The polysemy of ‘fallacy’—or ‘bias’, for that matter
Zenker, Frank (2016). The polysemy of ‘fallacy’—or ‘bias’, for that matter. Bondy, Pat; Benaquista, Laura (Eds.). Argumentation, Objectivity and Bias, 11,. 11th Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, 18-21 May, 2016). Windsor, Canada
Conference Proceeding/Paper
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Published
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English
Editors:
Bondy, Pat
;
Benaquista, Laura
Department:
Theoretical Philosophy
Lund University Information Quality Research Group (LUIQ)
Research Group:
Lund University Information Quality Research Group (LUIQ)
Abstract:
Starting with a brief overview of current usages (Sect. 2), this paper offers some constituents of a use-based analysis of ‘fallacy’, listing 16 conditions that have, for the most part implicitly, been discussed in the literature (Sect. 3). Our thesis is that at least three related conceptions of ‘fallacy’ can be identified. The 16 conditions thus serve to “carve out” a semantic core and to distinguish three core-specifications. As our discussion suggests, these specifications can be related to three normative positions in the philosophy of human reasoning: the meliorist, the apologist, and the panglossian (Sect. 4). Seeking to make these conditions available for scholarly discussion, this analysis-sketch should not be viewed as final or exhaustive.
Keywords:
bias ;
fallacy ;
meaning analysis
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