The Experience Machine
(2016) In Philosophy Compass 11(3). p.136-145- Abstract
In this paper, I reconstruct Robert Nozick's experience machine objection to hedonism about well-being. I then explain and briefly discuss the most important recent criticisms that have been made of it. Finally, I question the conventional wisdom that the experience machine, while it neatly disposes of hedonism, poses no problem for desire-based theories of well-being.
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/c972fc5a-7f60-4358-ab5a-ab5e82c14487
- author
- Bramble, Ben LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2016-03-01
- type
- Contribution to journal
- publication status
- published
- subject
- in
- Philosophy Compass
- volume
- 11
- issue
- 3
- pages
- 10 pages
- publisher
- Wiley-Blackwell
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:84959906170
- wos:000372002800001
- ISSN
- 1747-9991
- DOI
- 10.1111/phc3.12303
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- c972fc5a-7f60-4358-ab5a-ab5e82c14487
- date added to LUP
- 2016-06-16 10:06:21
- date last changed
- 2024-04-19 04:26:39
@article{c972fc5a-7f60-4358-ab5a-ab5e82c14487,
abstract = {{<p>In this paper, I reconstruct Robert Nozick's experience machine objection to hedonism about well-being. I then explain and briefly discuss the most important recent criticisms that have been made of it. Finally, I question the conventional wisdom that the experience machine, while it neatly disposes of hedonism, poses no problem for desire-based theories of well-being.</p>}},
author = {{Bramble, Ben}},
issn = {{1747-9991}},
language = {{eng}},
month = {{03}},
number = {{3}},
pages = {{136--145}},
publisher = {{Wiley-Blackwell}},
series = {{Philosophy Compass}},
title = {{The Experience Machine}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12303}},
doi = {{10.1111/phc3.12303}},
volume = {{11}},
year = {{2016}},
}