Pluralistic Ignorance : A Case for Social Epistemology and Epistemic Logic

Hansen, Jens Ulrik (2014). Pluralistic Ignorance : A Case for Social Epistemology and Epistemic Logic. Holliday, Wes; Icard, Thomas (Eds.). Proceedings of the workshop on Epistemic Logic for Individual, Social, and Interactive Epistemology (ELISIEM). Epistemic Logic for Individual, Social, and Interactive Epistemology (ELISIEM 2014). Tübingen, Germany
Download:
URL:
Conference Proceeding/Paper | Published | English
Authors:
Hansen, Jens Ulrik
Editors:
Holliday, Wes ; Icard, Thomas
Department:
Theoretical Philosophy
Lund University Information Quality Research Group (LUIQ)
Project:
Knowledge in a Digital World: Trust, Credibility and Relevance on the Web
Research Group:
Lund University Information Quality Research Group (LUIQ)
Abstract:
In this paper the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance is discussed and it is argued why it is of relevance for epistemic logic and social psychology. Roughly put, pluralistic ignorance is the case when a group of interacting agents all experience a discrepancy between their private opinions and the perceived opinions of the others. After introducing the phenomenon, numerous features of pluralistic ignorance that are of interest for epistemic logic and social epistemology, are discussed. This discussion serves two purposes: It recaps the existing research on pluralistic ignorance within epistemic logic and social epistemology, while at the same time stating open problems for social epistemology and epistemic logic that pertains to the study of pluralistic ignorance. Finally, it is argued that the features of pluralistic ignorance of interest to epistemic logic and social epistemology relate to general features of information dynamics in situations of social interaction.
LUP-ID:
ac11ac36-1300-401d-8633-6081a76d792d | Link: https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/ac11ac36-1300-401d-8633-6081a76d792d | Statistics

Cite this