Logical Dialogues with Explicit Preference Profiles and Strategy Selection
Genot, Emmanuel; Jacot, Justine (2017-09). Logical Dialogues with Explicit Preference Profiles and Strategy Selection. Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 26, (3), 261 - 291
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Published
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English
Authors:
Genot, Emmanuel
;
Jacot, Justine
Department:
Theoretical Philosophy
Lund University Information Quality Research Group (LUIQ)
CogComlab
Research Group:
Lund University Information Quality Research Group (LUIQ)
CogComlab
Abstract:
The Barth–Krabbe–Hintikka–Hintikka Problem, independently raised by Barth and Krabbe (From axiom to dialogue: a philosophical study of logics and argumentation. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1982) and Hintikka and Hintikka (The sign of three: Peirce, Dupin, Holmes. In: Eco U, Sebeok TA (eds) Sherlock Holmes confronts modern logic: Toward a theory of information-seeking through questioning. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1983), is the problem of characterizing the strategic reasoning of the players of dialogical logic and game-theoretic semantics games from rational preferences rather than rules. We solve the problem by providing a set of preferences for players with bounded rationality and specifying strategic inferences from those preferences, for a variant of logical dialogues. This solution is generalized to both game-theoretic semantics and orthodox dialogical logic (classical and intuitionistic).
Keywords:
Game semantics ;
Dialogical Logic ;
Game-theoretic semantics ;
Philosophy ;
Algebra and Logic
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