Essays on Auctions
(2007) In Lund Economic Series 145.- Abstract
- The thesis is concerned with topics relating to auctions and competitive bidding. In the first chapter, the case of a procurement
situation where multiple producers compete in price and quality, but are unable to commit to quality, is treated in a scoring
auction context. An optimal scoring rule, for a buyer able to comittto a rule, is characterised. The second chapter is concerned
with auctions where bidders are ex-ante asymmetric in the sense that one bidder may receive a fraction of the seller's profit. The
issue of existence of equilibria under such circumstances is considered. It turns out there are in general no equilibria in
continuous, strictly increasing strategies. The final... (More) - The thesis is concerned with topics relating to auctions and competitive bidding. In the first chapter, the case of a procurement
situation where multiple producers compete in price and quality, but are unable to commit to quality, is treated in a scoring
auction context. An optimal scoring rule, for a buyer able to comittto a rule, is characterised. The second chapter is concerned
with auctions where bidders are ex-ante asymmetric in the sense that one bidder may receive a fraction of the seller's profit. The
issue of existence of equilibria under such circumstances is considered. It turns out there are in general no equilibria in
continuous, strictly increasing strategies. The final chapter considers competition between privately held and state-owned
businesses in the German auction for third-generation (3G) mobile telecommunications. A theoretical model is developed. The
only equilibria of this model consistent with observed behaviour are equilibria where ownership does nor affect the outcome of
the auction. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/750754
- author
- Rander, Robin LU
- supervisor
- opponent
-
- Professor Wolfstetter, Elmar, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie
- organization
- publishing date
- 2007
- type
- Thesis
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- Auctions, Bidding, Bayesian equilibrium, Procurement, Game theory
- in
- Lund Economic Series
- volume
- 145
- pages
- 110 pages
- publisher
- Department of Economics, Lund University
- defense location
- Holger Crafoords Ekonomicentrum, EC3:210
- defense date
- 2008-01-11 14:15:00
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- 27d03c39-9617-4e3f-a4b2-0e4040b325e7 (old id 750754)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-04 10:20:02
- date last changed
- 2019-05-21 16:12:57
@phdthesis{27d03c39-9617-4e3f-a4b2-0e4040b325e7,
abstract = {{The thesis is concerned with topics relating to auctions and competitive bidding. In the first chapter, the case of a procurement <br/><br>
situation where multiple producers compete in price and quality, but are unable to commit to quality, is treated in a scoring <br/><br>
auction context. An optimal scoring rule, for a buyer able to comittto a rule, is characterised. The second chapter is concerned <br/><br>
with auctions where bidders are ex-ante asymmetric in the sense that one bidder may receive a fraction of the seller's profit. The <br/><br>
issue of existence of equilibria under such circumstances is considered. It turns out there are in general no equilibria in <br/><br>
continuous, strictly increasing strategies. The final chapter considers competition between privately held and state-owned <br/><br>
businesses in the German auction for third-generation (3G) mobile telecommunications. A theoretical model is developed. The <br/><br>
only equilibria of this model consistent with observed behaviour are equilibria where ownership does nor affect the outcome of <br/><br>
the auction.}},
author = {{Rander, Robin}},
keywords = {{Auctions; Bidding; Bayesian equilibrium; Procurement; Game theory}},
language = {{eng}},
publisher = {{Department of Economics, Lund University}},
school = {{Lund University}},
series = {{Lund Economic Series}},
title = {{Essays on Auctions}},
volume = {{145}},
year = {{2007}},
}