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Who Gets What in Coalition Governments? Predictors of Portfolio Allocation in Parliamentary Democracies

Bäck, Hanna LU ; Debus, Marc and Dumont, Patrick (2011) In European Journal of Political Research 50. p.441-478
Abstract
Ministerial portfolios are the most obvious payoffs for parties entering a governing coalition in parliamentary democracies. This renders the bargaining over portfolios an important phase of the government formation process. The question of ‘who gets what, and

why?’ in terms of ministerial remits has not yet received much attention by coalition or party scholars. This article focuses on this qualitative aspect of portfolio allocation and uses a new comparative dataset to evaluate a number of hypotheses that can be drawn from the

literature. The main hypothesis is that parties which, in their election manifestos, emphasise themes corresponding to the policy remit of specific cabinet portfolios are more likely to obtain... (More)
Ministerial portfolios are the most obvious payoffs for parties entering a governing coalition in parliamentary democracies. This renders the bargaining over portfolios an important phase of the government formation process. The question of ‘who gets what, and

why?’ in terms of ministerial remits has not yet received much attention by coalition or party scholars. This article focuses on this qualitative aspect of portfolio allocation and uses a new comparative dataset to evaluate a number of hypotheses that can be drawn from the

literature. The main hypothesis is that parties which, in their election manifestos, emphasise themes corresponding to the policy remit of specific cabinet portfolios are more likely to obtain control over these portfolios. The results show that policy saliency is indeed an

important predictor of portfolio allocation in postwar Western European parliamentary democracies. (Less)
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author
publishing date
type
Contribution to journal
publication status
published
subject
in
European Journal of Political Research
volume
50
pages
441 - 478
publisher
Kluwer
external identifiers
  • Scopus:79955006051
ISSN
0304-4130
language
English
LU publication?
no
id
8ebfbe24-f785-4e2e-a0cf-1d103df9fc0d (old id 2344044)
date added to LUP
2012-02-20 16:02:40
date last changed
2016-11-06 04:35:24
@misc{8ebfbe24-f785-4e2e-a0cf-1d103df9fc0d,
  abstract     = {Ministerial portfolios are the most obvious payoffs for parties entering a governing coalition in parliamentary democracies. This renders the bargaining over portfolios an important phase of the government formation process. The question of ‘who gets what, and<br/><br>
why?’ in terms of ministerial remits has not yet received much attention by coalition or party scholars. This article focuses on this qualitative aspect of portfolio allocation and uses a new comparative dataset to evaluate a number of hypotheses that can be drawn from the<br/><br>
literature. The main hypothesis is that parties which, in their election manifestos, emphasise themes corresponding to the policy remit of specific cabinet portfolios are more likely to obtain control over these portfolios. The results show that policy saliency is indeed an<br/><br>
important predictor of portfolio allocation in postwar Western European parliamentary democracies.},
  author       = {Bäck, Hanna and Debus, Marc and Dumont, Patrick},
  issn         = {0304-4130},
  language     = {eng},
  pages        = {441--478},
  publisher    = {ARRAY(0x50d7e30)},
  series       = {European Journal of Political Research},
  title        = {Who Gets What in Coalition Governments? Predictors of Portfolio Allocation in Parliamentary Democracies},
  volume       = {50},
  year         = {2011},
}