A Logic-Based Approach to Pluralistic Ignorance

Hansen, Jens Ulrik (2014). A Logic-Based Approach to Pluralistic Ignorance In . Christoff, Zoé; Galeazzi, Paolo; Gierasimczuk, Nina; Marcoci, Alexandru; Smets, Sonja (Eds.). Logic and Interactive RAtionality Yearbook 2012, Volume II, 226 - 245: The Institute for Logic, Lanuage and Computation
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Book Chapter | Published | English
Authors:
Hansen, Jens Ulrik
Editors:
Christoff, Zoé ; Galeazzi, Paolo ; Gierasimczuk, Nina ; Marcoci, Alexandru ; Smets, Sonja
Department:
Theoretical Philosophy
Lund University Information Quality Research Group (LUIQ)
Project:
Collective Competence in Deliberative Groups: On the Epistemological Foundation of Democracy
Research Group:
Lund University Information Quality Research Group (LUIQ)
Abstract:
“Pluralistic ignorance” is a phenomenon mainly studied in social psychology. Viewed as an epistemic phenomenon, one way to define it is as a situation where “no one believes, but everyone believes that everyone else believes”. In this paper various versions of pluralistic ignorance are formalized using epistemic/doxastic logic (based on plausibility models). The motive is twofold. Firstly, the formalizations are used to show that the various versions of pluralistic ignorance are all consistent, thus there is nothing in the phenomenon that necessarily goes against logic. Secondly, pluralistic ignorance, is on many occasions, assumed to be fragile. In this paper, however, it is shown that pluralistic ignorance need not be fragile to announcements of the agents’ beliefs. Hence, to dissolve pluralistic ignorance in general, something more than announcements of the subjective views of the agents is needed. Finally, suggestions to further research are outlined.
LUP-ID:
e02c60ae-b463-40fc-8f38-05422015af4c | Link: https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/e02c60ae-b463-40fc-8f38-05422015af4c | Statistics

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