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Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited

Andersson, Tommy LU and Svensson, Lars-Gunnar LU (2006) In Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
Abstract
This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof.
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Working Paper
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Indivisible objects, fairness, coalitionally strat
in
Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
issue
11
publisher
Department of Economics, Lund Universtiy
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
0f9cbe99-7b3e-4eba-9a0d-e37c5fadbcba (old id 1387592)
alternative location
http://swopec.hhs.se/lunewp/abs/lunewp2006_011.htm
date added to LUP
2009-04-20 12:27:26
date last changed
2016-09-30 15:01:53
@misc{0f9cbe99-7b3e-4eba-9a0d-e37c5fadbcba,
  abstract     = {This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof.},
  author       = {Andersson, Tommy and Svensson, Lars-Gunnar},
  keyword      = {Indivisible objects,fairness,coalitionally strat},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {11},
  publisher    = {ARRAY(0x8361fb8)},
  series       = {Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University},
  title        = {Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited},
  year         = {2006},
}