Disentangling The Thick Concept Argument
Blomberg, Olle LU
(2007)
In SATS Northern European Journal of Philosophy
8(2).
p.63-78
- Abstract
- Critics argue that non-cognitivism cannot adequately account for the existence and nature of some thick moral concepts. They use the existence of thick concepts as a lever in an argument against non-cognitivism, here called the Thick Concept Argument (TCA). While TCA is frequently invoked, it is unfortunately rarely articulated. In this paper, TCA is first reconstructed on the basis of John McDowell’s formulation of the argument (from 1981), and then evaluated in the light of several possible non-cognitivist responses. In general, TCA assumes too much about what a non-cognitivist is (or must be) committed to. There are several non-cognitivist theories, and only some fit the view attacked by TCA. Furthermore, TCA rests on a contestable... (More)
- Critics argue that non-cognitivism cannot adequately account for the existence and nature of some thick moral concepts. They use the existence of thick concepts as a lever in an argument against non-cognitivism, here called the Thick Concept Argument (TCA). While TCA is frequently invoked, it is unfortunately rarely articulated. In this paper, TCA is first reconstructed on the basis of John McDowell’s formulation of the argument (from 1981), and then evaluated in the light of several possible non-cognitivist responses. In general, TCA assumes too much about what a non-cognitivist is (or must be) committed to. There are several non-cognitivist theories, and only some fit the view attacked by TCA. Furthermore, TCA rests on a contestable intuition about a thought experiment, here called the External Standpoint Experiment (ESE). It is concluded that TCA is remarkably weak, given how frequently the argument is invoked. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/76dbff4e-5352-4c9d-a9f2-bc9b971d0db6
- author
- Blomberg, Olle
LU
- publishing date
- 2007
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- SATS Northern European Journal of Philosophy
- volume
- 8
- issue
- 2
- pages
- 63 - 78
- publisher
- De Gruyter
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:79960829416
- ISSN
- 1869-7577
- DOI
- 10.1515/SATS.2007.63
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- no
- id
- 76dbff4e-5352-4c9d-a9f2-bc9b971d0db6
- date added to LUP
- 2017-07-04 14:58:02
- date last changed
- 2022-01-30 21:21:41
@article{76dbff4e-5352-4c9d-a9f2-bc9b971d0db6,
abstract = {{Critics argue that non-cognitivism cannot adequately account for the existence and nature of some thick moral concepts. They use the existence of thick concepts as a lever in an argument against non-cognitivism, here called the Thick Concept Argument (TCA). While TCA is frequently invoked, it is unfortunately rarely articulated. In this paper, TCA is first reconstructed on the basis of John McDowell’s formulation of the argument (from 1981), and then evaluated in the light of several possible non-cognitivist responses. In general, TCA assumes too much about what a non-cognitivist is (or must be) committed to. There are several non-cognitivist theories, and only some fit the view attacked by TCA. Furthermore, TCA rests on a contestable intuition about a thought experiment, here called the External Standpoint Experiment (ESE). It is concluded that TCA is remarkably weak, given how frequently the argument is invoked.}},
author = {{Blomberg, Olle}},
issn = {{1869-7577}},
language = {{eng}},
number = {{2}},
pages = {{63--78}},
publisher = {{De Gruyter}},
series = {{SATS Northern European Journal of Philosophy}},
title = {{Disentangling The Thick Concept Argument}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/SATS.2007.63}},
doi = {{10.1515/SATS.2007.63}},
volume = {{8}},
year = {{2007}},
}