Coalitions, Coordination and Electoral Choice : A Lab Experimental Study of Strategic Voting
(2016) Part III. p.191-213- Abstract
- When a voter chooses between large and small parties in a coalition, strategic reasons may be the tie-breaker. “Strategic voting” is often defined as a vote for another party than one’s most preferred one with the intention to affect the outcome of the election. The presence of coalitions can sometimes be argued to lead to less strategic voting, whereas others claim that coalitions create more strategic incentives. This chapter looks at how the relative strength of parties in a coalition affect voters’ tendency to vote strategically. Comparing two contexts with more or less uncertainty about which parties will make it to the parliament, the findings are that voters cast strategic votes for small parties to a greater extent when there are... (More)
- When a voter chooses between large and small parties in a coalition, strategic reasons may be the tie-breaker. “Strategic voting” is often defined as a vote for another party than one’s most preferred one with the intention to affect the outcome of the election. The presence of coalitions can sometimes be argued to lead to less strategic voting, whereas others claim that coalitions create more strategic incentives. This chapter looks at how the relative strength of parties in a coalition affect voters’ tendency to vote strategically. Comparing two contexts with more or less uncertainty about which parties will make it to the parliament, the findings are that voters cast strategic votes for small parties to a greater extent when there are substantial size differences between the coalition parties. Individual expectations of parties’ likelihood of success are crucial to the decision making. (Less)
Please use this url to cite or link to this publication:
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/f6767d86-9974-4fad-9e3a-7be975b25d86
- author
- FREDÉN, ANNIKA LU
- organization
- publishing date
- 2016
- type
- Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding
- publication status
- published
- subject
- host publication
- Voting Experiments
- editor
- Blais, André ; Laslier, Jean-François and Van der Straeten, Karine
- volume
- Part III
- pages
- 191 - 213
- publisher
- Springer International Publishing
- external identifiers
-
- scopus:85018037467
- ISBN
- 978-3-319-40571-1
- 978-3-319-40573-5
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-319-40573-5_10
- language
- English
- LU publication?
- yes
- id
- f6767d86-9974-4fad-9e3a-7be975b25d86
- date added to LUP
- 2016-10-31 14:45:43
- date last changed
- 2024-01-04 15:10:31
@inbook{f6767d86-9974-4fad-9e3a-7be975b25d86,
abstract = {{When a voter chooses between large and small parties in a coalition, strategic reasons may be the tie-breaker. “Strategic voting” is often defined as a vote for another party than one’s most preferred one with the intention to affect the outcome of the election. The presence of coalitions can sometimes be argued to lead to less strategic voting, whereas others claim that coalitions create more strategic incentives. This chapter looks at how the relative strength of parties in a coalition affect voters’ tendency to vote strategically. Comparing two contexts with more or less uncertainty about which parties will make it to the parliament, the findings are that voters cast strategic votes for small parties to a greater extent when there are substantial size differences between the coalition parties. Individual expectations of parties’ likelihood of success are crucial to the decision making.}},
author = {{FREDÉN, ANNIKA}},
booktitle = {{Voting Experiments}},
editor = {{Blais, André and Laslier, Jean-François and Van der Straeten, Karine}},
isbn = {{978-3-319-40571-1}},
language = {{eng}},
pages = {{191--213}},
publisher = {{Springer International Publishing}},
title = {{Coalitions, Coordination and Electoral Choice : A Lab Experimental Study of Strategic Voting}},
url = {{http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40573-5_10}},
doi = {{10.1007/978-3-319-40573-5_10}},
volume = {{Part III}},
year = {{2016}},
}