelong quest [...] to learn to speak with our own voice" (p. 41). The jazz improviser's *inner voice* is often mentioned by informants. One informant distinguishes between on one hand preparing for imagined musical scenarios and on the other hand being mentally prepared for the demands of the moment; in his opinion, it is the latter that is of real value to the jazz improviser. He speaks of it as a kind of flexibility, while another informant addresses a similar openness in terms of awareness and developed sensibility, and yet another one points to the value of "returning to yourself, returning to the simple things in life" (cf. 5.2.2).

Furthermore, several informants emphasize the importance of *balance* in the improviser's musical craftsmanship: balance between knowledge and expression, between sense and sensibility, between being serious and easy-going, and balance between polarities in life such as humour and melancholy, joy and pain (cf. 5.2.2).

#### TRADITION-AUTHENTICITY VS. SELF-AUTHENTICITY

Based on the results, it might make sense to speak of a difference between '*American*' and '*Swedish*' (or '*Scandinavian*') storytelling in jazz. Furthermore, such a distinction may relate in interesting ways to a difference between two kinds of authenticity – I suggest the terms '*tradition-authenticity*' and '*self-authenticity*', or cultural and psychological authenticity, respectively – as well as to a distinction between *search for mastery* and *search for freedom*. Needless to say, these dichotomies are not identical. (It is certainly not the case that all American jazz improvisers strive primarily for mastery of tradition, for instance.) Nor is any of these distinctions in itself mutually exclusive; on the contrary, it is perfectly possible and perhaps even commendable to strive for both kinds of authenticity as well as to strive for both mastery and freedom.

Furthermore, these perspectives – as well as others – might perhaps be viewed in terms of differences in *master narrative*. Individual stories that are 'told' in individual jazz improvisations may relate to larger narrative patterns. If Signifyin(g) on conditions of poverty, injustice, and oppression have been ingredients in one master narrative of some African American jazz improvisers, then it is reasonable that some Scandinavian jazz improvisers, given their differences regarding social conditions,

should relate mainly to alternative master narratives. In a sense, this perspective comes forward as another way of formulating the importance of sociocultural context to the improvisational outcome of individual artists. Different cultural and historical frameworks will prompt different master narratives, different individual jazz improvisational 'stories' – in one word, different music.

This perspective arguably includes audiences' perspectives as well as performers' perspectives. A story is intended; a story is told; a story is understood. Regarding the latter perspective, one interesting and relevant aspect is put forward in Neubauer's (1997) claim that listeners' re-employment of music varies depending on different cultural conditions (cf. 3.1.2, 6.2.1). In brief, the story as understood by the listener is not necessarily the story intended by the performer. Generally speaking, the intentions of senders and the interpretations of recipients do not necessarily coincide.

The discussion now approaches questions of musical semantics: "aboutness", personal narrative, and authenticity. As mentioned previously in this chapter (cf. 6.2.1), the listener's narrativization of music may be dependent of cultural competence (Wittgenstein, 1967; cf. 3.1.3). In the African American jazz tradition, certain cultural practices – often termed Signifyin(g) – permeate both performing and listening activities regarding jazz improvisation (Gates, 1988; Floyd, 1995; cf. 2.2.5 and 3.1.4). These practices are characterized by double meaning, double consciousness, and double-voiced discourse. They include a large number of aspects of jazz improvisation such as, for instance, the importance of transformation of preexisting musical material, playing *on* cultural memory while playing *with* musical ideas; the relation between the music and the life of the performers and the audience; as well as the importance of embodiment, the performers' physical play (DuBois, 1903/1989; Bakhtin, 1981, 1986; Gates, 1988; Murphy, 1990; Gilroy, 1993; Floyd, 1995; Frith, 1996; Lewis, 2002; Radano, 2003; Borgo, 2004a; Butterfield, 2010).

Modes of communication come about in response to human needs. Ambiguity may, of course, be called for when the possibilities to express oneself unambiguously are restrained. It might be argued that a language of implication, of double meaning, may not have developed in the same way in Scandinavian jazz improvisation because this mode of expression was not needed in the same way as in African American culture; similarly, in Swedish comedy, the concept of satire has arguably not developed in the same way as in non-democratic Eastern European countries during the cold war, for instance. Hence, Bakhtin's (1981, 1986) concepts of dialogism and double-voiced discourse, though eminently adequate to the analysis of African American jazz, may arguably be somewhat less relevant in some European contexts.

In line with Charlie Parker's words, "If you don't live it, it won't come out of your horn", several writers on jazz improvisation mention the inclusion of personal narrative in solos as an important quality in jazz (Floyd, 1991; Berliner, 1994; Lewis, 1996; Marsalis & Hinds, 2004; Berendt & Huesmann, 2009; cf. 2.2.4). Many informants in the present investigation adhere to this view. One of them finds that "Sometimes a note can actually tell of a whole life. [...] It's about life energy. And that



energy is communicated." Another informant holds that when improvising in jazz, "you always tell about yourself" (cf. 5.2.2).

If one would wish to attempt to dissolve the dichotomy of the two authenticities of tradition and of self, one might argue that it is a merely superficial tradition-authenticity that would employ only idioms, gestures, and phraseologies out of the tradition, but would not include the requirement of self-authenticity which is arguably *also* a part of that same tradition. For practices of contemporary jazz improvisers to be fully and wholly in line with the ways in which jazz improvisation has traditionally been perceived, self-authenticity is arguably a relevant ingredient.

Hamm (1995) in his discussion of musical authenticity distinguishes between historical, stylistic, and social authenticity. These notions are doubtless of great value especially in an historical or social study of the music. However, the distinction suggested by me between tradition-authenticity and self-authenticity is, I believe, of some importance in order to clarify what is actually said in jazz authenticity discourses. Importantly and paradoxically, any call for authenticity may be a symptom of lack of authenticity. That is what *nostalgia* is about: a lack of that which it purportedly represents.

Lack of tradition-authenticity in a more rigid sense of the term – meaning lack of such things as relevant ethnic, cultural, and socio-historical background, including traditions of Signifyin(g) practices, and perhaps even lack of relevant economic background – may be perceived by some as highly relevant to jazz performance. It may also be perceived by others as not at all relevant. Such questions of relevance seemingly depend on one's stance regarding a number of issues such as traditionalism versus individualism, and orthodoxy versus heterodoxy.

Lack of self-authenticity, however, as indicated by the views of the informants in this study, can only be disastrous to jazz improvisational practice. While listeners may differ greatly in their evaluation of jazz music that lacks (in their opinion) in tradition-authenticity, there is probably significant agreement in their evaluation of jazz music that lacks (in their opinion) in self-authenticity. It may be argued that the jazz tradition, generally speaking, includes as an important requirement that the improviser be self-authentic in her playing; hence, as indicated above, you could perhaps not attain tradition-authenticity in a full sense without some sort of self-authenticity.

One interviewee contends that the solo must have "soul" or "content". It ought to mirror the musician's own life: "You have to tell a story when you play a solo. It's an abstract thing. You don't tell it in words, you tell it in notes when you tell it in a solo, an improvisation. But clearly, if a musician only plays with masterly skill but with no soul or content, the listener will often get tired. You want to be touched by the one you hear playing. And that goes for all great musicians such as Billie Holiday and Coltrane and Miles and Bill Evans, that is, they mirror their own life in their playing, their music. And that is what touches us. So content is extremely important" (cf.

5.1.4). Comparing a number of great saxophonists through jazz history, one informant remarks that "they are very different kinds of stories" (cf. 5.1.1).

In accordance with the argument put forward by Moore (2002), musical authenticity ought to be viewed as a matter of interpretation; authenticity is not inherent in the musical sound (cf. 3.5.2). The notions of self-authenticity and tradition-authenticity seem to relate closely to Moore's concepts of *authenticity of expression* (first-person authenticity) and *authenticity of execution* (third-person authenticity), respectively. Clearly, the Swedish informants on the whole attach great significance to 'first-person authenticity'.

Incidentally, it is my personal impression that while the concept of 'storytelling' may have been less prominent in discourse on Swedish 20th century jazz greats such as Lars Gullin and Jan Johansson, the concept of 'voice' has figured there as a rather important ingredient. Attempting to interpret the tendency of the present investigation, I suggest that Swedish jazz improvisers' emphasis on self-authenticity – or, in the words of Moore (2002), authenticity of expression, or first-person authenticity – could probably be understood in relation to the fact that the perceived distance to jazz improvisational role models may be larger than in the case of American jazz musicians. Consequently, Swedish jazz improvisers may attach relatively less importance to tradition-authenticity – or, in the words of Moore (2002), authenticity of execution, or third-person authenticity. In a sense, then, the 'third person' (meaning, in effect, the African American jazz tradition) may be perceived as comparatively distant, perhaps unattainable, even, to Swedish jazz improvisers in a way that may render the quest for 'first-person' (self)-authenticity more relevant, realistic, and feasible to Swedish musicians than an attempt to attain 'third-person' (tradition)-authenticity. It should go without saying, though, that generalizations regarding these issues are neither desirable nor possible.

In the outline of the theoretical framework of this study (cf. 3.1.4) I quote Nicholson (2005) on the relevance of Signifyin(g) in European jazz contexts, drawing on a different cultural heritage. It would seem, though, based on the results of the present interview study, that Swedish jazz improvisers do not conceive of indirection and allusions as especially important to their art, at least not to the extent suggested by Nicholson. Primarily, they value and aim at *self-authenticity*, seemingly finding that quality far more essential to their craft than playing on cultural memory in double-voiced discourse. I hold this to be a quite interesting indication of a distinctive character in Swedish or European jazz, as well as a corroboration of the assumption in my own working definition of musical improvisation (cf. 2.1): *it is always situated in a socio-musical context*. These perspectives, I believe, would be well worth considering as matters of further research in this field.

### 6.2.5. Telling it NOW

Narrative and narrativization, as pointed out in Chapter 3, could be perceived as closely related to the concept of temporality. Music belongs to the time-based arts, and thoughts about the importance of *presence in the moment* permeate the informants' response. Clearly, musical experiences may be difficult to research because they are non-repeatable (Fröhlich, 2009); the methodology of the present investigation tries to deal with this difficulty through interviews with highly experienced individuals. My research questions regard how a certain narrative concept relates to a certain form of music. Stern (2010), stating that time-based arts move us primarily by expressions of vitality, suggests that the distinction between time-based and language-based arts may place music at a distance from narrative (cf. 3.1.2). Nevertheless, as stated in Chapter 3, I believe that some parts of Ricoeur's time-oriented analysis of narrativity may prove quite helpful to understanding jazz improvisation, especially the storytelling perspective. Ricoeur (1983–1985/1984–1988) puts forward three tripartite notions: the threefold now (past–present–future), the threefold narrative consciousness (memory–attention–expectation), and the threefold mimesis (prefiguration–configuration–refiguration). Rynell (2008) advocates a similar analysis in the field of drama (background–situation–intention). All of these perspectives (cf. 3.1.1, 3.1.3) seem to cover relevant and important aspects of jazz improvisation, and the overview in the previous chapter of the results of this investigation is structured in accordance with such three-part analyses of narrativity. The crucial importance of the present moment to jazz improvisation permeates the interview results. Especially, these perspectives are closely related to the quality of openness which is prominent in the interview results and which was highlighted in the previous subsection. One informant finds that the storytelling metaphor "in a way" gives a good impression of jazz improvisation; but she thinks it ought to be supplemented with a requirement regarding presence in the moment. She says: "if you are to convey something, you have to be there in yourself" (cf. 5.1.1).

As noted in my presentation of earlier writings on jazz improvisation, temporality comes forward as an important aspect in several studies. What happens at one point of time during a jazz solo may affect what happens afterwards; for instance, a number of writers document and comment on the perspective that mistakes may have a positive influence on the development of jazz solos (Sawyer, 1992; Berliner, 1994; cf. 2.2.8). On a more general level, Sarath (1996) suggests that jazz improvisation requires a twofold capacity to combine a heightened conception of the present moment with an awareness of past–present–future patterns (Sarath, 1996; cf. Pike, 1974; Sawyer, 1992; Berliner, 1994; Kühl, 2003; and subsection 2.2.8).

Mead's (1932) notion of the *emergent* affords another interesting theoretical perspective on our conception of the present moment. Sawyer (1996) holds that this perspective may have significant bearing on our understanding of improvisation. Before the emergent appears, it does not follow from the past, but when it does, it is

always found to follow from the past; therefore it is an analytic error to assume that an action was predicted by the prior flow of interaction (Mead, 1932; Sawyer, 1996; cf. 3.1.3). One interviewee in the present study discusses the 'predictability' of jazz improvisation in a manner that adheres closely to Mead's (1932) and Sawyer's (1996) perspectives:

'Predictable' is used by people with blunt ears. As soon as they have heard how a phrase ended, or how something sounds when it's finished, they say: 'I see. Exactly what you would have expected.' Then they write: 'It was predictable.' But if you would have interrupted the phrase right in the middle of it and asked them: 'OK, now sing how he's going to continue this!' – how many do you think would have hit the mark? Not one. On the contrary, it's often a false and untalented rewriting of something that was logical and intelligent, I think. So I avoid it. (cf. 5.1.1)

This utterance comes forward, very much to the point, as a concrete and very lucid exemplification of Mead's notion of the emergent. In this subsection, based on the interview results, I will attempt a closer look at the temporal aspects of jazz improvisation. To begin with, the collected results make it seem highly relevant not only to structure and categorize them in terms of temporality, but to apply the triadic approach also in order to attain a deeper understanding of jazz improvisation through an interpretation and discussion of attitudes in improvisational approach as matters of prefiguration, configuration, and refiguration.

### *PREFIGURATION*

I take *prefiguration* in this context to designate the improvisational transformation of preexisting materials. This includes intertextual perspectives with regard to socio-cultural tradition as well as to intra-musical formulas, 'licks'. Different features of Signifyin(g) have been mentioned. Among them are the transformation of preexisting musical material, as well as playing *on* cultural memory while playing *with* musical ideas. One special aspect of preexisting material, mentioned by several jazz writers, need not necessarily relate to Signifyin(g) practices; the formulaic approach to jazz improvisation (Pressing, 1987; Kernfeld, 1995) is often viewed in relation to formal musical aspects such as structural coherence, internal logic, repetitive and imitative features (cf. 2.2.3).

The importance of tradition is mentioned by several informants. Their perspectives seem closely related to Monson's (1996) notion of intermusicality as well as Floyd's (1991, 1995) and others' emphasis on cultural memory, including practices of meaning-making through conscious use of allusions. However, as noted above in connection with the idea of a Scandinavian storytelling mode (6.2.4), two differences may be noted: (i) the relevant cultural heritage is partly another one; and (ii) with regard to the ambiguity of authenticity, informants tend to include in their

descriptions more of self-authenticity, less of tradition-authenticity. Notwithstanding, elements of tradition come forward as crucial to several interviewees.

One informant makes use of the storytelling metaphor in order to point to the importance of tradition: "a story isn't something that I make up instantaneously [...] it also is that you tell a story of something that already exists, that you recount something and pass on something. You simply are in a tradition. If you have this picture of a bunch of guys sitting, then it could be like someone is telling a story about something that you... try to remember!" He is convinced that a soloist must make use of the existing jazz language and relate to tradition; however, he perceives a conflict with the "cult of the soloist". Influenced by how musicians relate to tradition in Morocco, this informant advocates a listening strategy of "root nourishment", to "listen vertically in time" in order to return to the tradition and keep it alive (cf. 5.1.1, 5.2.1).

The same informant also points out how Charlie Parker, for instance, relates "so creatively" to formulae in his repetitions, variations, and combinations of phrases. This way of relating to the musical tradition, in his opinion, is the more common one in music, generally speaking; what he terms the "cult of the soloist", the mania for originality, may be a more narrow – perhaps a more modern – phenomenon. Obviously, however, there are two sides of this coin, as it were: from another perspective on how musicians relate to tradition, their activity might be viewed as reproduction. In another informant's opinion, "there are people in jazz who reproduce more than others" (cf. 5.2.1).

Several writers highlight the pertinence to jazz improvisation of (collective) memory, prior knowledge, musical self-reflectivity, self-referentiality, or intramusicality (Pike, 1974; Beeson, 1990; Berliner, 1994; Monson, 1996; Oakland, 1998; cf. 2.2.6). The improvisational strategies described by Norgaard (2008, 2010) include the use of memorized material from an *idea bank*, and the *repetition* of material that was played earlier in the solo. Stephen Davies (2001) points out that "jazz solos are constrained by interpretative rules", whereas David Davies (2011) contends that both spontaneity and tradition are essential to jazz improvisation. My own working definition of musical improvisation includes the importance of both individual voice and tradition, but without specifying any proportions (cf. 2.1): *an individual and/or collective musical activity which, though it is always situated in a socio-musical context (including input of momentaneous as well as traditional character), is to a certain extent characterized by real-time decision making by the performers of that musical activity.*

Quite in accordance with this definition, the improviser's dynamic relation to preexisting musical material and cultural memory also comes forward as an important aspect in the interview results. In one informant's opinion, the tunes a jazz musician improvises on ought to be familiar to the audience; good jazz improvisation, he holds, is the creation of coherence in improvised variations over a well-known material. Another informant offers his opinion of what the soloist ought to be able to do: to be

musically free; to raise above the form of the musical material (the skeleton of chords and scales) and to create rhythmically free ideas instantly, intuitively, and freely, thereby communicating "the feeling of joy of creating in the present" (cf. 5.1.4).

However, as mentioned above (cf. 6.2.4), playing on cultural memory in the double-voiced sense of Signifyin(g), indirection, seems a bit less highlighted in the interviews of the present study than in previous writings on African American jazz improvisation. One interviewee refers to the phenomenon of quotations in jazz improvisation as "a sport", "more of an internal thing". Another informant views it as a kind of musical humour; there are "serious" soloists who seldom or never insert quotes in their solos (cf. 5.2.1).

To be sure, Signifyin(g) must not be equated with or narrowed down to the use of citations; on the contrary, it is indeed a wide notion, including a variety of ways of suggesting multiple meanings through association, working by way of reference, gesture, and interaction. There is certainly no evidence in the empirical data to justify the conclusion that Swedish jazz improvisers tend to avoid such modes of expression. I still find notable the absence throughout the interviews of any mentions of rhetorical use – borrowing, restating – of pre-existing material in contemporary Swedish improvisational practice.

### CONFIGURATION

I take *configuration* in this context to designate improvisational multidirectionality. In almost all literature on jazz the collective, interactional creativity is put forward as an important characteristic of jazz improvisation (Rinzler, 1988; Sawyer, 1992, 1996; Berliner, 1994; Monson, 1996; Reinholdsson, 1998; Davis, 2005; cf. 2.2.7). In this study, the composition, communication and musical interplay of jazz groups is highlighted by many informants. One interviewee points out that any jazz solo "exists in a context together with other instruments and other improvisers". Several informants also testify to relations with fellow musicians as being very deep and strong experiences, both on musical and non-musical levels (cf. 5.2.2).

The informants' views on how audiences may impact jazz improvisations come forward as much more divided. The impact may at times be "incredibly positive" but, on the other hand, a jazz musician may sometimes also perceive the audience as inattentive, indifferent, or even hostile (cf. 5.2.2).

Breathing, listening, and pauses are mentioned by several informants as essential to jazz improvisation. In one informant's view, it is a matter of the soloist's credibility; pauses "will give a certain quality to your storytelling; [...] it inspires confidence that what he tells is true". Another informant testifies that "If I'm playing myself, I have an imagined interlocutor, whose phrase I wait for – and to me it becomes a pause" (cf. 5.2.2).

One interviewee gives this picture of a solo improvisation in a small jazz band context: "If someone plays a solo, that is, tells a story – then the others sit and listen, and perhaps make comments, or ask some question, support, 'yeah', like, or laugh –

that is, they contribute. [If] everyone agrees one hundred percent in every tiny detail: Yes, it was exactly like that! Then it probably does not swing." He also expands this picture to encompass the audience as people sitting a bit further away in the same room: "if it's a good story-teller who hasn't got stuck in that rather internal way of telling a story, then of course those who are sitting a bit further away from the centre, that is, the audience, also can appreciate the story" (cf. 5.1.1).

Dichotomies such as solo versus collective and individual versus tradition are, in a way, dissolved by this expanded storytelling metaphor. It provides us with a picture of *layered systems of communication* where the story may be told by everyone in togetherness (though on different activity levels). This picture includes all musicians, all the audience, and the tradition. The jazz improvisation, then, is never a soloist's enterprise in a strict sense. Apart from the individual ('solo') voice, the layered systems of communication include the collective of musicians as well as *larger contexts in space and time*: audience and tradition. Needless to say, there are innumerable kinds of cocktails in this bar. While the taste of inner vision will be more prominent in some, the taste of cultural tradition dominates in others.

### REFIGURATION

I take *refiguration* in this context to designate improvisers' conveying of improvisationally created coherence, individually and collectively (Berliner, 1994; Davis, 2005). How do jazz soloists reach their listeners? How do they communicate meaning? More specifically, how do the stories they tell come forward as stories? In the opinion of many informants, technical perfection appears to be counterproductive. One interviewee mentions as the most interesting features of improvising, in his opinion, to challenge oneself, to take risks, and to avoid perfectionist ideals. He especially emphasizes "resistance, and the relation to resistance". Another informant agrees that perfect ease is not all that desirable in a soloist (cf. 5.1.4). Yet another one finds one common denominator in all soloists she likes: "there is something [...] urgent. You want to express something very strongly." Similarly, one informant speaks of "a need to express", even of the solo being "a matter of life and death" as important qualities in a jazz improvisation (cf. 5.1.4).

One interviewee believes that a listener is *affected* by a jazz improvisation when sensing that the improviser is *in touch with his/her inner flow* and that the improvisation is going on *just now* (in contradistinction to repeating phrases or exercises that the improviser has been practising beforehand). Another informant views the successful improvisation as a question of *coming close to one's own inner voice*, of capturing an inner musical vision and translating it to his instrument: "And it takes preparation and craftsmanship on a masterly level. It also takes a mental and spiritual state of concentration and openness at the same time. [...] It doesn't have so much to do with sounds as with my coming really close to my inner voice" (cf. 5.1.4). By doing so, he hopes to "touch another human being on a spiritual level", to help listeners "get closer to their own vision of creativity and of life as a whole" (cf. 5.2.3).

Similarly, one informant speaks of "The inner song, that I believe is the be-all and end-all to me. What you hear within you, that you will play well. [...] A really great improviser has a rich and very nuanced inner musical life. That is, every second you hear a lot of possibilities within you. [...] you have an inner logical hearing that you only have to manage to find on the instrument" (cf. 5.1.4).

Several informants also point to the importance of theoretical and technical competence. One of them testifies: "It helps me to practise a lot." Another one says: "you need to acquire instrumental control". Yet another one points out that "it could be difficult when playing and theory don't match at all well" (cf. 5.2.1).

The ability to come forward as a human being is mentioned as important to the quality of jazz improvisations in several interviews. One interviewee finds that you have to dare to be yourself, to make big gestures, to be "bare and naked". Another one points to honesty as an essential quality in the improviser. In a similar vein, one informant points out that "you always tell about yourself" (cf. 5.2.2).

The interplay of a jazz musician is multidirected, according to the descriptions of several informants: "It's the gaze outwards, towards the listeners, towards the fellow musicians – and inwards, to your own inner voice and vision"; "a balance between an outward ear and an inward ear" (cf. 5.2.2).

This outline of artistic implications of the storytelling metaphor employs the temporality of jazz improvisation as an analytical tool, distinguishing between three aspects of the improvisational moment: *prefiguration* (transformation of pre-existing materials), *configuration* (multidirectionality), and *refiguration* (conveying improvisationally created coherence). In addition to their relevance as analytical categorization, I suggest that the dynamics and fluidity of these perspectives make them applicable, suitable, and advantageous to the understanding (including self-understanding) of jazz improvisational practice.

### 6.3. Storytelling landscapes

You must bring forward that artistic baby, whatever it looks like, that every human being carries. (Gunnar Lindgren)

This section focuses on the *educational implications* of the storytelling metaphor in the context of jazz improvisation. In it, I introduce the notions of *landscape of metaphor* and *landscape of learning*. These models and their interrelations might also be seen as constituting important theoretical implications of the investigation of storytelling in the jazz improvisation context. I suggest that metaphorical usage in the arts may be related to artistic learning by means of a model that is based on the notion of landscape. Specifically, the broad and complex conceptualizations of jazz storytelling indicated by the results of the present study may be visualized as a multidimensional



landscape of metaphor and, consequently, as a corresponding landscape of learning. Accordingly, the discussion of these issues is divided in two parts: (i) the landscape of the storytelling metaphor (subsection 6.3.1) and (ii) the landscape of learning regarding jazz improvisation (subsection 6.3.2).

The relationship between the landscape of metaphor and the landscape of learning, I suggest, is mainly one of *parallel structures*. The landscape of metaphor is a model designed as an attempt to sum up the rich diversity of results of the interview study. The landscape of learning is the next step: a model designed as an attempt to discuss educational consequences of these results. If the storytelling metaphor mediates all these diverse meanings of jazz improvisation, then what will a jazz improviser need to learn in order to 'tell stories' in the full sense of the metaphor? I propose that this educational landscape ought to include several areas other than relatively codified systems for improvisational instruction, such as imitation, and genre and form practices; in addition, the relevance and importance of more experiential, exploratory, collective, and reflective approaches such as, for instance, the improviser's multi-directed relations to fellow musicians and audience as well as to inner voice and vision come forward as essential.

### 6.3.1. Landscape of metaphor

The aim of my interview study has been to document different views among jazz practitioners regarding storytelling in jazz improvisation. The findings clarify, I believe, how the storytelling metaphor may help us understand several aspects of jazz improvisation. I suggest that on a general level, they exemplify how a rich intermedial metaphor may mediate holistic views in artistic practice, analysis, and education.

To be sure, the notion of understanding artistry through some sort of spatial visualization is not a new one. In his reflections on jazz improvisation, Liebman (1996) speaks of "the artistic triangle" (p. 188) which may be expressed in several ways: heart–hand–head; soul–body–mind; or emotion–technique–ideas. Liebman sums up the implications of this model in rather generalized terms: "Mastering anything in life is a matter of combining the three aspects of being human: mind, body and soul [...] man must develop a world view, a way of expression, and self-knowledge" (p. 22). In relation to the results of the present study, I take the perceived meanings of the storytelling metaphor as a basis for a visualization of its artistic and educational implications regarding jazz improvisation.


Together, the results make a quite rich collection of perspectives. In Chapter 5, I have tried to structure them in different ways. Among other things, I have found help in Paul Ricoeur's analysis of time and narrative, taking the temporal character of storytelling as a point of departure for the categorization.

Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) attempt to understand a concept from our interaction with it has also been inspirational to this study. For instance, I consider

their discussion of ontological metaphors illuminating in the present context: in such metaphorical usage, they argue, experiences are viewed as entities. In my mind, when the experience of hearing or playing a jazz improvisation is viewed as a story, this comes forward as a convincing example of an ontological metaphor in Lakoff and Johnson's sense.

As noted in subsection 3.3.6, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) in their analysis of metaphorical entailment hold that "understanding takes place in terms of entire domains of experience" (p. 117), structural wholes, conceptualized as experiential gestalts. Furthermore, Lakoff (1993) contends that metaphorical mappings "preserve the cognitive topology" of the source domain (p. 215). The present investigation makes it eminently clear, however, that the rich metaphor of 'storytelling' when used about jazz improvisation can mean several things and that not all of those who use this metaphor take it to mean all of these things. I still find very inspirational Lakoff's (1993) suggestion regarding what he terms the *cognitive topology* in metaphorical mapping; and I believe that the notion of an 'interpersonal topology' might be fruitful to understand the scope of metaphorical usage. Through an extrapolation along this line of thought, and inspired by, among others, Kleinen's (1997, 2011) topography of metaphor and Nyrrnes's (2000, 2002) didactic topology, I suggest that the notion of a landscape of the storytelling metaphor may provide interesting possibilities to also develop a landscape of learning suited for jazz improvisation.

As I interpret my findings, they point to a multidimensional landscape of metaphor including inner vision, openness, and temporality as important dimensions (cf. section 6.2).



**Figure 1. The landscape of the storytelling metaphor**  
Temporality. Openness, wholeness, listening.

In a very schematic way, this landscape is visualized in Figure 1. One way of interpreting the collection of perspectives on the storytelling metaphor might be to view the jazz improviser as a traveller in time. The expression of one's inner voice and one's vision is at the centre of the improviser's task, and among its prerequisites are: *openness*, *wholeness*, and *listening*. The route the improviser will take is not – indeed, cannot be – known in detail beforehand. Hence, any plans one makes must be restricted to overarching structure and cannot go into detail. The map, that is, the improviser's plans regarding structure, coherence, simplicity, contrast, or dramaturgy, cannot go into detail beforehand. Furthermore, one must be prepared to adapt at any time, since the improviser must relate continuously not only inwards, to one's inner voice and vision, but outwards as well: both to the fellow musicians and to the audience.

In this picture, the tradition, the style, the formulae, and the quotes are what makes up the luggage of the traveller, or perhaps, rather, her supplies. This is probably the dimension of the landscape that corresponds to the main content of much education in jazz improvisation. But according to this interpretation of my findings, this part is only one of several important areas that any jazz improviser must focus on simultaneously.

### 6.3.2. Landscape of learning

This observation brings me to the question how the analysis of the landscape of metaphor might give rise to a *landscape of learning*. What are the educational consequences of this rich metaphor?

To begin with, there appear to be many reasons why a landscape of learning should be particularly relevant in the case of jazz improvisation. In my outline of the theoretical framework of this study, I suggested that investigations of learning in jazz contexts will benefit from ecological perspectives on learning, creativity, and musical meaning (Gibson, 1979/1986; Boyce-Tillman, 2004; Clarke, 2005; Barron, 2006; cf. 3.4.1–3.4.4). The interview data provide ample corroboration of the view of ecological perceptual theory. In several important respects, jazz improvisers and jazz improvisation learners draw on their situatedness in time (in social and musical tradition) and in space (in social and musical environment). Their experience of musical meaning is clearly a matter of perceptual experience (Clarke, 2005); and their musical activities can be seen as results of perceptual information structured by the environment (Gibson, 1979/1986).


Furthermore, a concept such as *stealing knowledge* seems pertinent with regard to traditionally prevalent jazz learning activities (Brown & Duguid, 1993; cf. 3.4.4). As one theoretical point of departure, I also introduced the concept of didactic topology. I suggested that a more open, dynamic and hermeneutic application of didactic topology (renamed landscape of learning) may subsume several aspects of educational

perspectives that are highly relevant to jazz improvisation: practice communities of situated learning, ecological perspectives, learning ecology frameworks, and stealing knowledge through windows onto practice (Nyernes, 2000, 2002; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Nielsen & Kvale, 2000; Boyce-Tillman, 2004; Barron, 2006; Brown & Duguid, 1993; cf. 3.4.4). Specifically, that overview clarified the close relations between Nyernes's concept of didactic topology and some perspectives of African American rhetorical practices that are of relevance to jazz studies, such as the notion of cultural memory and the transformation of preexisting musical material (Nyernes, 2000, 2002; cf. 3.1.4 and 3.5).

Several aspects of apprenticeship (Nielsen and Kvale, 2000; cf. 3.4.1) are of pertinence to the informants' statements on educational issues. Some musicians' outlook on the potential of formal jazz improvisation education may indeed come forward as rather pessimistic. In its place, they seem to advocate apprenticeship learning, such as learning through practice in a community (e.g., developing a professional identity through participation in a jazz band), learning between generations, and learning between communities of practice (e.g., through musical interplay with older – perhaps even American – jazz musicians), and learning through imitating and identifying (e.g., analysing jazz recordings). Based on their own experiences, several informants adhere to the view that learning in communities of practice is the appropriate kind of learning for jazz improvisation; these perspectives are further discussed in subsection 6.4.2.

With formulations seemingly closely related to notions such as stealing knowledge and learning ecology framework, one informant points out the importance of *learning as a driving force* for the jazz musician's development: "I think this music is so cool, because it is so rich. It is so rich of so much. There is so much to learn. So rich harmonically and rhythmically. There is so much you can do, so much you can learn. [...] I also think you grow as a human being by seeking honestly for more knowledge" (cf. 5.3.2).

Language analogies permeate discourse on jazz improvisation. Much of the present results arguably corroborates these analogies also from an educational viewpoint; learning how to improvise does in many ways resemble learning how to use a language. However, the analogy to language acquisition would seem overly simplistic, if it is summed up in two stages of learning, such as in Kenny and Gellrich's (2002) expression, "the hardware and software of improvisation" (p. 130). Indeed, the multivariety of aspects involved in jazz teaching and learning comes forward as an important result of the present investigation. The landscape model appears adequate in order to attempt to visualize this multivariety.



**Figure 2. The landscape of jazz improvisation learning**  
 Temporality. Openness, wholeness, listening.

Figure 2 also includes five parts. Some of the ingredients of this landscape of learning were borrowed from Nyernes's (2000, 2002) outline of didactic topology. The concept of *temporality* is crucial to her; in short, Nyernes holds that didactics has to do with being at the right place at the right time. She also puts forward the concepts of *mimesis* and *copia*. The inclusion of the dimension of *mimesis* points to the relation of knowledge to imitation; consequently, learning will include methodical form and genre practices. The dimension of *copia* (stock, supply) has to do with the didactic question of *how* to store up, and with the supply of forms on all levels: from details to large structure; for instance, from vocabulary to style (Nyernes, 2000, 2002). The *mimesis* and *copia* dimensions correspond, I would say, to the luggage of the traveller: to imitation and to genre and form practices. Arguably, they also correspond to the main contents of traditional and current formal jazz education.

The guitarist Derek Bailey (1993) has spoken of bebop as "the pedagogue's delight" (p. 50; cf. subsection 3.4.3). Certain aspects of this tradition and style, its formulae and its structures, lend themselves particularly well to systematization. The chord/scale approach to improvisation has dominated jazz education for half a century now. Improvisers learn to associate scales with chords, which then guide their choices of notes when they improvise. This model for instruction regarding genre and form is easily gradable.

As a consequence, improvisation may become a *search for mastery* rather than a *search for freedom*. Musical knowledge may be treated as individual, abstract, and relatively fixed. Arguably, much conventional jazz pedagogy is limited, since it often does not focus on *collective*, *experiential*, or *exploratory* approaches to improvisation.

There are of course many different approaches to jazz education in a global perspective. Many educators are well aware of these kinds of complexities. Their work ought not to be summed up in a simplified schema. Still, if I return to Bailey's words, it is only certain aspects of bebop that have been "the pedagogue's delight". He continues: "The mechanics of the style are everywhere; [but] of the the restlessness, the adventurousness, the thirst for change which was a central characteristic of the jazz of that period there seems to be no sign at all" (p. 50).

Nevertheless, the importance of learning the jazz tradition and musical craftsmanship is emphasized by many informants. Several of them point to the importance of theoretical and technical competence. One interviewee testifies: "It helps me to practise a lot." Another one says: "you need to acquire instrumental control". One informant points out that "it could be difficult when playing and theory don't match at all well" (cf. 5.2.1).

In the view of several jazz scholars, certain features of jazz (e.g., chord/scale methods, structure, and sound) come more easily as objects of pedagogy than other aspects (Berliner, 1994; Lewis, 1996; Schwartz, 1996; cf. 2.2.10). Several informants agree that jazz education is probably marked by what is easy to teach. For instance, one person points to the difficulties to design exercises based on Cannonball Adderley's playing: "To me he has the qualities I'm looking for. Completely impossible to turn him into didactics." Another informant contends that this focus on that which is easy to teach leads to schematization and simplification. For instance, it might be argued that the chord/scale formulaic methods are likely to remain a popular approach in jazz pedagogy for several reasons: it is comparatively easy to verbalize and communicate, it is measurable to some degree, and it has come to be perceived as a stepping stone in improvisational instruction. Yet another informant thinks it may lead to an overly strong emphasis on theory, whereas sound may be neglected. One interviewee believes that jazz educators often put too much focus on rhythmical and harmonic aspects at the expense of what he understands as storytelling aspects (cf. 5.3.1).

These comments are in tune with the common view in literature that storytelling in jazz improvisation, however, may require much more far-reaching experience than the easy-to-teach aspects predominant in much current jazz pedagogy (Berliner, 1994; Oakland, 1998; cf. 2.2.10).

One informant implies that some ways of improvising may be too "internal" in order to tell stories that will reach listeners: "the person who tells the story can do it in a very internal way. [...] But otherwise, if it's a good story-teller who hasn't got stuck in that rather internal way of telling a story, then of course those who are sitting a bit further away from the centre, that is, the audience, can also appreciate the story" (cf. 5.1.1).

Of course, it may be easier to teach that which is easy to systematize, that which Bailey (1993) calls "the mechanics of the style" (p. 50). In my interpretation of the findings, these things make up only one of several important areas that any jazz improviser must focus on simultaneously. I believe that my results point to the

relevance and importance of more experiential, exploratory, collective, and reflective approaches in jazz improvisation teaching and learning.

If the improviser is a traveller, then I believe that there may be more things to explore than the highroad, and more things you need than the luggage and the map. In other words, imitation and genre practices are not enough. Based on the interview results, I have proposed the landscape of the storytelling metaphor (Figure 1), and I suggest that the corresponding landscape of learning (Figure 2) may include several other areas than imitation, and genre and form practices. In addition, other things come forward as essential: for instance, the improviser's multi-directed relations to fellow musicians and audience as well as, perhaps most importantly, the improviser's own inner voice and vision.

So, even though the other parts of the picture may be less prominent in formal jazz education, they appear to be no less important to the jazz improviser. *Collective interplay with fellow musicians* as well as with an *audience*, of course, correspond to the observation made in the landscape of metaphor that the improviser must relate outwards continuously, to the fellow musicians and to the audience. *Maieutics* or *automaieutics* (cf. Bigelow, 1997; Ljungar-Chapelon, 2008), finally, corresponds to the improviser's inner voice and inner vision, which are at the centre of her task.

It is crucial that a jazz improviser develop this *multi-directedness*. Importantly, the improviser's attention is always (i) *directed*, never contained; (ii) directed in *multi-varied* ways, never in only one way. For lack of better words, such improvisational multi-directedness might be analysed as:

- *self-directedness* (inner voice, inner vision);
- *context-directedness* (fellow musicians, audience);
- *text-directedness* (tradition, style, formulae, quotes);
- *goal-directedness* (planning, structure).

The quality of *temporality* permeates any improvisational activity. Furthermore, in order to enhance the multi-directedness of the improviser, the qualities of *openness*, *wholeness*, and *listening* stand out as crucial.

To make all these things the objects of formal education, to be sure, is not easy. In a general sense, the words of Small (1987) apply: "there is not much point in practising alone what can only be done in a group" (p. 464). On the same note, Johansen's (2013a) findings point to the importance ascribed by jazz students to band practice as a learning arena for developing abilities specific to the interactive situation. Such multi-directedness – and, indeed, any multivariety of skills – would seem to call for a multivariety of didactic loci. I suggest that the two landscape models (the landscape of metaphor and the landscape of learning) should be supplemented, in jazz learning practice, with yet another, very real, landscape which is, however, to be developed in its details on a local and individual level: the *didactic loci of jazz*

*improvisation*. Arguably, faculties such as those I have termed text-directedness and goal-directedness are comparatively suitable for the kinds of didactic loci that formal teaching may provide, while faculties such as those I have termed context-directedness and self-directedness would seem to call for other or complementary forms of didactic loci.

Indeed, this multivariety of required skills is arguably a main reason why jazz learning may have to rely on a rich learning ecology framework (Barron, 2006) that not only includes legitimate peripheral participation characterized by improvised practices and cognitive apprenticeship (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Kvale & Nielsen, 2000) but also offers rich and multivariety opportunities to steal knowledge (Brown & Duguid, 1993). Reflections like these may be developed into arguments against formal jazz education, at least its more orthodox manifestations, in favour of an autodidactic learning culture or more heterodox educational ideologies. Such lines of thought will be pursued further in section 6.4.

The difficulty, or impossibility, to teach individuality or creativity is emphasized by several informants. One informant says: "You can't teach creativity, you know. You can only learn that in life." Another one, after mentioning the analyses and techniques a jazz teacher may be able to provide, continues: "it's still up to the student to make something of it". One interviewee suggests that "input from theatre and literature" may facilitate jazz improvisation learning with regard to storytelling aspects (cf. 5.3.1).

Those inclined to agree regarding the need for a multivariety of jazz learning aspects indicated by these visualizations might still argue that some prerequisite of a technical and/or theoretical nature (such as, for instance, 'learning bebop') is needed *before* students can, or should, focus on storytelling aspects of jazz improvisation. Jazz education curricula may even be construed from such premises: first technique, then expression. Commenting on such lines of argument, I suggest that the landscape of learning provides no reason, at least not in principle, that any single dimension should be prioritized before the others. From a historical point of view, it might seem less than accurate to assume that learning processes of jazz musicians in the 1940s, for instance, took place along these lines: learn bebop first, then (and not until then) use this knowledge to express and communicate. Rather, it might be argued that these aspects may co-exist throughout musical learning processes; and that the possibility or commendability of such co-existence deserves continuous consideration.

I would like to conclude this section by returning to two interview quotes that appear particularly relevant in this context. One informant does not find current Swedish jazz education good enough. He offers, and states reasons for, three recommendations for learning processes in jazz. In his opinion, technical practice ought to be less focused on and much more attention and work should be devoted to musical interplay.



Number one is to play together. Number two is to listen a lot, to concerts and records. And then, number three: to practice on your own. Music will never work without communication and listening. I don't know how many practice rooms I have passed, and I have been extremely impressed by how people have played – then when I heard them play together with others, it was completely meaningless. (cf. 5.3.1)

Another informant points to the often astounding musical learning processes that took place among musicians working with Miles Davis:

When you ask those who have been shaped by Miles, 'What did he teach you? What did he do to you?' they all reply, 'Nothing.' He let the baby come out. He may often have been an authoritarian asshole in social life, but he had that openness.

The informant describes the jazz educator's task as a mission to deliver the individuality of every improviser: "to draw out the artistic baby, whatever it looks like, that every human being carries [...] to feel the universe of that particular student [...] to help them the best you can" (cf. 5.3.1).

## 6.4. Storytelling as counterdiscourse

A story isn't just something that I make up instantaneously, which is the wet dream of the wannabe jazz musician. You tell a story of something that already exists. You recount something and pass on something. You are in a tradition. (Roland Keijser)

This section focuses on the cultural and educational *sociological implications* of the storytelling metaphor in the context of jazz improvisation. In line with the views presented in subsection 3.5.2 on how society, musical authenticity, and several other relevant concepts may be discursively constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1966/1991; Bourdieu, 1993; Hamm, 1995; Potter, 1996) I suggest that the usage of the storytelling metaphor may be interpreted as an inclusionist discourse and/or an exclusionist counter-discourse.

The meanings of words may – and will – transform along the way. In words there is much fickleness and little solidarity. Ever rambling, words get the meanings we decide for them and are used the ways we decide to use them. As pointed out in Black's (1962, 1993) analysis, metaphors are interactive. To use metaphors is to redescribe reality. Thus, importantly, metaphors do not only describe – they *prescribe* as well (cf. 3.3.4, 3.3.12). A term such as 'storytelling' may be used in jazz

improvisation contexts in order to prompt or accomplish actions in this field (to influence, teach, or evaluate practices of jazz improvisation, for instance). Potter's (1996) notion of the offensive rhetoric of a description comes forward as a very apt perspective for our understanding of how metaphorical descriptions may be used performatively; Potter points out how "the specific sense of something" may be constituted through categorization (p. 177). Along these lines, musicians, teachers, or listeners may agree in an openly normative fashion that in order to function better, jazz improvisations ought to be (like) storytelling. But the very same term may also be used in the very same contexts as an alleged factual description of reality – what Potter terms reifying discourse – arguing that jazz improvisation is in fact storytelling, or else it is not jazz improvisation.

Different functions and effects of such discourses will be put forward in the discussion, which is divided in four parts in accordance with a number of groups who may employ the usage of the storytelling metaphor as a kind of exclusionist counterdiscourse: (i) an older generation of musicians against a younger generation of musicians (subsection 6.4.1); (ii) an (earlier) autodidactic, 'uneducational' musical culture against a (later) educational culture (subsection 6.4.2); (iii) a later, heterodox ('holistic' or 'synthetic') educational culture against an earlier orthodox ('analytical') educational culture (subsection 6.4.3); and (iv) advocates of genuinity/authenticity against technical proficiency (subsection 6.4.4).

The concept tradition stands out as central to these kinds of discourses. In the words of the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre (2007),

man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a storytelling animal. [...] But the key question for men is not about their own authorship; I can only answer the question 'What am I to do?' if I can answer the prior question 'Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?' (p. 216)

Though MacIntyre's reflections on the concept of tradition may be cast in generic form, they seem equally relevant to our topic, as a way of perceiving the role and function of 'prefiguration' in jazz improvisational storytelling, the tension between individual expression and frames of convention, between self-authenticity and tradition-authenticity, between freedom and mastery. When storytelling is viewed as a 'counterdiscursive' weapon employed, perhaps, by older, autodidactic, heterodox advocates of genuinity, philosophical perspectives on human existence in relation to human traditions are never far away.

### 6.4.1. A battle of generations

In this section, the storytelling metaphor is analysed as a counterdiscourse, employed by an older generation of musicians against a younger generations.

I have argued above (cf. 2.1) that it may be fruitful to our understanding of the development of jazz to view certain historical periods as the music's modernity, others as its postmodernity. It seems clear throughout this study that conceptions and developments of the history of jazz music are relevant to the research questions. A study of the history of the concept of storytelling in jazz – the *Begriffsgeschichte* of the term – would probably have the potential to add significantly to our understanding of it. To apply an historical perspective in a strict sense, consistently and throughout, however, is beyond the scope and limits of the present study. Nevertheless, I have tried to include such perspectives in order to make a point when appropriate.

What are the relations of historical processes of musical progression and regression to our field of study? How are we to perceive the view of jazz improvisation as storytelling in relation to the innovation, novelty, and dynamism of modernistic movements *versus* the relativism, fragmentation, pluralism, and indeterminacy of the postmodern? Clearly, the storytelling metaphor can function in this field of dynamic tension in more than one way. Finkelstein (1948/1988), in his critique of the "fetish" of originality (p. 57), contends that jazz improvisation is permeated by the re-use of valuable melodic material; arguably, his perspective is one of postmodernism. Historically, however, Louis Armstrong's quest for soloistic coherence during early jazz history may be perceived as an early modernistic take on storytelling in jazz.

One informant distinguishes between old and new styles in jazz improvisation: "Those who play best, whom I like, they play in an extremely traditional way. [...] It may be a matter of taste, but it may be something else as well. Whether I am touched by those who play. I have to be touched in order for anything to happen. [...] A new generation of musicians is coming, playing in a completely new way which doesn't... reach me. [...] It may be languages I don't understand, though they do." Another informant chimes in, though in a non-normative way: "that sort of description, *telling a story*, was much more essential fifty years ago than nowadays"; and yet another interviewee summarizes the bulk of modern Swedish jazz as brilliant, virtuoso playing, but complicated. One informant is inclined to hear in later jazz styles (e.g., fusion and "ECM jazz") not so much storytelling but rather "landscapes, natural scenery" (cf. 5.2.1). In line with the distinction discussed above, I am inclined to understand the statement made by the first of these informants as expressing a modernist perspective while the other utterances may perhaps rather be interpreted as postmodernist views.

It should be noted in this context that the selection of informants will have bearing on the results with regard to these issues as well as to those discussed in the following subsections. Out of the fifteen informants, one was in his seventies, four were in their sixties, five in their fifties, three in their forties, and two in their thirties.

Interviews with a larger number of younger musicians would probably have rendered complementary, maybe divergent perspectives.

Even though the storytelling metaphor appears to be employed in alternating modes, sometimes descriptively, sometimes normatively, the results clearly indicate that it may function as a means to position oneself or others with regard to age, experience, or generation affiliation.

#### 6.4.2. Autodidacticism vs. educationalism

Experience, of course, importantly includes learning experience. In this section, the storytelling metaphor is analysed as a counterdiscourse, employed by an (earlier) autodidactic, 'uneducational' musical culture against a (later) educational culture.

As mentioned above in connection with the landscape of jazz education, the difficulty – or even impossibility – to teach individuality and creativity is emphasized by several informants. One informant says: "You can't teach creativity, you know. You can only learn that in life." Another one, after mentioning the analyses and techniques a jazz teacher may be able to provide, continues: "it's still up to the student to make something of it".

Also, the multivariety of required skills may constitute a strong reason for a richer *learning ecology framework* than formal education can usually provide, including legitimate peripheral participation and offering opportunities to *steal knowledge* in as many ways as possible (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Brown & Duguid, 1993; Kvale & Nielsen, 2000; Barron, 2006). Furthermore, in the interview results, learning jazz in communities of practice is clearly often considered more valuable or appropriate than learning jazz in formal learning environments. For instance, one informant says: "I don't understand how you can teach improvisation – except from presenting certain elementary concepts and explain and clarify them. But, I mean, the rest you have to find out for yourself." Another informant sums up the jazz learning of his own and earlier generations: "We learned how to play by playing, [...] listening and checking it out". One of the interviewees comments on how this kind of learning processes are reflected in the musical output as a strong musical identity in the improviser: "When you find out things for yourself, you create your own mix. Everyone is a mixture of all one's impressions. People you've met, comments that have been made, things you've studied... somehow everything has come down in you, and the result is the person you are today. When you look on your own you get a strong identity in many ways, because the decisions are your own" (cf. 5.3.1).

The music's ability to reflect the player's own identity may of course be the necessary condition in order for music to function as a means of individual expression; it may also be the necessary condition in order for musical improvisation to attain social power, to function as an antidote to perceived lack of freedom (Attali, 1985; Small, 1987; Nicholson, 2005).

The results of this study indicate, then, that usage of the storytelling metaphor may function as a means to position oneself or others with regard to questions of education, for instance, on an autodidacticism–educationalism continuum.

It might be argued that there exists a view within academic music education that European traditions and/or composed music are of superior quality to vernacular traditions and/or improvised music. In an interesting way, the autodidactic discourse (such as, for instance, regarding jazz storytelling) may join forces with such rejections of jazz and improvisation within academia.

### 6.4.3. Heterodoxy vs. orthodoxy

In this section, the storytelling metaphor is analysed as a counterdiscourse, employed by a later, heterodox ('holistic', or 'synthetic') educational culture against an earlier, orthodox ('analytical') educational culture.

One informant advocates an educational focus on *craftsmanship* and *tradition*: "I think it would be better if you learned to play classical music and learned to play your instrument, learned harmony properly. [...] And then go home and transcribe records, and play a lot with older musicians." Another informant directs attention to the fact that the connection of learning processes in jazz to tradition is sanctioned by long usage: "I use to tell young people: listen to your idols, and imitate them, and then gradually it will grow [...] the American, mostly black musicians that I have played with did just that. [...] And that's why jazz music is similar to a language... it's a culture, that's all." One interviewee believes that learning improvisation must include focus on *body* and *movement*, in order to attain presence and openness. This is quite in line with the importance of embodiment, of the performers' physical play, in the African American jazz tradition (cf. 6.2.3). In turn, this requires another kind of thinking than traditional musical learning, the same interviewee says: "you have to free yourself of some sort of general thinking of exercises, or achievements, or goals. It takes on different forms" (cf. 5.3.1).

The seemingly eternal questions of individuality versus tradition (or change versus convention) inevitably arise in this context as well. One informant states that "If your dream is to be a good jazz saxophonist, then you should play jazz" (cf. 5.2.2). Does this statement express an exclusionist, orthodox view? Not necessarily. The informant explicitly states that input from other types of music may be valuable to jazz. I take the words "then you should play jazz" in this context as an utterance aiming at clarification regarding the dynamics of *neutrality* and *personality*. The same informant holds that "[t]here is no neutral technique". Along the lines of this statement, it might be suggested that any instrumentalist who wishes to master a certain musical style must consider carefully how phenomena such as neutrality of sound and personality of sound are realized and evaluated within that style.

Section 2.1 included a discussion regarding idiomaticity in improvisation. It may be argued that there is a very thin line between relating to an idiom and *conforming* to it. The dynamics of tradition and individual spontaneity may be subject to sociohistorical change, and it may be argued that different periods of modernity and postmodernity, respectively, in jazz improvisational approach are identifiable (cf. the discussion included in subsection 6.4.1 with regard to storytelling as a counterdiscourse employed by an older generation of jazz musicians). For instance, the 'bebop era' might be viewed as a period of innovation while some later stages of development may be considered as derivative. In accordance with such an outlook on the development of jazz improvisation, the 'storytelling' discourse may be understood as a means of positioning oneself and others within the dynamics of individual voice and collective conventions.

Storytelling is, of course, a term marked by its openness. Interestingly, it would also seem possible to employ the 'storytelling' discourse for different – perhaps even diametrically opposite – purposes: on one hand, you may argue that a jazz improviser ought to conform to the *convention* of improvising in a 'storytelling mode'; on the other hand, you may hold that what every jazz improviser must do is to play her own, *individual* story.

Several informants put forward ear training and imitation as essential educational methodologies for jazz learning. Furthermore, composition exercises as a form of 'reflected improvisation' are mentioned by many as a fruitful educational approach. One informant also advocates the introduction of a *spiritual dimension* as a complement to the technical and theoretical elements of improvisation education.

In subsection 6.2.3, I discussed how the notions of divergence and convergence relate to the artistic implications of this study. These notions come forward as relevant to its implications regarding sociological aspects of education as well. The theoretical framework includes an introduction and a brief discussion of the notion of *norm convergence* (cf. 3.5.4). The positioning of methodologies such as composition exercises or spiritual exercises within a field of heterodoxy/orthodoxy is by no means unequivocal. From one point of view, the tendency to advocate composition exercises as a means to develop students' improvisational skills may be analysed as a case of educational norm convergence, as a way of approaching conventional academic practices that are relatively easy to define, teach, and assess. An alternative viewpoint, however, is to see this kind of compositional exercises as a way to develop further methods for the student to develop her or his own musical individuality; in brief, another method of jazz improvisational *auto-maetics*. In relation to conventional jazz learning practices, such methods may be interpreted as *norm divergent*. Arguably, then, depending on context, intention, and analytical perspectives, the same educational practice may be applied by the educational practitioner as well as interpreted by the educational analyst in diametrically different ways.

In terms of jazz educational cultures, a rich variety of opinions and perspectives prevail among the interview results. The storytelling metaphor clearly may function as

a means to position oneself or others with regard to educational orthodoxy or heterodoxy.

#### 6.4.4. Genuinity vs. proficiency

In this section, the storytelling metaphor is analysed as a counterdiscourse, employed by advocates of genuinity or authenticity against technical proficiency. This is arguably the oldest and most self-evident way to employ the term in jazz discourse, eminently exemplified by Lester Young's utterance, "You're technically hip. *But what is your story?*" (O'Meally, 1989, p. 221). The tension between rules and freedom, between technique and playfulness, is emphasized in several discussions of improvisation and play (Nachmanovitch, 1990; Caillois, 1958/2001).

One informant says: "Improvisation to me is not a style, it is personal expression." Another one says: "If you think about storytelling and you identify it as... content in music, then maybe you have to be a little older, too. [...] Experienced more things. [...] if you tell stories from your heart, then you carry your own luggage." Yet another informant chimes in: "Storytelling, that's exactly what it begins and ends with. [...] It really is the story of the heart [...] an expression which is just his own [...] a kind of sincerity and naturalness [...] authentic and credible". Remarking on the importance of authenticity, this informant reacts negatively to the ambitions of a fellow saxophonist to be like "an excellent actor", to "go into any part whatsoever": "I find it difficult to accept his view" (cf. 5.1.1).

One interviewee perceives lack of self-authenticity in an improviser as the result of attempts to illustrate or imitate a true expression of something, rather than really expressing it (cf. 5.1.2). Speaking of contemporary Swedish musicians, another informant expresses his wish to hear "pain" and "joy" in their playing; it should "go straight to my heart" (cf. 5.2.1).

The results of this study clearly indicate that usage of the storytelling metaphor may function as a means to position oneself or others in favour of genuinity or authenticity against technical proficiency.

#### 6.4.5. Concluding remarks on sociological implications of the storytelling metaphor

The 'storytelling' perspective has been shown to function in a variety of inclusionist and exclusionist discourses: as a weapon in a battle between older and younger generations, as a prestige word of autodidacticism rather than educationalism; as an argument against orthodox educational culture in favour of a more heterodox one; and as an apology for authenticity rather than technical skills.

These functions of the 'storytelling' perspective on jazz are clearly present in, among, and between groups of practitioners. Due to the limitations of scope in the present investigation, it remains to be ascertained to what extent the 'storytelling' perspective also has been adapted and incorporated – or even honoured as innovative? – by the organized world of music (Becker, 1976). The question to what extent this perspective has been included in the world of music education comes forward as an interesting task for future research.

## 6.5. Concluding remarks on theoretical, artistic, educational, and sociological implications

I advocate a metaphorical interpretation of 'storytelling' in jazz improvisation (as well as of 'language' in music). Storytelling in jazz improvisation is a rich intermedial metaphor which is an instance of intermediality on a conceptual level. Its metaphoricality is bidirectional: while our language about music is metaphorical, musical sounds, at the same time, are metaphors for 'stories'.

Furthermore, the storytelling capacity of jazz improvisation, like all music's capacity of conveying something, must be understood socioculturally as part of an intricate interplay between discourse in music and discourse on music. In a strict sense, jazz improvisation is never a soloist's enterprise. It is best understood as a system of layered communication including larger contexts in space (fellow musicians, audience) and time (tradition). From artistic and educational as well as sociological points of view, the outlook on jazz improvisation as storytelling is marked by a multivariety of interesting and important aspects. Just as this richness of metaphor has left its mark on the object of this study, it has done so on the study itself, too.

In this chapter's discussion of the interview results, a variety of implications of the storytelling metaphor have been touched upon. In conclusion, the results ought to be viewed in relation to the background and theoretical framework of the study also with the assistance of a question formulated in the negative. What aspects are *not* covered by the informants? In this brief attempt to sum up the multivariety of views covered in the discussion chapter, I will restrict myself to pointing to three questions. (i) Do the informants consider intermedial conceptual relations between music, language, and narrativity? (ii) Do they reflect on metaphoricality in connection with the storytelling concept? (iii) Do their perspectives on jazz improvisation include Signifyin(g) in any sense similar to that of Gates (1988) and other analysts? It would seem that all three of these questions could reasonably be answered in the negative. If so, what questions arise, and what future research fields come forward, as a consequence of such results? The third of these questions has been dealt with extensively in connection with the notion of a Scandinavian storytelling mode (6.2.4).



Regarding the first two of the questions mentioned, I consider it less than surprising that jazz practitioners do not seem to devote their main interest to the theoretical aspects of intermedial metaphors and that they do not seem to focus particularly on issues of intermedial conceptual relations and metaphoricity. However, I do find the theoretical implications of this investigation worthwhile, and it might be highly interesting to follow up the present study with additional interview studies in this direction. In the next chapter, these and other issues will be presented as potential areas of future research.

## Further research

This study could be viewed as *an expansion from word to world*: from the term storytelling to a multitude of implications regarding theoretical issues, artistic practice, as well as educational and sociological perspectives. At the core of its methodology are two hermeneutic aims: to identify, firstly, a multitude of answers rather than one answer; and to formulate, secondly, several questions in addition to the ones that were asked initially. I will now attempt a brief overview of such questions. Based on the analysis and discussion of the results of the present investigation, this chapter outlines a number of potential areas and strategies for future research.

The quest for a broad base for understanding – the inclusionist approach – has rendered a theoretical suitcase of some size; I have not particularly aimed at travelling light on this research journey. The consequences of this may perhaps be viewed by the reader with different degree of acceptance depending on research traditions, cultural and scientific background. According to one very common view, the researcher should never carry any more theoretical luggage than that which is made use of in relation to the empirical data. I feel that this view must be confronted, however, firstly with the line of argument presented in the introduction of Chapter 3, but also, secondly, with reference to the phenomenon of prolonged research engagement. I have argued, when presenting a number of theoretical perspectives, for their potential relevance. I suggest that, due to the *prolonged engagement* (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) on several levels – with data, with theories, with rich experiences, and with multi-layered reflections – , a researcher's development during the course of the research journey will inevitably render some discrepancies regarding theory and data analysis. For instance, in the present case, the construction of a relevant theoretical framework has been an ongoing process. I had not studied all the pertinent literature beforehand, nor do I consider that alternative to be a favourable or even possible strategy; rather, the empirical and analytical aspects of the research process have been intertwined, as they arguably should be, in a dynamic and dialogic fashion, and I have proceeded with theoretical studies continuously and throughout. This may be a commendable thing in itself, but its consequences are not always desirable. For instance, had I been more well read, early on during the research process, in the field of Bourdieu's and Becker's

sociological perspectives on arts and arts education, my questions to the informants would doubtless have rendered more significant and useful answers with regard to such issues.

Notwithstanding, the perspectives presented in Chapter 3 are, in my mind, all valid and relevant to the object of study. To the extent that they have not been made useful in the present investigation in spite of this, they will remain potentially useful to the further research projects outlined in the present chapter. This, I suggest, is the advantage of not travelling light: your luggage may suffice for future journeys; and the experiences of the present one will most certainly inform and shape future expeditions. The luggage has been on a journey, too.

In section 4.1.8, introducing and discussing Lincoln and Guba's (1985) concept of prolonged engagement as a means towards trustworthiness, I pointed out that the dynamics between the specific research process and such a prolonged engagement on several levels may provide interesting and important perspectives on the nature and significance of prolonged engagement. Since, in the present case, my own background includes several decades as a performer in the same artistic field as the informants, this is arguably an investigation where *prolonged artistic engagement* has prevailed. Furthermore, this is the case on more than this level: in addition to my prolonged engagement with (i) jazz improvisation practice, there is my *prolonged research engagement* with (ii) intermedial conceptual loans and metaphoricity (Bjerstedt, 2010; cf. 3.2.4). In generalized terms, this is a research project that deals with artistic thought and practice; hence, both my prolonged research engagement and my prolonged artistic engagement are of relevance to it. The concept of prolonged engagement is obviously not a monolithic one. Not only my previous – and ongoing – musicianship but also, to an important extent, my previous research has shaped and informed the present study. In its turn, this investigation will shape and inform future investigations; which is the primary focus of this chapter.

In a sense, several areas for future research were implied in the discussions of the previous chapter. Such aspects and others are included in the present chapter. On a general level, its structure is analogous to the previous discussion of different kinds of implications. The first section of the chapter (7.1) includes suggestions for further research regarding a number of theoretical issues, such as how a time-based analysis and categorization can be expanded to other art forms, how rich intermedial metaphoricity can be explored in other art forms, and how the concept of *mirror reflectivity in the arts* can be studied through a comparison of the intermedial metaphors storytelling in jazz improvisation and musicality in spoken theatre.

The second section (7.2) presents artistic issues as another area for future research, e.g., further studies of narrativization and temporality in jazz improvisation, studies of jazz improvisation in different cultural contexts, as well as the expansion of several issues to other art forms.

The third section of this chapter (7.3) puts forward a number of further research directions regarding educational perspectives. Firstly, I suggest an application to other

art forms of several issues in the present study that come forward as potentially fruitful for such an expansion: the landscape models, the mastery/freedom distinction, and the analysis of artistic multi-directedness. Secondly, I advocate further in-depth exploration of one important jazz educational implication as an urgent research strategy: using the concept of didactic locus as a tool for the investigation and discussion of how learning opportunities can best be provided for those educational aims that have been summarized in the landscape models.

The concluding section of this chapter (7.4) presents further explorations of the sociological implications of rich intermedial metaphoricity as a promising area for future investigations, both regarding storytelling in jazz improvisation and other intermedial metaphors. In particular, two approaches are put forward as possible means towards this end: a social constructionist approach, and a discourse analytical approach.

## 7.1. Further research regarding theoretical issues

The concept of rich intermedial metaphors is highlighted in the title of this thesis, and among its significant findings is the detailed exemplification that the study of storytelling in jazz improvisation provides regarding the characteristics and functions of this phenomenon. The field of conceptual loans between the arts has been demonstrated to be a rich and fertile domain for further research. In order to not only deepen but also broaden the investigative perspectives on intermedial metaphors, other art forms ought to be taken into consideration. The same strategy of expansion comes forward as fruitful with regard to other theoretical aspects, such as the temporality-based mode of analysis and categorization.

### 7.1.1. Expansion of time-based categorization to other kinds of artistic practice and thought

Temporality and presence in the moment are crucial to our understanding of jazz improvisation. To the task of analysing and reflecting on the interview data of the present study, the tripartite notions of Augustine's and Ricoeur's temporal analysis of narrativity have proved very useful. Based on this interpretive experience, I suggest that it may also prove fruitful to expand it and apply a similar basis for threefold temporal categorization (past–present–future, memory–attention–expectation, prefiguration–configuration–refiguration, or background–situation–intention) to the interpretation and discussion of a multitude of aspects of practice and reflection in all of the time-based arts.

### 7.1.2. Explorations of rich intermedial metaphoricity in other art forms

Chapters 2 and 5 amply demonstrate that intermedial metaphoricity and perspectives on musical narrativity permeate previous writings on jazz as well as the interview results of the present investigation. As I have argued above (in subsection 6.1.2) this amounts to a significant contribution – an addition as well as a problematization – to prevalent discussions of narrative in music (which are presented in detail in section 3.1), the intermedial use of concepts (cf. section 3.2), and theories of metaphor (section 3.3). Within the limits of the discussion of results provided here (section 6.1), the range of theoretical implications can only be hinted at through a few examples: the conceptual level of intermediality and the bidirectionality of intermedial metaphors. Much more remains to be done in this field by way of further exploring intermedial metaphoricity and developing adequate conceptualizations. The possibilities to pursue the theoretical bases for intermedial conceptual loans come forward as important tasks for future research investigations. First and foremost, however, opportunities to collect and analyse concrete exemplification of conceptual loans between other art forms must be assessed, carried out, and evaluated.

### 7.1.3. Storytelling in jazz improvisation and musicality in spoken theatre – 'Mirror reflectivity' in the arts

This thesis has focused on the use of the concept of storytelling in discourse on jazz improvisation. Section 3.2.4 presents a previous investigation (Bjerstedt, 2010) where a similar intermedial conceptual loan was the object of study: *musicality* as a standard and an educational goal for Western spoken theatre. In the introduction of the present chapter, I suggested that previous research has shaped this study through my prolonged engagement with issues of intermedial metaphoricity, and that, in turn, this study will inform future investigations. This is, to my mind, very much the case with regard to the theme of musicality in theatre.

Like the object of the present thesis, the concept of musicality in spoken theatre is also a case where a rich intermedial metaphor is found to mediate holistic views in artistic practice, analysis, and education. In short, there seems to be an interesting relationship between that investigation and the present one. In this subsection, I will outline a number of questions for further research that may build on both of these studies.

In the course of the discussion in the previous chapter (6.1.1), I pointed out that the present investigation has generated, through the detailed analysis and discussion of a specific example, a deeper and more specified theoretical understanding of the classification of conceptual intermedial relations as a fruitful resource for developing our understanding of the arts in general. The two kinds of conceptual loans investigated in Bjerstedt (2010) and in the present study – musicality in discourse on

spoken theatre and storytelling in discourse on jazz improvisation – make an interesting couple. It seems that in both cases a certain art form attempts to explain things considered crucially important by borrowing a concept from another art form. Based on these two studies, it could be argued that art forms, or artists, tend to mirror themselves in each other in order to understand themselves better. It could also be argued that an interesting symmetry can be discerned in the combination of these two phenomena: in one case, the performing of a narrative art form (drama) is perceived as similar to *music*; in the other, the performing of music is perceived as similar to *a narrative art form* (storytelling). In both contexts, improvisatory dimensions seem to me to be of particular significance.

Much current practice in music and theatre tends to focus on explorations in the borderland between the traditional art forms. The study of rich intermedial metaphors opens up possibilities for new theoretical and practical insights in this area. I have coined above a new concept, *mirror reflectivity in the arts*, as a tool for analytical thought regarding these very interesting phenomena. A further comparison of musicality in discourse on spoken theatre and storytelling in discourse on jazz improvisation, with its focus, among other things, on the improvisatory dimensions of both contexts, and with its foundation in further qualitative interview studies with practitioners in both fields, comes forward as an urgent option for future research. As noted above, these research prospects may be seen in the light of my prolonged engagement with intermedial conceptual loans and metaphoricality; just as my previous research in this area has informed the present study, it will in turn shape future investigations.

## 7.2. Future research focused on artistic issues

In the same way as regarding theoretical issues, future research based on the artistic implications of this study may pursue, in principle, two directions: that of in-depth exploration of the field of jazz improvisation and that of expansion to other art forms. Yet another potential and desirable development is the expansion of consequential studies in both jazz and other artistic fields to a wider scope of cultural contexts.

### 7.2.1. Further studies of narrativization and temporality

The lines of thought in this subsection constitute one example of further in-depth exploration. In connection with the concept of narrativization with regard to jazz improvisation, the discussion in the previous chapter has focused mainly on the listeners' perspective. This limitation may indicate a number of questions for further research. Especially, it would seem, it might be fruitful to investigate different

perspectives on narrativization with regard to questions of temporality. The present study, I have argued, points to the profound role and function of temporality for the improviser. This importance of temporal aspects notwithstanding, it would seem that an interesting phenomenon of *abandoned subjective temporality* remains to be investigated further. In brief, when a 'story' told by the music gets a hold on listeners, their experience may include the impression that subjective temporality is abandoned. The intensity or beauty of the moment makes it stay a while, as it were. Arguably, a similar phenomenon may hold for improvisers. These are highly relevant and tempting research perspectives that would perhaps seem to call for interesting explorations of alternative methodologies.

### 7.2.2. Jazz improvisation in different cultural contexts

Nicholson (2005) points to the relevance of Signifyin(g) in European jazz contexts, drawing on a cultural and social heritage that differs in several respects from its African American origin (cf. 3.1.4). However, the present study indicates that the Swedish informants do not view indirection and allusions as all that important to jazz improvisation, at least not to the extent suggested by Nicholson. They rather seem to find the quality of *self-authenticity* essential to their craft, more so than playing on cultural memory in double-voiced discourse. In the discussion of these issues (6.2.4) I suggest that this might be interpreted as a quite interesting indication of a distinctive character in Swedish or European jazz, as well as a corroboration of the assumption in my own working definition of musical improvisation (cf. 2.1): *it is always situated in a socio-musical context*. Consequently, I argue that comparative research on interpretations of jazz storytelling – as well as other intermedial metaphors – in different cultural contexts comes forward as an urgent area of future research.

### 7.2.3. Expansion of issues to other art forms

The artistic implications discussed in the previous chapter (6.2) include several aspects that prompt further investigation with regard to other artistic practices. In this subsection I will take a brief look at three issues that seem to call for such investigative expansion.

(i) Taking the view that language structures reality as a point of departure, the present investigation may be interpreted as an attempt to understand the conceptualization of an artistic practice (jazz improvisation) through the dynamics of individual, subjective experiences and the culturally constituted usage of a term (storytelling) to designate it.

(ii) The case of storytelling has prompted discussions of whether the verb or the noun, the process or the product, the artistic activity or the work of art, is the more

relevant perspective to our understanding of the arts. Arguing with the aid of Ricoeur's view on changing narrative identity, I have suggested that improvisation in jazz could be understood as a temporal performative process of construction of improvisational identity.

(iii) I have argued that in perceiving jazz improvisation as storytelling, the basis for the listener's narrativization of the music is twofold: on one hand, it is informed by the socio-cultural context and the listener's 'cultural competence'; on the other, it is informed by intra-musical features such as, for instance, patterns of continuation and change.

Arguably, all of these three issues will provide very fruitful soil for future investigations, such as (i) studying the use of intermedial conceptual loans in relation to conceptualizations of other art forms; (ii) collecting and reflecting on interview data regarding how other artistic practices tend to be understood in relation to process/product, verb/noun, and performativity/identity dichotomies; and (iii) studying the relevance of extra-artial and intra-artial features to conceptualizations of other art forms.

## 7.3. Further exploration of educational perspectives

Section 6.3 includes a discussion of a number of educational implications of this study. In it, several conceptualizations come forward. Some of these, to the best of my knowledge, constitute new notions in the field of music education research. I suggest that all of these conceptualizations, whether old or new, may provide useful analytical tools for further educational investigations with regard to an expanded scope of artistic fields. I will commence the overview of suggestions for future research in this section by summarizing a few possibilities in this direction.

### 7.3.1. Expansion to other art forms

Firstly, based on the usage of metaphor with regard to a central artistic activity, I have introduced the two notions of *landscape of metaphor* and *landscape of learning*. These two models are related by their parallel structures; the first is designed in order to sum up a diversity of interview results, and the second as an attempt to discuss educational consequences of these results. I suggest, also, provided that there is an intention to implement research results in educational practice, that these two landscape models be supplemented, in a rich learning ecology framework, viz., with a 'real' landscape. In order to envision this, we must ask the question: given that one single *didactic locus* is not enough, what combination of didactic loci comes forward as the most relevant and suitable in relation to the models?



Secondly, a significant result of the two landscape models in the present context is that they relate to, elucidate, and point to the significance of the distinction between two educational aims: the *search for mastery* and the *search for freedom*. Arguably, both mastery and freedom are desirable educational aims. But the outcome may stand the risk of lopsidedness, if efforts of teaching and learning focus prominently only on certain parts of the landscape of learning, while others are neglected.

Thirdly, I have suggested, tentatively, that the multi-directedness that, as indicated by these landscape models, is involved in the jazz improviser's practice can be analysed as *self-directedness*, *context-directedness*, *text-directedness*, and *goal-directedness*.

In this context, I put forward as potentially fruitful areas of research the expansion of the notions mentioned above to the analysis of several other fields of artistic practice and education: (i) constructing, on the basis of empirical studies, landscape models of metaphor and of learning, supplemented with relevant didactic loci; (ii) applying these models to issues of artistic mastery versus artistic freedom; and (iii) suggesting and testing similar models of analysis of artistic multi-directedness.

### 7.3.2. Jazz educational implications – an in-depth exploration

Needless to say, the expansion to other artistic fields of practice than jazz improvisation is not the only direction that future research may take, based on the present investigation. There are clearly several issues regarding jazz education that call for further studies. First and foremost, I believe that a change of focus from conceptual issues to 'real' issues is warranted. The notion of *didactic locus* is intended to provide exactly this: a means to relate 'conceptual' perspectives on jazz improvisation with concrete questions regarding suitable learning ecology frameworks. The notion has been introduced briefly but not expanded on within this study; *tout court*, I consider it a promising tool for further jazz educational study and thought. If the educational goal includes a healthy balance between artistic mastery and artistic freedom; if faculties such as openness, wholeness, and listening are considered crucial for the jazz improviser; and if learning the jazz tradition and musical craftsmanship is important, as well as acquiring the ability to relate inwards to one's inner vision and articulate it musically, and the ability to relate outwards continuously in collective interplay with one's fellow musicians and one's audience – what combination of didactic loci, then, may be best suited to provide learning opportunities for all of these aims? This is an urgent topic for future educational studies and development.

## 7.4. Further exploration of sociological implications

As mentioned in the introduction to the present chapter, one aspect of my prolonged research engagement has been that, regrettably, sociological perspectives have not been a sufficiently influential part of my research journey in its entirety and that, consequently, such perspectives did not particularly inform my data collection achievements during the interviews. One obvious desirable future research aim, then, regards further exploration of sociological perspectives on the usage of storytelling in discourse on jazz improvisation as well as an investigative expansion to other fields of intermedial conceptual loans: to conduct further interview studies including relevant questions, and to apply to the discussion and analysis of thus acquired data the theoretical and methodological framework best suited for sociological analysis. The present investigation, in its aim for methodological breadth in order to grasp this usage as *fully* as possible, has favoured a hermeneutic approach. In order to scrutinize this usage *critically* in its function as inclusionist discourse or exclusionist counterdiscourse, however, other theoretical and methodological approaches may be more apt. Firstly, I advocate an analysis based in the theory of social constructionism, focusing on an analysis and discussion of how conceptualizations of jazz improvisation, jazz improvisation learning and other artistic and educational practices may be contingent on social and historical processes. Secondly, I suggest a methodological approach based on discourse analysis as a way to understanding how such conceptualizations may be part of institutionalized patterns of knowledge and structures of power.



## Concluding remarks

It has been said, wrongly, that all metaphors oversimplify; at least I believe otherwise, and I like to think that the rich metaphor of storytelling, as used in discourse on jazz improvisation, provides ample proof to the contrary.

Throughout this study we have encountered a number of interrelated problematic dichotomies that seem insolubly connected to jazz improvisation: individuality *vs.* tradition; originality *vs.* convention; change *vs.* coherence; freedom *vs.* mastery; performance *vs.* essence; surprise *vs.* accuracy; *paidia vs. ludus*; modernity *vs.* postmodernity; or, indeed, verb *vs.* noun. Miraculously, in a sense, the notion of jazz improvisation as storytelling may dissolve – or at least render manageable – all of these dichotomies; for storytelling is a concept that comprises in it both the noun *and* the verb, the story *and* the telling. The improviser's multidirectedness in the improvising moment is key.

As noted in section 4.4, it remains for future research to scrutinize the communicative validity and generalizability of the results of this study. Has the interview investigation distinguished in a satisfactory manner between, on one hand, the informants' views on the usage of the concept of storytelling in particular and, on the other hand, their views on (good) jazz improvisation in general? Is it clear whether the informants' responses are applicable regarding both? Is it fair, based on the results of the present investigation, to equal good jazz improvisatory activity and storytelling?

Given the methodological approach of this study, I believe that my research questions have been answered in the best and most thorough way possible. Two results stand out, in my opinion, as particularly significant. (i) From artistic and educational points of view, as well as from a methodological perspective – regardless of whether or not it is fair to equal storytelling with good jazz improvisation –, it remains clear without doubt that storytelling is a key concept that will help open up, and fuel, jazz musicians' inclination to discuss and explore what really matters in jazz improvisation. (ii) From a theoretical point of view, it is highly interesting to note the significance of this rich intermedial metaphor to the practice and reflection of performing artists, as well as its potential to mediate holistic views of a great number of aspects considered by them to be of crucial importance in artistic practice, analysis, and education.

The art of jazz improvisation and the notion of storytelling in connection with this art form are not unitary conceptions nor phenomena; rather, the terms denote fields occupied by a variety of differently structured and multi-layered interests, experiences, and perceptions. Both expression and communication, coherence, temporality, openness and wholeness, as well as tradition-authenticity and self-authenticity, are important aspects in our understanding of jazz improvisation and of how this art form is informed by the notion of storytelling. It is a concept that operates within artistic, educational, social, cultural, and historical contexts, at the heart of processes of transformation that change not only the words we use and the music we play and listen to, not only our thoughts and practices, but that in the end also change ourselves. Hence I find Ricoeur's notion of narrative identity as an identity that changes eminently relevant to the present study.

I still have serious doubts as to whether my own formal jazz education ever, in any significant way, made me any better as a jazz musician, whether it made me understand at all *what really matters in jazz*. This PhD project has helped me, however, I think, not only to rethink my own jazz playing and jazz listening, but also to a more thorough understanding of what it may mean to have doubts regarding the outcome of formal jazz education, and some reasons why such doubts may occur. Above all, I am not that pessimistic about the potential of jazz education anymore: in the light of this investigation, its developmental possibilities might be viewed as a matter of recognizing the scope of learning that is needed (what I have termed the landscape of jazz education). If this investigation manages to clarify something or inspire someone in this respect, I believe it has been worthwhile.

Gioia (1988) identifies jazz improvisation as "an art markedly unsuited for the patient and reflective" (p. 57); still, as he no doubt agrees, reflection may serve our understanding of this art form well. Indeed, if the outcome of the present study could be stated *in nuce*, I believe a good way to sum it up may be to point to the benefits of increased reflectivity on the part of the performer, educator, student, and listener. In order to better understand the temporal, impulsive, opaque, elusive practice of jazz improvisation, the patient and reflective state of mind has its merits.

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