Buck-Passing Personal Values
(2008) p.37-51- Abstract
- Abstract in Undetermined
So-called fitting-attitude analyses or buck-passing accounts of value have lately received much attention among philosophers of value. These analyses set out from the idea that values must be understood in terms of attitudinal responses that we have reason to or that it is fitting or that we ought to have regarding the valuable object. This work examines to what extent this kind of analysis also can be applied to so-called personal values - value-for, rather than to the impersonal value period which has been the standard analysandum. The shift from impersonal to personal values can, it is argued, be taken without any major change to the pattern. It is not the normative element that needs to be changed in the... (More) - Abstract in Undetermined
So-called fitting-attitude analyses or buck-passing accounts of value have lately received much attention among philosophers of value. These analyses set out from the idea that values must be understood in terms of attitudinal responses that we have reason to or that it is fitting or that we ought to have regarding the valuable object. This work examines to what extent this kind of analysis also can be applied to so-called personal values - value-for, rather than to the impersonal value period which has been the standard analysandum. The shift from impersonal to personal values can, it is argued, be taken without any major change to the pattern. It is not the normative element that needs to be changed in the analysis but rather the kind of attitude - what is required is that the attitudes all have to be so called 'for someone's sake' attitudes. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/789574
- author
- Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2008
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- keywords
- buck-passing, fitting-attitude analysis, good-for, personal values, value-for
- host publication
- Values, Rational Choice, and the Will: New Essays in Moral Psychology
- editor
- Chan, David
- pages
- 37 - 51
- publisher
- Springer
- external identifiers
-
- wos:000254405300003
- ISBN
- 978-1-4020-6871-3
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- bc961448-860b-40fa-9e78-6db86ab7c1f7 (old id 789574)
- date added to LUP
- 2016-04-04 10:24:20
- date last changed
- 2021-03-29 17:39:58
@inbook{bc961448-860b-40fa-9e78-6db86ab7c1f7,
abstract = {{Abstract in Undetermined<br/>So-called fitting-attitude analyses or buck-passing accounts of value have lately received much attention among philosophers of value. These analyses set out from the idea that values must be understood in terms of attitudinal responses that we have reason to or that it is fitting or that we ought to have regarding the valuable object. This work examines to what extent this kind of analysis also can be applied to so-called personal values - value-for, rather than to the impersonal value period which has been the standard analysandum. The shift from impersonal to personal values can, it is argued, be taken without any major change to the pattern. It is not the normative element that needs to be changed in the analysis but rather the kind of attitude - what is required is that the attitudes all have to be so called 'for someone's sake' attitudes.}},
author = {{Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni}},
booktitle = {{Values, Rational Choice, and the Will: New Essays in Moral Psychology}},
editor = {{Chan, David}},
isbn = {{978-1-4020-6871-3}},
keywords = {{buck-passing; fitting-attitude analysis; good-for; personal values; value-for}},
language = {{eng}},
pages = {{37--51}},
publisher = {{Springer}},
title = {{Buck-Passing Personal Values}},
year = {{2008}},
}