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Can I be an instantaneous stage and yet persist through time?

Hansson Wahlberg, Tobias LU (2008) In Metaphysica 9(2). p.235-239
Abstract
An alternative to the standard endurance/perdurance accounts of persistence has recently been developed: the stage theory (Sider, T. Four-Dimensionalism: an Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Hawley, K. How Things Persist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). According to this theory, a persisting object is identical with an instantaneous stage (temporal part). On the basis of Leibniz’s Law, I argue that stage theorists either have to deny the alleged identity (i.e., give up their central thesis) or hold that stages are both instantaneous and continuants. I subsequently show that, although stage theory is flexible enough to accommodate the latter claim, the cost for accommodating it is an excessive... (More)
An alternative to the standard endurance/perdurance accounts of persistence has recently been developed: the stage theory (Sider, T. Four-Dimensionalism: an Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Hawley, K. How Things Persist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). According to this theory, a persisting object is identical with an instantaneous stage (temporal part). On the basis of Leibniz’s Law, I argue that stage theorists either have to deny the alleged identity (i.e., give up their central thesis) or hold that stages are both instantaneous and continuants. I subsequently show that, although stage theory is flexible enough to accommodate the latter claim, the cost for accommodating it is an excessive proliferation of persistence concepts. (Less)
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author
organization
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
keywords
Persistence - Stage theory - Temporal counterparts - Predication - Leibniz’s Law
in
Metaphysica
volume
9
issue
2
pages
235 - 239
publisher
Springer
ISSN
1437-2053
DOI
10.1007/s12133-008-0036-9
language
English
LU publication?
yes
id
8c66fe3c-e2a0-4ff6-b1c4-d8ce6490f42a (old id 1503754)
alternative location
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12133-008-0036-9
date added to LUP
2009-11-17 10:39:28
date last changed
2016-08-23 14:10:34
@misc{8c66fe3c-e2a0-4ff6-b1c4-d8ce6490f42a,
  abstract     = {An alternative to the standard endurance/perdurance accounts of persistence has recently been developed: the stage theory (Sider, T. Four-Dimensionalism: an Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Hawley, K. How Things Persist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). According to this theory, a persisting object is identical with an instantaneous stage (temporal part). On the basis of Leibniz’s Law, I argue that stage theorists either have to deny the alleged identity (i.e., give up their central thesis) or hold that stages are both instantaneous and continuants. I subsequently show that, although stage theory is flexible enough to accommodate the latter claim, the cost for accommodating it is an excessive proliferation of persistence concepts.},
  author       = {Hansson Wahlberg, Tobias},
  issn         = {1437-2053},
  keyword      = {Persistence - Stage theory - Temporal counterparts - Predication - Leibniz’s Law},
  language     = {eng},
  number       = {2},
  pages        = {235--239},
  publisher    = {ARRAY(0x9dddf78)},
  series       = {Metaphysica},
  title        = {Can I be an instantaneous stage and yet persist through time?},
  url          = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12133-008-0036-9},
  volume       = {9},
  year         = {2008},
}